[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 84 (Wednesday, May 21, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4578-S4585]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I wish to focus my remaining remarks on the 
supplemental appropriations bill which is pending before the Senate. We 
passed a supplemental appropriations bill out of the Appropriations 
Committee, which I serve on, last week. This bill contains $168.9 
billion for funding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is the 
amount the President requested. But importantly, this bill also 
includes significant contributions to the domestic economy of this 
country, to the needs here at home, not just overseas.
  It includes funds for LIHEAP. At a time when oil is topping $130 a 
barrel, the drain on low-income Americans and seniors particularly, 
simply to pay heating prices, and in the Southwest and South of our 
country, cooling prices this summer are extraordinary. It is a burden. 
It is a huge burden. We have incorporated some funds for that 
situation.
  We also have moneys for unemployment insurance, not only necessary to 
sustain families in a time of economic crisis but also one of the most 
effective stimulus devices. The money from unemployment insurance goes 
quickly from the recipient to the local market, to all the needs of a 
family struggling in this economy to get by. It is a tremendous way to 
stimulate our economy. So it has both individual benefits and economic 
benefits for the country as a whole.
  I must also point out that included in these domestic provisions is 
extraordinary legislation by Senator Webb, my colleague from Virginia, 
the enhanced GI bill of rights. Senator Webb has done an extraordinary 
job, and it is not surprising. He approaches this not only as a very 
astute legislator but as a combat marine veteran of Vietnam. He has 
borne the burden of battle. He understands now, in the famous words of 
President Lincoln, that it is our responsibility to take care of those 
who have borne the burden of battle.
  This responsibility is, I think, one of the most paramount we face, 
and his legislation goes right to the concerns of so many returning 
veterans: How will I get back to education? How will I fund my 
education? How will I be similar to my predecessors, the generation of 
my father--when so many had the opportunity to go to college, and then 
not only did they contribute to their own family's well-being, they 
helped build an economic powerhouse we have seen in America since World 
War II.
  This is a program, again, which I think is extraordinarily important. 
I commend Senator Webb for his vision, for his persistence, and for his 
passion. I hope we include it in the final version of the supplemental 
appropriations bill.
  As I mentioned before, we are putting funds in for LIHEAP. I offered 
an amendment to include $1 billion. It is so necessary. In places such 
as California, there are 1.7 million households behind in their utility 
bills. That is up 100,000 from last year, and last year was a difficult 
year for many. There are 650,000 households in Pennsylvania that are 
receiving shutoff warnings, a huge number of families who are facing 
the end of their utility service. In a very uncertain economy, it is 
difficult to reestablish that relationship going forward unless we help 
them.
  We have seen a 162-percent increase in energy costs since 2000. It is 
extraordinary. There is no paycheck for working Americans that has gone 
up 162 percent, but their energy bills have. We have seen heating oil 
prices in the last year increase 35 percent. So this is something that 
is absolutely critical, just as unemployment insurance, just as so many 
aspects of this legislation.
  There are also included provisions not requested by the President. 
There is some assistance for the global food crisis and for the 
terrible natural disasters in Myanmar and China.
  We also include, as another aspect of the legislation, something that 
is absolutely, I believe, critical, and that is conditions on our 
policy with respect to Iraq, particularly. This Congress has, over my 
strenuous efforts otherwise, essentially given the President a blank 
check. He demands money, and he has been given money but without 
conditions. I think it is the responsibility of this Congress to impose 
reasonable conditions on the funding, to not only govern our operations 
but also to make it clear to the Iraqi Government that they are 
ultimately responsible for their own safety, their own future, their 
own stability, the future of the Iraqi nation and the Iraqi people. It 
is not something we can do for them. We have rendered extraordinary 
assistance to them, but the task is truly theirs, and they must seize 
that task.

  These conditions, I think, are terribly important. One would, for 
example, ensure the readiness of our troops, who are being stretched to 
the limit, ensure they are ready when they are deployed. That is 
something I hope no one is arguing with.
  Another provision directs the Government to negotiate cost sharing 
for fuel and troop training with the Iraqis. The Iraqi Government has 
accumulated upward of $10 billion or more because of the surging oil 
prices. Very little, if any, of those funds is being devoted to their 
own people or to the joint effort we have undertaken with them to 
stabilize the country. It is only fair that they should begin to pay 
their fair share, particularly since they are sitting on a significant 
amount of money resulting from high energy prices. That money should be 
devoted to stabilizing their country and helping their people, much 
more so than they are doing today.
  Then there is another provision which is something Senator Levin and 
I have been stressing for many months now, and that is to begin a 
transition of the missions our military forces and diplomatic forces 
are performing in Iraq, particularly our military forces, instead of an 
open-ended mission, and we have seen this mission from the President's 
standpoint change dramatically.
  As you will recall, the first mission was to find and destroy the 
weapons of mass destruction, a very difficult mission, since there were 
no weapons of mass destruction. Then there was the mission of creating 
a democratic oasis in the Persian Gulf, a very grandiose mission, more 
or less, and that mission, I think, has been discounted dramatically 
over the last several months by the President's own rhetoric. He has 
talked now about simply creating a country that will sustain itself and 
not threaten its neighbors.
  We have to focus not on these globalized missions which are more

[[Page S4579]]

dogmatic and ideological, but on things the military should be doing 
for our protection in the context of redeploying forces out of Iraq. 
Those missions are, in my view, force protection--we have to ensure our 
forces are fully protected--counterterrorism, because we cannot 
surrender that mission anywhere in the world; we have to be able to 
seek out and destroy those terrorist cells that are plotting and 
planning against the United States and our allies; and third is to 
train the Iraqi security forces because we do have to provide a force 
that will stay behind, a force that will help stabilize that country.
  The essence of the Levin-Reed amendment has been to move from the 
open-ended missions of today to these discrete missions and, in so 
doing, begin a deliberate, consistent disengagement of our forces and a 
reduction of our forces in Iraq. That is a policy that will, I think, 
work, and it is a policy that eventually, ultimately must be followed.
  I think the reluctance of the administration to entertain any 
conditions whatsoever over the last several years has undermined, in 
the long run, our ability to influence the Government of Iraq and also 
to reassure the American public we are not into an open-ended, 
unlimited commitment, stretching years and decades and beyond, that our 
mission is discrete, that our mission in terms of military presence is 
coming down and will not reverse itself, and that we are doing all we 
can in that context to save lives in Iraq.
  On 9/11, this country was struck by terrorists. The United States, 
this Senate, the Congress, the administration rallied together with 
unanimity and with purpose. We authorized and supported an attack 
against Afghanistan because that is where the perpetrators were lodged, 
that is where al-Qaida was headquartered. They were collaborating with 
the Taliban government. They were given safe haven there. The planning 
for so much of what went on, on that fateful day, originated from 
Afghanistan. That is where bin Laden, that is where the leadership of 
al-Qaida was. We struck there, and I must say in an extraordinarily 
successful operation--and credit and criticism must be given, and there 
is great credit in terms of the leadership of the administration, our 
military forces conducting a very sophisticated operation, an operation 
that used our advantages with precision weapons, used very effectively 
our special forces, and used collaborative efforts with forces on the 
ground in Afghanistan and also the collaboration and support, in many 
respects, of the international community. But rather than consolidating 
our gains after that successful operation and pursuing al-Qaida in 
Pakistan, where the leadership fled, the administration turned 
immediately, almost immediately, to Iraq. And not out of any, I think, 
strategic need, but out of a dogmatic political, ideological need.

  They thought Iraq would be a relatively easy target. They were 
speaking in those days, informally at least, about a very short 
operation, and that almost immediately Iraq would blossom as a source 
of democratic inspiration and market economics in that region. We know 
the history has not been that cheerful. And that diversion to Iraq, I 
believe, was a deeply flawed strategy. It was an attack on a country 
that did not represent an immediate threat to the United States, a 
point I made on the floor of this Senate as I opposed the resolution of 
2002 to conduct those operations.
  Because we were pursuing not a strategic necessity but an ideological 
obsession, it was not a mission that was well advised or well planned 
for. There was more hope than planning involved, more ideology than 
practical commonsense application of force to a threatening situation 
in the world. One of the unfortunate ironies of this is that as we have 
been obsessed and committed in Iraq, al-Qaida has reconstituted itself 
as an incredible force once again. The whole purpose of our attack in 
Afghanistan, the whole thrust of our efforts immediately after 9/11, 
was to decisively and, we hoped, irrevocably destroy al-Qaida. Al-Qaida 
is back. While we have been engaged in this hugely expensive mission--
expensive not only in terms of resources but in terms of the lives of 
our soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen, and also the wear and tear 
on our military forces--al-Qaida has been quietly rebuilding.
  The other thing that has happened unwittingly is that Iran has become 
a much more credible threat to stability in the region; has become even 
more influential and powerful. In some respects, this is a direct 
result of our engagement in Iraq.
  Also in that time period, we stood by as the North Koreans overthrew 
the agreed framework, seized the plutonium that was in the reactors 
around Yongbyan and took it away. Now we are trying desperately to put 
together another agreement with the North Koreans, but after years in 
which they not only tested longer range missiles but also detonated a 
nuclear device. They crossed a threshold that had never been crossed 
before, they detonated a nuclear device, and our reaction was, I think 
necessarily perhaps because of our engagement in Iraq, one of seeking, 
perhaps too late now, a diplomatic approach. But if you go back to 
2000, we had a framework in place that looks very much like the 
framework they are working out today. We had the plutonium secured, 
North Korea had not tested a nuclear device, and there were hopes that 
with further active negotiations we could make additional progress. 
That, I think, too, is a cost of our engagement in Iraq.
  It has also greatly diminished our standing in the international 
community. This is not just a nice thing to have. An essential 
attribute of national power is the respect, the esteem, the 
cooperation, the good wishes, the goodwill, and the political and 
diplomatic support of other nations, because in this world most of the 
great challenges cannot be met alone. That was contrary, I think, to 
the unilateralism that abounded in this administration; that if in fact 
we are going to do something significant, longstanding and sustainable, 
it requires a multinational approach and the foundation of that 
approach is the goodwill and good wishes of the people of the world. 
This administration has squandered much of that.
  It also is contributing, and we can debate how much, to this 
faltering economy. Oil today is $130 a barrel. Some of that is 
attributable to the instability in the gulf region; the fact that Iraq 
has not been producing the same volume of oil consistently over the 
last several years that it did before the operation. This geopolitical 
uncertainty has contributed significantly to the price of oil and it is 
also, I think, contributing to the overall economic issue we are 
addressing here today, a very critical issue in the United States.
  Another aspect of this policy is that we have stretched our military, 
our land forces, to the brink, if you will. They have seen significant 
deployments consistently time and time again and the toll is adding up 
on our military forces. We are now left, and the next administration is 
left, and this Congress and the American people, with dealing with the 
consequences of this flawed strategy. I believe we have to begin to 
recognize and realistically assess the political and military situation 
in Iraq. We have to begin to develop and implement achievable missions 
for our U.S. forces there and their civilian counterparts, and then we 
must turn our attention to restoring our economic prosperity and 
growth, and rebuilding our military, which has been significantly 
stretched and stressed by this operation.
  We have to also reorganize our civilian resources to deal with the 
ongoing threats in the world. That is something this administration has 
yet to do effectively--to develop a complementary power of our State 
Department officials, our agriculture officials, and all those people 
who must be part of this approach to a kind of warfare that is, in many 
cases, less about firepower and more about reaching people with 
economic progress and educational reform, and water systems. Those are 
more potent weapons sometimes than any precision-guided missile we 
might deploy.
  I think our first step in all of this is passing this supplemental 
appropriations bill, with conditioned funding for our forces, with 
reasonable conditions about the mission and the responsibilities the 
Iraqi Government should have, and also once again beginning to invest 
in the American people, investing in keeping them warm in the winter 
through LIHEAP and keeping them cool through LIHEAP in the summertime; 
giving them a chance, if they lose

[[Page S4580]]

their job, to at least keep looking for some support with extended 
unemployment benefits, and so many other things we have included in 
this. I think that is critical.

  Now, I mentioned before I have felt since 2002 that the strategy of 
the administration toward Iraq was flawed significantly. It was, I 
think, a product of a dogma. No one can I think dispute the power of 
democracy, and it is a power that is not exclusive to our culture. It 
is a human demand, the ability to live with a sense of personal 
integrity and personal freedom. But I think the administration didn't 
realize you need the institutional capacity to have a democratic 
government, and this capacity is not automatic nor is it built up in a 
matter of weeks or months. We have seen in Iraq, and in so many other 
places, that democratic elections do not necessarily lead to democratic 
political forces controlling a country; that you need to build 
carefully over, I would suggest, many years the institutional capacity 
so that elections lead to true democracy, not simply legitimizing those 
people who are antidemocratic.
  I think this has been one of the tremendous flaws of the President's 
concept of the mission. As a result, we started off with, obviously, I 
think, an ill-conceived mission of eliminating weapons of mass 
destruction in a country in which it turned out there were no weapons 
of mass destruction. People forget that the United Nations put 
inspectors on the ground, and that it was this administration who 
hastened their departure, rather than using these inspectors over time 
to establish whether there were weapons or whether there were no 
weapons, or at least to do it in a way in which subsequent military 
action would be legitimized by either noncooperation of the Iraqis or 
the fact that the questions couldn't be established or answered. But 
they quickly rushed to a military option, and I think that option has 
had unfortunate consequences for the United States.
  One of the principal consequences, and I mentioned this in my 
introductory comments, is the fact that al-Qaida, the existential 
threat to this country, as evidenced by 9/11, has in fact reconstituted 
itself, not only in the border regions of Afghanistan, to a degree, but 
much more particularly in Pakistan, in the federally administered 
tribal areas. These are poor tribal areas ill governed by the 
Government of Pakistan. In fact, there are provisions in their organic 
laws which limit their real access to these areas. It has a population 
of 3 million people, and in that 3 million people al-Qaida, bin Laden, 
and al Zawahiri have found sanctuary and a safe haven, that continues 
today.
  In a sobering report released last month by the Government 
Accountability Office, they stated:

       The United States has not met its national security goals 
     to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe havens in 
     Pakistan's FATA.

  And this is 7 years after 9/11.

       Since 2002, the U.S. has provided Pakistan with $10.5 
     billion in military, economic, and developmental aid. Half of 
     it has gone to the military. But despite these actions--
     despite this extraordinary amount of money--GAO found broad 
     agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence 
     Estimate, State and embassy documents, as well as defense 
     officials in Pakistan, that al-Qaida had regenerated its 
     ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in 
     establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA.

  Now, I thought the point of our national strategy after 9/11 was to 
destroy al-Qaida and to eliminate any possibility of a safe haven 
anywhere in the world. And according to these documents, our embassy, 
our Defense officials, our national intelligence agency, al-Qaida has 
reestablished itself and has found safe haven. I would suggest that is, 
I think, a stunning indictment of the strategy of this administration 
over the last several years; again, I think an unfortunate consequence 
of the obsession that they have chosen to pursue in Iraq.
  An even more disturbing finding of GAO is:

       No comprehensive plan comprised of diplomatic, economic, 
     intelligence and military efforts for meeting U.S. National 
     security goals in the FATA has been developed.

  The one thing that seems to be consistent about the administration is 
they do not do much planning. There was no plan for Iraq and, according 
to the GAO, there is no plan for Pakistan and the federally 
administered tribal areas there.
  A key part of the plan that must be developed in Pakistan is economic 
development. Because what I have witnessed, in the several times I have 
been to Pakistan, is that this is not strictly, as so many of these 
conflicts are, a military action. It requires providing economic 
support, it requires giving people a sense that their fate should be 
linked to their legitimate government, and that government should be 
pursuing goals which are not strictly sectarian. That government should 
be a government relatively open and democratic, and that the appeal of 
the extremist is weakened if people have that sense of confidence in 
their government, confidence in their future. That is not a military 
issue essentially; that is an issue of economic development, of 
supporting legitimate institutions of the state, be it Pakistan or 
elsewhere.
  That has been recognized by, I think, many experts. But the senior 
U.S. Embassy officials in Pakistan admit there has been overreliance on 
the Pakistani military to achieve U.S. national security objectives; 
that we have not developed a complementary approach of a comprehensive 
strategy which includes economic, political, and social development 
also.
  As a result, in March, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, Michael Hayden, described al-Qaida's safe haven as a ``clear 
and present danger to the United States.'' The chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, ADM Michael Mullen, has stated:

       If I were going to pick the next attack to hit the United 
     States, it would come out of the FATA.

  Now, let us be clear. It is not out of Iraq, it is not out of Mosul, 
or Basra, or Baghdad, it is out of the FATA. That is the view of the 
chief uniformed officer of the United States. The 2008 Director of 
National Intelligence annual threat assessment, which represents the 
combined judgments of 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, has concluded 
that:

       The resurgence of the FATA now poses a preeminent threat to 
     the United States national security.

  The problems of the FATA are being highlighted by deteriorating 
conditions in Afghanistan.
  What we have seen from the initial success in Afghanistan has been a 
steady, at times rapid, deterioration of conditions there. It is 
evident that our efforts in Afghanistan are being undermined by what is 
happening in Pakistan. Not only have we taken our eye off the major 
threat, al-Qaida, and allowed it to reconstitute, we are in danger of 
seeing the progress we have made in Afghanistan slip away.
  In 2003, the Taliban, the former government, and their followers, who 
have continued to try to assert their will in Afghanistan, were 
operating squad size units. Now we have reports they are operating in 
battalion size units of almost 400 people, showing the climate has 
changed radically. Suicide bombers have attacked at rates that were not 
observed in Afghanistan until relatively recently, but as you have no 
doubt surmised, it is something that has been imported through 
terrorist networks into Afghanistan.
  Afghanistan's index of corruption is among the highest in the world. 
You have a state that has marginal capacity to govern well and wisely. 
Again, this is after many years of our involvement, our engagement. 
Also, there was a sense that, initially at least, before Iraq, 
Afghanistan was the major test of our ability, not only to defeat al-
Qaida but also to create or help create, in collaboration with the 
Afghanis, a stable government. That test is in danger of failing 
miserably.
  Afghanistan now provides 93 percent of the world's opium. One of the 
great additional ironies, now it is one of the major suppliers of 
drugs, and it is doing so while we maintain our military and diplomatic 
presence there.
  We have a NATO contingent there, but frankly NATO has not been able 
to fulfill all of its obligations, putting more pressure on our 
military alliance forces. I think we have to urge NATO to be more 
helpful. Hopefully, they will. But, as a result, we have sent 
additional forces in there, about 4,300 troops. We are prepared to send 
more. This is adding additional stress and strain on our military 
forces.
  As I look, we are seeing a situation in which the principal objective 
in response to 9/11, the principal place where our enemies were, has 
now been relegated to the third page of the

[[Page S4581]]

paper, as the headlines are dominated by Iraq. I think we have a 
situation where we have literally taken our eye off the major 
existential threat.
  We have another consequence of our operations in Iraq, and that is we 
have empowered Iran. Iran is heavily involved in Iraq. Its objectives 
are questionable. They have an interest in maintaining strategic depth 
by keeping the regime in Baghdad as one that is friendly to them, not 
hostile as the Baathists were. Also, they have many colleagues in the 
Iraqi Shia movement. Some of these individuals actually fought with the 
Iranians against the Iraqis in the 1980s in the Iraq-Iran war.
  Iraq is materially assisting all the major Shia parties. They have 
not limited themselves to one party or one particular group. As we all 
know, in March of this year, President Ahmadinejad visited Iraq for 2 
days. The present government in Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki and all, 
rolled out the red carpet--literally. He arrived in a motorcade and ran 
around Baghdad in a sport coat. When any of our colleagues go or when 
any of our major administrative officials go, it is surreptitiously, it 
is guarded, and it is in a flak jacket. So there is something going on 
there with respect to this Government of Iraq and Ahmadinejad and his 
warm welcome. I think it graphically shows the influence they have in 
that country.
  We are finding a steady supply of IEDs which our military authorities 
trace to Iran, or at least their technology. Iran is heavily engaged in 
funding social organizations and building a model they have used 
elsewhere--Hezbolla in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian Authority--
where they are able to not only help them organize the military force 
but help them carry out social functions, helping people, helping 
widows, providing relief. That is very powerful when you have a 
dysfunctional government and that is the case in Iraq.
  We also know, on another track, the Iranians are attempting to 
develop a nuclear fuel cycle. The IAEA, the International Atomic Energy 
Administration, has been spending decades trying to track the 
developmental work of the Iranian Government. In 2006 there were 
documents found of possible nuclear dimension to their program in Iran. 
This is of great consequence to us. There is a legitimate concern that 
if the Iranian Government were able to develop a nuclear fuel cycle and 
could produce nuclear material, they would not be able to resist the 
temptation to develop a nuclear device. That would be of significant 
consequence in the region and in the world.
  All that is happening in the context of our energies and our 
attention being overwhelmingly devoted to Iraq. There is a connection 
between the growing geopolitical clout of Iran in the region and our 
situation within Iraq. In the long run, I think we might look back and 
discover that one of the real costs of Iraq was the emergence of a much 
more difficult, much more threatening, much more powerful Iran.
  As I mentioned earlier, while we have been focused so strenuously on 
Iraq, North Korea has broken out of the Agreed Framework. They have 
expelled international inspectors. They have withdrawn from the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. They restarted their nuclear installation at 
Yongbyon. It is estimated that up to 50 kilograms of separated 
plutonium, enough for at least six nuclear weapons, have been taken by 
the North Koreans and dispersed somewhere in the country.

  On October 9, 2006, the North Koreans conducted a nuclear test--
crossed a red line they had never done before, detonated a nuclear 
device. Fortunately, over the last several months the administration 
has reinstituted serious negotiations with the North Koreans. Under the 
able leadership of Ambassador Christopher Hill, they have begun to 
identify and work with the North Koreans to identify where the 
plutonium might be, where there are other nuclear materials, nuclear 
technologies, and they are beginning to walk back where we were, 
ironically, in the year 2000 and provide some sense of a diplomatic 
solution to a very pressing problem.
  But I would argue this would be a very different situation if we were 
not so decisively involved and engaged in Iraq.
  I mentioned also, in the course of these last several years, our 
involvement in Iraq has hurt us in terms of the world's opinion. That 
is not just a nice thing to have, it is an essential thing to have. In 
late 2001, 52 percent of Turkish citizens and 75 percent of our British 
allies viewed the United States favorably. Now that favorable view has 
dropped to 9 percent in Turkey and 51 percent in Great Britain--one of 
our longest and most significant allies, Great Britain, and Turkey, one 
of the most significant members of NATO and also a Muslim country. We 
have seen our public approval drop precipitously.
  In a poll conducted by the BBC just last month, 47 percent of 
citizens in 25 countries said the United States is playing a mainly 
negative role in the world. That type of public opinion will not 
inspire political leaders around the world to help us very much. In 
fact, to do so they have to consciously operate against their own 
public opinion. That is a difficult challenge anywhere.
  Last month, Zogby and the University of Maryland surveyed citizens of 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and the UAE and found 83 
percent had an unfavorable view of the United States. These countries 
are moderate Arab countries, so to speak, whose support in this effort 
in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere is necessary. Their unfavorable 
view of the United States is alarming.
  One of the keys we know of prevailing in this struggle is to 
challenge and rally the forces of moderation and democracy through the 
Arab world, of getting the people of the Arab world to understand that 
we are trying to assist them. That is not working, unfortunately.
  Then, as I mentioned, we have the economic consequences of the war. 
In December 31, 2002, the New York Times reported:

       The administration's top budget official estimated today 
     that the cost of a war with Iraq could be in the range of $50 
     billion to $60 billion, a figure that is well below earlier 
     estimates from White House officials--

  Then OMB Director--

     Mitch Daniels would not provide specific costs for either a 
     long or a short military campaign against Saddam Hussein. But 
     he said the administration was budgeting for both, and 
     earlier estimates of $100 billion to $200 billion in Iraq war 
     costs by Lawrence B. Lindsey, Mr. Bush's former chief 
     economic adviser, were too high.

  To date we have approved $526 billion for operations in Iraq--far in 
excess of any of the estimates of the administration. That spending is 
affecting what we can do to help our own citizens, what we can do to 
play a positive role in the world--not in a military sense but in a 
diplomatic and international sense, helping in so many different areas.
  Now, to gain some perspective on the $500-plus billion that we have 
committed to Iraq, what we could have used it for, this amount accrued 
plus the amount in the supplemental we are considering would have been 
sufficient to provide health insurance coverage to all the 45 million 
uninsured Americans for the timeframe 2003 to 2008. That is taken from 
the Joint Economic Committee. That would be a significant benefit to 
the people of America, but that is a benefit foregone. I have pointed 
out all this money to date has been deficit spending. This is not 
something we have paid for. One of the complaints we often hear around 
here is that it is irresponsible to spend money without somehow 
offsetting it. That line of thought does not persist with the 
administration when it comes to funding this war in Iraq.
  We have also piled up huge contingency costs as we go forward. The 
direct costs are significant, but the indirect costs and the future 
costs are also important to note. We have to repair and replace the 
military equipment that is being used. We have spent money to increase 
recruitment and retention, and we have to do that for many years. We 
have had economic disruptions caused by deployment of the National 
Guard and Reserve troops who have to leave their jobs to go into the 
military.
  According to a November 2007 report compiled by the Joint Economic 
Committee, the impact of the war on the U.S. economy to date is $1.3 
trillion or $16,500 for every American family of four. So the costs, 
both direct and indirect, have been staggering.
  Those costs continue. One of the critical costs we are going to face 
is the cost going forward of helping our veterans. I was very pleased 
last year to

[[Page S4582]]

act as the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Military 
Construction and Veterans' Affairs while Senator Johnson recovered, and 
now I am equally pleased to know that he is chairing that subcommittee 
and doing a remarkable job. But we were able to pass a significant 
increase in spending for our veterans.
  But the real challenge for us is will we do that 5 years from now? 7 
years from now? 8 years from now? 20 years from now, when these 
veterans still need the help but time has passed? I hope we will. That 
would be a test--and if I am here, I hope I will be able to remind 
people that the test is each year not 1 year or 2 years.
  As Professor Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate, pointed out, this cost, when 
you aggregate it all, is in the trillions of dollars going forward, 
looking at the consequential costs today, looking at the direct 
spending.
  That is taking its toll on the economy of this country.
  Another place where the toll is being taken is on our Army and Marine 
Corps, particularly; our military in general, but particularly our Army 
and Marine Corps.
  I recall, as so many of us do, years ago, August 3, 2000, to be 
precise when Governor Bush stated: Our military is low on parts, pay 
and morale. If called upon by the Commander in Chief today, two entire 
divisions of the Army will have to report ``Not ready for duty, sir.''.
  Well, Army readiness is worse today than it was in 2000, and if that 
is the metric to measure the success of the Commander in Chief, I would 
argue that that metric has failed. If we look at readiness today, while 
we have a situation which our brigade combat teams that are deployed or 
are preparing to deploy are considered ready, the Army has only one 
ready brigade combat team in reserve for any other contingency in the 
world. Strategically our flexibility has been constrained almost to the 
vanishing point. That is a consequence of Iraq.
  On February 26, the Army Chief of Staff, General Casey, said before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee:

       The cumulative effects of the last 6 plus years at war have 
     left our Army out of balance, consumed by the current fight 
     and unable to do the things we know we need to do properly, 
     sustain our all-volunteer force, and restore our flexibility 
     for an uncertain future.

  He added:

       We are consuming readiness as fast as we build it.

  I would ask, rhetorically, I wonder if General Casey had to report 
how many divisions are not ready today, it would probably be more than 
two, if you aggregated all of the brigades, that for reasons of 
training, equipping, and personnel are not at 100 percent.
  On April 8, General Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on readiness:

       I have been doing this for 6 years. As you know I was at G-
     3 of the Army and vice chief now for almost 4 years. And I 
     have never seen our lack of strategic depth where it is 
     today.

  We have 162,400 troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. There are 
33,000 troops in Afghanistan serving in the ISAF and Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Since 2002, 1.6 million troops have served in either Iraq or 
Afghanistan, and many of them are multiple tours. Of those on active 
duty, 336,000 have 1 tour; 108,000 have had 2 tours; and 30,000 have 
had 3 or more tours.
  This is a pace that cannot be sustained. It is a pace that is taking 
a tremendous toll on our troops and their families, and it is a toll 
again that cannot be indefinitely sustained.
  For our reservists, we have had many of those who have had at least 1 
tour, 97,000; 9,000 have had 2 or more tours; and the notices that went 
out this week to mobilize and alert roughly 42,000 troops include 
significant Reserve and National Guard deployments, brigade combat 
teams in the National Guard that will go again. I suspect for many of 
them it will be at least their second tour and perhaps for some their 
third. So we have had tremendous turbulence in terms of deployment of 
our land forces. Our military personnel are dedicated. They are doing a 
superb job. But they cannot keep up this pace. That is one aspect of 
it, personnel.
  The other aspect is equipment. We have fought tirelessly here in this 
Congress to give our forces the equipment they need. I can recall 
returning in 2003 from Iraq, seeing my National Guard military police 
people in Baghdad being told that they did not have armored humvees and 
they needed them because they were in the middle of a fight in 
Fallujah.
  I contacted the military authorities. I came to the floor of the 
Senate, proposed we increase the funding for armored humvees, and that 
was an initiative that started with my colleagues here in the Senate 
and the House, reluctantly agreed to, I think, from my perspective, by 
the administration. It took us many months to begin to get sufficient 
armored vehicles into Iraq.
  Similarly we are now on a second and third generation with MRAP, the 
mine resistant vehicles. That too was a result of many efforts here in 
the Congress to get that equipment out to our troops.
  I believe, I hope, they have everything they need, the latest 
technology. That is something that is absolutely essential. But all of 
this equipment is being used and overused. Roughly 30 percent of the 
Marine Corps' ground equipment and half of the Army's ground equipment 
is in Iraq and Afghanistan, again leaving very little back here in the 
United States, relatively speaking, for the training and the 
contingency operations that might take place here in a natural disaster 
or some other major contingency.
  It is a harsh, hard environment. The operational tempo is wearing out 
this equipment. I recall being out in Anbar Province getting ready to 
go on a Marine helicopter. They were briefing us routinely, claiming 
that the engines on these helicopters were operating way beyond where 
they would normally operate. They assured me it was safe to get on the 
helicopter. But one wondered, as you got on: Would this rate of 
operational use, if the stress and the strains eventually, would it 
result in malfunctions for our troops, our forces, our marines in the 
field.
  So we expect, the Army expects, to need $12 to $13 billion per year 
to reset the forces. The Marine Corps estimates it will need $15.6 
billion for reset over the next several years when the operations begin 
to wind down. The Army National Guard has little more than half of its 
required equipment and they will need $22 billion for the next 5 years 
to build the equipment up to 75 percent of authorized levels. So we 
have a tremendous impact on our Army because of our operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and principally Iraq.

  The other aspect of readiness is training. Because the time back home 
of Army forces has been reduced effectively to 12 months, they cannot 
do the same type and the same level of training they had been doing 
previous to Iraq. In fact, if you talked to most troops, they come back 
from Iraq, and then they start training, not for the range of missions 
our military force has to be prepared for but for their next deployment 
into either Iraq or Afghanistan. In that time they have to squeeze in 
time with their family, they have to squeeze in the administrative 
details that are part and parcel of being in home base.
  Their training is being pressured. Some of the equipment they need to 
train is not there. It is already overseas and it remains over there. 
There is this increasing concern that the only mission they are 
training for is counterinsurgency and urban combat, because Iraq 
dominates so much of the time, attention, and resources in the Army.
  Another aspect of readiness is recruiting, and this high operational 
tempo has led the Army in some cases to miss their recruiting goals. 
Recently, they have been achieving those goals, but it is not without 
lowering standards, it is not without huge incentives or significant 
incentives. It is something that over the course of the next several 
months and years will show increasing strain and stress on the military 
force, their ability to recruit, their ability to retain.
  In 2005 the Army missed its active-duty recruiting targets by 8 
percent. That was the first time they had ever missed recruiting 
targets since 1999, and by a margin not seen since 1979, in the early 
years of the volunteer Army. Since 2006 the Army has met its yearly 
recruiting goals, but only by taking some extraordinary measures. In 
2007, more than 20 percent of the new Army recruits needed waivers; 57 
percent for

[[Page S4583]]

conduct, 36 percent for medical reasons, and 7 percent for substance 
abuse. There was a time prior to Iraq when the Army prided itself on 
approving very few waivers and was trying to drive the standards up, 
not lower the standards. Thus far in fiscal year 2008, only 82 percent 
of the recruits have high school diplomas. The longstanding goal of the 
Army is at least 90 percent. The maximum age for new recruits has been 
raised from 35 to 42. Now, all of these soldiers are doing their job. 
But we have to ensure, as we were doing before Iraq, that to the 
greatest extent possible we increase the quality of our forces. All of 
these reductions in standards will come with some cost as the Army 
continues to go forward.
  There is another similar picture with respect to retention. The 
number of officers the Army needs grew by 8,000 as we increased the 
size of the Army, with 58 percent of this group in captains and majors. 
As the Army grows, they have to retain more and more of these captains 
and majors. While the overall officer loss rate for fiscal year 2007 
equaled the 10-year average of 8.5 percent, this loss rate must drop to 
5 percent in order to maintain this increased size of the Army at these 
critical positions of captains and majors.
  What is happening is that the tempo of operations, the limited time 
with family, the cycling in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, is causing 
these very talented officers, captains, majors, senior noncommissioned 
officers, to decide that they, for personal reasons, have to leave the 
service. And this is depriving the military, not only today, but for 
many years, of the talent and the skill they need, which is a great 
factor in our military forces. We have got sophisticated equipment, but 
if we do not have the high quality officers, senior noncommissioned 
officers, in all of our services, then we will not be as effective as 
we must be. The cost over the long term is a loss of many talented 
young men and women who otherwise would be committed to a career in the 
military.
  We are taking efforts to retain these people with bonuses. But more 
and more what I am hearing is that the financial incentives, the other 
incentives, are not compensating for the time away from home, for the 
treadmill in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the toll will mount 
despite these incentives.
  There is another aspect too of what is happening, and that is 
something that has become the signature injury of these operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, that is, the increasing number of mental health 
issues arising within our forces. Post-deployment health reassessments 
which are administered to servicemembers 90 to 120 days after returning 
from deployment indicate that 38 percent of soldiers and 31 percent of 
marines report psychological symptoms. The figure in the National Guard 
is 49 percent.
  Of the 1.6 million military personnel who have served in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, almost 800,000 who have left active service are now 
eligible for VA benefits, VA care. Of these almost 800,000 veterans, 
roughly 300,000, or 37 percent, have obtained VA health care since 
2001. Of this roughly 300,000, 40 percent, have been diagnosed with a 
mental disorder.
  That is a staggering total, a consequence of the stress, the strain, 
the types of combat situations, the types of weapons deployed against 
them. But that is a staggering figure. If that number is projected 
throughout all of those who have served, that is a huge number of 
active personnel and veterans who are suffering some type of mental 
consequence of their service in Iraq.
  In January, Dr. William Winkenwerder, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Health Affairs, announced the Army's suicide rate in Iraq 
has been about a third higher than past rates for troops during 
peacetime, another very significant and very sobering statistic.
  Anonymous postdeployment surveys show that 20 percent of married 
soldiers plan to separate or divorce in 2006, another consequence of 
this operational tempo.
  The incidence of alcohol-related instances has substantially 
increased over the last several years. The VA has identified that one 
in four homeless persons are veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This is again another sobering statistic and a result of the operations 
that are being conducted and the requirements to deal effectively and 
principally with those veterans who are returning and those active-duty 
personnel who are returning.
  We have encountered huge costs because of the failed strategy and 
incompetent execution of this operation in Iraq by the administration. 
We have seen over the last several months a surge that was promoted as 
giving the Iraqi Government the ability to reconcile itself, but that 
reconciliation has not yet been achieved.
  We have seen, as I pointed out, that in Iraq today, probably the most 
influential country, certainly challenging us, is not a democratic 
country, but Iran, not a country that is committed as we are to the 
same democratic principles.
  The Maliki government is a Shia government. It is operated in 
collaboration with the Kurds who have their own aspirations for 
autonomy.
  The odd-group-out still remains the Sunni population. We have seen 
over the last several weeks operations in the south in Basra that 
started off inauspiciously and ended quickly with the help of Iran. We 
have seen operations now directed against the Sadr's militiamen in Sadr 
City, the JAM, the Mahdi army. This is rapidly becoming a fight not 
against international terrorism but a fight for power within Iraq among 
various factions and sectarian groups. We are being thrown into it day 
by day.
  It also raises serious questions about, frankly, what we have done in 
the last several years to prepare for this day, to prepare not only the 
military forces in Iraq but the political institutions of Iraq to deal 
effectively and peacefully, we hope, with their citizens and to help 
develop a stable country that can stand on its own.
  We are in a situation also where we have--and I think this was a 
calculated risk, one that was taken and is working, but the question 
is, How long it will work?--recognized Sunni militias. They are called 
the Sons of Iraq or Concerned Local Citizens. These groups are standing 
by at the moment watching as the Maliki government tries to assert its 
authority over JAM and some of the Shia extremist groups. But their 
future direction is uncertain. We are paying them. We have lobbied 
heavily that the Government of Iraq assume this responsibility. But 
there is a real question whether the Maliki government will ever truly 
recognize the 91,000 Sunni militiamen who are organized in the country, 
and there is the real potential that without this integration, this is 
another source of not only friction but of significant conflict in 
Iraq.
  There are numerous scenarios that could play out. One scenario is, if 
Maliki is successful to a degree in disrupting the Shia militias and 
the JAM, he might decide it is now time to take care of the CLCs, the 
Sons of Iraq. This could prompt significant fighting. The other 
possibility is that the Sunni militias, the Sons of Iraq, the CLC, 
decide the moment is right for them to reassert themselves as a much 
more powerful force in the political life of Iraq. None of this is 
certain. But with each passing day, we are further away from weapons of 
mass destruction and international terrorism and al-Qaida. We are 
closer and closer to a struggle between contending Iraqi forces for the 
power to run their country. That is a struggle they must resolve. We 
cannot. It is a struggle that indicates, again, that our course must be 
to change our policy, to assist legitimate forces to train to go after 
whatever remnants of terrorism exist in the country and any place else 
in the world, and to at all times protect our forces.
  Embedded in the supplemental is that policy decision which I hope we 
make positively. If we can begin our redeployment, successfully and 
without deviation, from Iraq, then we can begin to focus on what to me 
are much more critical and central issues--al-Qaida elements in 
Pakistan, the stability of the Government of Pakistan, renewed support 
for the Government in Afghanistan, and the successful effort to not 
only defeat the remnants of the Taliban but to do what we have not been 
able to yet, which is to create political institutions that will 
outlast us, that will be committed to a fair view of democracy and a 
fair view of the treatment of their own people. The economic 
infrastructure to support such a

[[Page S4584]]

government, not through opium but through legitimate commercial 
transaction, that, too, is a difficult task. And then, too, I think we 
can focus and must focus our attention on Iran, dealing with their 
nuclear aspirations and also recognizing that ultimately our success in 
the region of the Persian Gulf depends upon diplomatic efforts 
involving all countries in a positive way.
  This is a tall order. It is a consequence of a misinformed strategy 
and failed implementation. I hope we can begin with this supplemental 
to change course, to move forward. I urge my colleagues to consider 
this supplemental, consider the fact that we have to change direction 
in Iraq and redirect resources here in the United States. I hope in 
that spirit we can pass this supplemental and move forward.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I rise today with the hope that this 
Chamber will soon find consensus in our efforts to find a new course 
and a new direction in Iraq.
  I am more convinced than ever that we must change our mission in Iraq 
from one of combat to one of support. We must place the responsibility 
for Iraq's future and for the security of its citizens in the hands of 
the Government of the Iraqi people. Until we change our mission and we 
take our military out of their streets, Iraqi politicians will not take 
the necessary, courageous, and final steps toward a political 
reconciliation that can achieve a lasting peace for Iraq and for the 
region.
  Our military is performing admirably in difficult circumstances. They 
have been tasked with calming streets that are wrought with sectarian 
conflict, with unraveling thousand-year-old webs of Sunni, Kurd, and 
Shia rivalries, with understanding the mixture of motives behind car 
bombings, suicide bombings, roadside bombings, and mass executions. 
They have been told that if they do this and slow the downward spiral 
of civil war, the Shiite-dominated Government will press for national 
reconciliation and a more stable, secure future for Iraq.
  Our troops have done their job. The Iraqi Government has not done its 
part. The Maliki government in Iraq has failed to capitalize on the 
opportunities for success our soldiers have provided, and the 
administration has failed to implement a political or a diplomatic 
strategy that is worthy of their sacrifice on the battlefield.
  ``There is no military solution . . . to the insurgency [in] Iraq.'' 
That is a quote from General Petraeus. It is a quote General Petraeus 
made to the world and to Members of this body many months ago. He was 
right then, and he is right today.
  I believe the overwhelming majority of Senators have the same goals 
with respect to our future policy in Iraq. In my view, we share four 
key principles and ambitions.
  First and foremost, every Senator in this Chamber wants a stable Iraq 
that can protect its citizens without dependence on American combat 
troops. Regardless of one's position on the merits or demerits of the 
invasion, we must now help Iraq stand as a sovereign nation. We must 
root out the terror cells that have set up shop since the invasion. And 
we must guard against a failed state. We must also find a way to help 
the 2 million Iraqis who fled across the border to Jordan, to Syria, 
and to Iran, as well as the nearly 2 million internally displaced 
persons who have fled the violence of their neighborhoods. It is the 
largest refugee crisis in the world today.
  Second, we generally agree that our military mission in Iraq must 
transition at some point from one of combat to one of support. We must 
have the ultimate goal of bringing our troops home. We may disagree 
about the number or the timing of troop drawdowns, but we all know we 
cannot sustain 15 to 20 brigade combat teams in Iraq indefinitely. It 
will take courage and conviction to shift our mission and to bring our 
troops home, but if Iraq is truly to stand on its own, we must take the 
decisive action so we can begin that transition.
  The third point on which I believe we can, by and large, agree is 
that this war has been poorly managed. The administration made a series 
of disastrous mistakes and gross miscalculations after the invasion. 
Failing to plan for a postwar Iraq, disbanding the Iraqi Army, purging 
Baathist technocrats from the Government, staffing the Coalition 
Provisional Authority with neophytes, sending our troops into harm's 
way without body armor or armored vehicles--these blunders have cost 
America dearly. They have eroded this administration's credibility, and 
they have cost us in lives and treasure.
  Fourth, I believe there is a widely shared view in this Chamber that 
the United States should focus its military and diplomatic efforts on 
the most pressing threats to national security. Senators on both sides 
of the aisle agree that our top national security priorities should be 
to capture the men who were behind the attacks of September 11, to 
break up the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, 
and to confront the nuclear threats that we see, especially from Iran.
  Sustaining 140,000 troops in Iraq limits our ability to prosecute the 
war on terror where terrorist training camps are actually located. Our 
top intelligence analysts have concluded that al-Qaida has regrouped--
has regrouped stronger than ever--on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 
While it is true that al-Qaida in Iraq is a franchise, al-Qaida's main 
headquarters are elsewhere and not in Iraq.
  Furthermore, prolonged commitments in Iraq limit our strategic 
flexibility should we need to respond to threats elsewhere around the 
world. We must evaluate whether putting all of our eggs in one basket 
in Iraq is the best strategy to protect America against threats and 
future attacks.
  On these four points, I believe we should be able to find consensus 
in this Chamber. Our goal of stability in Iraq, our desire to start 
bringing our troops home, our shared frustration with the management of 
this war, and our concern that escalation in Iraq is weakening our 
defenses against terrorist threats and nuclear proliferation--these 
four points of agreement lead to the conclusion that we must find a new 
way forward in Iraq.
  The wise heads of the Iraq Study Group laid the groundwork many 
months ago for a comprehensive strategy on how we would move forward in 
Iraq. We commissioned out of this Congress our finest and most 
experienced foreign policy experts, led by former Secretary of State 
James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton, to provide us an 
objective and bipartisan set of recommendations on how we should 
proceed forward in this intractable war. I have reviewed this report 
multiple times, the report of the Iraq Study Group. That report was 
released at the end of 2006. It is a small book, but it contains great 
wisdom of our top diplomats, military commanders, and statesmen from 
around our country and, indeed, around the world.
  The report of the Iraq Study Group laid out a political, diplomatic, 
and military strategy for how we create the conditions to end this 
war. Its core military recommendation is simple: It is time to 
transition our troops from a mission of combat to a mission of 
training, equipping, advising, and support of the Iraq military. Iraq 
must take responsibility for its own security, and it must be forced to 
take the political steps necessary toward that reconciliation.

  Unlike the President's policy, the Iraq Study Group's prescriptions 
couple a military strategy with a robust and effective diplomatic and 
political strategy. The group recommended making our economic and 
military support contingent upon the Iraq Government devising and 
achieving specific benchmarks. While the Iraqis have made some progress 
in achieving these benchmarks, much remains to be done, and most of 
these benchmarks have not been met.

[[Page S4585]]

  Finally, the report makes it very clear we need a diplomatic 
offensive to help change the equation in the Middle East. Under this 
diplomatic push, we would reach out to potential partners in the 
region, engaging those partners in the region as we strive to have a 
stake in creating long-lasting peace and stability in Iraq.
  I wish to spend a few minutes now speaking about the Iraq war 
provisions in the supplemental which is later on in the day formally 
before the Senate. The bill before us contains many of the propositions 
that would change our Iraq policy in ways that are consistent with the 
Iraq Study Group's core recommendations. First and foremost, the bill 
expresses the sense of the Senate that our troops' mission should 
change from combat operations to counterterrorism, training and 
supporting Iraqi forces, and force protection. It would set a 
reasonable goal--not a deadline, a reasonable goal--of June 2009 to 
complete this transition. This goal is some 15 months past the date of 
March of 2008, which the Iraq Study Group originally proposed as its 
target date for the completion of this transition.
  This bill would require the Iraq Government to stand up to its own 
responsibilities in important ways. It would be required to match any 
funds we spend for training of Iraqi security forces or for 
reconstruction. This legislation would ensure that the U.S. military 
pays the same price at the pump as Iraqi civilians are paying today, by 
requiring the Iraq Government to provide the same kind of support for 
the fuel costs we are using to protect Iraq today. We are spending $12 
billion of America's taxpayer dollars each month in Iraq. We are 
spending $12 billion of American taxpayer dollars each month in Iraq. 
After more than 5 years of this war, in my view, it is time for the 
Iraq Government to share this financial burden.
  We also need to recognize that this administration's policies have 
stretched our military to the breaking point. Our troops are away from 
their families too long, they do not get enough time to train, and 
readiness is suffering. Under this legislation, the President would 
have to certify that troops are fully trained and equipped before they 
are deployed to Iraq. It would place a time limit on combat deployments 
and ensure that our troops have sufficient dwell time between tours.
  Finally, the bill would ban permanent U.S. bases on Iraqi soil and 
require that any mutual defense agreements with Iraq must be approved 
by this Congress and by this Senate.
  It is not enough to simply endorse a set of military tactics and hope 
for the best, which is what the President of the United States has 
done. The solution in Iraq, our military commanders tell us, is one 
which is not a military solution but one which combines all those 
elements that were set forth in the Iraq Study Group.
  Henry Kissinger once said America needs to rid itself of ``the 
illusion that there are military answers to our security, and that 
policy ends where strategy begins.''
  We would be wise to heed Kissinger's advice in this age of turmoil. 
There are no easy answers in Iraq, no easy exits, no certainty of 
success. To stay on the President's path of more of the same is simply 
to embrace a policy that is not working--the same dogmatic leadership 
that led us into war, the same dogmatic leadership that failed to make 
a postinvasion plan, the same dogmatic leadership that chases the hope 
of a mission accomplished without regard to learning the lessons of the 
failures of the past.
  To charge a new path--to build a political, diplomatic, and military 
strategy in Iraq--is to embrace the role of a statesman. For it is a 
statesman, Kissinger used to say, who takes responsibility for all the 
favorable results if everything goes as planned but also for all the 
undesirable results if they do not.
  To serve as statesmen is our role. This is our role as Senators. It 
is up to the wise heads of this body to take the long view in Iraq, to 
be realistic about our options, and to consider all our national 
security interests--from terrorism to nuclear threats--when pursuing 
our goals of stability and peace in the Middle East.
  Thank you. I yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________