[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 156 (Sunday, September 28, 2008)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E2128]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION 
                            ENHANCEMENT ACT

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                               speech of

                         HON. JEFF FORTENBERRY

                              of nebraska

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 26, 2008

  Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Speaker, given the enormous pressures this 
Congress is facing to solve urgent financial problems which threaten 
the stability and health of our economy, I must express my deep 
reservations about expediting approval of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear 
Agreement at this time.
  While I fully favor strengthening economic, social, cultural, and 
political ties with our Indian friends, why this most desirable pursuit 
hinges upon the sale of sensitive nuclear technology--remains a mystery 
to me.
  The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement sets a groundbreaking 
precedent that could open a floodgate for worldwide nuclear commerce 
that, absent rigorous conditions, safeguards, and oversight, could 
significantly damage the stability and integrity of U.S. and 
international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Just this week, the 
Russian Prime Minister announced that Russia ``was ready to consider 
the possibility of cooperation in nuclear energy'' with Venezuela's 
President Hugo Chavez.
  As you know, in 2006 Congress passed the Hyde Act, which waives key 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to enable our consideration of the 
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Absent the Hyde Act, the agreement 
would violate the Atomic Energy Act, which has regulated U.S. nuclear 
commerce since 1954 to prevent the dangerous proliferation of nuclear 
technology and materials.
  Upon a preliminary review, the agreement does not address the Hyde 
Act's prohibition on nuclear cooperation in the event of nuclear 
testing. Also, I understand that the terms of this agreement and 
India's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency would permit the removal of tritium from heavy water in 
safeguarded reactors, possibly enhancing nuclear weapons yields, in 
contravention of U.S. law and the NPT.
  Moreover, I am deeply concerned that international guidelines 
recently eased to pave the way for this agreement and exempt India from 
longstanding rules of nuclear commerce that have applied equally to all 
nations are insufficiently rigorous to prevent the potential erosion of 
decades of global nonproliferation gains.
  Let us remember that the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, the NPT, which India has not signed, is the nonproliferation 
mainstream.
  This bill also waives the 30-day period provided in the Hyde Act for 
congressional consideration of the underlying agreement. As co-chair of 
the Nuclear Security Caucus and the author of a Hyde Act amendment that 
seeks to prevent potential diversion of fissile material for military 
purposes, I oppose waiving the 30-day requirement to permit thoughtful 
consideration of whether this agreement in fact complies with the law 
we passed to condition its implementation.
  Mr. Chairman, we should not rush this. We are accountable to the 
American people for conducting rigorous oversight on matters of nuclear 
security, and I am concerned that short-circuiting the review process 
for this agreement is not consistent with that obligation. The Hyde Act 
was the result of precise and painstaking negotiations. I urge my 
colleagues to allow for adequate ,due diligence of this complex matter.

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