[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 60 (Wednesday, April 16, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3071-S3073]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         FOREIGN POLICY VISION

  Mr. CARPER. Madam President, I wish to bring to the attention of my 
colleagues a speech that my good friend and fellow Delawarean Joe Biden 
delivered yesterday at Georgetown University. In his remarks, Senator 
Biden eloquently laid out a foreign policy vision for Democrats and 
outlined what is at stake for our country in the years ahead. I urge my 
colleagues to read Senator Biden's speech, and I ask unanimous consent 
that it be printed in the Congressional Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       When people say ``this is the most important election in my 
     lifetime,'' they're right.
       So much is at stake. The physical security of our children. 
     The retirement security of our parents. The economic and 
     health security of our families. And, above all else, the 
     national security of our country, which is a President's 
     first responsibility.
       I start from a simple premise: we cannot afford another 
     four years of Republican stewardship of our nation's 
     security.
       After eight years of the Bush Administration, our country 
     is less secure and more isolated than it has been at any time 
     in recent history. This administration has dug America into a 
     very deep hole--with very few friends to help us climb out.
       It doesn't have to be this way. The next President will 
     have an awesome responsibility--but also the greatest 
     opportunity since FDR--to change the direction of our 
     country* * * and the world.
       It starts with a much clearer understanding of how the 
     world has changed over the past two decades. As Yeats wrote 
     in ``Easter 1916,'' our world has ``changed utterly, a 
     terrible beauty has been born.''
       The emergence of China and India as major economic powers. 
     The resurgence of Russia floating on a sea of oil. A unifying 
     Europe. The spread of dangerous weapons and lethal diseases. 
     The shortage of secure sources of energy, water and even 
     food. The impact of climate change. Rising wealth and 
     persistent poverty. A technological revolution that sends 
     people, ideas and money hurtling around the planet at ever 
     faster speeds. The challenge to nation states from ethnic and 
     sectarian strife. The struggle between modernity and 
     extremism.
       That's a short list of the forces shaping the 21st century. 
     No one country can control these forces, but more than any 
     other country, we have an ability to affect them--if we use 
     the totality of our strength.
       Our military might and economic resources are necessary but 
     not sufficient to lead us into this new century. It is our 
     ideas and ideals that will allow us to exert the kind of 
     leadership that persuades others to follow and to deal 
     effectively with these forces of change.
       Over the next few months, I'll speak in detail about how 
     Democrats will exert that kind of leadership.
       For today, I want to concentrate on this administration. It 
     has squandered our ability to shape this new world. It has 
     put virtually all of these issues on the back burner, failing 
     to devote the intellectual capital and constant effort they 
     require. It has destroyed faith in America's judgment. And it 
     has devalued America's moral leadership in the world.
       Instead, this administration has focused to the point of 
     obsession on the so-called ``war on terrorism'' and produced 
     a one-size-fits-all doctrine of military preemption and 
     regime change ill suited to the challenges we face.
       It has made fear the main driver of our foreign policy. It 
     has turned a deadly serious but manageable threat--a small 
     number of radical groups that hate America--into a ten-foot 
     tall existential monster that dictates nearly every move we 
     make.
       Even if you look at the world through this administration's 
     distorted lens, you see a failed policy. This failure flows 
     from a dangerous combination of ideology and incompetence and 
     a profound confusion about whom we're fighting.
       It starts with the very language the President has tried to 
     impose: ``the global war on

[[Page S3072]]

     terror.'' That is simply wrong. Terrorism is a means, not an 
     end, and very different groups and countries are using it 
     toward very different goals. If we can't even identify the 
     enemy or describe the war we're fighting, it's difficult to 
     see how we will win.
       The most urgent threat is the intersection of the world's 
     most radical groups--like Al Qaeda--with the world's most 
     lethal weapons.
       But we also must confront groups that use terror not to 
     target us directly, but to advance their own nationalistic 
     causes. We must deal with outlaw states that support them and 
     otherwise flout the rules. We must face a civil war in Iraq, 
     a renewed war for Afghanistan, and an ideological war for the 
     future of Pakistan. We must help resolve a historic conflict 
     between Arabs and Israelis.
       And we must contend with Iran, especially its efforts to 
     acquire the capacity to build a nuclear weapon.
       This administration spent five years fixated on changing 
     the Iranian regime. No one likes the regime, but think about 
     the logic: renounce the bomb--and when you do, we're still 
     going to take you down. The result is that Iran 
     accelerated its efforts to produce fissile material and is 
     closer now to the bomb than when Bush took office.
       Instead of regime change, we should focus on conduct 
     change. We should make it very clear to Iran what it risks in 
     terms of isolation if it continues to pursue a dangerous 
     nuclear program but also what it stands to gain if it does 
     the right thing.
       That will require keeping our allies in Europe, as well as 
     Russia and China, on the same page as we ratchet up pressure. 
     But it also means doing much more to reach out to Iran--
     including through direct talks--to exploit cracks within the 
     ruling elite and between Iran's rulers and its people, who 
     are struggling economically and stifled politically. The 
     Iranian people need to know that their government, not the 
     United States, is choosing confrontation over cooperation.
       Saber rattling is the most self-defeating policy 
     imaginable. It forces Iranians who despise the regime to 
     rally behind their leaders and spurs instability in the 
     Middle East, which adds to the price of oil, with the 
     proceeds going right into Tehran's pockets. The worst 
     nightmare for a regime that thrives on isolation and tension 
     is an America ready, willing and able to engage. It's amazing 
     how little faith this administration has in the power of 
     America's ideas and ideals.
       All these fronts throughout the Middle East and South Asia 
     are connected. But this administration has wrongly conflated 
     them under one label, and argued that success on one front 
     ensures victory on the others. It has lumped together, as a 
     single threat, extremist groups and states more at odds with 
     each other than with us. It has picked the wrong fights at 
     the wrong time, failing to finish a war of necessity in 
     Afghanistan before starting a war of choice in Iraq.
       The result is that, to quote the findings of the most 
     recent National Intelligence Estimate on the Terrorist 
     Threat: ``Al Qaeda is better positioned to strike the West . 
     . . [it has] regenerated . . . and remains determined to 
     attack us at home.''
       Of course, we must destroy Al Qaeda.
       But instead of rolling back the threat it poses, this 
     administration's approach has helped produce a global 
     breakout of extremism, which now threatens more people in 
     more places than it did before 9-11.
       So even on its own terms, the national security strategy of 
     this administration has been a failure. We cannot afford four 
     more years.
       Last month, a man I greatly admire and consider a friend, 
     Senator John McCain, set out his vision for our foreign 
     policy.
       To his credit, John repudiates some of the Bush 
     Administration's approach to the world. He recognizes that 
     the power of our example is as important as the example of 
     our power . . . that allies we respect, not disdain, can 
     advance our interests. He is especially eloquent about his 
     abhorrence for war--as John is uniquely placed to be.
       But John McCain remains wedded to the Bush Administration's 
     myopic view of a world defined by terrorism. He would 
     continue to allow a tiny minority to set the agenda for the 
     overwhelming majority.
       It is time for a total change in Washington's world view. 
     That will require more than a great soldier. It will require 
     a wise leader.
       Nowhere is this truer than in Iraq. The war dominates our 
     national life. It stands like a boulder in the road between 
     us and the credibility we need to lead in the world and the 
     flexibility we require to meet our challenges at home.
       When it comes to Iraq, there is no daylight between John 
     McCain and George W. Bush. They are joined at the hip.
       When it comes to Iraq, there will be no change with a 
     McCain administration . . . and so there is a real and 
     profound choice for Americans in November.
       Like President Bush, Senator McCain likes to talk about the 
     dire consequences of drawing down our forces in Iraq. He 
     argues that Iraq is the meeting point for two of the greatest 
     threats to America: Al Qaeda and Iran. It's an argument laden 
     with irony. After all, who opened Iraq's door to Al Qaeda and 
     Iran? The Bush Administration.
       ``Al Qaeda in Iraq'' is a Bush-fulfilling prophecy: it 
     wasn't there before the war, but it is there now. As to Iran, 
     its influence in Iraq went from zero to sixty when we toppled 
     Saddam's Sunni regime and gave Shi'ite religious parties 
     inspired and nurtured by Iran a path to power.
       No matter how we got to this point, President Bush and 
     Senator McCain argue that if we start to leave, it will 
     further empower Al Qaeda and Iran.
       I believe they are exactly wrong. And so do a large number 
     of very prominent retired military and national security 
     experts who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee 
     this month.
       Would drawing down really strengthen ``Al Qaeda in Iraq'' 
     and give it a launching pad to attack America? Or would it 
     help eliminate what little indigenous Iraqi support ``Al 
     Qaeda in Iraq'' retains?
       Most Sunni Arabs have turned on ``Al Qaeda in Iraq,'' 
     alienated by their tactics and ideology. ``Al Qaeda in Iraq'' 
     is down to about 2,000 Iraqis and a small number of 
     foreigners whose almost exclusive focus is Iraq. When we draw 
     down, the most likely result is that Iraqis of all 
     confessions will stamp out its remnants--and we can retain a 
     residual force in or near Iraq to help them finish the job.
       Last week, I asked our ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, to 
     tell us where al Qaeda poses a greater threat to America's 
     security: in Iraq, or in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He said: 
     Afghanistan and Pakistan.
       So what about Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan--the 
     people who actually attacked us on 9-11? If we draw down, 
     would they be emboldened?
       Or, to paraphrase the National Intelligence Estimate on 
     Terrorism, would they lose one of their most effective 
     recruiting tools--the notion that we're in Iraq to stay, with 
     permanent military bases and control over the oil? And would 
     they finally risk the full measure of America's might?
       Senator McCain has taken a lot of heat for saying he would 
     not mind if American troops stay in Iraq for 100 years. The 
     truth is, he was trying to make an analogy to our long term 
     presence in peaceful post-war Germany, post-armistice Korea 
     and post-Dayton Bosnia.
       But Germany, Korea or Bosnia after the peace are nothing 
     like Iraq today--with thousands of bombs, hundreds of 
     American injured and dozens of American killed every month--
     and there is little prospect Iraq will look like them anytime 
     soon.
       Worse, saying you're happy to stay in Iraq for 100 years 
     fuels exactly the kind of dangerous conspiracy theories about 
     America's intentions throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds 
     that we should be working to dispel.
       What about Iran? Would drawing down increase its already 
     huge influence in Iraq? Or would it shift the burden of 
     helping to stabilize Iraq from us to them and make our forces 
     a much more credible deterrent to Iran's wider misbehavior?
       The idea that we could or even should wipe out every 
     vestige of Iran's influence in Iraq is a fantasy. Even with 
     160,000 American troops in Iraq, our ally in Baghdad greets 
     Iran's leader with kisses. Like it or not, Iran is a major 
     regional power and it shares a long border--and a long 
     history--with Iraq.
       Right now, Iran loves the status quo, with 140,000 
     Americans troops bogged down and bleeding, caught in a cross 
     fire of intra Shi'a rivalry and Sunni-Shi'a civil war.
       The challenge for us is not eliminating all Iranian 
     influence in Iraq, but forcing Iran to confront the specter 
     of a disintegrating Iraq or all-out war between different 
     Shi'a factions.
       By drawing down, we can take away Iran's ability to wage a 
     proxy war against our troops and force Tehran to concentrate 
     on avoiding turmoil inside Iraq's borders and instability 
     beyond them.
       Finally, would our responsible draw down accelerate 
     sectarian chaos?
       Or would it cause Iraq's leaders and Iraq's Sunni Arab 
     neighbors to finally act responsibly? To date, both have used 
     our large presence as a crutch or an excuse for inaction. 
     When that stops, they will have to start to fill the vacuum 
     or put their interests at much greater risk.
       We should debate the consequences of drawing down in Iraq. 
     But more importantly, we should talk about what both 
     President Bush and Senator McCain refuse to acknowledge: the 
     increasingly intolerable costs of staying.
       The risks of drawing down are debatable. The costs of 
     staying with 140,000 troops are knowable--and they get 
     steeper every day: the continued loss of the lives and limbs 
     of our soldiers; the emotional and economic strain on our 
     troops and their families due to repeated, extended tours, as 
     Army Chief of Staff General George Casey recently told 
     Congress; the drain on our Treasury-- $12 billion every 
     month; the impact on the readiness of our armed forces--tying 
     down so many troops that, as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 
     Richard Cody said, we don't have any left over to deal with a 
     new emergency; and the inability to send enough soldiers to 
     the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Al Qaeda 
     has regrouped and is plotting new attacks.
       When I visited Afghanistan in February, General McNeil, who 
     commands the international force, told me that with two extra 
     combat brigades--about 10,000 soldiers--he could turn around 
     the security situation in the south, where the Taliban is on 
     the move. But he can't get them because of Iraq.
       Even when we do pull troops out of Iraq, the Chairman of 
     the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, says he would want to send 
     them home for a year to rest and retrain before sending them 
     to Afghanistan.
       The longer we stay in Iraq, the more we put off the day 
     when we fully join the fight

[[Page S3073]]

     against the real Al Qaeda threat and finally defeat those who 
     attacked America 7 years ago.
       It is long past time to clearly define our interests in 
     Iraq. It is not in our interest to intervene in an internal 
     power struggle among Shi'a factions. It is not in our 
     interest to back one side or the other, or get caught in the 
     cross fire of a Sunni-Shi'a civil war. It is in our interest 
     to start to leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind.
       Even if we could keep 140,000 troops in Iraq, they will not 
     be the deciding factor in preventing chaos. Instead, we need 
     to focus all our remaining energy and initiative on achieving 
     what virtually everyone agrees is the key to stability in 
     Iraq: a political power sharing agreement among its warring 
     factions. I remain convinced that the only path to such a 
     settlement is through a decentralized, federal Iraq that 
     brings resources and responsibility down to the local and 
     regional levels.
       We need a diplomatic surge to get the world's major powers, 
     Iraq's neighbors and Iraqis themselves invested in a 
     sustainable political settlement.
       Fifteen months into the surge that President Bush ordered 
     and Senator McCain embraced, we've gone from drowning to 
     treading water. We are no closer to the President's stated 
     goal of an Iraq that can defend itself, govern itself and 
     sustain itself in peace. We're still spending $3 billion 
     every week and losing 30 to 40 American lives every month.
       We can't keep treading water without exhausting ourselves 
     and doing great damage to our other vital interests around 
     the world. That's exactly what both the President and Senator 
     McCain are asking us to do.
       They can't tell us when, or even if, Iraqis will come 
     together politically, which was the purpose of the surge in 
     the first place. They can't tell us when, or even if, we will 
     draw down below pre-surge levels. They can't tell us when, or 
     even if, Iraq will be able to stand on its own two feet. They 
     can't tell us when, or even if, this war will end.
       Most Americans want this war to end. They want us to come 
     together around a plan to leave Iraq without leaving chaos 
     behind.
       They're not defeatists. They're patriots who understand the 
     national interest--and the great things Americans can achieve 
     if we responsibly end a war that we should not have started.
       I believe it is fully within our power to do that. Then, 
     with our credibility restored, our alliances repaired and our 
     freedom renewed, we will once again lead the world. We will 
     once again address the hopes, not play to the fears, of our 
     fellow Americans.
       That is my hope for next November--and for the country we 
     all love.
       May God bless America and protect our troops.

                          ____________________