[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 57 (Thursday, April 10, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2947-S2948]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN:
  S. 2841. A bill to amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and title 46, 
United States Code, to establish a marine emergency protocol and 
requirements for double-hulling of vessel fuel tanks; to the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce an important 
piece of legislation. The Marine Emergency Protocol and Hull 
Requirement Act will take two major steps in preventing oilspills.
  First, the bill directs the United States Coast Guard to control and 
oversee a vessel's route and speed during dangerous conditions. This 
oversight is critical to protect our ships during an attack or in 
conditions of low visibility.
  Second, the bill will keep dangerous oil and fuel out of our 
waterways by mandating that all large cargo ships reinforce their fuel 
tanks with double hulls. By doing so, many of the small mishaps that 
occur will not lead to major oilspills.
  San Franciscans learned the hard way that further precautions and 
regulations are needed.
  Last November, in my hometown, a large cargo ship carrying over 
100,000 gallons of fuel, ran into the San Francisco Bay Bridge. The 
damaged ship poured 53,000 gallons of oil into the bay.
  In the following hours and days there was confusion, it was difficult 
to obtain accurate information, and there was a general sense of 
frustration felt by Bay Area residents.

[[Page S2948]]

  Here is what we knew:
  On the foggy November morning, visibility was very low--less than a 
quarter of a mile--in the San Francisco Bay.
  Under these low visibility conditions the Cosco Busan, a large 900-
foot-long cargo ship, decided to leave for its destination despite the 
poor conditions.
  As the ship proceeded towards the Bay Bridge, the captain was advised 
by the Coast Guard that his vessel may be off course. However the Coast 
Guard did nothing to stop the ship, which they knew was heading 
directly towards a pillar of the bridge.
  Despite the warnings and the poor visibility, the ship continued to 
speed toward the bridge until it collided.
  The fact is this: The Coast Guard's actions did not stop the ship 
from running into the pier.
  It is the responsibility of the Coast Guard to make sure that 
preventable oilspills are prevented. Sector Commanders and Vessel 
Traffic Service officers track ships as they traverse harbors across 
the country. In this case they could see that the ship was off course, 
yet they did nothing. This is unacceptable.
  The Marine Emergency Protocol and Hull Requirement Act will mandate 
that the Coast Guard act to stop a ship--such as the Cosco Busan--that 
is dangerously off course.
  Yes, there was substantial human error that led to this oilspill. 
That is unquestionable. But the fact remains that the Coast Guard had 
an opportunity to stop this ship, and it did not.
  The bill directs the Sector Commander of the Coast Guard, that is the 
top official within each of the Coast Guard's 35 regions, to assume 
direct authority of all vessels during conditions of enhanced danger, 
such as low visibility or an attack.

  By doing this, we will create a central system where all decisions 
are made. There will not be any confusion about who should do what, or 
when, or how. This way, during emergency conditions when confusion 
abounds, all orders are coming from one central source.
  The Sector Commander will have the authority to stop ships, change 
their course, or return them to a safe harbor. They will have the 
authority to alter the course of one ship, or of all ships. This 
authority is necessary to ensure safe navigation of dangerous 
waterways.
  Yet even in a perfect world, the Coast Guard cannot stop all 
oilspills. Sometimes the circumstances are out of their control.
  That is why we need to make sure that the ships in our waterways take 
all reasonable precautions to protect against spilling oil.
  The Marine Emergency Protocol and Hull Requirement Act also mandates 
that all cargo vessels are built with, or install, double hull 
containment structures around their petroleum based fuel tanks. Doing 
so keeps small mishaps and collisions from turning into major 
oilspills.
  The extra layer of protection was required for oil tankers under the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, OPA 90.
  Following the 11-million gallon Exxon Valdez tragedy in 1989, new 
restrictions on oil tankers were at the center of the debate on how to 
prevent another catastrophic oilspill. The result of the OPA 90 
legislation has been remarkable.
  Compared to the 15 years before the enactment of the Oil Pollution 
Act, the following 15 years have seen a 90-percent drop in oilspills 
over 100,000 gallons.
  In the same time period, there has been a 79-percent drop in spills 
less than 100,000 gallons.
  By 2015 there will be no single-hull tank vessels operating in U.S. 
waters. As of 2010, only 5 percent of domestic and only 4 percent of 
foreign tank vessels will still have a single hull. Nearly 90 percent 
had single hulls in 1990.
  These are incredible successes. Unfortunately one other statistic 
sticks out.
  Since 1990, 90 percent of all oilspills have been from non-tank 
vessels.
  Clearly, this illustrates the need for cargo ships, the main culprit 
of oilspills in recent years, to be subject to the Oil Pollution Act 
standards.
  In 1990, cargo ships were left out because relatively, they carried 
much less oil. However, newer, larger cargo ships carry hundreds of 
thousands of gallons of oil as fuel, and this oil still poses a grave 
environmental threat.
  In the Cosco Busan incident, and dozens of other catastrophic 
oilspills around the world, it was fuel oil that ended up in the water, 
not cargo oil. Of course this oil is just as deadly, yet under current 
law it is treated differently.
  It is time to close this loophole.
  The Marine Emergency Protocol and Hull Requirement Act also provides 
a reasonable timeframe for implementing these standards.
  In the 1990 bill, Congress adopted a sliding scale for when vessels 
needed to have applied the appropriate double hull protections. The 
timetable was developed to allow shipping companies and ship owners to 
plan for the additional costs--and up to 15 years to implement them. 
Under this bill, we will adopt the same time-tested schedule and apply 
it to the conversion of cargo vessels.
  The Marine Emergency Protocol and Hull Requirement Act is a 
commonsense bill that will unquestionably make our waters safer.
  In an emergency situation, be it an attack or a condition of low 
visibility, the Coast Guard must assume authority over a ship in 
danger. It is their responsibility to guide the vessel to safety. This 
bill clarifies that they have the authority to do so, and it mandates 
that they follow through.
  Similarly, vessels carrying a large volume of oil--be it as cargo or 
as fuel--have the responsibility to take reasonable steps to prevent 
that oil from spilling.
  In the event of even a minor accident, a single hull breach is a very 
real possibility. This is why we mandated that oil tankers implement a 
double containment system in 1990.
  It has come time to close this loophole and call all oil, oil. Fuel 
oil is just as detrimental and just as deadly as oil that is carried in 
the cargo hold of a ship. Therefore it should have to be contained with 
an equal level of protection.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues on this very important 
matter, passing this important piece of commonsense legislation.
                                 ______