[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 151 (Tuesday, September 23, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9283-S9284]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. BROWNBACK:
  S. 3546. A bill to establish the National Center for Strategic 
Communication to advise the President regarding public diplomacy and 
international broadcasting to promote democracy and human rights, and 
for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, one might conclude from the last 7 
years without a successful al Qaeda attack in America either that we 
have crippled our enemies or that the terrorist threat is overstated. 
Unfortunately, neither is true: violence is rising in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and elsewhere, and the ideas behind this violence continue to 
proliferate from Europe to Asia and across the World Wide Web. But 
while we spend a great deal of time discussing tactics and troop 
deployments, we rarely analyze the broader ideological struggle.
  Military force may sometimes be necessary in the war on terrorism, 
but force alone cannot defeat the threat posed by violent Islamist 
extremism. Recognizing this fact, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
worries about the

[[Page S9284]]

state of the ``war of ideas'' and rightly points out that it is ``plain 
embarrassing'' that al Qaeda communicates more effectively than we do.
  The answer to this problem is not more money. We have spent billions 
since 9/11 on a wide array of public diplomacy initiatives, 
international broadcasts and information and exchange programs. Some 
succeeded, others failed, but none were developed in accordance with a 
national strategy overseen by an official who is accountable for making 
strategic communications work.
  The U.S. Information Agency focused on strategic communications 
during the Cold War. After the defeat of communism, USIA's mission 
seemed fulfilled, and I supported its dismantlement. Today's 
ideological threats, however, demand the same focus on strategic 
communications that the USIA provided a generation ago. Today, I am 
introducing legislation that would establish a new National Center for 
Strategic Communications to correct a number of deficiencies and meet 
21st century challenges.
  There are several reasons why I believe major reforms are necessary. 
First, fundamentally, we are not on offense. Seven years after 
September 11, we have only begun to acknowledge the existence of a war 
of ideas. We need to move from merely informing the world about America 
to countering those who support terrorism and violence. We also need to 
enable moderate voices around the world to help us in opposing violent 
extremism.
  Second, we need to separate official diplomacy--by which I mean the 
act of communicating with foreign governments--from public diplomacy--
which means talking to foreign publics. When we dismantled USIA, we 
thought the result would be better coordination between official and 
public diplomacy. We now know that this arrangement has relegated 
public diplomacy to second-tier status. We need to ensure that such a 
crucial part of the war on terrorism receives the attention and 
priority level that it deserves.
  Third, our strategic communications programs lack transparency and 
accountability. Despite spending hundreds of millions per year on 
international broadcasting, it is unclear how these broadcasts fit into 
a national strategic communications plan or how the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors makes decisions on allocating the resources Congress 
appropriates. The same could be said of the State Department's 
Educational and Cultural Affairs programs. Moreover, it is nearly 
impossible to determine how much the Department of Defense is spending 
on strategic communications activities and how many of those functions 
might be performed--or at least better supported--by other parts of the 
government.
  Beyond government programs, it is clear that the U.S. Government does 
not effectively leverage the resources of the private sector and 
nonprofit groups. We should be able to promote our values and oppose 
violence and extremism alongside organizations that already work along 
the same lines. And there is no question that there are times when 
these outside voices will be more persuasive than the messages linked 
to Washington, DC.
  These problems call for something beyond a bigger budget or the 
generic cry for better coordination among departments and agencies. We 
need to realign authorities so that the President has a single 
individual responsible for ensuring that the Nation's strategic 
communications goals are being met. We need that individual to be 
responsible for an agency that has a clear mission to fight and win the 
war of ideas and the budgetary authority and flexibility to match.
  My proposal abolishes the existing Undersecretary for Public 
Diplomacy at the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, transferring their functions to the new National Center for 
Strategic Communications where they would be managed by single 
director. The Director would report to the President as the Nation's 
top strategic communications official and oversee the creation of a new 
national strategic communications strategy. Just as important, the 
Director will oversee an interagency panel of representatives from 
other Federal agencies and departments, including the Department of 
Defense, whose missions inherently involve strategic communications 
with foreign publics.
  More than providing information about America, the goal of strategic 
communications should be nothing less than the ability to persuade 
individuals all over the world to choose freedom, human rights and the 
rule of law over any challenging ideologies or philosophies. My 
legislation would correct a number of deficiencies in our current 
structure in support of this objective.
  First, the new Center would separate public diplomacy--speaking to 
foreign publics--from official diplomacy--speaking to foreign 
governments. We should not let public diplomacy be held hostage to the 
official priority of the moment, nor should public diplomacy budgets 
compete with official diplomatic priorities.
  Second, the Center would manage U.S. international broadcasts 
directly. Too often in the last few years, taxpayer-funded broadcasts 
have been kept at arms length from government oversight and undermined 
rather than affirmed U.S. policies and values. My legislation makes our 
broadcasts more transparent and focused on the national mission by 
giving the Center close oversight of our broadcasts and abolishing 
outdated Smith-Mundt Act provisions that keep the American public from 
knowing what the government is saying abroad.
  Third, the Center enlists the support of private, non-profit and non-
governmental organizations. There is no reason to believe the U.S. 
Government must always deliver key messages, and outside groups may 
have the best ability to counter ideological support for extremism. My 
proposal enables the new Center to make grants to such groups and 
places representatives of the Center in key countries around the globe 
to implement our national strategy on a local level.
  Our vision of a free, prosperous and peaceful world is under attack 
from extremists who propose endless violence and fear. Military force 
may keep these extremists at bay for a time, but ultimate victory 
depends on winning the war of ideas. Though some would throw more money 
at our strategic communications problems or settle for smaller, 
marginal reforms, I believe major reforms are necessary for us to 
succeed. I look forward to developing this proposal with the next 
administration and the new Congress. No matter who ends up in power, we 
will have a share in reforms that can help win the war on terror 
without just relying on more bullets.

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