[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 84 (Wednesday, May 21, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4578-S4585]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I wish to focus my remaining remarks on the
supplemental appropriations bill which is pending before the Senate. We
passed a supplemental appropriations bill out of the Appropriations
Committee, which I serve on, last week. This bill contains $168.9
billion for funding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is the
amount the President requested. But importantly, this bill also
includes significant contributions to the domestic economy of this
country, to the needs here at home, not just overseas.
It includes funds for LIHEAP. At a time when oil is topping $130 a
barrel, the drain on low-income Americans and seniors particularly,
simply to pay heating prices, and in the Southwest and South of our
country, cooling prices this summer are extraordinary. It is a burden.
It is a huge burden. We have incorporated some funds for that
situation.
We also have moneys for unemployment insurance, not only necessary to
sustain families in a time of economic crisis but also one of the most
effective stimulus devices. The money from unemployment insurance goes
quickly from the recipient to the local market, to all the needs of a
family struggling in this economy to get by. It is a tremendous way to
stimulate our economy. So it has both individual benefits and economic
benefits for the country as a whole.
I must also point out that included in these domestic provisions is
extraordinary legislation by Senator Webb, my colleague from Virginia,
the enhanced GI bill of rights. Senator Webb has done an extraordinary
job, and it is not surprising. He approaches this not only as a very
astute legislator but as a combat marine veteran of Vietnam. He has
borne the burden of battle. He understands now, in the famous words of
President Lincoln, that it is our responsibility to take care of those
who have borne the burden of battle.
This responsibility is, I think, one of the most paramount we face,
and his legislation goes right to the concerns of so many returning
veterans: How will I get back to education? How will I fund my
education? How will I be similar to my predecessors, the generation of
my father--when so many had the opportunity to go to college, and then
not only did they contribute to their own family's well-being, they
helped build an economic powerhouse we have seen in America since World
War II.
This is a program, again, which I think is extraordinarily important.
I commend Senator Webb for his vision, for his persistence, and for his
passion. I hope we include it in the final version of the supplemental
appropriations bill.
As I mentioned before, we are putting funds in for LIHEAP. I offered
an amendment to include $1 billion. It is so necessary. In places such
as California, there are 1.7 million households behind in their utility
bills. That is up 100,000 from last year, and last year was a difficult
year for many. There are 650,000 households in Pennsylvania that are
receiving shutoff warnings, a huge number of families who are facing
the end of their utility service. In a very uncertain economy, it is
difficult to reestablish that relationship going forward unless we help
them.
We have seen a 162-percent increase in energy costs since 2000. It is
extraordinary. There is no paycheck for working Americans that has gone
up 162 percent, but their energy bills have. We have seen heating oil
prices in the last year increase 35 percent. So this is something that
is absolutely critical, just as unemployment insurance, just as so many
aspects of this legislation.
There are also included provisions not requested by the President.
There is some assistance for the global food crisis and for the
terrible natural disasters in Myanmar and China.
We also include, as another aspect of the legislation, something that
is absolutely, I believe, critical, and that is conditions on our
policy with respect to Iraq, particularly. This Congress has, over my
strenuous efforts otherwise, essentially given the President a blank
check. He demands money, and he has been given money but without
conditions. I think it is the responsibility of this Congress to impose
reasonable conditions on the funding, to not only govern our operations
but also to make it clear to the Iraqi Government that they are
ultimately responsible for their own safety, their own future, their
own stability, the future of the Iraqi nation and the Iraqi people. It
is not something we can do for them. We have rendered extraordinary
assistance to them, but the task is truly theirs, and they must seize
that task.
These conditions, I think, are terribly important. One would, for
example, ensure the readiness of our troops, who are being stretched to
the limit, ensure they are ready when they are deployed. That is
something I hope no one is arguing with.
Another provision directs the Government to negotiate cost sharing
for fuel and troop training with the Iraqis. The Iraqi Government has
accumulated upward of $10 billion or more because of the surging oil
prices. Very little, if any, of those funds is being devoted to their
own people or to the joint effort we have undertaken with them to
stabilize the country. It is only fair that they should begin to pay
their fair share, particularly since they are sitting on a significant
amount of money resulting from high energy prices. That money should be
devoted to stabilizing their country and helping their people, much
more so than they are doing today.
Then there is another provision which is something Senator Levin and
I have been stressing for many months now, and that is to begin a
transition of the missions our military forces and diplomatic forces
are performing in Iraq, particularly our military forces, instead of an
open-ended mission, and we have seen this mission from the President's
standpoint change dramatically.
As you will recall, the first mission was to find and destroy the
weapons of mass destruction, a very difficult mission, since there were
no weapons of mass destruction. Then there was the mission of creating
a democratic oasis in the Persian Gulf, a very grandiose mission, more
or less, and that mission, I think, has been discounted dramatically
over the last several months by the President's own rhetoric. He has
talked now about simply creating a country that will sustain itself and
not threaten its neighbors.
We have to focus not on these globalized missions which are more
[[Page S4579]]
dogmatic and ideological, but on things the military should be doing
for our protection in the context of redeploying forces out of Iraq.
Those missions are, in my view, force protection--we have to ensure our
forces are fully protected--counterterrorism, because we cannot
surrender that mission anywhere in the world; we have to be able to
seek out and destroy those terrorist cells that are plotting and
planning against the United States and our allies; and third is to
train the Iraqi security forces because we do have to provide a force
that will stay behind, a force that will help stabilize that country.
The essence of the Levin-Reed amendment has been to move from the
open-ended missions of today to these discrete missions and, in so
doing, begin a deliberate, consistent disengagement of our forces and a
reduction of our forces in Iraq. That is a policy that will, I think,
work, and it is a policy that eventually, ultimately must be followed.
I think the reluctance of the administration to entertain any
conditions whatsoever over the last several years has undermined, in
the long run, our ability to influence the Government of Iraq and also
to reassure the American public we are not into an open-ended,
unlimited commitment, stretching years and decades and beyond, that our
mission is discrete, that our mission in terms of military presence is
coming down and will not reverse itself, and that we are doing all we
can in that context to save lives in Iraq.
On 9/11, this country was struck by terrorists. The United States,
this Senate, the Congress, the administration rallied together with
unanimity and with purpose. We authorized and supported an attack
against Afghanistan because that is where the perpetrators were lodged,
that is where al-Qaida was headquartered. They were collaborating with
the Taliban government. They were given safe haven there. The planning
for so much of what went on, on that fateful day, originated from
Afghanistan. That is where bin Laden, that is where the leadership of
al-Qaida was. We struck there, and I must say in an extraordinarily
successful operation--and credit and criticism must be given, and there
is great credit in terms of the leadership of the administration, our
military forces conducting a very sophisticated operation, an operation
that used our advantages with precision weapons, used very effectively
our special forces, and used collaborative efforts with forces on the
ground in Afghanistan and also the collaboration and support, in many
respects, of the international community. But rather than consolidating
our gains after that successful operation and pursuing al-Qaida in
Pakistan, where the leadership fled, the administration turned
immediately, almost immediately, to Iraq. And not out of any, I think,
strategic need, but out of a dogmatic political, ideological need.
They thought Iraq would be a relatively easy target. They were
speaking in those days, informally at least, about a very short
operation, and that almost immediately Iraq would blossom as a source
of democratic inspiration and market economics in that region. We know
the history has not been that cheerful. And that diversion to Iraq, I
believe, was a deeply flawed strategy. It was an attack on a country
that did not represent an immediate threat to the United States, a
point I made on the floor of this Senate as I opposed the resolution of
2002 to conduct those operations.
Because we were pursuing not a strategic necessity but an ideological
obsession, it was not a mission that was well advised or well planned
for. There was more hope than planning involved, more ideology than
practical commonsense application of force to a threatening situation
in the world. One of the unfortunate ironies of this is that as we have
been obsessed and committed in Iraq, al-Qaida has reconstituted itself
as an incredible force once again. The whole purpose of our attack in
Afghanistan, the whole thrust of our efforts immediately after 9/11,
was to decisively and, we hoped, irrevocably destroy al-Qaida. Al-Qaida
is back. While we have been engaged in this hugely expensive mission--
expensive not only in terms of resources but in terms of the lives of
our soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen, and also the wear and tear
on our military forces--al-Qaida has been quietly rebuilding.
The other thing that has happened unwittingly is that Iran has become
a much more credible threat to stability in the region; has become even
more influential and powerful. In some respects, this is a direct
result of our engagement in Iraq.
Also in that time period, we stood by as the North Koreans overthrew
the agreed framework, seized the plutonium that was in the reactors
around Yongbyan and took it away. Now we are trying desperately to put
together another agreement with the North Koreans, but after years in
which they not only tested longer range missiles but also detonated a
nuclear device. They crossed a threshold that had never been crossed
before, they detonated a nuclear device, and our reaction was, I think
necessarily perhaps because of our engagement in Iraq, one of seeking,
perhaps too late now, a diplomatic approach. But if you go back to
2000, we had a framework in place that looks very much like the
framework they are working out today. We had the plutonium secured,
North Korea had not tested a nuclear device, and there were hopes that
with further active negotiations we could make additional progress.
That, I think, too, is a cost of our engagement in Iraq.
It has also greatly diminished our standing in the international
community. This is not just a nice thing to have. An essential
attribute of national power is the respect, the esteem, the
cooperation, the good wishes, the goodwill, and the political and
diplomatic support of other nations, because in this world most of the
great challenges cannot be met alone. That was contrary, I think, to
the unilateralism that abounded in this administration; that if in fact
we are going to do something significant, longstanding and sustainable,
it requires a multinational approach and the foundation of that
approach is the goodwill and good wishes of the people of the world.
This administration has squandered much of that.
It also is contributing, and we can debate how much, to this
faltering economy. Oil today is $130 a barrel. Some of that is
attributable to the instability in the gulf region; the fact that Iraq
has not been producing the same volume of oil consistently over the
last several years that it did before the operation. This geopolitical
uncertainty has contributed significantly to the price of oil and it is
also, I think, contributing to the overall economic issue we are
addressing here today, a very critical issue in the United States.
Another aspect of this policy is that we have stretched our military,
our land forces, to the brink, if you will. They have seen significant
deployments consistently time and time again and the toll is adding up
on our military forces. We are now left, and the next administration is
left, and this Congress and the American people, with dealing with the
consequences of this flawed strategy. I believe we have to begin to
recognize and realistically assess the political and military situation
in Iraq. We have to begin to develop and implement achievable missions
for our U.S. forces there and their civilian counterparts, and then we
must turn our attention to restoring our economic prosperity and
growth, and rebuilding our military, which has been significantly
stretched and stressed by this operation.
We have to also reorganize our civilian resources to deal with the
ongoing threats in the world. That is something this administration has
yet to do effectively--to develop a complementary power of our State
Department officials, our agriculture officials, and all those people
who must be part of this approach to a kind of warfare that is, in many
cases, less about firepower and more about reaching people with
economic progress and educational reform, and water systems. Those are
more potent weapons sometimes than any precision-guided missile we
might deploy.
I think our first step in all of this is passing this supplemental
appropriations bill, with conditioned funding for our forces, with
reasonable conditions about the mission and the responsibilities the
Iraqi Government should have, and also once again beginning to invest
in the American people, investing in keeping them warm in the winter
through LIHEAP and keeping them cool through LIHEAP in the summertime;
giving them a chance, if they lose
[[Page S4580]]
their job, to at least keep looking for some support with extended
unemployment benefits, and so many other things we have included in
this. I think that is critical.
Now, I mentioned before I have felt since 2002 that the strategy of
the administration toward Iraq was flawed significantly. It was, I
think, a product of a dogma. No one can I think dispute the power of
democracy, and it is a power that is not exclusive to our culture. It
is a human demand, the ability to live with a sense of personal
integrity and personal freedom. But I think the administration didn't
realize you need the institutional capacity to have a democratic
government, and this capacity is not automatic nor is it built up in a
matter of weeks or months. We have seen in Iraq, and in so many other
places, that democratic elections do not necessarily lead to democratic
political forces controlling a country; that you need to build
carefully over, I would suggest, many years the institutional capacity
so that elections lead to true democracy, not simply legitimizing those
people who are antidemocratic.
I think this has been one of the tremendous flaws of the President's
concept of the mission. As a result, we started off with, obviously, I
think, an ill-conceived mission of eliminating weapons of mass
destruction in a country in which it turned out there were no weapons
of mass destruction. People forget that the United Nations put
inspectors on the ground, and that it was this administration who
hastened their departure, rather than using these inspectors over time
to establish whether there were weapons or whether there were no
weapons, or at least to do it in a way in which subsequent military
action would be legitimized by either noncooperation of the Iraqis or
the fact that the questions couldn't be established or answered. But
they quickly rushed to a military option, and I think that option has
had unfortunate consequences for the United States.
One of the principal consequences, and I mentioned this in my
introductory comments, is the fact that al-Qaida, the existential
threat to this country, as evidenced by 9/11, has in fact reconstituted
itself, not only in the border regions of Afghanistan, to a degree, but
much more particularly in Pakistan, in the federally administered
tribal areas. These are poor tribal areas ill governed by the
Government of Pakistan. In fact, there are provisions in their organic
laws which limit their real access to these areas. It has a population
of 3 million people, and in that 3 million people al-Qaida, bin Laden,
and al Zawahiri have found sanctuary and a safe haven, that continues
today.
In a sobering report released last month by the Government
Accountability Office, they stated:
The United States has not met its national security goals
to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe havens in
Pakistan's FATA.
And this is 7 years after 9/11.
Since 2002, the U.S. has provided Pakistan with $10.5
billion in military, economic, and developmental aid. Half of
it has gone to the military. But despite these actions--
despite this extraordinary amount of money--GAO found broad
agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence
Estimate, State and embassy documents, as well as defense
officials in Pakistan, that al-Qaida had regenerated its
ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in
establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA.
Now, I thought the point of our national strategy after 9/11 was to
destroy al-Qaida and to eliminate any possibility of a safe haven
anywhere in the world. And according to these documents, our embassy,
our Defense officials, our national intelligence agency, al-Qaida has
reestablished itself and has found safe haven. I would suggest that is,
I think, a stunning indictment of the strategy of this administration
over the last several years; again, I think an unfortunate consequence
of the obsession that they have chosen to pursue in Iraq.
An even more disturbing finding of GAO is:
No comprehensive plan comprised of diplomatic, economic,
intelligence and military efforts for meeting U.S. National
security goals in the FATA has been developed.
The one thing that seems to be consistent about the administration is
they do not do much planning. There was no plan for Iraq and, according
to the GAO, there is no plan for Pakistan and the federally
administered tribal areas there.
A key part of the plan that must be developed in Pakistan is economic
development. Because what I have witnessed, in the several times I have
been to Pakistan, is that this is not strictly, as so many of these
conflicts are, a military action. It requires providing economic
support, it requires giving people a sense that their fate should be
linked to their legitimate government, and that government should be
pursuing goals which are not strictly sectarian. That government should
be a government relatively open and democratic, and that the appeal of
the extremist is weakened if people have that sense of confidence in
their government, confidence in their future. That is not a military
issue essentially; that is an issue of economic development, of
supporting legitimate institutions of the state, be it Pakistan or
elsewhere.
That has been recognized by, I think, many experts. But the senior
U.S. Embassy officials in Pakistan admit there has been overreliance on
the Pakistani military to achieve U.S. national security objectives;
that we have not developed a complementary approach of a comprehensive
strategy which includes economic, political, and social development
also.
As a result, in March, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, Michael Hayden, described al-Qaida's safe haven as a ``clear
and present danger to the United States.'' The chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, ADM Michael Mullen, has stated:
If I were going to pick the next attack to hit the United
States, it would come out of the FATA.
Now, let us be clear. It is not out of Iraq, it is not out of Mosul,
or Basra, or Baghdad, it is out of the FATA. That is the view of the
chief uniformed officer of the United States. The 2008 Director of
National Intelligence annual threat assessment, which represents the
combined judgments of 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, has concluded
that:
The resurgence of the FATA now poses a preeminent threat to
the United States national security.
The problems of the FATA are being highlighted by deteriorating
conditions in Afghanistan.
What we have seen from the initial success in Afghanistan has been a
steady, at times rapid, deterioration of conditions there. It is
evident that our efforts in Afghanistan are being undermined by what is
happening in Pakistan. Not only have we taken our eye off the major
threat, al-Qaida, and allowed it to reconstitute, we are in danger of
seeing the progress we have made in Afghanistan slip away.
In 2003, the Taliban, the former government, and their followers, who
have continued to try to assert their will in Afghanistan, were
operating squad size units. Now we have reports they are operating in
battalion size units of almost 400 people, showing the climate has
changed radically. Suicide bombers have attacked at rates that were not
observed in Afghanistan until relatively recently, but as you have no
doubt surmised, it is something that has been imported through
terrorist networks into Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's index of corruption is among the highest in the world.
You have a state that has marginal capacity to govern well and wisely.
Again, this is after many years of our involvement, our engagement.
Also, there was a sense that, initially at least, before Iraq,
Afghanistan was the major test of our ability, not only to defeat al-
Qaida but also to create or help create, in collaboration with the
Afghanis, a stable government. That test is in danger of failing
miserably.
Afghanistan now provides 93 percent of the world's opium. One of the
great additional ironies, now it is one of the major suppliers of
drugs, and it is doing so while we maintain our military and diplomatic
presence there.
We have a NATO contingent there, but frankly NATO has not been able
to fulfill all of its obligations, putting more pressure on our
military alliance forces. I think we have to urge NATO to be more
helpful. Hopefully, they will. But, as a result, we have sent
additional forces in there, about 4,300 troops. We are prepared to send
more. This is adding additional stress and strain on our military
forces.
As I look, we are seeing a situation in which the principal objective
in response to 9/11, the principal place where our enemies were, has
now been relegated to the third page of the
[[Page S4581]]
paper, as the headlines are dominated by Iraq. I think we have a
situation where we have literally taken our eye off the major
existential threat.
We have another consequence of our operations in Iraq, and that is we
have empowered Iran. Iran is heavily involved in Iraq. Its objectives
are questionable. They have an interest in maintaining strategic depth
by keeping the regime in Baghdad as one that is friendly to them, not
hostile as the Baathists were. Also, they have many colleagues in the
Iraqi Shia movement. Some of these individuals actually fought with the
Iranians against the Iraqis in the 1980s in the Iraq-Iran war.
Iraq is materially assisting all the major Shia parties. They have
not limited themselves to one party or one particular group. As we all
know, in March of this year, President Ahmadinejad visited Iraq for 2
days. The present government in Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki and all,
rolled out the red carpet--literally. He arrived in a motorcade and ran
around Baghdad in a sport coat. When any of our colleagues go or when
any of our major administrative officials go, it is surreptitiously, it
is guarded, and it is in a flak jacket. So there is something going on
there with respect to this Government of Iraq and Ahmadinejad and his
warm welcome. I think it graphically shows the influence they have in
that country.
We are finding a steady supply of IEDs which our military authorities
trace to Iran, or at least their technology. Iran is heavily engaged in
funding social organizations and building a model they have used
elsewhere--Hezbolla in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian Authority--
where they are able to not only help them organize the military force
but help them carry out social functions, helping people, helping
widows, providing relief. That is very powerful when you have a
dysfunctional government and that is the case in Iraq.
We also know, on another track, the Iranians are attempting to
develop a nuclear fuel cycle. The IAEA, the International Atomic Energy
Administration, has been spending decades trying to track the
developmental work of the Iranian Government. In 2006 there were
documents found of possible nuclear dimension to their program in Iran.
This is of great consequence to us. There is a legitimate concern that
if the Iranian Government were able to develop a nuclear fuel cycle and
could produce nuclear material, they would not be able to resist the
temptation to develop a nuclear device. That would be of significant
consequence in the region and in the world.
All that is happening in the context of our energies and our
attention being overwhelmingly devoted to Iraq. There is a connection
between the growing geopolitical clout of Iran in the region and our
situation within Iraq. In the long run, I think we might look back and
discover that one of the real costs of Iraq was the emergence of a much
more difficult, much more threatening, much more powerful Iran.
As I mentioned earlier, while we have been focused so strenuously on
Iraq, North Korea has broken out of the Agreed Framework. They have
expelled international inspectors. They have withdrawn from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. They restarted their nuclear installation at
Yongbyon. It is estimated that up to 50 kilograms of separated
plutonium, enough for at least six nuclear weapons, have been taken by
the North Koreans and dispersed somewhere in the country.
On October 9, 2006, the North Koreans conducted a nuclear test--
crossed a red line they had never done before, detonated a nuclear
device. Fortunately, over the last several months the administration
has reinstituted serious negotiations with the North Koreans. Under the
able leadership of Ambassador Christopher Hill, they have begun to
identify and work with the North Koreans to identify where the
plutonium might be, where there are other nuclear materials, nuclear
technologies, and they are beginning to walk back where we were,
ironically, in the year 2000 and provide some sense of a diplomatic
solution to a very pressing problem.
But I would argue this would be a very different situation if we were
not so decisively involved and engaged in Iraq.
I mentioned also, in the course of these last several years, our
involvement in Iraq has hurt us in terms of the world's opinion. That
is not just a nice thing to have, it is an essential thing to have. In
late 2001, 52 percent of Turkish citizens and 75 percent of our British
allies viewed the United States favorably. Now that favorable view has
dropped to 9 percent in Turkey and 51 percent in Great Britain--one of
our longest and most significant allies, Great Britain, and Turkey, one
of the most significant members of NATO and also a Muslim country. We
have seen our public approval drop precipitously.
In a poll conducted by the BBC just last month, 47 percent of
citizens in 25 countries said the United States is playing a mainly
negative role in the world. That type of public opinion will not
inspire political leaders around the world to help us very much. In
fact, to do so they have to consciously operate against their own
public opinion. That is a difficult challenge anywhere.
Last month, Zogby and the University of Maryland surveyed citizens of
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and the UAE and found 83
percent had an unfavorable view of the United States. These countries
are moderate Arab countries, so to speak, whose support in this effort
in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere is necessary. Their unfavorable
view of the United States is alarming.
One of the keys we know of prevailing in this struggle is to
challenge and rally the forces of moderation and democracy through the
Arab world, of getting the people of the Arab world to understand that
we are trying to assist them. That is not working, unfortunately.
Then, as I mentioned, we have the economic consequences of the war.
In December 31, 2002, the New York Times reported:
The administration's top budget official estimated today
that the cost of a war with Iraq could be in the range of $50
billion to $60 billion, a figure that is well below earlier
estimates from White House officials--
Then OMB Director--
Mitch Daniels would not provide specific costs for either a
long or a short military campaign against Saddam Hussein. But
he said the administration was budgeting for both, and
earlier estimates of $100 billion to $200 billion in Iraq war
costs by Lawrence B. Lindsey, Mr. Bush's former chief
economic adviser, were too high.
To date we have approved $526 billion for operations in Iraq--far in
excess of any of the estimates of the administration. That spending is
affecting what we can do to help our own citizens, what we can do to
play a positive role in the world--not in a military sense but in a
diplomatic and international sense, helping in so many different areas.
Now, to gain some perspective on the $500-plus billion that we have
committed to Iraq, what we could have used it for, this amount accrued
plus the amount in the supplemental we are considering would have been
sufficient to provide health insurance coverage to all the 45 million
uninsured Americans for the timeframe 2003 to 2008. That is taken from
the Joint Economic Committee. That would be a significant benefit to
the people of America, but that is a benefit foregone. I have pointed
out all this money to date has been deficit spending. This is not
something we have paid for. One of the complaints we often hear around
here is that it is irresponsible to spend money without somehow
offsetting it. That line of thought does not persist with the
administration when it comes to funding this war in Iraq.
We have also piled up huge contingency costs as we go forward. The
direct costs are significant, but the indirect costs and the future
costs are also important to note. We have to repair and replace the
military equipment that is being used. We have spent money to increase
recruitment and retention, and we have to do that for many years. We
have had economic disruptions caused by deployment of the National
Guard and Reserve troops who have to leave their jobs to go into the
military.
According to a November 2007 report compiled by the Joint Economic
Committee, the impact of the war on the U.S. economy to date is $1.3
trillion or $16,500 for every American family of four. So the costs,
both direct and indirect, have been staggering.
Those costs continue. One of the critical costs we are going to face
is the cost going forward of helping our veterans. I was very pleased
last year to
[[Page S4582]]
act as the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Military
Construction and Veterans' Affairs while Senator Johnson recovered, and
now I am equally pleased to know that he is chairing that subcommittee
and doing a remarkable job. But we were able to pass a significant
increase in spending for our veterans.
But the real challenge for us is will we do that 5 years from now? 7
years from now? 8 years from now? 20 years from now, when these
veterans still need the help but time has passed? I hope we will. That
would be a test--and if I am here, I hope I will be able to remind
people that the test is each year not 1 year or 2 years.
As Professor Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate, pointed out, this cost, when
you aggregate it all, is in the trillions of dollars going forward,
looking at the consequential costs today, looking at the direct
spending.
That is taking its toll on the economy of this country.
Another place where the toll is being taken is on our Army and Marine
Corps, particularly; our military in general, but particularly our Army
and Marine Corps.
I recall, as so many of us do, years ago, August 3, 2000, to be
precise when Governor Bush stated: Our military is low on parts, pay
and morale. If called upon by the Commander in Chief today, two entire
divisions of the Army will have to report ``Not ready for duty, sir.''.
Well, Army readiness is worse today than it was in 2000, and if that
is the metric to measure the success of the Commander in Chief, I would
argue that that metric has failed. If we look at readiness today, while
we have a situation which our brigade combat teams that are deployed or
are preparing to deploy are considered ready, the Army has only one
ready brigade combat team in reserve for any other contingency in the
world. Strategically our flexibility has been constrained almost to the
vanishing point. That is a consequence of Iraq.
On February 26, the Army Chief of Staff, General Casey, said before
the Senate Armed Services Committee:
The cumulative effects of the last 6 plus years at war have
left our Army out of balance, consumed by the current fight
and unable to do the things we know we need to do properly,
sustain our all-volunteer force, and restore our flexibility
for an uncertain future.
He added:
We are consuming readiness as fast as we build it.
I would ask, rhetorically, I wonder if General Casey had to report
how many divisions are not ready today, it would probably be more than
two, if you aggregated all of the brigades, that for reasons of
training, equipping, and personnel are not at 100 percent.
On April 8, General Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on readiness:
I have been doing this for 6 years. As you know I was at G-
3 of the Army and vice chief now for almost 4 years. And I
have never seen our lack of strategic depth where it is
today.
We have 162,400 troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. There are
33,000 troops in Afghanistan serving in the ISAF and Operation Enduring
Freedom. Since 2002, 1.6 million troops have served in either Iraq or
Afghanistan, and many of them are multiple tours. Of those on active
duty, 336,000 have 1 tour; 108,000 have had 2 tours; and 30,000 have
had 3 or more tours.
This is a pace that cannot be sustained. It is a pace that is taking
a tremendous toll on our troops and their families, and it is a toll
again that cannot be indefinitely sustained.
For our reservists, we have had many of those who have had at least 1
tour, 97,000; 9,000 have had 2 or more tours; and the notices that went
out this week to mobilize and alert roughly 42,000 troops include
significant Reserve and National Guard deployments, brigade combat
teams in the National Guard that will go again. I suspect for many of
them it will be at least their second tour and perhaps for some their
third. So we have had tremendous turbulence in terms of deployment of
our land forces. Our military personnel are dedicated. They are doing a
superb job. But they cannot keep up this pace. That is one aspect of
it, personnel.
The other aspect is equipment. We have fought tirelessly here in this
Congress to give our forces the equipment they need. I can recall
returning in 2003 from Iraq, seeing my National Guard military police
people in Baghdad being told that they did not have armored humvees and
they needed them because they were in the middle of a fight in
Fallujah.
I contacted the military authorities. I came to the floor of the
Senate, proposed we increase the funding for armored humvees, and that
was an initiative that started with my colleagues here in the Senate
and the House, reluctantly agreed to, I think, from my perspective, by
the administration. It took us many months to begin to get sufficient
armored vehicles into Iraq.
Similarly we are now on a second and third generation with MRAP, the
mine resistant vehicles. That too was a result of many efforts here in
the Congress to get that equipment out to our troops.
I believe, I hope, they have everything they need, the latest
technology. That is something that is absolutely essential. But all of
this equipment is being used and overused. Roughly 30 percent of the
Marine Corps' ground equipment and half of the Army's ground equipment
is in Iraq and Afghanistan, again leaving very little back here in the
United States, relatively speaking, for the training and the
contingency operations that might take place here in a natural disaster
or some other major contingency.
It is a harsh, hard environment. The operational tempo is wearing out
this equipment. I recall being out in Anbar Province getting ready to
go on a Marine helicopter. They were briefing us routinely, claiming
that the engines on these helicopters were operating way beyond where
they would normally operate. They assured me it was safe to get on the
helicopter. But one wondered, as you got on: Would this rate of
operational use, if the stress and the strains eventually, would it
result in malfunctions for our troops, our forces, our marines in the
field.
So we expect, the Army expects, to need $12 to $13 billion per year
to reset the forces. The Marine Corps estimates it will need $15.6
billion for reset over the next several years when the operations begin
to wind down. The Army National Guard has little more than half of its
required equipment and they will need $22 billion for the next 5 years
to build the equipment up to 75 percent of authorized levels. So we
have a tremendous impact on our Army because of our operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and principally Iraq.
The other aspect of readiness is training. Because the time back home
of Army forces has been reduced effectively to 12 months, they cannot
do the same type and the same level of training they had been doing
previous to Iraq. In fact, if you talked to most troops, they come back
from Iraq, and then they start training, not for the range of missions
our military force has to be prepared for but for their next deployment
into either Iraq or Afghanistan. In that time they have to squeeze in
time with their family, they have to squeeze in the administrative
details that are part and parcel of being in home base.
Their training is being pressured. Some of the equipment they need to
train is not there. It is already overseas and it remains over there.
There is this increasing concern that the only mission they are
training for is counterinsurgency and urban combat, because Iraq
dominates so much of the time, attention, and resources in the Army.
Another aspect of readiness is recruiting, and this high operational
tempo has led the Army in some cases to miss their recruiting goals.
Recently, they have been achieving those goals, but it is not without
lowering standards, it is not without huge incentives or significant
incentives. It is something that over the course of the next several
months and years will show increasing strain and stress on the military
force, their ability to recruit, their ability to retain.
In 2005 the Army missed its active-duty recruiting targets by 8
percent. That was the first time they had ever missed recruiting
targets since 1999, and by a margin not seen since 1979, in the early
years of the volunteer Army. Since 2006 the Army has met its yearly
recruiting goals, but only by taking some extraordinary measures. In
2007, more than 20 percent of the new Army recruits needed waivers; 57
percent for
[[Page S4583]]
conduct, 36 percent for medical reasons, and 7 percent for substance
abuse. There was a time prior to Iraq when the Army prided itself on
approving very few waivers and was trying to drive the standards up,
not lower the standards. Thus far in fiscal year 2008, only 82 percent
of the recruits have high school diplomas. The longstanding goal of the
Army is at least 90 percent. The maximum age for new recruits has been
raised from 35 to 42. Now, all of these soldiers are doing their job.
But we have to ensure, as we were doing before Iraq, that to the
greatest extent possible we increase the quality of our forces. All of
these reductions in standards will come with some cost as the Army
continues to go forward.
There is another similar picture with respect to retention. The
number of officers the Army needs grew by 8,000 as we increased the
size of the Army, with 58 percent of this group in captains and majors.
As the Army grows, they have to retain more and more of these captains
and majors. While the overall officer loss rate for fiscal year 2007
equaled the 10-year average of 8.5 percent, this loss rate must drop to
5 percent in order to maintain this increased size of the Army at these
critical positions of captains and majors.
What is happening is that the tempo of operations, the limited time
with family, the cycling in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, is causing
these very talented officers, captains, majors, senior noncommissioned
officers, to decide that they, for personal reasons, have to leave the
service. And this is depriving the military, not only today, but for
many years, of the talent and the skill they need, which is a great
factor in our military forces. We have got sophisticated equipment, but
if we do not have the high quality officers, senior noncommissioned
officers, in all of our services, then we will not be as effective as
we must be. The cost over the long term is a loss of many talented
young men and women who otherwise would be committed to a career in the
military.
We are taking efforts to retain these people with bonuses. But more
and more what I am hearing is that the financial incentives, the other
incentives, are not compensating for the time away from home, for the
treadmill in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the toll will mount
despite these incentives.
There is another aspect too of what is happening, and that is
something that has become the signature injury of these operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, that is, the increasing number of mental health
issues arising within our forces. Post-deployment health reassessments
which are administered to servicemembers 90 to 120 days after returning
from deployment indicate that 38 percent of soldiers and 31 percent of
marines report psychological symptoms. The figure in the National Guard
is 49 percent.
Of the 1.6 million military personnel who have served in Iraq or
Afghanistan, almost 800,000 who have left active service are now
eligible for VA benefits, VA care. Of these almost 800,000 veterans,
roughly 300,000, or 37 percent, have obtained VA health care since
2001. Of this roughly 300,000, 40 percent, have been diagnosed with a
mental disorder.
That is a staggering total, a consequence of the stress, the strain,
the types of combat situations, the types of weapons deployed against
them. But that is a staggering figure. If that number is projected
throughout all of those who have served, that is a huge number of
active personnel and veterans who are suffering some type of mental
consequence of their service in Iraq.
In January, Dr. William Winkenwerder, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs, announced the Army's suicide rate in Iraq
has been about a third higher than past rates for troops during
peacetime, another very significant and very sobering statistic.
Anonymous postdeployment surveys show that 20 percent of married
soldiers plan to separate or divorce in 2006, another consequence of
this operational tempo.
The incidence of alcohol-related instances has substantially
increased over the last several years. The VA has identified that one
in four homeless persons are veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This is again another sobering statistic and a result of the operations
that are being conducted and the requirements to deal effectively and
principally with those veterans who are returning and those active-duty
personnel who are returning.
We have encountered huge costs because of the failed strategy and
incompetent execution of this operation in Iraq by the administration.
We have seen over the last several months a surge that was promoted as
giving the Iraqi Government the ability to reconcile itself, but that
reconciliation has not yet been achieved.
We have seen, as I pointed out, that in Iraq today, probably the most
influential country, certainly challenging us, is not a democratic
country, but Iran, not a country that is committed as we are to the
same democratic principles.
The Maliki government is a Shia government. It is operated in
collaboration with the Kurds who have their own aspirations for
autonomy.
The odd-group-out still remains the Sunni population. We have seen
over the last several weeks operations in the south in Basra that
started off inauspiciously and ended quickly with the help of Iran. We
have seen operations now directed against the Sadr's militiamen in Sadr
City, the JAM, the Mahdi army. This is rapidly becoming a fight not
against international terrorism but a fight for power within Iraq among
various factions and sectarian groups. We are being thrown into it day
by day.
It also raises serious questions about, frankly, what we have done in
the last several years to prepare for this day, to prepare not only the
military forces in Iraq but the political institutions of Iraq to deal
effectively and peacefully, we hope, with their citizens and to help
develop a stable country that can stand on its own.
We are in a situation also where we have--and I think this was a
calculated risk, one that was taken and is working, but the question
is, How long it will work?--recognized Sunni militias. They are called
the Sons of Iraq or Concerned Local Citizens. These groups are standing
by at the moment watching as the Maliki government tries to assert its
authority over JAM and some of the Shia extremist groups. But their
future direction is uncertain. We are paying them. We have lobbied
heavily that the Government of Iraq assume this responsibility. But
there is a real question whether the Maliki government will ever truly
recognize the 91,000 Sunni militiamen who are organized in the country,
and there is the real potential that without this integration, this is
another source of not only friction but of significant conflict in
Iraq.
There are numerous scenarios that could play out. One scenario is, if
Maliki is successful to a degree in disrupting the Shia militias and
the JAM, he might decide it is now time to take care of the CLCs, the
Sons of Iraq. This could prompt significant fighting. The other
possibility is that the Sunni militias, the Sons of Iraq, the CLC,
decide the moment is right for them to reassert themselves as a much
more powerful force in the political life of Iraq. None of this is
certain. But with each passing day, we are further away from weapons of
mass destruction and international terrorism and al-Qaida. We are
closer and closer to a struggle between contending Iraqi forces for the
power to run their country. That is a struggle they must resolve. We
cannot. It is a struggle that indicates, again, that our course must be
to change our policy, to assist legitimate forces to train to go after
whatever remnants of terrorism exist in the country and any place else
in the world, and to at all times protect our forces.
Embedded in the supplemental is that policy decision which I hope we
make positively. If we can begin our redeployment, successfully and
without deviation, from Iraq, then we can begin to focus on what to me
are much more critical and central issues--al-Qaida elements in
Pakistan, the stability of the Government of Pakistan, renewed support
for the Government in Afghanistan, and the successful effort to not
only defeat the remnants of the Taliban but to do what we have not been
able to yet, which is to create political institutions that will
outlast us, that will be committed to a fair view of democracy and a
fair view of the treatment of their own people. The economic
infrastructure to support such a
[[Page S4584]]
government, not through opium but through legitimate commercial
transaction, that, too, is a difficult task. And then, too, I think we
can focus and must focus our attention on Iran, dealing with their
nuclear aspirations and also recognizing that ultimately our success in
the region of the Persian Gulf depends upon diplomatic efforts
involving all countries in a positive way.
This is a tall order. It is a consequence of a misinformed strategy
and failed implementation. I hope we can begin with this supplemental
to change course, to move forward. I urge my colleagues to consider
this supplemental, consider the fact that we have to change direction
in Iraq and redirect resources here in the United States. I hope in
that spirit we can pass this supplemental and move forward.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business for up to 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Colorado is recognized.
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I rise today with the hope that this
Chamber will soon find consensus in our efforts to find a new course
and a new direction in Iraq.
I am more convinced than ever that we must change our mission in Iraq
from one of combat to one of support. We must place the responsibility
for Iraq's future and for the security of its citizens in the hands of
the Government of the Iraqi people. Until we change our mission and we
take our military out of their streets, Iraqi politicians will not take
the necessary, courageous, and final steps toward a political
reconciliation that can achieve a lasting peace for Iraq and for the
region.
Our military is performing admirably in difficult circumstances. They
have been tasked with calming streets that are wrought with sectarian
conflict, with unraveling thousand-year-old webs of Sunni, Kurd, and
Shia rivalries, with understanding the mixture of motives behind car
bombings, suicide bombings, roadside bombings, and mass executions.
They have been told that if they do this and slow the downward spiral
of civil war, the Shiite-dominated Government will press for national
reconciliation and a more stable, secure future for Iraq.
Our troops have done their job. The Iraqi Government has not done its
part. The Maliki government in Iraq has failed to capitalize on the
opportunities for success our soldiers have provided, and the
administration has failed to implement a political or a diplomatic
strategy that is worthy of their sacrifice on the battlefield.
``There is no military solution . . . to the insurgency [in] Iraq.''
That is a quote from General Petraeus. It is a quote General Petraeus
made to the world and to Members of this body many months ago. He was
right then, and he is right today.
I believe the overwhelming majority of Senators have the same goals
with respect to our future policy in Iraq. In my view, we share four
key principles and ambitions.
First and foremost, every Senator in this Chamber wants a stable Iraq
that can protect its citizens without dependence on American combat
troops. Regardless of one's position on the merits or demerits of the
invasion, we must now help Iraq stand as a sovereign nation. We must
root out the terror cells that have set up shop since the invasion. And
we must guard against a failed state. We must also find a way to help
the 2 million Iraqis who fled across the border to Jordan, to Syria,
and to Iran, as well as the nearly 2 million internally displaced
persons who have fled the violence of their neighborhoods. It is the
largest refugee crisis in the world today.
Second, we generally agree that our military mission in Iraq must
transition at some point from one of combat to one of support. We must
have the ultimate goal of bringing our troops home. We may disagree
about the number or the timing of troop drawdowns, but we all know we
cannot sustain 15 to 20 brigade combat teams in Iraq indefinitely. It
will take courage and conviction to shift our mission and to bring our
troops home, but if Iraq is truly to stand on its own, we must take the
decisive action so we can begin that transition.
The third point on which I believe we can, by and large, agree is
that this war has been poorly managed. The administration made a series
of disastrous mistakes and gross miscalculations after the invasion.
Failing to plan for a postwar Iraq, disbanding the Iraqi Army, purging
Baathist technocrats from the Government, staffing the Coalition
Provisional Authority with neophytes, sending our troops into harm's
way without body armor or armored vehicles--these blunders have cost
America dearly. They have eroded this administration's credibility, and
they have cost us in lives and treasure.
Fourth, I believe there is a widely shared view in this Chamber that
the United States should focus its military and diplomatic efforts on
the most pressing threats to national security. Senators on both sides
of the aisle agree that our top national security priorities should be
to capture the men who were behind the attacks of September 11, to
break up the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and in Pakistan,
and to confront the nuclear threats that we see, especially from Iran.
Sustaining 140,000 troops in Iraq limits our ability to prosecute the
war on terror where terrorist training camps are actually located. Our
top intelligence analysts have concluded that al-Qaida has regrouped--
has regrouped stronger than ever--on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
While it is true that al-Qaida in Iraq is a franchise, al-Qaida's main
headquarters are elsewhere and not in Iraq.
Furthermore, prolonged commitments in Iraq limit our strategic
flexibility should we need to respond to threats elsewhere around the
world. We must evaluate whether putting all of our eggs in one basket
in Iraq is the best strategy to protect America against threats and
future attacks.
On these four points, I believe we should be able to find consensus
in this Chamber. Our goal of stability in Iraq, our desire to start
bringing our troops home, our shared frustration with the management of
this war, and our concern that escalation in Iraq is weakening our
defenses against terrorist threats and nuclear proliferation--these
four points of agreement lead to the conclusion that we must find a new
way forward in Iraq.
The wise heads of the Iraq Study Group laid the groundwork many
months ago for a comprehensive strategy on how we would move forward in
Iraq. We commissioned out of this Congress our finest and most
experienced foreign policy experts, led by former Secretary of State
James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton, to provide us an
objective and bipartisan set of recommendations on how we should
proceed forward in this intractable war. I have reviewed this report
multiple times, the report of the Iraq Study Group. That report was
released at the end of 2006. It is a small book, but it contains great
wisdom of our top diplomats, military commanders, and statesmen from
around our country and, indeed, around the world.
The report of the Iraq Study Group laid out a political, diplomatic,
and military strategy for how we create the conditions to end this
war. Its core military recommendation is simple: It is time to
transition our troops from a mission of combat to a mission of
training, equipping, advising, and support of the Iraq military. Iraq
must take responsibility for its own security, and it must be forced to
take the political steps necessary toward that reconciliation.
Unlike the President's policy, the Iraq Study Group's prescriptions
couple a military strategy with a robust and effective diplomatic and
political strategy. The group recommended making our economic and
military support contingent upon the Iraq Government devising and
achieving specific benchmarks. While the Iraqis have made some progress
in achieving these benchmarks, much remains to be done, and most of
these benchmarks have not been met.
[[Page S4585]]
Finally, the report makes it very clear we need a diplomatic
offensive to help change the equation in the Middle East. Under this
diplomatic push, we would reach out to potential partners in the
region, engaging those partners in the region as we strive to have a
stake in creating long-lasting peace and stability in Iraq.
I wish to spend a few minutes now speaking about the Iraq war
provisions in the supplemental which is later on in the day formally
before the Senate. The bill before us contains many of the propositions
that would change our Iraq policy in ways that are consistent with the
Iraq Study Group's core recommendations. First and foremost, the bill
expresses the sense of the Senate that our troops' mission should
change from combat operations to counterterrorism, training and
supporting Iraqi forces, and force protection. It would set a
reasonable goal--not a deadline, a reasonable goal--of June 2009 to
complete this transition. This goal is some 15 months past the date of
March of 2008, which the Iraq Study Group originally proposed as its
target date for the completion of this transition.
This bill would require the Iraq Government to stand up to its own
responsibilities in important ways. It would be required to match any
funds we spend for training of Iraqi security forces or for
reconstruction. This legislation would ensure that the U.S. military
pays the same price at the pump as Iraqi civilians are paying today, by
requiring the Iraq Government to provide the same kind of support for
the fuel costs we are using to protect Iraq today. We are spending $12
billion of America's taxpayer dollars each month in Iraq. We are
spending $12 billion of American taxpayer dollars each month in Iraq.
After more than 5 years of this war, in my view, it is time for the
Iraq Government to share this financial burden.
We also need to recognize that this administration's policies have
stretched our military to the breaking point. Our troops are away from
their families too long, they do not get enough time to train, and
readiness is suffering. Under this legislation, the President would
have to certify that troops are fully trained and equipped before they
are deployed to Iraq. It would place a time limit on combat deployments
and ensure that our troops have sufficient dwell time between tours.
Finally, the bill would ban permanent U.S. bases on Iraqi soil and
require that any mutual defense agreements with Iraq must be approved
by this Congress and by this Senate.
It is not enough to simply endorse a set of military tactics and hope
for the best, which is what the President of the United States has
done. The solution in Iraq, our military commanders tell us, is one
which is not a military solution but one which combines all those
elements that were set forth in the Iraq Study Group.
Henry Kissinger once said America needs to rid itself of ``the
illusion that there are military answers to our security, and that
policy ends where strategy begins.''
We would be wise to heed Kissinger's advice in this age of turmoil.
There are no easy answers in Iraq, no easy exits, no certainty of
success. To stay on the President's path of more of the same is simply
to embrace a policy that is not working--the same dogmatic leadership
that led us into war, the same dogmatic leadership that failed to make
a postinvasion plan, the same dogmatic leadership that chases the hope
of a mission accomplished without regard to learning the lessons of the
failures of the past.
To charge a new path--to build a political, diplomatic, and military
strategy in Iraq--is to embrace the role of a statesman. For it is a
statesman, Kissinger used to say, who takes responsibility for all the
favorable results if everything goes as planned but also for all the
undesirable results if they do not.
To serve as statesmen is our role. This is our role as Senators. It
is up to the wise heads of this body to take the long view in Iraq, to
be realistic about our options, and to consider all our national
security interests--from terrorism to nuclear threats--when pursuing
our goals of stability and peace in the Middle East.
Thank you. I yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business for up to 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________