[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 14 (Tuesday, January 29, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S433-S434]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FISA
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Georgia. I thought
maybe, if anybody is still listening, we would talk a little bit about
the intent of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I hope maybe
we can clarify some of the misunderstandings.
First, I believe that when the distinguished Senator from California,
a valued member of the committee, Mrs. Feinstein, spoke on the origins
of FISA, she correctly noted that it was created, at least in part, in
response to the disclosed abuses of domestic national security
surveillance. However, as the legislative history makes clear, FISA was
never intended to regulate the acquisition of the contents of
international or foreign communications where the contents are acquired
by intentionally targeting a particular known U.S. person who is in the
United States.
The legislative history states:
This bill does not afford protections to U.S. persons who
are abroad, nor does it regulate the acquisition of the
contents of international communications of U.S. persons who
are in the United States, where the contents are acquired
unintentionally. The Committee does not believe this bill is
the appropriate vehicle for addressing this area. The
standards and procedures for overseas surveillance may have
to be different than those provided in this bill for
electronic surveillance within the United States, or targeted
against U.S. persons who are in the United States.
In essence, then, FISA, as originally drafted, was a domestic foreign
intelligence surveillance act. Congress was concerned about targeting
persons inside the United States with interceptions conducted inside
the United States.
The FISA Act amendments legislation we are considering today is a
very different animal, and it could be better characterized as an
international foreign intelligence surveillance act. The bill is
concerned mainly with targeting persons outside the United States when
interception might occur inside the United States. What do I mean by
that? The legislation will regulate how the President may conduct
electronic surveillance of foreign terrorists operating in foreign
countries when their communications just happen to pass through the
United States on wire communications networks.
This strange interference with the intelligence community's and,
indeed, the President's authority to conduct foreign intelligence
activities appears to arise from an overabundant concern about the
``rights'' of persons in the United States whose communications are
incidentally collected when they talk to terrorists overseas.
It is odd that we are creating a new law in this area that departs
from the original construct of FISA because in the international
surveillance realm, there have been no significant abuses of the
intelligence community's ability to collect overseas foreign
intelligence.
Unfortunately, two factors have compelled us to make these changes to
FISA. First, we need to ensure that the critical intelligence gaps
identified by the DNI last year do not reappear.
The Protect America Act effectively closed those gaps last summer,
but there was bipartisan agreement that we could improve on its
provisions, especially in the area of carrier liability protection, and
that is what our committee did.
Second, this legislation is also required because we must address the
practical reality that electronic communications service providers are
now insisting on a formal process to compel cooperation in the foreign
arena in order to obtain prospective liability protection similar to
that enjoyed for domestic intelligence and criminal wiretaps. That is
why the carrier liability protection and prospective liability
protection provisions of this bill are so important.
Another area where we are departing from the original intent of FISA
is the targeting of U.S. persons abroad. FISA, as passed in 1978, left
the targeting of American citizens abroad to the President's Executive
order applicable to the intelligence community and the procedures
approved by the Attorney General. In this legislation for the first
time in history, we build into the FISA new laws that govern the
targeting of U.S. persons overseas who are agents, officers or
employees of foreign powers when a significant purpose of the
acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information.
These new procedures are sometimes referred to as 2.5 procedures
because they are based in part upon section 2.5 of Executive Order
12333, which has long governed the electronic surveillance of U.S.
persons overseas by requiring the approval of the Attorney General
based upon a finding of probable cause that the target is a foreign
power or agent of a foreign power.
These 2.5 changes were part of the overall bipartisan compromise and
now require prior court review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of all surveillance conducted by the U.S. Government targeting
U.S. persons overseas. Americans will still be on their own with
respect to being surveilled by foreign governments overseas, but at
least they can remain confident that if they are not working for a
foreign power as a spy or terrorist, their own Government will not be
listening to their conversations.
The last area that merits discussion on the issue of FISA's original
intent is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. We refer to it
as the FISC. According to section 103 of FISA, the FISC was established
as a special court with nationwide jurisdiction to ``hear applications
for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within
the United States.'' That is it.
As evidenced by the application and order requirements in FISA, each
application is for a ``specific target'' for the significant purpose of
obtaining foreign intelligence information.
The court was originally structured so its seven judges would provide
geographical diversity. The post-9/11 expansion of the FISC from 7 to
11 judges enhanced that diversity. Judges are nominated by the chief
judge of their circuit to promote ideological balance on the FISC.
It was clearly recognized that only one or two judges would be in
Washington, DC, on a rotating basis at any given time. This was
intended to discourage judge shopping and make it unlikely that an
application for the extension of an order would be heard by the same
judge who granted the original order.
The FISC was never envisioned as a court that would or should handle
protracted litigation. It possesses neither the staff nor the
facilities to preside over such litigation. Moreover, it is very likely
that such prolonged litigation would interfere with the main business
of the FISC, which is to ensure the timely review and approval of
individual operational FISA applications for court orders.
We need to remember that the FISC was set up to review domestic
electronic surveillance and later physical searches, an area that has
numerous parallels to the similar reviews conducted by district court
judges when they are asked to authorize criminal wiretaps. As I
mentioned previously, even the FISC has acknowledged its lack of
expertise in the foreign-targeting context, which is, they say, better
left to the executive branch.
The Court's recent opinion in the case of In re: Motion for Release
of Court Records stated:
. . . even if a typical FISA judge had more expertise in
national security matters than a typical district court
judge, that expertise would still not equal that of the
Executive Branch, which is constitutionally entrusted with
protecting the national security.
We should be very hesitant to disregard the Court's own assessment of
its competency in the overseas intelligence realm, especially given the
original intent of FISA. I urge all my colleagues to be mindful of the
Court's own words as we consider some of the
[[Page S434]]
proposed amendments, particularly those that would allow the court to
assess compliance with minimization procedures used to target foreign
terrorists. For example, amendment Nos. 3920 and 3908, and would
require the court to determine the good faith of those providers who
allegedly assisted the Government with the Terrorist Surveillance
Program. As examples, amendment Nos. 3919 and 3858.
In conclusion, I offer these observations mainly to ensure the record
reflect the legislation departs from FISA's original intent in a
deliberate and carefully tailored manner. While there are some
practical considerations, including a desire for a strong bipartisan
bill, that have driven the need for this legislation, we should be
extremely careful about adding new or changing existing provisions in
the bill that could negatively impact the operational effectiveness of
our intelligence community or provide unwarranted protection to
overseas terrorists and spies.
Mr. President, I will not propound a unanimous consent request now,
but I advise my colleagues that if we cannot reach agreement, I will
ask unanimous consent that all amendments to the FISA bill be brought
up and decided at a 60-vote threshold so we can move forward on this
important legislation. I am not making that request now. I alert my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I hope that will not be
necessary, but we have not had a response to our proposal on how we
move forward. We have been at this a week now, and we only have, at
best, two full working weeks before we go on recess. We must get this
bill done, sent to the House, conferenced, and passed before we leave
for the President's Day recess. Failure to do so could leave our
intelligence community without the tools they need and, thus, America
without the protection it needs.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Menendez). The Senator from Colorado.
____________________