[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 190 (Wednesday, December 12, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H15354-H15368]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[[Page H15354]]
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2007
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution
862, I call up the bill (H.R. 4299) to extend the Terrorism Insurance
Program of the Department of the Treasury, and for other purposes, and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 4299
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Terrorism
Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definition of act of terrorism.
Sec. 3. Reauthorization of the program.
Sec. 4. Annual liability cap.
Sec. 5. Enhanced reports to Congress.
Sec. 6. Coverage of group life insurance.
Sec. 7. Large event reset.
Sec. 8. Availability of life insurance without regard to lawful foreign
travel.
Sec. 9. Program trigger.
Sec. 10. Applicability.
SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF ACT OF TERRORISM.
Section 102(1)(A)(iv) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended by striking ``acting
on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest''.
SEC. 3. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE PROGRAM.
(a) Termination Date.--Section 108(a) of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended by
striking ``2007'' and inserting ``2014''.
(b) Additional Program Years.--Section 102(11) of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(G) Additional program years.--Except when used as
provided in subparagraphs (B) through (F), the term `Program
Year' means, as the context requires, any of Program Year 1,
Program Year 2, Program Year 3, Program Year 4, Program Year
5, or any of calendar years 2008 through 2014.''.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--The Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) in section 102(7)(F)--
(A) by inserting ``and each Program Year thereafter''
before ``, the value''; and
(B) by striking ``preceding Program Year 5'' and inserting
``preceding that Program Year'';
(2) in section 103(e)(1)(A), by inserting ``and each
Program Year thereafter'' after ``Year 5'';
(3) in section 103(e)(1)(B)(ii), by inserting before the
period at the end ``and any Program Year thereafter'';
(4) in section 103(e)(2)(A), by striking ``of Program Years
2 through 5'' and inserting ``Program Year thereafter'';
(5) in section 103(e)(3), by striking ``of Program Years 2
through 5,'' and inserting ``other Program Year''; and
(6) in section 103(e)(6)(E), by inserting ``and any Program
Year thereafter'' after ``Year 5''.
SEC. 4. ANNUAL LIABILITY CAP.
(a) In General.--Section 103(e)(2) of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by striking ``(until such time as the Congress may act
otherwise with respect to such losses)''; and
(B) in clause (ii), by striking ``that amount'' and
inserting ``the amount of such losses''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting before the period at
the end ``, except that, notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any
other provision of Federal or State law, no insurer may be
required to make any payment for insured losses in excess of
its deductible under section 102(7) combined with its share
of insured losses under paragraph (1)(A) of this
subsection''.
(b) Notice to Congress.--Section 103(e)(3) of the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) by adding at the end the following: ``The Secretary
shall provide an initial notice to Congress not later than 15
days after the date of an act of terrorism, stating whether
the Secretary estimates that aggregate insured losses will
exceed $100,000,000,000.''; and
(2) by striking ``and the Congress shall'' and all that
follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting a
period.
(c) Regulations for Pro Rata Payments; Report to
Congress.--Section 103(e)(2)(B) of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``For purposes'' and inserting the
following:
``(i) In General.--For purposes''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) Regulations.--Not later than 240 days after the date
of enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Secretary shall issue final
regulations for determining the pro rata share of insured
losses under the Program when insured losses exceed
$100,000,000,000, in accordance with clause (i).
``(iii) Report to congress.--Not later than 120 days after
the date of enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Secretary shall provide a
report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services
of the House of Representatives describing the process to be
used by the Secretary for determining the allocation of pro
rata payments for insured losses under the Program when such
losses exceed $100,000,000,000.''.
(d) Disclosure.--Section 103(b) of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs
(4) and (5), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) in the case of any policy that is issued after the
date of enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2007, the insurer provides clear and
conspicuous disclosure to the policyholder of the existence
of the $100,000,000,000 cap under subsection (e)(2), at the
time of offer, purchase, and renewal of the policy;''.
(e) Surcharges.--Section 103(e) of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (7)--
(A) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``133 percent of''
before ``any mandatory recoupment''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(E) Timing of mandatory recoupment.--
``(i) In general.--If the Secretary is required to collect
terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums under subparagraph
(C)--
``(I) for any act of terrorism that occurs on or before
December 31, 2010, the Secretary shall collect all required
premiums by September 30, 2012;
``(II) for any act of terrorism that occurs between January
1 and December 31, 2011, the Secretary shall collect 35
percent of any required premiums by September 30, 2012, and
the remainder by September 30, 2017; and
``(III) for any act of terrorism that occurs on or after
January 1, 2012, the Secretary shall collect all required
premiums by September 30, 2017.
``(ii) Regulations required.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this subparagraph, the Secretary
shall issue regulations describing the procedures to be used
for collecting the required premiums in the time periods
referred to in clause (i).
``(F) Notice of estimated losses.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of an act of terrorism, the Secretary shall
publish an estimate of aggregate insured losses, which shall
be used as the basis for determining whether mandatory
recoupment will be required under this paragraph. Such
estimate shall be updated as appropriate, and at least
annually.''; and
(2) in paragraph (8)--
(A) in subparagraph (C)--
(i) by striking ``(including any additional amount included
in such premium'' and inserting ``collected''; and
(ii) by striking ``(D))'' and inserting ``(D)''; and
(B) in subparagraph (D)(ii), by inserting before the period
at the end ``, in accordance with the timing requirements of
paragraph (7)(E)''.
SEC. 5. ENHANCED REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) Study and Report on Insurance for Nuclear, Biological,
Chemical, and Radiological Terrorist Events.--Section 108 of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701
note) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(f) Insurance for Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and
Radiological Terrorist Events.--
``(1) Study.--The Comptroller General of the United States
shall examine--
``(A) the availability and affordability of insurance
coverage for losses caused by terrorist attacks involving
nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological materials;
``(B) the outlook for such coverage in the future; and
``(C) the capacity of private insurers and State workers
compensation funds to manage risk associated with nuclear,
biological, chemical, and radiological terrorist events.
``(2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Comptroller General shall
submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services
of the House of Representatives a report containing a
detailed statement of the findings under paragraph (1), and
recommendations for any legislative, regulatory,
administrative, or other actions at the Federal, State, or
local levels that the Comptroller General considers
appropriate to expand the availability and affordability of
insurance for nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
terrorist events.''.
(b) Study and Report on Availability and Affordability of
Terrorism Insurance in Specific Markets.--Section 108 of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) Availability and Affordability of Terrorism Insurance
in Specific Markets.--
``(1) Study.--The Comptroller General of the United States
shall conduct a study to determine whether there are specific
markets in the United States where there are unique capacity
constraints on the amount of terrorism risk insurance
available.
``(2) Elements of study.--The study required by paragraph
(1) shall contain--
[[Page H15355]]
``(A) an analysis of both insurance and reinsurance
capacity in specific markets, including pricing and coverage
limits in existing policies;
``(B) an assessment of the factors contributing to any
capacity constraints that are identified; and
``(C) recommendations for addressing those capacity
constraints.
``(3) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2007, the Comptroller General shall
submit a report on the study required by paragraph (1) to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House
of Representatives.''.
(c) Ongoing Reports.--Section 108(e) of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by inserting ``ongoing'' before ``analysis''; and
(B) by striking ``, including'' and all that follows
through the end of the paragraph, and inserting a period; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by inserting ``and thereafter in 2010 and 2013,'' after
``2006,''; and
(B) by striking ``subsection (a)'' and inserting
``paragraph (1)''.
SEC. 6. COVERAGE OF GROUP LIFE INSURANCE.
(a) Findings and Purpose.--Section 101 of the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (8); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new
paragraphs:
``(6) group life insurance companies are important
financial institutions whose products make life insurance
coverage affordable for millions of Americans and often serve
as their only life insurance benefit;
``(7) the group life insurance industry, in the event of a
severe act of terrorism, is vulnerable to insolvency because
high concentrations of covered employees work in the same
locations, because primary group life insurers do not exclude
terrorism risks while most catastrophic reinsurance does
exclude such risks, and because a large-scale loss of life
would fall outside of actuarial expectations of death; and'';
and
(2) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting ``and group life
insurance'' after ``property and casualty insurance''.
(b) Definitions.--Section 102 of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note), as amended by
the preceding provisions of this Act, is further amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(B)(ii), by inserting ``and group life
insurance'' before ``losses'';
(2) in paragraph (5), in the matter preceding subparagraph
(A)--
(A) by inserting ``, or group life insurance to the extent
of the amount at risk,'' after ``property and casualty
insurance'';
(B) by inserting a comma after ``insurer''; and
(C) by adding after and below subparagraph (B) the
following:
``Such term shall not include any losses of an insurer
resulting from coverage of any single certificate holder
under any group life insurance coverages of the insurer to
the extent such losses are not compensated under the Program
by reason of section 103(e)(1)(D).'';
(3) in paragraph (6)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by inserting ``, or group life
insurance,'' after ``excess insurance''; and
(B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``or, in the case of
group life insurance, that receives direct premiums,'' after
``insurance coverage,'';
(4) in paragraph (7)--
(A) in subparagraph (F)--
(i) by striking the first comma and inserting ``(i) with
respect to property and casualty insurance,''; and
(ii) by inserting before the semicolon the following:
``(ii) with respect to group life insurance, the value of an
insurer's amount at risk for a covered line of insurance over
the calendar year immediately preceding such Program Year,
multiplied by 0.0351 percent'';
(B) in subparagraph (G)--
(i) by inserting ``with respect to property and casualty
insurance, and such portion of the amounts at risk with
respect to group life insurance,'' after ``such portion of
the direct earned premiums''; and
(ii) by inserting ``and amounts at risk'' after ``such
direct earned premiums'';
(5) by redesignating paragraph (16) as paragraph (18); and
(6) by inserting after paragraph (15) the following new
paragraphs:
``(16) Group life insurance.--The term `group life
insurance' means an insurance contract that provides life
insurance coverage, including term life insurance coverage,
universal life insurance coverage, variable universal life
insurance coverage, and accidental death coverage, or a
combination thereof, for a number of individuals under a
single contract, on the basis of a group selection of risks,
but does not include `Corporate Owned Life Insurance' or
`Business Owned Life Insurance,' each as defined under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any similar product, or
group life reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance.
``(17) Amount at risk.--The term `amount at risk' means
face amount less statutory policy reserves for group life
insurance issued by any insurer for insurance against losses
occurring at the locations described in subparagraph (A) of
paragraph (5).''.
(c) Mandatory Availability.--Section 103(c) of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is
amended by striking ``During each Program Year'' and all that
follows through ``property and casualty insurance'' in
paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
``(1) Availability of coverage for insured losses.--During
each Program Year, each entity that meets the definition of
an insurer under section 102 shall make available, in all of
its insurance policies for property and casualty insurance
and in all of its insurance policies for group life
insurance,''.
(d) Federal Share of Compensation.--Section 103(e)(1) of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701
note) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
``(D) Limitation on compensation for group life
insurance.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
the Federal share of compensation under the Program paid by
the Secretary for insured losses of an insurer resulting from
coverage of any single certificate holder under any group
life insurance coverages of the insurer may not during any
Program Year exceed $1,000,000.''.
(e) Separate Retention Pool.--Section 103(e)(6)(E) of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is
amended by striking clauses (i) and (ii) and inserting the
following new clauses:
``(i) for property and casualty insurance, the lesser of--
``(I) $27,500,000,000; and
``(II) the aggregate amount, for all such insurance, of
insured losses during such Program Year; and
``(ii) for group life insurance, the lesser of--
``(I) $5,000,000,000; and
``(II) the aggregate amount, for all such insurance, of
insured losses during such Program Year.''.
(f) Separate Recoupment.--Section 103(e)(7) of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note),
as amended by the preceding provisions of this Act, is
further amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ``applicable'' before
``insurance''; and
(B) in clause (ii), by striking ``all insurers'' and
inserting ``all applicable insurers (pursuant to subparagraph
(G))'';
(2) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) in the heading, by inserting ``applicable'' before
``insurance''; and
(B) by inserting ``applicable'' before ``insurance''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(G) Separate recoupment.--``The Secretary shall provide
that--
``(i) any recoupment under this paragraph of amounts paid
for Federal financial assistance for insured losses for
property and casualty insurance shall be applied to property
and casualty insurance policies; and
``(ii) any recoupment under this paragraph of amounts paid
for Federal financial assistance for insured losses for group
life insurance shall be applied to group life insurance
policies.''.
(g) Policy Surcharge for Terrorism Loss Risk-Spreading
Premiums.--Section 103(e)(8) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``Any''
and inserting ``Subject to paragraph (7)(G), any'';
(B) in clause (i), by inserting ``and group life insurance
policies'' after ``policies''; and
(C) by striking clause (iii) and inserting the following
new clause:
``(iii) be based on--
``(I) a percentage of the premium amount charged for
property and casualty insurance coverage under the policy;
and
``(II) a percentage of the amount at risk for group life
insurance coverage under the policy.''; and
(2) in subparagraph (C)--
(A) by inserting ``with respect to property and casualty
insurance,'' after ``annual basis,''; and
(B) by inserting before the period at the end the
following: ``and, with respect to group life insurance, the
amount equal to 0.0053 percent of the amount at risk for
covered lines under the policy''.
SEC. 7. LARGE EVENT RESET.
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701
note) is amended--
(1) in section 102(7)--
(A) in subparagraph (F), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in subparagraph (G), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(H) notwithstanding subparagraph (F)(i), if aggregate
industry insured losses resulting from a certified act of
terrorism exceed $1,000,000,000, for any insurer that
sustains insured losses resulting from such act of terrorism,
the value of such insurer's direct earned premiums over the
calendar year immediately preceding the Program Year,
multiplied by a percentage, which--
``(i) for the Program Year consisting of calendar year 2008
shall be 5 percent; and
``(ii) for each Program Year thereafter, shall be 50 basis
points greater than the percentage applicable to the
preceding Program
[[Page H15356]]
Year, except that if an act of terrorism occurs during any
such Program Year that results in aggregate industry insured
losses exceeding $1,000,000,000, the percentage for the
succeeding Program Year shall be 5 percent and the increase
under this clause shall apply to Program Years thereafter;
except that for purposes of determining under this
subparagraph whether aggregate industry insured losses exceed
$1,000,000,000, the Secretary may combine insured losses
resulting from two or more certified acts of terrorism
occurring during such Program Year in the same geographic
area (with such area determined by the Secretary), in which
case such insurer shall be permitted to combine insured
losses resulting from such acts of terrorism for purposes of
satisfying its insurer deductible under this subparagraph;
and except that the insurer deductible under this
subparagraph shall apply only with respect to compensation of
insured losses resulting from such certified act, or combined
certified acts, and that for purposes of compensation of any
other insured losses occurring in the same Program Year, the
insurer deductible determined under subparagraph (F)(i) shall
apply.''; and
(2) in section 103(e)(1)(B)--
(A) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(B) by adding after and below clause (ii) the following:
``except that if a certified act of terrorism occurs for
which resulting aggregate industry insured losses exceed
$1,000,000,000, the applicable amount for any subsequent
certified act of terrorism shall be the amount specified in
section 102(1)(B)(ii).''.
SEC. 8. AVAILABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE WITHOUT REGARD TO
LAWFUL FOREIGN TRAVEL.
Section 103(c) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(15 U.S.C. 6701 note), as amended by the preceding provisions
of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
``(2) Availability of life insurance without regard to
lawful foreign travel.--During each Program Year, each entity
that meets the definition of an insurer under section 102 and
any other entity that issues insurance contracts that provide
life insurance coverage shall make available, in all of its
life insurance policies issued after the date of the
enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2007 under which the insured person is
a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence in the United States, coverage that
neither considers past, nor precludes future, lawful foreign
travel by the person insured, and shall not decline such
coverage based on past or future, lawful foreign travel by
the person insured or charge a premium for such coverage that
is excessive and not based on a good faith actuarial
analysis, except that an insurer may decline or, upon
inception or renewal of a policy, limit the amount of
coverage provided under any life insurance policy based on
plans to engage in future lawful foreign travel to occur
within 12 months of such inception or renewal of the policy
but only if, at time of application--
``(A) such declination is based on, or such limitation
applies only with respect to, travel to a foreign
destination--
``(i) for which the Director of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention of the Department of Health and Human
Services has issued a highest level alert or warning,
including a recommendation against non-essential travel, due
to a serious health-related condition;
``(ii) in which there is an ongoing military conflict
involving the armed forces of a sovereign nation other than
the foreign destination to which the insured person is
traveling; or
``(iii)(I) that the insurer has specifically designated in
the terms of the life insurance policy at the inception of
the policy or at renewal, as applicable; and
``(II) with respect to which the insurer has made a good-
faith determination that--
``(aa) a serious fraudulent situation exists which is
ongoing; and
``(bb) the credibility of information by which the insurer
can verify the death of the insured person is substantially
compromised; and
``(B) in the case of any limitation of coverage, such
limitation is specifically stated in the terms of the life
insurance policy at the inception of the policy or at
renewal, as applicable.''.
SEC. 9. PROGRAM TRIGGER.
Section 103(e)(1)(B)(ii) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended by striking
``$100,000,000'' and inserting ``$50,000,000''.
SEC. 10. APPLICABILITY.
The amendments made by this Act shall apply beginning on
January 1, 2008. The provisions of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002, as in effect on the day before the
date of the enactment of this Act, shall apply through the
end of December 31, 2007.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Israel). Pursuant to House Resolution
862, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) and the gentleman
from Alabama (Mr. Bachus) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
General Leave
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their
remarks and insert extraneous material on the pending legislation.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, the House passed a version of the terrorism risk
insurance program by a large vote, 300-something to 100-something,
earlier this year. It happened after a very open process at the
subcommittee and committee level. We had a very good set of meetings.
There were concerns raised. I think there was general agreement that
terrorism insurance had to go forward, but there were some very
legitimate debates about how to do it. Not all of them, obviously, have
been resolved.
{time} 1500
We had, unusual for our committee and I think maybe for other
committees, a full markup in subcommittee followed by a full markup in
committee. The bill that emerged was much closer to a consensus
product, although obviously not unanimous. There were amendments
offered by both sides. There were bipartisan compromises worked out. We
came to the floor. It wasn't as open a process as I would have hoped,
but it still represented, we thought, a fairly good piece of
legislation, and, of course, it got well over 70 percent of the House
Members voting for it. Then it went to the Senate and nothing happened
for a very long time, and I regret that. We had hoped that we could
continue this process and in fact have a conference. The Senate did not
act.
Finally, the Senate acted and sent us a bill which was an extension
of the current program, better in my view than the current program, not
as comprehensive as the bill we passed. And we were told by the Senate,
as we have been from time to time this year: This is all we can do.
Take it or leave it. That seemed to me to be a problem and, now, not so
much for substance as for institutional concerns. Members have asked,
well, in the end we may just have to accept what the Senate sent us.
That is possible, and we have preserved the option to do that.
Let me be very clear, Mr. Speaker. We are here dealing with a new
bill that we introduced. The Senate bill still sits at the desk. It
will be available if the Senate continues to refuse to act in any kind
of a bicameral manner. But I am not ready to give up yet, Mr. Speaker,
on some important issues, the most important of which is the
institutional one. It is simply not in the spirit of the United States
Constitution for one of the Houses to say, this is it, take it or leave
it, especially when you contrast the way in which the two Houses acted.
We had subcommittee and committee markup and debate on the floor. The
Senate had one of their not very open processes. The bill emerged from
some quiet conversations among the senior members of both parties and
went to the floor, no amendments, no votes, here it is. As I said, I
regret that. We may not be able to prevent it from happening in this
instance. I do think it is important for us to send the message that we
do not want to see this sort of procedure repeated.
So what we did was to in effect have a virtual conference. We looked
at the Senate bill, we looked at our bill, and we came up with what I
think might well have resulted had there been a conference. The bill we
passed had a 15-year extension. The reason for a long extension is that
we are talking here about building projects. We are talking about the
need for terrorism risk insurance if we are to get large commercial
buildings, or residential, but especially commercial buildings built in
our big cities. You can't get those buildings obviously without bank
loans and you can't get the bank loans without insurance. That is why
the Chamber of Commerce scores this as an important bill, why the real
estate industry, the cities, a whole range of business and urban
interests tell us this is important. And you need to have some
assurance of a timeframe in which to build. We thought 15 years. The
Senate said 7 years. We didn't here come with a split-the-difference.
We have accepted
[[Page H15357]]
the Senate's 7 years. We were told at the last minute that there was a
PAYGO problem in a calculation by the Congressional Budget Office that
I still do not understand, but we have no option but to abide by it. We
came up with a PAYGO solution which was not a very good one. The Senate
came up with, and I give them credit here, a much better PAYGO
solution. They had more time to work on it, but they did it well. We
have accepted the Senate PAYGO solution. So we accept that term of
years, we accept that PAYGO solution.
We had also broadened this from simply being in case a building was
destroyed to include group life insurance and protection against what
sadly we cannot rule out, nuclear, biological, chemical, or
radiological attacks. The Senate rejected both of those. We split the
difference. We accepted their rejection of nuclear, biological,
chemical and radiological attacks. We did feel that group life
insurance should be in. I should say that including the group life
provision is something that was called to our attention on a bipartisan
basis from Members from Florida which says that you should not have
your life insurance cancelled if you go to Israel. That is basically
what we are talking about, or maybe some other areas where the
insurance companies think there is a problem when there isn't one. And
we checked, and the number of payoffs they have had to make of people
who died going to Israel or other countries on their list is
negligible, zero, from what we could tell. So we included a provision
in our bill that was overwhelmingly supported by both sides, to say
that there were rules; not that you couldn't deny someone life
insurance if they were going to a hazardous area, but that you had to
have a rational process by which you defined that.
We put group life back in. Members will remember that after the 2001
mass murders of so many innocent Americans by vicious thugs, we adopted
a very expensive program to compensate people. A better way to do that
would be to have this group life insurance as part of the terrorism
risk insurance.
And at the request of smaller insurance companies, we lowered the
trigger from $100 million to $50 million per incident, because small
insurance companies said to us: We would like to be able to insure some
of these buildings. Our colleagues from some of the smaller States
brought this to our attention. But if it is $100 million that you have
to absorb before this kicks in, we can't do it; we can do it at $50
million.
So we accept the Senate version on 7 years versus our 15. We accept
their version of PAYGO. We accept their rejection of nuclear,
biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. We do ask that group
life insurance be kept in with the travel provision I mentioned, and
that the trigger go from $100 million to $50 million.
Finally, there is the reset provision, which says that if you have
once been attacked and you have to deal with it, should that same area
be attacked again, the clock starts again. That is, you would not be in
a position where, having been attacked once by these vicious murderers,
you would be unable to get full insurance if they did it a second time.
Those are the differences. As I said, we have no guarantee that the
Senate will do this or pay even serious attention. We have retained a
vehicle in case they don't. But I don't want, and I said this earlier,
we are not debating preemptive strikes here. We are debating preemptive
surrender. I don't want to have a situation where the United States
Senate passes legislation, sends it to us and says, You may not even
think about changing things.
We are prepared to compromise. But I think inclusion of group life
and that travel protection is important. We think that the smaller
insurance companies had a legitimate concern. We think the reset
provision is legitimate.
We are asking the Senate again to consider them. We can't compel
that. But I think it would be a mistake for us to set the precedent
that, when they confront us with these ultimata, that we simply cave
in.
Let me repeat, because I got it right now. I was quoting before the
lyric from ``MacArthur Park.'' What the Senate tells us is, Look, we
were able to do this, but we can't do it again. You just have to accept
it as it is. And the theme song apparently is, if people will remember;
I will say it because I sing something awful.
``Someone left the cake out in the rain.
I don't think that I can take it
'Cause it took so long to bake it
And I'll never have the recipe again.''
If someone in the Senate tells us, we left the bill out in the rain,
or at least they are telling us that if we were to try to get them to
change it, it would be leaving the bill out in the rain, and they
couldn't remake it because they don't have the recipe.
Mr. Speaker, I think it's time to send the Senate back to their
recipe books and ask them to keep track. I understand in the end we may
not be able to change things, but I do not want this House simply at
this point to say, Okay, you gave us an ultimatum, we accept it.
I would hope, and we are going to be here obviously next week, that
the small life insurance companies, people interested in the ability to
travel to Israel and others would then at least go to Senators and say,
Can't we at least even have a vote on this? Can't you even consider
this?
And that is why I ask that today we send this bill back over. We
retain a vehicle if the Senate remains impervious, but I think it's
worth a try.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Members of the body, first let me address the practicalities of where
we are. I am going to talk about the policies in a few minutes after
others have had an opportunity to speak, but let's just talk about
where we are.
The chairman has talked about the Senate this, the House this. But
the truth is that the present legislation expires December 31. That is
in 19 days. Businesses across the country are trying to arrange their
insurance coverages for next year, and they have no certainty as to
whether or how much there will be a Federal safety net in place.
Nineteen days.
Even if Congress were to act today, there is hardly time enough for
insurance companies to develop new policy forms, to obtain approval
from 50 State regulators, to get them in the marketplace for review by
the brokers, and to finish negotiating coverage with their
policyholders. There is just not time.
Now, it can be the Senate problem. The House passed a bill earlier
this year. That is all true, but that doesn't change the facts.
Nineteen days. Nineteen days. Each additional day that we fail to get a
bill on the President's desk means less ability in the marketplace to
adjust and to respond to the new mandates in this program, or the
Senate program, particularly the mandates on domestic terrorism.
Policies are going to have to be rewritten. And both the House and the
Senate bill does that, so it doesn't really matter which bill
ultimately passes.
Mr. Speaker, I share Chairman Frank's frustration with the Senate. He
described this ping pong, back and forth. A House-Senate conference
would have been nice to work out our differences, although in a minute
I will say why I personally believe the Senate bill is more in keeping
with our original intention. The chairman of the full committee and I
were two of the authors of the original legislation. And it says in
that legislation it was intended as a very temporary Federal backstop
until the private market could fill in, and I will talk about that and
why I support the Senate bill later.
But as a practical matter, whether I supported the Senate or the
House bill, there is only one bill that is going to pass. I think the
chairman knows that, I know that, Members of this body know that.
That's the Senate bill.
The administration has indicated they are going to veto anything but
the Senate bill. If we pass this bill, they will veto it. The Senate
has agreed unanimously to their bill. They came together unanimously. I
regret we weren't able to do that. But it was, at that time, a 15-year
permanent bill. So we didn't come together. But we have got to put this
behind us and adopt legislation that has a realistic possibility of
becoming law, and to do it right now. We need to do that on the
alternate minimum tax. It is staring us in the face.
I don't think the American people, the taxpayers, I don't think the
accounting industry care whether or not the Senate did this to the
House or the
[[Page H15358]]
House did this to the Senate. On terrorist insurance, I don't think the
insurance companies, the developers, the policyholders, I am not sure
they care about all the internal fights between this body and that
body. They are caught in the middle, and you do have a bill available.
It's a Senate bill that will go to the President to be signed and take
away this uncertainty.
The Senate has made it clear that they are not going to pass the
legislation that the chairman is offering. It is not me; that is the
Senate. The White House has issued a Statement of Administrative Policy
indicating that if presented with the bill we are going to vote on
today, the President will veto it. That's with less. The Senate is not
going to take it up, so it won't ever get to the President. So that is
just theoretical because the Senate said they are not going to pass it.
And we have got 3 weeks left before the program expires.
Now, some of our Members think that the private market, that the TRIA
5 years after 9/11, a 3-year bill and a 2-year extension, that TRIA has
served its purpose. And in a few minutes I am going to talk about the
Treasury and that they believe that it has fulfilled its purpose and
from now on it just retards the private market.
But we can vote this bill down, we can bring up the Senate bill, and
we can put a bipartisan TRIA extension on the President's desk. We can
do it this week. The time for further deliberation or argument has
passed. Time has run out on us.
With all due respect to the chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, I recommend we vote down this legislation, we bring up the
Senate legislation, we do it in a motion to recommit, we do it in a
unanimous consent, we do it in a suspension. We move it, we pass it
over to the Senate, and we end the uncertainty.
If it is such a vital program that many Members think it is, why
don't we need it in place? Why would we wait until a week or two or
even after it expires to reauthorize it?
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, first of all, there is no
chance of waiting until after it expires. I don't know why the
gentleman would have said that. He knows there is zero chance of that.
Now, I agree it has waited too long. But I would have been more
impressed with the urgency if I had had people joining us in trying to
get the Senate to act. We passed the bill months ago. We would have
liked to have seen an act. But I didn't hear all this passion trying to
force the Senate to act, and it was partly the minority in the Senate
that was blocking it, that is, block the ability to have a conference.
{time} 1515
Here is the point. I think telling the life insurance companies that
they should not be restricting people's ability to travel unfairly is
important. We think group life is important. We think that not allowing
your community to be disadvantaged if it has been attacked once is
important. And we may not be able to accomplish them this year, but we
think it is important not simply to cave in and say those aren't even
worth fighting for.
We are going to send a message, I hope, by voting for those
principles because we pass the bill this year, and we may have to
accept a minimal position, but we will be back here in a month or two
and we hope to renew some of these things.
So I just reject the notion that the Senate can achieve this by
waiting and waiting and waiting and then saying, Oh, well, there isn't
enough time. There is not enough time because they held it up. No one
can seriously argue that having seen this delay of many months, and
again I didn't hear all this passion trying to make the Senate act for
all of those months, nobody can argue that another day or two is going
to make a difference. And that's what we're talking about.
So I reiterate, there is no chance of this expiring. Everybody knows
that. We have preserved our ability at any point simply to accept this
bill. The question is do we give up now or do we send them the message
that the ability to travel to Israel, the concern for the small
insurance companies being able to insure commercial properties and the
concern for group life and not just property, that those are important
issues.
We can take that vote today and send that message. And if we have to,
we will accommodate reality. But we will have sent that message, and it
gives us a basis upon which to act next year.
I yield now 6 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman).
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, it has been almost a year since the
Committee on Financial Services began the process of reauthorizing the
terrorism risk insurance program. It has been 9 months since our
committee held a field hearing in New York at which we heard experts,
insurers, developers and reinsurers testify about the private market
for terrorism insurance which has not grown enough since 9/11 to
sufficiently meet the demand in many of our Nation's so-called high-
risk areas.
It has been over 4 months since we held a subcommittee and a full
committee markup and almost 3 months since the House overwhelmingly
approved H.R. 2761, a strong reauthorization that would have extended
TRIA for 15 years, provided group life insurance as well as nuclear,
chemical, biological and radiological coverage, and significantly
lowered the program's trigger level.
Most importantly of all, and after constructive negotiations and
compromise with the minority, the House bill included a reset mechanism
to address increased capacity shortages following major terrorist
attacks such as those that may occur anywhere in our country.
And yet despite a proactive bipartisan effort in the House
spearheaded by Chairman Frank and Ranking Member Bachus, we find
ourselves in the 11th hour with TRIA set to expire at the end of the
month, and we are faced with a weak Senate bill that was deliberately
sent to us only after we had recessed for Thanksgiving, effectively
stalling the negotiation process between the two Chambers.
The Senate bill, a 7-year reauthorization that only amends the TRIA
program by eliminating the distinction between foreign and domestic
acts of terrorism simply does not provide developers, insurers, and
reinsurers with enough of the stability they need in our free-market
economy to plan, finance, insure and build our Nation's major
development projects.
Mr. Speaker, for TRIA to be truly effective in addressing the
shortages in the terrorism insurance market, we must recognize that the
market is dynamic. The terrorism insurance market behaves much
differently in the wake of a terrorist attack than it does before an
attack. The reset contained in this compromise bill is identical to the
reset provision that was included in the House-passed TRIA extension in
September, on which I and Mr. Baker of the minority came to a mutually
acceptable agreement. Under those terms, which are in this compromise
bill, in the event of a terrorist attack with losses of a billion
dollars or greater, the deductibles for any insurance company that pays
out losses due to the event immediately lower to 5 percent while the
nationwide trigger for any insurer for future events drops to $5
million.
Mr. Baker and I also reached agreement on my proposal to enable the
Secretary of the Treasury to aggregate the total losses of two or more
attacks that occur in the same geographic area in the same year so if
the total insured losses of those events are over a billion dollars,
the reset mechanism would be triggered. The inclusion of this language
is absolutely vital to every high-risk area across the country, and
many of us consider this to be the most essential, must-be-included
aspect of the legislation.
My colleagues may recall that the TRIA extension passed by the House
in September was subject to PAYGO concerns because the CBO had assessed
its cost at roughly $10 billion over 10 years. With this CBO score,
some of our friends on the other side of the aisle argued that even
though no funds would have been appropriated unless the country was
attacked, our bill would have been too much of a burden on the American
taxpayer. Not knowing who else to bill for an attack on America, I
disagreed with that view and with the CBO scoring; but I, too, am
committed to a fiscally responsible bill.
[[Page H15359]]
I am pleased to say that my fiscally conservative friends on both
sides of the aisle can now vote for this bill without any hesitation
thanks to the inclusion of language from the Senate bill, and more
significantly, because the reset language, this compromise legislation
has been assessed to a positive CBO score of $200 million. Let me say
that again. This compromise bill that we are debating today will result
in a net gain of $200 million. Legislation that protects developers and
the insurance industry from terrorist attacks and provides taxpayers
with a return on their dime is something that I believe we should all
support.
Mr. Speaker, the next terrorist attack against the United States,
like the one on 9/11, is going to damage more than just buildings. We
must acknowledge that the structural losses associated with a terrorist
incident will be accompanied by the loss of human life. The legislation
before the House today recognizes this fact and includes group life
insurance coverage because this Congress is concerned not only with the
value of buildings but the people inside of them as well.
Our bill lowers the program trigger in the Senate bill from $100
million to $50 million. Our lower trigger would prevent smaller
insurance companies from being priced out of the terrorism insurance
market. And, with a greater supply of insurance, we can expect a higher
degree of stability for large-scale developers all over America.
Mr. Speaker, in the absence of a formal conference which most of us
in this body would have preferred, we have taken it upon ourselves to
consider this legislation in which we have compromised with the Senate
on many of their issues but hold firm on those provisions that we
believe must be included in TRIA: the reset mechanism, group life
coverage, and lower triggers.
I urge all of our colleagues to support this important compromise
legislation and, as the clock strikes 11:59, to place the burden of
responsibility back on the broad shoulders of the United States Senate.
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling).
Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I am reminded of a quote from late President Reagan, and perhaps I
can paraphrase: The closest thing to eternal life on Earth is a Federal
program.
Indeed, we have had speaker after speaker come before in this debate
to tell us how TRIA was going to be a temporary program. And I see the
able gentlelady from New York, the chairwoman of our Financial
Institutions Subcommittee. I wasn't here in this body when TRIA was
originally passed, but I took the time to review the record of the
debate. At that time she said, ``We are simply working to keep our
economy on track with a short-term program that addresses the new
terrorist threat.''
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, the chairman of our Capital Markets
Subcommittee said, ``We wisely design the TRIA Act as a temporary
backstop to get our Nation through a period of economic uncertainty
until the private sector can develop models.''
And if you look at the Record, Mr. Speaker, of those who proposed
TRIA in the first place, all said it would be a temporary program.
Perhaps temporary is in the eye of the beholder. What started out as a
3-year program has since become a 5-year program. The House attempted
to extend it 15 years. I think we are now looking at a 7-year
extension. I believe for all intents and purposes, we are looking at
giving birth de facto to a new Federal permanent insurance program to
go along with the scores of others, few of which are financially sound.
So again, what was meant to be temporary, and I hope had I been in
this body at that time I would have voted for it. I was here for the
vote on the first extension, and I supported that extension. I believe
there was, indeed, a great calamity in this marketplace. I believe that
people in the marketplace needed time to react, to plan, to model. But
again, is this something that is going to go on in perpetuity?
The question again is begged, and that is, Who can do a better job in
the reinsurance market, the Federal Government or private industry? I
have no doubt that private industry would love to have the subsidies
that are represented by TRIA. Any time the government is going to hand
out something free or at a subsidized rate versus the market rate, who
wouldn't accept it? Such a deal. I certainly understand that they might
be favoring this.
Now, I haven't heard in this debate, but in previous iterations of
the debate I have heard many come and talk about the great tragedy of
9/11, and I want to let it be known again, we are talking about
terrorism reinsurance. It does nothing to prevent terrorism in the
first place. We are talking about coming in after the fact and
providing this Federal backstop, which many of us don't believe is any
longer necessary, putting the taxpayer on the hook at a time when
markets could develop.
I would take the argument more serious if more people on the other
side of the aisle would vote to strengthen, for example, the FISA
legislation. Unfortunately, many of them are voting to make it even
more difficult for our Federal Government to listen in on the
conversations of known terrorists. Most of the Democrats, most of my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, Mr. Speaker, in May voted
against the Hoekstra amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act
which would have eliminated that section of the bill requiring the
Director of National Intelligence to use resources, and I paraphrase
him, to study bugs and bunnies instead of suspected terrorists. They
have supported expanding the legal rights of terrorist detainees,
holding up passage of the 9/11 Commission Recommendation Implementation
bill to give union bargaining advantages to TSA screeners, and the list
goes on and on.
So if we want to talk about terrorism, let's talk about what we can
do to prevent it in the first place as opposed to what we can do to
subsidize large insurance companies after the fact.
Another point I would like to make, and everybody is certainly
entitled to their own opinion, and I have looked very carefully at the
President's working group position on this, and they have observed what
I have observed, and that is the availability and affordability of
terrorism risk insurance has improved since the initial terrorist
attacks. And despite increases in risk retentions under TRIA, insurers
have allocated additional capacity to terrorism risk. Prices have
declined. Take-up rates have increased.
I simply don't buy into the argument, Mr. Speaker, that we have a
market failure here that somehow, some way the market can't create this
particular insurance product.
{time} 1530
I mean, how are we ever going to know, once again, if we're going to
hand out something free or at a subsidized rate, as opposed to people
having to buy it at the market rate?
And let me quote from the President's working group: ``The presence
of subsidized Federal reinsurance through TRIA appears to negatively
affect the emergence of private reinsurance capacity because it dilutes
demand for private sector reinsurance.''
Now, some have said, well, again, that terrorism is a very unique
risk. Well, of course it is. But our reinsurance industry has faced
these challenges in the past. At one point they had to figure out how
to model for the risk of loss of electronic data. At one time in our
history they had to figure out how to model for airline crashes.
Many say that we will never have major construction in the United
States unless we have a government, Federal reinsurance backstop for
acts of terrorism. I simply don't observe that in real life.
And how, Mr. Speaker, during the Cold War, when thousands of nuclear
weapons were poised, aimed at our Nation, how did construction take
place during that time in our history? Yet there are those who will
maintain that somehow it cannot take place today.
Again, I'm not saying that reinsurance is not an important aspect of
our market. It is. But I disagree with those on the other side of the
aisle who say that even after 5 years that the market is simply
incapable of creating a product that those who wish it can pay for at
an affordable rate.
Another point I would make is that even if this were a valuable
program to the Nation, what are we going to do to
[[Page H15360]]
pay for it, and what are the long-term implications?
Again, as I mentioned earlier, Uncle Sam does not have a particularly
stellar track record when it comes to running insurance programs.
Social Security, according to the latest report of the trustees of
the Social Security and Medicare trust funds, owes $6.8 trillion,
trillion with a T, more in benefits than it's receiving in taxes, and
has a long-term deficit of almost $9 trillion, not a particularly good
track record there.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is currently running a
deficit of $18.1 billion, with an additional off-balance sheet
liability of $73.3 billion.
The National Flood Insurance Program has a shortfall of $1.3 billion
a year over the long term and, according to the Congressional Budget
Office, its current financial situation is unsustainable.
Medicaid, $317 billion a year. The National Governors Association
says, ``The growth of a program that is unsustainable in its current
form.''
The Federal crop insurance program requires Federal subsidies. The
list goes on and on and on and on. As history is my guide, Mr. Speaker,
forgive me if I don't share the enthusiasm and optimism of those on the
other side of the aisle who say that somehow this is not going to prove
painful for future taxpaying generations. I believe it will be.
I believe the private market can handle this. I think they will
handle this if we give them the opportunity. I do not think the private
insurance companies need this huge subsidy.
And when, Mr. Speaker, are we finally going to do something about the
long-term financial implications of entitlement spending in these
insurance programs?
Now, something's got to give. The Comptroller General has said that
we're on the verge of being the first generation in America's history
to leave the next generation with a lower standard of living because of
out-of-control spending. Instead, we add burden on top of burden on top
of burden.
Because of all those reasons, Mr. Speaker, I oppose this legislation,
I oppose this report and would urge the House to oppose it as well.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney), a representative from the
city who is Chair of the Financial Institution Subcommittee and has
been very active on this issue.
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for his extraordinary
leadership and for yielding.
I would like to respond to some of the comments of my good friend on
the other side of the aisle and to remind my colleagues that New York,
and he mentioned it several times in his statement, was attacked not as
a city, and our State was not attacked as a State. This was a national
attack against our country, at our Pentagon, a symbol of our military
strength, and New York, one of the symbols of our economic strength.
And after that attack, this body was united and determined, and I thank
all of my colleagues for your aid and support.
But the most important act by this body to get New York moving again
and our other economic centers was voting for TRIA, the anti-terrorism
risk insurance plan.
My good friend stated that construction can go forward without it.
After 9/11 you could not even build a hot dog stand. Nothing moved
until we got the anti-terrorism risk insurance in place.
I am told by the businesses in New York and other large cities in our
country that they cannot get insurance now. They get insurance up to
the date that TRIA expires, and they are not given insurance unless
there is agreement or a condition that TRIA will continue.
He argued that TRIA was not homeland security. I will say very
strongly that part of our homeland security is our economic security,
and a very important part of our economic security is having a Federal
support system for terrorism risk insurance.
The TRIA bill was a top priority of the Financial Services Committee.
It was one of the first bills reported out, and I thank Chairman Frank
for his continued support for a long-term TRIA, including a reset
provision to increase the availability of terrorism insurance for areas
that have been targets of terror acts like my city of New York.
The reset language in this bill, though, treats equally everyone
across this country. We are including in this bill absolutely
everything that was in the Senate-passed bill. The only change is we
come from the 15 years down to the 7 years of the Senate. But the other
key provisions that were dropped, we are putting back in, such as the
lower trigger level so that more insurers can be part of this program.
This is very important. Group life insurance. Life insurance for
fairness for travelers, and the very important reset mechanism for the
anti-terrorism risk insurance.
We need this bill and we need it promptly to avoid interruptions in
coverage and the disruptions that that will cause in our economy.
I would say that TRIA has created jobs and helped America's economy
grow despite the continuing terrorist threat. I thank the chairman and
this body on both sides for supporting it.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak in support of this bill.
I would like to thank Chairman Frank for his continued strong support
for a long term renewal of TRIA including the reset provisions to
increase the availability of terrorism insurance for areas that have
been targets of terror attacks like my city of New York.
I appreciate the chairman's insistence on having the House debate and
vote on a bill that includes four key provisions from the original
House-passed bill.
Most important of these, in my view, is the reset provision. To
encourage companies to write insurance in an area that has been a
target of terrorism, after a significant terrorist attack, that is, an
attack causing over $1 billion in damages, the bill would lower both
the deductible and the trigger for terrorism insurance policies in the
targeted area, to rebuild market capacity and then gradually increase
private sector obligations over time.
This reset mechanism applies equally for everyone across the country.
For example, the lower deductible would apply to all the insurers that
were affected by the significant terrorist attack, regardless of where
the attack occurred.
Also, the bill lowers the ``trigger'' level--the size of an attack at
which the Federal Government would provide aid to insurers--back to the
$50 million in the original House bill. The TRIA extension enacted in
2005 set the limit at $50 million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007. The
Senate bill provides a trigger of $100 million. A lower trigger will
allow more insurers to participate in the program and thereby increase
the availability of terrorism insurance, and will also address a
serious concern of the small insurers who fear they will be driven out
of business by terrorist attacks that cause less than $100 million in
insured losses that would not trigger the protection provided by TRIA.
The bill includes the provision from the House bill putting group
life insurance in TRIA. TRIA should cover not only buildings but also
the people who work in them. Group life carriers face insolvency if a
terrorist event affects a large group of people. It is important to the
economic security of America's workers and their families that group
life carriers remain solvent and capable of paying claims after a
terrorist attack.
Finally, like the original House bill, the bill prohibits life
insurance companies from denying or reducing coverage to an individual
based on their foreign travel.
It is critical that these provisions be included in the bill we send
back to the Senate. We need to send a strong message that these
provision are important, and that this body will not be cowed by the
White House's foolish threat to veto this legislation.
I could not more strongly disagree with the White House when they
insist the program should be short term and temporary. That will
exacerbate market disarray and harm our economy--exactly what the
terrorists want.
The administration's continued opposition to this bill is another
example of the stubborn wrongheadedness for which this White House has
become renowned.
On a bipartisan basis, business leaders, law enforcement, and the
American people strongly support a long term TRIA bill that protects
our economy and our security.
Recognizing the significant benefits that TRIA has for our entire
economy, the US Chamber of Commerce said, and I quote:
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act has promoted long-term
availability of terrorism risk insurance for catastrophic
terror events and has provided a standard of stability for
financial markets and recovery after such an attack. [TRIA]
has created jobs and helped America's economy grow despite
the continuing terrorist threats against the United
[[Page H15361]]
States. . . . It is essential that Congress not allow this
vital law to expire.
There are few issues so important to our Nation's economy as a stable
long term federal support system for terrorism risk insurance.
We need a new TRIA bill and we need it promptly, to avoid
interruptions in coverage and the disruptions that will cause.
We all fervently hope there will be no more terrorist attacks on our
soil. But we must recognize that insuring against that dreadful
contingency is a fundamental part of making our country safer. It is a
part of homeland security that we cannot afford to ignore. I urge my
colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, TRIA, provides a free
Federal backstop to private insurers to protect them against acts of
terrorism in the United States so they can have insurance. It was
enacted, as all of us recall, right after 9/11 for 3 years as a very
temporary measure. It was intended to give the insurance industry
developers a 3-year period of transition to a private market, allow
them to stabilize, to price terrorism insurance, and the third goal was
to rebuild capacity.
Now, in 2005, Republicans agreed. We came together bipartisanly and
extended it for 2 years. However, that same year, the Treasury did a
study on TRIA, and here's what they said. They said, by 2005, 2 years
ago, the program had achieved all its purposes. The insurance market
had stabilized. They were pricing terrorism insurance, and they were
rebuilding capacity.
I will submit for the Record the Treasury Department study that they
found had achieved all its goals. Now, let me read from the Treasury
study of 2 years ago: ``The availability and affordability of terrorism
risk insurance has improved since the terrorist attacks of September
11. Despite increases in risk retentions under TRIA, insurers have
allocated additional capacity to terrorism risk, prices have declined,
and take-up (purchase) rates have increased.'' But we extended it.
And then we passed the legislation that the chairman has talked about
today, and it went over to the Senate. And the Senate, unanimously,
passed a TRIA bill. One hundred Republicans and Democrats came together
and passed that legislation, and the President said he would sign it.
Now, there are things about this bill that some of my colleagues on
this side support. The gentlelady from Florida has a provision that I
think would be beneficial. But it deals with group life. I'm sure she's
going to talk about that provision in a minute.
But let me say this. The Senate has said they're not going to include
group life. So why put a provision in about group life when the Senate
has already said they're not going to include group life?
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BACHUS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. The gentleman said why put the provision
in if the Senate said it's not going to talk about group life? Because
I don't think that we should have a de facto amendment to the House
rules that puts the Senate in charge of what we can discuss.
Mr. BACHUS. Well, as I said a few minutes ago to the chairman, with
all respect to the chairman, we have 19 days. We've talked about the
importance, particularly on that side of the aisle, and many Members on
our side, the importance, if we are going to have a bill, let's have a
bill. If the program is important, let's have the program. Let's not
let it expire.
If terrorist risk insurance will shut down New York, if in the
absence of this bill you can't build a hotdog stand in New York, why
would we let a bill expire that will, quote, shut down the economy of
New York? We have an alternative. The alternative is to pass a bill
that passed unanimously in the Senate.
Executive Summary
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 requires
the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) to
perform an analysis regarding the long-term availability and
affordability of insurance for terrorism risk, including
group life coverage; and coverage for chemical, nuclear,
biological, and radiological events; and to submit a report
of its findings to Congress by September 30, 2006.
In conducting this analysis, the PWG was assisted by staff
of the member agencies who reviewed academic and industry
studies on terrorism risk insurance, and sought additional
information and consultation through a Request for Comment
published in the Federal Register. Staff also met with
insurance regulators, policyholder groups, insurers,
reinsurers, modelers, and other governmental agencies to
gather further information.
The key findings of the PWG's analysis are set forth below.
The findings are presented under three main areas: the
general availability and affordability of terrorism risk
insurance; coverage for group life insurance; and coverage
for chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological events.
Further detail on each finding is provided in the body of the
report.
Key Findings
Long-Term Overall Availability and Affordability of Terrorism
Risk Insurance
The availability and affordability of terrorism risk
insurance have improved since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Despite increases in risk retentions
under TRIA, insurers have allocated additional capacity to
terrorism risk, prices have declined, and take-up (purchase)
rates have increased. The take-up rate--or the percentage of
companies buying terrorism coverage--has reportedly increased
from 27 percent in 2003 to 58 percent in 2005, while the cost
of coverage has generally fallen to roughly 3 to 5 percent of
total property insurance costs. These improvements have
transpired in a marketplace that has had access to a Federal
backstop that has gradually contracted through the life of
the temporary TRIA Program. Insurers' retention of risk has
steadily increased under the TRIA Program: deductibles have
increased from 7 percent of direct earned premium in 2003 to
17.5 percent in 2006, and other changes made to TRIA in 2005
have also increased insurer retentions. The general trend
observed in the market has been that as insurer retentions
have increased under TRIA and policyholder surpluses have
risen, prices for terrorism risk have fallen and take-up
rates have increased.
The improvement in the terrorism risk insurance market is
due to several important factors, including better risk
measurement and management, improved modeling of terrorism
risk, greater reinsurance capacity, and a recovery in the
financial health of property and casualty insurers. State
regulation does not appear to have had a significant impact
on capacity, and a significant number of policyholders are
still not purchasing terrorism coverage. How these factors
continue to evolve will importantly affect further
developments in the long-term availability and price of
terrorism risk insurance.
Insurers have made great strides in measuring and managing
their risk accumulations. The amount of capital an individual
insurance company is willing to allocate to a particular risk
in a given location depends on its understanding of its
maximum loss under different scenarios. Since September 11,
insurers have made greater use of sophisticated models that
allow them to identify and manage concentrations of risk in
order to avoid accumulating too much risk in any given
location. This improvement in risk accumulation management
has allowed insurers to better diversify and control their
terrorism risk exposures, which has enhanced their ability to
underwrite terrorism risk.
A significant effort has been made by the insurance
industry in modeling the potential frequency and severity of
terrorist attacks, which helps insurers to assess their
potential loss exposures. An understanding of the potential
frequency and severity of terrorist attacks is important for
insurers to properly evaluate their risk exposures.
Improvements in probability modeling of terrorist attacks
have likely had a positive impact on insurers' willingness to
provide coverage for terrorism risk following the re-
evaluation of terrorism risk that took place after September
11. However, unlike other catastrophic exposures (e.g.,
natural disasters) where there are more refined methods of
modeling frequency, modeling terrorism risk frequency relies
largely on analysis of terrorist behavior. Given the
uncertainty of terrorism in general and, in particular, the
uncertainty associated with these modeling efforts, insurers
appear to have limited confidence in these models for
evaluating their risk exposures.
The quantity of terrorism risk reinsurance capacity has
increased since the period following September 11.
Reinsurance for terrorism risk all but vanished after
September 11 as reinsurers withdrew from the market. The
market has since improved and reinsurers have gradually
allocated more capital to terrorism risk. The key
determinants in the capital allocation decisions of
reinsurers include pricing, which is influenced largely by
demand, loss experience, underwriting performance, and
probability of loss for a given risk at a given location.
These determinants also factor into the willingness of other
capital providers (e.g., through catastrophe bonds or other
mechanisms) to allocate capital to terrorism risk. The
presence of subsidized Federal reinsurance through TRIA
appears to negatively affect the emergence of private
reinsurance capacity because it dilutes demand for private
sector reinsurance.
The financial health and capacity of insurers has recovered
since September 11. There
[[Page H15362]]
has been improvement in the financial health of the insurance
industry, which plays a role in how much capacity an insurer
is willing to expose to terrorism risk. Since September 11,
policyholder surpluses in the property and casualty industry
have risen, as the industry has remained profitable (even
with the 2005 hurricane season losses) and has benefited from
increased rates of return on assets. As a result, insurers
have more available capital to allocate, and they apparently
have chosen to allocate additional capacity to terrorism risk
as demonstrated by the increased provision of terrorism risk
insurance coverage over the past few years.
States require that some types of terrorism risk insurance
be provided and otherwise regulate aspects of the terrorism
risk insurance market. However, it is unclear whether these
requirements have reduced capacity significantly. State laws
and regulations govern various aspects of the insurance
marketplace (e.g., mandating certain types of coverage,
approving forms and rates, and monitoring financial
solvency), and the provision of terrorism risk insurance
falls within this general structure. In terms of pricing,
although states regulate commercial insurance rates to
various degrees (to a larger extent with workers'
compensation insurance), commercial terrorism risk insurance
for large property risks may be exempt from state price
regulation or not subject to state price regulation (or other
state mandates) when purchased from non-admitted surplus
lines insurers. In addition, some insurers do not even charge
for the terrorism coverage that is included in their
policies. In lines of insurance with the greatest amount of
price regulation and coverage mandates (such as workers'
compensation insurance), insurers have generally remained in
the market, even as their TRIA retentions have increased,
despite not having the flexibility to fully price for
terrorism risk. Therefore, while state regulations have the
potential to significantly interfere with the operation of
the insurance markets, it does not appear that such
restrictions have had a significant impact in the market for
terrorism risk insurance in the post-TRIA environment.
While take-up rates have increased as prices have fallen, a
significant number of policyholders are still not purchasing
coverage. The willingness of consumers to pay for terrorism
risk insurance is a determinant of how much capital insurers
will allocate. It is unclear why approximately 40 percent of
all policyholders do not purchase coverage, although the
Treasury's 2005 study and others have found that the primary
reasons were price and assessment of their individual risk to
terrorist attack. Individual perceptions of low risk are
likely related to the lack of a successful terrorist attack
within the U.S. since 2001, and perhaps to some degree an
expectation that Federal aid might be available if a
significant attack occurs.
Further improvements in insurers' ability to model and
manage terrorism risk will likely contribute to the long-term
development of the terrorism risk insurance market. However,
the high level of uncertainty currently associated with
predicting the frequency of terrorist attacks, along with
what appears to be a general unwillingness of some insurance
policyholders to purchase insurance coverage, makes any
prediction of the potential degree of long-term development
of the terrorism risk insurance market somewhat difficult.
The post-September 11 terrorism insurance market has
developed in the presence of a Federal backstop (albeit a
progressively less generous one over time), which creates
inherent difficulties in evaluating the long-term development
of the terrorism risk insurance market.
Group Life Insurance
Coverage for terrorism risk insurance in group life
insurance policies has remained generally available and
prices have declined, even though group life insurance is not
part of TRIA. Given these market signals, there is no reason
to expect negative developments in the group life insurance
market. Group life insurance is generally sold to employers
as part of employee benefit packages along with other
benefits, such as medical, dental, vision, and disability. In
some cases group life insurers partner with other providers
of employee benefit services. The group life insurance market
is highly competitive and insurers appear to be unwilling in
the face of such competition to raise prices (states do not
regulate group life insurance rates), or to decline to
provide terrorism coverage. Even though group life insurance
has not had access to the Federal backstop under TRIA,
private market forces (high competitiveness and extreme price
sensitivity) have ensured the continued availability and
affordability of group life insurance to employers and their
participating employees.
As in the market for property and casualty reinsurance,
there have also been improvements in the availability of
catastrophic life reinsurance, and there is the potential for
continued market development. Just as with the property and
casualty reinsurance, catastrophic life reinsurance all but
disappeared after September 11, even though by most industry
metrics, September 11 was not a catastrophe in terms of
either individual or group life insurance losses. Still, the
lack or limited availability of catastrophic life reinsurance
following September 11 had no disruptive effect on the
availability and affordability of group life insurance to
consumers largely due to competitive market forces. Since
then, some catastrophic life reinsurance has again become
available in the marketplace, albeit at higher cost when
compared to pre-September 11 pricing. Today, group life
insurers are deciding whether to purchase reinsurance, or to
forgo and retain most of the risk--a decision that has not
had any impact on the availability and cost of group life
insurance to consumers.
Similar to the situation with property and casualty
insurers, group life insurers have developed an increased
ability to measure and manage their accumulation of terrorism
exposure through the use of modeling, and there appears to be
potential for additional improvements. While group life
insurers face aggregation exposure (the risk of multiple
losses from a terrorist-related mass casualty event due to
concentrations of insured lives), they are capable of
managing this risk to some degree by managing risk
accumulations. Property and casualty insurers have made great
strides in modeling techniques, but it is unclear to what
extent group life insurers have made use of these tools. The
highly competitive environment in the group life market, the
general wider dispersion of overall life insurance risks (for
companies that sell both group and individual life), and some
institutional arrangements regarding how policies are sold,
may all influence how group life insurers view their need and
ability to manage accumulation risk.
Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological (``CNBR'')
Coverage
Historically, insurance coverage for losses associated with
chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological risks has
generally not been widely available unless it was mandated.
Insurers generally did not provide CNBR coverage even before
September 11, and for the most part they do not provide such
terrorism coverage even with a Federal backstop in place.
Given the general reluctance of insurance companies to
provide coverage for these types of risks, there may be
little potential for future market development. The factors
determining the availability and affordability of CNBR
coverage in the marketplace have more to do with the nature,
scale, and uncertainty of the damage and losses from CNBR
events--however caused--and less to do with terrorism
specifically. What coverage exists today is mostly tied to
state mandates, most prominently workers' compensation
insurance, as well as some aspects of fire insurance through
the Standard Fire Policy. In addition, a Federal mandate
requires some nuclear coverage for reactor operators and some
specialty coverage exists. There is virtually no CNBR
reinsurance available, and the modeling issues both for
exposure and probability become even more complicated for
CNBR.
Some insurance consumers have expressed an interest in
purchasing CNBR coverage, but due to limited capacity and
relatively high prices, many have decided to forgo such
purchases. Policyholder expectations regarding their own
potential terrorism exposure and likelihood of post-disaster
Federal aid are probably higher for CNBR risks than for
relatively smaller-scale conventional terrorist attacks. The
2005 Treasury study found that the number of policyholders
that purchased CNBR terrorism coverage was relatively small
(except in the case of workers' compensation insurance where
coverage is mandated). Among the main reasons for not
purchasing CNBR terrorism coverage were that policyholders
believed either that they were not at risk or that the
premiums were too high. Most commercial policyholders remain
generally uninsured (except where coverage is mandated, such
as with workers' compensation). Some consumers may equate
CNBR coverage with other coverages that are not generally
available (e.g., war risk).
Finally, there may be an even greater market expectation
that the Federal government would respond post-loss to a CNBR
event through Federal disaster aid than would be the case for
a smaller-scale conventional terrorist attack.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
The gentleman has raised a red herring. There is no chance of it
expiring, and the fact that he would talk about a nonexistent threat of
expiration seems to me to be an indication that there's nothing
substantive to talk about.
In the end, we would retain the vehicle to pass this bill. But we
will not give up talking about issues prematurely, and that's why we
will not allow the Senate's unanimous consent agreement, very hastily
done, to shut off debate here. But there is no chance of this expiring
and the gentleman from Alabama knows that.
I yield now 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Scott), a
member of the committee.
Mr. SCOTT of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, it baffles me when, on this floor,
we, who are Members of the House of Representatives, so quickly, so
easily want to abdicate our responsibilities to the Senate. No wonder
the Senate does what it does.
Well, Mr. Speaker, we're not going to abdicate our responsibilities
to the Senate. The Founders of this Constitution and this country
dedicated two
[[Page H15363]]
Houses, one, the Senate, that runs every 6 years, and they made a
distinct decision to have the Members of the House of Representatives
run every other year because the power of the House closest to the
people is that House that the people look to to be most responsive to
the day-to-day delicacies of their needs. This is what we're doing
here. And the day-to-day delicacies says we've got to pass the most
significant, the most meaningful terrorism risk insurance program
possible. There's no greater threat we face.
My colleagues on the other side have said, well, why can't the
private sector do this? The private sector has come to us. We don't
know how catastrophic these events may be. But one thing is for
certain, Mr. Speaker, we must not allow the terrorists to shut down and
destroy our economy. And unless we have this backstop, the insurers
have said they cannot rebuild.
Not only that, the insurers have come to us, who we've got to listen
to, to say we need this backstop so that the economy will be stable.
Perhaps we may not need to use it. Let us hope and let us pray that we
will not have to.
{time} 1545
But, Mr. Speaker, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,
and we must prepare for the storm before the hurricane is raging.
This is not a giveaway program. This is not a subsidy program. This
is an insurance program, insurance that we hope and we pray that we
will not need. But if we do, it is the House of Representatives who are
responding to say, We need to insure life, not just property. You ask
the American people. Property you can get again and again. Buildings
you can rebuild. But a life, a life is gone like that and must be
insured.
This is the House of Representatives speaking, and I urge passage of
this bill.
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, we have 19 days till this program expires.
Now, if, as you have said, this is such an essential program, we need
to pass a bill today. The industry needed 6 months. They've only got 19
days. Policies have to be written. We can continue to talk about not
letting the Senate run over the House. We can continue to say we're
going to stand up for our version of the bill, but ask yourself this
question: How could 100 Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, come
up with a unanimous bill, which many of us in this bill support, and
the President said he will take it up and sign it, why are we here
today delaying the extension of what many of you have argued on the
floor today is a very important bill?
I'm going to say it again. Even if Congress were to act today,
there's not enough time for insurance companies to develop new policy
forms. There's not enough time for 50 State regulators to approve those
forms. There's not time to get the finished product to the marketplace.
There's not time to negotiate with policyholders.
So this idea that we don't have to pass it today, no, we don't have
to pass it today. No, we don't have to pass it tomorrow. We should have
passed it 6 months ago. We did. The Senate passed a different version,
and we are arguing at the end of this session, 19 days before this
program expires, as to differences between the Senate and the House
version.
And quite frankly, as I have said, the Senate version, which is the
version the Treasury Department urged on the House, the version the
President has said he will sign, the insurance industry's happy with.
It extends the TRIA program. Why are we here delaying? As I said, we're
delaying this. We're putting this program at jeopardy. We're postponing
a decision on AMT. The IRS is not going to have time to react to that,
and here we are as if we have all the time in the world.
The American people are not interested in differences between the
House and the Senate bill. I believe the American people, you know, if
a bill can pass unanimously out of the Senate, which it did, and the
President take it up, why does this House continue to debate long after
the time to act and pass legislation? It should have happened 6 months
ago. It can happen today. It should happen today.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I would just say the
gentleman from Alabama appears to have the Senate's preference for
conflict avoidance confused with genuine consensus.
There weren't 100 votes for that. They didn't have a roll call vote.
They're barely able to act, and so a couple of Members worked out a
deal and the rest of them waved it good-bye. But the notion that that
comes with some great significance clearly misunderstands what's
happening, and it certainly shouldn't keep us from legislating.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey
(Mr. Sires).
Mr. SIRES. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 4299, the
revised terrorist insurance act reauthorization. We've heard a lot
today about how important this legislation is for New York, but it's
also just as important for my home State of New Jersey, the region and
this Nation.
I have said before on this floor that I represent the two most
dangerous miles in this country. I represent the tunnels, the Lincoln
and the Holland Tunnels. I represent the ports, and I also represent
the region which also has the largest repository of fuel on the east
coast of this country. I represent part of Newark and Jersey City,
which are both considered high threat areas. I know firsthand what it
is like to have a district that deals with the threat of terrorism
every day. That is why it's so important for my district, my State and
the entire Nation that we extend TRIA in a way that ensures
stabilization for all businesses across this country, as well as those
in high-risk areas.
Last year, New York City created some 50,000 jobs. It is thought that
in the next 10 years New York City could possibly create another
500,000 jobs. That is one of the reasons New Jersey and New York are
talking about a new tunnel to bring people to fill some of those jobs,
and they need this stability to know that these businesses can come
into this city so those people can fill those jobs. And that's the
engine not just for New York City or New Jersey but for the region and
this country, quite frankly.
And I want to thank, at this time, Chairman Frank for his hard work
on trying to form a compromise on this bill while holding true to
important aspects of the TRIA legislation already passed by this House.
It is important that any TRIA reauthorization legislation include
reasonable trigger levels, group life insurance and a reset mechanism.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I just want to end by
saying I came to this Congress not to follow in lockstep with the
Senate. I came in to represent my district, not knowing that I would
have to bow to the Senate.
This is important legislation today, and I urge my colleagues to
support this legislation.
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to myself such time as I may
consume.
It's all come down to this. We can continue to debate the Senate, we
can continue to try to change this bill, or we can pass a bill, send it
to the President, which extends this vitally important program as so
many speakers on the majority side have said. Let's be honest with
ourselves. We know that this bill should have passed 6 months ago. We
know it probably should have passed 9 months ago. We know that it will
not pass in time for new coverage to be written January 1. We know
that.
So here we are, arguing differences with the Senate, but I think the
first thing we ought to acknowledge is the Senate unanimously passed
this bill. Now, the chairman says that two people got together, agreed
on everything and the other 98 waved good-bye. Well, let me say this.
We, the majority of this body, almost all the Members on your side, if
not all, and a good number of the Members on our side have said we need
to extend this program and we needed to do it 6 months ago. It's time
for us to pass the Senate language, send this bill to the President.
You know, there comes a time when if what the Senate did is wave this
bill good-bye, it's time for us to wave this bill good-bye.
We have engaged in a debate. The Senate has been unfair to us. Quite
frankly, policyholders don't care whether the Senate's unfair to the
[[Page H15364]]
House. They don't care whether the House didn't get its way and the
Senate did. The bill the Senate passed, I'm not supporting it because
it's not only the only thing available today, although it is. Let me
again read to you what the statement of the administration is.
The administration continues to believe that any TRIA reauthorization
should satisfy these three key elements: The program should be
temporary and short-term, there should be no expansion of the program,
and private sector retention should be increased. That was the original
policies and the original bill we passed. However, the administration
will not oppose the version of H.R. 2761 passed by the Senate on
November 16, but the administration strongly opposes any amendments to
the Senate-passed version of the bill away from the administration's
key elements.
And the only thing underlined in this statement to us is,
accordingly, if H.R. 2761 passes, that's the bill before us, if it's
presented to the President to be considered, his senior advisers will
recommend him veto the bill. A very important program.
It's already too late for insurance companies and policyholders to
adopt the provisions as of January 1. State regulators don't have time
to print the forms. It's time for us to pass the bill. It's time for us
to say, Okay, we didn't settle all our differences with the Senate, and
we can do that. And, quite frankly, I am very happy that it is the
Senate bill we'll be passing, because the Senate bill is very, very
close to what we Republicans some year ago proposed. And we've gone
through a year.
Provisions, the House has not gotten its way on certain provisions.
It's time to act. It's past time to act, and we're going to have that
opportunity today. We're going to have the opportunity to extend what
you say is a vital program, what some of us say, well, actually we're
not getting what we want because we believe that this program continues
to be a free Federal backstop for private insurers and developers, and
that's okay.
We want development, just like you do. We don't believe, as the
Treasury does, many of us, that the program has served its purpose and
it is actually impeding the private market, but we don't have to get
there. We have compromised our beliefs and are willing to vote for a 7-
year extension. The Senate unanimously came together and compromised
their various differences and voted unanimously for a version the
President has said he will sign.
The only thing that remains is on this side, the House side, that
some in the majority have not gotten their way on certain provisions.
And listen, I'm all for advocating a House position, but we've done
that, and in the interests of the American people, in the interests of
getting legislation, in the interests of closure, let's vote for the
Senate version.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. How much time remains?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank)
has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).
Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Frank for your
hard work on the legislation, and with all due respect to the gentleman
from Alabama, I can appreciate what you are saying about the Senate and
our negotiations with them, but the Congress of the United States is
not a unicameral institution.
{time} 1600
The Founding Fathers created two Chambers, two bodies, and the
opinions of this body are just as important as the opinions of the
other body. And sending a strong message about the reset provisions and
about the group life provisions for the policyholders that you say
don't care about those provisions is why we have a bicameral Congress.
The other issue that I want to raise is that the life insurance
fairness provision in this legislation, which you have strongly
supported consistently, can stand on its own. It is not dependent upon
group life being included in this legislation overall and it has no
ties to that provision.
In the 109th Congress, we passed a bipartisan version of TRIA that
included a provision that says that individuals will not be denied life
insurance coverage based solely on where they might lawfully travel,
and that is included in this provision again. Too often life insurance
companies deny the applications of people who express the intent to
travel internationally. That's particularly true when people say that
they plan to travel to Israel because Israel and 26 other countries
appear on the State Department's travel warning list. The life
insurance industry is using the State Department's travel warning list
as an underwriting tool. It was never intended to be an underwriting
tool. Countries don't make that list based on an actuarial analysis.
There are political and diplomatic considerations for those appearing
on that list. Travel fairness language will protect consumers from
unfair life insurance discrimination on the basis of past or future
lawful travel, and this provision allows the insurers to price for risk
according to an actuarial analysis. It's also fair to the insurance
companies because it allows for denial based on war, serious health
conditions in the country the person is traveling to, or fraud.
The freedom to travel is a right that we cherish, and no American
should have to choose between their children's financial security and
having the right to travel freely. And that is what we are forcing
Americans to do if we don't pass this travel fairness language as a
part of the reauthorization of TRIA. If we allow insurance companies to
deny coverage based on the notion of where a person might travel, we
are giving in to the terrorists who wish to change our way of life.
Life insurance companies have been using the State Department warning
list as an underwriting tool. It was never meant to be utilized that
way. I urge the Members to support the House-passed version of TRIA.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my
time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley).
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Israel). The gentleman from New York is
recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. CROWLEY. I thank my friend and colleague from Massachusetts.
I had a wonderful speech I was prepared to read to you today, but,
quite frankly, I'm outraged by the discussion that has taken place
here.
There is the discussion of 19 days left to get this legislation
passed as though a gun is put to our heads that either we pass the
Senate bill or this does not get extended. That's hogwash. That's not
the way in which we should make legislation. The notion that 100
Senators came to the floor and passed this bill is hogwash. They hot-
lined this bill. It went to the floor without debate. The only debate
that has taken place on this issue has taken place here on the floor of
the House of Representatives.
Chairman Frank in cooperation with the ranking member on the minority
have worked diligently to get a qualified bill to this floor, that New
York wants, that our country wants and deserves. We should not allow a
hole in the middle of Manhattan to lie as a monument to Osama bin
Laden, because that's what we're doing by not allowing for a reset
provision in this legislation. This is not about New York City. That
provision is the Osama bin Laden protection provision.
We should pass the House version of this bill and reject the Senate
bill. Pass the House version. I would also note that not one Republican
Member from New York State has been to the floor to defend your
position on this issue.
During negotiations on providing appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008,
the Republicans have opposed providing the emergency service workers
who are sick from the pollution they were exposed to at Ground Zero
with the care they need.
And today, many are expected to oppose this legislation, which would
enable New York City to rebuild at Ground Zero.
But I hope that does not happen.
Because Americans believe that those who served on the frontlines at
Ground Zero, and are sick due to their service, should be cared for.
Because Americans believe that New York City must be rebuilt--
stronger, prouder and better protected.
Because Americans believe that in doing so we will send a message to
al-qaeda that we won't back down.
[[Page H15365]]
And that's what today's legislation is about--letting every terrorist
organization know that you cannot break us. And if you try, we will
only grow stronger.
Let us take note, it was Chairman Frank's work on the terrorism risk
insurance act that has moved the Bush Administration from an absolute
position of opposition to being supportive of extending this program
for 7 years.
He successfully moved a bi-partisan bill earlier this year, in light
of many Republicans ready to acquiesce to the President to kill this
terrorism Insurance program.
I welcome the new positions of the White House and many Republicans
in this chamber today to finally support a real terrorism insurance
bill, it is a welcome change.
Now, let's talk some basic facts.
We all know the Government will step in if there is another large
scale attack like 9-11 on our country again.
What TRIA does is actually put the private insurance markets on the
hook to pay part of the damages, meaning TRIA is a cost savings to the
taxpayer and ensure that the insurance industry does what it is suppose
to do--insure.
TRIA saves taxpayers money.
Now onto a specific provision of to day's bill that I want to
highlight.
Part of today's bill includes a provision to honor those who were
killed on 9-11, and protect the memories of others who, God forbid, may
be killed in future attacks on our soil.
This new language, language that was included in the House-passed
TRIA bill, creates a re-assurance to insurers and developers to rebuild
on previously hit sites.
This is important because we all know al-Qaeda returns to the scene
of their crime; they hit the Twin Towers in 1993, and they returned in
2001. And knowing their mentality, they will try to return again.
Those that ignore that, ignore history and fact.
The impacted site in Lower Manhattan cannot continue to be a hole in
the ground, or a sick tribute or trophy to Osama bin Laden--wherever he
may be.
Rather, we need to rebuild there, letting the terrorists know they
can knock us down, but we will always pick ourselves up stronger.
We need to pass this bill and get the Senate working on a strong
compromise bill to ensure a real TRIA, one that won't let Osama bin
Laden continue to use the pictures at Ground Zero as a recruiting tool
against our soldiers in Afghanistan or for attacks against Americans in
this country or anywhere in the world.
We have seen the White House veto threat against this bill as it is
``expanding'' the terrorism insurance program.
Rebuilding at previously hit sites is not expanding the terrorism
insurance program--it is the reason for the terrorism insurance
program.
If you are serious about supporting TRIA, vote for this bill and
ensure Osama bin Laden and his evil partners view September 11, 2001 as
the worst day in their lives, not the best.
Mr. TERRY. Mr Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 4299, the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007. This
legislation revises and extends the Terrorism Risk Insurance program
established under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). TRIA
has been a cornerstone of our Nation's comprehensive response to the
events of September 11, 2001, providing a vital and necessary backstop
for our insurance industry and its policyholders.
I am pleased that H.R. 4299 does not reduce TRIA's complete coverage
for nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological events. It should
be noted that workers' compensation insurers are uniquely obligated by
state law to provide coverage for these events to their policyholders;
for them, especially, it is critical that TRIA provide a backstop for
these events as well as for conventional acts of terrorism.
It is important that TRIA serve the industry and its policyholders
equally. Over the course of TRIA's life, the ``trigger level,'' or
threshold of losses insurers must suffer from an act of terrorism
before TRIA can kick in, has been raised from $5 million to $100
million. For small- and medium-sized insurers--the majority of the
industry--a trigger level of $100 million is too high. As a result, I
support the provision which has survived in the House version in H.R.
4299 which returns the trigger level to the 2006 level of $50 million.
While I support H.R. 4299, it is important to note a significant
omission which also affects our small- and medium-sized insurers and
their policyholders. The deductible insurers' must pay under TRIA is
potentially cost-prohibitive for these companies. Additionally, this
deductible is calculated based on the amount of an insurer's direct
earned premium over the previous year. Insurers' deductibles under TRIA
should be tied to their capital, not the amount of their liabilities.
As a result, I encourage the House to reexamine TRIA in the future to
address this issue.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 862, the bill is considered read and the
previous question is ordered.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Bachus
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. BACHUS. In its current form, I am.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Bachus moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 4299, to the
Committee on Financial Services with instructions to report
the same back to the House forthwith with the following
amendment:
Strike sections 6 through 10.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Alabama is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the Financial Services
Committee, whom I have great respect for, indicated several times that
we are here today because of the Senate's inaction and intransigence.
Now, I'm not going to argue that point. The Senate, what they didn't do
is they didn't take action on our bill, but what they did do is they
came together and they unanimously passed legislation, and that
legislation is very close to what House Republicans advocated from day
one. They did take action. They passed legislation. The President said
he'll sign it. It's legislation that Treasury said is consistent with
the original declarations of the TRIA bill.
I share the chairman's frustration on the predicament we find
ourselves in. I wish the Senate had been willing to engage in a
conference to allow Members the opportunity to work out their
differences on the extension of this program. However, I will tell the
chairman this: The House Republicans, many of us on that conference
committee, would have voted to adopt the Senate language. So the Senate
bill, in my opinion, had we conferenced, we would have still passed the
Senate bill.
Now, the chairman has expressed his frustration with the Senate that
they are holding a gun to our head. I'm not going to characterize it in
that regard. Whether it is or isn't, I wish it wasn't so. But the clock
has run out on this Congress and the opportunity to get anything done
on TRIA has, as a practical matter, gone by. But if it is so important,
and most Members of this body believe it is, it's important to pass
legislation today, and that's the Senate legislation.
The motion to recommit removes additions in the bill offered by the
majority and returns the TRIA language to that passed by the Senate
last month by unanimous consent. The Senate bill reflects a bipartisan
compromise with the administration. It extends the TRIA program for 7
years, the same amount of time that we advocated in a bipartisan bill
in the House. We didn't get a bipartisan bill in the House. It wasn't a
bad bill. It wasn't a bad bill. But that bill when it passed and the
bill today, the bill that was just offered, is not going to become law.
The Senate bill includes coverage for domestic terrorism. Many in
this body felt like it ought to include that. It imposes a liability
cap for the marketplace. That's good. I think it's a responsible,
measured approach to extending a vital program, as many have
characterized it. Not all on this side agree. But the majority on this
side will come together, the majority of the minority, and pass what
you say is a vital program and we'll do it today. The administration
has said they will veto the House bill. Both sides of the aisle and the
Senate have indicated that the Senate is unwilling to consider it. We
have a gripe against the Senate, but let's take that up with the
Senate. A large number of Members in the House may continue to oppose
the Senate bill. You have an opportunity to vote on it in just a
minute.
The only TRIA extension that can get enacted is the Senate
compromise. Many say I wish it wasn't so. It is. The only responsible
course for this House to take is to accept the Senate bill and move on.
My motion is the Senate compromise.
[[Page H15366]]
We have 19 days until TRIA expires. Let me say it again. That's not a
practical time left for the industry to comply with legislation. In a
reasoned society, a deliberative body would never pass a bill and ask
the American people to adopt all that in 5 days.
Mr. Speaker, we cannot risk TRIA's expiration. We need to get the job
done now. A vote for this motion to recommit is a vote to promote
economic vitality in this country.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the
motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I want to begin with the
schizophrenic attitude towards the Senate. The gentleman said a number
of times that the Senate passed this unanimously. Yes, by avoiding
conference, by making a deal.
But he also continually said, correctly, that this bill was passed
way too late. Why are we here now? The answer as to why we're here now,
Mr. Speaker, it's the Senate that he was so admiring of. Yes, the
Senate passed it without a vote, on November 16. We passed the bill on
September 19. The House passed the bill with 3\1/2\ months left to go
in the year. The Senate passed the bill less than a month ago. The
Senate passed the bill, by the way, a different bill than ours, after
we had adjourned for the recess.
So the Senate, whom he extols for having managed to put everything
under the rug and make one of their deals where nobody gets
fingerprinted for anything, they sent us this bill, and the earliest we
could have passed it was last week. So all this rhetoric about 6
months, et cetera, well, that's, Mr. Speaker, his friends in the Senate
who caused that problem. If they had worked with us, we would have had
several months.
Now, we are going to pass a bill. We understand that. And we may well
be able to pass only the Senate bill early next week. We have preserved
our ability to do that. There is no chance of this expiring. The
question is this: Should we acquiesce in a procedure by which the
United States Senate waits until after we have adjourned for the
Thanksgiving recess and sends us a bill and says, this is it, take it
or leave it, or do we say, no, we don't like that and we're going to at
least try to make you vote on things.
Now, I know the gentleman from Alabama likes the Senate version
apparently where you just have unanimity so-called. I prefer democracy.
I prefer letting things get voted on. Maybe the Senate won't vote, but
let's at least give them one more option. It may take us another 3 or 4
days. So the notion that we are somehow delaying this for 3 or 4 days,
no. We waited from our bill in September to theirs in November. Two
months later they passed it. Three days or 4 days isn't going to make
any difference and we'll get the bill through.
Here's what we want to do. We want to say that the point that the
gentlewoman from Florida made that you should not arbitrarily cancel
people's life insurance because they're traveling to a country that's
on the State Department watch list, whether it's the nation of Israel
or others that Americans want to travel to. Yes, if you can show that
there's danger there, you can cut off their insurance. But don't say
that we're just going to give up on that. Maybe we can't do it this
year. Let's take the motion to recommit, then, because we're going to
pass this bill soon, anyway, and we may have to pass the Senate
version. Let's have a referendum on the freedom to travel provision.
Let's have a referendum on whether or not we include group life or say
that we insure buildings in this country but not life. Let's have a
referendum on whether smaller insurance companies should be able to
participate. Under our bill they can. Under the Senate bill they can't.
And let's have that reset mechanism that the gentleman from Queens, New
York, talked about so eloquently, which says we're going to rebuild and
any place that's hit, we will rebuild them again.
Let me say, we have a referendum on those issues. We may not be able
to win this year, but I want to be able, as chairman of the committee,
to go back early next year and say to our friends in the Senate, okay,
your rope-a-dope tactics may have worked, but they didn't work on the
merits.
{time} 1615
And we want to go back at you on small insurance companies and on
group life and on the question of freedom to travel, and we want to
bring it up again.
And the last point, when we're talking about why is this being done
now, it's supposed to be temporary? I never thought it would be
temporary. Here's the point: If you go through the private market, it
is paid for by the insured, ultimately. I do not think that those
people who are choosing to do business in areas that may be singled out
by the terrorists ought to have to pay the higher cost of insuring
themselves for that. Against fire, against theft, against liability for
someone falling down, sure, that's their responsibility. But defending
ourselves against terrorism is not a market matter; it's a matter of
national security. And the whole country ought to come together in a
unified way and say you may not threaten New York or Chicago or Atlanta
or Miami, or any other part of America, or Los Angeles, as they
threatened the airport. You may not threaten us and make us pay more.
You cannot make it more expensive to do business in one part of this
country than another. We will come together as one Nation in this
program and say, yes, you are responsible for insuring yourself against
various dangers. But for insuring yourself against murderous thugs
seeking to do harm to this country, this country will come together as
one in a national program and rebut that, and we will not allow them to
intrude.
Now, again, it may be that in the end the best we can get is the
Senate bill. But at this point, I urge the Members not to vote down, in
principle, a reset mechanism that says, okay, you only get hit once and
then you're gone, or the freedom to travel, or group life, or smaller
companies.
I hope the motion to recommit is defeated and that we let the Senate
know that we will continue to engage in democracy in this part of the
Capitol.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time has expired.
Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to
recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by
5-minute votes on passage of H.R. 4299, if ordered, and adoption of the
conference report to accompany H.R. 1585.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 173,
nays 246, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 1149]
YEAS--173
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Boyda (KS)
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Deal (GA)
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Nunes
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
[[Page H15367]]
Reichert
Renzi
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--246
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Ferguson
Filner
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Gerlach
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Kuhl (NY)
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mack
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McIntyre
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Reynolds
Richardson
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Tsongas
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walsh (NY)
Walz (MN)
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Weldon (FL)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--12
Carson
Cubin
Hooley
Hunter
Jindal
Kind
Matheson
Miller, Gary
Neugebauer
Paul
Spratt
Tancredo
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there
are 2 minutes remaining on this vote.
{time} 1638
Messrs. SAXTON, DENT, RUSH, GERLACH, LINCOLN DAVIS of Tennessee and
Ms. SOLIS changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. SULLIVAN, CAMP of Michigan, LATHAM, WICKER and Ms. GINNY
BROWN-WAITE of Florida changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 303,
noes 116, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 1150]
AYES--303
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Butterfield
Calvert
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carter
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Ferguson
Filner
Fortenberry
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Gerlach
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gordon
Graves
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hall (TX)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Herger
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hobson
Hodes
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Hulshof
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
King (NY)
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Knollenberg
Kucinich
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McHenry
McHugh
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murphy, Tim
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Nunes
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pickering
Platts
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Reichert
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Richardson
Rodriguez
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schmidt
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sessions
Sestak
Shays
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Tsongas
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walsh (NY)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (OH)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
Young (FL)
NOES--116
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Castle
Chabot
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Costello
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Deal (GA)
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gingrey
Goode
Granger
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
King (IA)
Kingston
Kline (MN)
Lamborn
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCrery
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Musgrave
Myrick
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pitts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Radanovich
Rehberg
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Walden (OR)
[[Page H15368]]
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Westmoreland
Wicker
Wilson (SC)
Young (AK)
NOT VOTING--12
Carson
Cubin
Gohmert
Hooley
Hunter
Jindal
Matheson
Miller, Gary
Neugebauer
Paul
Spratt
Tancredo
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised 2
minutes remain in this vote.
{time} 1647
Mr. MARCHANT changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. GOODLATTE changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________