[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 101 (Wednesday, June 18, 2008)]
[House]
[Pages H5498-H5502]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CATCHING OPERATIONAL VULNERABILITIES BY ENSURING RANDOM TESTING ACT OF
2008
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules
and pass the bill (H.R. 5909) to amend the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act to prohibit advance notice to certain individuals,
including security screeners, of covert testing of security screening
procedures for the purpose of enhancing transportation security at
airports, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 5909
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Catching Operational
Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008'' or
the ``COVERT Act of 2008''.
SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF ADVANCE NOTICE OF COVERT TESTING TO
SECURITY SCREENERS.
Section 111 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(Public Law 107-71; 49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is amended--
(1) by striking the section enumerator and heading and
inserting the following:
[[Page H5499]]
``SEC. 111. TRAINING, EMPLOYMENT, AND TESTING OF SECURITY
SCREENING PERSONNEL.''
and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(e) Prohibition of Advance Notice to Security Screeners
of Covert Testing and Evaluation.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
ensure that information concerning a covert test of a
transportation security system to be conducted by a covert
testing office, the Inspector General of the Department of
Homeland Security, or the Government Accountability Office is
not provided to any individual prior to the completion of the
test.
``(2) Exceptions.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)--
``(A) an individual may provide information concerning a
covert test of a transportation security system to employees,
officers, and contractors of the Federal Government
(including military personnel); employees and officers of
State and local governments; and law enforcement officials,
who are authorized to receive or directed to be provided such
information by the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
(Transportation Security Administration), the Inspector
General of the Department of Homeland Security, or the
Comptroller General of the United States, as the case may be;
and
``(B) for the purpose of ensuring the security of any
individual in the vicinity of a site where a covert test of a
transportation security system is being conducted, an
individual conducting the test may disclose his or her status
as an individual conducting the test to any appropriate
individual if a security screener or other individual who is
not a covered employee identifies the individual conducting
the test as a potential threat.
``(3) Special rules for the transportation security
administration.--
``(A) Monitoring and security of testing personnel.--The
head of each covert testing office shall ensure that a person
or group of persons conducting a covert test of a
transportation security system for the covert testing office
is accompanied at the site of the test by a cover team
comprised of one or more employees of the covert testing
office for the purpose of monitoring the test and confirming
the identity of personnel involved in the test under
subparagraph (B).
``(B) Responsibility of cover team.--Under this paragraph,
a cover team for a covert test of a transportation security
system shall--
``(i) monitor the test; and
``(ii) for the purpose of ensuring the security of any
individual in the vicinity of a site where the test is being
conducted, confirm, notwithstanding paragraph (1), the
identity of any individual conducting the test to any
appropriate individual if a security screener or other
individual who is not a covered employee identifies the
individual conducting the test as a potential threat.
``(C) Aviation screening.--Notwithstanding subparagraph
(A), the Transportation Security Administration is not
required to have a cover team present during a test of the
screening of persons, carry-on items, or checked baggage at
an aviation security checkpoint at or serving an airport if
the test--
``(i) is approved by the Federal Security Director for such
airport; and
``(ii) is carried out under an aviation screening
assessment program of the Department of Homeland Security.
``(D) Use of other personnel.--The Transportation Security
Administration may use employees, officers, and contractors
of the Federal Government (including military personnel) and
employees and officers of State and local governments to
conduct covert tests.
``(4) Impact study and report on covert testing
procedures.--
``(A) Impact study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall conduct a study of the impact of the implementation of
this subsection on the Department of Homeland Security's
efforts to improve transportation security.
``(B) Requirements.--The study under subparagraph (A) shall
include an assessment of--
``(i) the impact of the implementation of this subsection
on personnel of the Department of Homeland Security;
``(ii) the impact of such implementation on information
sharing within the Department;
``(iii) best practices for integrating the topic of covert
testing into existing training and testing programs for
personnel of the Department; and
``(iv) the effectiveness of covert testing as a method to
improve security.
``(C) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of
the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit
to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that contains--
``(i) the results of the study under subparagraph (A);
``(ii) recommendations for changes to the training of
personnel of the Department that are necessary to ensure
compliance with the requirements of this subsection; and
``(iii) recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the
implementation of this subsection.
``(5) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection, the
following definitions apply:
``(A) Appropriate individual.--The term `appropriate
individual', as used with respect to a covert test of a
transportation security system, means any individual that--
``(i) the individual conducting the test determines needs
to know his or her status as an individual conducting a test
under paragraph (2)(B); or
``(ii) the cover team monitoring the test under paragraph
(3)(B)(i) determines needs to know the identity of an
individual conducting the test.
``(B) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means
any individual who receives notice of a covert test before
the completion of a test under paragraph (2)(A).
``(C) Covert test.--
``(i) In general.--The term `covert test' means an exercise
or activity conducted by a covert testing office, the
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, or
the Government Accountability Office to intentionally test,
compromise, or circumvent transportation security systems to
identify vulnerabilities in such systems.
``(ii) Limitation.--Notwithstanding clause (i), the term
`covert test' does not mean an exercise or activity by an
employee or contractor of the Transportation Security
Administration to test or assess compliance with regulations
under title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
``(D) Covert testing office.--The term `covert testing
office' means any office of the Transportation Security
Administration designated by the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) to
conduct covert tests of transportation security systems.
``(E) Employee of a covert testing office.--The term
`employee of a covert testing office' means an individual who
is an employee of a covert testing office or a contractor or
an employee of a contractor of a covert testing office.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Daniel E. Lungren) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi.
General Leave
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under
consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Mississippi?
There was no objection.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of
this bill and yield myself as much time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by
Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, or the COVERT Act of 2008, was
introduced by Congresswoman Lowey of New York.
The COVERT Act of 2008 was introduced to eliminate the practice of
giving advance notice to transportation security workers of covert
tests before the tests happened. I want to thank Congresswoman Lowey
and the other members of the Committee on Homeland Security for working
together in a bipartisan manner to approve this measure unanimously.
I also want to thank the Transportation Security Administration for
recognizing the need for this legislation and working with us to ensure
that the bill accomplishes its goal without impeding the way in which
TSA conducts its covert testing.
This legislation is vital to protecting the integrity of covert tests
of transportation security systems. We know of at least three incidents
where covert tests were compromised by individuals who inappropriately
warned security officials.
This bill will prohibit individuals from providing advance notice of
these important covert tests to any persons, unless authorized to do so
by the Assistant Secretary of TSA, the Inspector General of DHS, or the
Comptroller General of GAO.
Covert testing efforts by TSA, the DHS IG, and GAO have helped to
increase the effectiveness of our transportation security systems by
highlighting vulnerabilities and keeping the screening workforce on
their toes. Any effort to compromise these important testing efforts,
whether intentional or accidental, should not be tolerated by this
Congress.
If we choose to ignore the problems of the past, we will provide
future opportunities to compromise a worthy program intended to educate
the workforce and benefit the security of our transportation security
systems throughout the country.
I strongly encourage all my colleagues to support H.R. 5909, which
complements the work the committee has done on H.R. 1684, the DHS
authorization bill that is pending before the Senate.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such
time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational
[[Page H5500]]
Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008, otherwise known
as the COVERT Act.
This act simply would prohibit the disclosure of information
concerning a covert test conducted by TSA, the Inspector General of
DHS, or GAO to any individual prior to the completion of the test. The
bill also requires any TSA covert testing team to be accompanied by a
cover team to monitor the covert test and to confirm the identity of
the covert testing team to any appropriate individual, if an individual
or security screener not aware of the covert test identifies the covert
testing team as a threat to security.
This bill is substantially modified from the bill as originally
introduced because there was some real give-and-take and compromise
produced on the part of both sides of the aisle at the subcommittee
level and with the full committee staff.
{time} 1130
And for that I am thankful and believe that we have a better product
as a result of that consultation and that give and take.
One of the things we wanted to make sure we did not do in attempting
to prevent people spilling the beans, so to speak, on these kinds of
covert tests was to have such a heavy-handed approach that it might tip
off people by the presence of additional folks. We've worked that out
here, and I thank the gentleman and the gentlelady for being able to do
that.
I would just have one small point, perhaps disagreement with the
chairman. There are reports that there was a tipping off in one
particular instance that was intentional, seemingly meant to give
people notice that there was going to be a test or it was about to take
place. In another case, at least from my review of the files, it
appears to be inadvertent, and I believe something on the order of
within 30 seconds the notice that was contained in an e-mail was
retrieved by the responsible party when he realized someone else had
put that out. And then there's a third one that's somewhat in dispute
between TSA and some Members of the House, and others.
And all I would say is, irrespective of how many there were, if there
was just one, that's one too many. This bill I think helps us move in
the direction of improving the circumstances so the likelihood of that
occurring is much less in the future than it would have been without
this legislation. And so for those reasons, I would enthusiastically
support H.R. 5909 and ask my colleagues to support it.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the
author and supporter of this legislation, the gentlelady from New York
(Mrs. Lowey).
Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5909 and begin by
thanking Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Subcommittee
Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, and Subcommittee Ranking Member Lungren for
moving this legislation to the floor.
My bill, the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random
Testing, or COVERT, Act would prohibit the advance notification of
covert tests on transportation systems without direct approval from the
highest officials in our Homeland Security operations.
This legislation bolsters accountability and integrity for covert
testing within our transportation systems overseen by the
Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Homeland
Security.
The core principles and goals of covert testing are undermined when
individuals are alerted in advance that a test or evaluation is
imminent. In fact, in case we haven't figured it out, there is nothing
covert about activities employees already know will occur.
Unfortunately, there have been a number of reported incidents in which
covert tests may have been compromised as a result of advanced
notification to Transportation Security officers.
The Inspector General at the Department of Homeland Security found
that between August 2003 and May 2004, Transportation Security
Administration officials at San Francisco International Airport
compromised covert testing efforts by tracking testers throughout the
airport utilizing surveillance cameras, then notifying screening
personnel in advance of the testers arriving at security checkpoints.
The Inspector General also found that Transportation Security officers
at Jackson-Evers International Airport in Jackson, Mississippi,
reported receiving advance notice of covert tests conducted by TSA's
Office of Inspection on February 12, 2004.
Finally, led by Chairman Thompson's efforts, the Homeland Security
Committee discovered on April 2006 an e-mail sent via TSA's net hub
system from the Office of Security Operations to all Federal security
directors and other TSA airport officials informing them of testing at
airports throughout the country.
In this unfortunate instance, while the e-mail may have violated TSA
protocols, it did not constitute the sharing of sensitive information
under the law. My legislation will close that loophole, making it a
violation to tip off employees before covert tests without high-level
approval at TSA and DHS.
During mark-up of this legislation, the Homeland Security Committee
adopted an amendment allowing local law enforcement to be notified
prior to a test if directed by the administrator providing for
personnel flexibility by clarifying that only one individual is
necessary to serve as a cover agent supervising testing, and including
a study on implementation of these procedures and their impact on the
Department's effort to improve transportation security.
I want to make it very clear to my colleagues that this bill does not
tie the hands of DHS or TSA. It simply ensures that any decision to
notify personnel in advance must come directly from the TSA
administrator, the Inspector General of the Department, or the
Comptroller General at GAO to ensure the safety of the traveling public
and the testers.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 5909.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlelady an
additional minute.
Mrs. LOWEY. I will probably need an additional 4 minutes to respond,
if you have it, Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Lungren on this very, very
important issue that he has been referencing concerning drilling.
We've been hearing frequently from my colleagues, my good friends
like Mr. Lungren, from President Bush, and from other Republicans in
the Congress. They continue to argue that opening more of the Outer
Continental Shelf to oil and gas drilling will lower gasoline prices.
But we can't drill our way to energy independence. The United States
has only 1.6 percent of the world's oil reserves, but Americans consume
25 percent of the oil used around the world every day. Nearly 80
percent of oil and 82 percent of natural gas believed to exist on the
Outer Continental Shelf is located in areas that are now open for
leasing.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentlelady an
additional 3 minutes to complete her statement.
Mrs. LOWEY. I thank the distinguished Chair.
Only 10.5 million of the 44 million leased offshore acres are
actually producing oil or gas. So oil companies, my colleagues, are
reaping billions in record profits, $123 billion in 2007 alone,
received billions in subsidies in the 2005 energy bill, but they are
not using the Federal lands already open to development. Given this,
opening sensitive areas to drilling makes no sense.
For example, ExxonMobil made $40 billion in profits last year alone,
but has only increased investment in drilling and production by $3
billion over the last 5 years. Oil and gas companies have stockpiled
9,000 drilling permits--9,000--my good friends--drilling permits--
without expanding domestic production.
The New Direction Congress is working to make America more energy
independent and secure, lower costs to consumers, grow our economy with
hundreds of thousands of new green jobs, and reduce global warming.
This Congress has fought for historic new commitments to American-grown
biofuels, sustained investments in clean renewable energy, large-scale
efficiency improvements to buildings and
[[Page H5501]]
transportation, enhanced tools to crack down on OPEC price fixing and
price gouging, and to investigate the effects on price of rampant
commodity speculation. And this Congress has forced the President to
increase supply and thereby lower costs by not continuing to fill the
almost full Strategic Petroleum Reserve starting June 30.
I'm sure this debate will continue, my colleagues. And it seems to be
a mantra of many of my good friends on the other side of the aisle, but
I do wish there would be more focus on the oil companies using the
drilling leases that they have and taking some of those profits and
investing them and producing the oil that we need.
So I thank you, I thank the Chair, and I thank my good friend on the
other side of the aisle for focusing on this issue. I'm sure we'll
continue this discussion. But I would like to conclude by thanking
everybody, because it has been a bipartisan effort, and I encourage
support of H.R. 5909.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. May I inquire as to how much
time I have remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 17 minutes
remaining.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such
time as I may consume.
Again I rise in support of H.R. 5909, the Catching Operational
Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008. I just wish we
had the Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Real Energy
Production in this Country Act of 2008.
The gentlelady from New York has suggested that it's almost
insignificant what we do offshore and that we are not actually going
after those things right now. Well, let me just put some facts on the
table.
According to the U.S. Minerals Management Service--not a Republican
or Democratic operation--America's deep seas on the Outer Continental
Shelf contain 420 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Now, to put that
in perspective, the United States consumes 23 trillion cubic feet per
year; so 20 times, almost, what we get per year.
And 86 billion barrels of oil contained in the deep seas on the Outer
Continental Shelf; 86 billion barrels of oil, and currently the U.S.
imports 4.5 billion barrels of oil per year. So that's about the
equivalent of a little less than 20 years of our imports. But 85
percent of the lower 48 Outer Continental Shelf energy resources remain
under the lock and key of the Federal Government.
Now, why do I say this deals with operational vulnerabilities? We
have said in this bill that if you tip off people that they're being
investigated, they might not act as they normally do. They might take
advantage of you because they know that you are doing these covert
operations. Similarly, we are the only developed Nation in the world
that forbids safe energy production on our Outer Continental Shelf. No
other country in the world does that. Brazil just explored on theirs,
and they found the largest single gas find in modern history. In fact,
some people are saying that Brazil will now be energy independent and
not even have to deal with their ethanol production by way of sugar.
Oh, by the way, we could be importing ethanol from sugar from Brazil at
much lower costs than ethanol produced by corn in the United States. We
have a 53 cent per gallon subsidy for corn-based ethanol, and we have
something on the order of a 51 cent tariff on any ethanol brought in
produced by sugar from Brazil or anywhere else, and I believe the farm
bill brings it down to 45 cents. So we basically have put ourselves in
the hole by about 90 cents per gallon with respect to ethanol that
makes more cents from sugar than that that we're producing in corn.
But even though Brazil is the leader in the world in ethanol produced
by sugar, it went ahead and explored on their Outer Continental Shelf.
And what did they find? The largest single find. Now, if you had looked
a year ago or 2 years ago about the proven reserves for Brazil, that
would not even be there because we didn't know about it.
The other thing is, with technology, already known fields can produce
more than they ever did before. One of the reasons I have a little bit
of knowledge of this, I grew up in Long Beach, California.
{time} 1145
We have been producing offshore Long Beach since before I was born.
Every single citizen of the State of California who has any interest in
the schools of California is proud of the fact, frankly, that there are
subsidies that go to our schools from the royalties paid as a result of
producing offshore Long Beach.
Now we haven't had a major oil spill in my lifetime. We have I think
over 1,000 rigs in the gulf coast that have been sitting there during
these tremendous storms that we call hurricanes, including Katrina,
that came through that area in the last few years. Not a single drop of
oil has resulted, even though we have had massive destruction of all
other kinds of facilities in that area.
The United States companies, that some on this floor have berated,
have spent billions of dollars in development of new technology to make
it safer. And the suggestion that somehow they are hiding, somehow they
are not utilizing these leases that they have, is just a fantastic
claim, because it is utterly preposterous that they would pay money for
leases and then not try to see what is there. The fact of the matter is
that 52 percent of the oil and gas wells that have been drilled by
American companies, 52 percent over the last 5 years, have turned out
dry. Now, did they get these leases because they wanted to find dry
wells? No. They went because there is a certain risk.
It is not as easy as is suggested on this floor of the House that,
okay, I am an oil company. I make money. I have friends who have worked
on oil rigs who are missing fingers from the work that goes on there. I
have friends that have worked in South and Central America who have
worked on rigs at all time using what is called drilling mud, using
those drill bits, losing fingers, working hard at it, realizing that
you don't have a guarantee of every time you put a well down, you are
going to get oil up.
So I just find it fantastic that in this argument, number one, we are
told, well, we don't have that much oil. It is really the fault of
Americans because they use so much oil. I don't know whether that sells
too much, blaming Americans for using energy that allows their lives to
be better than our parents' and grandparents' generation was in terms
of the standard of living. And secondly, to berate American companies
that are leaders in the world in technology around the world.
It is strange to me that some on the other side of the aisle believe
that it is important for us to make sure we don't have any Outer
Continental Shelf drilling off Florida, for instance, when Cuba has
lease agreements with a number of countries, including China, although
they haven't yet started to drill, that would allow them to drill
within either 45 miles or 60 miles of our Florida coast. Now maybe it
makes sense to tell the American people that they are at fault. I don't
believe they are at fault. I think they are looking at us for some
solutions.
We have a solution here to the problem of the possibility of tipping
people off to testing. It makes no sense to me, and most on my side of
the aisle, for us to be the only developed nation in the world tipping
off the rest of the world that we are going to close off most of our
areas of natural resources. Remember, when we got Alaska, some referred
to it as Seward's Folly. Maybe we didn't realize the folly until now
when we intentionally cut off our ability to be able to environmentally
and safely explore and produce energy in Alaska.
But we divert a little bit from this bill. This bill is the Catching
Operational Vulnerabilities By Ensuring Random Testing Act of 2008,
COVERT testing. I congratulate the gentlelady for bringing this bill
forward. I congratulate the chairwoman of the subcommittee for working
on this along with those of us on this side. I congratulate the
chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, for bringing
this forward.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot emphasize how important these covert tests are
to
[[Page H5502]]
protecting the country's transportation security systems. A single tip-
off of a covert test is too many. We have already had three we know of.
We must do our part to stop the next one from happening. We must do
whatever we can to ensure that these tests remain covert and candid so
we can truly evaluate our transportation security workers.
I look forward to working with my colleagues as we move forward on
this important legislation that will make our transportation systems
more secure. I ask my colleagues to support this important legislation.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support
of H.R. 5909, Catching Operational Vulnerabilities by Ensuring Random
Testing Act of 2008, introduced by my distinguished colleague from New
York, Representative Lowe. This important legislation will further
shore up the gaps in our testing and evaluation protocols for
transportation security.
As we've seen just in the past year, the details of covert tests and
evaluations have been disseminated to the screener workforce, thereby
``tipping-off' those we are trying to accurately and responsibly test.
The Committee on Homeland Security has been extremely concerned about
this issue and I have held hearings in the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, of which I am
the chair, in order to examine what exactly has gone wrong.
Any efforts to compromise these important testing efforts, whether
intentional or on accident, should not be tolerated. Some have claimed
that one of these incidents--the April 2006 e-mail from TSA's Office of
Security Operations that tipped TSA field staff off to covert tests--
was unintentional, but evidence suggests otherwise. The April 2006 e-
mail clearly referenced that individuals who were probing the system
were Federal employees and even provided a physical description of one
of the employees conducting the tests. This bill is necessary to
prohibit individuals from providing advance notice of covert tests to
any persons, unless authorized to do so by the Assistant Secretary of
the Transportation Security Administration, the Inspector General of
the Department, or the Comptroller General of the United States.
The COVERT Act of 2008 explicitly prohibits the advance notice or
notification to individuals by those employees who are participating in
a covert test or evaluation, which will ensure that the integrity of
all covert testing efforts--across all modes of transportation--are
protected, not just aviation. This legislation puts in place controls
to monitor the testing personnel and the testing and evaluation
procedures by building in accountability. It establishes the presence
of a second team of covert test and evaluation employees with the first
team in order to monitor and confirm their actions. Finally, the act
requires an impact study to evaluate covert testing and evaluation and
how it could be incorporated into other training and testing programs.
The study is required to include: Recommendations on the implementation
and execution of this section; an assessment on the results of covert
testing; a summary of best practices on how to best integrate covert
testing into other programs; and recommendations for additional
personnel training necessary to fulfill this act. The study and report
will also provide an assessment on the test and evaluation results and
recommendations for personnel training required to fulfill the act.
Mr Speaker, if we choose to ignore these past disclosures, we provide
future opportunities to compromise a worthy program intended to educate
the workforce and benefit the security of our transportation systems
throughout the country. One tip-off of a covert test is one too many.
We've already had three that we know of. Let's do our part to stop any
future tip-offs.
I am proud to support this incredibly important and timely
legislation and I strongly encourage my colleagues to support this
important legislation.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of
my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson) that the House suspend the
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5909, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________