[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 93 (Friday, June 6, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5363-S5364]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PAKISTAN
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, during the Senate recess at the end of
last month, I visited the central front in our Nation's fight against
al-Qaida: Pakistan. During my 4-day stay, I met with a broad range of
political officials from numerous parties, including the Pakistan
People's Party of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the PLM-N of
former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as well as with President Pervez
Musharraf, Pakistani intelligence officials, the ousted chief justice,
and representatives of Pakistan's civil society. Outside of Islamabad,
my visit included a trip to Peshawar, in the tumultuous Northwest
Frontier Province, where I met with local officials, and Kashmir, where
the United States has funded numerous successful humanitarian and
development programs in the wake of the devastating 2005 earthquake.
The breadth of this trip was commensurate with the critical
importance of Pakistan to our country's national security. Despite
recent claims by CIA Director Michael Hayden that al-Qaida is now on
the defensive, including in its safe haven in Pakistan, I traveled
there because it is out of that country that we face our most serious
national security threat. As the intelligence community has said again
and again, the fight against al-Qaida begins in Pakistan. According to
the State Department's 2007 terrorism report which was released this
past April, al-Qaida and associated networks remain the greatest
terrorist threat to the United States. That threat emanates from the
reconstitution of some of al-Qaida's pre-9/11 capabilities ``through
the exploitation of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.''
The report added that instability in Pakistan, ``coupled with the
Islamabad brokered cease-fire agreement in effect for the first half of
2007 along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, appeared to have provided
AQ leadership greater mobility and ability to conduct training and
operational planning, particularly that targeting Western Europe and
the United States.''
During my visit, I conducted extensive discussions with Pakistani
leaders about ceasefire negotiations, in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas, FATA, as well as in the Swat region of the NWFP. I remain
skeptical about those negotiations and am particularly concerned that
those in the FATA region will give al-Qaida room to plot against our
troops in Afghanistan and our citizens here in the United States. The
new civilian-led Government in Pakistan is seeking a different approach
from that of President Musharraf, and that is understandable--it has,
in fact, been mandated by the people of Pakistan, and it is high time
they have a responsive government that heeds their call. A key part of
this new approach will require success in reining in the military
apparatus, which has historically controlled much of Pakistan's foreign
policy--sometimes overtly with a military dictator running the country
and other times more discreetly from behind a screen of a civilian-led
government. But as Pakistan's new Government seeks to reconcile these
complex, multilayered issues, it must not do so at the expense of the
grave threats emanating from the border region. We must address those
threats head-on because what happens in the terrorist safe haven of
FATA is central to our national security, and we cannot afford to be
distracted or complacent. To do so would be to the detriment of our
safety and security as well as that of our friends and allies.
At the same time, any long-term counterterrorism strategy in the FATA
must include serious economic reforms, legal political party
development, and initiatives to integrate FATA with the rest of
Pakistan. This will not be easy, but it is long overdue and will help
ensure we are using all the tools at our disposal to fight al-Qaida and
associated terrorist threats. The growing extremism and creation of a
terrorist safe haven in FATA has emerged out of decades of political
marginalization and ensuing poverty. In working closely with the FATA
political agents and local law enforcement, as well as the Government
of Pakistan, we need to help create sustainable development strategies
that provide opportunities for engagement while ensuring sufficient
financial resources are allocated to those in need now and in the years
to come.
This must include not only traditional development projects but
institution building and political engagement in a region long deprived
of such opportunities. The people of the FATA must have alternative
livelihood options that help facilitate opposition to terrorists and
extremists.
At the same time, we must find Osama Bin Laden and his senior
leaders, and we must work to neutralize forces that plot or carry out
attacks against Americans. But that cannot be our only goal. This fight
runs much deeper than a simple manhunt--if we are serious about
countering al-Qaida, and preventing another Bin Laden from emerging, we
must shift our assistance to be more aligned with the needs of the
local population and expand our development assistance throughout a
country where poverty and anti-Western sentiment are pervasive.
This administration's policies toward Pakistan have been highly
damaging to our long-term national security. By embracing and relying
on a single, unpopular, antidemocratic leader--namely, President
Musharraf--President Bush failed to develop a comprehensive
counterterrorism strategy that transcends individuals. He also
encouraged Pakistanis to be skeptical about American intentions and
principles. The recent elections provide a window of opportunity as the
people of Pakistan soundly rejected President Musharraf's leadership in
favor of political parties that promised a new direction. Although
domestic politics remain fragile, we have an opportunity to reverse our
history of neglect and mixed signals by expanding our relationships and
supporting fundamental democratic institutions instead of one strong
man--something the President may still be reluctant to do. We must do
this so that our counterterrorism partnership can withstand the ups and
downs of Pakistan's domestic politics, reflecting a more wide-ranging
approach that does not ratchet up the already high levels of anti-
American sentiment in that country.
Any enduring counterterrorism partnership must recognize that
Pakistan, despite the coups and military dictatorships that have marred
its history, has a democratic tradition, a vibrant civil society, and a
large and educated middle class whose interests and values frequently
coincide with ours. By working with those Pakistanis and supporting
their desire to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,
we align ourselves with the moderate forces that are critical to the
fight against extremism. Supporting the Pakistani people as they seek
to strengthen democratic institutions is not just an outgrowth of our
values--it is in our national security interests. The counterterrorism
efforts we need from Islamabad must be serious and sustained in a way
that only democratic processes can ensure.
For these reasons, I have been deeply disappointed by the Bush
administration's failure to condemn the illegal dismissal of the chief
justice of Pakistan and scores of other judges and its
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refusal to call for their reinstatement. The ousting of the judges has
become a cause celebre for Pakistan's civil society. It prompted the
creation of a ``Lawyers' Movement''--a moderate, democratic uprising
that Americans should embrace. During my time in Pakistan, I visited
with the chief justice and shortly thereafter called for the judges to
be reinstated because it is a clear violation of the basic tenets of
the rule of law. I was asked whether I had made such a call in support
of a particular political party and whether I also sought the removal
of President Musharraf. I responded that those are issues for the
Pakistanis to determine, and I continue to believe that is the case.
Indeed, while the political landscape in Pakistan remains turbulent and
fragile, I have no intention of meddling in domestic affairs.
Nonetheless, it is unacceptable for the United States to sit back in
the face of such fundamentally undemocratic actions. We cannot be
selective in the democratic principles we support--that is not
consistent with our values, and it is shortsighted in terms of our
national security.
Mr. President, the emergence of a new civilian leadership in Pakistan
provides an opening for us to develop a new approach--a new
relationship--that includes a sustainable, comprehensive
counterterrorism partnership. We must seize this opportunity because,
despite a great deal of anti-American sentiment, in many areas the
Pakistanis are ready and willing to work with us. This is not to say
that this process will be free from challenges--there are already
serious hurdles that must be dealt with, including negotiations in the
FATA and NWFP, both of which are cause for concern. In the end, we must
recognize that the new leadership reflects a broad cross-section of
Pakistan, and by fully engaging them, we can take an important step
toward defending our national security interests in the central front
in the fight against al-Qaida.
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