[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 153 (Thursday, September 25, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9496-S9497]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. ENSIGN:
  S. 3578. A bill to establish a commission to assess the nuclear 
activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran; to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I rise today to address an issue of 
critical importance to the security of our Nation and the world. I want 
to talk about the future of Iran's nuclear capabilities and what it 
means for the United States.
  Too often here in Washington, we get caught up in the debate of the 
moment and fail to appreciate the larger picture. Too many are more 
concerned with petty blame games and not enough are concerned with the 
greater challenge of protecting Americans.

[[Page S9497]]

  General Michael Hayden, the Director of Central Intelligence, has 
said that he believes Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Others, 
including the President of the United States and the leaders of France 
and Great Britain agree.
  I ask myself what would happen if the Ahmadinejad regime in Iran 
succeeded in acquiring a nuclear weapon. Among the possibilities, he 
could use that weapon. Iran could share it with terrorists or other 
rogue states. At a minimum, an Iranian nuke would prompt its neighbors 
in the Gulf, in Turkey, in Egypt and elsewhere to seek a similar 
ability in order to defend themselves against Iran's efforts to gain 
regional dominance.
  The stakes could not be higher, and I am concerned that we are not 
meeting the challenge. To the contrary, I believe we are being tested, 
and we are failing.
  Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism around the world. 
In addition to its long time support for groups like Hezbollah and 
Hamas, Iran is now active in directing aggression against our troops in 
Iraq, sponsoring not only Shiite extremists but even Sunni terror 
groups. According to General Petraeus, ``...Iran has played [a 
fundamental role] in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-
called Special Groups and generated renewed concern about Iran in the 
minds of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the Special Groups pose the 
greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq.''
  In addition to its destabilizing sponsorship of violence across the 
Middle East, we also know that Iran is working on delivery vehicles for 
deadly weapons. The regime has continuously upgraded its missile 
capabilities, and now has delivery vehicles that can strike targets all 
over the Middle East and into Europe. Couple that knowledge with the 
evidence available that Iran has worked on fitting nuclear warheads 
onto these missiles, and we have even more practical reasons for 
concern.
  Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has stated emphatically that 
his Nation ``will not give up one iota of its nuclear rights.''
  Where does this leave the United States, and the American people, in 
confronting this growing and multidimensional threat? Unfortunately, 
the answer appear, to be: confused.
  The clearest evidence that we have yet to focus on the exact nature 
of the Iranian threat--an understanding that is imperative if we are 
going to succeed in countering it--is last year's National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iran.
  Although leaders and intelligence agencies around the world believe 
that Iran is indeed pursuing nuclear weapons, the NIE drew confusing, 
misleading, and contradicting conclusions. In dramatic phrasing clearly 
designed to mislead, the NIE states that ``We judge with high 
confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons 
program.'' In a footnote that got short shrift from both the press and 
the jubilant Iranian regime, the analysts explain that what they say `` 
`nuclear weapons program' we mean Iran's nuclear weapon design and 
weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium 
enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran's declared civil work 
related to uranium conversion and enrichment.'' In other words, the 
work referred to that had ``halted'' was in fact work that this 
Congress had heretofore not been able to confirm, and that we were 
uncertain existed. What continued, according to the NIE, was Iran's 
attempts to use its licit nuclear program to develop nuclear weapons 
capability. Which is exactly what we have been worrying about all 
along.
  Since the NIE, the intelligence community has backed away from its 
original assessment. The Director of National Intelligence, Vice 
Admiral Mike McConnell said that Iran could ``probably'' produce the 
fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon by as early as 2010. He 
has also testified that he would ``change the way we described the 
nuclear program'' in the NIE.
  Both Hayden and McConnell have also admitted that the NIE was so 
quickly declassified and poorly focused that it confused people. 
Unfortunately, the damage is done. The notion that Iran has suspended 
its nuclear program--however false that may be--has derailed our 
diplomatic push to a great extent and caused more confusion. Whatever 
the intentions behind this misleading assessment, we now know that 
Iran, with some of its international supporters, used the opportunity 
to derail the diplomatic process and move ahead with its uranium 
enrichment. Iran is now on the verge of producing enough highly 
enriched uranium for one to three nuclear weapons a year.
  This is not good news. Diplomacy, and more serious sanctions, keep 
military action at bay. A lack of options is what forces nations to 
make military choices.
  I raise these points not to criticize the administration, advocate 
for one action course of action over another, or argue about the 
results of the recent NIE. I raise these points because our Nation 
cannot afford confusion about the threat at hand. We have 
underestimated our adversaries in the past, and missed important 
developments even in friendly nations. Saddam Hussein developed nuclear 
weapons while receiving U.S. aid. India detonated a nuclear device 
before the U.S. had any advance warning. More recently, Syria procured 
a nuclear reactor as the United States negotiated in good faith with 
its suppliers in North Korea.
  We need to get this right. A mistake, a botched timeline, a missed 
event, a faulty analysis--all or any of the above could result in the 
worst of all possible outcomes. It is for that reason, that I rise 
today to introduce the legislation to help us better assess the nuclear 
threat from Iran. This legislation will create an independent 
commission comprised of 12 private U.S. citizens with expertise in 
nuclear proliferation and experience on the question of Iran. They will 
be appointed by the Speaker of the House, the House Minority Leader, 
and the Senate Minority Leader. Together, they will lend their 
expertise on this critical issue.
  There is a venerable history to such bipartisan commissions, 
including the 9/11 Commission, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States, and the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States. A commission can 
provide a set of fresh eyes to look without bias at the information at 
hand and make assessments upon which the American people and American 
policymakers can rely.
  Perhaps there are some among my colleagues or in the bureaucracy of 
the executive branch who believe that they need no help, and that such 
a commission is not necessary. To them, I suggest a brief review of 
history. Let us rely on the best our Nation has to offer, and bring 
bipartisan, fresh expertise to the question of the Iranian threat.
  I urge my colleagues to support me in this effort.
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