[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 152 (Wednesday, September 24, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9392-S9396]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             LATIN AMERICA

  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to report on 
a trip I made to Latin America during the August recess. Specifically, 
from August 17 to 23, I traveled to Mexico and Venezuela to investigate 
conditions relating to national security, immigration and counterdrug 
efforts. I also explored the current state of our diplomatic relations 
with these two important neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. I last 
visited both countries in 2005, and I was eager to assess firsthand the 
impact of recent changes in their domestic political landscapes.
  On Sunday, August 17, I flew to Mexico City, Mexico. There, I was 
greeted by Robyn Prinz, a Foreign Service officer from the economic 
section of our Embassy, who served as my guide in Mexico. That evening, 
I enjoyed a taste of Mexico's rich cultural heritage by attending the 
famous Ballet Folkloico, a performance of Mexican folk dances, at the 
Palacio de Bellas Artes.
  On Monday morning, August 18, I began the day by meeting with a large 
team from our Embassy. Ambassador Antonio Garza was traveling, so the 
Embassy team was led by Deputy Chief of Mission Leslie Bassett. In 
addition to Ms. Bassett, my meeting included representatives of the 
Department of Homeland Security, DHS, Customs and Border Protection, 
CBP, the Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA, the Defense Attache Office, the 
U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of 
Justice. I explained to the group my interest in learning about current 
efforts to combat drug trafficking and the attendant violence in Mexico 
and the extent to which U.S. aid can be of assistance in tackling these 
problems. In particular, I inquired about the likely impact of the 
Merida Initiative, a multiyear proposal to provide funding to Latin 
American countries to support counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and 
border security efforts, as well as programs designed to build 
accountable public institutions and ensure the rule of law. Earlier 
this year Congress approved the initial sum of $400 million for Mexico 
and $65 million for Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. 
Finally, I asked our representatives in Mexico about Mexican efforts to 
stem the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States.
  According to Ms. Bassett, in the 18 months since he was elected, 
Mexican President Felipe Calderon of the center-right Partido Accion 
Nacional, PAN, has moved quickly to bolster law enforcement and 
counterdrug efforts. He has also launched economic reforms intended to 
make Mexico more attractive to Mexicans. Ms. Bassett further noted the 
importance of our bilateral trade with Mexico. She pointed out that 
Mexico is now the third largest trading partner of the United States. 
And, as transportation costs continue to rise, trade between Mexico and 
the Unites States will likely become even more important.
  David Gaddis, the regional director for DEA in Mexico, explained that 
President Calderon's efforts to combat drug traffickers have been 
costly for Mexico--not only in terms of enhanced resources but also in 
terms of lives lost. The press has taken note of this unfortunate 
reality. In June 2008, the New York Times wrote, ``[s]ince Mr. Calderon 
came to office in December 2006, he has sent thousands of federal 
police officers and troops to reclaim cities and states where [drug] 
traffickers controlled local officials through bribes and threats. The 
offensive has unleashed a war among different cartels that has killed 
more than 4,000 people, among them about 450 soldiers, police officers 
and public officials.'' Nevertheless, according to Agent Gaddis, Mexico 
has achieved significant successes against the traffickers, arresting 
key leaders and extraditing many of them to the United States to stand 
trial. The DEA has also seen large improvements in the level of 
information sharing and cooperation from Mexican officials. This 
interaction directly benefits the United States because the major 
cartels in Mexico can be tied directly to drug traffickers in the 
United States. To drive home this point, Agent Gaddis provided a map 
showing cases in every state with links to Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations.

[[Page S9393]]

  As the assembled agency representatives noted, of course, the drug 
problem is not a one-way street. High demand for illegal drugs within 
the United States fuels much of the drug trade. And, just as drugs are 
smuggled into the United States, weapons and money are increasingly 
being smuggled into Mexico from our country. By some estimates, more 
than 90 percent of the weapons being used by Mexican drug traffickers 
originate in the United States. Erik Moncayo, the CBP attache in 
Mexico, pointed out that the United States has been far more focused on 
contraband, hazardous materials, and persons entering the country than 
those leaving it for Mexico. As a result, bulk cash shipments totaling 
more than $12 billion are reportedly smuggled into Mexico annually. 
Among other things, these illegal proceeds are used to pay off corrupt 
police and public officials.
  Although the Mexican Government has begun to implement new legal 
reforms, including a shift away from a confession-driven judicial 
system to one that places a greater emphasis on other evidence, 
corruption is still a major problem in Mexico--especially among the 
ranks of the local police. This breeds mistrust of the very officials 
who should be relied upon by the public to keep them safe. This 
mistrust was illustrated in a tragic case that occurred shortly before 
my arrival in Mexico and which was mentioned in nearly every meeting I 
had there.

  In June 2008, the 14-year-old son of a wealthy family--the founders 
of a chain of sporting goods stores--was kidnapped and held for ransom. 
Rather than call the police, however, the family reportedly hired a 
private negotiator to deal directly with the kidnappers. Then, after 
they had paid millions of dollars in ransom money, their son's body was 
found in the trunk of a stolen car abandoned in Mexico City. This 
tragic case, and the deep mistrust of the police it reveals, 
underscores the serious challenge faced by President Calderon and his 
administration as they seek to reform Mexico's criminal justice system.
  On the illegal immigration front, Ms. Bassett noted that there had 
been a decrease in illegal immigration from Mexico, but she 
acknowledged that the causes could range from a weakened U.S. economy 
to enhanced border security to increased opportunities in Mexico, or 
some combination of these factors. Mr. Moncayo, the CBP representative, 
highlighted a successful joint operation with Mexican officials--dubbed 
the Oasis program--under which more than 800 cases involving alien 
smugglers have been prosecuted by Mexico during the last 3 years, using 
evidence collected in part by U.S. authorities, with a nearly 98 
percent conviction rate.
  In response to my question about Mexico's willingness to accept 
criminal aliens being deported by the United States, Ms. Bassett said 
that Mexico actively cooperates with such repatriation efforts. I was 
pleased to hear this news because I have been particularly concerned 
about the refusal by some countries to accept their nationals back 
after they have served criminal sentences in the United States and been 
ordered deported.
  Later on August 18, I met with Mexico's Secretary of Public Security, 
Genero Garcia Luna. Secretary Luna is charged with the daunting task of 
reforming Mexico's federal police force and forging new, cooperative 
arrangements with the country's state and local police. A July 13, 2008 
profile in the New York Times Magazine notes that ``Garcia Luna 
cultivates the image of a cop in a world of politicians, a doer in a 
world of talkers.'' The article also quotes a security analyst as 
saying that Secretary Luna has ``the hardest job in the country.''
  I found the Secretary to be sincere and enthusiastic about his 
mission. He described ongoing efforts to improve police pay, regulate 
the requirements for new recruits, and require comprehensive ``trust'' 
centers--akin to community policing centers--for citizens to interact 
with police and prosecutors in the states and localities. He also 
focused on the need to stem the tide of illegal weapons entering Mexico 
from the United States.
  Secretary Luna represented that more than 95 percent of the firearms 
used by Mexican criminals come from the United States. He said that, in 
the first 2 years of the Calderon administration, approximately 20,000 
high-caliber weapons have been seized by Mexican law enforcement. While 
acknowledging the value of assistance from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF, in tracing the origins of such 
weapons, Secretary Luna urged a crackdown on retailers along the 
southwest border selling weapons for export to Mexico.
  With respect to the recent, high-profile kidnapping and murder of a 
14-year-old boy, Secretary Luna noted that kidnapping is not a federal 
offense in Mexico; a fact that limits his ability to investigate such 
cases. I cited the 1932 kidnapping and murder of the young son of 
aviator Charles Lindbergh as the catalyst for making kidnapping a 
Federal offense in the United States and suggested that Mexico may have 
reached a similar moment in its legal evolution. The Secretary agreed 
and said that members of the administration planned to meet with 
legislators later in the week to consider such a change.
  Although somewhat outside his jurisdiction, I asked the Secretary for 
his views on the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
NAFTA, on security matters and the standard of living in Mexico. I also 
asked about his department's cooperation with other countries to combat 
drug trafficking, particularly Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba. Secretary 
Luna said that he thought NAFTA had been very important for job 
creation in Mexico, with incidental benefits for security. With respect 
to international cooperation on drugs, he said that cooperation with 
Colombia was very good. He said that the cooperation with Venezuela and 
Cuba was more difficult but noted that they had worked collaboratively 
through third-party organizations. For example, he cited cooperation 
with Venezuela through Interpol.
  I further inquired about Mexico's cooperation with the United States 
on terrorism matters. Secretary Luna was very positive about the level 
of cooperation. He said, for example, there was an active effort to 
preempt potential terrorists from the Middle East from seeking entry 
into the United States via Mexico.
  Following my meeting with Secretary Luna, I met with Mexico's 
Attorney General, Eduardo Medina-Mora Icaza. I had met the Attorney 
General during my last visit to Mexico, when he was serving as the 
Director of the Center for National Security Investigations, Mexico's 
equivalent of the CIA. Once again, I found him to be 
articulate, intelligent and dedicated to public service--though he also 
has a strong background in the private sector and brings a business 
person's pragmatism to the work of government.

  The Attorney General described his department's current relationship 
with U.S. law enforcement and our Justice Department as the ``best 
ever'' in his considerable experience. He said that, through joint 
operations, we have succeeded in challenging and disrupting the key 
drug cartels, which are now more fragmented than ever. He conceded, 
however, that we have not yet succeeded in significantly reducing the 
total output of drugs. He then focused on some of the concerns that had 
been discussed in my earlier meetings, particularly the smuggling of 
guns and bulk cash shipments into Mexico.
  In addition to improved checkpoints for south-bound traffic, the 
Attorney General recommended some other avenues for exploration. For 
example, he noted that approximately half of the cash shipments 
smuggled into Mexico consisted of large-denominations, like $100 bills. 
This suggests that the smugglers may have some contact with U.S. 
financial institutions, which may provide another avenue for 
investigation and interdiction. Further, the Attorney General said that 
most of the weapons shipped into Mexico were purchased by ``straw'' 
buyers, who were paid a fee for essentially renting their 
identification to the true purchasers--a practice that might be 
subjected to limitations without infringing on the second amendment.
  On the issue of immigration, the Attorney General offered a thought-
provoking demographic analysis of the subject. First, he acknowledged 
that the United States has the most vibrant economy in the world, 
supported by a host of desirable factors including the

[[Page S9394]]

rule of law the ability to innovate and profit from innovation; labor 
flexibility and mobility; and the ability to shift assets from one 
sector of the economy to another through the financial markets. 
Nevertheless, he argued that the United States simply does not produce 
enough humans to keep up with its economic growth. And, although 
concerns about illegal immigration may currently be focused on Mexico, 
the Attorney General further argued that--within just 15 years--Mexico 
won't be able to supply much labor to the United States because 
Mexico's labor force peaked in 2006 and is now growing at a rate of 
less than 1.4 percent. Indeed, Attorney General Medina-Mora suggested 
that the whole world may face a labor shortage within a generation, due 
to falling population rates across much of the globe. In contrast to 
years past, the Attorney General also said that today's migrants are 
not uneducated peasants but workers with an average of 9 years of 
education and sought-after skills.
  I asked the Attorney General for his views on the value of dialog 
with other nations, even dialog with adversaries. He agreed that dialog 
is critical. With respect to my trip to Venezuela, Attorney General 
Medina-Mora said that isolating Venezuela would be the worst way to 
deal with the country. He said that Cuba ought to serve as an important 
lesson; namely, that isolation can actually help a disfavored regime to 
sustain itself. Of course, it would be naive to think that dialog is a 
silver bullet. In fact, at the time of our meeting, the Attorney 
General still appeared hopeful that dialog would ensure fair 
compensation for a Mexican-owned cement company that Venezuela was 
seeking to nationalize. As we later learned, however, efforts to engage 
the Venezuelan Government on this subject failed to prevent Venezuela's 
expropriation of the Mexican company by threat of force or at least 
under the supervision of national guard troops. Nevertheless, I believe 
that, over time, dialog often produces better results than heated 
rhetoric and posturing.
  On Tuesday, August 19, following a brief tour of the beautifully 
restored Chapultepec Castle overlooking Mexico City, I departed for 
Caracas, Venezuela. Upon arrival in Caracas, I was welcomed by our 
Ambassador there, Patrick Duddy, and the Control Officer for my visit, 
Evan Owen. Due to a traffic accident, our trip from the airport to the 
Ambassador's residence turned into a tour of relatively impoverished 
enclaves perched on the steep slopes of a twisting mountain road. By 
the time we reached our destination, it was nearly midnight.
  On Wednesday, August 20, I began my day with a briefing from 
Ambassador Duddy and key members of his Embassy team. They provided an 
overview of significant developments in Venezuela since my last visit 
in 2005. Perhaps most significantly, President Hugo Chavez lost a 
Constitutional Referendum in December 2007 that would have further 
consolidated his power, despite publicly characterizing the vote as a 
choice between himself and President George Bush. Now, as the New York 
Times reported on August 6, 2008, President Chavez is ``using his 
decree powers to enact a set of [26] socialist-inspired measures that 
seem based on a package of constitutional changes that voters rejected 
last year.''
  Among other things, these decrees create new regional officers, 
appointed by the government, who could help President Chavez to retain 
influence in states and localities even if his party loses upcoming 
state and local elections. Similarly, the decrees elevate the status of 
a new militia force that reports directly to the President, making it 
co-equal with the traditional branches of the military services, which 
facilitated a short-lived coup against President Chavez in 2002. 
According to the August 6, 2008, Wall Street Journal, ``Mr. Chavez said 
that if anyone didn't approve of the laws, they could file for a 
challenge with the supreme court. But critics . . . said that would be 
futile because six of the seven justices are sympathetic to the 
president.''

  In another troubling development, Venezuela's Controller General has 
reportedly disqualified nearly 300 individuals from holding appointed 
public office, or running for elected office, based on central 
government sanctions--but not convictions--for alleged administrative 
irregularities. A number of those who have been disqualified would have 
been strong potential opposition candidates for municipal and state 
elections scheduled for November 23, 2008. These elections pose the 
next major test for both the Chavez administration and the political 
opposition.
  At the same time, there has been some recent reason for optimism. On 
July 5, 2008, Venezuela's Independence Day, President Chavez publicly 
approached Ambassador Duddy and expressed a desire to renew antidrug 
cooperation with the United States. Among other things, President 
Chavez recalled how he had met several times with John Maisto, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Venezuela from 1997 to 2000. According to press accounts 
of the overture, President Chavez also mentioned the upcoming U.S. 
Presidential elections and commented, ``whoever wins, we should be able 
to sit down and converse. I did this with Clinton, we sat down to 
talk.''
  I was particularly heartened by the prospect of renewed cooperation 
on drugs because I had pushed for such collaboration between our 
countries during my visit in 2005. I even took the somewhat 
extraordinary step of asking then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
to consider ``a moratorium on adverse comments on Venezuela'' because I 
believed his harsh rhetoric about President Chavez at the time was 
counterproductive. With respect to the most recent overtures from 
President Chavez, however, it remains somewhat unclear whether he is 
prepared to match his positive words with meaningful actions.
  Following my meeting with the Ambassador and his team, I accompanied 
him to the U.S. Embassy for further briefings on drug trafficking and 
national security issues. With regard to the drug issues, I met with 
members of the U.S. Embassy's law enforcement team. By way of 
background, in September 2007, President Bush issued a determination 
that Venezuela, for the third year in a row, had failed demonstrably 
over the previous 12 months to adhere to its obligations under 
international counternarcotics agreements. In a September 17, 2007, 
report, State Department officials maintained that, although Venezuela 
indicated that it had developed some new programs to fight drug 
trafficking and were making seizures, its efforts continued to be 
limited.
  Given this backdrop, I asked the representatives of the law 
enforcement team in Caracas about recent reports suggesting that 
Venezuela had further increased its drug seizures and begun a campaign 
to bomb clandestine airstrips in the Venezuelan jungle being used by 
Colombian drug traffickers. Those present reported that the flow of 
drugs through Venezuela had increased dramatically, making the new 
seizures a smaller percentage of the whole. They also questioned the 
value of bombing dirt airstrips that could be quickly reconstituted. 
Moreover, the Government's claims with regard to such airstrips 
arguably served to confirm the importance of Venezuela as a 
transshipment point for drugs from Colombia being sent to the United 
States and the need for further cooperation.
  The group identified several modest steps that President Chavez could 
take to demonstrate his commitment to re-building cooperation on 
counter-drug efforts: No. 1, reiterate to his people what he said to 
Ambassador Duddy; No. 2, designate clear points-of-contact in 
Venezuela's counterdrug agencies for their U.S. counterparts; No. 3, 
approve seven pending applications for visas from the DEA; No. 4, give 
DHS access to the airport in Caracas to screen for contraband headed to 
the United States; No. 5, allow the United States to re-export an x-ray 
machine intended for scanning cargo at a port but currently sitting 
unused; and No. 6, permit effective cooperation between U.S. officials 
and the Intelligence Unit of the superintendent of Banks. To this list, 
I would add that the Chavez government should meet with the America's 
so-called drug czar, Director of National Drug Control Policy John 
Walters. As noted later in my remarks, Director Walters was denied a 
visa during my visit to Caracas, although the purpose of his requested 
visit was to follow up on the proposal President Chavez made to 
Ambassador Duddy to begin increasing counternarcotics cooperation 
between the United States and the Government of Venezuela.

[[Page S9395]]

  The following day, August 21, I started the morning by meeting with 
two members of the Venezuelan National Assembly: Saul Ortega, the first 
Vice-President of the National Assembly, and Francisco Torrealba, the 
leader of the U.S.-Venezuela Friendship Group in the National Assembly. 
We discussed the fact that, prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections, 
there used to be fairly regular dialog between the U.S. Congress and 
the Venezuelan National Assembly through the informal ``Boston Group.'' 
The parliamentarians commented favorably on their past contacts with 
former Representative Cass Ballenger of North Carolina and 
Representative William Delahunt of Massachusetts. Vice President Ortega 
also recalled fondly a meeting with Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts 
and mentioned a visit to Venezuela by Senator Kerry and his fellow 
Massachusetts Senator, Edward Kennedy, that had been discussed but 
not completed. Both members of the assembly said that such exchanges 
with the U.S. Congress would be welcome.

  During our meeting, which was also attended by Ambassador Duddy, I 
stressed the importance of the separation of powers under the U.S. 
Constitution. I noted that, as a Senator, I am free to criticize or 
dissent from the decisions of Presidents of my own party. I also cited 
the example of recent Supreme Court rulings on the rights of detainees 
being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to underscore the value of our 
independent judiciary, confirmed with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. I am hopeful that through future exchanges, legislator-to-
legislator, we may demonstrate the merits of our system of checks and 
balances and find a way to address areas of common interest to both 
countries, even if our respective executive branches remain at 
loggerheads.
  Following the meeting with the parliamentarians, Ambassador Duddy and 
I traveled to the economically challenged Bucaral neighborhood in the 
affluent Chacao borough of Caracas. A grassroots nongovernmental 
organization called ``Friends of the Health of Bucaral'' is working to 
improve conditions for the neighborhood's residents. Among other 
things, this organization operates a computer room for young students. 
In addition, the group's center offers conflict resolution programs, 
drug prevention workshops, and cultural classes in dance, theater, 
storytelling and music. The U.S. Embassy, through the Narcotics Affairs 
Section, has helped to support the youth center's illicit drug demand 
reduction efforts. I had the pleasure of meeting the organization's 
founder, Maria Teresa Gonzalez, and several of the children who benefit 
from the group's programs. I also had the chance to visit a small 
police post to see firsthand the work they are doing--much like 
community police stations in American cities--to build trust in the 
community and prevent crime.
  After visiting the Bucaral neighborhood, I met with representatives 
of Venezuela's Jewish community at a meeting hosted by the 
Confederation of Israelite Associations of Venezuela, CAIV. CAIV is the 
leading Jewish organization in Venezuela. The Jewish community in 
Venezuela stands at some 13,000, down from over 20,000 10 years ago.
  I was especially interested to speak with representatives of the 
Jewish community because, the week before my visit to Venezuela, 
President Chavez met with Jewish leaders including Ronald Lauder, 
president of the World Jewish Congress. As reported by the Miami Herald 
on August 14, 2008, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicols Maduro expressed 
hope following the meeting that ``this coming-together will be 
maintained.'' According to the Herald, Argentina's Ambassador in 
Washington, Hector Timerman, who also attended the meeting, said Chavez 
had ``expressed a desire to join forces with [Argentine President 
Cristina] Fernandez de Kirchner and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio 
Lula da Silva `to achieve the eradication of anti-Semitism in Latin 
America.' '' The Herald also quoted another meeting participant as 
saying that the three leaders may sign a joint statement against anti-
Semitism in September.
  At my meeting with Jewish leaders, I received generally positive 
reports on the meeting with President Chavez. The group expressed hope 
about the direction of relations between the Jewish community and the 
Government. I would note that, in addition to publicly condemning anti-
Semitism, there are other concrete things the Chavez government could 
do to improve relations. As reported by the Associated Press on August 
14, 2008, the Simon Wiesenthal Center has urged Venezuela to 
investigate two police raids on the Jewish community center in Caracas, 
including one ``on the eve of a contentious referendum vote in 
December.'' Especially given his public support of Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and said that Israel 
should be wiped off the map, I hope that President Chavez will take 
concrete and public actions to reassure the Jewish community in 
Venezuela that they are valued members of Venezuelan society.
  On Friday, August 22, I met with potential opposition candidates in 
November's state and local elections. The first of these was a mayoral 
candidate who, like more than 260 others, has been banned from seeking 
elective office through an administrative decision by Venezuela's 
Controller General. He denied any wrongdoing and stressed that he had 
not been given an opportunity to challenge the factual basis for the 
Controller General's decision. While he and others are challenging 
their disqualification, they are concerned that the courts lack 
sufficient independence to issue a fair ruling on the matter.
  Among those I met was Henrique Capriles Radonski. He is the current 
mayor of Baruta, a borough of Caracas where the U.S. Embassy is 
located. Prior to serving as mayor, Capriles was the President of the 
Venezuelan National Assembly 1999/ 2000, the youngest in its history. 
Capriles is currently the opposition candidate for the governorship of 
Miranda State, which surrounds much of Caracas.
  Mr. Capriles has received international notoriety due to an apparent 
political prosecution against him. His case was profiled in a 
Washington Post op-ed by Deputy Editor Jackson Diehl on April 10, 2006. 
As noted by the Post, the case against Capriles relates to an incident 
during the brief 2002 coup against Chavez, when Capriles sought to 
disperse a hostile crowd that besieged the Cuban Ambassador's 
residence. Despite his efforts at peacekeeping, Capriles was later 
jailed and charged with trespassing, intimidation, and ``violating 
international principles,'' among other crimes. Although the case was 
dismissed, the charges were later refiled and Capriles remains in legal 
jeopardy. The Post op-ed described Capriles as ``one of the brightest 
stars in a new generation of Venezuelan politicians untainted by the 
discredited political establishment Chavez replaced.'' I would concur. 
Despite obvious hurdles, he remains optimistic about the future of 
democracy in Venezuela--as well as his own prospects for being elected 
Governor of Miranda in November.

  I should note that, in addition to my meeting with opposition 
candidates, the U.S. Embassy also arranged for me to meet with several 
scholars, community leaders, business leaders, and representatives of 
the independent media during my visit. Although it is my normal 
practice to publicly document my meetings during foreign trips, the 
current political situation in Venezuela leads me to be somewhat 
circumspect about naming everyone with whom I met. Although the 
individuals expressed a range of viewpoints, those who were not aligned 
with President Chavez's party expressed concerns about the health of 
Venezuelan democracy, especially in light of the recent Presidential 
decrees, which appear to run contrary to the 2007 referendum. They also 
expressed anxiety about the disqualification of opposition candidates 
in advance of the November elections for state and local offices, and 
they shared concerns about the Government's increased push to 
nationalize key sectors of the economy. All agreed that the upcoming 
elections, much like the constitutional referendum last December, 
represent a critical moment in Venezuela's contemporary political 
development.
  On Friday, Ambassador Duddy and I also received two pieces of 
disappointing news: First, we learned that Venezuela had declined to 
schedule a meeting with Director John Walters, America's drug czar. 
Second, we

[[Page S9396]]

learned that President Chavez had used his regular television program 
to hurl new slurs at President Bush. Specifically, President Chavez 
used a photograph of President Bush stumbling on some steps at the 
Olympics to criticize him as a ``drunk.'' As reported by the Associate 
Press, Chavez said Bush looked ``drunk and quipped to his listeners: 
``Gold medal for alcoholism.''' Despite these setbacks, however, I 
agreed to a meeting with Venezuela's Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Nicolas Maduro, on Friday afternoon. Ambassador Duddy accompanied me to 
the meeting.
  Mr. Maduro has served as Foreign Minister, basically Venezuela's 
Secretary of State, since August 2006. Previously, he served as 
President of the National Assembly from 2005 to 2006. He is known as an 
ardent defender of President Chavez and his socialist program. I began 
the meeting by emphasizing my belief that Venezuela and the United 
States share many common interests, such as our mutual interest in drug 
interdiction, which can be advanced by greater dialogue. I expressed my 
hope that it may yet be possible to arrange a visit by Director 
Walters, and I added that both U.S. Presidential candidates understand 
the importance of dialog.
  Minister Maduro said he was open to the possibility of greater 
dialog, but he said the Venezuelan Government was pessimistic because 
they believed that positive gestures from the United States were too 
often followed by negative statements about Venezuela by U.S. 
spokespersons. He also noted that efforts to improve relations with the 
United States were not always received well by the Government's own 
grassroots supporters. Minister Maduro questioned aloud whether the 
time was ripe for better relations and said that after the U.S. 
elections might present a new opportunity. Mr. Maduro also mentioned 
his own involvement in the former ``Boston Group.''
  I responded that it would be better to lower the negative rhetoric on 
both sides. I also discussed my positive meeting with members of the 
National Assembly and said that we should not wait until after the 
elections to begin to build bridges. I pointed out, for example, that 
Director Walters was not a politician but a professional who could help 
facilitate greater cooperation against drug traffickers. Minister 
Maduro said Venezuela was taking the proposal seriously and would have 
a final answer very soon. He then recited some of Venezuela's successes 
in domestic counterdrug efforts. I left the meeting encouraged that 
future dialog may be possible. But, in response to a reporter's 
question as I left, I also defended President Bush against the 
ridiculous claim that he had been intoxicated at the Olympics.
  In closing, I would like to add that Ambassador Duddy, a career 
member of the Senior Foreign Service who most recently served as Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, is doing a 
splendid job under difficult circumstances. He is a true expert on 
Latin America and exemplifies the best of the Foreign Service. He is 
aided by a very able staff, all of whom are seeking to improve 
diplomatic relations in a challenging environment. Also, on a personal 
note, the Ambassador and his wife were gracious and charming hosts 
throughout our stay in Venezuela, and I look forward to working with 
him in the future. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Almost a week to the day after I left Venezuela, President Hugo 
Chavez threatened our Ambassador, Patrick Duddy, with expulsion in 
apparent response to criticism by America's drug czar, John Walters. 
Mr. Walters, after being denied a visa to travel to Venezuela, warned 
that the flow of Colombian cocaine through Venezuela has quadrupled 
since 2004, reaching an estimated 282 tons last year.
  As the New York Times reported on September 1, 2008, ``Mr. Chavez's 
comments effectively ended what seemed to be the start of a thaw in 
July, when he chatted with Mr. Duddy at a military parade and invited 
him to lunch.''
  On September 11, 2008, President Chavez followed through on his 
threat. He announced that he was expelling Ambassador Duddy and gave 
him 72 hours to leave the country. According to the New York Times, 
President Chavez claimed to have ``discovered an American-supported 
plot by military officers to topple him.'' Of course, the Times also 
noted that President Chavez has ``claimed at least 26 times in the last 
six years that there were plots to kill him, according to counts in the 
local media.''
  Since this announcement, relations between our two countries have 
continued to deteriorate. On September 12, 2008, the United States 
announced it would expel the Venezuelan Ambassador and the U.S. 
Treasury Department accused three Venezuelan officials with close ties 
to President Chavez of aiding the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia, or FARC, which the United States has designated as a 
terrorist organization.
  To add even more fuel to the fire, as all of this was occurring, 
Russian bombers landed in Venezuela and several media outlets reported 
that President Chavez is discussing plans for military exercises with 
Russia's navy in the Caribbean.
  I am deeply disturbed by these developments. During my visit, there 
were already signs that President Chavez had decided not to follow 
through on his July overtures to Ambassador Duddy concerning renewed 
cooperation against drug traffickers, but I did not imagine that within 
weeks he would seek to expel the Ambassador. As I have noted in my trip 
report, Ambassador Duddy is an exemplary diplomat. His ouster is truly 
a tragedy.

                          ____________________