[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 40 (Monday, March 10, 2008)]
[House]
[Pages H1435-H1437]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
U.S.-COLOMBIA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Weller) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WELLER of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I rise to support the U.S.-
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, to urge the Speaker of this House
to bring the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement to this House
floor for a vote.
And let me tell you this: this agreement is good for the State that I
represent. It's good for Colombia. It's good for the United States.
It's good for Illinois farmers. It's good for Illinois workers. And
it's good for Illinois manufacturing.
And I would note that in my district I have 8,000 Caterpillar
workers, union Caterpillar workers who are manufacturing workers. And
under this agreement, I note under the U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement
that our machinery exports see their tariffs imposed on Illinois-made
construction equipment eliminated on day one. Now, you think about it,
mining equipment used in Colombia is $1 million equipment, that's a
$100,000 tax on U.S.-made products eliminated on day one.
Currently, Illinois exports $214 million to Colombia, and that's just
the beginning. According to the International Trade Commission,
Illinois is a big winner. Pork products will increase 72 percent,
according to their economic analysis. Corn and soybeans will see
increased sales to Colombia. Fabricated metal products, processed
foods, and chemicals will all see increases. And, again, it's expected
that machinery, manufactured machinery, like products made by John
Deere and Navistar and Caterpillar, will increase 15 percent.
Agriculture. The leaders of agriculture will tell you the U.S.-
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement is the best for agriculture in the
history of all trade negotiations. And let's not forget that 80 percent
of U.S. exports are currently taxed when they enter Colombia, and they
will become duty free immediately. That will allow us to
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become competitive with China and Asia and other competition.
We know Colombia, a democracy, as a reliable partner and ally. We
know that Colombia is the oldest democracy in Latin America. And we
also recognize that President Uribe of Colombia is our hemisphere's
most popular elected official with over 80 percent approval ratings.
Compare that to this Congress, which has a 15 percent approval rating.
Big difference.
Now, there are those who oppose the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement. They say that Colombia, amongst all the good things it's
done, just hasn't done enough regarding violence against labor leaders.
Let's remember that Colombia has had 40 years of civil strife driven by
left-wing gorillas trying to overthrow the democratically elected
government of Colombia. But today, 71 percent of Colombians say they
feel more secure under President Uribe; 73 percent say Uribe respects
human rights. Those are Colombians, not Americans, saying that.
Homicides are down 40 percent in Colombia; kidnappings are down 76
percent. The murder rate today in Medellin, once the poster child of
violence in Colombia, one of the most dangerous cities on the planet,
today has a lower murder rate than Washington, DC, or Baltimore.
But let's look at the facts on labor violence. President Uribe has
made major changes, beginning with reforming the judiciary. He has had
hired 418 new prosecutors, 545 new investigators. In fact, in the
Prosecutor General's Office, responsible for targeting those who are
responsible for the violence in Colombia, they've added over 2,000 new
posts.
Funding has gone up 75 percent in the last few years alone under
President Uribe. And quoting Carlos Rodriguez, president of the United
Workers Confederation, a labor leader in Colombia: ``Never in the
history of Colombia have we achieved something so important.'' Again,
that's a Colombian labor leader.
President Uribe and Colombia, under the government initiatives, have
worked to protect labor leaders, giving them special protections. Last
year, they spent over $38 million for body guard protection for labor
union leaders; 1,500 union members and activists received special
protection, the second largest protected group in Colombia, and it's
been successful. For labor activists under this program, none have lost
their lives. And I would note that the murder rate today for labor
unionists is lower than the national murder rate for everyone else.
So progress has been made.
And I would note that crimes categorized as anti-union violence often
are not union related, but regular crime that everyone in Colombia has
contended with, many are the responsibility of the leftist FARC.
I would note that the International Labor Organization has removed
Colombia from its labor watch list. Colombia has agreed to a permanent
ILO representative in Colombia. And perhaps most telling, 14 Colombian
labor leaders have given their support to the trade agreement.
The bottom line is, ladies and gentlemen, this agreement is good for
Illinois workers, it's good for Illinois manufacturers, it's good for
Illinois farmers. Let's bring it up for a vote. I ask my colleagues to
support this important trade agreement. And I will also include for the
Record a copy of an ``Economist'' article talking about President Hugo
Chavez and the FARC and their opposition to this agreement.
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC. March 10, 2008.
Dear Colleague: Please read this informative recent article
from The Economist about FARC narcoterrorists in Colombia and
troubling links with the Chavez administration in Venezuela.
As noted below, ``Mr. Chavez, still with oil money but
politically on the defensive, may have thrown in his lot with
an outlaw army of drug-traffickers.''
Now more than ever we must support the pending Trade
Promotion Agreement with our neighbor and friend Colombia.
Sincerely,
Jerry Weller,
Member of Congress.
____
(From The Economist, Mar. 6, 2008)
Colombia Is Moving Closer To Breaking the FARC--Unless Venezuela Stops
It
On few, if any, other occasions has a head of state issued
detailed orders for military mobilization as jauntily as if
he were ordering pizza, and on live television. That is what
Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's president, did on March 2nd, after
Colombian forces bombed a camp just inside Ecuador, killing
Raul Reyes, a senior commander of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas.
``Minister of defence!'' bellowed Mr. Chavez, on ``ALo
PRESIDENTE'' (``Hello President''), his weekly radio and
television programme. ``Send me ten battalions to the border,
including tanks.'' He also ordered the forward deployment of
his new Russian fighter-bombers, threatening that if
Colombia's president, Alvaro Uribe, tried a similar raid on
Venezuelan soil he would ``send over the Sukhois''. The next
day he broke diplomatic ties with Colombia.
Venezuelan troops and tanks duly moved to the more
populated points of the long border between the two
countries. Customs officials halted Colombian trucks at the
busiest crossing point, between Cucuta and San Cristobal.
What made this performance odd was that it was Ecuador, not
Venezuela, whose sovereignty had been violated. True,
Colombia has often accused Venezuela of harbouring guerrilla
leaders and tolerating camps near the border similar to the
one bombed in Ecuador. But did Venezuela's president have a
guilty conscience?
``Maybe he knew what was coming,'' wrote Teodoro Petkoff, a
guerrilla leader in the 1960s who now edits an opposition
newspaper in Caracas. Mr. Chavez's apparent over-reaction was
a pre-emptive attempt to ``throw a veil over the revelations
he suspected might come from Raul Reyes' computer,''
suggested Mr Petkoff.
With Ecuador's president, Rafael Correa, following Mr.
Chavez's lead, this week's events sent Latin America's
diplomats scurrying to prevent war enveloping the
neighbourhood. But they also laid bare that Colombia's
government is coming close to breaking the back of the FARC,
and in the process threatening to shine light on its murky
relations with neighbouring governments.
When Mr. Uribe took office in 2002, the guerrillas were
rampant. His predecessor had just halted peace negotiations
because the FARC had used a ``demilitarised'' zone created to
host the talks as a base for recruitment and for kidnapping
(many of the politicians it has held hostage were seized
during the talks). The guerrillas had some 17,000 troops;
they blocked main roads and bombarded small towns, kidnapping
and killing almost at will. To make matters worse, the
state's inability to provide security had spawned murderous
right-wing paramilitary groups.
Mr. Uribe's ``democratic security'' policy has achieved a
dramatic change. By expanding the security forces, he has
driven the FARC from populated areas, while persuading most
of the paramilitaries to demobilize. Officials reckon they
have reduced the FARC's ranks to fewer than 11,000. But the
guerrillas withdrew to the vast tropical lowlands, to areas
they have controlled for 40 years. There they resisted a two-
year offensive by 18,000 troops. The army could not get near
the FARC's seven-man governing secretariat, of which Mr.
Reyes (the NOM DE GUERRE of Luis Edgar Devia) was a member.
SEEKING THE SECRETARIAT
Thwarted, the security forces refined their strategy. They
put more effort into seeking the FARC's leaders using
information from guerrilla deserters and infiltrators, and
from sophisticated bugging equipment provided by the
United States. Over the past year, this has started to pay
off. Two FARC regional commanders have been killed and one
captured. In January and February alone, the army claims
to have killed 247 guerrillas and captured 226, with
another 360 deserting. This pressure has pushed FARC units
to the borders with Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama.
Last month the government received a tip-off that Mr. Reyes
was in a camp less than two kilometers (1.25 miles) inside
Ecuador. Mr. Uribe authorized a bombing raid by Brazilian-
made Super Tucano aircraft, which killed at least 21
guerrillas. Colombian troops then crossed the border to
recover Mr. Reyes's corpse--and his laptop computers. (They
left three wounded women guerrillas unattended.)
Most Colombians were jubilant that the government had
struck at the very top of the FARC at last. Mr. Reyes handled
the guerrillas' relations with the outside world; he was one
of three deputies to Manuel Marulanda, the FARC's elderly
leader. For the first time the security forces have shown
that they are capable of infiltrating and defeating the
guerrillas tough systematic strikes, said Roman Ortiz of
Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, a Bogota think-tank.
Mr. Uribe doubtless thought that Mr. Correa could be
mollified over the cross-border raid. But spurred on by Mr.
Chavez, Ecuador's president sent 3,200 troops to the border
and cut diplomatic ties. He demanded an emergency meeting of
the Organization of American States (OAS) to condemn
Colombia, and set off on a tour of regional capitals seeking
support.
THE LAPTOP LODE
Almost as important as the killing of Mr. Reyes may be the
capture of his laptops. Apart from inside information on the
FARC, according to Colombian offIcials, they contain
documents which--if true--are embarrassing to Mr. Correa but
highly damaging to Mr. Chavez. As the FARC's top negotiator,
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Mr. Reyes appears to have met representatives of many
governments. According to one e-mail, he met Gustavo Larrea,
Mr. Correa's security minister last month. Mr. Larrea is
alleged to have proposed a formal meeting in Quito to discuss
securing the border and negotiating the release of some of
the FARC's 700-odd hostages. Mr. Larrea said that Colombian
offIcials knew of his meeting, which was purely to talk about
the hostages.
Ecuadorean officials having swapped complaints with their
Colombian counterparts about their mutual inability to
prevent the FARC from crossing the border. Ecuador claims to
spend $160m a year containing the spillover. It is also angry
about Colombia spraying coca fields on the border with
weedkiller, which it says drifts south on to other crops.
Nevertheless, Ecuador has given some help to Colombia. Mr.
Correa claimed that last year his forces dismantled 47 FARC
camps inside Ecuador and on three occasions carried out joint
operations with Colombian troops. American surveillance
aircraft still patrol over Colombia from an air base in
Ecuador, although Mr. Correa has promised not to renew the
lease for this when it expires in 2009.
By contrast, Mr. Chavez has recently been unambiguous in
his support for the FARC. He fell out with Mr. Uribe last
year over his attempt to act as a mediator for the hostages.
Since then he has cast aside his previous stance as an honest
broker seeking a peaceful solution to Colombia's internal
conflict. When the FARC turned over two hostages to him in
January, Mr. Chavez hailed the guerrillas as a ``true army''
whose status as belligerents should be recognised. No other
government in the region, not even Cuba's, echoed this call.
On ``ALo PRESIDENTE'' Mr. Chavez held a minute's silence in
honor of Mr. Reyes, whom he said he had met three times over
the years. He declared that Colombia needed to be
``liberated'' from its ``subservience'' to the United States.
Another document allegedly on Mr. Reyes's computer showed
that Mr. Chavez paid (or planned to pay) the FARC $300m. An
(unrelated) e-mail to Mr. Reyes suggested that the FARC were
trying to obtain uranium for a ``dirty bomb''. All this
prompted some far-fetched exchanges. Mr. Uribe said that he
would denounce Mr. Chavez for ``financing genocide''; in
return, Venezuela accused Colombia's police chief, who
revealed the contents of Mr. Reyes's laptop, of being a
``drug trafficker''.
``This is * * * a microphone war,'' said General Raul
Salazar, a former defense minister. Like many other
Venezuelans, he doubts that it will become a real one. That
is not least because many army officers do not want war with
Colombia and find Mr. Chavez's actions an ``embarrassment'',
said another former defense minister, General Raul Baduel,
who is now a prominent opponent of the president.
So what is Mr. Chavez's game? One possible answer is his
obsessive search for an external enemy to shore up his waning
popularity at home. In December, his political blueprint for
a socialist Venezuela, with indefinite presidential re-
election, was defeated in a referendum. This came only a year
after he won a second six-year term with 63 percent of the
vote, and was the first time he had lost a national vote.
In November Venezuelans are due to vote for mayors and
state governors. They are increasingly discontented about
crime, an inflation rate that has surged to 25 percent and
shortages of basic goods, including food and cooking gas.
Because of Mr. Chavez's mismanagement of agriculture,
Venezuela imports much of its food from Colombia. Any lasting
interruption of trade would hurt both countries. Reputable
pollsters say that Mr. Chavez's popularity has fallen well
below 50 percent. Visible faction fights have broken out in
his newly formed Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela.
Picking a fight with Colombia and supporting the FARC are
unlikely to win him friends. One poll, by Hinterlaces, showed
89 percent opposed to a war and 87 percent opposed to the
FARC. So the reason for his military mobilization may be to
deter Colombia from moving against the FARC camps in
Venezuela where some Colombian officials believe that Mr.
Marulanda is based. A more worrying, though improbable,
hypothesis is that Mr. Chavez, a former army officer, is
throwing off all pretence at being a civilian democrat and,
fearing that he may not remain in power for long, wants to
launch an assault on what he sees as American imperialism and
its regional stooge, Mr. Uribe.
Although George Bush gave public support to Mr. Uribe,
other governments in the region, led by Brazil, tried to
drive a wedge between Mr. Correa and Mr. Chavez. There were
signs that this might work. On March 5th Ecuador agreed to an
OAS resolution criticizing, but not formally condemning,
Colombia. The OAS also agreed to investigate the bombing.
Once the region's diplomats have patched things up between
these two countries, they face another, more intractable
problem: Mr. Chavez, still with oil money but politically on
the defensive, may have thrown in his lot with an outlaw army
of drug-traffickers.
____________________