[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 113 (Thursday, July 10, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6567-S6571]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself, Ms. Collins, and Ms. Cantwell):
  S. 3248. A bill to amend the Commodity Exchange Act to clarify 
treatment of purchases of certain commodity futures contracts and 
financial instruments with respect to limits established by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission relating to excessive speculation, 
and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation, the 
Commodity Speculation Reform Act of 2008, with my colleague Senator 
Collins, the ranking minority member of our Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee. The legislation is designed to wring 
out of the commodity markets the excessive speculation--and I stress 
the word ``excessive''--that we believe has helped lead to the sudden 
and soaring spikes in the prices Americans pay for food and energy.
  We are going to do this by returning the commodity markets to what 
they

[[Page S6568]]

were meant to be--a place where producers and consumers of specific 
commodities can enter into futures contracts that help hedge the risks 
of price fluctuations common to their industries.
  These commodity market traders--farmers, airlines, refineries--
actually intend to produce or take delivery of specific commodities as 
part of doing business.
  On the other hand, financial speculators, including pension funds, 
university endowments, and other large institutional investors, have 
poured billions and billions of dollars into these markets over the 
past 5 years betting on rising prices--and let's make it clear, that 
these are bets--without ever intending to actually own a barrel of oil 
or a bushel of corn. They are looking for nothing more than paper 
profits.
  In a series of hearings held by our Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, we heard testimony that this kind of 
excessive speculation in the commodity markets may have added as much 
as $40 to $60 to the cost of a barrel of oil.
  Some say these figures are too high. But I would say that even a 
single dollar increase due to excessive speculation is a dollar too 
much because of the inflationary effect it can have not only on the 
U.S. economy, but around the world.
  Consider this: according to the Air Transport Association, every $1 
increase in the price of a barrel of crude oil adds $470 million a year 
in jet fuel costs--almost half a billion dollars--to the U.S. airline 
industry. These costs are passed on to consumers in the forms of higher 
ticket prices and other surcharges that are now keeping potential 
passengers on the ground and has the industry reeling.
  These increases directly hit consumers in the global economy through 
higher gas and food prices. Moreover, the negative effects of commodity 
price inflation ripple through the economy as the high cost of energy 
and raw materials weakens our manufacturing base, and the high cost 
associated with transporting goods impedes international trade.
  The profits made by the speculators do not produce one new barrel of 
oil, put one new acre of farmland into production, put one new mine 
into operation, or add one new gallon of refinery capacity.
  If speculators really want to invest in commodities, they can buy 
stock in an energy company or an agricultural firm. They can purchase 
the royalty rights to land. Any of these options would benefit from 
market trends related to commodity prices and would also bring needed 
investment into means of production that would increase supplies and 
eventually contribute to lower commodity prices.
  Unfortunately, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has ignored 
the urgent task of providing our front line defense against rampant and 
unmanaged speculation. To this day, the Commission has yet to recognize 
that speculation affects commodity prices.
  Instead, the Commission has delegated much of its regulatory 
authority to the for-profit exchanges. Moreover, in contradiction with 
Congress's original legislative intent, the Commission views its 
mission as confined to a single purpose--preventing market 
manipulation. On the contrary, Congress fully intended the Commission 
to regulate market manipulation AND excessive speculation.
  Our bill effectively closes the door to excessive speculation, but in 
a rational and reasonable way by, in effect, perfecting current law. 
First, it requires the CFTC to consider the overall effect of 
speculation when it sets the position limits that restrict the amount 
that any one investor can invest in a commodity. This is a critical and 
necessary change--if the Commission does not acknowledge and embrace 
its obligation to prevent excessive speculation, all of our efforts 
will be in vain.
  Second, it extends the existing rules that apply to the regulated 
exchanges to currently unregulated over-the-counter and foreign 
markets. Over the last 10 years, over-the-counter trading in 
commodities has exploded. The over-the-counter investment vehicles are 
simply economic substitutes for futures contracts. There is no rational 
reason that they should not be subject to the same laws and regulations 
that apply to futures contracts.
  This change also eliminates the ``swaps loophole'' that allows 
pension funds and other large investors to invest in index funds that 
circumvent the position limits. From 2003 to 2008, investment in 
commodity index funds has swelled from $13 billion to $260 billion and 
has, in effect, chased up prices and taken control of the commodity 
markets away from the industries and producers that must use them as a 
means of doing business.
  Other important provisions would direct that the speculative position 
limits must be set by the CFTC, not the futures exchanges, and repeal 
the CFTC's authority to substitute meaningless reporting requirements 
for actual speculative position limits.
  In the course of our Committee hearings and in later deliberations we 
looked at a number of legislative options, including banning certain 
large investors, such as pension funds, from the commodity markets 
altogether.
  But we feel the approach we've come up with in this bill is a 
reasonable, commonsense approach that will help bring order back to the 
commodity markets while preserving the liquidity it needs to function 
properly.
  Some have suggested that Congressional action will simply push 
investors to foreign markets. Our bill actually discourages flight from 
the major exchanges because it puts all trading platforms under the 
same regulatory umbrella. Speculators are subject to the same position 
limits regardless of whether they invest in New York, London, Dubai, or 
over-the-counter.
  Is excessive speculation the sole cause of rising prices? Of course 
not. Global economic growth, particularly in emerging nations like 
China and India, has put tremendous upward pressure on the prices of 
energy, food and raw materials.
  But there is little doubt--even among most skeptics of our 
legislation--that excessive speculation has had an effect on rising 
prices. Our bill will end that and help create a more orderly market 
for the industries and producers who must deal in commodities as a 
matter of business.
  The father of modern capitalism, Adam Smith, overall wanted to limit 
the role of government in free markets. In fact, in ``The Wealth of 
Nations'' Smith said speculators served many useful functions in a free 
market and many of his observations are still true today.
  But Smith knew there had to be limits, writing: ``those exertions of 
the natural liberty of a few individuals, which may endanger the 
security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the 
laws of all governments.''
  With this bill we seek that kind of restraint so that the few don't 
gain exorbitant profits at the expense of the average American reeling 
under spiraling prices for food and fuel.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and 
a summary be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 3248

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Commodity Speculation Reform 
     Act of 2008''.

     SEC. 2. AUTHORITY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION TO 
                   ISSUE NO ACTION LETTERS.

       Section 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 
     2(a)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(G) Authority to issue no action letters to foreign 
     boards of trade.--
       ``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), the 
     Commission may not issue a no action letter to any foreign 
     board of trade that lists a contract the price of which 
     settles on the price of a contract traded on an exchange 
     regulated by the Commission.
       ``(ii) Exception.--The Commission may issue a no action 
     letter to a foreign board of trade described in clause (i) if 
     the foreign board of trade provides to the Commission 
     information and data accessibility the scope of which is 
     comparable to the information and data accessibility provided 
     to the Commission by entities under the jurisdiction of the 
     Commission.''.

     SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES.

       Section 2(a)(7) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 
     2(a)(7)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) Additional employees.----As soon as practicable after 
     the date of enactment of this subparagraph, the Commission 
     shall appoint at least 100 full-time employees (in addition 
     to the employees employed by the

[[Page S6569]]

     Commission as of the date of enactment of this subparagraph) 
     to assist in carrying out section 4a(a)(2).''.

     SEC. 4. TREATMENT OF PURCHASES OF CERTAIN COMMODITY FUTURES 
                   CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 4a of the Commodity Exchange Act 
     (7 U.S.C. 6a) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``sec. 4a. (a) Excessive speculation'' and 
     inserting the following:

     ``SEC. 4A. EXCESSIVE SPECULATION.

       ``(a) Burden on Interstate Commerce; Trading or Position 
     Limits.--
       ``(1) In general.--Excessive speculation and''; and
       (2) in subsection (a) (as amended by paragraph (1)), by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Treatment of purchases of certain commodity futures 
     contracts and financial instruments.--
       ``(A) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
       ``(i) Bona fide hedging transaction.--

       ``(I) In general.--The term `bona fide hedging transaction' 
     means a transaction that--

       ``(aa) represents a substitute for a transaction to be made 
     or a position to be taken at a later time in a physical 
     marketing channel;
       ``(bb) is economically appropriate for the reduction of 
     risks in the conduct and management of a commercial 
     enterprise; and
       ``(cc) arises from the potential change in the value of--
       ``(AA) assets that a person owns, produces, manufactures, 
     possesses, or merchandises (or anticipates owning, producing, 
     manufacturing, possessing, or merchandising);
       ``(BB) liabilities that a person incurs or anticipates 
     incurring; or
       ``(CC) services that a person provides or purchases (or 
     anticipates providing or purchasing).

       ``(II) Exclusion.--The term `bona fide hedging transaction' 
     does not include a transaction entered into on a designated 
     contract market for the purpose of offsetting a financial 
     risk arising from an over-the-counter commodity derivative.

       ``(ii) Over-the-counter commodity derivative.--The term 
     `over-the-counter commodity derivative' means any agreement, 
     contract, or transaction that--

       ``(I)(aa) is traded or executed in the United States; or
       ``(bb) is held by a person located in the United States;
       ``(II) is not traded on a designated contract market or 
     derivatives transaction execution facility; and
       ``(III)(aa) is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar 
     option of any kind for the purchase or sale of, or 
     substantially based on the value of, 1 or more qualifying 
     commodities or an economic or financial index or measure of 
     economic or financial risk primarily associated with 1 or 
     more qualifying commodities;
       ``(bb) provides on an executory basis for the applicable 
     transaction, on a fixed or contingent basis, of 1 or more 
     payments substantially based on the value of 1 or more 
     qualifying commodities or an economic or financial index or 
     measure of economic or financial risk primarily associated 
     with 1 or more qualifying commodities, and that transfers 
     between the parties to the transaction, in whole or in part, 
     the economic or financial risk associated with a future 
     change in any such value without also conveying a current or 
     future direct or indirect ownership interest in an asset or 
     liability that incorporates the financial risk that is 
     transferred; or
       ``(cc) is any combination or permutation of, or option on, 
     any agreement, contract, or transaction described in item 
     (aa) or (bb).

       ``(iii) Over-the-counter commodity derivative dealer.--The 
     term `over-the-counter commodity derivative dealer' means a 
     person that regularly offers to enter into, assume, offset, 
     assign, or otherwise terminate positions in over-the-counter 
     commodity derivatives with customers in the ordinary course 
     of a trade or business of the person.
       ``(iv) Qualifying commodity.--The term `qualifying 
     commodity' means--

       ``(I) an agricultural commodity; and
       ``(II) an energy commodity.

       ``(B) Regulations.--
       ``(i) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this paragraph, in accordance with clauses (ii) 
     and (iii), the Commission shall promulgate regulations to 
     establish and enforce--

       ``(I) speculative position limits for qualifying 
     commodities;
       ``(II) a methodology--

       ``(aa) to enable persons to aggregate the positions held or 
     controlled by the persons on designated contract markets, on 
     derivatives transaction execution facilities, and in over-
     the-counter commodity derivatives; and
       ``(bb) to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that 
     the determinations made by the Commission with respect to 
     each person examined under subparagraph (C) accurately 
     reflect the net long and net short positions held or 
     controlled by the person in the underlying qualifying 
     commodity; and

       ``(III) information reporting rules to facilitate the 
     monitoring and enforcement by the Commission of the 
     speculative position limits established under subclause (I), 
     including the monitoring of positions held in over-the-
     counter commodity derivatives.

       ``(ii) Applicability.--

       ``(I) Position limits.--The speculative position limits 
     established under clause (i)(I) shall apply to position 
     limits that, with respect to each applicable position limit, 
     expire during--

       ``(aa) the spot month;
       ``(bb) each separate futures trading month (other than the 
     spot month); or
       ``(cc) the sum of each trading month (including the spot 
     month).

       ``(II) Sum of positions.--The speculative position limits 
     established under clause (i)(I) shall apply to the sum of the 
     positions held by a person--

       ``(aa) on designated contract markets;
       ``(bb) on derivatives transaction execution facilities; and
       ``(cc) in over-the-counter commodity derivatives.
       ``(iii) Maximum level of position limits.--In establishing 
     the speculative position limits under clause (i)(I), the 
     Commission shall set the speculative position limits at the 
     minimum level practicable to ensure sufficient market 
     liquidity for the conduct of bona fide hedging activities.
       ``(C) Prohibition relating to certain positions.--
       ``(i) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act, no person may hold or control a position, 
     separately or in combination, net long or net short, for the 
     purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery or, on a 
     futures-equivalent basis, any option, or an over-the-counter 
     commodity derivative that exceeds a speculative position 
     limit established by the Commission under subparagraph 
     (B)(i)(I).
       ``(ii) Bona fide hedging transactions.--In determining 
     whether the sum of a position held or controlled by a person 
     has exceeded the applicable speculative position limit 
     established by the Commission under subparagraph (B)(i)(I), 
     the Commission shall not consider positions attributable to a 
     bona fide hedging transaction.
       ``(iii) Determination of position limits for over-the-
     counter commodity derivative dealers.--To determine the 
     position of an over-the-counter commodity derivative dealer, 
     the sum of the positions held or controlled by the over-the-
     counter commodity derivative dealer shall be--

       ``(I) calculated on the last day of each month; and
       ``(II) considered, for the monthly period covered by the 
     determination, to be the average daily net position held or 
     controlled by the over-the-counter commodity derivative 
     dealer for the period beginning on the first day of the month 
     and ending on the last day of the month.''.

       (b) Reports.--
       (1) Necessary additional funding.--Not later than 45 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commodity 
     Futures Trading Commission (referred to in this subsection as 
     the ``Commission'') shall submit to the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a report providing 
     the recommendations of the Commission for any additional 
     funding that the Commission considers to be necessary to 
     carry out the amendments made by subsection (a), including 
     funding for additional staffing and technological needs.
       (2) Speculative activity trends.--
       (A) Study.--The Commission shall conduct a study--
       (i) to identify trends in speculative activity relating to 
     metals; and
       (ii) to determine whether the authority of the Commission 
     under section 4a(a)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
     U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)) (as added by subsection (a)(2)) should be 
     extended to cover the trading of metals.
       (B) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit a report 
     containing the results of the study conducted under 
     subparagraph (A) to--
       (i) the Committee on Agriculture of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (ii) the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 
     of the Senate; and
       (iii) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate.
       (3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out 
     this subsection.
                                  ____


                Commodity Speculation Reform Act of 2008

 (Senators Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, Summary of Provisions, 
                             July 10, 2008)

       The legislation closes the ``Swaps Loophole'' and creates a 
     seamless system of speculative position limits that applies 
     to all food and energy-related contracts held by financial 
     speculators, including over-the-counter holdings and futures 
     positions on foreign exchanges.
       In theory, position limits should curb excessive 
     speculation in food and energy markets by imposing caps on 
     the amount of futures contracts that may be held by any one 
     investor. However, the position limits no longer serve their 
     original purpose. Large institutional investors, such as 
     pension funds, can circumvent the position limits by 
     investing in over-the-counter markets. Through a regulatory 
     ``swaps'' loophole, financial institutions that serve the 
     over-the-counter markets also circumvent the position limits.
       The bill will reduce excessive speculation by closing the 
     swaps loophole and eliminating the exemptions that apply to 
     investors that are not taking physical delivery of food and 
     energy commodities. The bill applies the position limits if 
     the position is not

[[Page S6570]]

     related to a bona fide hedging activity. The bill 
     incorporates the CFTC's definition of bona fide hedging, but 
     clarifies that it does not include hedging financial risks 
     associated with over-the-counter derivatives, such as swaps 
     and structured notes.
       In the evolving commodity marketplace, trading is 
     increasingly occurring in unregulated over-the-counter 
     markets or overseas. By extending the position limits to 
     holdings regardless of where they are held, the position 
     limits will no longer create an incentive to trade off-
     exchange or overseas. The bill would require the CFTC to 
     develop a methodology that allows investors to aggregate 
     their positions on the exchanges and in over-the-counter 
     markets for purposes of regulatory enforcement of the 
     position limits.
       The legislation requires the CFTC to set the individual 
     position limits at amounts necessary to prevent excessive 
     speculation while still ensuring sufficient market liquidity.
       The CFTC currently sets the speculative position limits at 
     amounts the Commission believes are necessary to prevent 
     market manipulation by individual market participants. In 
     contradiction with the original intent of the Congress, the 
     CFTC does not set the position limits at amounts necessary to 
     control the harmful inflationary effects of excessive 
     speculation. The bill clarifies that the position limits 
     should be set at amounts no greater than necessary to ensure 
     sufficient market liquidity for the conduct of bona fide 
     hedging activities.
       The legislation directs that the speculative position 
     limits must be set by the CFTC, not the futures exchanges.
       The bill would repeal the CFTC's authority to delegate the 
     responsibility for setting the position limits to the 
     exchanges. The major exchanges are no longer nonprofit 
     entities, but rather for-profit businesses. The position 
     limits should be set by a regulatory entity that has a single 
     mission--serving the public interest.
       The legislation repeals the authority that permits the CFTC 
     to substitute reporting requirements for actual speculative 
     position limits.
       Currently, position limits apply to an investor's holdings 
     in the spot month, any single month, and all months combined. 
     With respect to energy futures contracts, the position limits 
     are replaced with a simple reporting requirement, or 
     ``position accountability level'', in the all-months time 
     period. The bill would extend actual speculative position 
     limits to the all-months time period.
       The legislation requires foreign futures exchanges to 
     provide the CFTC with daily trading information comparable to 
     the information provided by domestic exchanges.
       Increasingly, foreign futures exchanges are offering cash-
     settled futures contracts that are based on commodity prices 
     set by contracts traded on U.S. exchanges. These ``look-
     alike'' contracts arguably offer investors a competitive 
     alternative to contracts that are traded and physically 
     settled through U.S. exchanges. The CFTC recently indicated 
     it will require foreign exchanges offering look-alike 
     contracts to provide trading information comparable to the 
     information provided by domestic exchanges. This provision 
     codifies the new CFTC policy. The provision lays the 
     statutory framework necessary for a seamless system of 
     information reporting and improved transparency that will 
     ensure the CFTC has the ability to monitor and enforce the 
     new speculative position limits.
       The legislation increases the resources available to the 
     CFTC to carry out is its expanded responsibilities under the 
     Act, including additional funds for staffing and technology.
       The legislation constitutes a historic expansion of the 
     CFTC's mission. Significant new resources will be needed to 
     carry out these directives. As soon as practicable after the 
     date of enactment, the legislation requires the CFTC to hire 
     100 additional full-time employees and authorizes such sums 
     as are necessary to implement its new responsibilities. No 
     later than 45 days after enactment, the CFTC must report to 
     the Congressional appropriations committees with an estimate 
     of the additional funding necessary to fully administer the 
     Act.
       The legislation directs the CFTC to review trends in 
     speculative activity related to metals, and report to 
     Congress on whether the Commission's new authority should 
     extend to trading in metals.

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, high energy prices are having a 
devastating impact on our economy and our people--especially in large, 
rural States like Maine. Truckdrivers, loggers, fishermen, farmers, and 
countless others are struggling with the high cost of oil and gasoline. 
In Maine, where 80 percent of homes are heated with oil, many families 
do not know how they can afford to stay warm next winter.
  The high cost of energy is also taking a toll on businesses, both 
large and small. Katahdin Paper recently announced plans to shut down 
its plant in Millinocket due to the cost of oil. If this occurs--and 
everyone is working to prevent it--the community would be devastated by 
the loss of more than 200 good jobs.
  Many factors affect energy prices, including the value of the dollar, 
global tensions, and demand in other countries, such as China and 
India. But Senator Lieberman and I have heard persuasive and troubling 
evidence in hearings of our Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs that another factor is also at work--excessive 
speculation in futures markets for energy commodities.
  At issue is the activity of noncommercial traders who do not produce 
or take delivery of oil or agricultural products, unlike commercial 
traders such as oil producers and heating oil dealers, farmers and 
cereal companies. Instead, these noncommercial investors use futures 
contracts and related transactions solely for financial gain.
  Speculation in commodity markets by noncommercial investors has grown 
enormously. In just the last 5 years, the total value of their futures-
contract and commodity index-fund investments has soared from $13 
billion to $260 billion.
  These massive new holdings of oil-futures contracts by pension funds, 
university endowments, and other institutional investors appear to be 
driving up prices beyond what they would otherwise be. These investors' 
intentions may be simply to provide good returns, a hedge against 
inflation, and diversification, but many experts believe their 
activities are distorting commodity markets.
  I have worked with Senator Lieberman to produce a comprehensive and 
bipartisan bill, the Commodity Speculation Reform Act of 2008, which we 
are introducing today.
  Our bill takes some very strong steps toward countering excessive 
speculation.
  First, it would remedy staffing shortfalls at the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission by adding 100 staff to improve its market oversight 
and enforcement capabilities. This is a vital step. The CFTC tells us 
that more than 3 billion futures and options contracts were traded last 
year, up from 37 million in 1976. Yet the Commission is operating with 
fewer employees than it had 30 years ago.
  Second, our bill closes the so-called ``swaps loophole,'' which 
currently allows financial institutions to evade position limits on 
commodity contracts that regulators use to prevent unwarranted price 
swings or attempts at manipulation.
  Third, our bill directs the CFTC to establish position limits that 
will apply to an investor's total interest in a commodity, regardless 
of whether they originate on a regulated exchange, the over-the-counter 
market, or on foreign boards of trade that deal in U.S. commodities.
  Fourth, our bill instructs the CFTC to permit no foreign boards of 
trade to deal in U.S.-linked commodity contracts unless they agree to 
reporting and data- accessibility standards at least equivalent to that 
required of U.S.-regulated exchanges. This is not a matter of telling 
other countries what to do: foreign boards of trade request ``no-
action'' letters from the CFTC so they can maintain trading terminals 
here while remaining regulated by their own authorities. The CFTC has 
recently taken positive steps to require comparable reporting, and our 
bill codifies those improvements.
  These are powerful measures, but they are also prudently designed. We 
recognize that producers, handlers, and purchasers of commodities who 
use those markets to lock in prices, hedge risks, and see clues for 
price trends require some level of participation by non- commercial, 
financial investors.
  Our bill does not prevent financial investors from participating in 
commodity markets. It simply places some limits on their presence by 
directing the CFTC to set position limits across trading venues at a 
level no higher than that needed to ensure that commercial participants 
can always find counterparties for their contract needs.
  These and other provisions of our bill--which applies to agricultural 
as well as energy commodities--will provide a stronger regulator, 
improved flows of information, new and more consistent protections 
against excessive speculation, and assurance to both businesses and 
consumers that our markets in basic commodities are transparent, 
competitive, and effectively policed.
  The Commodity Speculation Reform Act of 2008 represents a balanced 
and bipartisan approach. I urge my colleagues to join Senator Lieberman 
and me in supporting it.

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