[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 154 (Friday, September 26, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9852-S9853]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION ACT

  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to 
the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 1086, H.R. 2631.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 2631) to strengthen efforts in the Department 
     of Homeland Security to develop nuclear forensics 
     capabilities to permit attribution of the source of nuclear 
     material.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, 
which had been reported from the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs with an amendment to strike all after the enacting 
clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

                               H.R. 2631

  Be it enacted by the Senate and House Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American 
     interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most 
     serious threats to the national security of the United 
     States. In the wake of an attack, attribution of 
     responsibility would be of utmost importance. Because of the 
     destructive power of the weapon, there could be little 
     forensic evidence except the radioactive material in the bomb 
     itself.
       (2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing 
     techniques and those under development, it may be possible to 
     identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after 
     it is interdicted or detonated. Though identifying 
     intercepted smuggled material is now possible in some cases, 
     pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. 
     The post-detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, 
     and the challenges are compounded by the pressures and time 
     constraints of performing forensics after a nuclear or 
     radiological attack.
       (3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the 
     source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or 
     used in an act of terror could also deter prospective 
     proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of effective 
     attribution could compel improved security at material 
     storage facilities, preventing the unwitting transfer of 
     nuclear or radiological materials.
       (4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and 
     other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to 
     have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely 
     manner, analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples 
     against known signatures of nuclear and radiological 
     material.
       (B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of 
     a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely 
     acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the 
     past several decades, the ability of the United States to 
     gather atmospheric samples, often the preferred method of 
     sample acquisition, has diminished. This ability must be 
     restored and modern techniques that could complement or 
     replace existing techniques should be pursued.
       (C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a 
     relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a 
     nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional 
     forensics techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation 
     scenario, radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools 
     for analysis and characterization of samples. The number of 
     radiochemistry programs and radiochemists in United States 
     National Laboratories and universities has dramatically 
     declined over the past several decades. The narrowing 
     pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is a 
     serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible 
     nuclear forensics program.
       (5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it 
     is necessary to compare the results against samples of known 
     material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, 
     and from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities 
     containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of 
     these samples are available to the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and some 
     countries maintain internal sample databases. Access to 
     samples in many countries is limited by national security 
     concerns.
       (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 
     necessary to have the capability to positively identify the 
     source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential 
     traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware 
     of that capability. International cooperation may be 
     essential to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or 
     radiological material.

     SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR 
                   FORENSICS COOPERATION.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the President should--
       (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international 
     agreements to establish, or seek to establish under the 
     auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an 
     international framework for determining--
       (A) the source of any confiscated nuclear or radiological 
     material or weapon; and
       (B) the source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or 
     radiological material used in such a weapon;
       (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 
     dissemination of sensitive information relating to nuclear or 
     radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or 
     radiological materials, to the extent required by the 
     agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and
       (3) develop expedited protocols for the data exchange and 
     dissemination of sensitive information needed to publicly 
     identify the source of a nuclear detonation.

     SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION 
                   OFFICE.

       (a) Additional Responsibilities.--Section 1902 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 592) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``(a) Mission''
       (2) in paragraph (9), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (3) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (14); and
       (4) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
       ``(10) develop and implement, with the approval of the 
     Secretary, and in consultation with the Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary 
     of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
     heads of appropriate departments and agencies, a `National 
     Strategy and Five-Year Implementation Plan for Improving the 
     Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Capabilities of the United 
     States Government' and the methods, capabilities, and 
     capacity for nuclear materials forensics and attribution, 
     including--
       ``(A) an investment plan to support nuclear materials 
     forensics and attribution;
       ``(B) the allocation of roles and responsibilities for pre-
     detonation, detonation, and post-detonation activities; and
       ``(C) the attribution of nuclear or radiological material 
     to its source when such material is intercepted by the United 
     States, foreign governments, or international bodies or is 
     dispersed in the course of a terrorist attack or other 
     nuclear or radiological explosion;

[[Page S9853]]

       ``(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
     Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to 
     provide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap 
     analysis, exercises, improvement, and integration for all 
     Federal nuclear forensics and attribution activities--
       ``(A) to ensure an enduring national technical nuclear 
     forensics capability to strengthen the collective response of 
     the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear 
     attacks; and
       ``(B) to coordinate and implement the national strategic 
     plan and 5-year plan to improve national forensics and 
     attribution capabilities for all Federal nuclear and 
     radiological forensics capabilities;
       ``(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise 
     Development Program, which--
       ``(A) is devoted to developing and maintaining a vibrant 
     and enduring academic pathway from undergraduate to post-
     doctorate study in nuclear and geochemical science 
     specialties directly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, 
     including radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear physics, 
     nuclear engineering, materials science, and analytical 
     chemistry; and
       ``(B) shall--
       ``(i) make available for undergraduate study student 
     scholarships, with a duration of up to 4 years per student, 
     which shall include, if possible, at least 1 summer 
     internship at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal 
     agency in the field of technical nuclear forensics during the 
     course of the student's undergraduate career;
       ``(ii) make available for graduate study student 
     fellowships, with a duration of up to 5 years per student, 
     which shall--

       ``(I) include, if possible, at least 2 summer internships 
     at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal agency in the 
     field of technical nuclear forensics during the course of the 
     student's graduate career; and
       ``(II) require each recipient to commit to serve for 2 
     years in a post-doctoral position in a technical nuclear 
     forensics-related specialty at a national laboratory or 
     appropriate Federal agency after graduation;

       ``(iii) make available to faculty awards, with a duration 
     of 3 to 5 years each, to ensure faculty and their graduate 
     students have a sustained funding stream; and
       ``(iv) place a particular emphasis on reinvigorating 
     technical nuclear forensics programs; and''.
       (b) Joint Interagency Annual Reporting Requirement to 
     Congress and the President.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1907(a)(1) of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596(a)(1)) is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``and'' at the 
     end;
       (B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking the period at the 
     end and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
     and each of the relevant Departments that are partners in the 
     National Technical Forensics Center--
       ``(i) includes, as part of the assessments, evaluations, 
     and reviews required under this paragraph, each relevant 
     agency's activities and investments in support of nuclear 
     forensics and attribution activities;
       ``(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the Joint Interagency 
     Annual Review, the most current version of the plan required 
     under section 1902(a)(10); and
       ``(iii) after March 31 of each year, funds allocated for 
     activities authorized under section 1902 are not spent until 
     the submission to Congress of the report required under 
     subsection (b).''.

  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask unanimous consent that the committee-reported 
substitute be agreed to; the bill, as amended, be read a third time and 
passed; the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no 
intervening action or debate; and that any statements related thereto 
be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
  The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a 
third time.
  The bill (H.R. 2631), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

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