[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 59 (Tuesday, April 15, 2008)]
[House]
[Pages H2289-H2297]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 1400
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR SECURE ELECTIONS ACT OF 2008
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the
rules and pass the bill (H.R. 5036) to direct the Administrator of
General Services to reimburse certain jurisdictions for the costs of
obtaining paper ballot voting systems for the general elections for
Federal office to be held in November 2008, to reimburse jurisdictions
for the costs incurred in conducting audits or hand counting of the
results of the general elections for Federal office to be held in
November 2008, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 5036
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Emergency Assistance for
Secure Elections Act of 2008''.
SEC. 2. PAYMENTS TO CERTAIN JURISDICTIONS CONDUCTING 2008
GENERAL ELECTIONS.
(a) Reimbursement for Conversion to Paper Ballot Voting
System.--
(1) In general.--The Election Assistance Commission shall
pay to each eligible jurisdiction an amount equal to the sum
of the following:
[[Page H2290]]
(A) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by
such jurisdiction to replace any voting systems used to
conduct the general elections for Federal office held in
November 2006 that did not use or produce a paper ballot
verified by the voter or a paper ballot printout verifiable
by the voter at the time the vote is cast with paper ballot
voting systems.
(B) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by
such jurisdiction to obtain non-tabulating ballot marking
devices that are accessible for individuals with disabilities
in accordance with the requirements of section 301(a)(3) of
the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
(C) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by
such jurisdiction to obtain ballot marking stations or voting
booths for the protection of voter privacy.
(D) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by
such jurisdiction to obtain paper ballots.
(E) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by
such jurisdiction to obtain precinct-based equipment that
tabulates paper ballots or scans paper ballots.
(F) The documented reasonable administrative costs paid or
incurred by such jurisdiction that are associated with
meeting the requirements for an eligible jurisdiction.
(2) Eligible jurisdiction defined.--In this subsection, an
``eligible jurisdiction'' means a jurisdiction that submits
to the Commission (and, in the case of a county or equivalent
jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time and
in such form as the Commission may require, an application
containing--
(A) assurances that the jurisdiction conducted regularly
scheduled general elections for Federal office in November
2006 using (in whole or in part) a voting system that did not
use or produce a paper ballot verified by the voter or a
paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at the time the
vote is cast;
(B) assurances that the jurisdiction will conduct the
regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office to
be held in November 2008 using only paper ballot voting
systems;
(C) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will
obtain a sufficient number of non-tabulating ballot marking
devices that are accessible for individuals with disabilities
in accordance with the requirements of section 301(a)(3) of
the Help America Vote Act of 2002;
(D) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will
obtain a sufficient number of ballot marking stations or
voting booths for the protection of voter privacy;
(E) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will
obtain a sufficient number of paper ballots;
(F) such information and assurances as the Commission may
require to make the determinations under paragraph (1); and
(G) such other information and assurances as the Commission
may require.
(3) Determinations of reasonableness of costs.--The
determinations under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or
incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by
the Commission.
(4) Paper ballot voting system defined.--In this
subsection, a ``paper ballot voting system'' means a voting
system that uses a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand
or a paper ballot marked by the voter with the assistance of
a non-tabulating ballot marking device described in paragraph
(1)(B).
(b) Reimbursement for Retrofitting of Direct Recording
Electronic Voting Systems to Produce Voter Verifiable Paper
Records.--
(1) In general.--The Commission shall pay to each eligible
jurisdiction an amount equal to the documented reasonable
costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to retrofit
direct recording electronic voting systems so that the
systems will produce a voter verifiable paper record of the
marked ballot for verification by the voter at the time the
vote is cast, including the costs of obtaining printers to
produce the records.
(2) Eligible jurisdiction defined.--In this subsection, an
``eligible jurisdiction'' means a jurisdiction that submits
to the Commission (and, in the case of a county or equivalent
jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time and
in such form as the Commission may require, an application
containing--
(A) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will
obtain a printer for and retrofit each direct recording
electronic voting system used to conduct the general
elections for Federal office held in November 2008 so that
the system will produce a voter verifiable paper record of
the marked ballot for verification by the voter;
(B) such information and assurances as the Commission may
require to make the determinations under paragraph (1); and
(C) such other information and assurances as the Commission
may require.
(3) Determination of reasonableness of costs.--The
determinations under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or
incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by
the Commission.
(c) Reimbursement for Provision of Backup Paper Ballots by
Jurisdictions Using Direct Recording Electronic Voting
Systems.--
(1) In general.--The Commission shall pay to each eligible
jurisdiction an amount equal to the documented reasonable
costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to obtain,
deploy, and tabulate backup paper ballots (and related
supplies and equipment) that may be used in the event of the
failure of a direct recording electronic voting system in the
regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office to
be held in November 2008.
(2) Eligible jurisdiction defined.--In this subsection, an
``eligible jurisdiction'' means a jurisdiction that submits
to the Commission (and, in the case of a county or equivalent
jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time and
in such form as the Commission may require, an application
containing--
(A) assurances that the jurisdiction will post, in a
conspicuous manner at all polling places at which a direct
recording electronic voting system will be used in such
elections, a notice stating that backup paper ballots are
available at the polling place and that a voter is entitled
to use such a ballot upon the failure of a voting system;
(B) assurances that the jurisdiction counts each such
backup paper ballot cast by a voter as a regular ballot cast
in the election, and does not treat it (for eligibility
purposes) as a provisional ballot under section 302(a) of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002, unless the individual casting
the ballot would have otherwise been required to cast a
provisional ballot;
(C) such information and assurances as the Commission may
require to make the determinations under paragraph (1); and
(D) such other information and assurances as the Commission
may require.
(3) Determination of reasonableness of costs.--The
determinations under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or
incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by
the Commission.
(d) Amounts.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Commission such sums as may be necessary for payments
under this section. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authorization under this subsection shall remain available
until expended.
SEC. 3. PAYMENTS FOR CONDUCTING MANUAL AUDITS OF RESULTS OF
2008 GENERAL ELECTIONS.
(a) Payments.--
(1) Eligibility for payments.--If a State conducts manual
audits of the results of any of the regularly scheduled
general elections for Federal office in November 2008 (and,
at the option of the State, conducts audits of elections for
State and local office held at the same time as such
election) in accordance with the requirements of this
section, the Commission shall make a payment to the State in
an amount equal to the documented reasonable costs incurred
by the State in conducting the audits.
(2) Certification of compliance and costs.--
(A) Certification required.--In order to receive a payment
under this section, a State shall submit to the Commission,
in such form as the Commission may require, a statement
containing--
(i) a certification that the State conducted the audits in
accordance with all of the requirements of this section;
(ii) a statement of the reasonable costs incurred in
conducting the audits; and
(iii) such other information and assurances as the
Commission may require.
(B) Amount of payment.--The amount of a payment made to a
State under this section shall be equal to the reasonable
costs incurred in conducting the audits.
(C) Determination of reasonableness of costs.--The
determinations under this paragraph of whether costs incurred
by a State are reasonable shall be made by the Commission.
(3) Timing of payments.--The Commission shall make the
payment required under this section to a State not later than
30 days after receiving the statement submitted by the State
under paragraph (2).
(4) Mandatory immediate reimbursement of counties and other
jurisdictions.--If a county or other jurisdiction responsible
for the administration of an election in a State incurs costs
as the result of the State conducting an audit of the
election in accordance with this section, the State shall
reimburse the county or jurisdiction for such costs
immediately upon receiving the payment from the Commission
under paragraph (3).
(5) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as may be
necessary for payments under this section. Any amounts
appropriated pursuant to the authorization under this
subsection shall remain available until expended.
(b) Audit Requirements.--In order to receive a payment
under this section for conducting an audit, the State shall
meet the following minimum requirements:
(1) Not later than 30 days before the date of the regularly
scheduled general election for Federal office in November
2008, the State shall establish and publish guidelines,
standards, and procedures to be used in conducting audits in
accordance with this section.
(2) The State shall select an appropriate entity to oversee
the administration of the audit, in accordance with such
criteria as the State considers appropriate consistent with
the requirements of this section, except that the entity must
meet a general standard of independence as defined by the
State.
(3) The State shall determine whether the units in which
the audit will be conducted will be precincts or some
alternative auditing unit, and shall apply that determination
[[Page H2291]]
in a uniform manner for all audits conducted in accordance
with this section.
(4) The State shall select the precincts or alternative
auditing units in which audits are conducted in accordance
with this section in a random manner following the election
after the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the
State) has been announced, such that each precinct or
alternative auditing unit in which the election was held has
an equal chance of being selected, subject to paragraph (9),
except that the State shall ensure that at least one precinct
or alternative auditing unit is selected in each county in
which the election is held.
(5) The audit shall be conducted in not less than 2 percent
of the precincts or alternative auditing units in the State
(in the case of a general election for the office of Senator)
or the Congressional district involved (in the case of an
election for the office of Representative in, or Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to, the Congress).
(6) The State shall determine the stage of the tabulation
process at which the audit will be conducted, and shall apply
that determination in a uniform manner for all audits
conducted in accordance with this section, except that the
audit shall commence within 48 hours after the State or
jurisdiction involved announces the final unofficial vote
count (as defined by the State) in each precinct in which
votes are cast in the election which is the subject of the
audit.
(7) With respect to each precinct or alternative audit unit
audited, the State shall ensure that a voter verified paper
ballot or paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at
the time the vote is cast is available for every vote cast in
the precinct or alternative audit unit, and that the tally
produced by counting all of those paper ballots or paper
ballot printouts by hand is compared with the corresponding
final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State)
announced with respect to that precinct or audit unit in the
election.
(8) Within each precinct or alternative audit unit, the
audit shall include all ballots cast by all individuals who
voted in or who are under the jurisdiction of the precinct or
alternative audit unit with respect to the election,
including absentee ballots (subject to paragraph (9)), early
ballots, emergency ballots, and provisional ballots, without
regard to the time, place, or manner in which the ballots
were cast.
(9) If a State establishes a separate precinct for purposes
of counting the absentee ballots cast in the election and
treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that
precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots
sortable by precinct and include those ballots in the hand
count described in paragraph (7) which is administered with
respect to that precinct, the State may divide absentee
ballots into audit units approximately equal in size to the
average precinct in the State in terms of the number of
ballots cast, and shall randomly select and include at least
2 percent of those audit units in the audit. Any audit
carried out with respect to such an audit unit shall meet the
same standards applicable under paragraph (7) to audits
carried out with respect to other precincts and alternative
audit units, including the requirement that all paper ballots
be counted by hand.
(10) The audit shall be conducted in a public and
transparent manner, such that members of the public are able
to observe the entire process.
(c) Collection and Submission of Audit Results;
Publication.--
(1) State submission of report.--In order to receive a
payment under this section, a State shall submit to the
Commission a report, in such form as the Commission may
require, on the results of each audit conducted under this
section.
(2) Commission action.--The Commission may request
additional information from a State based on the report
submitted under paragraph (1).
(3) Publication.--The Commission shall publish each report
submitted under paragraph (1) upon receipt.
(d) Delay in Certification of Results by State.--No State
may certify the results of any election which is subject to
an audit under this section prior to completing the audit,
resolving discrepancies discovered in the audit, and
submitting the report required under subsection (c).
SEC. 4. PAYMENTS FOR CONDUCTING HAND COUNTS OF RESULTS OF
2008 GENERAL ELECTIONS.
(a) Payments.--
(1) Eligibility for payments.--If a State, county, or
equivalent location tallies the results of any regularly
scheduled general election for Federal office in November
2008 by conducting a hand count of the votes cast on the
paper ballots used in the election (including paper ballot
printouts verifiable by the voter at the time the vote is
cast) in accordance with the requirements of this section,
the Commission shall make a payment to the State, county, or
equivalent location in an amount equal to the documented
reasonable costs incurred by the State, county, or equivalent
location in conducting the hand counts.
(2) Certification of compliance and costs.--
(A) Certification required.--In order to receive a payment
under this section, a State, county, or equivalent location
shall submit to the Commission (and, in the case of a county
or equivalent jurisdiction, shall provide a copy to the
State), in such form as the Commission may require, a
statement containing--
(i) a certification that the State, county, or equivalent
location conducted the hand counts in accordance with all of
the requirements of this section;
(ii) a statement of the reasonable costs incurred by the
State, county, or equivalent location in conducting the hand
counts; and
(iii) such other information and assurances as the
Commission may require.
(B) Amount of payment.--The amount of a payment made to a
State, county, or equivalent location under this section
shall be equal to the reasonable costs incurred by the State,
county, or equivalent location in conducting the hand counts.
(C) Determination of reasonableness of costs.--The
determinations under this paragraph of whether costs incurred
by a State, county, or equivalent location are reasonable
shall be made by the Commission.
(3) Timing of payments.--The Commission shall make the
payment required under this section to a State, county, or
equivalent location not later than 30 days after receiving
the statement submitted by the State, county, or equivalent
location under paragraph (2).
(4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as may be
necessary for payments under this section. Any amounts
appropriated pursuant to the authorization under this
subsection shall remain available until expended.
(b) Hand Counts Described.--
(1) In general.--A hand count conducted in accordance with
this section is a count of all of the paper ballots on which
votes were cast in the election (including paper ballot
printouts verifiable by the voter at the time the vote is
cast), including votes cast on an early, absentee, emergency,
and provisional basis, which is conducted by hand to
determine the winner of the election and is conducted without
using electronic equipment or software.
(2) Completeness.--With respect to each jurisdiction in
which a hand count is conducted, the State, county, or
equivalent location shall ensure that a voter verified paper
ballot or paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at
the time the vote is cast is available for every vote cast in
the jurisdiction.
(c) Process for Conducting Hand Counts.--
(1) In general.--In order to meet the requirements of this
section, a hand count of the ballots cast in an election
shall be conducted in accordance with the following
procedures:
(A) After the closing of the polls on the date of the
election, the appropriate election official shall secure the
ballots at the polling place (or, in the case of ballots cast
at any other location, at the office of the chief election
official of the jurisdiction conducting the hand count).
(B) Beginning at any time after the expiration of the 8-
hour period that begins at the time the polls close on the
date of the election, the jurisdiction shall conduct an
initial hand count of the ballots cast in the election, using
the ballots which are eligible to be counted in the election
as of the time the polls are closed.
(C) Any ballot which is eligible to be counted in the
election but which is not included in the initial count
conducted under subparagraph (B), including a provisional
ballot cast by an individual who is determined to be eligible
to vote in the election or an absentee ballot received after
the date of the election but prior to the applicable deadline
under State law for the receipt of absentee ballots, shall be
subject to a hand count in accordance with this section and
added to the tally conducted under subparagraph (B) not later
than 48 hours after the ballot is determined to be eligible
to be counted.
(D) The hand count shall be conducted by a team of not
fewer than 2 individuals who shall be witnessed by at least
one observer sitting at the same table with such individuals.
Except as provided in paragraph (2), all such individuals
shall be election officials of the jurisdiction in which the
hand count is conducted. The number of such individuals who
are members of the political party whose candidates received
the greatest number of the aggregate votes cast in the
regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held
in the State in November 2006 shall be equal to the number of
such individuals who are members of the political party whose
candidates received the second greatest number of the
aggregate votes cast in the regularly scheduled general
elections for Federal office held in the State in November
2006.
(E) After the completion of the hand count, the ballots may
be run through a tabulating machine or scanner for comparison
with the tally, if such a machine or scanner is available.
(2) Use of other personnel.--An individual who is not an
election official of the jurisdiction in which a hand count
is conducted under this section may serve on a team
conducting the hand count or may serve as an observer of a
team conducting the hand count if the jurisdiction certifies
that the individual has completed such training as the
jurisdiction deems appropriate to conduct or observe the hand
count (as the case may be).
(3) Location.--The hand counts conducted under this section
of the ballots cast in an election shall be conducted--
[[Page H2292]]
(A) in the case of ballots cast at a polling place on the
date of the election, at the polling place at which the
ballots were cast; or
(B) in the case of any other ballots, at the office of the
chief election official of the jurisdiction conducting the
hand count.
(4) Information included in results.--Each hand count
conducted under this section shall produce the following
information with respect to the election:
(A) The vote tally for each candidate.
(B) The number of overvotes, undervotes, spoiled ballots,
and blank ballots cast (or their equivalents, as defined by
the State, county or equivalent location).
(C) The number of write-in ballots and the names written in
on such ballots pursuant to State law.
(D) The total number of ballots cast.
(E) A record of judgement calls made regarding voter
intent.
(5) Public observation of hand counts.--Each hand count
conducted under this section shall be conducted in a manner
that allows public observation of the entire process
(including the opening of the ballot boxes or removal of
machine-printed ballots from their containers, the sorting,
counting, and notation of results, and the announcement of
final determinations) sufficient to confirm but not interfere
with the proceedings.
(6) Establishment and publication of procedures.--Prior to
the date of the regularly scheduled general election for
Federal office held in November 2008, a State, county, or
equivalent location shall establish and publish procedures
for carrying out hand counts under this subsection.
(d) Application to Jurisdictions Conducting Elections With
Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems.--
(1) Requiring systems to produce voter verifiable paper
record.--If a State, county, or equivalent location uses a
direct recording electronic voting system to conduct an
election, the State, county, or equivalent location may not
receive a payment under this section for conducting a hand
count of the votes cast in the election unless (in addition
to meeting the other requirements applicable under this
section) the State, county, or equivalent location certifies
to the Commission that each such system produces a paper
record printout of the marked ballot which is verifiable by
the voter at the time the vote is cast.
(2) Treatment of paper record printouts.--In applying this
section to a hand count conducted by a State, county, or
equivalent location which provides a certification to the
Commission under paragraph (1), the paper record printout
referred to in such paragraph shall be treated as the paper
ballot used in the election.
(e) Announcement and Posting of Results.--Upon the
completion of a hand count conducted under this section, the
State, county, or equivalent location shall announce the
results to the public and post them on a public Internet
site.
(f) Use of Hand Count in Certification of Results.--The
State shall use the results of the hand count conducted under
this section for purposes of certifying the results of the
election involved. Nothing in this section may be construed
to affect the application or operation of any State law
governing the recount of the results of an election.
SEC. 5. STUDY, DEVELOPMENT OF TESTING METHODS, AND
ACCELERATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS AND
STANDARDS TO ENSURE ACCESSIBILITY OF PAPER
BALLOT VERIFICATION AND CASTING FOR CERTAIN
INDIVIDUALS.
(a) Study, Testing, and Development.--In accordance with
OMB Circular A-119, the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (hereafter in this section referred
to as the ``Director'') shall study, develop testing methods,
and accelerate the development of products and standards that
ensure the accessibility of paper ballot verification and
casting for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose
primary language is not English, and for voters with
difficulties in literacy, including the mechanisms themselves
and the processes through which the mechanisms are used. In
carrying out this subsection, the Director shall investigate
existing and potential methods or systems, including non-
electronic systems, that will assist such individuals and
voters in creating voter verified paper ballots, presenting
or transmitting the information printed or marked on such
ballots back to such individuals and voters in an accessible
form, and enabling the voters to cast the ballots.
(b) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2009, the Director
shall submit a report to Congress on the results of the
studying, development of testing methods, and acceleration of
the development of products and standards under subsection
(a).
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Director such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this section, to remain available
until expended.
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act--
(1) the term ``Commission'' means the Election Assistance
Commission; and
(2) the term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and
the United States Virgin Islands.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Serrano). Pursuant to the rule, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe Lofgren) and the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Ehlers) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
General Leave
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their
remarks on H.R. 5036 and to include extraneous matter.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from California?
There was no objection.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 5036, the Emergency
Assistance for Secure Elections Act 2008, is a bill that provides State
and local governments the opportunity to have safe, secure and
auditable elections in this, the election, year.
I commend Congressman Holt and his bipartisan cosponsors for their
continued dedication to the issue of election reform.
This bill recognizes that 2008 is quickly approaching and options
must be provided to ensure the integrity of the vote. Our election
process must be open and transparent to ensure public confidence. We
are now 8 months from the general election and cannot place State and
local governments in a position to require change. Therefore, the bill
is 100 percent optional.
State and local governments can choose which provisions they can
successfully implement. Opting in entitles the State or jurisdiction to
reimbursement. In committee, several changes were made to this bill
through bipartisan cooperation, and I want to thank Mr. Ehlers for his
support during the committee markup. Changes were also made to meet the
concerns of disability groups, as well as State and local government.
H.R. 5036, as amended, reimburses jurisdictions for retrofitting
paperless touch-screen voting machines, or DREs, with systems that
produce a voter verifiable paper record, allows for reimbursements for
jurisdictions to obtain backup paper ballots in the event of failure of
electronic voting systems and authorizes reimbursement for
jurisdictions which conduct a manual audit of a Federal and any State
and local election in November, 2008, in no less than 2 percent of the
precincts.
During the markup, all the amendments offered by the Republicans were
accepted by voice vote, and those four amendments were to allow for
audits to commence within 48 hours after States or relevant
jurisdictions involved announced the unofficial vote count. It requires
no hand count to commence until at least 8 hours after the polls close
and requires the ballots to be in a secured location until the hand
count commences, and ensures that the hand-counting teams, when
conducting a hand count of the election results, have equal
representation from both political parties of the candidates who
received the two greatest numbers of aggregate votes cast, and requires
that after the hand count is complete the ballots be run through a
tabulating machine or scanner for verification of the tally, if such a
machine or scanner is available.
Having a voter verified paper trail with an automatic routine audit
will go a long way to increase voter confidence and deter fraud.
Post-election audits are an essential tool to increase voter
confidence in the election process. While the bill authorizes such sums
as necessary, the CBO has come back to us with a score of $685 million,
about what we expected, and a sum that was in the original Holt bill.
The CBO score, however, anticipates the participation of everyone in
this bill. I think it is highly unlikely that every jurisdiction will
participate in every aspect of the bill, since they have the
opportunity to do nothing or to pick and choose portions of the bill.
It is clear that the actual score or total would be less.
I would note that we are spending over $10 billion a month in Iraq
and that we have spent a total of $1.32 billion on democracy-building
programs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The CBO figure is certainly less than
that. It seems to me, if we can't protect our elections at home,
really, how are we supposed to be a model of democracy without safe and
secure and auditable elections.
The country could end up revisiting the contentious and mistrusted
count
[[Page H2293]]
of 2000 and, even more recently, in the contested election of District
13 where people could not verify votes through an actual written
ballot.
The bill reported out of committee makes the changes requested by the
minority to the legislation but keeps the core purpose of the bill,
providing a voter verifiable paper and auditable paper trail.
If this bill is enacted promptly, jurisdiction should have adequate
time to purchase and implement the voting system upgrades and the other
provisions of this bill and provide voter confidence in the integrity
of the 2008 election.
I urge all of my colleagues to support this option bill, this
bipartisan effort.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss this bill and, first of all, to
commend Mr. Holt for his efforts and his concerns.
He is sincerely and extremely concerned about accuracy in voting, and
what can be done to make certain that the results are accurate. He
expressed that in his first bill, H.R. 811, which did not receive
committee consideration.
I spent considerable time with him trying to work out the details of
that bill, but we simply could not reach agreement or even come close
to agreement.
I commend Mr. Holt again for his concern and his persistence, as he
authored H.R. 5036. When I reviewed it with him I thought this might be
a much better basis for agreement and, that by working together, we
might be able to achieve that.
Unfortunately, we have not achieved full agreement on it, although we
did get it out of committee. I supported it out of committee because I
thought it should reach the floor for floor debate. I anticipated that
it would be taken up under a rule where we might have the possibility
for an additional compromise, but that has not happened.
There are a number of issues that still remain. I agree with Mr. Holt
that we should have some type of redundancy in our recording systems. I
disagree that it has to be paper. I think there are other methods of
achieving redundancy.
Recently we had an exposition in the House Administration Committee
room where we had demonstrations of equipment which shows redundancy in
an electronic fashion, and I think would be fully as reliable as
redundancy in paper.
Another area where we disagree is in the hand counting of ballots. I
have enough experience with elections in local politics to recognize
that hand counting is not as accurate as almost any machine counting
that I have seen.
There are ways of achieving what Mr. Holt wishes. I think the
optical-scan method is certainly a valid one, and that is what the
State of Michigan uses. Other States are beginning to go use that.
But the final blow to our efforts was the judgment of the CBO that it
was $685 million for 1 year. I realize that Mr. Holt had estimated that
would be the cost in his original bill. In fact he had included it as
an authorization in his original bill.
But having the CBO report that large sum that casts a pall over this
particular bill in respect to the opinions of the Members of this body,
and I am afraid that is likely to be the death knell.
In summary, I certainly commend Mr. Holt for his concerns. I commend
him for his efforts. I just don't think we have achieved enough
agreement to effectively make this a bipartisan bill. Therefore, I
suspect it will not pass, and I will have great difficulty supporting
it at this point.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I would like to recognize
the author of the bill, Congressman Rush Holt from New Jersey, who has
been tremendously diligent in pursuing these reform measures. Really,
without his persistence, we would not be here today.
I would recognize him for 5 minutes.
Mr. HOLT. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge my colleagues to support the Emergency
Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008.
This is a bill that is optional for counties. It's to encourage
counties and States to do the right thing. We should all want national
standards of accessibility, reliability and auditability for our
elections. This is an emergency stop-gap measure to see that we achieve
as much of that as possible before the November elections.
The principle is simple. Anything of value should be auditable. Votes
are valuable. They should be audited so that voters can have the
confidence that each vote is recorded the way the voter intended. In
too many places around the United States, votes are not audited.
In too many places around the United States, they are not even
auditable. Voters leave the polling places wondering if their vote will
be counted as they intended and election losers and their supporters
are left wondering if they can believe the results.
Already in this primary season, there have been numerous, numerous
problems, questions, and unresolved disputes.
In county after county, in State after State, electronic voting
systems have failed in many ways, failure to start-up in the morning, a
mismatch between the electronic count and the end-of-day printout,
failed memory cards, and on and on and on. In too many places, the
irregularities can not be resolved. There is no way to resolve them.
There is no way to know because there is no record of the voter's
intentions.
This legislation would reimburse counties and States for allowing
voters to inspect paper-based records of their vote, in other words,
paper ballots. That would not only make it possible for audits, but
this legislation would go further and reward States for putting in
place procedures to conduct those audits. This would go a long way
toward restoring confidence in the process.
There is still time before November to secure our election system. If
our Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act is enacted,
localities could choose to convert to paper ballot voting systems,
offer emergency paper ballots if machines fail, and to conduct audits
to confirm the accuracy of the electronic tallies.
I want to stress that this is optional. We took great pains to accept
the suggestions of the minority party, to take suggestions of election
officials, to take suggestions of people all over the country, lawyers
and others who have looked at elections in detail. We simplified this
so that counties could not object that we were making them do something
that we weren't going to support them on. This is optional. We have
simplified it as much as possible so that it could be implemented in
time for this year's election, and it could be.
{time} 1415
This modest bill simply entitles jurisdictions to reimbursement for
the costs to conduct fully auditable, fully audited elections. It will
encourage States and counties that want to do the right thing on behalf
of their voters. But time is of the essence.
If we don't take action immediately, we will not leave enough time
for States that wish to opt to do so before the November election.
Voters will lose further confidence in the system, and candidates will
leave on election night wondering if they can trust the results.
Common Cause wrote: ``The security and reliability problems with
electronic machines have been well documented. Both the State of
California with the Top to Bottom Review and the State of Ohio with
their study have documented numerous security vulnerabilities and have
systems and have taken action to protect voters. Additionally, a number
of academic and public policy experts have recommended that the
shortcomings of these systems be addressed. Finally, there have been a
number of incidents in which voters have been disenfranchised and
election outcomes thrown into doubt because the machines have simply
failed to work properly.''
The Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of
Law writes: ``Reports of machine problems during States' recent
Presidential primary elections provide a preview of potentially
widespread machine failure and disenfranchisement in November.''
They and others go on to argue that this simple, straightforward
legislation
[[Page H2294]]
will allow many counties and States around the country to address these
problems in time for their November election so that we can have a
truly reliable, accessible and auditable election that voters can
believe in.
I yield back the balance of my time with thanks to the gentlelady
from California for her diligent work in putting together such a good
piece of legislation.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. I thank the gentleman, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mr. EHLERS. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Regula).
(Mr. REGULA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5036.
CBO estimates that this bill will cost the taxpayers $685 million to
reimburse jurisdictions for the cost of converting to voting systems
that produce paper ballots, manual audits and hand recounts. We have
already provided the States with $3.2 billion in grants to implement
the Help America Vote Act, including $115 million appropriated in
fiscal year 2008.
The administration of elections is a State and local responsibility.
Many jurisdictions have already decided to change their election
systems to require paper ballots using their own resources. This bill
would encourage other jurisdictions to rush the implementation of new
paper ballot systems for the November election.
In written testimony before the Appropriations Subcommittee, the
bipartisan Election Assistance Commission stated: ``Experience has
taught election officials that a minimum of 6 to 8 months, and
preferably longer, is needed to effectively implement a new voting
system and to educate the voting public about how to use the system.
Consistency in procedures and process is key in creating a secure,
accurate and effective election. As we have seen in Ohio and in several
other jurisdictions, the hasty attaching of a printer to some machines
has led to paper jams, long lines, and confusion. While jurisdictions
may find a voter verified paper audit trail to be suitable for their
needs, hastily requiring such a thing for this year's election has the
potential to lead to more problems than it can possibly solve. At this
point in the election cycle, election officials are better served by
sharpening their already existing policies than trying to apply
patchwork fixes that could lead to greater problems.''
That was from the Election Assistance Commission which is a
bipartisan group.
I would add, this bill will not only put the country further in debt,
but would encourage jurisdictions to implement new voting systems
between the primaries and general election, leading to additional
election problems.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this legislative proposal.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Davis of Virginia is
a principal cosponsor and I don't see him here, so I will yield to Mr.
Holt for 1 minute.
Mr. HOLT. I thank the gentlelady. I just wanted to address a couple
of the points that the gentleman from Ohio made.
The first is we don't in this legislation tell the counties how to
run their elections. We leave this up to them, and it is entirely
optional. There are States around the country who have instituted
complete auditable election systems in a matter of months.
If a county or a State feels they cannot do it, then I would advise
them not to opt in to this program. But we believe they can. Let's
leave that to them rather than as the gentleman from Ohio would, try to
decide for them whether this is something that they would want.
We believe from a number of indications that this will be useful in
many counties and States around the country.
Mr. EHLERS. I yield 4 minutes to the Republican whip, the gentleman
from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
Mr. BLUNT. I thank the gentleman for yielding and I come to the floor
to talk about this bill with real appreciation for the hard work that
the gentleman from New Jersey has put into this effort. I know it is a
heartfelt effort on his part.
In fact, I first met his mother when we were both serving as the
Secretaries of State of respective States, West Virginia and Missouri,
at the time. I just come here to say that the States have handled the
responsibility of the mechanics of election administration well for a
very long time.
The process of voting, how you vote, the mechanics of what the ballot
looks like, whether you have a straight ballot voting system, all that
has been left to the States, and I think wisely so.
In the Help America Vote Act, the Congress provided States with over
$3 billion to modernize their voting systems, including allowing the
States to decide whether they wanted to have a paper backup. In my
State, the State of Missouri, the Secretary of State determined if that
money was used, there would be no system authorized in our State unless
the paper backup was part of that system. As it turned out, that was a
very good decision.
But in the aftermath of the 2000 elections, many States took that
incentive, that $3 billion that was out there, and in my view made
decisions more quickly than they otherwise would have.
This bill now offers a second round of money that would be available
to encourage changing their systems, many of them that we know about
today changing their system from a system they just used Federal money
to change to. I think this is neither wise nor the responsible thing
for us to do.
I also very much think that there is no reason to rush this bill at
this time. There is not enough time left between now and the November
election to change voting systems. Over 30 States have already
conducted primary elections with the system they will use in November.
The very worst time to change a voting system is an election that has
overwhelming participation, as we believe this one will.
Election administration and the mechanics of election grew up in this
country over decades and generations of voting and voting habits. To
try to change those voting habits from a primary election some time
earlier in the year to a new system, to be frankly tested the first
time in probably the biggest election turnout that we have had or will
have in a long time, is just a mistake.
To think that we should pass this bill today for the November
election, I think, is as far off base as we could be. I am not
absolutely opposed to the Federal Government encouraging States to do
better with their election process; I am opposed to this feeling that
we get into that creates an environment where the States have to make
these decisions more quickly than they should, and particularly to make
a decision like this just in advance of a high-participation election.
I don't think the $3.2 billion so-called solution produced the right
results. In fact, several States are now complaining that it produced
problems. But they are the ones that decided that they would deal with
those problems. Those problems, frankly, become less significant every
time voters use a system. Maybe you made an investment that you wished
you didn't make, but you made that investment. It is not impossible to
either reverse it on your own or decide you are going to make it work.
I think this is the wrong approach at the wrong time. I encourage my
colleagues to vote ``no'' on this bill today, not to give up in working
with our friend from New Jersey to find a bill that would be helpful to
the States, but not to pass a bill today that would only create with
certainty more problems in November than we will have without it.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I just want to make it
clear that the Holt bill is optional for jurisdictions. No one is
required to opt in, so no one would be rushed unless they wanted and
felt they could take advantage of this legislation. I would note also
that several States have undergone very rapid conversion. I would note
that Governor Crist from Florida was a witness before the Election
Subcommittee in House Administration, and he had the entire State of
Florida switch from the electronic machines to optical scan in really a
matter of months. This is a matter of intention if you want to do it.
I reserve the balance of my time.
[[Page H2295]]
Mr. EHLERS. I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Iowa (Mr. King).
Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Michigan
for yielding, and I appreciate the privilege to address you here on the
floor of the House with regard to integrity in the ballot system.
I will say as a compliment to Mr. Holt, he and I have had a number of
conversations about integrity in the electoral process. We share
concern that the electoral process here in America have the highest
level of integrity. I, for one, actually sat in my chair for all but a
couple of 37 days following the election of the year 2000 watching
television, scooting around and surfing the Internet, chasing down the
rabbit trails. I was on the telephone. At the time I was the chairman
of the Senate State Government Committee in Iowa, and I didn't want
Iowa to become a Florida.
As I educated myself, it was a crash course in the electoral process.
I found fraud in elections in a number of States, at least solid
newspaper and journalistic reports of fraud, and I became convinced
that it was scattered throughout this country. And the pattern is hard
to follow, but the conclusion I drew was if this country ever loses its
faith in our electoral system, this constitutional republic will
collapse due to a lack of faith of the people.
So integrity in the electoral process is important. I would rather
lose an election than lose the integrity of the electoral process.
I come to this floor today to oppose this bill, however, because this
is Tax Day, 2008, election year 2008, and we are watching the
Presidential debates unfold and soon we will hear the congressional
debates light up. To try to jump on this horse in the middle of this
fast current of stream that we have racing toward an election, I think
is a bridge too far for us to be able to get there without further
damaging the integrity, rather than improving it.
{time} 1430
I would urge this House to step back, take a look, take a deep
breath, and come together with some legislation that would provide, of
course, for a paper audit trail, which I support, but one that does so
in a reasoned fashion, not in the middle of an election year, not
something that's designed to patch some of the flaws that came with the
Help America Vote Act, but something that's well thought out, something
that's bipartisan, something that's reasoned, something that's
cautious, and something that will preserve the integrity of the
electoral system that we have. And that's why I come to the floor, Mr.
Speaker, for that purpose.
And I support the position taken by the ranking member from Michigan
and my colleagues, although I intend to continue to work with Mr. Holt.
Another point that I would make is that we do have a disagreement in
our viewpoint, and that is that I think we should, at the very last
resort, impose obligations on the States. The States have run this
electoral process. The Federal Government has a minimal involvement.
And so my view is, if the States have integrity, we have to be very
careful because the voters within the States will be determining the
next leader in the free world. I think the number was just 527 votes in
Florida made the difference on who the leader of the free world was in
the year 2000. That integrity is important. We must hold it together.
But I urge a ``no'' vote on this bill at this time.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to note
that this has not been a hurried effort. In fact, we reported out of
the House Administration Committee the original Holt bill before last
Easter, Easter of 2007, and have been working with interested parties
and across the aisle since that time.
It's worth noting that these changes can happen responsibly and also
quickly. For example, in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, they're going
to switch from DREs to optical scan in 7 weeks, before this primary.
And I would note that the legislature in Iowa has voted, I understand
the vote was nearly unanimous, to transition from DREs to optical scan,
and that's going to be done before this November election. So I think
that this measure would help cities and counties who want to take those
responsible steps.
I would yield to the author of the legislation, Mr. Holt, an
additional minute.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will note that the gentleman from
Michigan has 6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California
has 6 minutes remaining.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, under this legislation, the States and
counties still have the responsibility for the mechanics of the
elections. All we're saying is, if they put in place procedures to make
them auditable, and procedures to audit the votes, we will assist them
in the cost.
There are many things the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King) said we
could be dealing with, and, indeed, we are not dealing with questions
of registration and purging of names on registration lists and absentee
voting and the openness of the tabulation phase of results. We are just
talking about what happens in the voting booth, so that each voter will
be able to verify, on paper, that her vote or his vote is recorded the
way they intended, and then, those voter verified records be used to
audit the results. It's that simple.
I can promise you that if jurisdictions don't take these steps, there
will be many questions around the country that cannot be resolved. This
is a simple, straightforward way to take care of it.
Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Florida, who has considerable voting
experience, Mr. Mica.
Mr. MICA. I want to thank Ranking Member Ehlers and others for
working on this bill.
I join in opposition to the legislation. First of all, let me say, my
colleagues, there's nothing more important than the integrity of the
election process in the United States and confidence that all Americans
would have in making certain our system of election is secure.
But let me tell you, folks, this is compounding error and mistake
Congress made, and here it is on Tax Day, 2008, that we're going to
commit another two-thirds of a billion dollar mistake.
I sat on House Administration that oversees elections. I was there in
2000 when we had the problems in Florida with the hanging chads. We've
all heard of the hanging chads. And everybody rushed here, and every
vote's got to count; we've got to spend taxpayer dollars and make sure
that every vote is counted; and we're going to put in a system, and we
have to make it look like we're doing something to make certain that
system's secure.
Now, we listened to the witnesses and they came before House
Administration and they told folks that an electronic voting system,
which would cost billions of dollars to implement, would have the
possibility of error and just about the same percentage of error if you
choose a lever, if you use a hanging chad ballot, if you use optical
scan, if you use a paper ballot. And you can mess up any of those
elections.
They told us. And then everybody rushed down. They voted it out of
committee. We passed it. We spent $2 billion or $3 billion to put in
place a system that they told us, well, somebody can pull the plug, the
electronic thing doesn't work. Duh. Somebody can come up with some sort
of electronic device. Even one of these might set it off and you might
get some results.
They told us there might be errors, and they told us they didn't have
a paper trail. Duh.
So here we are putting in place the system. On Tax Day, spend another
two-thirds of a billion dollars. Keep working out there, Americans.
Send it here because they'll spend it in some dumb fashion, and this
follows that.
Now, we do want the system to work, but there are errors in
everything. You heard them talking about the scan.
I went down and sat all night and watched the scan voting. It's
simple. You just take a pen and you fill in the space. My God, I
couldn't believe, hundreds of people, they put X's all the way around,
they circled optical scan. They could screw up any kind of a ballot. A
paper ballot. Actually I'm told that the old levers are probably the
[[Page H2296]]
best, that we took out for $2 billion or $3 billion worth of hard-
earned taxpayer dollars and replaced with these electronic machines
which now we're coming to correct. But they still have the same rate of
error.
I guess it never stops around here. But here we are again spending
that money on another whim. But we'll do it.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I just want to make a
couple of comments. In the last several years, the United States has
spent at least $240 million to make sure that democratic elections in
other countries met the same standards that we're hoping elections will
be held to here. And so, obviously, every dollar that we have is
precious tax money, but I would hope that we would be at least as
interested in protecting the integrity of the elections in America as
we are in protecting the integrity of the elections in Pakistan,
Afghanistan and the like.
Secondly, I was not a member of the House Administration Committee
when Mr. Mica, the gentleman from Florida, was. But I was on the
Florida 13 Task Force, and we reached a conclusion. It was unanimous
and it was bipartisan, and I don't second-guess them. We had GAO go in
and they gave us a report, and we accepted that report. But had there
been a paper trail we wouldn't have had to have the GAO go in and
examine these machines.
And I would finally note that the gentleman is right. If you can mess
it up, it will be messed up. But at least, with a paper ballot, you can
discern intent. And if somebody circles the name instead of fills it
in, and there is a recount, you can see what a voter meant to do. You
cannot see that with an electronic machine.
So with that, and I understand the points being made, but I would
hope that we can come together and support this bipartisan bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. EHLERS. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Mica).
Mr. MICA. I didn't get a chance to say this, but there is a quote
that I think should be part of the record. And the quote is: ``An
informed electorate is the cornerstone of democracy and an educated
electorate.'' And that's what we need to do.
And they make errors. Folks make errors. They just don't circle one
and it's very clear. I'd love to bring the ballots here. Sometime I'll
have to do that to show you how people can mess it up. But an informed
electorate is the cornerstone of democracy. And, yes, we need to do all
we can to make certain that they're provided with all the assistance
from the Federal level to make certain that we have a fair, open,
honest election.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. We don't have additional speakers. I
wonder if the gentleman has additional speakers.
Mr. EHLERS. We have no further speakers. If you have none then I will
make some concluding remarks.
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
We've heard a good deal of discussion on this bill. Some of you may
recall Parkinson's laws from some years ago in which he commented that
when there's a debate on a subject, the more the people know, the
longer the debate. And I suspect we could go on considerably longer if
we had more of the Members of Congress here simply because all of us
have experience with elections.
I would like to point out a few items. First of all, the comments
about the integrity of the system. I agree totally. The objective
should be the complete integrity of the system to insure that every
vote is counted accurately, and that every voter can be assured that
their vote is not cancelled out by someone who has illegally voted the
wrong way; in other words, through fraud or through mistakes by the
machine.
I believe that the audits that Mr. Holt has proposed are very
important and should be developed. It should be developed with the help
of the Secretaries of State and local election officials to develop a
system that works, so that we can ensure that the count is as accurate
as possible.
I also want to comment that the White House also has taken a dim view
of this. They've issued a SAP this afternoon, somewhat to my surprise,
that indicates that they oppose this bill and urge Members of the
Congress to vote against it.
But I do want to look at this from the historical perspective, and as
an older person, I've been around a while, and I've seen a lot of
different elections. Recalling the early history of our country, all
balloting was with paper. But because there was too much miscounting on
opportunity for fraud, machines were developed: the iron monsters, as
they called them, meaning the lever machines. And those were used for
years, even though their error rate also was note zero. And then we've
gone to many other voting methods over the years.
Now we're using high tech approaches with computers, and we have
encountered some of the same difficulties.
I am not saying that you can't make a perfect machine. I am saying
that as long as people are involved in operating them, there are likely
to be mistakes.
And one of my classics that I remember is from the presidential
election in 2004, when in Los Angeles County there were something like
nine candidates for President listed on the ballot. This was an optical
scan ballot. Over 3,600 voters crossed through the oval for candidates
other than President Bush and left his blank.
Now, how is one to interpret that? Did these voters think they should
leave the Bush oval blank because that was who they wanted to vote for?
Or were they saying ``Anyone but the President? Who knows. As long as
those types of mistakes are possible, they will be made. And we have to
do our best here to work diligently, with, and I emphasize ``working
with'' very strongly, working with the local elected officials, the
State-elected officials, and continue to do as best we can to perfect
the best possible voting system.
And with that, I will yield back.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I urge that we pass this
important legislation today.
I will confess that I am disappointed that the ranking member is not
today in support of this measure. We, on the majority side, accepted
every amendment offered by Republicans in the committee mark-up on this
bill, and I had hoped and expected that we would be able to continue to
work together and support this measure on the floor.
We reported the original Holt bill out of the committee over 1 year
ago, and in that time, between now and then, we have worked with
Secretaries of State, the National Association of Counties, disability
rights groups, voting rights groups, civil rights groups, to try and
get a measure that could garner broad support across the country. And I
believe that we have that measure before us today.
I will say that the White House issuing an SAP today, after a year's
work, I think, is really bad faith. We have worked very hard, and to
come out at the last minute is really very unprofessional.
I'd finally like to say that the dollar amount estimated by the
Congressional Budget Office is a worst-case scenario. There's no way
that that would be the full amount.
But even if it were, I would ask Members to think of this: Isn't the
American democracy worth as much as the Iraqi or the Pakistani
democracy?
{time} 1445
Aren't we willing to spend as much to make sure that our precious
American votes are counted as we are the votes of foreigners in other
countries? I would hope that as we consider our responsibility as
Members of Congress to our wonderful America and our wonderful country,
that the answer to that would be yes and therefore, a ``yes'' on the
whole bill.
There have been various quotes made today, but I think back of the
second Californian to ever be President of the United States, his
phrase was not used about voting, but it was this: Trust but verify.
That's what the Holt bill would do. It would trust but verify, and I
hope that Members today can come together and support the Holt bill.
I would like to commend once again Congressman Holt for his enormous
efforts that brought us here today.
Mrs. CAPPS. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of the Emergency Assistance
for Secure Elections Act, I rise in strong support of the bill.
Voting is the most fundamental element of democracy. It is the
mechanism by which citizens hold their government accountable for its
actions. This most critical of democratic actions depends, however, on
voters' confidence
[[Page H2297]]
that their votes are counted fairly and accurately.
Voters have lost this confidence.
Election after election, year after year, millions of voters cast
votes not knowing if their votes will count because the machines
produce no paper records.
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 was supposed to resolve these
problems. However, it failed to address several major issues that
continue to plague the system and undermine the legitimacy of our
elections.
This so-called response to the 2000 election debacle in Florida
failed to implement accountability measures to ensure that every vote
is cast and counted accurately.
The Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act would address this
problem by providing funding for states and counties to implement safe,
secure and auditable voting systems in time for the 2008 general
election.
It would reimburse jurisdictions that choose to convert to paper-
based voting systems. The reimbursements also cover emergency paper
ballots used in the event of machine failure, and the cost of
conducting hand-counted audits or hand counting the results of
elections.
We must act to restore confidence in our election system. The
Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act will help restore this
confidence and help ensure that all votes are counted and recorded
properly. I urge my colleagues to fulfill their responsibility to
American voters by voting yes on this critical bill.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5036, the
Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008.
I think everyone in the chamber today remembers the frustration and
disbelief we all felt in November 2000 as hundreds of volunteers poured
into Dade County Florida to oversee the recount of the Presidential
election. As the future of our nation swayed in the balance, we all
thought to ourselves, Can this actually be happening in America?
The answer, unfortunately, was yes. As devastating as that event was,
I think we learned two very important lessons. The first is that every
vote really does count. Every person who is eligible must get to the
polls. The second lesson learned is that our system of elections is
broken. Changes must be mandated, improvements must be made.
That is why I am proud to rise in support of H.R. 5036. This bill
takes real steps to improve the transparency and accuracy of electoral
process by minimizing the financial burden placed on local governments
to ensure the accuracy of election results.
H.R. 5036 fully reimburses jurisdictions that choose to offer paper
ballots on Election Day. In the 2006 election cycle, we learned that
electronic voting machines are not always reliable, often
malfunctioning and creating substantial complications on Election Day.
H.R. 5036 also subsidizes manual recounts of elections results if basic
minimum requirements are met. We must provide resources to the states
to ensure that the elections they conduct are fair and accurate.
Both provisions provide absolutely necessary funding to alleviate the
significant burden placed on local and county governments when holding
elections. This relief is critical to ensure that local government
entities can protect the legitimacy of election results without
enduring financial hardship.
While, I recognize the fact that more must be done, I also believe
that this bill is a very good start and I want to commend my good
friend and colleague, Rush Holt, for his leadership on this issue. Even
a month ago, it appeared that passing this bill was impossible.
However, thanks to Representative Holt's tireless efforts to work with
members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, that impossibility
becomes reality today. America will be a better for place for his
efforts on this Issue.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, elections are the bedrock of our republic.
Our capacity to function as a tripartite government of co-equal
branches rests in the public's assurance that those of us entrusted to
administer and legislate assumed our offices through free, fair and
open elections.
I laud Congressman Rush Holt and his efforts to ensure the integrity
and accuracy of our voting system. However, today I must rise in
opposition to H.R. 5036, the Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections
Act of 2008.
H.R. 5036 acknowledges that problems exist in our system of voting,
and that without action now these problems will grow. For this reason
the legislation has merit. While H.R. 5036 includes a provision to
reimburse jurisdictions that convert their paperless voting system to
one that includes a paper trail, it may also include optical scan
technology. I have serious concerns with optical scan technology and
its susceptibility to hacks and security breaches. Recent tests and
research have demonstrated the ease with which a person can manipulate
the configuration files to change votes. What's more, most of the
equipment necessary to accomplish this can be purchased off-the-shelf
at most technology stores.
Indeed, our voting system needs improvement, but replacing one flawed
technology with another will do little to garner public faith in the
electoral process. Let us make comprehensive electoral system reform a
priority, and let us enact a policy that ensures system integrity,
system security, and that each and every vote is counted.
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance
of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe Lofgren) that the House suspend
the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5036, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.
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