[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 108 (Friday, June 27, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6317-S6320]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION BUREAUCRACY OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today I wish to discuss the U.S. arms
control and nonproliferation bureaucracy and its impact on our national
security.
Recently, I chaired two hearings of the Oversight of Government
Management Subcommittee of the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee concerning the national security
bureaucracy for arms control and nonproliferation. I examined several
options for improving our ability to control proliferation. They
included: Reestablishing an independent arms control and
nonproliferation agency, creating a semiautonomous arms control and
nonproliferation agency within the State Department, and reestablishing
an arms control bureau in the State Department. Other issues discussed
were elevating the role of the head of the arms control and
nonproliferation bureaucracy and ensuring that there are enough
qualified arms control and nonproliferation experts to protect our
national security and meet our international obligations.
Witnesses for both hearings had decades of experience in managing our
nation's arms control and nonproliferation issues. Ambassador Thomas
Graham and Ambassador Norman Wulf, along with Dr. Andrew Semmel, who
recently retired as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations, provided perspective
about the changes to this bureaucracy over the past decade and the need
for reform. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed into
the Record, following my remarks, a report submitted by Ambassador Wulf
which represents consensus findings of a number of experts and former
U.S. officials experienced in this field.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. AKAKA. The second hearing featured Ms. Patricia McNerney, the
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Security and Nonproliferation, and Ms. Linda Taglialatela, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Resources. They gave greater
insight into the controversial, and damaging, arms control and
nonproliferation bureaucracy reorganization at the State Department in
2005 and the ongoing human capital changes the bureaus involved
continue to face today. The State Department's use of short-term, Band-
Aid fixes to cover a loss of qualified civil servants and a lack of
commitment by senior leaders to address the Department's cultural
tensions, primarily between regional and functional issues, troubled me
since these problems affect both human capital and organizational
capacity to confront the evolving threat of weapons of mass
destruction.
In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy entered office, the United
States faced a perceived missile gap against its foe, the Soviet Union.
The Kennedy administration, confronting the critical challenges of the
day, advocated a new government ``agency of peace'' which would work
toward ``ultimate world disarmament.'' This agency, the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, ACDA, helped craft and implement the policy
decisions that would reduce the nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons threat to Americans through multiple, lasting, and verifiable
treaties. The world was at a nuclear tipping point, where a small
change could make a significant difference. The Kennedy administration
challenged the conventional wisdom that argued for only an increase in
nuclear weapons. It instead focused on controlling and limiting the
spread of nuclear weapons by creating the small, but agile, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency that gradually began to increase
international security.
The world appears to be at another nuclear tipping point. Today
international security does not hinge on an arms race between two
mighty superpowers. Rather, international security is increasingly
threatened by the wide proliferation of nuclear programs, material, and
knowledge. Countries such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran
have either achieved a nuclear weapons program or have aspirations to
create one. Others soon may follow. Along with these headline-grabbing
nuclear proliferation concerns, many countries are seeking nuclear
power and assured access to uranium to satisfy their growing energy
demands. The peaceful application of civilian nuclear programs
heightens the risk of diversion or the proliferation of plutonium and
enriched uranium. Both presidential candidates have expressed their
commitment to addressing proliferation and working with other nations
to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict.
The next administration must confront this tipping point head on and
solve the problem of our troubled arms control and nonproliferation
bureaucracy. Along with its organizational structure, fundamental human
capital issues must be resolved. They include: Addressing what is
considered by some a cumbersome hiring process; recruiting, developing,
and retaining a diverse and highly qualified workforce; involving key
stakeholders during organizational changes; and making it desirable for
Foreign Service Officers to serve in the fields of arms control and
nonproliferation.
We need to consider the gravity of this issue now. I urge my
colleagues to advocate an arms control and nonproliferation workforce
and organization that will support effectively the policies of the next
administration and prepare us for the nuclear threats developing
throughout the world.
Exhibit 1
Foreword
This report was prepared by a volunteer task force. The
task force solicited views from participants through two
general meetings and from contributors via written comments.
These two groups included many former U.S. officials most
with decades of experience in nonproliferation or arms
control who graciously gave of their time to this project.
They are named below--a short biography of each appears in
the annex.
This report contains a general consensus that the
Administration taking office in January 2009 should
strengthen the organizational capacity of the State
Department to meet critical nonproliferation and arms control
challenges. Participants and contributors endorse the general
thrust of this report though not necessarily every finding
and suggestion.
Christopher Mitchell of the Institute for Conflict Analysis
and Resolution (ICAR) of George Mason University served as
convener of the two meetings that were held. Norman Wulf led
those discussions and along with Dean Rust and Barclay Ward
drafted the discussion papers and this report.
The task force also included Linda Gallini, Fred
McGoldrick, and Sharon Squassoni.
Participants in at least one of the two meetings included
members of the task force and Vic Alessi, Kevin Avruch,
Joseph M.
[[Page S6318]]
DeThomas, James E. Goodby, Allan Krass, Frances Omori, Randy
Rydell and Andy Semmel.
Among those commenting upon various drafts of the paper
were William Burns, Ralph Earle II, Mark Fitzpatrick, Bob
Gallucci, John Holum, Edward Ifft and John Rhinelander.
No funds were made available to the task force other than
by ICAR for use of their new retreat and conference center
located on Mason Neck in Northern Virginia and for
refreshments at the two meetings. Special appreciation is
expressed to Gina Cerasani and Aneela Shamshad, and Saira
Yamin, graduate students at ICAR, who served as volunteer
note-takers at the two meetings.
Executive Summary
All three major presidential candidates have endorsed (i.)
maintaining and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation
regime and (ii.) pursuing nuclear arms control measures with
Russia and others. Regrettably, the State Department, which
will bear the brunt of the work on nonproliferation and arms
control, has lost significant capability--critical personnel
have left, the arms control bureau has been abolished, and
the bureau whose mandate includes nonproliferation is
burdened with tasks outside its traditional purview that
dilute its mission. Moreover, the State Department is simply
not organized to ensure continued access and accountability
to the Secretary of State and President on these critical
issues.
Following the election, the President-elect should appoint
a high-caliber individual to head up a task force charged
with laying out detailed priorities in nonproliferation and
arms control and recommending structural changes needed
within the executive branch to achieve those priorities. The
White House and National Security Council will need to be
well-organized to serve the President, but the task force
should direct its primary attention to the Department of
State. Restoring focus at State will require creating a
bureau focused on arms control, removing non-core tasks from
the bureau whose responsibilities include nonproliferation,
and limiting the activities of the verification and
compliance bureau to those required by law. If there are
substantial obstacles to near-term creation of an arms
control-focused bureau, then those functions should be
consolidated in the verification and compliance bureau
effectively making it the arms control and verification
bureau while seeking a long-term structure. Aggressive steps
must be taken to redress the loss of expert staff. For the
civil service, this means rehiring, recruiting, and
strengthening career paths for personnel, including physical
scientists, with expertise in nonproliferation and arms
control. For the foreign service, this means providing
training in these topics and career paths that reward those
working on these functional issues.
Particular attention should be focused on ensuring that
nonproliferation and arms control views get to the Secretary
of State and the President. Both not only need advice but
someone accountable in these areas. Existing law makes
provision for such advice but it has proven difficult to
implement those provisions effectively. Relying on personal
relationships can work up to a point, but as personalities
change, other priorities intrude, and administrations change,
a more enduring channel and focus not dependent upon personal
relationships is needed.
Decisions on these structural issues are critical in the
transition period so the new administration can hit the
ground running. Iran and North Korea, among others, will not
delay their proliferation progress while a new administration
organizes itself. Delaying decisions until after the
inauguration risks subordinating structural questions to the
crisis of the day or decisions being thwarted by ``turf''
issues as political appointees are put into place. A variety
of alternatives should be considered ranging from creating a
special office attached to the Secretary, or creating a
separate agency within the State Department or an independent
agency.
Ensuring the U.S. Government Has the Capacity To Meet Critical
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Challenges
This short Report which is the result of meetings and
discussions between a number of experts focuses on improving
the Nation's capacity for dealing with the increasingly
complex issues associated with nonproliferation and arms
control. It lays out a number of alternative strategies for
improving the Government's currently attenuated capacities
for effective nonproliferation and arms control action.
I. Introduction
All three major presidential candidates have endorsed the
following objectives: (i.) maintaining and strengthening the
nuclear nonproliferation regime and (ii.) pursuing nuclear
arms control measures with Russia and others. Regrettably,
what the next President will find is a diminished capability
within the Executive Branch to achieve either objective.
The historical leadership role of the United States in
nonproliferation and arms control has been severely
downgraded and the nonproliferation regime significantly
weakened. Along with this overall decline, there has been a
loss of valuable expertise and bureaucratic structure
diminishing the capacity of the United States to pursue
nonproliferation and arms control measures.
Restoring U.S. leadership in these areas will require a
personal commitment by the new President. Within the
Executive Branch, there will need to be a strong organization
to execute policies and be accountable to the White House.
This paper looks at key organizational issues that must be
met, particularly in the State Department, if the new
administration is to meet its nonproliferation and arms
control objectives.
II. Critical Proliferation Challenges
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the
foundation for global cooperation in this area. Its primary
goal is to decrease the risk of nuclear war by preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons. It also obligates the five states
which the NPT recognizes as possessing nuclear weapons--U.S.,
Russia, UK, France and China--to work toward nuclear
disarmament The urgency of dealing with the threat posed by
nuclear weapons has been highlighted recently by former
senior officials of both political parties--Secretaries of
State Kissinger and Shultz, Secretary of Defense Perry, and
Senator Nunn--who have called for renewed efforts to work
towards a nuclear weapon free world, arguing that ``the world
is now on a precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era.''
Their agenda, known as the Hoover plan after the Stanford
institute where the group meets, is built around the NPT and
focuses on U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control as well as on
specific nonproliferation measures. No vision of a nuclear
weapon free world or major progress toward that goal can be
achieved without an intensive focus on both nonproliferation
and arms control.
The three major candidates for the Presidency have called
for strengthening the NPT and other elements of the
nonproliferation regime and for reducing the nuclear arsenals
of the United States and other nuclear powers; two have
endorsed specific portions of the Hoover plan. Any new
administration will likely focus on a wide variety of other
nuclear-related challenges as well, e.g., Iran and North
Korea; protecting against the theft or diversion of nuclear
material; strengthening export control and interdiction
activities; and developing nuclear fuel cycle strategies to
reduce the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities. It may
reconsider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the
Senate failed to endorse in 1999, and give higher priority to
U.S-Russian cooperation on strategic nuclear and missile
defense issues and to a fissile material cutoff treaty. The
new administration will have to continue specific measures to
prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear, radiological,
chemical and biological weapons.
III. Structural Factors
The first year of a new administration offers a unique
opportunity for progress. Grasping that opportunity requires
diligent preparations during the transition period. To
prepare, the President-elect should establish a task force to
identify key substantive goals and devise a plan for the
creation of nonproliferation and arms control structures to
achieve those goals. The task force should be led by an
individual of stature who is directly accountable to the
President-elect and well-known to the Congress. The task
force could continue beyond the inauguration but should not
be permanent. After the inauguration, the task force leader
might be directly attached to the White House with the
assignment of ensuring that substantive and structural goals
are achieved.
As cabinet departments with equities in nonproliferation
and arms control have appointees put into place, a senior
official in each department should be identified to work with
the relevant White House and NSC officials. The NSC structure
must include interagency groups responsible for integrating
the activities and resources of each department, promoting
transparency and information flow among agencies, and
ensuring the input of the intelligence community. The
appointment of a Deputy National Security Adviser for
Nonproliferation and Arms Control would demonstrate the
priority attached to these issues and allow for greater
coordination of interagency activities.
The task force must pay special attention to the
organizational structure under the Secretary of State, as
State will bear the brunt of the work. State must be capable
of performing a wide range of daily activities such as
monitoring information, crafting and implementing policy
initiatives, anticipating problems, advising high-level
political officials, coordinating with other agencies,
consulting with Congress, informing the public, and most
importantly engaging in extensive diplomacy to maintain and
strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Effective
nonproliferation can only be achieved if the U.S. works
closely with others.
A good organizational structure will help to set
priorities, allocate resources, maintain the quality and
morale of staff, and get issues to decision-makers in a
timely manner. Among the key determinants of an effective
structure are: (i) enough senior policy officials and
supporting bureaus to focus attention on the full range of
issues; (ii) an experienced multi-disciplinary career staff
with a high percentage of civil servants including physical
science officers; and (iii) high-level channels for getting
views to the Secretary of State and President.
As shown below in Section IV, the current structure, which
reflects the priorities and approach of this Administration,
is entirely inadequate for pursuit of a more comprehensive
approach by the new administration. The suggestions offered
in Section IV do not
[[Page S6319]]
require legislation but should lead to near-term improvements
in State's capacity. Even though not required, the
administration and Congress may decide that it would be
beneficial to codify some of these Section IV changes to
ensure that the United States maintains over the long term
a high level of capability in these critical areas.
Section V looks at other possible legislative approaches
that would create either a semi-autonomous agency within the
State Department or a separate agency for nonproliferation
and arms control with an independence similar to that
possessed by the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), which was merged with the State Department in 1999.
If not already decided by campaign commitments, the
President-elect should decide during the transition whether
to pursue a separate agency or limit structural reforms to
near-term changes that do not require legislation. Even if
the President decides on a separate agency, some improvements
in the State structure will still be desirable while awaiting
the necessary legislative action. Thorough consultations with
the Congress should occur regardless of which direction is
chosen.
IV. Suggested Changes to the Current State Department Organizational
Structure
A. Bureaus and Special Representatives
At the outset of this Administration, three separate
bureaus in State dealt with nonproliferation, arms control,
and verification and compliance. The arms control bureau was
abolished in 2005. Some of the arms control functions, e.g.,
START, were taken over by the verification and compliance
bureau but that bureau's duties remain largely verification
and compliance as prescribed by law. Other arms control
duties were transferred to the former nonproliferation
bureau, now renamed International Security and
Nonproliferation. A quick inventory of this bureau's
jurisdiction includes: six treaties, five export control
regimes, three international organizations that specialize in
nonproliferation or arms control topics, conventional arms
proliferation, missile proliferation, missile defense, the
Proliferation Security Initiative, implementation of several
U.N. Security Council resolutions and negotiation of
resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly, combating nuclear
terrorism, country strategies, cooperative threat reduction
in the former U.S.S.R., and securing and disposing of fissile
material.
Diluting the focus of the bureau charged with
nonproliferation by adding such areas as missile defense and
General Assembly resolutions makes it much more difficult to
achieve priority nonproliferation objectives. Abolishing the
arms control focus and scattering its remains renders it
unlikely that a renewed arms control agenda as proposed in
the Hoover plan can be successfully pursued. Finally, while
verification and compliance remain important, the need for
U.S. global engagement on nonproliferation and arms control
measures should have higher priority and greater focus.
Suggestions
1. Establish a bureau focused solely on nonproliferation by
shifting all non-core duties, such as missile defense and
General Assembly resolutions, to a bureau with an arms
control focus.
2. Revitalize the organizational structure for arms control
by bringing back a bureau solely focused on arms control.
Given the difference in priorities in 2005 and what will
exist in 2009, new priorities can best be met by creating
such a single-focus bureau.
3. Through administrative action, limit the activities of
the verification and compliance bureau to the minimum
necessary to fulfill its statutory duties. The goal should be
to eliminate bureaucratic infighting and free up staff from
this bureau for high priority nonproliferation and arms
control activities.
4. If there are substantial obstacles to near-term creation
of an arms control focused bureau, then consolidate those
functions in the verification and compliance bureau
effectively making it the arms control and verification
bureau while seeking a long-term structure. This approach
should include clearly defining the verification role as
suggested above.
5. Utilize existing statutory authority to appoint
``Special Representatives of the President'' at the
ambassadorial level, with at least one dedicated to
nonproliferation treaties and related activities; and another
to the reemerging arms control agenda. They would work with
the assistant secretaries for nonproliferation and arms
control and be responsible for negotiations, conferences, and
consulting with other governments.
B. Staffing
The State Department should have skills and experience
relevant to bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and
negotiations; the development, testing and manufacture of
nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and their delivery
systems; the civil nuclear fuel cycle; and to the
implementation of interdiction measures, export controls,
treaties and international organizations. An
interdisciplinary group of civil servants from the physical
and social sciences is needed along with foreign service
officers (FSOs) and detailees from the military services.
This mix has worked well in the past.
Unfortunately, there has been a significant loss of civil
servants from the State Department in recent years, and
recruiting physical scientists in particular faces strong
competitive pressures outside the government. Moreover, with
the elimination of ACDA, it has become more difficult to
sustain civil service career patterns up through the office
director position. Within the relevant bureaus, the State
Department has reduced the number of senior executive service
positions (SES) for civil servants and several office
director positions have gone to FSOs. Such officers have much
to offer, including in some cases as office directors or
other senior positions. But FSOs must meet the qualifications
of the positions, and in most leadership positions, including
office directors; the qualifications require a high level of
expertise in the field. Regrettably, the foreign service
creates few incentives for FSOs to obtain the requisite
knowledge for leadership positions in nonproliferation and
arms control.
Suggestions
1. Halt any further ``bleeding'' of the career
nonproliferation and arms control staff. Encourage those who
transferred out of these jobs in recent years to return.
Promote a civil service career path leading to office
director positions, including at the SES level. Launch a
recruiting program to hire the next generation of civil
service specialists, including in relevant scientific and
technical fields. Seek special hiring authority, if
necessary, to recruit individuals with technical competence
and to tap the skills of those officers who have retired from
State.
2. Develop the technical competence of FSOs by creating a
career path for nonproliferation and arms control with a
protocol of training and assignments in these areas. For all
FSOs, regardless of their career path, at least one
assignment in nonproliferation and arms control or other
functional bureaus should be a factor in promotion decisions
to mid or senior level FSO positions. Such assignments could
reduce some cultural barriers that exist between the regional
and functional areas.
C. Advising the Secretary of State and the President
Competing interests are a fact of life at the highest
political levels and it is important that those advocating on
behalf of controlling nuclear weapons be heard. The Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security (``the Under Secretary'') is the most senior State
official with clearly defined responsibilities for
nonproliferation and arms control, although that position's
mandate covers other issues including security assistance and
conventional arms. This official is subordinate to the Deputy
Secretary of State, is one of six under secretaries and ranks
below the Under Secretary for Political Affairs who oversees
the powerful regional bureaus. This senior level structure is
further complicated by policy officials attached directly to
the Office of the Secretary of State for diverse areas, such
as reconstruction and stabilization, foreign assistance,
development aid, counter-terrorism, and global AIDS programs.
Seeking to ensure that nonproliferation and arms control
were not lost among the competing interests, the legislation
merging ACDA into State authorized the Under Secretary to
assume the former ACDA Director's role of senior adviser to
the Secretary and the President on arms control and
nonproliferation and to attend NSC meetings at the
President's direction (22 U.S.C. Sec. 2651 a. (b) (2))
(emphasis added). Use of this authority, however, was not
embraced by the current Administration.
It has long been clear that the State Department structure
tends to favor regional interests. This tendency is reflected
in the fact that the under secretary to whom the regional
bureaus report is the third ranking official in the
department. This does not mean that functional interests must
give way to regional interests but it does mean that a
Secretary of State or a President must ensure that functional
priorities are clearly understood and always given
appropriate weight. For that to happen, a mechanism must be
found to ensure that nonproliferation and arms control
equities are represented.
Different approaches--with varying degrees of success--have
been taken by different administrations. Some administrations
have relied upon the personal relationships among the
relevant assistant secretaries, under secretaries, the Deputy
Secretary and the Secretary to ensure that nonproliferation
and arms control are accorded adequate priority. Others have
created various additional mechanisms such as an ambassador-
at-large to obtain this result. Of course, up to 1999, the
ACDA Director had the rank of Deputy Secretary of State and
the authority to advise the Secretary and the President.
Relying solely on personal relationships places at risk
over time the capability to sustain the attention of the
Secretary of State as personalities change and the inevitable
crush of foreign policy issues competes for the Secretary's
attention. Continuity of attention to these critical issues
could be enhanced by having a structure not dependent upon
personalities. Set forth in the suggestions immediately
below, which would not require new legislation, and in
Section V, which would require new legislation, are various
alternatives that should be considered. They could supplement
any NSC or White House structural components set up to advise
the President. As noted earlier, decisions with respect to
these issues should be taken during the transition--delaying
those decisions until after the inauguration risks
[[Page S6320]]
critical substantive issues crowding out attention to
structural questions and ``turf'' mentalities developing that
hamper organizational change.
Suggestions
1. Establish procedures to implement the Under Secretary's
already existing statutory role as senior adviser to the
Secretary and the President on nonproliferation and arms
control matters. This would allow the Under Secretary to
weigh in on major policy questions, including with the
President. It would elevate this position in relation to the
other under secretaries. Implementing such an approach would
work only if understood and accepted up front by all
involved, including the President. Actual use of this
authority by the Under Secretary with the President is likely
to be rare, in any event, given this person's subordinate
position to the Secretary.
2. Establish a position in the Secretary's office such as
Coordinator, Ambassador-at-Large, or Special Adviser to the
Secretary of State and President, that would focus on nuclear
policy or nonproliferation. The mandate could be limited to a
few critical topics, e.g. Iran, North Korea, anti-nuclear
terrorism, and/or elements of the Hoover plan, or could be
broad enough to focus on all aspects of nuclear
proliferation. This would elevate nuclear issues to the
highest level in State and permit more focus than the Under
Secretary, whose mandate is far broader. This sort of
arrangement was used with varying degrees of success during
the Carter, Reagan and Bush I administrations. It would
require a high degree of coordination between the Under
Secretary and the new position, as well as with the relevant
assistant secretaries. It would not create any clearer path
to the President for views that are contrary to the
Secretary's.
V. Separate Agency
State and ACDA working in tandem over nearly three decades
were able to sustain a high level of U.S. global leadership
in nonproliferation and arms control. This was in large part
due to ACDA's exclusive focus on the mission, its status as
an independent sub-cabinet agency with statutory authority to
advise the Secretary of State and the President, and a strong
cadre of civil service experts. The ten years since ACDA's
demise have seen a decline in U.S. diplomacy in this area.
That said, there seems little doubt that ACDA-like resources
and strengths will be needed for the foreseeable future. The
question is will a strengthened State structure as suggested
above in Section IV be adequate to the task over the long
run or should the new Administration seek legislation to
transfer the nonproliferation and arms control functions
to a separate agency? Two different approaches to a
separate agency are set forth below.
A. Separate Agency, But Part of State
A semi-autonomous agency within State would be similar to
the concept of the National Nuclear Security Administration
within the Department of Energy. The agency's Director would
be the nonproliferation and arms control adviser to the
Secretary, and have a rank equivalent to the Deputy Secretary
of State. The Director would also have the right to
communicate directly with the President. The agency would
work closely with State regional bureaus and related
functional bureaus, but there would be no need for additional
nonproliferation and arms control offices elsewhere in State
since this agency would represent the coordinated view of the
State Department on these issues.
This approach would ensure optimal access to the Secretary.
The agency's unique identity and mission should improve the
recruitment and retention of the diverse professional staff
needed, including scientists and other technical experts. The
elevation of nonproliferation and arms control within State
will make clear to other governments the importance placed on
these topics by the United States and lead to regular
consultations with friends and allies. A separate agency is
the best way to promote an enduring focus on nonproliferation
and arms control policy, in contrast to embedding it in the
Department's traditional structure with the vast array of
competing interests and predominant focus on country and
regional factors. On the other hand, establishing a separate
agency would require legislation and presently Congress is
focusing on structural issues relevant to post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction, development aid, and
foreign assistance. Some argue that a separate agency is not
needed; and that State can be structured so that these issues
get the attention they deserve and the Secretary gets the
necessary advice.
B. Independent Agency
The principal difference from alternative A would be the
agency's independence from State. The agency's director would
have a seat at NSC meetings dealing with relevant issues, and
the agency would participate as a separate entity in
interagency deliberations. The agency would have a status
similar to that of the former ACDA, which would imply a
return to a pre-1999 situation where State had its own
nonproliferation and arms control offices. The duties and
structure of the new agency, however, would have to reflect
the priorities and threats of today. Many of the arguments in
alternative A are also applicable here.
In addition, this approach is the only one guaranteed to
ensure that the President could hear the nonproliferation and
arms control perspective even when the Secretary of State has
a different view. Equally important, having an independent
agency would make certain that unfiltered nonproliferation
and arms control views are considered at all levels of
interagency policy formulation, a situation that gave ACDA
influence. On the other hand, as experience with ACDA
demonstrated, the option of going to the President in
opposition to the Secretary of State can be more theoretical
than real, and might rarely be exercised. An independent
agency would result in State creating its own
nonproliferation and arms control officials and they would
have more influence on the Secretary on a day-to-day basis
than would a separate agency. Some in Congress would also not
be receptive to creating a new agency, believing that more
than a decade is needed to determine whether State can
effectively do the job on its own.
VI. Conclusion
The above suggestions are, we feel, both practical and
necessary although which approach to advising the Secretary
of State and the President is actually taken up by a new
administration remains a topic for debate and discussion,
which we hope will occur over the coming months. These
suggestions are offered not as firm conclusions but as
alternative ways of improving the country's capacities for
planning and implementing a coordinated and flexible, but
above all effective, strategy for dealing with
nonproliferation and arms control issues.
____________________