[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 20 (Thursday, February 7, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S794-S796]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS
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SENATE RESOLUTION 445--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN BENAZIR BHUTTO, AND
THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN PAKISTAN
Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. Obama, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Durbin, Mr.
Harkin, Mr. Casey, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Reid, and Mrs. Feinstein)
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations:
S. Res. 445
Whereas, on October 18, 2007, former Prime Minister of
Pakistan Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan after more than
8 years in exile, and was welcomed by supporters numbering in
the hundreds of thousands;
Whereas hours after her return, a suicide bomb attack on
her convoy in Karachi killed 145 people and narrowly missed
killing Benazir Bhutto herself, in one of the most violent
terrorist attacks in Pakistan's history;
Whereas Members of Congress and other friends of Pakistan
wrote to President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf weeks prior
to the October 18, 2007, attack on Benazir Bhutto, urging
support for the democratic process and the provision of
adequate security for democratic leaders such as Benazir
Bhutto;
Whereas Members of Congress and other friends of Pakistan
wrote to President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf immediately
after the October 18, 2007, attack, urging that a specific
set of security measures be taken to protect Benazir Bhutto,
and that a full investigation into the October 18 attack be
undertaken;
Whereas, on November 3, 2007, President Musharraf, in his
role as Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, declared a state of
emergency, suspended the Constitution of Pakistan, dismissed
Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and other
justices of the Supreme Court and provincial High Courts,
replacing them with candidates willing to take an oath to
uphold his actions during the suspension of the Constitution,
and initiated a nation-wide crackdown on political
opposition, the media, and the courts of Pakistan that
resulted in the arrest of more than 1,000 political
opponents;
Whereas, on December 15, 2007, President Musharraf lifted
the State of Emergency, but did not reinstate the dismissed
Supreme Court and High Court justices, allow full freedom of
the press, or release all political prisoners arrested during
the crackdown;
Whereas President Musharraf justified his actions in
November 2007 on the grounds of more effective
counterterrorism efforts, beginning his November 3
proclamation with the statement, ``Whereas there is visible
ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of
terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, IED
explosions, rocket firing and bomb explosions and the banding
together of some militant groups have taken such activities
to an unprecedented level of violent intensity posing a grave
threat to the life and property of the citizens of
Pakistan'';
Whereas, on December 27, 2007, Benazir Bhutto was killed in
the garrison town of Rawalpindi;
Whereas video footage, backed up by eyewitness testimony,
shows at least 1 gunman firing shots at Benazir Bhutto
instants before her death, and a second terrorist detonating
a bomb near her vehicle shortly after the firing of the
gunshots;
Whereas the precise circumstances surrounding both the
October 18, 2007, attack and the December 27, 2007,
assassination remain unclear, and those responsible for both
terrorist attacks remain at large;
Whereas President Musharraf has accepted the assistance of
Scotland Yard in his government's investigation of the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but has rejected calls for
an independent investigation under the auspices of the United
Nations;
Whereas President Musharraf has used the turmoil following
the assassination of Benazir Bhutto to delay elections from
their scheduled date of January 8, 2008, to February 18,
2008;
Whereas Benazir Bhutto's political party and the other
major opposition parties had opposed this delay, and have
expressed concern that it was motivated by an intention to
shape the outcome of the election through poll-rigging or
other improper means;
Whereas the current political crisis in Pakistan has a
grave impact on the national security of the United States,
in that it seriously undermines the ability of the Government
of Pakistan to devote adequate resources and attention to the
fight against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist
forces;
Whereas the political crisis in Pakistan cannot be resolved
without a speedy return to the democratic path, including
free and fair elections and restoration of an independent
judiciary in accordance with the express wishes of the vast
majority of the people of Pakistan;
Whereas the United States has provided Pakistan with
approximately $10,000,000,000 in assistance over the past 6
years; and
Whereas, on December 26, 2007, President Bush signed H.R.
2764, an omnibus spending bill which limited United States
military aid to Pakistan to counterterrorism and law
enforcement activities directed against al Qaeda and the
Taliban, and which withheld $50,000,000 in military aid until
such time as the Secretary of State reports that Pakistan has
restored democratic rights and an independent judiciary, and
is making concerted efforts to fight al Qaeda and the
Taliban: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate--
(1) conveys the deep condolences of the people of the
United States to the people of Pakistan on the tragic loss of
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and conveys special
condolences to the families of Benazir Bhutto and the other
victims of this terrorist attack;
(2) condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the murder
of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, and the slaughter of
at least 165 other Pakistani citizens in this attack and the
prior attempt on Benazir Bhutto's life in Karachi on October
18, 2007;
(3) calls upon the Government of Pakistan to do everything
in its power to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to
justice, and to permit investigators to follow their
inquiries in whatever direction they may lead;
(4) calls upon the Government of Pakistan to support and
facilitate an independent inquiry into the assassination of
Benazir Bhutto;
(5) strongly urges the Government of Pakistan to ensure
that free and fair elections are held on February 18, 2008,
as scheduled, and that independent election monitors are
allowed to monitor the elections;
(6) calls upon the Election Commission of Pakistan to
remove all of the restrictions it
[[Page S795]]
recently placed on election observation activities, which
included efforts to restrict observer movement and the
conduct of exit polling on Election Day;
(7) urges President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to replace
the partisan caretaker governments at the federal,
provincial, and district levels with neutral administrations
acceptable to all major political parties, and to
reconstitute the Election Commission as a genuinely
nonpartisan body;
(8) calls upon the Government of Pakistan to provide
adequate security, including the provision of adequately
armored vehicles and properly functioning jamming equipment
to help prevent the detonation of explosive devices, to all
senior opposition political leaders;
(9) calls upon the Government of Pakistan to release those
individuals still being detained without charges and to end
the ongoing harassment of judges, opposition party activists,
and lawyers;
(10) calls for the restoration of Pakistan's independent
judiciary and an end to all restrictions on the media and
freedom of speech;
(11) calls upon the President to review all existing United
States aid to Pakistan, to ensure that all assistance
furthers the common goals shared by the people of Pakistan
and the United States, with specific reference to combating
violent radicalism and promoting a free and democratic
Pakistan; and
(12) if the President's review concludes that the
conditions described in paragraph (11) are not met, calls
upon the President to suspend (until such time as such
conditions can be met) the transfer to Pakistan of weapons
systems primarily designed and manufactured for combat
against a rival state rather than counterterrorism or
counterinsurgency.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it has been a month--almost to the day--
that former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated.
She was murdered barely a mile from the site where her own father,
also a prime minister, had been executed by a military strongman nearly
two decades earlier.
She was killed by a terrorist attack in the very same park where,
over half a century ago, Pakistan's very first prime minister was
gunned down under circumstances that to this day remain clouded in
mystery.
The death of Ms. Bhutto was not the first time a Pakistani leader met
a violent end. But never has the loss been greater--for Pakistan, and
for friends of democracy the world over.
Never has the danger posed by such a loss been more serious--for
Pakistan, and for the U.S. as well.
For many Members of this body, the loss of Ms. Bhutto comes as a
personal shock. Some of us knew Benazir during her tenure in office,
others had met her during her years of exile.
Anyone who encountered the prime minister can understand the sadness
experienced by Pakistanis of all political outlooks.
The murder of Ms. Bhutto was a human tragedy, but one with
potentially dire political and national security repercussions. In the
wake of this shocking act of terrorism, Pakistani democracy remains
seriously threatened.
This is not merely a matter of concern to Pakistan, but to the U.S.
as well. Until the political crisis in Pakistan is resolved, no
government in Islamabad will have the focus, the will, or the military
and intelligence resources necessary to combat the threat of al-Qaeda
terrorism and Taliban insurgency effectively.
The resolution I offer expresses condolences on the murder of Ms.
Bhutto and condemns the cowardly terrorists who cut short the life of a
brave and brilliant woman.
It calls for a genuinely independent inquiry, to clear up the
mysteries surrounding this crime--an attack not only on one leader, but
on Pakistani democracy itself.
It calls upon the government of Pakistan to return to the democratic
path by insuring free and fair elections without further delays; by
releasing all political detainees; by revoking restrictions on the
press and free speech; and by restoring a genuinely independent
judiciary.
It also calls on the President of the review all U.S. aid to
Pakistan--as he promised to do immediately after Pakistan's current
leader suspended the constitution and declared a State of Emergency in
November.
The White House review found--to nobody's surprise--that no
significant change in policy was required. The resolution I offer calls
for a more targeted and more open-eyed approach.
It calls on the President to ensure that all assistance furthers the
common goals shared by the people of Pakistan and the U.S., with
specific reference to combating violent radicalism and promoting a free
and democratic Pakistan; and
It calls on the President, if he cannot make such a declaration, to
suspend the transfer of weapons systems primarily designed and
manufactured for combat against a rival state rather than
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency.
What does this mean?
In simple language, it calls upon President Bush to match his words
with deeds. For the good of the Pakistani people, and for the national
security interests of the United States.
The President has often said that a democratic Pakistan will be our
best partner in the battle against radical theocrats and bloodthirsty
terrorists.
I wholeheartedly agree--and urge the President to demonstrate that
his words are something more than empty rhetoric.
Specifically, I urge the President to let the Pakistani military
establishment know that the $10 billion we have provided in assistance
over the past 6 years--the vast bulk of it security assistance--is not
a blank check.
The American people and the Pakistani people, have a right to insist
that their money is being well spent.
At a time when Pakistani soldiers and paramilitary troop are sent to
fight the Taliban without bulletproof vests, without sufficient
ammunition, sometimes marching through the snow in sandals rather than
combat boots.
At such a time, does it make sense to spend $500 million on high-
tech, highcost, nuclear-capable fighter aircraft?
Does it make sense to spend hundreds of millions on P-3 naval
surveillance aircraft specifically designed to hunt submarines?
So far as I know, al-Qaeda has not yet developed a submarine navy.
The White House claims that weapons systems like these are indeed
counterterrorism tools, but such a claim is an insult to common sense.
Yes, it is possible to drop a bomb on a terrorist from a supersonic
jet--and our pilots sometimes do so.
Yes, it is possible to use P-3s to track fishing boats rather than
submarines--and our pilots may do that too. But let us get real here.
The primary use of these weapons has nothing to do with
counterterrorism--using them for this purpose is like swatting flies
with a sledgehammer.
Moreover, this resolution doesn't even mandate that such weapons
transfers be terminated. It merely urges that they be suspended:
temporarily put on hold, until the current political crisis has passed.
Why is this necessary? For starters, because the administration has
consistently failed to apply a common-sense approach to its Pakistan
policy--and shows no sign of starting to do so now. I'll give just one
example, but I could select from dozens.
A few days after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, just as
Pakistani President Musharraf was deliberating over whether or not to
postpone elections in which Bhutto's party was nearly certain to
prevail, the Pentagon awarded a contract for fighter jets worth $498
million.
Despite a direct Congressional inquiry several weeks earlier, no
member of the Foreign Relations Committee--or any other committee, so
far as I know--was alerted to this sale.
The administration claims this was merely a coincidence, that the
deal had been in the works for a long time, that no policy-maker had
any say in the timing of the announcement.
Perhaps that is true. If so, all the more reason for Congress to lay
down a marker.
I first suggested putting noncounterterrorism security aid on the
table on November 4--the morning after President Musharraf effectively
declared a coup d'etat against his own government.
I did so moments after speaking by phone with Benazir Bhutto, who had
just returned to Pakistan from 8 years in exile, and who had narrowly
escaped a bomb blast on her convoy that left 140 of her supporters
dead.
I urged President Musharraf to step back from the brink of disaster,
to revoke an order that could destroy his country's democracy.
[[Page S796]]
I urged President Bush to use U.S. military aid as a carefully
calibrated lever, in order to make sure our arms and our money helped
make Pakistan more free, and the U.S more safe.
Later that week, I unveiled a comprehensive plan for long-term
engagement with pakistan--or moving our strategy from a ``Musharraf
policy'' to a ``Pakistan policy.'' In broad strokes, the basic elements
of this plan are:
Triple non-security aid, to $1.5 billion annually. For at least a
decade. This aid would be unconditional: it is our pledge to the
Pakistani people.
Instead of funding military hardware, it would build schools,
clinics, and roads.
Condition security aid on performance. We should base our security
aid on clear results.
We are now spending well over $1 billion annually, and it is not
clear we are getting our money's worth.
We should be willing to spend more if we get better returns--and less
if we don't.
Help Pakistan enjoy a ``democracy dividend.'' The first year of
genuine democratic rule should bring an additional $1 billion, above
the $1.5 billion non-security aid baseline, with future non-security
aid calibrated, again, above the guaranteed baseline, to Pakistan's
institutionalization of democratic and good-governance norms.
We have got to help moderate, secular political leaders show the
Pakistani people that they can deliver the goods.
Engage the Pakistani people, not just their rulers. We need a broad-
based engagement, not just government to government.
This will involve everything from improved public diplomacy to
reviewing visa procedures and textile quotas to reversing this
administration's shameful torture policies and shutting the prison at
Gitmo.
Today is not the day to delve into the specifics of long-term
strategy; I will come to the floor at a later date and sketch out this
comprehensive plan in greater detail.
Today is a time for all of us to come together in support of a
resolution which, I would hope, expresses the sentiments of every
Member here.
All of us, surely, send our condolences on the death of Benazir
Bhutto, and condemn her bloodthirsty assassins.
All of us, surely, want to see her murderers--and those who arranged
her murder--brought to justice.
All of us, surely, want to see Pakistan set firmly back on the
democratic path.
All of us, surely, want to make certain that the billions of dollars
we send to Pakistan in aid genuinely serve the purposes for which it is
intended--that it bolsters a stable, moderate, democratic state, and
that it supports the battle against the violent terrorist groups who
have declared war on the U.S. and Pakistan alike.
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