[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 177 (Thursday, November 15, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H14037-H14062]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          RESTORE ACT OF 2007

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 746, 
proceedings will now resume on the bill (H.R. 3773) to amend the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure 
for authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence, and for 
other purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                H.R 3773

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, 
     Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of 
     2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States 
              persons outside the United States.

[[Page H14038]]

Sec. 3. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc.
Sec. 7. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 8. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of 
              United States persons.
Sec. 9. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign 
              intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 10. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic 
              surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign 
              intelligence information.
Sec. 11. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 12. Sunset; transition procedures.

     SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                       OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105A.  (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a court 
     order is not required for the acquisition of the contents of 
     any communication between persons that are not United States 
     persons and are not located within the United States for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information, 
     without respect to whether the communication passes through 
     the United States or the surveillance device is located 
     within the United States.
       ``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside 
     of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance 
     that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of 
     a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States and not a United States person for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as 
     defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by 
     targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
       ``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or 
     105B; or
       ``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section 
     105 or 105C.''.

     SEC. 3. PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


   ``PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
        UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105B.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the 
     court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, 
     or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up 
     to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that 
     are reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in 
     paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those 
     persons.
       ``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under 
     subsection (a) shall include--
       ``(1) a certification by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
       ``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications; and
       ``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
       ``(2) a description of--
       ``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the 
     duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable 
     belief that the targets of the acquisition are persons that 
     are located outside the United States and not United States 
     persons;
       ``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the 
     identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition 
     will be directed;
       ``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with 
     respect to such acquisition; and
       ``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under 
     subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be 
     directed.
       ``(d) Review of Application.--Not later than 15 days after 
     a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the 
     judge shall review such application and shall approve the 
     application if the judge finds that--
       ``(1) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection 
     (b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the 
     targets of the acquisition are located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons;
       ``(2) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(3) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is 
     filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, 
     when the Federal Government seeks to conduct electronic 
     surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be located in 
     the United States.
       ``(e) Order.--
       ``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under 
     subsection (d) shall issue an order--
       ``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the 
     communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
       ``(B) requiring the communications service provider or 
     custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service 
     provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition to provide such information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
     the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with 
     the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or 
     agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
       ``(C) requiring such communications service provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of 
     the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved 
     by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the 
     aid furnished;
       ``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
       ``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for 
     providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to 
     such order; and
       ``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing 
     the person to comply with the order to such person; and
       ``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
       ``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as 
     proposed or as modified by the judge;
       ``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge; 
     and
       ``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     as proposed or as modified by the judge.
       ``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with 
     an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may 
     invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) 
     to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order 
     of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of 
     court. Any process under this section may be served in any 
     judicial district in which the person may be found.
       ``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law, 
     no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person 
     for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in 
     accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
       ``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the court established under subsection 
     103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a 
     period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such 
     order is issued.
       ``(5) Assessment of compliance with minimization 
     procedures.--At or before the end of the period of time for 
     which an acquisition is approved by an order or an extension 
     under this section, the judge may assess compliance with the 
     minimization procedures referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(ii) 
     and the guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(iii) by 
     reviewing the circumstances under which information 
     concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or 
     disseminated.''.

     SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


  ``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
        UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105C.  (a) Application After Emergency 
     Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than 
     7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General authorize an acquisition

[[Page H14039]]

     under this section, an application for an order authorizing 
     the acquisition in accordance with section 105B shall be 
     submitted to the judge referred to in subsection (b)(2) of 
     this section for approval of the acquisition in accordance 
     with section 105B.
       ``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information for a period 
     of not more than 45 days if--
       ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General jointly determine that--
       ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an 
     authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an 
     order approving the acquisition under such section can with 
     due diligence be obtained;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
       ``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(D) there are reasonable procedures in place for 
     determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence 
     information under this section will be acquired by targeting 
     only persons that are reasonably believed to be located 
     outside the United States and not United States persons;
       ``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications;
       ``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
       ``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to 
     such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having 
     jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at 
     the time of the authorization under this section that the 
     decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence 
     information.
       ``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
     Pursuant to an authorization of an acquisition under this 
     section, the Attorney General may direct a communications 
     service provider, custodian, or an officer, employee, or 
     agent of such service provider or custodian, who has the 
     lawful authority to access the information, facilities, or 
     technical assistance necessary to accomplish such acquisition 
     to--
       ``(1) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner 
     that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce 
     a minimum of interference with the services that provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the 
     target of the acquisition; and
       ``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the acquisition or the aid 
     furnished.''.

     SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     105C the following new section:


  ``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES 
              PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105D.  (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not 
     later than 7 days after an application is submitted under 
     section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress--
       ``(1) in the case of an application, a copy of the 
     application, including the certification made under section 
     105B(b)(1); and
       ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, 
     including the procedures and guidelines referred to in 
     section 105B(e)(1)(E).
       ``(b) Quarterly Audits.--
       ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall 
     complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance 
     with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) 
     the results of such audit, including, for each order 
     authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under 
     section 105B--
       ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such 
     order that were later determined to be located in the United 
     States;
       ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such order;
       ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated 
     containing information on a United States person that was 
     collected under such order; and
       ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose 
     communications were acquired under such order.
       ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion 
     of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the 
     court established under section 103(a) a report containing 
     the results of such audit.
       ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days 
     thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under 
     section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a 
     report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the 
     previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this 
     section shall include a description of any incidents of non-
     compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), 
     including incidents of non-compliance by--
       ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
       ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
       ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with 
     guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
       ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under such order.
       ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
     containing the number of emergency authorizations of 
     acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any 
     incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization 
     under such section.
       ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' 
     means--
       ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
     and
       ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.''.

     SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

       Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(g) In any case where the court established under 
     subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review 
     a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of 
     the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any 
     orders related to such matter.''.

     SEC. 7. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

       (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs 
     of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of 
     communications conducted without a court order on or after 
     September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance 
     Program referred to by the President in a radio address on 
     December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all 
     documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda 
     concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations 
     of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, 
     and court orders.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report 
     containing the results of such audit, including all documents 
     acquired pursuant to conducting such audit.
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the 
     investigation and adjudication of an application by the 
     Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a 
     security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit 
     under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as 
     possible.

     SEC. 8. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

       (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop 
     and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track 
     of--
       (1) the instances where the identity of a United States 
     person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an 
     element of

[[Page H14040]]

     the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) that 
     collected the communications to other departments or agencies 
     of the United States; and
       (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
     and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
       (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created 
     under subsection (a), including the number of instances 
     referred to in paragraph (1).

     SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

       There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of 
     Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector 
     General, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and 
     other appropriate elements of the National Security Division, 
     and the National Security Agency such sums as may be 
     necessary to meet the personnel and information technology 
     demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of--
       (1) applications and other submissions to the court 
     established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));
       (2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
       (A) section 105D of such Act; and
       (B) section 7; and
       (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements 
     under section 8.

     SEC. 10. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH 
                   ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR 
                   GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

       (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of 
     gathering foreign intelligence information.
       (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
     Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory 
     authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an 
     amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific 
     statutory authorization shall be the only exception to 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 
     relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the 
     following new items:

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United 
              States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of persons 
              located outside of the United States.''.

       (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
       (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America 
     Act.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law 
     110-55) are hereby repealed.

     SEC. 12. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Sunset of New Provisions.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     effective on December 31, 2009--
       (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) are hereby repealed; and
       (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act 
     is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 
     105B, 105C, and 105D.
       (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any 
     authorization or order issued under section 105B of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 
     this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in 
     effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization 
     or order.
       (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.--
       (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this 
     Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall 
     remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such 
     authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of 
     enactment, whichever is earlier.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 
     110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in 
     accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, 
     including--
       (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 
     105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be 
     located in the United States;
       (B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such section;
       (C) the number of reports disseminated containing 
     information on a United States person that was collected 
     under such section;
       (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based 
     upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition 
     authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on 
     the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and
       (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with 
     an authorization under such section, including incidents of 
     non-compliance by--
       (i) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
       (ii) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of 
     such section; and
       (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
       (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, 
     the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 824, the 
further amendment printed in House Report 110-449 is adopted.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                                H.R 3773

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, 
     Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of 
     2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec.  2.  Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States 
              persons outside the United States.
Sec.  3.  Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
Sec.  4.  Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              Statesfwho may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
Sec.  5.  0versight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States fNho 
              may be communicating with persons inside the United 
              States.
Sec.  6.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banco
Sec.  7.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court matters.
Sec.  8.  Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which 
              electronic surveillance may be conducted for gathering 
              foreign intelligence information.
Sec.  9.  Enhancement of electronic surveillance authority in wartime 
              and other collection.
Sec.  10.  Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec.  11.  Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of 
              United States persons.
Sec.  12.  Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign 
              intelligence surveillance.
Sec.  13.  Document management system for applications for orders 
              approving electronic surveillance.
Sec.  14.  Training of intelligence community personnel in foreign 
              intelligence collection matters.
Sec.  15.  Information for Congress on the terrorist surveillance 
              program and similar programs.
Sec.  16.  Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec.  17.  Sunset; transition procedures.

[[Page H14041]]

     SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                       OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105A.  (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act, a court order is not required for the acquisition 
     of the contents of any communication between persons that are 
     not known to be United States persons and are reasonably 
     believed to be located outside the United States for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information, 
     without respect to whether the communication passes through 
     the United States or the surveillance device is located 
     within the United States.
       ``(2) Treatment of inadvertent interceptions.--If 
     electronic surveillance referred to in paragraph (1) 
     inadvertently collects a communication in which at least one 
     party to the communication is located inside the United 
     States or is a United States person, the contents of such 
     communication shall be handled in accordance with 
     minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General that 
     require that no contents of any communication to which a 
     United States person is a party shall be disclosed, 
     disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer 
     than 7 days unless a court order under section 105 is 
     obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the 
     information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily 
     harm to any person.
       ``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside 
     of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance 
     that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of 
     a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States and not a United States person for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as 
     defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by 
     targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
       ``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or 
     105B; or
       ``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section 
     105 or 105C.''.

     SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
                   COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


  ``ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
  UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
          COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       ``Sec. 105B. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the 
     court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, 
     or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up 
     to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that 
     are reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in 
     paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those 
     persons.
       ``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under 
     subsection (a) shall include--
       ``(1) a certification by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
       ``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States 
     who may be communicating with persons inside the United 
     States;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications; and
       ``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
       ``(2) a description of--
       ``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the 
     duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable 
     belief that the persons that are the targets of the 
     acquisition are located outside the United States and not 
     United States persons;
       ``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the 
     identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition 
     will be directed;
       ``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with 
     respect to such acquisition; and
       ``(D)(i) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an 
     application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required 
     by this Act, when a significant purpose of an acquisition is 
     to acquire the communications of a specific United States 
     person reasonably believed to be located in the United 
     States; and
       ``(ii) the criteria for determining if such a significant 
     purpose exists, which shall require consideration of 
     whether--
       ``(I) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition has made an inquiry to another 
     department or agency of the Federal Government to gather 
     information on the specific United States person;
       ``(II) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition has provided information that 
     identifies the specific United States person to another 
     department or agency of the Federal Government;
       ``(III) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition determines that the specific 
     United States person has been the subject of ongoing interest 
     or repeated investigation by a department or agency of the 
     Federal Government; and
       ``(IV) the specific United States person is a natural 
     person.
       ``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under 
     subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be 
     directed.
       ``(d) Review of Application; Appeals.--
       ``(1) Review of application.--Not later than 15 days after 
     a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the 
     judge shall review such application and shall approve the 
     application if the judge finds that--
       ``(A) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection 
     (b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the 
     targets of the acquisition are located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons;
       ``(B) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(C)(i) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is 
     filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, 
     when a significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire 
     the communications of a specific United States person 
     reasonably believed to be located in the United States; and
       ``(ii) the criteria for determining if such a significant 
     purpose exists require consideration of whether--
       ``(I) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition has made an inquiry to another 
     department or agency of the Federal Government to gather 
     information on the specific United States person;
       ``(II) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition has provided information that 
     identifies the specific United States person to another 
     department or agency of the Federal Government;
       ``(III) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition determines that the specific 
     United States person has been the subject of ongoing interest 
     or repeated investigation by a department or agency of the 
     Federal Government; and
       ``(IV) the specific United States person is a natural 
     person.
       ``(2) Temporary order; appeals.--
       ``(A) Temporary order.--A judge denying an application 
     under paragraph (1) may, at the application of the United 
     States, issue a temporary order to authorize an acquisition 
     under section 105B in accordance with the application under 
     subsection (a) during the pendency of any appeal of the 
     denial of such application.
       ``(B) Appeals.--The United States may appeal the denial of 
     an application for an order under paragraph (1) or a 
     temporary order under subparagraph (A) in accordance with 
     section 103.
       ``(e) Order.--
       ``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under 
     subsection (d) shall issue an order--
       ``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the 
     communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
       ``(B) requiring the communications service provider or 
     custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service 
     provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition to provide such information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
     the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with 
     the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or 
     agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
       ``(C) requiring such communications service provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of 
     the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved 
     by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the 
     aid furnished;
       ``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
       ``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for 
     providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to 
     such order;

[[Page H14042]]

       ``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing 
     the person to comply with the order to such person; and
       ``(iii) provide a certification stating that the 
     acquisition is authorized under this section and that all 
     requirements of this section have been met; and
       ``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
       ``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as 
     proposed or as modified by the judge;
       ``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge; 
     and
       ``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     as proposed or as modified by the judge.
       ``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with 
     an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may 
     invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) 
     to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order 
     of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of 
     court. Any process under this section may be served in any 
     judicial district in which the person may be found.
       ``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law, 
     no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person 
     for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in 
     accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
       ``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the court established under subsection 
     103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a 
     period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such 
     order is issued.
       ``(5) Assessment of compliance with court order.--At or 
     before the end of the period of time for which an acquisition 
     is approved by an order or an extension under this section, 
     the court established under section 103(a) shall, not less 
     frequently than once each quarter, assess compliance with the 
     procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E) and 
     review the circumstances under which information concerning 
     United States persons was acquired, retained, or 
     disseminated.''.

     SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
                   COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


  ``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
  UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
          COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105C.  (a) Application After Emergency 
     Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than 
     7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section, 
     an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in 
     accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge 
     referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval 
     of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B.
       ``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information (as defined 
     in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) for a period of 
     not more than 45 days if--
       ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General jointly determine that--
       ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an 
     authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an 
     order approving the acquisition under such section can with 
     due diligence be obtained;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
       ``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(D) there are procedures in place that will be used by 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General during the duration of the authorization to determine 
     if there is a reasonable belief that the persons that are the 
     targets of the acquisition are located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons;
       ``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications;
       ``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e));
       ``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to 
     such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(H)(i) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure 
     that an application is filed under secion 104, if otherwise 
     required by this Act, when a significant purpose of an 
     acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific 
     United States person reasonably believed to be located in the 
     United States; and
       ``(ii) the criteria for determining if such a significant 
     purpose exists require consideration of whether--
       ``(I) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition has made an inquiry to another 
     department or agency of the Federal Government to gather 
     information on the specific United States person;
       ``(II) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition has provided information that 
     identifies the specific United States person to another 
     department or agency of the Federal Government;
       ``(III) the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     conducting the acquisition determines that the United States 
     person has been the subject of ongoing interest or repeated 
     investigation by a department or agency of the Federal 
     Government; and
       ``(IV) the specific United States person is a natural 
     person.
       ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having 
     jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at 
     the time of the authorization under this section that the 
     decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence 
     information.
       ``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
       ``(1) Directive.--Pursuant to an authorization of an 
     acquisition under this section, the Attorney General may 
     direct a communications service provider, custodian, or an 
     officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or 
     custodian, who has the lawful authority to access the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish such acquisition to--
       ``(A) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner 
     that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce 
     a minimum of interference with the services that provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the 
     target of the acquisition; and
       ``(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished.
       ``(2) Parameters; certifications.--The Attorney General 
     shall provide to any person directed to provide assistance 
     under paragraph (1) with--
       ``(A) a document setting forth the parameters of the 
     directive;
       ``(B) a certification stating that--
       ``(i) the emergency authorization has been issued pursuant 
     to this section;
       ``(ii) all requirements of this section have been met;
       ``(iii) a judge has been informed of the emergency 
     authorization in accordance with subsection (b)(2); and
       ``(iv) an application will be submitted in accordance with 
     subsection (a); and
       ``(C) a certification that the recipient of the directive 
     shall be compensated, at the prevailing rate, for providing 
     information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to such 
     directive.''.

     SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH 
                   PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     105C the following new section:


  ``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES 
 PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING 
                 WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105D.  (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not 
     later than 7 days after an application is submitted under 
     section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress--
       ``(1) in the case of an application--
       ``(A) a copy of the application, including the 
     certification made under section 105B(b)(1); and
       ``(B) a description of the primary purpose of the 
     acquisition for which the application is submitted; and
       ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, 
     including the procedures and guidelines referred to in 
     section 105B(e)(1)(E).
       ``(b) Regular Audits.--
       ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall 
     complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance 
     with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) 
     the results of such audit, including, for each order 
     authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under 
     section 105B--
       ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such 
     order that were later determined to be located in the United 
     States;

[[Page H14043]]

       ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such order;
       ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated 
     containing information on a United States person that was 
     collected under such order; and
       ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose 
     communications were acquired under such order.
       ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion 
     of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the 
     court established under section 103(a) a report containing 
     the results of such audit.
       ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days 
     thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under 
     section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a 
     report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the 
     previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this 
     section shall include a description of any incidents of non-
     compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), 
     including incidents of non-compliance by--
       ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
       ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
       ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with 
     guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
       ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under such order.
       ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
     containing the number of emergency authorizations of 
     acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any 
     incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization 
     under such section.
       ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' 
     means--
       ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
     and
       ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.''.

     SEC. 6. DISSEMINATION OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES 
                   PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES 
                   WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE 
                   THE UNITED STATES.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     105D (as added by section 5) the following new section:


``DISSEMINATION OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED 
  OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS 
                        INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105E. The contents of communications collected under 
     section 105B or section 105C, and intelligence reports based 
     on such contents, shall not be disclosed or disseminated with 
     information that identifies a United States person unless an 
     officer or employee of the Federal Government whose rate of 
     basic pay is not less than the minimum rate payable under 
     section 5382 of title 5, United States Code (relating to 
     rates of pay for the Senior Executive Service) determines 
     that the identity of the United States person is necessary 
     to--
       ``(1) understand the foreign intelligence collected under 
     section 105B or 105C or assess the importance of such 
     intelligence; and
       ``(2) protect the national security of the United States, 
     the citizens, employees, or officers of the United States, or 
     the members of the United States Armed Forces.''.

     SEC. 7. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

       Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(g) In any case where the court established under 
     subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review 
     a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of 
     the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any 
     orders related to such matter.''.

     SEC. 8. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT MATTERS.

       (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803(a)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
       (2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated)--
       (A) by striking ``11'' and inserting ``15''; and
       (B) by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United 
     States judicial circuits''; and
       (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3) and 
     indenting such paragraph, as so designated two ems from the 
     left margin.
       (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section 
     is further amended by inserting after paragraph (1) (as 
     designated by subsection (a)(1)) the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) A judge of the court shall make a determination to 
     approve, deny, or modify an application submitted pursuant to 
     section 105(f), section 304(e), or section 403 not later than 
     24 hours after the receipt of such application by the 
     court.''.

     SEC. 9. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH 
                   ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR 
                   GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

       (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of 
     gathering foreign intelligence information.
       (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
     Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory 
     authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an 
     amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific 
     statutory authorization shall be the only exception to 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 10. ENHANCEMENT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY IN 
                   WARTIME AND OTHER COLLECTION.

       Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are 
     amended by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``Congress or 
     an authorization for the use of military force described in 
     section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 
     1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific 
     authorization for foreign intelligence collection under this 
     section, or if the Congress is unable to convene because of 
     an attack upon the United States.''.

     SEC. 11. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

       (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs 
     of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of 
     communications conducted without a court order on or after 
     September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance 
     Program referred to by the President in a radio address on 
     December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all 
     documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda 
     concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations 
     of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, 
     and court orders.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report 
     containing the results of such audit, including all documents 
     acquired pursuant to conducting such audit.
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the 
     investigation and adjudication of an application by the 
     Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a 
     security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit 
     under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as 
     possible.

     SEC. 12. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

       (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop 
     and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track 
     of--
       (1) the instances where the identity of a United States 
     person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an 
     element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
     that collected the communications to other departments or 
     agencies of the United States; and
       (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
     and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
       (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created 
     under subsection (a), including the number of instances 
     referred to in paragraph (1).

     SEC. 13. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office 
     of the Inspector General and the appropriate elements of the 
     National Security Division, and to the National Security 
     Agency such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel 
     and information technology demands to ensure the timely and 
     efficient processing of--
       (1) applications and other submissions to the court 
     established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));

[[Page H14044]]

       (2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
       (A) section 105D of such Act; and
       (B) section 10; and
       (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements 
     under section 8.
       (b) Additional Personnel for Preparation and Consideration 
     of Applications for Orders Approving Electronic Surveillance 
     and Physical Search.--
       (1) National security division of the department of 
     justice.--
       (A) Additional personnel.--The National Security Division 
     of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such 
     additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the 
     prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of 
     applications under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 for orders under that Act for foreign intelligence 
     purposes.
       (B) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign 
     personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among 
     appropriate offices of the intelligence community (as defined 
     in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4))) in order that such personnel may directly 
     assist personnel of the Intelligence Community in preparing 
     applications described in that paragraph and conduct prompt 
     and effective oversight of the activities of such agencies 
     under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders.
       (2) Director of national intelligence.--
       (A) Additional legal and other personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence is hereby authorized such additional 
     legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out 
     the prompt and timely preparation of applications under the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders 
     under that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign 
     intelligence purposes.
       (B) Assignment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and 
     among the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), 
     including the field offices of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, in order that such personnel may directly 
     assist personnel of the intelligence community in preparing 
     applications described in that paragraph.
       (3) Additional legal and other personnel for foreign 
     intelligence surveillance court.--There is hereby authorized 
     for the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) 
     such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to 
     facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that court 
     of applications under such Act for orders under such Act 
     approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
     purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall 
     perform such duties relating to the consideration of such 
     applications as that court shall direct.
       (4) Supplement not supplant.--The personnel authorized by 
     this section are in addition to any other personnel 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 14. DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR APPLICATIONS FOR 
                   ORDERS APPROVING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and 
     implement a secure, classified document management system 
     that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review 
     by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security 
     Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States 
     Government of applications under the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their 
     submission to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
       (b) Scope of System.--The document management system 
     required by subsection (a) shall--
       (1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of 
     applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and
       (2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel 
     submitting applications described in paragraph (1), and 
     provide for the secure electronic storage and retrieval of 
     all such applications and related matters with the court and 
     for their secure transmission to the National Archives and 
     Records Administration.

     SEC. 15. TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL IN 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MATTERS.

       The Director of National Intelligence shall, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General--
       (1) develop regulations to establish procedures for 
     conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance, 
     physical search, and the installation and use of pen 
     registers and trap and trace devices on an emergency basis, 
     and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving 
     applications and orders under the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978; and
       (2) prescribe related training on the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 and related legal matters for the 
     personnel of the applicable agencies of the intelligence 
     community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))).

     SEC. 16. INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS ON THE TERRORIST 
                   SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND SIMILAR PROGRAMS.

       As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the 
     President shall fully inform each member of the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate on the following:
       (1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National 
     Security Agency.
       (2) Any program in existence from September 11, 2001, until 
     the effective date of this Act that involves, whether in part 
     or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States 
     persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or 
     other purposes, and which is conducted by any department, 
     agency, or other element of the United States Government, or 
     by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or 
     other element of the United States Government, without fully 
     complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States 
     Code.

     SEC. 17. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 
     relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the 
     following new items:
``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United 
              States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States who 
              may be communicating with persons inside the United 
              States.''.
       (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
       (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act 
     of 2007.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public 
     Law 110-55) are hereby repealed.

     SEC. 18. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Sunset of New Provisions.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     effective on December 31, 2009--
       (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) are hereby repealed; and
       (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act 
     is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 
     105B, 105C, and 105D.
       (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any 
     authorization or order issued under section 105B of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 
     this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in 
     effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization 
     or order.
       (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.--
     (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this Act, 
     an authorization of the acquisition of foreign intelligence 
     information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) made before 
     the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect 
     until the date of the expiration of such authorization or the 
     date that is 180 days after such date of enactment, whichever 
     is earlier.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 
     110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in 
     accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, 
     including--
       (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 
     105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be 
     located in the United States;
       (B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such section;

[[Page H14045]]

       (C) the number of reports disseminated containing 
     information on a United States person that was collected 
     under such section;
       (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based 
     upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition 
     authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on 
     the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and
       (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with 
     an authorization under such section, including incidents of 
     non-compliance by--
       (i) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
       (ii) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of 
     such section; and
       (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
       (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, 
     the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)).

     SEC. 19. CERTIFICATION TO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS 
                   THAT ACQUISITIONS ARE AUTHORIZED UNDER FISA.

       (a) Authorization Under Section 102.--Section 102(a) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1802(a)) is amended by striking ``furnishing such aid'' and 
     inserting ``furnishing such aid and shall provide such 
     carrier with a certification stating that the electronic 
     surveillance is authorized under this section and that all 
     requirements of this section have been met''.
       (b) Authorization Under Section 105.--Section 105(c)(2) of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting ``;'';
       (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``aid.'' and inserting 
     ``aid; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
         ``(E) that the applicant provide such carrier, landlord, 
     custodian, or other person with a certification stating that 
     the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section 
     and that all requirements of this section have been met.''.

     SEC. 20. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       (e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be prosecuted, 
     tried, or punished for any offense under this section unless 
     the indictment is found or the information is instituted not 
     later than 10 years after the commission of the offense.''.
       (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations 
     applicable to that offense has not run as of such date.

     SEC. 21. NO RIGHTS UNDER THE RESTORE ACT FOR UNDOCUMENTED 
                   ALIENS.

       This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be 
     construed to prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights 
     to, an alien not permitted to be in or remain in the United 
     States.

     SEC. 22. SURVEILLANCE TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES.

       This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be 
     construed to prohibit the intelligence community (as defined 
     in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4))) from conducting lawful surveillance that is 
     necessary to--
       (1) prevent Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other 
     terrorist or terrorist organization from attacking the United 
     States, any United States person, or any ally of the United 
     States;
       (2) ensure the safety and security of members of the United 
     States Armed Forces or any other officer or employee of the 
     Federal Government involved in protecting the national 
     security of the United States; or
       (3) protect the United States, any United States person, or 
     any ally of the United States from threats posed by weapons 
     of mass destruction or other threats to national security.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Time for debate pursuant to House Resolution 
746 is considered expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 824, debate shall not exceed 1 hour, 
with 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 30 
minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Smith) each will control 15 minutes and the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) each 
will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).


                             General Leave

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
and include extraneous material on H.R. 3773.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  Members of the House, the RESTORE Act dealing with FISA addresses the 
needs of the intelligence community for flexibility in dealing with 
modern communications networks.

                              {time}  1815

  It received the most careful scrutiny and consideration by this 
Committee on the Judiciary, as well as by the Intelligence Committee, 
chaired by Chairman Reyes, to ensure that it meets every concern our 
intelligence agencies have raised, every single one of them, and does 
so consistent with the rules of law, our Constitution, and our values.
  Let's begin this discussion this evening by clearing up a few things 
that the bill will not do. The RESTORE Act will never require our 
intelligence agencies to stop listening to the bad guys. Never. Special 
emergency provisions allow us to listen first and get the warrant after 
the fact, if it's needed. No one will ever have to stop listening to a 
terrorist plotting an attack. I hope I don't hear that raised on the 
floor this evening.
  The RESTORE Act will not make our intelligence agencies have to get 
thousands of warrants for terrorists outside the country. It will not 
do that. Instead, a basket authorization will permit surveillance of an 
entire foreign terrorist organization. This is the most effective way 
to target Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and other threats to our country 
and our citizens.
  The RESTORE Act does not give the government free rein to listen to 
Americans. As has always been the case under FISA, this bill requires 
that the government get a warrant to target an American; any American. 
We have also a manager's amendment, which continues to promote the 
goals of intelligence flexibility with appropriate oversight, while 
safeguarding our security and our liberty. It makes clear that the 
protections of the act will not inhibit gathering intelligence against 
present dangers, such as Osama bin Laden, or threats to our troops in 
the field.
  It does provide guidelines to make it easier to determine when the 
significant purpose of the surveillance act is to acquire information 
on a United States person and a FISA warrant is needed. It provides 
important safeguards on dissemination of information about individual 
Americans when it's acquired under the RESTORE Act's more flexible 
structure. Specifically, an SES-level manager will review such 
dissemination on a particularized basis.
  Importantly, the RESTORE Act has no retroactive immunity for 
telecommunications carriers who may have assisted the government in 
conducting unlawful surveillance on Americans. I am sorry to report to 
you that the other body has a measure that does give that retroactive 
immunity. The RESTORE Act now on the floor has no retroactive immunity 
for telecommunications carriers who may have assisted the government in 
unlawful surveillance on Americans.
  Until we receive the information, the data, the letters that we have 
requested to know what they have done, information we have been waiting 
for more than 10 months for, we can't even begin to responsibly 
consider such a request. So as of now, it's out. No retroactive 
immunity.
  The legislation that we have before us now is a much-needed start to 
restoring our system of checks and balances, preserving our liberty, 
and ensuring that our government has the tools they legitimately need 
to combat terrorism. We got pressed up against the wall in August. It's 
not going to happen again. There's a 6-month run on the present measure 
before us. Before we get pushed up against the holidays, we are saying, 
Let's do it now.
  We have had a tremendous working relationship with the chairman of 
the Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes, and his staff and my 
staff. Majority and minority have been working

[[Page H14046]]

closely together to bring to you a commonsense and balanced piece of 
legislation that does what we set out to do, and that is to preserve 
our liberties and make sure we have effective security. We want our 
intelligence agencies strong, but we want to bring the FISA Court back 
into the picture, and we do in the measure before us.
  Six years ago, the administration unilaterally chose to engage in 
warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court review. 
That decision has--to be charitable--created a legal and political 
quagmire. Officials resigned, the program was riddled with errors, it 
was shut down for several weeks, officials rushed to the hospital to 
ask a sick man to reauthorize it over his deputy's objections, and 
vital prosecutorial resources were diverted. Most importantly, our own 
citizens questioned wheher their own government was operating within 
the confines of the law.
  Two months ago, when that scheme appeared to be breaking down, the 
administration forced Congress to accept an equally flawed statute. 
This new law gutted the power of the FISA court. It granted the 
administration broad new powers to engage in warrantless searches 
within the U.S., including physical searches of our homes, computers, 
offices and medical records. The law contained no meaningful oversight 
whatsoever.
  The legislation before us today seeks to once again strike the 
appropriate balance between needed government authority and our 
precious rights and liberties. It tells the government they need no 
warrant when foreign agents communicate with other foreigners. It 
reiterates that warrants are needed when Americans are being targeted. 
The bill also allows the interception of communications of foreign 
targets who may communicate with U.S. persons. However, it insists that 
procedures be in place--approved by the FISA court--to insure that no 
American is being targeted, and that his or her privacy is protected.
  The bill also provides for several critical safeguards. We include 
periodic audits by the Inspector General, we narrow the scope of the 
authority to protect against threats to our national security, and we 
protect the privacy of Americans traveling abroad. We also sunset the 
legislation in December 2009.
  The RESTORE Act, which has received careful consideration by the 
Judiciary Committee and by the Intelligence Committee, addresses the 
needs of the intelligence community for flexibility and the ability to 
deal with modern communications networks.
  It meets every concern that our intelligence agencies have raised and 
does so consistent with the rule of law, our Constitution, and our 
values.
  Let me be clear on a few things this bill will NOT do:
  The RESTORE Act will never require our intelligence agencies to stop 
listening to the bad guys. Never. There are emergency provisions and 
the ability to get a warrant after the fact. No one will ever have to 
stop listening to a terrorist plotting an attack.
  It will not make our intelligence agencies get thousands of warrants 
for terrorists outside of the country. Instead, they can get a basket 
authorization to surveil the entire foreign terrorist organization. 
This is the most effective way to target Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and 
other threats.
  The RESTORE Act does not give the government free rein to listen in 
to Americans. As has always been the case under FISA, this bill 
requires the government to get a warrant if it wants to target an 
American.
  The Managers' Amendment also reflects the RESTORE Act's goals of 
intelligence flexibility and oversight, while ensuring both safety and 
civil liberties. It makes it clear that the protections of the Act will 
not inhibit gathering intelligence against present dangers, such as 
Osama bin Laden or threats to our troops in the field. It provides 
guidelines to flesh out what should be considered when determining 
whether a significant purpose of collection is to acquire information 
about a U.S. person, such that a FISA warrant would be required.
  The Manager's Amendment also provides important safeguards on 
dissemination of information about individual Americans when it is 
acquired under the RESTORE Act's more flexible structure. Dissemination 
of U.S. person communications acquired under the RESTORE Act's basket 
authorities can only happen when an SES-Ievel supervisor determines 
that the identity of that person is needed to understand or assess the 
importance of the foreign intelligence, and to protect the national 
security of the United States. This is not a blanket authorization to 
unmask everyone intercepted, but must be done on a person-by-person 
basis.
  Importantly, the bill has no retroactive immunity for 
telecommunications carriers. Until we receive the underlying 
documents relating to their conduct from the administration--and we 
have been waiting for more than ten months--we cannot even begin to 
consider this request. Sending a small set of the documents to a 
subcommittee of the other body does not begin to meet this test.

  There is one of the grave concerns about the Protect America Act that 
bears mention as we consider the RESTORE Act. The Protect America Act 
was overbroad in the types of entities from which the government could 
compel information, reaching into business or medical records or 
libraries. We have narrowed the scope of the acquisitions in the 
RESTORE Act to ensure that the government can only seek information 
under the ``basket authorizations'' from telecommunications service 
providers and related companies.
  I share the concern of our library community that believes their 
mission and the chance to bring knowledge and freedom of expression 
abroad will be diminished if the U.S. government can indiscriminately 
monitor American libraries when they serve foreign users. This is not a 
hypothetical concern in an age of distance learning. While a library 
certainly is not the same kind of ``communications service provider'' 
as AOL or AT&T, it may allow patrons to access the internet, to send 
emails, and to conduct research on-line, so it literally ``provides'' 
these communications services to patrons. The Judiciary Committee 
report indicates that these now-standard library services do not make 
them ``telecommunications service providers'' for a 105B or 105C 
acquisition, but let me be clear--nothing in the bill is intended to 
leave libraries outside of the protections of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act.
  The legislation before us today is a much needed start to restoring 
our system of checks and balances, to preserving our precious 
liberties, and to insuring that our government has all the tools they 
legitimately need to combat terrorism. I urge my colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle to support this common sense and balanced 
legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, there is a time and place for politics and partisanship. 
But there are in fact important issues that transcend politics. The 
security of our Nation outweighs politics, especially when our country 
is at war.
  One of the finest moments of bipartisanship in Washington came after 
one of the darkest days in our history. On the evening of September 11, 
2001, Members of Congress stood shoulder to shoulder on the steps of 
the Capitol as a symbol of strength and unity in response to the 
terrorist attacks. In that moment, we stood together, not as 
Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans resolved to protect our 
Nation. However, as we stand here today, that same spirit of 
bipartisanship we shared on 9/11 no longer exists.
  We began in August to address a very specific and very urgent issue 
facing our intelligence community. We learned from the Director of 
National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, that the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, or FISA, was outdated for today's technology. But the 
bill we are considering today does not modernize FISA; it weakens it. 
Why, after 30 years of lawful foreign intelligence collection, does the 
Democratic majority suddenly object to a law that their party 
originally enacted in 1978? Why make it harder to gather intelligence 
on terrorists after 9/11 than before?
  Now, after only a few hours' notice, we are considering the RESTORE 
Act, which actually restores little. Rather, it undermines our national 
security and increases the risk of a future terrorist attack on our 
country. It prevents our intelligence community from gathering critical 
intelligence information. It ignores the need for legal protection for 
communications companies that assist law enforcement and intelligence 
officials. We are at war with terrorists who spend every day plotting 
attacks against us. Our intelligence community needs to detect and 
disrupt these plots. To deny this ability could have catastrophic 
consequences.
  Admiral McConnell testified in great detail before the Judiciary 
Committee about the specific needs of the intelligence community and 
the need to reform FISA. Admiral McConnell's recommendations are 
ignored, unfortunately, in the RESTORE Act. Instead, it requires the 
intelligence community to obtain FISA court orders for all 
communications of persons reasonably believed to be outside the United 
States. FISA has never applied to persons outside of the United States.
  Under the RESTORE Act, FISA court orders will be required for the 
first time ever for thousands of overseas terrorist targets. Also, 
section 18 of the

[[Page H14047]]

manager's amendment is bluntly titled: ``No Rights Under the RESTORE 
Act for Undocumented Aliens.'' That is what it says. But the practical 
effect of the RESTORE Act will be to allow unregulated, warrantless 
wiretapping of illegal immigrants in the United States. Is this really 
what the Democratic majority intends?
  Finally, the RESTORE Act omits any liability protection for telephone 
companies and other carriers that assisted the government after 
September 11, 2001. These companies deserve our thanks, not a flurry of 
harassing lawsuits. Communications technology has changed since 1978. 
We can no longer gather foreign intelligence without the assistance of 
private communications companies. Extending commonsense liability 
protection to communication providers who acted in good faith to 
protect the United States from another terrorist attack is completely 
appropriate. If we fail to provide this protection, we risk losing the 
future cooperation of communication providers in gathering foreign 
intelligence.
  Democrats made a promise to the American people in 2006 that Members 
of Congress would put aside politics and work together to find 
bipartisan solutions to issues facing the American people. That promise 
has apparently been broken.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise once again in support of H.R. 3773, the RESTORE 
Act. I would also like the Record to reflect that Congressman Baron 
Hill intended to be listed as a cosponsor of H.R. 3773, and we are 
certainly grateful for his support.
  In early September, at the direction of Speaker Pelosi, the 
Intelligence Committee and the House Judiciary Committee took up the 
call to improve the Protect America Act, or PAA. Passed in August, the 
PAA modified FISA and gave sweeping and unprecedented surveillance 
powers to the executive branch, while requiring minimal oversight and 
without providing a meaningful judicial check on the President's use of 
the new powers.
  While we were charged with undoing the excesses of PAA, we also have 
the mandate to provide our intelligence professionals the legal 
authorities required to protect the country from our enemies. Six years 
after the tragic attacks of 9/11, Osama bin Laden remains at large and 
America continues to face threats from al Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations. The war in Iraq continues to act as a recruitment tool 
for all our enemies.
  Mindful of these threats, we drafted the RESTORE Act as a bill that 
we can all support and be proud of. The RESTORE Act arms our 
intelligence community with powerful new authorities to conduct 
electronic surveillance of targets outside the United States while 
maintaining our fundamental liberties. First, it exempts truly foreign-
to-foreign communications from any judicial review, even when the 
communication passes through the United States or the surveillance 
device is still actually located in the United States. Second, it 
authorizes the acquisition of foreign intelligence information for all 
matters of national defense, including information relating to 
terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and other threats to the national 
security of our country.
  Third, the act clarifies that nothing in the act or the amendments to 
the act shall be construed to prohibit lawful surveillance necessary to 
prevent Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization 
from attacking the United States or our allies. But these powerful 
authorities are subject to the checks and the balances required by our 
Constitution.
  The RESTORE Act puts the FISA Court back in business where the rights 
of Americans are at stake. The RESTORE Act tightens overbroad language 
in the PAA that authorized physical searches of Americans' homes and 
offices without a warrant. The RESTORE Act restores meaningful, robust, 
and continuous oversight by the judicial and legislative branches to 
ensure that the powerful intelligence-gathering tools authorized by the 
RESTORE Act are being used effectively and within the boundaries set by 
our Constitution.
  In sum, the RESTORE Act provides tools to keep the Nation safe and 
upholds our constitutional liberties. This debate has gone on long 
enough, I believe, Mr. Speaker. It has been unnecessarily prolonged 
bipartisan maneuvering from some in this House. I am sure that we will 
see more of that partisan gamesmanship tonight. But I urge my 
colleagues to reject partisan politics in favor of sound policy and 
support this critically important bill.
  I urge all my colleagues to vote ``yes'' for the RESTORE Act.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1830

  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), the ranking member of the Crime 
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, unfortunately some things never change, and 
unfortunately this bill happens to be one of them. No matter how 
dangerous law enforcement says this bill is, it hasn't changed. No 
matter how dangerous the intelligence community says it is, this bill 
hasn't changed. And unfortunately there is a cycle that won't change 
either, and that cycle is simply this.
  In the nineties, we cut our intelligence capabilities. On 9/11/2001, 
we had the worst terrorist attack that has ever hit our shores. Since 
that time our intelligence community and our law enforcement people 
have worked hard and they have kept us safe. But if we have another 
hit, and this bill puts us on the same cycle, because what are we doing 
now? We are cutting our intelligence capabilities once again, like we 
did in the nineties. If we have another terrorist attack, the cycle 
will repeat itself, and they will bring back in law enforcement and 
they will point their fingers and they will say, why didn't you stop 
it?
  Mr. Speaker, we have an opportunity tonight not to repeat that cycle 
by not passing this bill and making the amendments necessary to keep 
our intelligence strong.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to recognize a very 
effective member of our committee, Mr. Schiff of California, as well as 
the gentleman Mr. Flake of Arizona, and I would yield them 2 minutes.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the chairman for yielding and for his leadership.
  Over the last 2 years, I have worked with my Republican colleague 
Jeff Flake of Arizona to ensure that the government has all the tools 
necessary to pursue al Qaeda and all the other terrorists who would 
seek to harm our country while ensuring that the requirement of court 
approval of surveillance of Americans on American soil is met.
  I am pleased that the committee has included many of the items we 
proposed, including reiterating FISA's exclusivity, providing robust 
oversight reporting, requiring FISA Court involvement when U.S. persons 
are involved, and clarifying that the interception of foreign-to-
foreign communications does not require a court order.
  To address a concern raised by Mr. Flake, our language makes clear 
that a court order would not be required for electronic surveillance 
directed at the acquisition of communications between persons that are 
not known to be U.S. persons and are reasonably believed to be located 
outside the U.S., without respect to whether the communication passes 
through the U.S. or the surveillance device is located in the U.S.
  We have also placed additional safeguards to ensure this section is 
not abused and used to acquire communications of U.S. persons.
  I am pleased to yield the balance of my time to my colleague.
  Mr. FLAKE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I have enjoyed working 
with Representative Schiff on this, and I thank the committee for 
addressing our concerns. Our concerns had to do mostly, my own concern 
in particular, with making sure that we are not involving a court when 
you are talking about foreign-to-foreign communications or 
communications between persons who are not known to be U.S. residents 
or not known or reasonably believed to be within the U.S. I believe 
those concerns were addressed here, and I appreciate the work that was 
done to do that.

[[Page H14048]]

  As mentioned, our language also requires that if a U.S. citizen is 
inadvertently tripped up in the communication, that proper procedures 
are taken to deal with that and that the information is disseminated to 
the right people and committees. So I appreciate the committee's work 
on this.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Gohmert), the deputy ranking member of the Crime 
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Speaker, to be accused of partisan maneuvering is 
pretty insulting. Some of us are not concerned about partisan 
maneuvering; we are concerned about the security of the United States. 
That is why I am here right now, not because of partisan maneuvering.
  Do you want to talk partisan maneuvering? How about when I go out to 
get a copy of the most current bill and we have got a bait and switch. 
This isn't even the most current bill out there that we can get ahold 
of to come in and talk about. But I know the provision, and I 
appreciate my fine chairman talking about we have taken care of 
emergency situations, and then we had two Members just talk about 
emergency situations.
  If you take these provisions, and hopefully the part I am talking 
about is the latest, that is the way I understand from what you are 
talking about, it says specifically in here, yeah, there is an 
emergency provision, but in order to get it, the Director of National 
Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, who was the National Security Advisor 
for President Clinton, he and the Attorney General have to jointly be 
able to swear that the targets of their acquisition are not reasonably 
believed to be located outside of the United States and they are not 
reasonably believed to be United States persons.
  You take that with their testimony, the testimony was I cannot ever 
swear that. The way you do this intelligence is you go after a foreign 
target, and I can never testify, he said, as to who the person will be 
that they call. I can never testify that I reasonably believe they will 
be outside the United States when they call or that they will not be a 
United States person.
  So, if he comes in and does this after he has testified ``I cannot 
say I reasonably believe that they will not call somebody in the U.S., 
when I don't know who they will call,'' then we got problems. This does 
not protect the problem. We need to vote ``no.''
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 seconds to the gentleman from Iowa 
(Mr. Boswell).
  Mr. BOSWELL. I thank the gentleman and I support the bill.
  I submit for the Record an op-ed by our friend and former colleague, 
the Honorable Lee Hamilton, cochair of the 9/11 Commission, regarding 
the issue of retroactive immunity. The op-ed fully expresses my 
concerns regarding this issue, and I wish for all Members to have the 
benefit of reviewing it.

                 [From the Baltimore Sun, Nov. 4, 2007]

             Immunity for Wiretap Assistance Is Right Call

                          (By Lee H. Hamilton)

       If the local fire company asked for your help putting out 
     neighbor's blaze, you would not force the firefighters to 
     justify their request. You would just help, right? That's 
     what the phone companies did when the Bush administration 
     asked them in secret for help with wiretaps to target al-
     Qaida communications into and out of the country.
       However, the president's warrantless wiretap program caused 
     a furor when it became public. The administration had 
     circumvented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
     raising many doubts about the legality and even 
     constitutionality of its wiretap program. The controversy 
     prompted class-action lawsuits against phone companies that 
     cooperated with the government.
       The Senate Intelligence Committee has reported out a 
     bipartisan bill that would bring this wiretap program back 
     under the FISA statute and court review. It would ensure the 
     legality and robust congressional oversight so lacking in the 
     original program. It also would give the phone companies 
     immunity for their previous actions.
       The committee made the right call. To the extent that 
     companies helped the government, they were acting out of a 
     sense of patriotic duty and in the belief that their actions 
     were legal. Dragging them through litigation would set a bad 
     precedent. It would deter companies and private citizens from 
     helping in future emergencies when there is uncertainty or 
     legal risk.
       The help and cooperation of all our citizens are vital in 
     combating the threats we face today. Companies in various 
     sectors of the economy are going to have information that 
     could save the lives of thousands of Americans. When they 
     respond in an emergency, at the call of our highest elected 
     officials and on assurances that what they are doing is 
     legal, they must be treated fairly. To do otherwise would put 
     our security at risk.
       This is particularly true of communications companies. They 
     are critical to our intelligence and ``early warning'' 
     against terrorist attacks. The increasing complexity of 
     communications technology has made the voluntary cooperation 
     of these companies vital.
       Government actions require public review. Actions by 
     private companies in response to government requests also 
     should place the burden of accountability on the government. 
     We should not expect private companies to second-guess the 
     propriety and legality of government requests. That is the 
     job of our public servants in the executive branch, the 
     legislators who oversee them, and ultimately the courts.
       Unless Congress provides immunity, the clear message will 
     be that private citizens should help only when they are 
     certain that all the government's actions are legal. Given 
     today's threats, that is too high a standard. We should hold 
     public officials accountable for their actions--and hold 
     harmless private citizens and companies when they respond to 
     government requests to help protect us.

  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Eshoo), who serves as the chairwoman of our 
Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management.
  Ms. ESHOO. I thank the distinguished chairman of the House 
Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation very importantly covers espionage, 
terrorism, sabotage and all threats to our national security. That 
sentence alone frames what this issue is about and the seriousness of 
it.
  The other part of it that fills out the frame is that it restores the 
FISA Court. It restores the FISA Court to its prominence, and, by doing 
so, it restores a legal framework for surveillance that must be 
conducted to protect our national security.
  This legislation provides every meaningful tool of the legislation 
that was passed last August. But, unlike that bill, it protects the 
rights of the American people.
  The legislation is true to its name. It restores the role for all 
three branches of our government by reestablishing the checks and the 
balances that have protected our security, as well as our rights as 
Americans. This is what the American people not only expect, it is what 
they have become accustomed to, and they like it.
  This legal framework for the NSA surveillance is absolutely 
essential. When no Americans are involved, no judicial oversight is 
required. When an American communication may be intercepted, the court 
must approve the procedures for handling it. Finally, when an American 
is targeted, the court must be asked for an order.
  The American people know all too well that this administration is now 
considered the most secretive in the history of our country. It has 
operated with unchecked power and without judicial or congressional 
oversight. We now know that the President went around the courts to 
conduct a program of warrantless surveillance of calls to Americans. We 
now know that the FBI abused the authorities granted under the PATRIOT 
Act improperly using National Security Letters to American businesses, 
including medical, financial and library records, instead of seeking a 
warrant from the court. In hundreds of signing statements, the 
President has quietly claimed he had the authority to set aside 
statutes passed by Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, I think enough is enough. This bill says that the 
executive is not the imperial branch of government. It restores the 
fundamental balance struck by our Framers, to secure our Nation and to 
protect the rights of all Americans. Preserving that balance makes our 
Nation stronger, and this is at the core of the legislation before us. 
I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Lungren) who is the senior member of both the 
Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in 
opposition to this bill, and I am sorry that I have to do that. I 
respect the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers). We have worked on 
many things together. I believe he is a prime time player, but I 
disagree with his statement that this bill is ready for prime time.

[[Page H14049]]

  To just give one example, if you look at section 6 of this bill, 
section 6 of the bill differs with the way we handle minimization under 
current law by saying that if there is evidence of a crime, it cannot 
be disseminated to a criminal justice entity. Now, maybe there is a 
reason for that, but that has never been discussed whatsoever.
  Secondly, I would say that in the two 1-hour Special Orders I gave, I 
raised the problem that exists in the underlying bill as we now see it, 
which is in the very beginning of the bill, and it deals with a section 
entitled ``treatment of inadvertent interceptions.''
  It deals with a situation where the intelligence community believes 
in good faith that they are dealing with foreign-to-foreign, but 
inadvertently they capture communication that deals with foreign-to-
domestic. And what we say here is that you cannot use that information 
for any purpose, any purpose. It cannot be disclosed. It cannot be 
disseminated. It cannot be used for any purpose or retained for longer 
than 7 days, unless what? A court order is obtained or unless the 
Attorney General determines that the information indicates a threat of 
death or serious bodily harm to any person, that the information 
indicates that.
  I have stood on this floor on several occasions and said what that 
means is if we have a conversation or a communication involving Osama 
bin Laden, and everybody recognizes that might be the case, because in 
the manager's amendment we talk about Osama bin Laden, if in fact that 
occurs and the communication deals with someone within the United 
States, and he doesn't in that communication have information 
indicating a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person, but 
indicates where he happens to be, the exact cave where he is at, we 
cannot operate on that in a timely fashion.
  I would challenge any Member on the other side of the aisle to read 
the language in the underlying merged text, page 3, entitled 
``Treatment of Inadvertent Interceptions,'' and tell me that I am 
wrong. This is, whether it is by mistake or you intended it to happen, 
giving greater protection to a terrorist around the world than you give 
to an American citizen charged with a crime.
  I have said it before and I will say it again: I don't believe you 
intended this, but it is in the bill. As a matter of fact, the 
gentleman from New York, the chairman of the Constitutional Rights 
Subcommittee, came to me after we had an exchange on the floor on the 
issue and said, ``You are right. We goofed up. We should get rid of 
it.'' Yet we are here with it on the floor. For that reason alone, we 
ought to defeat the bill.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am stunned by my friend from California's 
comments, but I yield now 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Nadler), the chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee in Judiciary.
  Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation restores the proper role of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court in the maintenance of our national 
security infrastructure. Let's get the terms of this debate clear 
before we begin. Anyone who can read will see that this bill does not 
inhibit the government's ability to spy on terrorists or on suspected 
terrorists or to act swiftly and effectively on the information we 
gather.

                              {time}  1845

  The American people expect that their government will keep us all 
safe and free. This bill does that.
  The bill does not require individual warrants of foreign terrorists 
located outside the United States. That has been the law for three 
decades; that is still the law.
  The bill does provide reasonable FISA Court oversight to ensure that 
when our government starts spying on Americans, it does so lawfully by 
getting a warrant from the FISA Court. It will put an end to this 
administration's well-worn ``trust me'' routine.
  I trust our intelligence community to gather solid intelligence on 
threats to our Nation. But protecting constitutional rights is not 
their prime job. That is why we have courts.
  This bill provides for Congress to receive independent reports on how 
the act is working and what our government is doing. This 
administration's penchant for secrecy and aversion to accountability 
will come to an end, at least in this area.
  Let me say a word for demands for retroactive immunity for the 
telecom companies. As many of our colleagues have pointed out, any such 
discussion is premature. We do not even know what we are being asked to 
immunize or whose rights would be compromised if we did so.
  More importantly, Congress should not decide legal cases between 
private parties; that's for the courts. If the claims are not 
meritorious, the courts will throw them out. But if the claims do have 
merit, we have no right to wipe them without even reviewing the 
evidence. How dare we have the presumption to decide the rights of 
allegedly injured parties in the blind.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill meets every single principle set forth by the 
Congressional Progressive Caucus. As one of the co-chairs of the 
caucus' FISA Task Force, I am pleased to support this important bill. 
It is true to our Constitution. It is true to our values. It is true to 
our safety. It will keep us safe and free.
  This bill gives our intelligence agencies the tools they have told us 
they need to make us safe, and gives the FISA Court the tools it needs 
to ensure that the extraordinary powers we are giving to the 
intelligence community are used correctly and consistently with our 
laws and our Constitution.
  It's called the separation of powers, with each branch of the 
government doing what it is supposed to do and acting as a check on the 
others. FISA exists to ensure that the balance between the needs of 
intelligence gathering and the protection of the rights of all 
Americans are balanced.
  Most importantly, it restores the role of FISA as the exclusive legal 
basis for foreign intelligence surveillance. No more making it up as 
you go along.
  Did the telecoms break the law? Were they acting appropriately? Were 
the rights of innocent Americans violated? We don't know.
  How dare we have the presumption to decide the rights of allegedly 
injured parties in the blind?
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Arizona (Mr. Shadegg), a senior member of the Commerce Committee.
  Mr. SHADEGG. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I think this is a very, very important debate. I understand the 
frustration of the majority in trying to deal with this issue, but I 
believe they have created a structure that even they themselves don't 
understand, and a structure that fundamentally turns the Constitution 
and the role of at least two branches of the government upside down.
  We have the executive branch which is charged with defending the 
Nation against foreign enemies and we have the judicial branch which is 
charged with applying and interpreting the laws. But it is charged with 
judging disputes between American citizens, not with making decisions 
how about to gather foreign intelligence.
  Now, how does this bill work? Number one, it says if the executive 
branch in carrying out its duty to protect the country from foreign 
enemies knows in advance that both people, both ends of a telephone 
communication or some other electronic communication, are in fact 
foreigners, no warrant is needed.
  Well, if we could be mind readers and if we could hire mind readers 
as intelligence officers, that might be useful. But everyone in the 
intelligence community tells you that have targeted one person, and 
without the ability to read the mind of that person, you don't know who 
the other person they are calling is.
  So as a matter of fact, you can never know, never ever know, no CIA 
agent, no judge, nobody can ever know that both people are foreigners. 
And so if the law says if you don't know that both are foreigners, you 
must get a warrant from a judge.
  Now they have said we are going to be reasonable about it; it is 
going to be a basket warrant. But that then gives the duty of 
protecting the Nation to a judge, an unelected judge.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), our chairman of the Select 
Intelligence Oversight Panel.
  Mr. HOLT. I thank my friend and colleague from Texas.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill. As many of you know, 
when the committee reported this bill to the floor, I expressed 
concerns that it

[[Page H14050]]

lacked provisions ensuring that the courts would decide whether the 
executive branch could seize and search communications of Americans.
  The RESTORE Act now before us includes provisions via the manager's 
amendment that will ensure that it is the courts, not an executive 
branch political appointee, who decides whether or not the 
communications of an American can be seized and searched and that such 
seizures and searches must be done pursuant to an individualized court 
order.
  This bill gives our citizens the best protection we can provide them, 
a sound intelligence collection that will foil our enemies and the 
review of the executive branch's surveillance actions by the court. In 
other words, each of us can say to each of our constituents: you have 
the protection of the court.
  Now, it is important to note that this bill will provide better 
intelligence than existing law, the existing law which was passed in 
haste and fear. This bill, by applying checks and balances, improves 
intelligence collection and analysis. It has been demonstrated that 
when officials establish before a court that they have reason to 
intercept communications, we get better intelligence, better 
intelligence than we get through indiscriminate collection and fishing 
expeditions.
  Mr. Speaker, this does it right. Mr. Speaker, I would like to close 
by thanking the staff of the committee, Jeremy Bash and Eric Greenwald; 
and from the Judiciary Committee, Lou DeBaca and Burt Wides; as well as 
the chairmen, Mr. Reyes and Mr. Conyers, who took my concerns to heart 
and made them their own concerns. It has produced a good bill. I urge 
my colleagues to vote ``yes'' for the RESTORE Act.
  Mr. Speaker, the RESTORE Act will ensure that it is the courts--and 
not an executive branch political appointee--who decide whether or not 
the communications of an American citizen can be seized and searched, 
and that such seizures and searches must be done pursuant to a court 
order. This bill gives our citizens the best protection we can provide 
them: good intelligence collection against our adversaries, and review 
of the executive branch's surveillance actions by a court.
  I was pleased to be able to work with my colleagues on the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to add several key 
provisions to this bill. For example, the bill's most critical new 
provision ensures that the government must have an individualized, 
particularized court-approved warrant based on probable cause in order 
to read or listen to the communications of an American citizen. 
Inclusion of this provision was vital. We must be able to assure our 
citizens that their communications cannot be seized and searched by the 
government in the absence of a court order, and with this provision now 
in the bill, we can provide that assurance.
  Another provision I worked to include requires the Court to review 
and approve not only the procedures and guidelines required under this 
Act, but also the application of those guidelines. This provision 
provides another important point of review by the courts that will help 
ensure that the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence are actually doing what they claim they are doing.
  I also asked that a provision be inserted that makes it clear that 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is the sole statutory 
basis for domestic surveillance. This language was needed to remove any 
ambiguity. We cannot have any President inventing other claims for 
secret, warrantless surveillance.
  The bill also provides additional resources to both the executive and 
judiciary branches for processing FISA applications and orders. The 
bill increases the number of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) judges from 11 to 15, provides additional personnel to both the 
FISC and government agencies responsible for making and processing FISA 
applications, creates an electronic filing, sharing, and document 
management system for handling this highly classified data, and 
mandates training for all government personnel involved in the FISA 
process. All of this will help modernize and streamline the FISA 
application approval process.
  Finally, the bill requires the Bush administration to ``fully 
inform'' Congress on all surveillance programs conducted since 9/11. 
It's outrageous that the Bush Administration has continued to stonewall 
this Congress over documents for the one program it has acknowledged. 
If we're to do our job of oversight, we need all the facts about past 
and current surveillance programs, and this provision will help us get 
those answers.
  I hope our colleagues in the Senate will quickly pass the RESTORE 
Act, and I call upon the President to end his veto threats and work 
with Congress to bring America's surveillance activities into 
compliance with the Constitution.
  President Bush has no inherent Constitutional authority to spy on our 
own citizens in the name of national security. If the President is 
serious about passing a law that allows us to protect our citizens from 
all enemies--foreign and domestic--he will sign this bill.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the distinguished minority whip of 
the House.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for 
his hard work on the floor this evening, for the leadership of Mr. 
Hoekstra and others on this important bill. We need to modernize FISA 
to keep up with changes in communications technology and the 
continually evolving tactics of our terrorist enemies.
  We made some important steps in this direction only 90 days ago. We 
all understand that more needs to be done. But rather than responding 
to this need, this legislation actually impedes the intelligence 
community's ability to conduct effective investigations and to prevent 
future terrorist attacks.
  This act requires FISA court orders for the first time for thousands 
of overseas terrorist targets. The Director of National Intelligence, 
Admiral McConnell, has described this requirement as unworkable and 
impractical.
  This act contains a sunset date which fails to provide the certainty 
under the law that our intelligence community needs to effectively do 
its job.
  It doesn't provide the liability protections for telephone companies 
and other carriers that assisted the government after 9/11 who now have 
a flurry of harassing lawsuits facing them.
  Mr. Speaker, the majority claims that this legislation will restore a 
balance between civil liberties and national security. In fact, this 
bill will restore the intelligence gap that existed prior to our 
actions the 1st of August.
  I urge this legislation be defeated. The current bill is better than 
this bill. We need to deal with it certainly between now and the end of 
the 6 months, but let's not take a step backwards. Let's let the law do 
what this law was intended to do in 1978 and is doing today.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure now to recognize the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz), a member of the 
Judiciary Committee, for 1\1/4\ minutes.
  Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, in August I urged my colleagues 
to vote against an unconstitutional Senate bill. Simply put, that bill 
trampled on our constituents' constitutional right to privacy.
  Today, I am proud to rise in support of the RESTORE Act, a bill that 
provides the intelligence community the tools it needs, but that 
restores the constitutional rights of Americans.
  Mr. Speaker, we can be both safe and free, and this bill strikes the 
right balance.
  This bill permits surveillance of foreign-to-foreign communication. 
It allows us to listen in on Osama bin Laden or any other terrorist who 
threatens our troops or country. This bill will keep us safe.
  But this bill also requires a warrant from the FISA Court in order to 
eavesdrop on the communications of ordinary Americans, and it requires 
a court review of targeting procedures to ensure Americans' rights are 
protected. This bill restores our civil liberties.
  Mr. Speaker, our colleagues across the aisle would rather play 
politics with this bill and unleash arguments of mass distortion, so 
let me be clear: nothing in this bill gives our constitutional rights 
to terrorists.
  Our Republican colleagues create this smoke screen in order to hide 
the fact that they have taken away those same constitutional freedoms 
from Americans.
  We need not choose between our secure and liberty. With the RESTORE 
Act, we can have both.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  This morning as we did the rules debate, I asked some questions of my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, and they said we will cover 
that during general debate tonight.
  So the questions I have that I hope will be answered is in the 
manager's amendment that was presented this

[[Page H14051]]

morning and was voted on in the self-enacting rule talks about illegal 
aliens. The questions I have:
  Would it allow surveillance against possible illegal aliens for law 
enforcement purposes?
  Would it allow foreign intelligence surveillance to be conducted 
against transnational smuggling rings?
  Would it allow surveillance to determine whether someone is an alien 
not permitted to be in or remain in the United States?
  Would the amendment exempt undocumented aliens from the physical 
search requirements of FISA? Exactly how far does this amendment go? 
What is it intended to do?
  These were the questions that I asked this morning that I hope will 
be answered tonight.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, could I ask how much time remains on each 
side.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has 
6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) has 
3\3/4\ minutes remaining. The time has expired for the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Smith). The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has 14 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time so we can 
balance the time out with the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Thornberry), a member of the committee.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate that here we are again 
debating a FISA bill that is more about politics than it is about the 
country. This bill is a cobbled-together mess designed to keep most of 
the Democratic Caucus together rather than a bill designed to meet the 
national security needs of the country. It is full of contradictory, 
unworkable provisions.
  Most of this body and most of the American people agree that our 
intelligence professionals, civilian and military, should be able to 
gather foreign intelligence on terrorists and others without having a 
pack of lawyers trail along behind you. Unfortunately, that is exactly 
what they will need if this bill were to ever become law.
  It is also sad that those who have volunteered to help defend us 
against terrorists are being punished. We debate Good Samaritan laws 
from time to time. The country needs Good Samaritans, as well, to help 
prevent terrorist attacks.
  What the country needs, Mr. Speaker, is an updated law that 
intelligence professionals can really use, that really works in the 
field, not some cobbled-together mess designed to achieve a political 
purpose just before a recess. We can do better. I continue to hope that 
someday this House actually will.

                              {time}  1900

  Mr. REYES. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman on the committee, 
Mr. Tiahrt of Kansas.
  Mr. TIAHRT. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for yielding to me. I 
rise in opposition to this bill.
  I am really surprised by the procedure we have gone through to get to 
this point in this legislation. You know, under the underlying bill we 
had open hearings, we had closed hearings, we looked at a lot of the 
details and openly debated them and I thought we were making pretty 
good progress. But then, in the self-enacting rule, we have a whole 
bunch of new language that is dumped into this bill that has had no 
hearings.
  In fact, section 18 says in this bill now, no rights under the 
RESTORE Act for undocumented aliens. It says: This Act shall not be 
construed to prohibit surveillance of an alien not permitted to be in 
the United States.
  Undocumented aliens, no rights.
  Then we get to what, the rights that the terrorists have in the 
underlying bill. Section 3 has procedures for authorizing acquisitions 
of communications, and there are 8 pages telling how we are going to 
protect the terrorists. They have got some rights protected under this 
bill.
  Then we get to section 4, the emergency authorization. We have 8 more 
pages explaining how terrorists have more rights than undocumented 
aliens right here in the United States.
  So then we listened to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lungren), 
who is the former Attorney General of the State of California, and he 
explains that, through the minimization procedures, that we are 
actually giving terrorists more rights than we do our own U.S. common 
criminals.
  So what is the deal with this? It is really a mess. You have got 
terrorists at a higher status than undocumented aliens that are here in 
America and a lot of them just trying to make a living, and then you 
have got a higher standard for terrorists than you do for our own 
criminals. Now, why don't we balance things out here? Why don't we 
balance things out? You have tried to push this thing through without 
hearings, you have hodgepodged it together, and it truly is a mess. We 
ought to send this back to committee and do the right thing on this.
  We want to protect the rights of American citizens, and we think that 
humans have a certain set of rights, too. But this bill does not 
provide it. It has mixed standards. It is a mess, and I think we should 
vote it down.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time until we 
balance out the time.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I think we have balanced the time. We 
chose on our side to go with the 15 minutes of Judiciary time and then 
15 minutes of Intelligence time. I believe the people in opposition to 
this bill now have 10 minutes; the people who are supportive of this 
bill have 11. That sounds like balance to me.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, how much time is remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has 
6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) 
has 10\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Conyers) has 3\3/4\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I will now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the RESTORE Act 
because I believe that the way we conduct the fight against terrorism 
says a great deal about who we are as a people.
  We all want to keep the country safe from terrorism and to provide 
the necessary tools to our intelligence community, but I am not willing 
to sacrifice who we are and what we stand for just because this 
President says so.
  The President's Protect America Act cut the FISA Court out of the 
process. The RESTORE Act puts the court back in. Now, the court, not 
the President, will decide whether the constitutional legal 
requirements are met. The court will assess in advance a program of 
surveillance that may intercept the communications of Americans. The 
court will ensure that the system the NSA establishes will protect the 
rights of any Americans they come across. The RESTORE Act clarifies the 
Protect America Act cannot be used to conduct secret searches of 
Americans' homes, businesses, computers, and medical records. It 
reiterates the exclusivity of FISA, which would put an end to secret, 
warrantless spying programs. It makes clear that the President has to 
obey the laws.
  The RESTORE Act requires meaningful reporting to the Congress about 
the warrantless surveillance programs that have occurred since 
September 11, and it will require meaningful oversight in the future. 
The RESTORE Act will make America safer and keeps us true to who we are 
as a Nation. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes.''
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from 
California (Mr. Lungren).
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Once again, I would ask my friends on the other side of the aisle: 
Can anyone explain why, on page 3, you give stronger rights to someone 
who is a suspected terrorist, even Osama bin Laden, if he has a 
communication we intercept believing it was going to be foreign-to-
foreign, now foreign to someone in the United States, and in that he 
reveals where he is, why we cannot use that information as we are able 
to with a legal wiretap in the United States on an American citizen

[[Page H14052]]

charged with a crime who calls someone who is not a target of a crime? 
I do not understand it. Page 3. Is there anybody on your side who can 
explain why you would have that?
  The silence has been deafening for a month now on this.
  Mr. CONYERS. Would the former Attorney General of California yield?
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I would be happy to yield if the 
gentleman would tell me exactly what I just asked.
  Mr. CONYERS. That is why I seek to have you yield to me, sir.
  Osama bin Laden is never going to have any rights superior to any 
citizen.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Reclaiming my time, because I 
asked you to specifically talk about the language in the bill. I have 
read it and read it and read it, and you have refused to respond to it, 
even though the chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
told me that I was correct in my reading of the bill and that you folks 
were going to change it. You didn't change it. I expect that is because 
you forgot about it.
  I would invite the gentleman from New York to respond to me, because 
he intellectually honestly told me just 2\1/2\ weeks ago that you folks 
were going to change it. Why haven't you done it?
  Mr. Speaker, the silence I think speaks volumes. This is a bill that 
is not ready for prime time. It inadvertently protects Osama bin Laden 
with greater rights than an American citizen charged with a crime.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, it is very important that we understand 
that Mr. Lungren in his dramatic presentation about the cumbersomeness 
and the protections that we are affording bin Laden almost begs the 
question here.
  We have been on this bill for several times. We have got a carve-out 
here. Nothing prevents conducting lawful surveillance that is necessary 
to, one, prevent Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda or any other terrorists, 
Mr. Lungren, or any ally of those persons from receiving any of these 
protections. We can operate against them without giving them any 
rights, and I think you must know that by now.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman 
yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I can't give you time. I have got less than anybody 
here. No. I reserve the balance of my time.


                Announcement By the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ross). All Members are reminded to 
address their remarks to the Chair.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2 minutes to my 
colleague from Arizona (Mr. Shadegg).
  Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I want to point out that this bill raises a 
fundamental question: Do we trust judges, unelected judges, to control 
foreign intelligence? Are we going to move that responsibility from the 
executive branch to judges? Or is that not their job?
  As I explained earlier, this measure requires that a warrant be 
obtained every single time you are seeking to gather foreign 
intelligence. That means that we are asking Federal judges, who are 
unelected, to decide in 100 percent of the cases whether we can or 
cannot gather intelligence.
  Now, I respect judges. I admire judges. But judges have the duty of 
deciding disputes between Americans. They do not have the 
responsibility to protect our Nation. But this bill says you can never 
gather intelligence from a foreigner without first going and getting a 
warrant.
  So a job that under our Constitution has been given to the executive 
branch, that is, to conduct foreign intelligence and protect the 
Nation, we are now taking from the executive branch and giving to 
judges. Because unelected Federal judges, who have no responsibility to 
protect our Nation, no responsibility to gather foreign intelligence, 
now get to decide, this has never been true in the history of our 
Nation, whether or not the Federal Government will gather any 
intelligence.
  I respect judges. I am all for judges. If I am in a dispute over the 
civil rights of an American, I want a judge to decide. But when it 
comes to gathering intelligence about terrorists, we are going to take 
that authority away from the executive branch, which we have never done 
in the past, and give it to judges and judges only? Judges whom we 
cannot defeat in office, judges who are appointed, judges who do not 
stand for election, judges who cannot be voted out of office? We are 
going to take the authority away from the executive branch to protect 
our Nation and in 100 percent of cases give it to unelected judges. 
That is a mistake.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I think we just saw some shrill out of 
options articulation there.
  I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. 
Langevin).
  (Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3773. This 
legislation does exactly what our Constitution requires us to do: 
protect security while preserving civil liberties.
  Maintaining that balance has sometimes been difficult, and the events 
of 9/11 have made it even more challenging. However, the RESTORE Act is 
a carefully crafted solution. We all recognize the gravity of the 
threats facing our country, and this bill gives the Director of 
National Intelligence all the authority he has asked for to fight 
terrorism while at the same time it protects civil liberties.
  Further, the RESTORE Act provides for rigorous and independent 
oversight from the courts, the Congress, and the Department of Justice 
Inspector General. In our committee markup, I successfully offered an 
amendment to even strengthen this oversight by preserving the FISA 
Court's role to review compliance with their rules every 90 days for 
the life of a court order.
  Rigorous oversight is why the Bush administration objects to this 
bill. They want unfettered authority. Unfortunately, we have seen what 
happens without checks and balances, and I will not allow that to 
happen again. As Members of Congress, we took an oath to defend the 
Constitution and the principles on which it was founded.
  I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3773, which provides security 
while preserving the fundamental values that make this country so 
great.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from the 
State of New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
  Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Rhode 
Island talked about the importance of upholding the Constitution, and 
there is something in the manager's amendment to this bill that was 
inserted without any hearing in the committee that I don't understand, 
that makes no sense to me. It is a provision that says, very plainly: 
This act and the amendments made by this act shall not be construed to 
prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights to, an alien not 
permitted to be in or remain in the United States.
  Now, I think there are probably a lot of people on this side of the 
aisle who don't have a problem with that provision. What I don't 
understand is why you all are proposing it.
  Here is the irony here. This bill will extend rights under our 
Constitution to foreigners in foreign countries, while denying the 
protections of the Constitution to some 12 million people who are not 
legally in the United States, when the case law is clear that they do 
have rights. Whether we think they should have rights or not, the case 
law is absolutely clear. So we will deny those rights to people in the 
United States while extending them to people in foreign countries?
  I think we should be clear with the American people why we insisted 
on fixing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and did so 
successfully in August. We had soldiers who were kidnapped in Iraq by 
insurgents.

                              {time}  1915

  And because of changes in technology and the demands of the court, 
the American military had to go to lawyers in the United States to get 
a warrant to try to intercept the communications of the terrorists 
trying to kill them. That took time, too much time. And the law had to 
be fixed.
  Soldiers should not need an army of lawyers in Washington to listen 
to the communications of the enemy that's trying to kill them. This 
needed to be fixed, and we fixed it the first week of August.
  We all remember where we were on the morning of 9/11. We remember who 
we were with, what we were wearing, what we ate for breakfast.

[[Page H14053]]

  But people don't remember where they were the day that the British 
Government arrested 16 people who were within 48 hours of walking on to 
airliners and blowing them up simultaneously over the Atlantic. We 
don't remember it because it didn't happen. And the reason it didn't 
happen is because of exceptional intelligence and the cooperation of 
the British, Pakistani and American Governments.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I'm concerned about the self-induced 
confusion on the other side.
  I now yield 1\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Patrick J. Murphy) who served in Iraq and also serves with me on the 
Armed Services Committee, as well as our Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in 
support of the RESTORE Act and to set the record straight on an issue 
that is close to my heart.
  In May of 2007, three men from the 10th Mountain Division were 
captured in Iraq. They're names are Specialist Alex Jiminez, Private 
First Class Joseph Anzak, and Private Byron Fouty. I recite their names 
because the right wing attack machine never does. But these are the 
facts, and they're not pretty.
  The intelligence community stood ready to help find these three 
soldiers. But for 5 hours, for 5 hours, the Bush administration could 
not decide what to do. When they decided to go ahead, no Bush 
administration official could authorize it, could be found to authorize 
it. But when they finally found the Attorney General in Texas, it took 
an additional 2 hours to authorize the surveillance, even though he 
could have granted the authority in just minutes. Hours of indecision 
and incompetence while these three soldiers went missing.
  * * * * *
  While the RESTORE Act can solve many problems posed by the current 
FISA law, it will not solve the problem in these soldiers' situations.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask the 
gentleman's words be taken down with respect to the use of the word 
``deceit.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All Members will suspend.
  The Clerk will report the words.
  Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, this has been a 
very powerful and emotional debate today, and the issue is very close 
to my heart. I did not mean to offend anyone across the other side of 
the aisle. And I ask the Speaker and the other side for unanimous 
consent to withdraw the paragraph that may have given offense to some 
Members that were on the floor.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In this debate, the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Reyes) has 1\3/4\ minutes remaining, the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Conyers) has 2 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Hoekstra) has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  I just want to make a couple of points. Again, no one has answered 
the questions that I asked earlier today and that I asked in the debate 
tonight. The amendment talking about illegal aliens, would it allow for 
surveillance against possible illegal aliens? Would it allow for 
foreign intelligence surveillance to be conducted against transnational 
smuggling gangs? Would the amendment exempt undocumented aliens from 
the physical search requirements?
  And then just to reiterate the point that my colleague made in the 
previous speech, this is all about lawyering up the process, and that's 
what extends the time.
  At this point, I yield 1 minute to my colleague, Mr. Kirk of 
Illinois.
  Mr. KIRK. I thank the gentleman. And as the leader of the moderates 
in this, I would say that this issue should unite us all as Americans, 
not divide us along partisan lines.
  I also speak as a Navy intelligence officer that would say that the 
provision that was newly included in this legislation says that nothing 
in this act shall prevent an intelligence officer from monitoring 
someone related to al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri to 
prevent an attack against the United States. But so much of our 
intelligence is beyond the imminent attack on the United States. So 
much of us in the intelligence world, we have to watch the earliest 
signs of this.
  Let's be clear, this bill before us has nothing to do with the rights 
of U.S. citizens; those are already protected. As an intelligence 
officer, we are always drilled on the code of conduct in dealing with 
U.S. persons. This bill has everything to do with creating new rights 
for people overseas. And I think we should let our intelligence 
community monitor whoever Osama bin Laden is talking with to protect 
the United States, even if an attack is not imminent.

                              {time}  1945

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield for the purpose of making a 
unanimous consent request to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).
  (Mr. SCOTT of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in favor of the 
legislation.
   Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your leadership on efforts to address 
warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, or ``FISA'' and for introducing a bill that corrects many of the 
shortcomings of the bill that passed the House last August.
  The RESTORE Act establishes a strong framework, much stronger than 
the Administration's PROTECT Act, to fight terrorism effectively, while 
providing reasonable safeguards to protect personal privacy.
  One important change in the Restore Act is that it draws the 
appropriate distinctions based on the physical location and types of 
targets. There has never been any controversy over the fact that 
surveillance directed at people all of whom are overseas does not need 
any warrant at all. This bill rightly makes it clear that no court 
orders are required for the government to conduct surveillance on 
foreign targets outside the United States, even if the technical 
surveillance is conducted on U.S. soil. But if any surveillance is 
intentionally conducted on a U.S. person, this bill makes it clear that 
the government needs to apply for an individual warrant to conduct that 
surveillance. And if information on U.S. persons is incidentally 
collected, the Manager's Amendment to the bill rightly limits 
dissemination of that information among government agencies.
  Second, the bill removes vague and overbroad language from the bill 
passed in August that would allow the wiretapping of conversations 
without a warrant if the communication was ``concerning'' a foreign 
target. That, by its own wording, suggests that if two citizens are in 
the United States talking about somebody overseas, that you could 
wiretap their communications without a warrant. The bill before us 
makes it clear that the persons involved in the communications must be 
overseas, not just that the subject of their conversation must be 
overseas.

  Third, the RESTORE Act goes a step further than the Administration's 
bill and allows for the expanded wiretapping authority only in cases 
involving ``national security,'' as opposed to the over-expansive 
``foreign intelligence.'' ``Foreign intelligence'' could include trade, 
deals or anything involving general foreign affairs activities.
  Finally, the RESTORE Act was made even stronger in Committee by 
requiring the Department of Justice, in its application to the Court, 
to identify the ``primary purpose'' of its wiretapping. Under the 
original FISA, when an agent wanted to obtain the authority to conduct 
electronic surveillance or secret searches, a certificate was necessary 
detailing what the purpose of the surveillance was in order to obtain 
the warrant. The standard was altered by the Patriot Act, which 
provided that obtaining foreign intelligence only has to be ``a 
significant purpose.''
  We have to put this change in context because the Department of 
Justice has not credibly refuted the allegations that some U.S. 
Attorneys were fired, because they failed to indict Democrats in time 
to affect an upcoming election. So if the Department of Justice 
wiretapped someone when foreign intelligence was not the primary 
purpose, you have to wonder what the primary purpose was. This bill 
would allow the surveillance to be conducted but the administration 
would be required to reveal the true purpose of the wiretap to the 
secret FISA court.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize that we do not have to balance 
security and privacy. It is therefore important to note that everything 
that the administration can do in its own bill, it can do under this 
bill. We just require them to get a warrant before they do it, or if 
they are in a hurry, get a warrant after they do it, but they can 
wiretap and get the information. We just provide a modicum of oversight 
to ensure that our laws are being obeyed. I urge my colleagues to 
support the bill.

[[Page H14054]]

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am now pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
Speaker of the House, the gentlewoman from California, Nancy Pelosi.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, as one who has long served on the 
Intelligence Committee, I understand full well the threats to our 
national security. I understand full well the need for us to have 
legislation that strikes the proper balance between liberty and 
security. I think this legislation does just that. And I commend 
Chairman Conyers, chairman of the Judiciary Committee; and the chairman 
of the Intelligence Committee, Chairman Reyes, for their important work 
and their leadership in presenting this legislation to the floor for 
consideration.
  The bill is important and accomplishes the goal of striking the 
balance between security and liberty in the following ways: it defends 
Americans against terrorism and other threats; it protects Americans' 
civil liberties; and it restores checks and balances.
  The bill protects Americans by providing the Director of National 
Intelligence with the flexibility he has requested of Congress to 
conduct electronic surveillance of persons outside the United States. 
No warrants are required whenever foreign-to-foreign communications are 
captured regardless of the point of collection or anywhere in the 
world.
  It protects our civil liberties in a number of ways. The DNI has 
agreed that when Americans are targeted for surveillance, a warrant is 
required. We have now included certain criteria that the government 
must take into account in considering whether a warrant is required. 
This will help prevent inappropriate warrantless surveillance and 
``reverse targeting'' of Americans under the guise of foreign 
intelligence.
  The bill restores checks and balances. This is very, very important 
because it, again, is part of our oath of office to protect the 
Constitution of the United States. The bill rejects groundless claims 
of ``inherent executive authority.''
  There are those who claim that the President has inherent authority 
from the Constitution to do whatever he wishes. Long ago our Founders 
rejected that concept in founding our country. We must do that as well 
and continue to make that clear.
  The legislation also makes clear that FISA is the exclusive means for 
conducting electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence. The 
government must seek approval from a FISA Court. So we are talking 
about the Congress of the United States passing legislation, as it did 
in the late seventies, passing this legislation today which is in light 
of the new technologies and new reality in the world, and recognizing 
the authority of the third branch of government: the courts.
  This legislation includes extensive reporting to Congress with 
respect to the interception and dissemination of communications among 
Americans and from Americans. This is very important because we want to 
minimize the use of that information and keep it for the purpose for 
which it is collected.
  Most significantly, the bill does not provide immunity to 
telecommunications companies that participated in the President's 
warrantless surveillance program. We cannot even consider providing 
immunity unless we know exactly what we are providing immunity from. 
And even then, and even then, we have to proceed with great caution.
  It is important to note that the bill sunsets on December 31, 2009, 
the date the PATRIOT Act sunsets, so the next administration and the 
next Congress can review and reassess the program.
  This legislation is supported by organizations dedicated to 
protecting our national security and protecting our civil liberties, 
including the Center for National Security Studies, the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, and many other groups that work to protect 
privacy rights. The bill protects both national security and civil 
liberties, reaffirms our constitutional system of checks and balances, 
and deserves the support of this House.
  Mr. Speaker, all of us want our President to have the best possible 
intelligence, our President and our policymakers, so they can do the 
best possible job to protect the American people. But no President, 
Democrat or Republican, should have the authority, to have inherent 
authority, to collect on Americans without doing so under the law. This 
legislation establishes that principle; and it establishes it in a very 
focused way in keeping with the need for flexibility for the Director 
of National Intelligence, in keeping with honoring our oath of office 
to the Constitution. I urge our colleagues to support this important 
legislation.
  I, for one, am very, very proud of the work of Mr. Conyers and Mr. 
Reyes and thank them for their leadership.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  A month after I originally came to the floor to oppose this bill, I 
now rise in opposition to this flawed legislation, which, 
disappointingly, has been made worse ever since we started the process.
  In August Congress finally acted, after months of prodding from 
Republicans, to close significant intelligence gaps against potential 
foreign terrorists in foreign countries that jeopardize America's 
ability to protect and prevent potential terrorist attacks and to 
effectively collect intelligence on foreign adversaries.
  Now we have a simple choice: Do we do what is necessary to provide 
long-term legal authority for our intelligence community to conduct 
necessary surveillance, or do we reopen that intelligence gap?
  It now seems that the majority is determined to move a bill intended 
to make political statements rather than to give intelligence 
professionals the tools that they need to protect our country.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to our distinguished 
majority leader, Mr. Hoyer of Maryland.
  Mr. HOYER. I thank my friend for yielding. I thank him for his 
leadership as well. I thank Mr. Conyers for his leadership, and I thank 
Mr. Hoekstra and Mr. Smith for their participation.
  This is a serious issue that confronts us. Mr. Speaker, this 
legislation, the RESTORE Act, is nothing less than the fundamental 
reiteration of the most basic concepts of our Constitution, our 
constitutional form of government that we, indeed, are a Nation of laws 
and that our Founders deliberately designed our three branches of 
government to serve as a check and balance on each other.
  One of my colleagues, my friend, I believe, from Arizona, stood and 
said it was not the job of judges to conduct intelligence. He was 
correct. It is not the job of judges to conduct intelligence. But it is 
the constitutional duty given by our Founding Fathers, who understood 
that King George too often abused his sovereign power and who said to 
all that they would have adopt this Constitution that we will protect 
you from the abuse of power of government, and we will do it by having 
it reviewed by independent judges, not by the legislature.
  We can be told by judges that we are not acting constitutionally, and 
that is a protection for our people against congressional abuse of 
power. And the executive department can be told by judges you are 
abusing your constitutional power. No power, no protection was felt to 
be more necessary and important by our Founding Fathers than their 
right to personal privacy and a lack of intrusion by King George just 
because he wanted to do it. And they said King George had to have 
probable cause, in this case, the Government of the United States. So 
that's why they established the courts. And we, in our wisdom, in my 
view, established the FISA Court to do just that.
  Every single one of us here recognizes that our highest duty is to 
protect the American people. Indeed, we must detect, disrupt, and 
eliminate terrorists who have no compunction about planning and 
participating in the mass killing of innocent people. We saw that 
tragically on 9/11. We also, each one of us, come to this well or stand 
at our seats and raise our hand and swear an oath to defend the 
Constitution of the United States, to protect its laws and to honor the 
values and principles that are contained therein. That is our oath. 
That is what we do here this night, including the fourth amendment 
right that Americans are secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. That's not an 
assertion on any individual or any government or even the

[[Page H14055]]

legislature. It was an assertion by our Founding Fathers that they had 
seen too often abuses by the executive agencies of government.
  Our basic duties as Members of this Congress, protecting the American 
people and protecting the values that define us as Americans, are not 
mutually exclusive. We can protect our country and protect our 
Constitution. That is our duty.
  And that is precisely what this historic act, introduced by Chairman 
Reyes and Chairman Conyers, has done. This legislation gives our 
intelligence community the tools it needs to listen in on those who 
seek to harm us while addressing concerns that the bill passed in 
August could authorize warrantless surveillance of Americans. That is 
our concern. That is our focus.
  Among other things, this legislation modernizes the technologically 
outdated Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 by restoring a 
checks and balances rule for the FISA Court and addressing the 
intelligence gap asserted by the Director of National Intelligence.

                              {time}  2000

  We heard Director McConnell. We want to help Director McConnell. Let 
us be clear. This legislation does not require a warrant for listening 
in on suspected and known terrorists, period. An assertion to the 
contrary is not accurate. In fact, it clarifies that no court order is 
required for surveillance of conversations where both parties are 
foreign citizens. It does not extend constitutional rights to suspected 
or known terrorists, assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. Nor 
does it delay the collection of intelligence information.
  Furthermore, it grants the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence authority, authority to apply to the FISA Court 
for a block order, not an individual order, not a discrete order, but a 
block order saying that you can pursue this gathering of information to 
protect America, but you cannot do it simply because you want to do it. 
You've got to do it consistent with the Constitution of the United 
States and the laws thereof. You cannot conduct freelance surveillance 
without some authority of law.
  The FISA Court can give a block order to conduct surveillance on 
large groups of foreign targets for up to a year, and that can be 
renewed, ensuring that only foreigners are targeted and Americans' 
rights are preserved. That was the whole reason in a bipartisan way we 
adopted FISA, to make sure that was the case.
  Why do you fear a FISA Court reviewing that basic principle that was 
its intent at its adoption?
  Finally, the legislation is silent on the issue of retroactive 
immunity for telecommunications companies that possibly violated 
privacy laws in turning over consumer information to the government. We 
don't make that judgment today. We need to review information to know 
what was done before we immunize conduct which we do not know. Simply 
stated, it would be grossly irresponsible for Congress to grant a 
blanket immunity for companies without even knowing whether their 
conduct was legal, appropriate, reasonable or not. Don't you think the 
American public, each one of our constituents, expects that of us?
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, let me quote The Washington Post, which 
stated in October, the measure produced by the House Intelligence and 
Judiciary Committees would alleviate the burden of obtaining 
individualized warrants for foreign targets while still maintaining a 
critical oversight for the FISA Court. In other words, we are relieving 
the administration from the burden of discrete approval. But we are 
providing for the protections that Americans expect under our 
Constitution.
  Mr. Speaker, we must give our Commander in Chief, the President of 
the United States and the intelligence community the resources, the 
authority, and flexibility that is necessary to protect our people and 
defend our Nation. I believe each of us in this Congress support that 
objective. But we must also honor the values and principles that make 
us Americans. This legislation allows us to do both.
  I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, facilitate the 
interception of information and terrorist communication dangerous to 
our people and our country. And at the same time, redeem that oath of 
protecting and defending our Constitution.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the order of closing.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ross). The Chair will recognize for 
closing speeches in the reverse order of opening, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has 1 minute remaining. 
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has 45 seconds remaining. The 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues and thank you for 
this debate.
  At this point in time to close our debate I would like to recognize 
the distinguished minority leader, Mr. Boehner of Ohio.
  Mr. BOEHNER. Let me thank my colleague for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, in August the Congress passed the Protect America Act. 
Before that bill passed, our intelligence officials did not have the 
tools they needed to protect our troops and to detect and prevent 
terrorist plots. This was made clear in a story we read about just last 
month about our, how our FISA laws failed our soldiers who were 
kidnapped in Iraq, and I think these outdated laws actually hampered 
their rescue. That is because our FISA laws in place before the Protect 
America Act entrusted government lawyers, not our intelligence 
professionals, to protect our troops and our security.
  Yet the bill we are considering today only makes this problem worse. 
It reopens the terrorist loophole and doesn't ensure that we can act 
quickly on vital intelligence to protect our troops and the American 
people. I think it would be a boon to trial lawyers who could take 
actions against third parties who assisted our government at our 
request after 9/11. It is yet another example of a troubling pattern of 
behavior on the part the majority, a pattern of behavior that is 
undermining our national security. Let me just give you a few examples.
  The majority want to extend habeas corpus rights to terrorists. The 
majority has had over 40 votes in the Congress trying to force retreat 
in Iraq. The majority wants to close down our Guantanamo detention 
facility and move those terrorists into American communities. The 
majority, in their intelligence authorization bill and appropriation 
bill, are diverting key intelligence resources away from terrorist 
surveillance to study global warming.
  In August, all the Members of this House succeeded in modernizing 
FISA and closing the terrorist loophole. We did so because terrorists 
were plotting to kill Americans and our allies, and there is no nice 
way of saying that. So why on Earth would we tie the hands of our 
intelligence officials again and open up this loophole that allows 
terrorists to jeopardize the safety of our troops and jeopardize the 
safety and security of the American people?
  Our country is safer today because of our efforts, and Republicans 
want to work with Democrats to make the Protect America Act permanent. 
We were very close to a bipartisan agreement on this bill just about 5 
weeks ago, very close. As a matter of fact, there was an agreement in 
principle until the ACLU got ahold of it and blew the entire bipartisan 
process up. I think the American people want us to do everything we can 
to make sure that they are safe and secure. The bill that we have 
before us will once again tie the hands of our intelligence officials 
and make America less safe. This is not the bill that I want to vote 
for.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, this bill, the RESTORE Act, is about balance. 
It is about putting checks and balances back in the process. It puts 
the FISA Court back in the process of protecting Americans. It corrects 
unchecked authority that we gave through the Protect America Act. Some 
would want us to continue to rubber-stamp what the administration 
wants. The American people deserve better.
  Mr. Speaker, Halloween is over. Why do our colleagues continue to 
pull ghouls out of the closet? It is now time to talk turkey.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield the balance of our

[[Page H14056]]

time on our side to the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas, Sheila 
Jackson-Lee, an invaluable member of the Judiciary Committee.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank both chairmen, Chairman Conyers for 
his leadership and Chairman Reyes. In the month of August, I stood here 
and shredded paper to reflect that the vote we took on that bill was 
really a destruction of the Constitution. I am very glad to be able to 
stand here today to hold the Constitution sacredly in my hand and to 
indicate that this bill does, in fact, offer a restoration of the civil 
liberties of Americans but yet does not protect one single terrorist.
  It is a bill that avoids reverse targeting of Americans. But it is a 
bill that provides the opportunity that if there was a pending threat 
against the United States, the Attorney General, the National Security 
Director, and three others could, in fact, prevent a terrorist act from 
occurring in the United States. This restores justice and it protects 
the American people.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3773, introduced by my 
colleague Mr. Conyers. Had the Bush administration and the Republican-
dominated 109th Congress acted more responsibly in the 2 preceding 
years, we would not be in the position of debating legislation that has 
such a profound impact on national security and on American values and 
civil liberties in the crush of exigent circumstances. More often that 
not, it is true, as the saying goes, that haste makes waste.
  Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us is intended to fill a gap in 
the Nation's intelligence gathering capabilities identified by Director 
of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, by amending the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. It gives our intelligence 
professionals the tools they need to legally monitor suspect foreigners 
outside the United States, while protecting the fundamental rights of 
Americans at home.
  Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the 
reason democracies invariably prevail in any martial conflict is 
because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and 
encourages those traits that are indispensable to martial success: 
initiative, innovation, resourcefulness, and courage.
  The United States would do well to heed de Tocqueville and recognize 
that the best way to win the war on terror is to remain true to our 
democratic traditions. If it retains its democratic character, no 
nation and no loose confederation of international villains will defeat 
the United States in the pursuit of its vital interests. A major 
challenge facing the Congress today is to ensure that in waging its war 
on terror, the administration does not succeed in winning passage of 
legislation that will weaken the Nation's commitment to its democratic 
traditions.
  This is why the upcoming debate over congressional approval 
authorizing the administration to conduct terrorist surveillance on 
U.S. soil is a matter of utmost importance. I offer some thoughts on 
the principles that should inform that debate.
  In the waning hours before the August recess, the House acceded to 
the Bush administration's request and approved the woefully misnamed 
``Protect America Act,'' which gives the Federal Government enlarged 
powers to conduct electronic surveillance of American citizens under 
the guise of conducting surveillance of foreign terrorists.
  Mr. Speaker, FISA has served the Nation well for nearly 30 years, 
placing electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign 
intelligence and counter-intelligence purposes on a sound legal 
footing. Given the exigent circumstances claimed by the administration, 
I am prepared to support a number of temporary changes to FISA 
legislation, provided that they follow certain principles.
  First, I am prepared to accept temporarily eliminating the need to 
obtain a court order for foreign-to-foreign communications that pass 
through the United States. But I do insist upon individual warrants, 
based on probable cause, when surveillance is directed at people in the 
United States. The Attorney General must still be required to submit 
procedures for international surveillance to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court for approval, but the FISA Court should not be 
allowed to issue a ``basket warrant'' without making individual 
determinations about foreign surveillance. There should be an initial 
emergency authority so that international surveillance can begin while 
the warrants are being considered by the Court. And there must also be 
congressional oversight, requiring the Department of Justice Inspector 
General to conduct an audit every 60 days of U.S. person communications 
intercepted under these warrants, to be submitted to the Intelligence 
and Judiciary Committees.
  This legislation allows the interception of electronic communications 
between foreigners outside of the United States without a warrant and 
permits the director of national intelligence and the attorney general 
to seek ``blanket'' warrants to intercept communications of people 
reasonably believed to be outside the United States, even if such 
communication happens to involve ``U.S. persons.'' Wiretap surveillance 
could be conducted for 7 days before a warrant must be sought, and the 
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance court would have to act on the 
application for a blanket warrant within 15 days.
  This legislation has many other important provisions. It affirms that 
FISA is the exclusive source of legal authority for conducting 
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence. Crucially, it does 
not grant amnesty to telecommunications companies for any past 
violations of law. Finally, it gives the FISA Court more oversight 
authority and terminates the authorization to conduct foreign 
surveillance on U.S. soil after 2 years.
  In all candor, Mr. Speaker, I must restate my firm conviction that 
when it comes to the track record of this President's warrantless 
surveillance programs, there is still nothing on the public record 
about the nature and effectiveness of those programs, or the 
trustworthiness of this administration, to indicate that they require 
any legislative response, other than to reaffirm the exclusivity of 
FISA and insist that it be followed. This could have been accomplished 
in the 109th Congress by passing H.R. 5371, the ``Lawful Intelligence 
and Surveillance of Terrorists in an Emergency by NSA'' Act, LISTEN 
Act, which I have cosponsored with the then ranking members of the 
Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, Mr. Conyers and Ms. Harman.
  The Bush administration has not complied with its legal obligation 
under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence 
Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence 
activities. Congress cannot continue to rely on incomplete information 
from the Bush administration or revelations in the media. It must 
conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the 
United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those 
that occur within FISA and those that occur outside FISA.

  The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must 
include the operational details of each program of intelligence 
surveillance within the United States, including: (1) who the NSA is 
targeting; (2) how it identifies its targets; (3) the information the 
program collects and disseminates; and most important; (4) whether the 
program advances national security interests without unduly 
compromising the privacy rights of the American people.
  Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit 
electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing 
information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the 
communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring 
more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms 
for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted 
communications.
  Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us is necessary. It is incumbent 
on the Congress to act expeditiously to amend existing laws so that 
they achieve the only legitimate goals of a terrorist surveillance 
program, which is to ensure that Americans are secure in their persons, 
papers and effects, but terrorists throughout the world are made 
insecure. The best way to achieve these twin goals is to follow the 
rule of law. And the exclusive law to follow with respect to 
authorizing foreign surveillance gathering on U.S. soil is the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. It is my sincere hope that my colleagues 
will join together today in enacting important and much needed reforms 
to FISA.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the Manager's Amendment 
to this legislation. This amendment clarifies that nothing in this act 
can be construed to prohibit lawful surveillance necessary to prevent 
Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization from 
attacking the U.S., any U.S. person, or any ally of the U.S.; to ensure 
the safety and security of our Armed Forces or other national security 
or intelligence personnel; or to protect the U.S., any U.S. person, or 
any U.S. ally from the threat of WMD or any other threats to national 
security.
  Mr. Speaker, even as we work to protect our Nation, we must remember 
the fundamental need to protect Americans. At bottom, America is its 
people connected to each other, and to past and future generations, as 
in Abraham Lincoln's unforgettable phrase, by ``the mystic chords of 
memory stretching from every heart and hearthstone.'' America, in other 
words, is Americans coming together in a community of shared values, 
ideals and principles. It is those shared values that hold us together. 
It is our commitment to those values that the terrorists wish to break 
because that is the only way they can win.
  Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for this 
country to redouble its commitment to the values that every American

[[Page H14057]]

will risk his or her life to defend. It is only by preserving our 
attachment to these cherished values that America will remain forever 
the home of the free, the land of the brave and the country we love.
  H.R. 3773 does just that. It balances the interest in protecting the 
Nation from terrorists who would do us harm and, at the same time, 
ensures that the constitutional rights of American citizens and persons 
in America are not abridged. I strongly urge my colleagues to join me 
in supporting this legislation.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3773.
  Today, as we have so many times in our history, we are wrestling with 
the question of how best to protect security while preserving liberty. 
That struggle has always been challenging, and the events of 9/11 made 
it even more so. But today, the RESTORE Act provides a carefully 
crafted solution to that problem.
  We all recognize the gravity of the threats facing our country, and 
that is why this bill gives the Director of National Intelligence all 
the authority he has asked for to fight terrorism. The legislation 
updates FISA to address new developments in technology so that our 
intelligence activities are not constrained based on what method of 
communication suspects happen to be using or where the communication 
may be routed. The bill also clarifies that no warrant is needed for 
foreign-to-foreign communications. These are requests that the DNI has 
made and which are included in the bill.
  However, unlike the so-called Protect America Act, which passed in 
August, the RESTORE Act provides for rigorous and independent oversight 
from the courts, the Congress, and the Department of Justice Inspector 
General.
  Additionally, during the Intelligence Committee's consideration of 
the bill, I successfully offered an amendment to strengthen the 
oversight by preserving the FISA Court's role to review compliance with 
their rules every 90 days for the life of a court order. By having the 
FISA Court review the procedures and guidelines used by the DNI and 
Attorney General when determining that prospective targets are located 
outside the U.S., we provide another safeguard against the collection 
of communications of people inside the U.S. Finally, the bill requires 
greater congressional oversight of the program so that we can monitor 
how it is being implemented and make any changes that may become 
necessary.
  Such rigorous oversight is why the Bush administration objects to 
this bill. To them, the Protect America Act that passed in August is 
just fine the way it is. They want unfettered authority, without checks 
and balances. But we have seen what happens when the administration is 
given free rein, and I will not let that happen again.
  I want to be clear that this is not a perfect bill. While in theory 
it is a vast improvement over the Protect America Act, in reality, this 
legislation will only work if everyone involved follows the rules that 
Congress establishes and remains within the confines of the law. Like 
any program, and indeed more so than most, this one could be subject to 
abuse, and we must remain vigilant in our efforts to ensure that does 
not happen. We have included meaningful safeguards and significant 
checks and balances in this measure. However, these provisions are only 
as strong as the individuals and agencies implementing them. Congress 
must continue to conduct robust oversight and insist on the briefings 
and information to which we are entitled. If we fail in these efforts 
and abuses occur, we will have ourselves to blame.
  Mr. Speaker, we have faced grave threats before. Our Constitution was 
drafted at a time when the very survival of our Nation was in doubt. 
Yet our Founding Fathers made the preservation of basic liberties part 
of the fabric of our national identity.
  As Members of Congress, it is our sworn duty to defend the 
Constitution and the principles on which our Nation was founded. I urge 
my colleagues to support H.R. 3773, which protects security while 
preserving the liberties that make this country great.
  Mr. MAHONEY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 
3773, the RESTORE Act.
  On my first day, I took an oath of office to support and defend the 
Constitution. Tonight we will vote to protect our Fourth Amendment 
rights by passing this bill. Never again will we give any person the 
ability to conduct surveillance on American citizens without court 
approval.
  America must be vigilant in our fight against terrorism. Congress has 
a duty to give our intelligence agencies the tools they need to hunt 
down those who threaten our Nation while protecting the constitutional 
rights of every American.
  The RESTORE Act gives the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence the flexibility they need to pursue the 
terrorists, while keeping the checks and balances enshrined in our 
Constitution.
  Mr. Speaker, it is critical that our intelligence community have the 
resources necessary to protect America. It is also critical that 
Americans are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. This 
bill accomplishes both of these objectives.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in support of the RESTORE Act.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, as a chamber, we have come a long way 
since August when the disgraceful ``Protect America Act'' was strong-
armed into law. The RESTORE Act, a comprehensive and thoughtful 
overhaul of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, could not cut a 
more striking contrast.
  Over the past 7 years I have been highly critical of Republican 
wiretapping legislation. I have voted against every effort to expand 
the ability of this administration to intrude in the lives and privacy 
of innocent citizens.
  But this is a Democratic Congress and a Democratic bill. The RESTORE 
Act strikes an unprecedented balance between civil defense and civil 
liberties. I deeply appreciate the hard-won progress we've made on this 
issue and I am heartened by our leadership's determination to end a 
Republican legacy that so blatantly disregards the rights of ordinary 
Americans.
  The bill before us will not solve every potential abuse of FISA, but 
it does greatly strengthen legal protections for Americans and 
introduces robust congressional oversight. As this issue continues to 
play out into the future, it is my hope that our next steps will 
include even stronger protections for innocent Americans, clearer legal 
standards for FISA to judge surveillance procedures, and explicit 
requirements for the destruction of unnecessary data.
  Ms. BEAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3773.
  Giving our intelligence community the tools they need to uncover 
threats to our Nation's security is one of Congress's most important 
duties. This bill soundly provides that.
  This legislation explicitly clarifies that a warrant is not needed 
when conducting foreign to foreign surveillance. Importantly this bill 
also includes reasonable safeguards to ensure U.S. citizens at home and 
abroad are not subject to surveillance without proper oversight.
  It lays out a responsible yet workable framework for the Director of 
National Intelligence and Attorney General to get FISA certification 
when U.S. persons may inadvertently be involved yet allows our 
intelligence community to act immediately in emergency situations prior 
to FISA court certification.
  I commend the committee for its hard work on an issue important to 
our national security.
  While Congress should continue to pursue all relevant information 
from the administration's surveillance program since September 11, 
2001, telecommunications providers should not be held liable for 
providing requested information that they were told could prevent 
future attacks on our Nation.
  An October editorial in the Washington Post noted that these 
companies were ``acting as patriotic corporate citizens in a difficult 
and uncharted environment.''
  Therefore I support retroactive immunity for participating companies 
and I'm hopeful it will be included in the final bill.
  With that, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3773.
  Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my 
support for H.R. 3773--the Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is 
Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective (RESTORE) Act of 2007.
  In August, Congress unfortunately passed the Protect America Act, a 
piece of legislation that allowed the surveillance activities of this 
Administration to go unchecked. Though I opposed that bill, the House 
was left little choice but to pass that flawed bill. While it is true 
that modernization of our foreign intelligence laws was necessary to 
meet the security and intelligence needs of this nation, the Protect 
America Act went beyond what was essential and instead allowed the 
continued infringement of American's civil liberties.
  Thankfully, today we have before us a piece of legislation that gives 
the intelligence community the authority it needs to protect Americans 
while also protecting civil liberties that are the bedrock of our 
nation. This bill modernizes our foreign surveillance system and 
authorizes necessary funding for training, personnel and technology 
resources at DOJ, NSA and the FISA Court to expedite the FISA process. 
Additionally, it ensures that nothing inhibits lawful surveillance for 
the purpose of protecting the nation and the troops from threats posed 
by terrorists.
  Also of great importance, unlike previous bills considered by the 
House, this bill includes vital checks and balances on the 
Administration. It prohibits warrantless surveillance of Americans and 
requires a court order before targeting Americans' phone calls or 
emails. It also requires a finding of probable cause before conducting 
surveillance on Americans abroad, which was not required under previous 
legislation. To ensure greater accountability, the legislation mandates 
audits on the

[[Page H14058]]

Administration's warrantless surveillance program and the 
communications collected under the program.
  Most importantly, this legislation ensures that it is the courts and 
not the Administration that decides whether or not an American's 
communications are targeted. The bill requires the FISA Court to review 
targeting procedures to ensure that they are reasonably designed to 
protect Americans and target people outside the United States. It also 
requires the Court to review the Administration's compliance to ensure 
that when the government conducts electronic surveillance on Americans, 
it obtains traditional, individualized warrants from the FISA Court.
  Mr. Speaker, for far too long this Administration has been able to 
extend its power and authority, often to the detriment and subversion 
of our nation's basic principles. Today, we are passing a bill that 
will finally curb the Administration's actions and restore a measure of 
accountability that has been sorely lacking for too long. For these 
reasons, I support the vitally necessary RESTORE Act.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I voted against the original Patriot Act, I 
voted against the reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 2005, I voted 
against the President's Protect America Act that was signed into law 
last August, and I was prepared to vote against the RESTORE Act if it 
did not adequately protect our constitutionally guaranteed civil 
rights. I had strong reservations about this legislation when it was 
first reported out of Committee, particularly with respect to the 
degree it appeared to give the Administration the ability to monitor 
the conversations of U.S. citizens without an individualized warrant. 
However, after reviewing the changes made to this legislation in the 
managers' amendment, I am satisfied that the RESTORE Act now contains 
adequate Fourth Amendment protections.
  I applaud Congressman Holt for working with Chairmen Conyers and 
Reyes to address this issue. While this legislation is not perfect, I 
believe that it represents a substantial improvement over existing law. 
I realize it is likely we will find ourselves revisiting this issue 
again in the coming months when the Senate is finished with its own 
legislation on this matter. As this debate continues, I will continue 
to insist that any legislation I support contains adequate protections 
for civil rights.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the RESTORE Act. 
Unlike past national security measures, this bill will prevent the 
administration from violating our basic civil liberties in the name of 
its phony war on terror.
  I appreciate the hard work of my colleagues, Chairmen Conyers, Reyes 
and Holt. Thanks to their efforts, this bill is a marked improvement 
from the legislation President Bush requested and from the Orwellian 
``Protect America Act'' the House passed in August.
  Unlike the President's proposal and the legislation I voted against, 
the RESTORE Act will prevent domestic spying. As its name implies, this 
bill restores the judiciary's vital role in checking the 
administration's desire to conduct surveillance on whomever they want, 
whenever they want.
  It prohibits the government from spying on Americans without the 
explicit approval of the FISA court. It also empowers the FISA court to 
determine if domestic communications picked up during blanket sweeps 
directed at international correspondence can be seized or searched.
  Importantly, this bill does not grant immunity to telecommunications 
companies. The RESTORE Act will allow individuals who have had their 
rights violated to sue the telecommunications companies that made 
spying possible by sharing telephone conversations and email 
correspondence with the government.
  The President has made it clear that he believes the three branches 
of government are ``me, myself, and I.'' Thankfully, this legislation 
dissolves him of that notion and firmly re-establishing the important 
and necessary role that the judiciary plays in protecting our civil 
liberties.
  I urge my colleagues to stand up in opposition to this President and 
vote yes to protect our civil liberties.
  Mr. GORDON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I would submit the following 
editorial from the Los Angeles Times for the Record.

              [From the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 15, 2007]

                       When the CIA Comes Calling

                         (By R. James Woolsey)

       When I was director of Central Intelligence during 
     President Clinton's first term, I had occasion to go hat in 
     hand to the private sector several times. In one case, it was 
     a detail that, if made public, could have caused a valuable 
     source to be captured or killed; in another, there was a 
     technical feature of a system in production that, slightly 
     modified, was of great help to the nation. In these several 
     cases, executives of American companies heard me out and 
     willingly met my requests, to the substantial benefit of our 
     national security.
       They had no legal requirement to do so, and they knew it. 
     They were helping solely out of a sense of patriotism and an 
     understanding that some steps that the nation needs to take 
     in a dangerous world cannot be taken in public, simply 
     because informing the public informs an opponent or an enemy.
       Shortly after 9/11, something similar happened. Senior U.S. 
     officials asked telecommunications companies to assist the 
     government in intercepts involving terrorist groups such as 
     those that had just attacked us and killed thousands of 
     people. In these cases, President Bush authorized the 
     intercepts and the senior officials gave written assurances 
     to the companies that their cooperation was legal.
       In my judgment, the president acted properly; he had the 
     authority under the Constitution to ask for such intercepts. 
     In addition, his request was reasonable because surveillance 
     of enemy-to-American communications is a time-honored means 
     of intelligence gathering in the U.S. George Washington did 
     it; those under his command intercepted and read 
     correspondence between Benedict Arnold and his spy handler, 
     foiling the plot to turn the fort at West Point over to the 
     British.
       But even if one believes the request was illegal and 
     unreasonable--and there are distinguished constitutional 
     lawyers and patriotic citizens on both sides of this debate--
     the issue currently before the Senate Judiciary Committee is 
     much narrower. It is whether the telecommunications companies 
     that complied with the president's request and trusted the 
     government's assurances of legality should be granted 
     immunity from about 40 lawsuits demanding billions of 
     dollars.
       Sen. John D. ``Jay'' Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), chairman of the 
     Intelligence Committee, has stated that companies ``should 
     not be dragged through the courts for their help with 
     national security.'' And now Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-
     Calif.), a member of the Judiciary Committee, has endorsed 
     his statement, saying that the companies should not be ``held 
     hostage to costly litigation in what is essentially a 
     complaint about [Bush] administration activities.''
       Feinstein is a member of the one-vote Democratic majority 
     on the Judiciary Committee, and it is possible that her 
     position will determine the outcome. I hope it does. Her 
     stance is farsighted. Having once, when I was practicing law, 
     taken depositions for months about a single one-hour meeting, 
     I know something about how burdensome litigation can be. If, 
     in the end, the surveillance request made by the government 
     is deemed improper, the government should be held 
     accountable, not those who complied with its request.
       We live in a world of terrorism, the possible proliferation 
     of nuclear weapons and a host of other risks to our security. 
     Intelligence, and the cooperation of the private sector in 
     obtaining and protecting it, will be among our most important 
     tools to avoid catastrophes such as 9/11 or worse.
       If some future senior government official needs to make a 
     call on a CEO of the sort I did, and that others did after 9/
     11, we and our children will be better off if the official 
     can answer the question ``Can you guarantee that my company 
     won't be sued if we help the country?'' with ``If it happens, 
     we'll get protective legislation approved as in 2007.'' We 
     would be in much more danger if, because companies that 
     helped after 9/11 became ensnared in years of litigation and 
     financial losses, that official has to answer the question 
     with a shrug.

  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I have reservations about this 
bill, but I will vote for it today.
  It is similar to one that I supported earlier this year but that 
failed to receive the two-thids vote necessary for passage under the 
procedure that applied to its consideration.
  In my opinion, the RESTORE Act is far preferable to the legislation--
the so-called ``Protect America Act''--that I voted against but which 
the House, to my regret, approved and is now law.
  Fortunately, that law will expire early next year, so we have the 
opportunity--and, I would say, the responsibility--to replace it with a 
better, more balanced measure.
  By a more balanced measure, I mean one that fulfills two equally 
important requirements--first, that of enabling our intelligence 
community to do its job to protect us against terrorism and other 
threats, and second, respecting and safeguarding the rights and 
liberties of all Americans.
  And while this bill is not perfect, I think it does meet those tests 
and deserves to be passed today.
  It is based on the legislation I supported earlier this year but in 
several important ways it is even better than that bill.
  For example, it is more carefully focused, applying not to all 
foreign intelligence but specifically to intelligence collection 
related to terrorism, espionage, sabotage and threats to national 
security. It also provides that the minimization rules--the steps 
agencies will take to limit their actions so as to avoid inadvertent or 
unnecessary surveillance--as well as the guidelines for intelligence 
collection regarding all targets must be approved by the FISA court, 
not merely by an administrative monitor.
  It includes critical language that says that actions in compliance 
with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and with that law's

[[Page H14059]]

procedural safeguards, will be the exclusive means to conduct 
surveillance for intelligence purposes. And the bill restates current 
law stipulating that surveillance targeting Americans requires an 
individualized FISA court order.
  It takes a great step toward greater accountability by requiring an 
audit of past surveillance activities by the National Security Agency 
and by mandating record-keeping on any interception of communications 
by American citizens and legal residents.
  The bill eliminates ambiguous language in the ``Protect America Act'' 
that appeared to authorize warrantless searches inside the United 
States, including physical searches of homes, offices, and medical 
records. And it makes clear that the Administration cannot conduct 
surveillance against Americans without probable cause--even if they are 
outside the United States.
  Furthermore, this bill, like the one hastily passed earlier this 
year, is not permanent but will expire at the end of 2009, at which 
time Congress will be able to reconsider it with the benefit of greater 
knowledge of how it has worked in practice and whether further 
refinements should be made.
  Also important is what the bill doesn't do. It does not provide 
constitutional protections to foreign terrorists. The bill does not 
require the government to obtain a FISA order in order to intercept 
``foreign to foreign'' communications of suspected terrorists, even if 
these communications pass through the United States. Nor does this bill 
permit the National Security Agency to collect the communications of 
Americans through a ``basket'' court order. Instead, the bill requires 
the Administration to certify that the targets are not Americans, and 
if it wants to conduct surveillance on Americans, the Administration 
must get a formal FISA order.
  And, as now amended, it includes additional language to make clear 
that there are other things it will not do. Specifically, it will not 
prevent the lawful surveillance necessary to: prevent Osama Bin Laden, 
al Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization from attacking our 
country, our people, any of our allies. It will not prevent 
surveillance needed to ensure the safety and security of our Armed 
Forces or other national security or intelligence personnel. It will 
not prevent surveillance needed to protect the United States, the 
American people, or any of our allies from the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction or any other threats to national security. And it will 
not prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights to, undocumented 
aliens.
  The bill does grant authority to the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Attorney General to apply to the FISA court for a 
single court order, or a ``basket'' order, authorizing surveillance of 
a suspected terrorist organization abroad for up to one year, as long 
as there are procedures in place to ensure that only foreigners are 
targeted and the rights of Americans are preserved.
  In general, I am wary of the concept of broad scope ``basket 
warrants,'' which are not normal under our laws. But I am prepared to 
support this part of the bill on the understanding that it is limited 
in scope and not applicable within the United States and with the 
expectation that the question will be revisited if the audits indicate 
a need for reconsideration of this part of the legislation. In this 
context, I am glad to note that this legislation is not permanent and 
will expire at the end of 2009.
  President Bush has criticized the bill, in part because it does not 
include a provision granting retroactive immunity for 
telecommunications companies that assisted in the Administration's 
secret surveillance program without a warrant. I think it might be 
appropriate to consider such a provision, but not until the Bush 
Administration responds to bipartisan requests for information about 
the past activities of these companies under the program. I am not 
ready to grant immunity for the companies' past activities while we 
don't know what activities would be covered.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is not perfect, but I am not prepared to 
insist on perfection at this point. I believe we must do all we can to 
correct the shortcomings of the ``Protect America Act,'' even if it 
takes Congress a number of attempts to get it right. The RESTORE Act 
will give the Administration the authority it says it needs to conduct 
surveillance on terrorist targets--while restoring many of the 
protections that the ``Protect America Act'' has taken away. For that 
reason, I will vote for this bill today.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 746, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


            Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Smith of Texas

  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the 
desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. I am in its current form.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Smith of Texas moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 3773, 
     to the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report 
     the same back to the House promptly with the following 
     amendments:
       In section 18 in the heading, strike ``ALIENS'' and insert 
     ``ALIENS, STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, OR AGENTS OF STATE 
     SPONSORS OF TERRORISM''.
       In section 18, strike ``This Act and'' and insert ``(a) In 
     General.--This Act and''.
       In section 18, strike ``United States'' and insert ``United 
     States, a State sponsor of terrorism, or an agent of a State 
     sponsor of terrorism''.
       At the end of section 18 add the following new subsection:
       (b) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``State sponsor of terrorism'' means a country the 
     government of which the Secretary of State has determined, 
     for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
     of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act) (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), section 
     40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 
     620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), 
     or any other provision of law, to be a government that has 
     repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
     terrorism.
       In paragraph (1) of the undesignated section relating to 
     Surveillance to Protect the United States added to the bill 
     pursuant to the adoption of House Resolution 824, insert 
     ``members of the al-Quds Iranian Revolutionary Guard,'' after 
     ``al Qaeda,''.
       In the undesignated section relating to Surveillance to 
     Protect the United States added to the bill pursuant to the 
     adoption of House Resolution 824, strike ``This Act and'' and 
     insert ``(a) This Act and''.
       At the end of the undesignated section relating to 
     Surveillance to Protect the United States added to the bill 
     pursuant to the adoption of House Resolution 824 add the 
     following new subsection:
       (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, or the 
     amendments made by this Act, the intelligence community (as 
     defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) shall be permitted to conduct 
     surveillance of any person concerning an imminent attack on 
     the United States, any United States person, including a 
     member of the United States Armed Forces, or an ally of the 
     United States by Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, members of the 
     al-Quds Iranian Revolutionary Guard, or any other terrorist 
     or foreign terrorist organization designated under section 
     219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

  Mr. SMITH of Texas (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
consent that the motion be considered as read.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point of order, and I object to 
waiving the reading of the motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The point of order is reserved.
  The Clerk will read.
  The Clerk concluded the reading of the motion.

                              {time}  2015

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Texas is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit says 
``promptly,'' because the bill needs to go back to committee 
immediately. Members were given almost no notice of what was going to 
be in this bill. There are many questions remaining about the text 
because it has not gone through the regular committee process.
  This motion addresses a major problem created by the manager's 
amendment. Under existing law, court orders are required to conduct 
certain surveillance of illegal immigrants within the United States. 
Section 18 of the manager's amendment strips away any rights that 
illegal immigrants have under FISA, stating clearly that there will be 
``no rights under the RESTORE Act for undocumented aliens.''
  If that is really what the Democratic leadership wants to do, then we 
should ensure that the legislation does not treat terrorists more 
favorably than illegal immigrants. To fix this problem, the motion adds 
``state sponsors of terrorism and their agents'' to section 18

[[Page H14060]]

to ensure that they are treated equally. There is no reason that the 
law should provide greater protection to terrorists than to illegal 
immigrants.
  Also, the motion preserves the ability of our intelligence community 
to conduct surveillance of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard, and other terrorist organizations to protect 
America from an imminent terrorist attack. When faced with a life-or-
death situation, a ticking bomb, an imminent threat of attack, do we 
really want to subject intelligence agents to unnecessary legal hurdles 
in order to protect our country?
  The RESTORE Act hinders our intelligence community's ability to 
collect foreign intelligence needed to prevent al Qaeda and other 
terrorists from attacking our country. It requires the government to 
obtain court orders to conduct surveillance of overseas terrorists. The 
implication of this requirement, Mr. Speaker, could be catastrophic.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), who is the ranking member of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, the new manager's amendment that self-
executed with a rule this morning included broad new language that 
would treat illegal immigrants differently than other threats to the 
homeland. This was a poorly conceived and ill-advised provision that 
has created a lot of confusion.
  Through the day, when we discussed the rule this morning, as we had 
the debate tonight, I had a series of questions: Would this amendment 
allow surveillance against possible illegal aliens for law enforcement 
purposes? Would it allow surveillance to determine whether someone is 
an alien not permitted to be in or remain in the United States?
  During the rule, I was told I would get the answers during general 
debate. During general debate there was nothing but silence.
  If we take a look at the bill, for a month we have been dealing with 
a bill that provided protections and legal protections to terrorists. 
Overseas terrorists having access to the courts, having warrants, and 
those types of things were moved. Then today, at the last minute, or 
yesterday at the last minute, we get an amendment, a manager's 
amendment, that provides or, it appears, rips away any type of 
protection for another threat.
  Is the majority saying that the threat to the homeland is greater for 
aliens, illegal aliens living in the United States, than state sponsors 
of terrorism? It appears that it does because they have 40 or 50 pages 
of protections and a paragraph of exceptions that says: ``No rights 
under the RESTORE Act for undocumented aliens.'' Many on our side may 
think that that is a good idea.
  What this manager's amendment says very simply is if there are no 
rights under the RESTORE Act for undocumented aliens, maybe we should 
put that same provision in here for state sponsors of terrorism and 
agents of sponsors of terrorism. It's very clear. We think that if a 
threat to the homeland, as identified by the other side, are illegal 
aliens, perhaps it's also time that we recognize that state sponsors of 
terrorism pose the same type of threat to the United States.
  Is the majority saying that illegal aliens are a greater threat to 
the United States than Cuba, than Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria? 
It appears from the bill that we have before us tonight that is exactly 
what they are saying, because they have 50 pages of protections and one 
page of exceptions.
  Let's make sure that we treat illegal aliens the same way we treat 
North Korea and Cuba.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Michigan continue to 
maintain his reservation?
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I do not insist upon my point of order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The reservation is withdrawn.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to respond to the motion to 
recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the motion to 
recommit?
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen of the House, here we 
are again at another one of these so-called motions to recommit. 
Approach them with great care. I strongly oppose this motion.
  The minority has just made it clear that they are not seeking to 
change the bill; they are seeking to kill the bill. The tactic is 
getting pretty old in the House of Representatives. If they wanted to 
vote on their proposal today, they would have used the word, doesn't 
everybody know it now, ``forthwith,'' as I have suggested. But they 
have refused under well-established House rules and precedents.
  Other words do not have that effect, even if they sound like they 
should. The minority used the word ``promptly.'' It's no accident that 
they chose that word. The authors of this motion know full well the 
effect of choosing this word, and so do we. That is why they chose it. 
They wanted to send the bill back to the graveyard, which is what will 
happen if this motion is adopted.
  I would now yield to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe 
Lofgren).
  Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I would note that the 
motion to recommit itself leads to a nonsense sentence, adding ``United 
States, a State sponsor of terrorism,'' to section 18. It's 
inexplicable nonsense. It also guts the bill.
  On August 2, I rushed to the floor to say that we were passing a bill 
that was a terrible offense to the Constitution. It gutted the fourth 
amendment. This bill does not. Mr. Speaker, I urge its passage.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield to the distinguished 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Reyes).
  Mr. REYES. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a sham solution in search of a problem. This 
language is unnecessary, and it would kill this bill. The bill already 
states that this act and the amendments made by this act shall not be 
construed to prohibit the intelligence community from conducting lawful 
surveillance that is necessary, one, to prevent Osama bin Laden, al 
Qaeda, or any other terrorist or terrorist organization from attacking 
the United States. It also provides the means to protect the United 
States, any United States person or any ally of the United States from 
threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or other threats of 
national security.
  Mr. Speaker, the answer to the ranking member's question about 
undocumented aliens, all they have to do is check section 235 and 287 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. This does not confer any 
additional rights not provided by the Constitution.
  Mr. CONYERS. I thank the chairman.
  I am really moved by the sudden concern for immigration rights that 
the other side has begun to display, to my surprise.
  I yield now to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
  Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I think this has been 
an interesting debate. I have sat through every minute of it. During 
the debate on the rule, I spoke for this bill and for the rule; and now 
I speak strongly against this motion to recommit. As you have already 
heard, it is redundant. We have inserted language in this bill that 
takes care of the problem. In the manager's amendment, language was 
added at the request of the Blue Dogs, and I am proud to be a co-chair 
of the Blue Dog Coalition, and that language specifically refers to 
terrorist organizations, and the Revolutionary Guards are one such 
organization.
  So I would like to say for two reasons there's no need to support 
this motion to recommit: one, it kills the bill by using the word 
``promptly''; number two, it is redundant with excellent language that 
we added to the bill in the manager's amendment. As I have said before, 
this is not a zero sum game. We don't get more security and less 
liberty or more liberty and less security. We either get more of both 
or less of both.
  These amendments carefully restore, it's called the RESTORE Act, the 
balance of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which Congress 
wisely

[[Page H14061]]

passed 20 years ago. Vote for this bill and against the motion to 
recommit. We will restore that balance.


                        Parliamentary Inquiries

  Mr. WESTMORELAND. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. WESTMORELAND. Mr. Speaker, is it not true that if indeed this 
motion passed, this bill could be reported back to the two respective 
committees to which it is designated and that the bill could be 
reported back to the House on the next legislative day?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. As the Chair reaffirmed on October 10, 2007, 
the adoption of a motion to recommit with instructions to report back 
promptly sends the bill to committee, whose eventual report, if any, 
would not be immediately before the House. Unlike the case of a motion 
to recommit with instructions to report back forthwith, a motion to 
recommit with ``non-forthwith'' instructions does not operate in real 
time. As the Chair put it on May 24, 2000: ``At some subsequent time 
the committee could meet and report the bill back to the House.''
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, would adoption of the motion 
to recommit promptly have the effect of suspending any of the committee 
or House rules which require certain numbers of days before action can 
be taken?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Although the Chair does not interpret the 
substance of a pending proposition, the Chair can make an observation 
about its procedural attributes. Thus, the Chair will observe that an 
order of recommital does not necessarily forestall the operation of a 
committee rule otherwise applicable to further proceedings.
  Mr. WESTMORELAND. Mr. Speaker, further parliamentary inquiry. Is it 
not true that different committees have different rules and that some 
committees have emergency rules where these bills can be brought back 
to the floor as early as the next legislative day?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair cannot say what in the rules of a 
committee might constrain the timing of any action it might take. 
Neither can the Chair render an advisory opinion whether points of 
order available under the rules of the House might preclude further 
proceedings on the floor.
  Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to 
recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by 
5-minute votes on passage of H.R. 3773, if ordered; and motion to 
suspend the rules on H.R. 4136.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 194, 
nays 222, not voting 16, as follows:

                            [Roll No. 1119]

                               YEAS--194

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bean
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Donnelly
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Ellsworth
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     Lamborn
     Lampson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--222

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Flake
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Bono
     Carson
     Cubin
     Doyle
     Everett
     Jindal
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Mack
     McCaul (TX)
     Nunes
     Oberstar
     Paul
     Slaughter
     Taylor
     Weller


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Two minutes remain in the 
vote.

                              {time}  2048

  Messrs. Ellison and Olver changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Messrs. Crenshaw, Johnson of Illinois and McHenry changed their vote 
from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 1119, had I been present, 
I would have voted ``nay.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.

[[Page H14062]]

                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 227, 
noes 189, not voting 16, as follows:

                            [Roll No. 1120]

                               AYES--227

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Flake
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gilchrest
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NOES--189

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capuano
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     Lamborn
     Lampson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Bono
     Carson
     Cubin
     Deal (GA)
     Doyle
     Everett
     Hayes
     Higgins
     Hunter
     Jindal
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Mack
     Oberstar
     Paul
     Weller


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Two minutes remain on this 
vote.

                              {time}  2055

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 1120, I was unavoidably 
detained and missed the vote on bill H.R. 3773, the Restore Act. Had I 
been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on passage.
  Stated against:
  Mr. HAYES. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 1120, had I been present, I 
would have voted ``no.''

                          ____________________