Congressional Record, Volume 153 Issue 177 (Thursday, November 15, 2007)

[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 177 (Thursday, November 15, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H14037-H14062]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

RESTORE ACT OF 2007

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 746,
proceedings will now resume on the bill (H.R. 3773) to amend the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure
for authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence, and for
other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R 3773

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen,
Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of
2007''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States
persons outside the United States.

[[Page H14038]]

Sec. 3. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications of
non-United States persons located outside the United
States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of
non-United States persons located outside the United
States.
Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United
States persons located outside of the United States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc.
Sec. 7. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 8. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of
United States persons.
Sec. 9. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign
intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 10. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign
intelligence information.
Sec. 11. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 12. Sunset; transition procedures.

SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES.

Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105A. (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a court
order is not required for the acquisition of the contents of
any communication between persons that are not United States
persons and are not located within the United States for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information,
without respect to whether the communication passes through
the United States or the surveillance device is located
within the United States.
``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside
of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance
that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of
a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States and not a United States person for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as
defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by
targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or
105B; or
``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section
105 or 105C.''.

SEC. 3. PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105B. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the
court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order,
or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up
to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that
are reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States and not United States persons for the purpose of
collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in
paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those
persons.
``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under
subsection (a) shall include--
``(1) a certification by the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under this section are persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably
believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a
communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,
employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who
has authorized access to the communications to be acquired,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
such communications; and
``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1)
or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
``(2) a description of--
``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the
duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable
belief that the targets of the acquisition are persons that
are located outside the United States and not United States
persons;
``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the
identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition
will be directed;
``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of
minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with
respect to such acquisition; and
``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under
subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific
facilities, places, premises, or property at which the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be
directed.
``(d) Review of Application.--Not later than 15 days after
a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the
judge shall review such application and shall approve the
application if the judge finds that--
``(1) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection
(b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the
targets of the acquisition are located outside the United
States and not United States persons;
``(2) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in
subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h); and
``(3) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D)
are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is
filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act,
when the Federal Government seeks to conduct electronic
surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be located in
the United States.
``(e) Order.--
``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under
subsection (d) shall issue an order--
``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the
communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
``(B) requiring the communications service provider or
custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service
provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the
information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the acquisition to provide such information,
facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish
the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with
the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or
agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
``(C) requiring such communications service provider,
custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of
the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved
by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the
aid furnished;
``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for
providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to
such order; and
``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing
the person to comply with the order to such person; and
``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as
proposed or as modified by the judge;
``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in
subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge;
and
``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D)
as proposed or as modified by the judge.
``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with
an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may
invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a)
to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order
of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of
court. Any process under this section may be served in any
judicial district in which the person may be found.
``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law,
no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person
for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in
accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National
Intelligence and the court established under subsection
103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a
period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such
order is issued.
``(5) Assessment of compliance with minimization
procedures.--At or before the end of the period of time for
which an acquisition is approved by an order or an extension
under this section, the judge may assess compliance with the
minimization procedures referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(ii)
and the guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(iii) by
reviewing the circumstances under which information
concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or
disseminated.''.

SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

[[Page H14039]]

under this section, an application for an order authorizing
the acquisition in accordance with section 105B shall be
submitted to the judge referred to in subsection (b)(2) of
this section for approval of the acquisition in accordance
with section 105B.
``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency
acquisition of foreign intelligence information for a period
of not more than 45 days if--
``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General jointly determine that--
``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an
authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an
order approving the acquisition under such section can with
due diligence be obtained;
``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under this section are persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably
believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
``(D) there are reasonable procedures in place for
determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information under this section will be acquired by targeting
only persons that are reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States and not United States persons;
``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a
communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,
employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who
has authorized access to the communications to be acquired,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
such communications;
``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1)
or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to
such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h); and
``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having
jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at
the time of the authorization under this section that the
decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence
information.
``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
Pursuant to an authorization of an acquisition under this
section, the Attorney General may direct a communications
service provider, custodian, or an officer, employee, or
agent of such service provider or custodian, who has the
lawful authority to access the information, facilities, or
technical assistance necessary to accomplish such acquisition
to--
``(1) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such
information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner
that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce
a minimum of interference with the services that provider,
custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the
target of the acquisition; and
``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
any records concerning the acquisition or the aid
furnished.''.

SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE
UNITED STATES.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
105C the following new section:

``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES
PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105D. (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not
later than 7 days after an application is submitted under
section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e),
the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
General shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress--
``(1) in the case of an application, a copy of the
application, including the certification made under section
105B(b)(1); and
``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order,
including the procedures and guidelines referred to in
section 105B(e)(1)(E).
``(b) Quarterly Audits.--
``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter
until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B,
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall
complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance
with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section
105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a)
the results of such audit, including, for each order
authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under
section 105B--
``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such
order that were later determined to be located in the United
States;
``(B) the number of persons located in the United States
whose communications have been acquired under such order;
``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated
containing information on a United States person that was
collected under such order; and
``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of
electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose
communications were acquired under such order.
``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion
of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the
court established under section 103(a) a report containing
the results of such audit.
``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days
thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under
section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a
report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the
previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this
section shall include a description of any incidents of non-
compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e),
including incidents of non-compliance by--
``(1) an element of the intelligence community with
minimization procedures referred to in section
105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
``(2) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
``(3) an element of the intelligence community with
guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance under such order.
``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
containing the number of emergency authorizations of
acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any
incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization
under such section.
``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress'
means--
``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
and
``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.''.

SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(g) In any case where the court established under
subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review
a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of
the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any
orders related to such matter.''.

SEC. 7. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

(a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs
of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of
communications conducted without a court order on or after
September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance
Program referred to by the President in a radio address on
December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all
documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda
concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations
of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers,
and court orders.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the
completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector
General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report
containing the results of such audit, including all documents
acquired pursuant to conducting such audit.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the
investigation and adjudication of an application by the
Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a
security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit
under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as
possible.

SEC. 8. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

[[Page H14040]]

the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) that
collected the communications to other departments or agencies
of the United States; and
(2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government
and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
(b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created
under subsection (a), including the number of instances
referred to in paragraph (1).

SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of
Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector
General, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and
other appropriate elements of the National Security Division,
and the National Security Agency such sums as may be
necessary to meet the personnel and information technology
demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of--
(1) applications and other submissions to the court
established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));
(2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
(A) section 105D of such Act; and
(B) section 7; and
(3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements
under section 8.

SEC. 10. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR
GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

(a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence information.
(b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory
authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an
amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific
statutory authorization shall be the only exception to
subsection (a).

SEC. 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United
States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications
of non-United States persons located outside the United
States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications
of non-United States persons located outside the United
States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of persons
located outside of the United States.''.

(b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
(c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America
Act.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law
110-55) are hereby repealed.

SEC. 12. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

(a) Sunset of New Provisions.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
effective on December 31, 2009--
(A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) are hereby repealed; and
(B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act
is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A,
105B, 105C, and 105D.
(2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any
authorization or order issued under section 105B of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by
this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in
effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization
or order.
(b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.--
(1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this
Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall
remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such
authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of
enactment, whichever is earlier.
(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law
110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in
accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations,
including--
(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section
105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of
the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be
located in the United States;
(B) the number of persons located in the United States
whose communications have been acquired under such section;
(C) the number of reports disseminated containing
information on a United States person that was collected
under such section;
(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of
electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based
upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition
authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and
(E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with
an authorization under such section, including incidents of
non-compliance by--
(i) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
(ii) an element of the intelligence community with
minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of
such section; and
(iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
(3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection,
the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the
term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 824, the
further amendment printed in House Report 110-449 is adopted.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

H.R 3773

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States
persons outside the United States.
Sec. 3. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of
non-United States persons located outside the United
States who may be communicating with persons inside the
United States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of
non-United States persons located outside the United
Statesfwho may be communicating with persons inside the
United States.
Sec. 5. 0versight of acquisitions of communications of non-United
States persons located outside of the United States fNho
may be communicating with persons inside the United
States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banco
Sec. 7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court matters.
Sec. 8. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance may be conducted for gathering
foreign intelligence information.
Sec. 9. Enhancement of electronic surveillance authority in wartime
and other collection.
Sec. 10. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 11. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of
United States persons.
Sec. 12. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign
intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 13. Document management system for applications for orders
approving electronic surveillance.
Sec. 14. Training of intelligence community personnel in foreign
intelligence collection matters.
Sec. 15. Information for Congress on the terrorist surveillance
program and similar programs.
Sec. 16. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 17. Sunset; transition procedures.

[[Page H14041]]

SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES.

Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105A. (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, a court order is not required for the acquisition
of the contents of any communication between persons that are
not known to be United States persons and are reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information,
without respect to whether the communication passes through
the United States or the surveillance device is located
within the United States.
``(2) Treatment of inadvertent interceptions.--If
electronic surveillance referred to in paragraph (1)
inadvertently collects a communication in which at least one
party to the communication is located inside the United
States or is a United States person, the contents of such
communication shall be handled in accordance with
minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General that
require that no contents of any communication to which a
United States person is a party shall be disclosed,
disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer
than 7 days unless a court order under section 105 is
obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the
information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily
harm to any person.
``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside
of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance
that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of
a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States and not a United States person for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as
defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by
targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or
105B; or
``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section
105 or 105C.''.

SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE
COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED
STATES.

Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE
COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

``Sec. 105B. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the
court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order,
or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up
to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that
are reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States and not United States persons for the purpose of
collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in
paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those
persons.
``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under
subsection (a) shall include--
``(1) a certification by the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under this section are persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
who may be communicating with persons inside the United
States;
``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably
believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a
communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,
employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who
has authorized access to the communications to be acquired,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
such communications; and
``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1)
or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
``(2) a description of--
``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the
duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable
belief that the persons that are the targets of the
acquisition are located outside the United States and not
United States persons;
``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the
identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition
will be directed;
``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of
minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with
respect to such acquisition; and
``(D)(i) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an
application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required
by this Act, when a significant purpose of an acquisition is
to acquire the communications of a specific United States
person reasonably believed to be located in the United
States; and
``(ii) the criteria for determining if such a significant
purpose exists, which shall require consideration of
whether--
``(I) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition has made an inquiry to another
department or agency of the Federal Government to gather
information on the specific United States person;
``(II) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition has provided information that
identifies the specific United States person to another
department or agency of the Federal Government;
``(III) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition determines that the specific
United States person has been the subject of ongoing interest
or repeated investigation by a department or agency of the
Federal Government; and
``(IV) the specific United States person is a natural
person.
``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under
subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific
facilities, places, premises, or property at which the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be
directed.
``(d) Review of Application; Appeals.--
``(1) Review of application.--Not later than 15 days after
a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the
judge shall review such application and shall approve the
application if the judge finds that--
``(A) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection
(b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the
targets of the acquisition are located outside the United
States and not United States persons;
``(B) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in
subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h); and
``(C)(i) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D)
are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is
filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act,
when a significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire
the communications of a specific United States person
reasonably believed to be located in the United States; and
``(ii) the criteria for determining if such a significant
purpose exists require consideration of whether--
``(I) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition has made an inquiry to another
department or agency of the Federal Government to gather
information on the specific United States person;
``(II) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition has provided information that
identifies the specific United States person to another
department or agency of the Federal Government;
``(III) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition determines that the specific
United States person has been the subject of ongoing interest
or repeated investigation by a department or agency of the
Federal Government; and
``(IV) the specific United States person is a natural
person.
``(2) Temporary order; appeals.--
``(A) Temporary order.--A judge denying an application
under paragraph (1) may, at the application of the United
States, issue a temporary order to authorize an acquisition
under section 105B in accordance with the application under
subsection (a) during the pendency of any appeal of the
denial of such application.
``(B) Appeals.--The United States may appeal the denial of
an application for an order under paragraph (1) or a
temporary order under subparagraph (A) in accordance with
section 103.
``(e) Order.--
``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under
subsection (d) shall issue an order--
``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the
communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
``(B) requiring the communications service provider or
custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service
provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the
information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the acquisition to provide such information,
facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish
the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with
the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or
agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
``(C) requiring such communications service provider,
custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of
the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved
by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the
aid furnished;
``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for
providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to
such order;

[[Page H14042]]

``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing
the person to comply with the order to such person; and
``(iii) provide a certification stating that the
acquisition is authorized under this section and that all
requirements of this section have been met; and
``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as
proposed or as modified by the judge;
``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in
subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge;
and
``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D)
as proposed or as modified by the judge.
``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with
an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may
invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a)
to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order
of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of
court. Any process under this section may be served in any
judicial district in which the person may be found.
``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law,
no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person
for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in
accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National
Intelligence and the court established under subsection
103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a
period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such
order is issued.
``(5) Assessment of compliance with court order.--At or
before the end of the period of time for which an acquisition
is approved by an order or an extension under this section,
the court established under section 103(a) shall, not less
frequently than once each quarter, assess compliance with the
procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E) and
review the circumstances under which information concerning
United States persons was acquired, retained, or
disseminated.''.

SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE
COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED
STATES.

Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE
COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105C. (a) Application After Emergency
Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than
7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section,
an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in
accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge
referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval
of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B.
``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency
acquisition of foreign intelligence information (as defined
in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) for a period of
not more than 45 days if--
``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General jointly determine that--
``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an
authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an
order approving the acquisition under such section can with
due diligence be obtained;
``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under this section are persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably
believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
``(D) there are procedures in place that will be used by
the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
General during the duration of the authorization to determine
if there is a reasonable belief that the persons that are the
targets of the acquisition are located outside the United
States and not United States persons;
``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a
communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,
employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who
has authorized access to the communications to be acquired,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
such communications;
``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1)
or (2)(A) of section 101(e));
``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to
such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h); and
``(H)(i) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure
that an application is filed under secion 104, if otherwise
required by this Act, when a significant purpose of an
acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific
United States person reasonably believed to be located in the
United States; and
``(ii) the criteria for determining if such a significant
purpose exists require consideration of whether--
``(I) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition has made an inquiry to another
department or agency of the Federal Government to gather
information on the specific United States person;
``(II) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition has provided information that
identifies the specific United States person to another
department or agency of the Federal Government;
``(III) the department or agency of the Federal Government
conducting the acquisition determines that the United States
person has been the subject of ongoing interest or repeated
investigation by a department or agency of the Federal
Government; and
``(IV) the specific United States person is a natural
person.
``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having
jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at
the time of the authorization under this section that the
decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence
information.
``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
``(1) Directive.--Pursuant to an authorization of an
acquisition under this section, the Attorney General may
direct a communications service provider, custodian, or an
officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or
custodian, who has the lawful authority to access the
information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish such acquisition to--
``(A) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such
information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner
that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce
a minimum of interference with the services that provider,
custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the
target of the acquisition; and
``(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished.
``(2) Parameters; certifications.--The Attorney General
shall provide to any person directed to provide assistance
under paragraph (1) with--
``(A) a document setting forth the parameters of the
directive;
``(B) a certification stating that--
``(i) the emergency authorization has been issued pursuant
to this section;
``(ii) all requirements of this section have been met;
``(iii) a judge has been informed of the emergency
authorization in accordance with subsection (b)(2); and
``(iv) an application will be submitted in accordance with
subsection (a); and
``(C) a certification that the recipient of the directive
shall be compensated, at the prevailing rate, for providing
information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to such
directive.''.

SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE
UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH
PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
105C the following new section:

``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES
PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING
WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

[[Page H14043]]

``(B) the number of persons located in the United States
whose communications have been acquired under such order;
``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated
containing information on a United States person that was
collected under such order; and
``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of
electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose
communications were acquired under such order.
``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion
of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the
court established under section 103(a) a report containing
the results of such audit.
``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days
thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under
section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a
report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the
previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this
section shall include a description of any incidents of non-
compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e),
including incidents of non-compliance by--
``(1) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
``(2) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
``(3) an element of the intelligence community with
guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance under such order.
``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
containing the number of emergency authorizations of
acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any
incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization
under such section.
``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress'
means--
``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
and
``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.''.

SEC. 6. DISSEMINATION OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES
PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES
WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE
THE UNITED STATES.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
105D (as added by section 5) the following new section:

``DISSEMINATION OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED
OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS
INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105E. The contents of communications collected under
section 105B or section 105C, and intelligence reports based
on such contents, shall not be disclosed or disseminated with
information that identifies a United States person unless an
officer or employee of the Federal Government whose rate of
basic pay is not less than the minimum rate payable under
section 5382 of title 5, United States Code (relating to
rates of pay for the Senior Executive Service) determines
that the identity of the United States person is necessary
to--
``(1) understand the foreign intelligence collected under
section 105B or 105C or assess the importance of such
intelligence; and
``(2) protect the national security of the United States,
the citizens, employees, or officers of the United States, or
the members of the United States Armed Forces.''.

SEC. 7. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

SEC. 8. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT MATTERS.

(a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1803(a)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
(2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated)--
(A) by striking ``11'' and inserting ``15''; and
(B) by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United
States judicial circuits''; and
(3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3) and
indenting such paragraph, as so designated two ems from the
left margin.
(b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section
is further amended by inserting after paragraph (1) (as
designated by subsection (a)(1)) the following new paragraph:
``(2) A judge of the court shall make a determination to
approve, deny, or modify an application submitted pursuant to
section 105(f), section 304(e), or section 403 not later than
24 hours after the receipt of such application by the
court.''.

SEC. 9. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR
GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

SEC. 10. ENHANCEMENT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY IN
WARTIME AND OTHER COLLECTION.

Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are
amended by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``Congress or
an authorization for the use of military force described in
section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.
1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific
authorization for foreign intelligence collection under this
section, or if the Congress is unable to convene because of
an attack upon the United States.''.

SEC. 11. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

SEC. 12. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

(a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop
and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track
of--
(1) the instances where the identity of a United States
person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an
element of the intelligence community (as defined in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))
that collected the communications to other departments or
agencies of the United States; and
(2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government
and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
(b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created
under subsection (a), including the number of instances
referred to in paragraph (1).

SEC. 13. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office
of the Inspector General and the appropriate elements of the
National Security Division, and to the National Security
Agency such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel
and information technology demands to ensure the timely and
efficient processing of--
(1) applications and other submissions to the court
established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));

[[Page H14044]]

(2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
(A) section 105D of such Act; and
(B) section 10; and
(3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements
under section 8.
(b) Additional Personnel for Preparation and Consideration
of Applications for Orders Approving Electronic Surveillance
and Physical Search.--
(1) National security division of the department of
justice.--
(A) Additional personnel.--The National Security Division
of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such
additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the
prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of
applications under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 for orders under that Act for foreign intelligence
purposes.
(B) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign
personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among
appropriate offices of the intelligence community (as defined
in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4))) in order that such personnel may directly
assist personnel of the Intelligence Community in preparing
applications described in that paragraph and conduct prompt
and effective oversight of the activities of such agencies
under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders.
(2) Director of national intelligence.--
(A) Additional legal and other personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence is hereby authorized such additional
legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out
the prompt and timely preparation of applications under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders
under that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes.
(B) Assignment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and
among the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))),
including the field offices of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in order that such personnel may directly
assist personnel of the intelligence community in preparing
applications described in that paragraph.
(3) Additional legal and other personnel for foreign
intelligence surveillance court.--There is hereby authorized
for the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a))
such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to
facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that court
of applications under such Act for orders under such Act
approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall
perform such duties relating to the consideration of such
applications as that court shall direct.
(4) Supplement not supplant.--The personnel authorized by
this section are in addition to any other personnel
authorized by law.

SEC. 14. DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR APPLICATIONS FOR
ORDERS APPROVING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

(a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and
implement a secure, classified document management system
that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review
by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security
Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States
Government of applications under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their
submission to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
(b) Scope of System.--The document management system
required by subsection (a) shall--
(1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of
applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and
(2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel
submitting applications described in paragraph (1), and
provide for the secure electronic storage and retrieval of
all such applications and related matters with the court and
for their secure transmission to the National Archives and
Records Administration.

SEC. 15. TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL IN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MATTERS.

The Director of National Intelligence shall, in
consultation with the Attorney General--
(1) develop regulations to establish procedures for
conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance,
physical search, and the installation and use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices on an emergency basis,
and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving
applications and orders under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978; and
(2) prescribe related training on the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 and related legal matters for the
personnel of the applicable agencies of the intelligence
community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))).

SEC. 16. INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS ON THE TERRORIST
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND SIMILAR PROGRAMS.

As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of
this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the
President shall fully inform each member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate on the following:
(1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National
Security Agency.
(2) Any program in existence from September 11, 2001, until
the effective date of this Act that involves, whether in part
or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States
persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or
other purposes, and which is conducted by any department,
agency, or other element of the United States Government, or
by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or
other element of the United States Government, without fully
complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States
Code.

SEC. 17. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first
section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items
relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the
following new items:
``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United
States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications
of non-United States persons located outside the United
States who may be communicating with persons inside the
United States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications
of non-United States persons located outside the United
States who may be communicating with persons inside the
United States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United
States persons located outside of the United States who
may be communicating with persons inside the United
States.''.
(b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
(c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act
of 2007.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public
Law 110-55) are hereby repealed.

SEC. 18. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

[[Page H14045]]

(C) the number of reports disseminated containing
information on a United States person that was collected
under such section;
(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of
electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based
upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition
authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and
(E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with
an authorization under such section, including incidents of
non-compliance by--
(i) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
(ii) an element of the intelligence community with
minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of
such section; and
(iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
(3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection,
the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the
term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)).

SEC. 19. CERTIFICATION TO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS
THAT ACQUISITIONS ARE AUTHORIZED UNDER FISA.

(a) Authorization Under Section 102.--Section 102(a) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1802(a)) is amended by striking ``furnishing such aid'' and
inserting ``furnishing such aid and shall provide such
carrier with a certification stating that the electronic
surveillance is authorized under this section and that all
requirements of this section have been met''.
(b) Authorization Under Section 105.--Section 105(c)(2) of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting ``;'';
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``aid.'' and inserting
``aid; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) that the applicant provide such carrier, landlord,
custodian, or other person with a certification stating that
the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section
and that all requirements of this section have been met.''.

SEC. 20. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

(a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
(e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be prosecuted,
tried, or punished for any offense under this section unless
the indictment is found or the information is instituted not
later than 10 years after the commission of the offense.''.
(b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the
enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations
applicable to that offense has not run as of such date.

SEC. 21. NO RIGHTS UNDER THE RESTORE ACT FOR UNDOCUMENTED
ALIENS.

This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be
construed to prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights
to, an alien not permitted to be in or remain in the United
States.

SEC. 22. SURVEILLANCE TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES.

This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be
construed to prohibit the intelligence community (as defined
in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4))) from conducting lawful surveillance that is
necessary to--
(1) prevent Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other
terrorist or terrorist organization from attacking the United
States, any United States person, or any ally of the United
States;
(2) ensure the safety and security of members of the United
States Armed Forces or any other officer or employee of the
Federal Government involved in protecting the national
security of the United States; or
(3) protect the United States, any United States person, or
any ally of the United States from threats posed by weapons
of mass destruction or other threats to national security.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Time for debate pursuant to House Resolution
746 is considered expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 824, debate shall not exceed 1 hour,
with 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and
ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 30
minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Smith) each will control 15 minutes and the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) each
will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).

General Leave

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on H.R. 3773.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
Members of the House, the RESTORE Act dealing with FISA addresses the
needs of the intelligence community for flexibility in dealing with
modern communications networks.

{time} 1815

It received the most careful scrutiny and consideration by this
Committee on the Judiciary, as well as by the Intelligence Committee,
chaired by Chairman Reyes, to ensure that it meets every concern our
intelligence agencies have raised, every single one of them, and does
so consistent with the rules of law, our Constitution, and our values.
Let's begin this discussion this evening by clearing up a few things
that the bill will not do. The RESTORE Act will never require our
intelligence agencies to stop listening to the bad guys. Never. Special
emergency provisions allow us to listen first and get the warrant after
the fact, if it's needed. No one will ever have to stop listening to a
terrorist plotting an attack. I hope I don't hear that raised on the
floor this evening.
The RESTORE Act will not make our intelligence agencies have to get
thousands of warrants for terrorists outside the country. It will not
do that. Instead, a basket authorization will permit surveillance of an
entire foreign terrorist organization. This is the most effective way
to target Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and other threats to our country
and our citizens.
The RESTORE Act does not give the government free rein to listen to
Americans. As has always been the case under FISA, this bill requires
that the government get a warrant to target an American; any American.
We have also a manager's amendment, which continues to promote the
goals of intelligence flexibility with appropriate oversight, while
safeguarding our security and our liberty. It makes clear that the
protections of the act will not inhibit gathering intelligence against
present dangers, such as Osama bin Laden, or threats to our troops in
the field.
It does provide guidelines to make it easier to determine when the
significant purpose of the surveillance act is to acquire information
on a United States person and a FISA warrant is needed. It provides
important safeguards on dissemination of information about individual
Americans when it's acquired under the RESTORE Act's more flexible
structure. Specifically, an SES-level manager will review such
dissemination on a particularized basis.
Importantly, the RESTORE Act has no retroactive immunity for
telecommunications carriers who may have assisted the government in
conducting unlawful surveillance on Americans. I am sorry to report to
you that the other body has a measure that does give that retroactive
immunity. The RESTORE Act now on the floor has no retroactive immunity
for telecommunications carriers who may have assisted the government in
unlawful surveillance on Americans.
Until we receive the information, the data, the letters that we have
requested to know what they have done, information we have been waiting
for more than 10 months for, we can't even begin to responsibly
consider such a request. So as of now, it's out. No retroactive
immunity.
The legislation that we have before us now is a much-needed start to
restoring our system of checks and balances, preserving our liberty,
and ensuring that our government has the tools they legitimately need
to combat terrorism. We got pressed up against the wall in August. It's
not going to happen again. There's a 6-month run on the present measure
before us. Before we get pushed up against the holidays, we are saying,
Let's do it now.
We have had a tremendous working relationship with the chairman of
the Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes, and his staff and my
staff. Majority and minority have been working

[[Page H14046]]

closely together to bring to you a commonsense and balanced piece of
legislation that does what we set out to do, and that is to preserve
our liberties and make sure we have effective security. We want our
intelligence agencies strong, but we want to bring the FISA Court back
into the picture, and we do in the measure before us.
Six years ago, the administration unilaterally chose to engage in
warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court review.
That decision has--to be charitable--created a legal and political
quagmire. Officials resigned, the program was riddled with errors, it
was shut down for several weeks, officials rushed to the hospital to
ask a sick man to reauthorize it over his deputy's objections, and
vital prosecutorial resources were diverted. Most importantly, our own
citizens questioned wheher their own government was operating within
the confines of the law.
Two months ago, when that scheme appeared to be breaking down, the
administration forced Congress to accept an equally flawed statute.
This new law gutted the power of the FISA court. It granted the
administration broad new powers to engage in warrantless searches
within the U.S., including physical searches of our homes, computers,
offices and medical records. The law contained no meaningful oversight
whatsoever.
The legislation before us today seeks to once again strike the
appropriate balance between needed government authority and our
precious rights and liberties. It tells the government they need no
warrant when foreign agents communicate with other foreigners. It
reiterates that warrants are needed when Americans are being targeted.
The bill also allows the interception of communications of foreign
targets who may communicate with U.S. persons. However, it insists that
procedures be in place--approved by the FISA court--to insure that no
American is being targeted, and that his or her privacy is protected.
The bill also provides for several critical safeguards. We include
periodic audits by the Inspector General, we narrow the scope of the
authority to protect against threats to our national security, and we
protect the privacy of Americans traveling abroad. We also sunset the
legislation in December 2009.
The RESTORE Act, which has received careful consideration by the
Judiciary Committee and by the Intelligence Committee, addresses the
needs of the intelligence community for flexibility and the ability to
deal with modern communications networks.
It meets every concern that our intelligence agencies have raised and
does so consistent with the rule of law, our Constitution, and our
values.
Let me be clear on a few things this bill will NOT do:
The RESTORE Act will never require our intelligence agencies to stop
listening to the bad guys. Never. There are emergency provisions and
the ability to get a warrant after the fact. No one will ever have to
stop listening to a terrorist plotting an attack.
It will not make our intelligence agencies get thousands of warrants
for terrorists outside of the country. Instead, they can get a basket
authorization to surveil the entire foreign terrorist organization.
This is the most effective way to target Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and
other threats.
The RESTORE Act does not give the government free rein to listen in
to Americans. As has always been the case under FISA, this bill
requires the government to get a warrant if it wants to target an
American.
The Managers' Amendment also reflects the RESTORE Act's goals of
intelligence flexibility and oversight, while ensuring both safety and
civil liberties. It makes it clear that the protections of the Act will
not inhibit gathering intelligence against present dangers, such as
Osama bin Laden or threats to our troops in the field. It provides
guidelines to flesh out what should be considered when determining
whether a significant purpose of collection is to acquire information
about a U.S. person, such that a FISA warrant would be required.
The Manager's Amendment also provides important safeguards on
dissemination of information about individual Americans when it is
acquired under the RESTORE Act's more flexible structure. Dissemination
of U.S. person communications acquired under the RESTORE Act's basket
authorities can only happen when an SES-Ievel supervisor determines
that the identity of that person is needed to understand or assess the
importance of the foreign intelligence, and to protect the national
security of the United States. This is not a blanket authorization to
unmask everyone intercepted, but must be done on a person-by-person
basis.
Importantly, the bill has no retroactive immunity for
telecommunications carriers. Until we receive the underlying
documents relating to their conduct from the administration--and we
have been waiting for more than ten months--we cannot even begin to
consider this request. Sending a small set of the documents to a
subcommittee of the other body does not begin to meet this test.

There is one of the grave concerns about the Protect America Act that
bears mention as we consider the RESTORE Act. The Protect America Act
was overbroad in the types of entities from which the government could
compel information, reaching into business or medical records or
libraries. We have narrowed the scope of the acquisitions in the
RESTORE Act to ensure that the government can only seek information
under the ``basket authorizations'' from telecommunications service
providers and related companies.
I share the concern of our library community that believes their
mission and the chance to bring knowledge and freedom of expression
abroad will be diminished if the U.S. government can indiscriminately
monitor American libraries when they serve foreign users. This is not a
hypothetical concern in an age of distance learning. While a library
certainly is not the same kind of ``communications service provider''
as AOL or AT&T, it may allow patrons to access the internet, to send
emails, and to conduct research on-line, so it literally ``provides''
these communications services to patrons. The Judiciary Committee
report indicates that these now-standard library services do not make
them ``telecommunications service providers'' for a 105B or 105C
acquisition, but let me be clear--nothing in the bill is intended to
leave libraries outside of the protections of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.
The legislation before us today is a much needed start to restoring
our system of checks and balances, to preserving our precious
liberties, and to insuring that our government has all the tools they
legitimately need to combat terrorism. I urge my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to support this common sense and balanced
legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, there is a time and place for politics and partisanship.
But there are in fact important issues that transcend politics. The
security of our Nation outweighs politics, especially when our country
is at war.
One of the finest moments of bipartisanship in Washington came after
one of the darkest days in our history. On the evening of September 11,
2001, Members of Congress stood shoulder to shoulder on the steps of
the Capitol as a symbol of strength and unity in response to the
terrorist attacks. In that moment, we stood together, not as
Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans resolved to protect our
Nation. However, as we stand here today, that same spirit of
bipartisanship we shared on 9/11 no longer exists.
We began in August to address a very specific and very urgent issue
facing our intelligence community. We learned from the Director of
National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, that the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, or FISA, was outdated for today's technology. But the
bill we are considering today does not modernize FISA; it weakens it.
Why, after 30 years of lawful foreign intelligence collection, does the
Democratic majority suddenly object to a law that their party
originally enacted in 1978? Why make it harder to gather intelligence
on terrorists after 9/11 than before?
Now, after only a few hours' notice, we are considering the RESTORE
Act, which actually restores little. Rather, it undermines our national
security and increases the risk of a future terrorist attack on our
country. It prevents our intelligence community from gathering critical
intelligence information. It ignores the need for legal protection for
communications companies that assist law enforcement and intelligence
officials. We are at war with terrorists who spend every day plotting
attacks against us. Our intelligence community needs to detect and
disrupt these plots. To deny this ability could have catastrophic
consequences.
Admiral McConnell testified in great detail before the Judiciary
Committee about the specific needs of the intelligence community and
the need to reform FISA. Admiral McConnell's recommendations are
ignored, unfortunately, in the RESTORE Act. Instead, it requires the
intelligence community to obtain FISA court orders for all
communications of persons reasonably believed to be outside the United
States. FISA has never applied to persons outside of the United States.
Under the RESTORE Act, FISA court orders will be required for the
first time ever for thousands of overseas terrorist targets. Also,
section 18 of the

[[Page H14047]]

manager's amendment is bluntly titled: ``No Rights Under the RESTORE
Act for Undocumented Aliens.'' That is what it says. But the practical
effect of the RESTORE Act will be to allow unregulated, warrantless
wiretapping of illegal immigrants in the United States. Is this really
what the Democratic majority intends?
Finally, the RESTORE Act omits any liability protection for telephone
companies and other carriers that assisted the government after
September 11, 2001. These companies deserve our thanks, not a flurry of
harassing lawsuits. Communications technology has changed since 1978.
We can no longer gather foreign intelligence without the assistance of
private communications companies. Extending commonsense liability
protection to communication providers who acted in good faith to
protect the United States from another terrorist attack is completely
appropriate. If we fail to provide this protection, we risk losing the
future cooperation of communication providers in gathering foreign
intelligence.
Democrats made a promise to the American people in 2006 that Members
of Congress would put aside politics and work together to find
bipartisan solutions to issues facing the American people. That promise
has apparently been broken.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise once again in support of H.R. 3773, the RESTORE
Act. I would also like the Record to reflect that Congressman Baron
Hill intended to be listed as a cosponsor of H.R. 3773, and we are
certainly grateful for his support.
In early September, at the direction of Speaker Pelosi, the
Intelligence Committee and the House Judiciary Committee took up the
call to improve the Protect America Act, or PAA. Passed in August, the
PAA modified FISA and gave sweeping and unprecedented surveillance
powers to the executive branch, while requiring minimal oversight and
without providing a meaningful judicial check on the President's use of
the new powers.
While we were charged with undoing the excesses of PAA, we also have
the mandate to provide our intelligence professionals the legal
authorities required to protect the country from our enemies. Six years
after the tragic attacks of 9/11, Osama bin Laden remains at large and
America continues to face threats from al Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations. The war in Iraq continues to act as a recruitment tool
for all our enemies.
Mindful of these threats, we drafted the RESTORE Act as a bill that
we can all support and be proud of. The RESTORE Act arms our
intelligence community with powerful new authorities to conduct
electronic surveillance of targets outside the United States while
maintaining our fundamental liberties. First, it exempts truly foreign-
to-foreign communications from any judicial review, even when the
communication passes through the United States or the surveillance
device is still actually located in the United States. Second, it
authorizes the acquisition of foreign intelligence information for all
matters of national defense, including information relating to
terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and other threats to the national
security of our country.
Third, the act clarifies that nothing in the act or the amendments to
the act shall be construed to prohibit lawful surveillance necessary to
prevent Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization
from attacking the United States or our allies. But these powerful
authorities are subject to the checks and the balances required by our
Constitution.
The RESTORE Act puts the FISA Court back in business where the rights
of Americans are at stake. The RESTORE Act tightens overbroad language
in the PAA that authorized physical searches of Americans' homes and
offices without a warrant. The RESTORE Act restores meaningful, robust,
and continuous oversight by the judicial and legislative branches to
ensure that the powerful intelligence-gathering tools authorized by the
RESTORE Act are being used effectively and within the boundaries set by
our Constitution.
In sum, the RESTORE Act provides tools to keep the Nation safe and
upholds our constitutional liberties. This debate has gone on long
enough, I believe, Mr. Speaker. It has been unnecessarily prolonged
bipartisan maneuvering from some in this House. I am sure that we will
see more of that partisan gamesmanship tonight. But I urge my
colleagues to reject partisan politics in favor of sound policy and
support this critically important bill.
I urge all my colleagues to vote ``yes'' for the RESTORE Act.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

{time} 1830

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), the ranking member of the Crime
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, unfortunately some things never change, and
unfortunately this bill happens to be one of them. No matter how
dangerous law enforcement says this bill is, it hasn't changed. No
matter how dangerous the intelligence community says it is, this bill
hasn't changed. And unfortunately there is a cycle that won't change
either, and that cycle is simply this.
In the nineties, we cut our intelligence capabilities. On 9/11/2001,
we had the worst terrorist attack that has ever hit our shores. Since
that time our intelligence community and our law enforcement people
have worked hard and they have kept us safe. But if we have another
hit, and this bill puts us on the same cycle, because what are we doing
now? We are cutting our intelligence capabilities once again, like we
did in the nineties. If we have another terrorist attack, the cycle
will repeat itself, and they will bring back in law enforcement and
they will point their fingers and they will say, why didn't you stop
it?
Mr. Speaker, we have an opportunity tonight not to repeat that cycle
by not passing this bill and making the amendments necessary to keep
our intelligence strong.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to recognize a very
effective member of our committee, Mr. Schiff of California, as well as
the gentleman Mr. Flake of Arizona, and I would yield them 2 minutes.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the chairman for yielding and for his leadership.
Over the last 2 years, I have worked with my Republican colleague
Jeff Flake of Arizona to ensure that the government has all the tools
necessary to pursue al Qaeda and all the other terrorists who would
seek to harm our country while ensuring that the requirement of court
approval of surveillance of Americans on American soil is met.
I am pleased that the committee has included many of the items we
proposed, including reiterating FISA's exclusivity, providing robust
oversight reporting, requiring FISA Court involvement when U.S. persons
are involved, and clarifying that the interception of foreign-to-
foreign communications does not require a court order.
To address a concern raised by Mr. Flake, our language makes clear
that a court order would not be required for electronic surveillance
directed at the acquisition of communications between persons that are
not known to be U.S. persons and are reasonably believed to be located
outside the U.S., without respect to whether the communication passes
through the U.S. or the surveillance device is located in the U.S.
We have also placed additional safeguards to ensure this section is
not abused and used to acquire communications of U.S. persons.
I am pleased to yield the balance of my time to my colleague.
Mr. FLAKE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I have enjoyed working
with Representative Schiff on this, and I thank the committee for
addressing our concerns. Our concerns had to do mostly, my own concern
in particular, with making sure that we are not involving a court when
you are talking about foreign-to-foreign communications or
communications between persons who are not known to be U.S. residents
or not known or reasonably believed to be within the U.S. I believe
those concerns were addressed here, and I appreciate the work that was
done to do that.

[[Page H14048]]

As mentioned, our language also requires that if a U.S. citizen is
inadvertently tripped up in the communication, that proper procedures
are taken to deal with that and that the information is disseminated to
the right people and committees. So I appreciate the committee's work
on this.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Gohmert), the deputy ranking member of the Crime
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Speaker, to be accused of partisan maneuvering is
pretty insulting. Some of us are not concerned about partisan
maneuvering; we are concerned about the security of the United States.
That is why I am here right now, not because of partisan maneuvering.
Do you want to talk partisan maneuvering? How about when I go out to
get a copy of the most current bill and we have got a bait and switch.
This isn't even the most current bill out there that we can get ahold
of to come in and talk about. But I know the provision, and I
appreciate my fine chairman talking about we have taken care of
emergency situations, and then we had two Members just talk about
emergency situations.
If you take these provisions, and hopefully the part I am talking
about is the latest, that is the way I understand from what you are
talking about, it says specifically in here, yeah, there is an
emergency provision, but in order to get it, the Director of National
Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, who was the National Security Advisor
for President Clinton, he and the Attorney General have to jointly be
able to swear that the targets of their acquisition are not reasonably
believed to be located outside of the United States and they are not
reasonably believed to be United States persons.
You take that with their testimony, the testimony was I cannot ever
swear that. The way you do this intelligence is you go after a foreign
target, and I can never testify, he said, as to who the person will be
that they call. I can never testify that I reasonably believe they will
be outside the United States when they call or that they will not be a
United States person.
So, if he comes in and does this after he has testified ``I cannot
say I reasonably believe that they will not call somebody in the U.S.,
when I don't know who they will call,'' then we got problems. This does
not protect the problem. We need to vote ``no.''
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 seconds to the gentleman from Iowa
(Mr. Boswell).
Mr. BOSWELL. I thank the gentleman and I support the bill.
I submit for the Record an op-ed by our friend and former colleague,
the Honorable Lee Hamilton, cochair of the 9/11 Commission, regarding
the issue of retroactive immunity. The op-ed fully expresses my
concerns regarding this issue, and I wish for all Members to have the
benefit of reviewing it.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Nov. 4, 2007]

Immunity for Wiretap Assistance Is Right Call

(By Lee H. Hamilton)

If the local fire company asked for your help putting out
neighbor's blaze, you would not force the firefighters to
justify their request. You would just help, right? That's
what the phone companies did when the Bush administration
asked them in secret for help with wiretaps to target al-
Qaida communications into and out of the country.
However, the president's warrantless wiretap program caused
a furor when it became public. The administration had
circumvented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
raising many doubts about the legality and even
constitutionality of its wiretap program. The controversy
prompted class-action lawsuits against phone companies that
cooperated with the government.
The Senate Intelligence Committee has reported out a
bipartisan bill that would bring this wiretap program back
under the FISA statute and court review. It would ensure the
legality and robust congressional oversight so lacking in the
original program. It also would give the phone companies
immunity for their previous actions.
The committee made the right call. To the extent that
companies helped the government, they were acting out of a
sense of patriotic duty and in the belief that their actions
were legal. Dragging them through litigation would set a bad
precedent. It would deter companies and private citizens from
helping in future emergencies when there is uncertainty or
legal risk.
The help and cooperation of all our citizens are vital in
combating the threats we face today. Companies in various
sectors of the economy are going to have information that
could save the lives of thousands of Americans. When they
respond in an emergency, at the call of our highest elected
officials and on assurances that what they are doing is
legal, they must be treated fairly. To do otherwise would put
our security at risk.
This is particularly true of communications companies. They
are critical to our intelligence and ``early warning''
against terrorist attacks. The increasing complexity of
communications technology has made the voluntary cooperation
of these companies vital.
Government actions require public review. Actions by
private companies in response to government requests also
should place the burden of accountability on the government.
We should not expect private companies to second-guess the
propriety and legality of government requests. That is the
job of our public servants in the executive branch, the
legislators who oversee them, and ultimately the courts.
Unless Congress provides immunity, the clear message will
be that private citizens should help only when they are
certain that all the government's actions are legal. Given
today's threats, that is too high a standard. We should hold
public officials accountable for their actions--and hold
harmless private citizens and companies when they respond to
government requests to help protect us.

Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Eshoo), who serves as the chairwoman of our
Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management.
Ms. ESHOO. I thank the distinguished chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation very importantly covers espionage,
terrorism, sabotage and all threats to our national security. That
sentence alone frames what this issue is about and the seriousness of
it.
The other part of it that fills out the frame is that it restores the
FISA Court. It restores the FISA Court to its prominence, and, by doing
so, it restores a legal framework for surveillance that must be
conducted to protect our national security.
This legislation provides every meaningful tool of the legislation
that was passed last August. But, unlike that bill, it protects the
rights of the American people.
The legislation is true to its name. It restores the role for all
three branches of our government by reestablishing the checks and the
balances that have protected our security, as well as our rights as
Americans. This is what the American people not only expect, it is what
they have become accustomed to, and they like it.
This legal framework for the NSA surveillance is absolutely
essential. When no Americans are involved, no judicial oversight is
required. When an American communication may be intercepted, the court
must approve the procedures for handling it. Finally, when an American
is targeted, the court must be asked for an order.
The American people know all too well that this administration is now
considered the most secretive in the history of our country. It has
operated with unchecked power and without judicial or congressional
oversight. We now know that the President went around the courts to
conduct a program of warrantless surveillance of calls to Americans. We
now know that the FBI abused the authorities granted under the PATRIOT
Act improperly using National Security Letters to American businesses,
including medical, financial and library records, instead of seeking a
warrant from the court. In hundreds of signing statements, the
President has quietly claimed he had the authority to set aside
statutes passed by Congress.
Mr. Speaker, I think enough is enough. This bill says that the
executive is not the imperial branch of government. It restores the
fundamental balance struck by our Framers, to secure our Nation and to
protect the rights of all Americans. Preserving that balance makes our
Nation stronger, and this is at the core of the legislation before us.
I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Lungren) who is the senior member of both the
Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in
opposition to this bill, and I am sorry that I have to do that. I
respect the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers). We have worked on
many things together. I believe he is a prime time player, but I
disagree with his statement that this bill is ready for prime time.

[[Page H14049]]

To just give one example, if you look at section 6 of this bill,
section 6 of the bill differs with the way we handle minimization under
current law by saying that if there is evidence of a crime, it cannot
be disseminated to a criminal justice entity. Now, maybe there is a
reason for that, but that has never been discussed whatsoever.
Secondly, I would say that in the two 1-hour Special Orders I gave, I
raised the problem that exists in the underlying bill as we now see it,
which is in the very beginning of the bill, and it deals with a section
entitled ``treatment of inadvertent interceptions.''
It deals with a situation where the intelligence community believes
in good faith that they are dealing with foreign-to-foreign, but
inadvertently they capture communication that deals with foreign-to-
domestic. And what we say here is that you cannot use that information
for any purpose, any purpose. It cannot be disclosed. It cannot be
disseminated. It cannot be used for any purpose or retained for longer
than 7 days, unless what? A court order is obtained or unless the
Attorney General determines that the information indicates a threat of
death or serious bodily harm to any person, that the information
indicates that.
I have stood on this floor on several occasions and said what that
means is if we have a conversation or a communication involving Osama
bin Laden, and everybody recognizes that might be the case, because in
the manager's amendment we talk about Osama bin Laden, if in fact that
occurs and the communication deals with someone within the United
States, and he doesn't in that communication have information
indicating a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person, but
indicates where he happens to be, the exact cave where he is at, we
cannot operate on that in a timely fashion.
I would challenge any Member on the other side of the aisle to read
the language in the underlying merged text, page 3, entitled
``Treatment of Inadvertent Interceptions,'' and tell me that I am
wrong. This is, whether it is by mistake or you intended it to happen,
giving greater protection to a terrorist around the world than you give
to an American citizen charged with a crime.
I have said it before and I will say it again: I don't believe you
intended this, but it is in the bill. As a matter of fact, the
gentleman from New York, the chairman of the Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee, came to me after we had an exchange on the floor on the
issue and said, ``You are right. We goofed up. We should get rid of
it.'' Yet we are here with it on the floor. For that reason alone, we
ought to defeat the bill.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am stunned by my friend from California's
comments, but I yield now 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Nadler), the chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee in Judiciary.
Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation restores the proper role of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court in the maintenance of our national
security infrastructure. Let's get the terms of this debate clear
before we begin. Anyone who can read will see that this bill does not
inhibit the government's ability to spy on terrorists or on suspected
terrorists or to act swiftly and effectively on the information we
gather.

{time} 1845

The American people expect that their government will keep us all
safe and free. This bill does that.
The bill does not require individual warrants of foreign terrorists
located outside the United States. That has been the law for three
decades; that is still the law.
The bill does provide reasonable FISA Court oversight to ensure that
when our government starts spying on Americans, it does so lawfully by
getting a warrant from the FISA Court. It will put an end to this
administration's well-worn ``trust me'' routine.
I trust our intelligence community to gather solid intelligence on
threats to our Nation. But protecting constitutional rights is not
their prime job. That is why we have courts.
This bill provides for Congress to receive independent reports on how
the act is working and what our government is doing. This
administration's penchant for secrecy and aversion to accountability
will come to an end, at least in this area.
Let me say a word for demands for retroactive immunity for the
telecom companies. As many of our colleagues have pointed out, any such
discussion is premature. We do not even know what we are being asked to
immunize or whose rights would be compromised if we did so.
More importantly, Congress should not decide legal cases between
private parties; that's for the courts. If the claims are not
meritorious, the courts will throw them out. But if the claims do have
merit, we have no right to wipe them without even reviewing the
evidence. How dare we have the presumption to decide the rights of
allegedly injured parties in the blind.
Mr. Speaker, this bill meets every single principle set forth by the
Congressional Progressive Caucus. As one of the co-chairs of the
caucus' FISA Task Force, I am pleased to support this important bill.
It is true to our Constitution. It is true to our values. It is true to
our safety. It will keep us safe and free.
This bill gives our intelligence agencies the tools they have told us
they need to make us safe, and gives the FISA Court the tools it needs
to ensure that the extraordinary powers we are giving to the
intelligence community are used correctly and consistently with our
laws and our Constitution.
It's called the separation of powers, with each branch of the
government doing what it is supposed to do and acting as a check on the
others. FISA exists to ensure that the balance between the needs of
intelligence gathering and the protection of the rights of all
Americans are balanced.
Most importantly, it restores the role of FISA as the exclusive legal
basis for foreign intelligence surveillance. No more making it up as
you go along.
Did the telecoms break the law? Were they acting appropriately? Were
the rights of innocent Americans violated? We don't know.
How dare we have the presumption to decide the rights of allegedly
injured parties in the blind?
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Arizona (Mr. Shadegg), a senior member of the Commerce Committee.
Mr. SHADEGG. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I think this is a very, very important debate. I understand the
frustration of the majority in trying to deal with this issue, but I
believe they have created a structure that even they themselves don't
understand, and a structure that fundamentally turns the Constitution
and the role of at least two branches of the government upside down.
We have the executive branch which is charged with defending the
Nation against foreign enemies and we have the judicial branch which is
charged with applying and interpreting the laws. But it is charged with
judging disputes between American citizens, not with making decisions
how about to gather foreign intelligence.
Now, how does this bill work? Number one, it says if the executive
branch in carrying out its duty to protect the country from foreign
enemies knows in advance that both people, both ends of a telephone
communication or some other electronic communication, are in fact
foreigners, no warrant is needed.
Well, if we could be mind readers and if we could hire mind readers
as intelligence officers, that might be useful. But everyone in the
intelligence community tells you that have targeted one person, and
without the ability to read the mind of that person, you don't know who
the other person they are calling is.
So as a matter of fact, you can never know, never ever know, no CIA
agent, no judge, nobody can ever know that both people are foreigners.
And so if the law says if you don't know that both are foreigners, you
must get a warrant from a judge.
Now they have said we are going to be reasonable about it; it is
going to be a basket warrant. But that then gives the duty of
protecting the Nation to a judge, an unelected judge.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), our chairman of the Select
Intelligence Oversight Panel.
Mr. HOLT. I thank my friend and colleague from Texas.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill. As many of you know,
when the committee reported this bill to the floor, I expressed
concerns that it

[[Page H14050]]

lacked provisions ensuring that the courts would decide whether the
executive branch could seize and search communications of Americans.
The RESTORE Act now before us includes provisions via the manager's
amendment that will ensure that it is the courts, not an executive
branch political appointee, who decides whether or not the
communications of an American can be seized and searched and that such
seizures and searches must be done pursuant to an individualized court
order.
This bill gives our citizens the best protection we can provide them,
a sound intelligence collection that will foil our enemies and the
review of the executive branch's surveillance actions by the court. In
other words, each of us can say to each of our constituents: you have
the protection of the court.
Now, it is important to note that this bill will provide better
intelligence than existing law, the existing law which was passed in
haste and fear. This bill, by applying checks and balances, improves
intelligence collection and analysis. It has been demonstrated that
when officials establish before a court that they have reason to
intercept communications, we get better intelligence, better
intelligence than we get through indiscriminate collection and fishing
expeditions.
Mr. Speaker, this does it right. Mr. Speaker, I would like to close
by thanking the staff of the committee, Jeremy Bash and Eric Greenwald;
and from the Judiciary Committee, Lou DeBaca and Burt Wides; as well as
the chairmen, Mr. Reyes and Mr. Conyers, who took my concerns to heart
and made them their own concerns. It has produced a good bill. I urge
my colleagues to vote ``yes'' for the RESTORE Act.
Mr. Speaker, the RESTORE Act will ensure that it is the courts--and
not an executive branch political appointee--who decide whether or not
the communications of an American citizen can be seized and searched,
and that such seizures and searches must be done pursuant to a court
order. This bill gives our citizens the best protection we can provide
them: good intelligence collection against our adversaries, and review
of the executive branch's surveillance actions by a court.
I was pleased to be able to work with my colleagues on the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to add several key
provisions to this bill. For example, the bill's most critical new
provision ensures that the government must have an individualized,
particularized court-approved warrant based on probable cause in order
to read or listen to the communications of an American citizen.
Inclusion of this provision was vital. We must be able to assure our
citizens that their communications cannot be seized and searched by the
government in the absence of a court order, and with this provision now
in the bill, we can provide that assurance.
Another provision I worked to include requires the Court to review
and approve not only the procedures and guidelines required under this
Act, but also the application of those guidelines. This provision
provides another important point of review by the courts that will help
ensure that the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence are actually doing what they claim they are doing.
I also asked that a provision be inserted that makes it clear that
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is the sole statutory
basis for domestic surveillance. This language was needed to remove any
ambiguity. We cannot have any President inventing other claims for
secret, warrantless surveillance.
The bill also provides additional resources to both the executive and
judiciary branches for processing FISA applications and orders. The
bill increases the number of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) judges from 11 to 15, provides additional personnel to both the
FISC and government agencies responsible for making and processing FISA
applications, creates an electronic filing, sharing, and document
management system for handling this highly classified data, and
mandates training for all government personnel involved in the FISA
process. All of this will help modernize and streamline the FISA
application approval process.
Finally, the bill requires the Bush administration to ``fully
inform'' Congress on all surveillance programs conducted since 9/11.
It's outrageous that the Bush Administration has continued to stonewall
this Congress over documents for the one program it has acknowledged.
If we're to do our job of oversight, we need all the facts about past
and current surveillance programs, and this provision will help us get
those answers.
I hope our colleagues in the Senate will quickly pass the RESTORE
Act, and I call upon the President to end his veto threats and work
with Congress to bring America's surveillance activities into
compliance with the Constitution.
President Bush has no inherent Constitutional authority to spy on our
own citizens in the name of national security. If the President is
serious about passing a law that allows us to protect our citizens from
all enemies--foreign and domestic--he will sign this bill.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt), the distinguished minority whip of
the House.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for
his hard work on the floor this evening, for the leadership of Mr.
Hoekstra and others on this important bill. We need to modernize FISA
to keep up with changes in communications technology and the
continually evolving tactics of our terrorist enemies.
We made some important steps in this direction only 90 days ago. We
all understand that more needs to be done. But rather than responding
to this need, this legislation actually impedes the intelligence
community's ability to conduct effective investigations and to prevent
future terrorist attacks.
This act requires FISA court orders for the first time for thousands
of overseas terrorist targets. The Director of National Intelligence,
Admiral McConnell, has described this requirement as unworkable and
impractical.
This act contains a sunset date which fails to provide the certainty
under the law that our intelligence community needs to effectively do
its job.
It doesn't provide the liability protections for telephone companies
and other carriers that assisted the government after 9/11 who now have
a flurry of harassing lawsuits facing them.
Mr. Speaker, the majority claims that this legislation will restore a
balance between civil liberties and national security. In fact, this
bill will restore the intelligence gap that existed prior to our
actions the 1st of August.
I urge this legislation be defeated. The current bill is better than
this bill. We need to deal with it certainly between now and the end of
the 6 months, but let's not take a step backwards. Let's let the law do
what this law was intended to do in 1978 and is doing today.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure now to recognize the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz), a member of the
Judiciary Committee, for 1\1/4\ minutes.
Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, in August I urged my colleagues
to vote against an unconstitutional Senate bill. Simply put, that bill
trampled on our constituents' constitutional right to privacy.
Today, I am proud to rise in support of the RESTORE Act, a bill that
provides the intelligence community the tools it needs, but that
restores the constitutional rights of Americans.
Mr. Speaker, we can be both safe and free, and this bill strikes the
right balance.
This bill permits surveillance of foreign-to-foreign communication.
It allows us to listen in on Osama bin Laden or any other terrorist who
threatens our troops or country. This bill will keep us safe.
But this bill also requires a warrant from the FISA Court in order to
eavesdrop on the communications of ordinary Americans, and it requires
a court review of targeting procedures to ensure Americans' rights are
protected. This bill restores our civil liberties.
Mr. Speaker, our colleagues across the aisle would rather play
politics with this bill and unleash arguments of mass distortion, so
let me be clear: nothing in this bill gives our constitutional rights
to terrorists.
Our Republican colleagues create this smoke screen in order to hide
the fact that they have taken away those same constitutional freedoms
from Americans.
We need not choose between our secure and liberty. With the RESTORE
Act, we can have both.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
This morning as we did the rules debate, I asked some questions of my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, and they said we will cover
that during general debate tonight.
So the questions I have that I hope will be answered is in the
manager's amendment that was presented this

[[Page H14051]]

morning and was voted on in the self-enacting rule talks about illegal
aliens. The questions I have:
Would it allow surveillance against possible illegal aliens for law
enforcement purposes?
Would it allow foreign intelligence surveillance to be conducted
against transnational smuggling rings?
Would it allow surveillance to determine whether someone is an alien
not permitted to be in or remain in the United States?
Would the amendment exempt undocumented aliens from the physical
search requirements of FISA? Exactly how far does this amendment go?
What is it intended to do?
These were the questions that I asked this morning that I hope will
be answered tonight.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, could I ask how much time remains on each
side.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has
6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) has
3\3/4\ minutes remaining. The time has expired for the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Smith). The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has 14
minutes remaining.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time so we can
balance the time out with the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry), a member of the committee.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate that here we are again
debating a FISA bill that is more about politics than it is about the
country. This bill is a cobbled-together mess designed to keep most of
the Democratic Caucus together rather than a bill designed to meet the
national security needs of the country. It is full of contradictory,
unworkable provisions.
Most of this body and most of the American people agree that our
intelligence professionals, civilian and military, should be able to
gather foreign intelligence on terrorists and others without having a
pack of lawyers trail along behind you. Unfortunately, that is exactly
what they will need if this bill were to ever become law.
It is also sad that those who have volunteered to help defend us
against terrorists are being punished. We debate Good Samaritan laws
from time to time. The country needs Good Samaritans, as well, to help
prevent terrorist attacks.
What the country needs, Mr. Speaker, is an updated law that
intelligence professionals can really use, that really works in the
field, not some cobbled-together mess designed to achieve a political
purpose just before a recess. We can do better. I continue to hope that
someday this House actually will.

{time} 1900

Mr. REYES. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman on the committee,
Mr. Tiahrt of Kansas.
Mr. TIAHRT. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for yielding to me. I
rise in opposition to this bill.
I am really surprised by the procedure we have gone through to get to
this point in this legislation. You know, under the underlying bill we
had open hearings, we had closed hearings, we looked at a lot of the
details and openly debated them and I thought we were making pretty
good progress. But then, in the self-enacting rule, we have a whole
bunch of new language that is dumped into this bill that has had no
hearings.
In fact, section 18 says in this bill now, no rights under the
RESTORE Act for undocumented aliens. It says: This Act shall not be
construed to prohibit surveillance of an alien not permitted to be in
the United States.
Undocumented aliens, no rights.
Then we get to what, the rights that the terrorists have in the
underlying bill. Section 3 has procedures for authorizing acquisitions
of communications, and there are 8 pages telling how we are going to
protect the terrorists. They have got some rights protected under this
bill.
Then we get to section 4, the emergency authorization. We have 8 more
pages explaining how terrorists have more rights than undocumented
aliens right here in the United States.
So then we listened to the gentleman from California (Mr. Lungren),
who is the former Attorney General of the State of California, and he
explains that, through the minimization procedures, that we are
actually giving terrorists more rights than we do our own U.S. common
criminals.
So what is the deal with this? It is really a mess. You have got
terrorists at a higher status than undocumented aliens that are here in
America and a lot of them just trying to make a living, and then you
have got a higher standard for terrorists than you do for our own
criminals. Now, why don't we balance things out here? Why don't we
balance things out? You have tried to push this thing through without
hearings, you have hodgepodged it together, and it truly is a mess. We
ought to send this back to committee and do the right thing on this.
We want to protect the rights of American citizens, and we think that
humans have a certain set of rights, too. But this bill does not
provide it. It has mixed standards. It is a mess, and I think we should
vote it down.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time until we
balance out the time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I think we have balanced the time. We
chose on our side to go with the 15 minutes of Judiciary time and then
15 minutes of Intelligence time. I believe the people in opposition to
this bill now have 10 minutes; the people who are supportive of this
bill have 11. That sounds like balance to me.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, how much time is remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has
6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra)
has 10\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Conyers) has 3\3/4\ minutes remaining.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I will now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
distinguished gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the RESTORE Act
because I believe that the way we conduct the fight against terrorism
says a great deal about who we are as a people.
We all want to keep the country safe from terrorism and to provide
the necessary tools to our intelligence community, but I am not willing
to sacrifice who we are and what we stand for just because this
President says so.
The President's Protect America Act cut the FISA Court out of the
process. The RESTORE Act puts the court back in. Now, the court, not
the President, will decide whether the constitutional legal
requirements are met. The court will assess in advance a program of
surveillance that may intercept the communications of Americans. The
court will ensure that the system the NSA establishes will protect the
rights of any Americans they come across. The RESTORE Act clarifies the
Protect America Act cannot be used to conduct secret searches of
Americans' homes, businesses, computers, and medical records. It
reiterates the exclusivity of FISA, which would put an end to secret,
warrantless spying programs. It makes clear that the President has to
obey the laws.
The RESTORE Act requires meaningful reporting to the Congress about
the warrantless surveillance programs that have occurred since
September 11, and it will require meaningful oversight in the future.
The RESTORE Act will make America safer and keeps us true to who we are
as a Nation. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes.''
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from
California (Mr. Lungren).
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
Once again, I would ask my friends on the other side of the aisle:
Can anyone explain why, on page 3, you give stronger rights to someone
who is a suspected terrorist, even Osama bin Laden, if he has a
communication we intercept believing it was going to be foreign-to-
foreign, now foreign to someone in the United States, and in that he
reveals where he is, why we cannot use that information as we are able
to with a legal wiretap in the United States on an American citizen

[[Page H14052]]

charged with a crime who calls someone who is not a target of a crime?
I do not understand it. Page 3. Is there anybody on your side who can
explain why you would have that?
The silence has been deafening for a month now on this.
Mr. CONYERS. Would the former Attorney General of California yield?
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I would be happy to yield if the
gentleman would tell me exactly what I just asked.
Mr. CONYERS. That is why I seek to have you yield to me, sir.
Osama bin Laden is never going to have any rights superior to any
citizen.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Reclaiming my time, because I
asked you to specifically talk about the language in the bill. I have
read it and read it and read it, and you have refused to respond to it,
even though the chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
told me that I was correct in my reading of the bill and that you folks
were going to change it. You didn't change it. I expect that is because
you forgot about it.
I would invite the gentleman from New York to respond to me, because
he intellectually honestly told me just 2\1/2\ weeks ago that you folks
were going to change it. Why haven't you done it?
Mr. Speaker, the silence I think speaks volumes. This is a bill that
is not ready for prime time. It inadvertently protects Osama bin Laden
with greater rights than an American citizen charged with a crime.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, it is very important that we understand
that Mr. Lungren in his dramatic presentation about the cumbersomeness
and the protections that we are affording bin Laden almost begs the
question here.
We have been on this bill for several times. We have got a carve-out
here. Nothing prevents conducting lawful surveillance that is necessary
to, one, prevent Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda or any other terrorists,
Mr. Lungren, or any ally of those persons from receiving any of these
protections. We can operate against them without giving them any
rights, and I think you must know that by now.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman
yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I can't give you time. I have got less than anybody
here. No. I reserve the balance of my time.

Announcement By the Speaker Pro Tempore

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ross). All Members are reminded to
address their remarks to the Chair.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2 minutes to my
colleague from Arizona (Mr. Shadegg).
Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I want to point out that this bill raises a
fundamental question: Do we trust judges, unelected judges, to control
foreign intelligence? Are we going to move that responsibility from the
executive branch to judges? Or is that not their job?
As I explained earlier, this measure requires that a warrant be
obtained every single time you are seeking to gather foreign
intelligence. That means that we are asking Federal judges, who are
unelected, to decide in 100 percent of the cases whether we can or
cannot gather intelligence.
Now, I respect judges. I admire judges. But judges have the duty of
deciding disputes between Americans. They do not have the
responsibility to protect our Nation. But this bill says you can never
gather intelligence from a foreigner without first going and getting a
warrant.
So a job that under our Constitution has been given to the executive
branch, that is, to conduct foreign intelligence and protect the
Nation, we are now taking from the executive branch and giving to
judges. Because unelected Federal judges, who have no responsibility to
protect our Nation, no responsibility to gather foreign intelligence,
now get to decide, this has never been true in the history of our
Nation, whether or not the Federal Government will gather any
intelligence.
I respect judges. I am all for judges. If I am in a dispute over the
civil rights of an American, I want a judge to decide. But when it
comes to gathering intelligence about terrorists, we are going to take
that authority away from the executive branch, which we have never done
in the past, and give it to judges and judges only? Judges whom we
cannot defeat in office, judges who are appointed, judges who do not
stand for election, judges who cannot be voted out of office? We are
going to take the authority away from the executive branch to protect
our Nation and in 100 percent of cases give it to unelected judges.
That is a mistake.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I think we just saw some shrill out of
options articulation there.
I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr.
Langevin).
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3773. This
legislation does exactly what our Constitution requires us to do:
protect security while preserving civil liberties.
Maintaining that balance has sometimes been difficult, and the events
of 9/11 have made it even more challenging. However, the RESTORE Act is
a carefully crafted solution. We all recognize the gravity of the
threats facing our country, and this bill gives the Director of
National Intelligence all the authority he has asked for to fight
terrorism while at the same time it protects civil liberties.
Further, the RESTORE Act provides for rigorous and independent
oversight from the courts, the Congress, and the Department of Justice
Inspector General. In our committee markup, I successfully offered an
amendment to even strengthen this oversight by preserving the FISA
Court's role to review compliance with their rules every 90 days for
the life of a court order.
Rigorous oversight is why the Bush administration objects to this
bill. They want unfettered authority. Unfortunately, we have seen what
happens without checks and balances, and I will not allow that to
happen again. As Members of Congress, we took an oath to defend the
Constitution and the principles on which it was founded.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3773, which provides security
while preserving the fundamental values that make this country so
great.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from the
State of New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Rhode
Island talked about the importance of upholding the Constitution, and
there is something in the manager's amendment to this bill that was
inserted without any hearing in the committee that I don't understand,
that makes no sense to me. It is a provision that says, very plainly:
This act and the amendments made by this act shall not be construed to
prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights to, an alien not
permitted to be in or remain in the United States.
Now, I think there are probably a lot of people on this side of the
aisle who don't have a problem with that provision. What I don't
understand is why you all are proposing it.
Here is the irony here. This bill will extend rights under our
Constitution to foreigners in foreign countries, while denying the
protections of the Constitution to some 12 million people who are not
legally in the United States, when the case law is clear that they do
have rights. Whether we think they should have rights or not, the case
law is absolutely clear. So we will deny those rights to people in the
United States while extending them to people in foreign countries?
I think we should be clear with the American people why we insisted
on fixing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and did so
successfully in August. We had soldiers who were kidnapped in Iraq by
insurgents.

{time} 1915

And because of changes in technology and the demands of the court,
the American military had to go to lawyers in the United States to get
a warrant to try to intercept the communications of the terrorists
trying to kill them. That took time, too much time. And the law had to
be fixed.
Soldiers should not need an army of lawyers in Washington to listen
to the communications of the enemy that's trying to kill them. This
needed to be fixed, and we fixed it the first week of August.
We all remember where we were on the morning of 9/11. We remember who
we were with, what we were wearing, what we ate for breakfast.

[[Page H14053]]

But people don't remember where they were the day that the British
Government arrested 16 people who were within 48 hours of walking on to
airliners and blowing them up simultaneously over the Atlantic. We
don't remember it because it didn't happen. And the reason it didn't
happen is because of exceptional intelligence and the cooperation of
the British, Pakistani and American Governments.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I'm concerned about the self-induced
confusion on the other side.
I now yield 1\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Patrick J. Murphy) who served in Iraq and also serves with me on the
Armed Services Committee, as well as our Intelligence Committee.
Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in
support of the RESTORE Act and to set the record straight on an issue
that is close to my heart.
In May of 2007, three men from the 10th Mountain Division were
captured in Iraq. They're names are Specialist Alex Jiminez, Private
First Class Joseph Anzak, and Private Byron Fouty. I recite their names
because the right wing attack machine never does. But these are the
facts, and they're not pretty.
The intelligence community stood ready to help find these three
soldiers. But for 5 hours, for 5 hours, the Bush administration could
not decide what to do. When they decided to go ahead, no Bush
administration official could authorize it, could be found to authorize
it. But when they finally found the Attorney General in Texas, it took
an additional 2 hours to authorize the surveillance, even though he
could have granted the authority in just minutes. Hours of indecision
and incompetence while these three soldiers went missing.
* * * * *
While the RESTORE Act can solve many problems posed by the current
FISA law, it will not solve the problem in these soldiers' situations.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask the
gentleman's words be taken down with respect to the use of the word
``deceit.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All Members will suspend.
The Clerk will report the words.
Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, this has been a
very powerful and emotional debate today, and the issue is very close
to my heart. I did not mean to offend anyone across the other side of
the aisle. And I ask the Speaker and the other side for unanimous
consent to withdraw the paragraph that may have given offense to some
Members that were on the floor.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Pennsylvania?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In this debate, the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Reyes) has 1\3/4\ minutes remaining, the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Conyers) has 2 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Hoekstra) has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
I just want to make a couple of points. Again, no one has answered
the questions that I asked earlier today and that I asked in the debate
tonight. The amendment talking about illegal aliens, would it allow for
surveillance against possible illegal aliens? Would it allow for
foreign intelligence surveillance to be conducted against transnational
smuggling gangs? Would the amendment exempt undocumented aliens from
the physical search requirements?
And then just to reiterate the point that my colleague made in the
previous speech, this is all about lawyering up the process, and that's
what extends the time.
At this point, I yield 1 minute to my colleague, Mr. Kirk of
Illinois.
Mr. KIRK. I thank the gentleman. And as the leader of the moderates
in this, I would say that this issue should unite us all as Americans,
not divide us along partisan lines.
I also speak as a Navy intelligence officer that would say that the
provision that was newly included in this legislation says that nothing
in this act shall prevent an intelligence officer from monitoring
someone related to al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri to
prevent an attack against the United States. But so much of our
intelligence is beyond the imminent attack on the United States. So
much of us in the intelligence world, we have to watch the earliest
signs of this.
Let's be clear, this bill before us has nothing to do with the rights
of U.S. citizens; those are already protected. As an intelligence
officer, we are always drilled on the code of conduct in dealing with
U.S. persons. This bill has everything to do with creating new rights
for people overseas. And I think we should let our intelligence
community monitor whoever Osama bin Laden is talking with to protect
the United States, even if an attack is not imminent.

{time} 1945

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield for the purpose of making a
unanimous consent request to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).
(Mr. SCOTT of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in favor of the
legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your leadership on efforts to address
warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, or ``FISA'' and for introducing a bill that corrects many of the
shortcomings of the bill that passed the House last August.
The RESTORE Act establishes a strong framework, much stronger than
the Administration's PROTECT Act, to fight terrorism effectively, while
providing reasonable safeguards to protect personal privacy.
One important change in the Restore Act is that it draws the
appropriate distinctions based on the physical location and types of
targets. There has never been any controversy over the fact that
surveillance directed at people all of whom are overseas does not need
any warrant at all. This bill rightly makes it clear that no court
orders are required for the government to conduct surveillance on
foreign targets outside the United States, even if the technical
surveillance is conducted on U.S. soil. But if any surveillance is
intentionally conducted on a U.S. person, this bill makes it clear that
the government needs to apply for an individual warrant to conduct that
surveillance. And if information on U.S. persons is incidentally
collected, the Manager's Amendment to the bill rightly limits
dissemination of that information among government agencies.
Second, the bill removes vague and overbroad language from the bill
passed in August that would allow the wiretapping of conversations
without a warrant if the communication was ``concerning'' a foreign
target. That, by its own wording, suggests that if two citizens are in
the United States talking about somebody overseas, that you could
wiretap their communications without a warrant. The bill before us
makes it clear that the persons involved in the communications must be
overseas, not just that the subject of their conversation must be
overseas.

Third, the RESTORE Act goes a step further than the Administration's
bill and allows for the expanded wiretapping authority only in cases
involving ``national security,'' as opposed to the over-expansive
``foreign intelligence.'' ``Foreign intelligence'' could include trade,
deals or anything involving general foreign affairs activities.
Finally, the RESTORE Act was made even stronger in Committee by
requiring the Department of Justice, in its application to the Court,
to identify the ``primary purpose'' of its wiretapping. Under the
original FISA, when an agent wanted to obtain the authority to conduct
electronic surveillance or secret searches, a certificate was necessary
detailing what the purpose of the surveillance was in order to obtain
the warrant. The standard was altered by the Patriot Act, which
provided that obtaining foreign intelligence only has to be ``a
significant purpose.''
We have to put this change in context because the Department of
Justice has not credibly refuted the allegations that some U.S.
Attorneys were fired, because they failed to indict Democrats in time
to affect an upcoming election. So if the Department of Justice
wiretapped someone when foreign intelligence was not the primary
purpose, you have to wonder what the primary purpose was. This bill
would allow the surveillance to be conducted but the administration
would be required to reveal the true purpose of the wiretap to the
secret FISA court.
Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize that we do not have to balance
security and privacy. It is therefore important to note that everything
that the administration can do in its own bill, it can do under this
bill. We just require them to get a warrant before they do it, or if
they are in a hurry, get a warrant after they do it, but they can
wiretap and get the information. We just provide a modicum of oversight
to ensure that our laws are being obeyed. I urge my colleagues to
support the bill.

[[Page H14054]]

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am now pleased to yield 1 minute to the
Speaker of the House, the gentlewoman from California, Nancy Pelosi.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, as one who has long served on the
Intelligence Committee, I understand full well the threats to our
national security. I understand full well the need for us to have
legislation that strikes the proper balance between liberty and
security. I think this legislation does just that. And I commend
Chairman Conyers, chairman of the Judiciary Committee; and the chairman
of the Intelligence Committee, Chairman Reyes, for their important work
and their leadership in presenting this legislation to the floor for
consideration.
The bill is important and accomplishes the goal of striking the
balance between security and liberty in the following ways: it defends
Americans against terrorism and other threats; it protects Americans'
civil liberties; and it restores checks and balances.
The bill protects Americans by providing the Director of National
Intelligence with the flexibility he has requested of Congress to
conduct electronic surveillance of persons outside the United States.
No warrants are required whenever foreign-to-foreign communications are
captured regardless of the point of collection or anywhere in the
world.
It protects our civil liberties in a number of ways. The DNI has
agreed that when Americans are targeted for surveillance, a warrant is
required. We have now included certain criteria that the government
must take into account in considering whether a warrant is required.
This will help prevent inappropriate warrantless surveillance and
``reverse targeting'' of Americans under the guise of foreign
intelligence.
The bill restores checks and balances. This is very, very important
because it, again, is part of our oath of office to protect the
Constitution of the United States. The bill rejects groundless claims
of ``inherent executive authority.''
There are those who claim that the President has inherent authority
from the Constitution to do whatever he wishes. Long ago our Founders
rejected that concept in founding our country. We must do that as well
and continue to make that clear.
The legislation also makes clear that FISA is the exclusive means for
conducting electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence. The
government must seek approval from a FISA Court. So we are talking
about the Congress of the United States passing legislation, as it did
in the late seventies, passing this legislation today which is in light
of the new technologies and new reality in the world, and recognizing
the authority of the third branch of government: the courts.
This legislation includes extensive reporting to Congress with
respect to the interception and dissemination of communications among
Americans and from Americans. This is very important because we want to
minimize the use of that information and keep it for the purpose for
which it is collected.
Most significantly, the bill does not provide immunity to
telecommunications companies that participated in the President's
warrantless surveillance program. We cannot even consider providing
immunity unless we know exactly what we are providing immunity from.
And even then, and even then, we have to proceed with great caution.
It is important to note that the bill sunsets on December 31, 2009,
the date the PATRIOT Act sunsets, so the next administration and the
next Congress can review and reassess the program.
This legislation is supported by organizations dedicated to
protecting our national security and protecting our civil liberties,
including the Center for National Security Studies, the Center for
Democracy and Technology, and many other groups that work to protect
privacy rights. The bill protects both national security and civil
liberties, reaffirms our constitutional system of checks and balances,
and deserves the support of this House.
Mr. Speaker, all of us want our President to have the best possible
intelligence, our President and our policymakers, so they can do the
best possible job to protect the American people. But no President,
Democrat or Republican, should have the authority, to have inherent
authority, to collect on Americans without doing so under the law. This
legislation establishes that principle; and it establishes it in a very
focused way in keeping with the need for flexibility for the Director
of National Intelligence, in keeping with honoring our oath of office
to the Constitution. I urge our colleagues to support this important
legislation.
I, for one, am very, very proud of the work of Mr. Conyers and Mr.
Reyes and thank them for their leadership.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
A month after I originally came to the floor to oppose this bill, I
now rise in opposition to this flawed legislation, which,
disappointingly, has been made worse ever since we started the process.
In August Congress finally acted, after months of prodding from
Republicans, to close significant intelligence gaps against potential
foreign terrorists in foreign countries that jeopardize America's
ability to protect and prevent potential terrorist attacks and to
effectively collect intelligence on foreign adversaries.
Now we have a simple choice: Do we do what is necessary to provide
long-term legal authority for our intelligence community to conduct
necessary surveillance, or do we reopen that intelligence gap?
It now seems that the majority is determined to move a bill intended
to make political statements rather than to give intelligence
professionals the tools that they need to protect our country.
I urge my colleagues to vote against this bill.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to our distinguished
majority leader, Mr. Hoyer of Maryland.
Mr. HOYER. I thank my friend for yielding. I thank him for his
leadership as well. I thank Mr. Conyers for his leadership, and I thank
Mr. Hoekstra and Mr. Smith for their participation.
This is a serious issue that confronts us. Mr. Speaker, this
legislation, the RESTORE Act, is nothing less than the fundamental
reiteration of the most basic concepts of our Constitution, our
constitutional form of government that we, indeed, are a Nation of laws
and that our Founders deliberately designed our three branches of
government to serve as a check and balance on each other.
One of my colleagues, my friend, I believe, from Arizona, stood and
said it was not the job of judges to conduct intelligence. He was
correct. It is not the job of judges to conduct intelligence. But it is
the constitutional duty given by our Founding Fathers, who understood
that King George too often abused his sovereign power and who said to
all that they would have adopt this Constitution that we will protect
you from the abuse of power of government, and we will do it by having
it reviewed by independent judges, not by the legislature.
We can be told by judges that we are not acting constitutionally, and
that is a protection for our people against congressional abuse of
power. And the executive department can be told by judges you are
abusing your constitutional power. No power, no protection was felt to
be more necessary and important by our Founding Fathers than their
right to personal privacy and a lack of intrusion by King George just
because he wanted to do it. And they said King George had to have
probable cause, in this case, the Government of the United States. So
that's why they established the courts. And we, in our wisdom, in my
view, established the FISA Court to do just that.
Every single one of us here recognizes that our highest duty is to
protect the American people. Indeed, we must detect, disrupt, and
eliminate terrorists who have no compunction about planning and
participating in the mass killing of innocent people. We saw that
tragically on 9/11. We also, each one of us, come to this well or stand
at our seats and raise our hand and swear an oath to defend the
Constitution of the United States, to protect its laws and to honor the
values and principles that are contained therein. That is our oath.
That is what we do here this night, including the fourth amendment
right that Americans are secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. That's not an
assertion on any individual or any government or even the

[[Page H14055]]

legislature. It was an assertion by our Founding Fathers that they had
seen too often abuses by the executive agencies of government.
Our basic duties as Members of this Congress, protecting the American
people and protecting the values that define us as Americans, are not
mutually exclusive. We can protect our country and protect our
Constitution. That is our duty.
And that is precisely what this historic act, introduced by Chairman
Reyes and Chairman Conyers, has done. This legislation gives our
intelligence community the tools it needs to listen in on those who
seek to harm us while addressing concerns that the bill passed in
August could authorize warrantless surveillance of Americans. That is
our concern. That is our focus.
Among other things, this legislation modernizes the technologically
outdated Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 by restoring a
checks and balances rule for the FISA Court and addressing the
intelligence gap asserted by the Director of National Intelligence.

{time} 2000

We heard Director McConnell. We want to help Director McConnell. Let
us be clear. This legislation does not require a warrant for listening
in on suspected and known terrorists, period. An assertion to the
contrary is not accurate. In fact, it clarifies that no court order is
required for surveillance of conversations where both parties are
foreign citizens. It does not extend constitutional rights to suspected
or known terrorists, assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. Nor
does it delay the collection of intelligence information.
Furthermore, it grants the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence authority, authority to apply to the FISA Court
for a block order, not an individual order, not a discrete order, but a
block order saying that you can pursue this gathering of information to
protect America, but you cannot do it simply because you want to do it.
You've got to do it consistent with the Constitution of the United
States and the laws thereof. You cannot conduct freelance surveillance
without some authority of law.
The FISA Court can give a block order to conduct surveillance on
large groups of foreign targets for up to a year, and that can be
renewed, ensuring that only foreigners are targeted and Americans'
rights are preserved. That was the whole reason in a bipartisan way we
adopted FISA, to make sure that was the case.
Why do you fear a FISA Court reviewing that basic principle that was
its intent at its adoption?
Finally, the legislation is silent on the issue of retroactive
immunity for telecommunications companies that possibly violated
privacy laws in turning over consumer information to the government. We
don't make that judgment today. We need to review information to know
what was done before we immunize conduct which we do not know. Simply
stated, it would be grossly irresponsible for Congress to grant a
blanket immunity for companies without even knowing whether their
conduct was legal, appropriate, reasonable or not. Don't you think the
American public, each one of our constituents, expects that of us?
In closing, Mr. Speaker, let me quote The Washington Post, which
stated in October, the measure produced by the House Intelligence and
Judiciary Committees would alleviate the burden of obtaining
individualized warrants for foreign targets while still maintaining a
critical oversight for the FISA Court. In other words, we are relieving
the administration from the burden of discrete approval. But we are
providing for the protections that Americans expect under our
Constitution.
Mr. Speaker, we must give our Commander in Chief, the President of
the United States and the intelligence community the resources, the
authority, and flexibility that is necessary to protect our people and
defend our Nation. I believe each of us in this Congress support that
objective. But we must also honor the values and principles that make
us Americans. This legislation allows us to do both.
I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, facilitate the
interception of information and terrorist communication dangerous to
our people and our country. And at the same time, redeem that oath of
protecting and defending our Constitution.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the order of closing.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ross). The Chair will recognize for
closing speeches in the reverse order of opening, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has 1 minute remaining.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) has 45 seconds remaining. The
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) has 1 minute remaining.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues and thank you for
this debate.
At this point in time to close our debate I would like to recognize
the distinguished minority leader, Mr. Boehner of Ohio.
Mr. BOEHNER. Let me thank my colleague for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, in August the Congress passed the Protect America Act.
Before that bill passed, our intelligence officials did not have the
tools they needed to protect our troops and to detect and prevent
terrorist plots. This was made clear in a story we read about just last
month about our, how our FISA laws failed our soldiers who were
kidnapped in Iraq, and I think these outdated laws actually hampered
their rescue. That is because our FISA laws in place before the Protect
America Act entrusted government lawyers, not our intelligence
professionals, to protect our troops and our security.
Yet the bill we are considering today only makes this problem worse.
It reopens the terrorist loophole and doesn't ensure that we can act
quickly on vital intelligence to protect our troops and the American
people. I think it would be a boon to trial lawyers who could take
actions against third parties who assisted our government at our
request after 9/11. It is yet another example of a troubling pattern of
behavior on the part the majority, a pattern of behavior that is
undermining our national security. Let me just give you a few examples.
The majority want to extend habeas corpus rights to terrorists. The
majority has had over 40 votes in the Congress trying to force retreat
in Iraq. The majority wants to close down our Guantanamo detention
facility and move those terrorists into American communities. The
majority, in their intelligence authorization bill and appropriation
bill, are diverting key intelligence resources away from terrorist
surveillance to study global warming.
In August, all the Members of this House succeeded in modernizing
FISA and closing the terrorist loophole. We did so because terrorists
were plotting to kill Americans and our allies, and there is no nice
way of saying that. So why on Earth would we tie the hands of our
intelligence officials again and open up this loophole that allows
terrorists to jeopardize the safety of our troops and jeopardize the
safety and security of the American people?
Our country is safer today because of our efforts, and Republicans
want to work with Democrats to make the Protect America Act permanent.
We were very close to a bipartisan agreement on this bill just about 5
weeks ago, very close. As a matter of fact, there was an agreement in
principle until the ACLU got ahold of it and blew the entire bipartisan
process up. I think the American people want us to do everything we can
to make sure that they are safe and secure. The bill that we have
before us will once again tie the hands of our intelligence officials
and make America less safe. This is not the bill that I want to vote
for.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, this bill, the RESTORE Act, is about balance.
It is about putting checks and balances back in the process. It puts
the FISA Court back in the process of protecting Americans. It corrects
unchecked authority that we gave through the Protect America Act. Some
would want us to continue to rubber-stamp what the administration
wants. The American people deserve better.
Mr. Speaker, Halloween is over. Why do our colleagues continue to
pull ghouls out of the closet? It is now time to talk turkey.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield the balance of our

[[Page H14056]]

time on our side to the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas, Sheila
Jackson-Lee, an invaluable member of the Judiciary Committee.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I thank both chairmen, Chairman Conyers for
his leadership and Chairman Reyes. In the month of August, I stood here
and shredded paper to reflect that the vote we took on that bill was
really a destruction of the Constitution. I am very glad to be able to
stand here today to hold the Constitution sacredly in my hand and to
indicate that this bill does, in fact, offer a restoration of the civil
liberties of Americans but yet does not protect one single terrorist.
It is a bill that avoids reverse targeting of Americans. But it is a
bill that provides the opportunity that if there was a pending threat
against the United States, the Attorney General, the National Security
Director, and three others could, in fact, prevent a terrorist act from
occurring in the United States. This restores justice and it protects
the American people.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3773, introduced by my
colleague Mr. Conyers. Had the Bush administration and the Republican-
dominated 109th Congress acted more responsibly in the 2 preceding
years, we would not be in the position of debating legislation that has
such a profound impact on national security and on American values and
civil liberties in the crush of exigent circumstances. More often that
not, it is true, as the saying goes, that haste makes waste.
Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us is intended to fill a gap in
the Nation's intelligence gathering capabilities identified by Director
of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, by amending the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. It gives our intelligence
professionals the tools they need to legally monitor suspect foreigners
outside the United States, while protecting the fundamental rights of
Americans at home.
Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the
reason democracies invariably prevail in any martial conflict is
because democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and
encourages those traits that are indispensable to martial success:
initiative, innovation, resourcefulness, and courage.
The United States would do well to heed de Tocqueville and recognize
that the best way to win the war on terror is to remain true to our
democratic traditions. If it retains its democratic character, no
nation and no loose confederation of international villains will defeat
the United States in the pursuit of its vital interests. A major
challenge facing the Congress today is to ensure that in waging its war
on terror, the administration does not succeed in winning passage of
legislation that will weaken the Nation's commitment to its democratic
traditions.
This is why the upcoming debate over congressional approval
authorizing the administration to conduct terrorist surveillance on
U.S. soil is a matter of utmost importance. I offer some thoughts on
the principles that should inform that debate.
In the waning hours before the August recess, the House acceded to
the Bush administration's request and approved the woefully misnamed
``Protect America Act,'' which gives the Federal Government enlarged
powers to conduct electronic surveillance of American citizens under
the guise of conducting surveillance of foreign terrorists.
Mr. Speaker, FISA has served the Nation well for nearly 30 years,
placing electronic surveillance inside the United States for foreign
intelligence and counter-intelligence purposes on a sound legal
footing. Given the exigent circumstances claimed by the administration,
I am prepared to support a number of temporary changes to FISA
legislation, provided that they follow certain principles.
First, I am prepared to accept temporarily eliminating the need to
obtain a court order for foreign-to-foreign communications that pass
through the United States. But I do insist upon individual warrants,
based on probable cause, when surveillance is directed at people in the
United States. The Attorney General must still be required to submit
procedures for international surveillance to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court for approval, but the FISA Court should not be
allowed to issue a ``basket warrant'' without making individual
determinations about foreign surveillance. There should be an initial
emergency authority so that international surveillance can begin while
the warrants are being considered by the Court. And there must also be
congressional oversight, requiring the Department of Justice Inspector
General to conduct an audit every 60 days of U.S. person communications
intercepted under these warrants, to be submitted to the Intelligence
and Judiciary Committees.
This legislation allows the interception of electronic communications
between foreigners outside of the United States without a warrant and
permits the director of national intelligence and the attorney general
to seek ``blanket'' warrants to intercept communications of people
reasonably believed to be outside the United States, even if such
communication happens to involve ``U.S. persons.'' Wiretap surveillance
could be conducted for 7 days before a warrant must be sought, and the
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance court would have to act on the
application for a blanket warrant within 15 days.
This legislation has many other important provisions. It affirms that
FISA is the exclusive source of legal authority for conducting
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence. Crucially, it does
not grant amnesty to telecommunications companies for any past
violations of law. Finally, it gives the FISA Court more oversight
authority and terminates the authorization to conduct foreign
surveillance on U.S. soil after 2 years.
In all candor, Mr. Speaker, I must restate my firm conviction that
when it comes to the track record of this President's warrantless
surveillance programs, there is still nothing on the public record
about the nature and effectiveness of those programs, or the
trustworthiness of this administration, to indicate that they require
any legislative response, other than to reaffirm the exclusivity of
FISA and insist that it be followed. This could have been accomplished
in the 109th Congress by passing H.R. 5371, the ``Lawful Intelligence
and Surveillance of Terrorists in an Emergency by NSA'' Act, LISTEN
Act, which I have cosponsored with the then ranking members of the
Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, Mr. Conyers and Ms. Harman.
The Bush administration has not complied with its legal obligation
under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the Intelligence
Committees ``fully and currently informed'' of U.S. intelligence
activities. Congress cannot continue to rely on incomplete information
from the Bush administration or revelations in the media. It must
conduct a full and complete inquiry into electronic surveillance in the
United States and related domestic activities of the NSA, both those
that occur within FISA and those that occur outside FISA.

The inquiry must not be limited to the legal questions. It must
include the operational details of each program of intelligence
surveillance within the United States, including: (1) who the NSA is
targeting; (2) how it identifies its targets; (3) the information the
program collects and disseminates; and most important; (4) whether the
program advances national security interests without unduly
compromising the privacy rights of the American people.
Given the unprecedented amount of information Americans now transmit
electronically and the post-9/11 loosening of regulations governing
information sharing, the risk of intercepting and disseminating the
communications of ordinary Americans is vastly increased, requiring
more precise--not looser--standards, closer oversight, new mechanisms
for minimization, and limits on retention of inadvertently intercepted
communications.
Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us is necessary. It is incumbent
on the Congress to act expeditiously to amend existing laws so that
they achieve the only legitimate goals of a terrorist surveillance
program, which is to ensure that Americans are secure in their persons,
papers and effects, but terrorists throughout the world are made
insecure. The best way to achieve these twin goals is to follow the
rule of law. And the exclusive law to follow with respect to
authorizing foreign surveillance gathering on U.S. soil is the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. It is my sincere hope that my colleagues
will join together today in enacting important and much needed reforms
to FISA.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the Manager's Amendment
to this legislation. This amendment clarifies that nothing in this act
can be construed to prohibit lawful surveillance necessary to prevent
Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization from
attacking the U.S., any U.S. person, or any ally of the U.S.; to ensure
the safety and security of our Armed Forces or other national security
or intelligence personnel; or to protect the U.S., any U.S. person, or
any U.S. ally from the threat of WMD or any other threats to national
security.
Mr. Speaker, even as we work to protect our Nation, we must remember
the fundamental need to protect Americans. At bottom, America is its
people connected to each other, and to past and future generations, as
in Abraham Lincoln's unforgettable phrase, by ``the mystic chords of
memory stretching from every heart and hearthstone.'' America, in other
words, is Americans coming together in a community of shared values,
ideals and principles. It is those shared values that hold us together.
It is our commitment to those values that the terrorists wish to break
because that is the only way they can win.
Thus, the way forward to victory in the war on terror is for this
country to redouble its commitment to the values that every American

[[Page H14057]]

will risk his or her life to defend. It is only by preserving our
attachment to these cherished values that America will remain forever
the home of the free, the land of the brave and the country we love.
H.R. 3773 does just that. It balances the interest in protecting the
Nation from terrorists who would do us harm and, at the same time,
ensures that the constitutional rights of American citizens and persons
in America are not abridged. I strongly urge my colleagues to join me
in supporting this legislation.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3773.
Today, as we have so many times in our history, we are wrestling with
the question of how best to protect security while preserving liberty.
That struggle has always been challenging, and the events of 9/11 made
it even more so. But today, the RESTORE Act provides a carefully
crafted solution to that problem.
We all recognize the gravity of the threats facing our country, and
that is why this bill gives the Director of National Intelligence all
the authority he has asked for to fight terrorism. The legislation
updates FISA to address new developments in technology so that our
intelligence activities are not constrained based on what method of
communication suspects happen to be using or where the communication
may be routed. The bill also clarifies that no warrant is needed for
foreign-to-foreign communications. These are requests that the DNI has
made and which are included in the bill.
However, unlike the so-called Protect America Act, which passed in
August, the RESTORE Act provides for rigorous and independent oversight
from the courts, the Congress, and the Department of Justice Inspector
General.
Additionally, during the Intelligence Committee's consideration of
the bill, I successfully offered an amendment to strengthen the
oversight by preserving the FISA Court's role to review compliance with
their rules every 90 days for the life of a court order. By having the
FISA Court review the procedures and guidelines used by the DNI and
Attorney General when determining that prospective targets are located
outside the U.S., we provide another safeguard against the collection
of communications of people inside the U.S. Finally, the bill requires
greater congressional oversight of the program so that we can monitor
how it is being implemented and make any changes that may become
necessary.
Such rigorous oversight is why the Bush administration objects to
this bill. To them, the Protect America Act that passed in August is
just fine the way it is. They want unfettered authority, without checks
and balances. But we have seen what happens when the administration is
given free rein, and I will not let that happen again.
I want to be clear that this is not a perfect bill. While in theory
it is a vast improvement over the Protect America Act, in reality, this
legislation will only work if everyone involved follows the rules that
Congress establishes and remains within the confines of the law. Like
any program, and indeed more so than most, this one could be subject to
abuse, and we must remain vigilant in our efforts to ensure that does
not happen. We have included meaningful safeguards and significant
checks and balances in this measure. However, these provisions are only
as strong as the individuals and agencies implementing them. Congress
must continue to conduct robust oversight and insist on the briefings
and information to which we are entitled. If we fail in these efforts
and abuses occur, we will have ourselves to blame.
Mr. Speaker, we have faced grave threats before. Our Constitution was
drafted at a time when the very survival of our Nation was in doubt.
Yet our Founding Fathers made the preservation of basic liberties part
of the fabric of our national identity.
As Members of Congress, it is our sworn duty to defend the
Constitution and the principles on which our Nation was founded. I urge
my colleagues to support H.R. 3773, which protects security while
preserving the liberties that make this country great.
Mr. MAHONEY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R.
3773, the RESTORE Act.
On my first day, I took an oath of office to support and defend the
Constitution. Tonight we will vote to protect our Fourth Amendment
rights by passing this bill. Never again will we give any person the
ability to conduct surveillance on American citizens without court
approval.
America must be vigilant in our fight against terrorism. Congress has
a duty to give our intelligence agencies the tools they need to hunt
down those who threaten our Nation while protecting the constitutional
rights of every American.
The RESTORE Act gives the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence the flexibility they need to pursue the
terrorists, while keeping the checks and balances enshrined in our
Constitution.
Mr. Speaker, it is critical that our intelligence community have the
resources necessary to protect America. It is also critical that
Americans are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. This
bill accomplishes both of these objectives.
I urge my colleagues to vote in support of the RESTORE Act.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, as a chamber, we have come a long way
since August when the disgraceful ``Protect America Act'' was strong-
armed into law. The RESTORE Act, a comprehensive and thoughtful
overhaul of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, could not cut a
more striking contrast.
Over the past 7 years I have been highly critical of Republican
wiretapping legislation. I have voted against every effort to expand
the ability of this administration to intrude in the lives and privacy
of innocent citizens.
But this is a Democratic Congress and a Democratic bill. The RESTORE
Act strikes an unprecedented balance between civil defense and civil
liberties. I deeply appreciate the hard-won progress we've made on this
issue and I am heartened by our leadership's determination to end a
Republican legacy that so blatantly disregards the rights of ordinary
Americans.
The bill before us will not solve every potential abuse of FISA, but
it does greatly strengthen legal protections for Americans and
introduces robust congressional oversight. As this issue continues to
play out into the future, it is my hope that our next steps will
include even stronger protections for innocent Americans, clearer legal
standards for FISA to judge surveillance procedures, and explicit
requirements for the destruction of unnecessary data.
Ms. BEAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3773.
Giving our intelligence community the tools they need to uncover
threats to our Nation's security is one of Congress's most important
duties. This bill soundly provides that.
This legislation explicitly clarifies that a warrant is not needed
when conducting foreign to foreign surveillance. Importantly this bill
also includes reasonable safeguards to ensure U.S. citizens at home and
abroad are not subject to surveillance without proper oversight.
It lays out a responsible yet workable framework for the Director of
National Intelligence and Attorney General to get FISA certification
when U.S. persons may inadvertently be involved yet allows our
intelligence community to act immediately in emergency situations prior
to FISA court certification.
I commend the committee for its hard work on an issue important to
our national security.
While Congress should continue to pursue all relevant information
from the administration's surveillance program since September 11,
2001, telecommunications providers should not be held liable for
providing requested information that they were told could prevent
future attacks on our Nation.
An October editorial in the Washington Post noted that these
companies were ``acting as patriotic corporate citizens in a difficult
and uncharted environment.''
Therefore I support retroactive immunity for participating companies
and I'm hopeful it will be included in the final bill.
With that, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3773.
Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my
support for H.R. 3773--the Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is
Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective (RESTORE) Act of 2007.
In August, Congress unfortunately passed the Protect America Act, a
piece of legislation that allowed the surveillance activities of this
Administration to go unchecked. Though I opposed that bill, the House
was left little choice but to pass that flawed bill. While it is true
that modernization of our foreign intelligence laws was necessary to
meet the security and intelligence needs of this nation, the Protect
America Act went beyond what was essential and instead allowed the
continued infringement of American's civil liberties.
Thankfully, today we have before us a piece of legislation that gives
the intelligence community the authority it needs to protect Americans
while also protecting civil liberties that are the bedrock of our
nation. This bill modernizes our foreign surveillance system and
authorizes necessary funding for training, personnel and technology
resources at DOJ, NSA and the FISA Court to expedite the FISA process.
Additionally, it ensures that nothing inhibits lawful surveillance for
the purpose of protecting the nation and the troops from threats posed
by terrorists.
Also of great importance, unlike previous bills considered by the
House, this bill includes vital checks and balances on the
Administration. It prohibits warrantless surveillance of Americans and
requires a court order before targeting Americans' phone calls or
emails. It also requires a finding of probable cause before conducting
surveillance on Americans abroad, which was not required under previous
legislation. To ensure greater accountability, the legislation mandates
audits on the

[[Page H14058]]

Administration's warrantless surveillance program and the
communications collected under the program.
Most importantly, this legislation ensures that it is the courts and
not the Administration that decides whether or not an American's
communications are targeted. The bill requires the FISA Court to review
targeting procedures to ensure that they are reasonably designed to
protect Americans and target people outside the United States. It also
requires the Court to review the Administration's compliance to ensure
that when the government conducts electronic surveillance on Americans,
it obtains traditional, individualized warrants from the FISA Court.
Mr. Speaker, for far too long this Administration has been able to
extend its power and authority, often to the detriment and subversion
of our nation's basic principles. Today, we are passing a bill that
will finally curb the Administration's actions and restore a measure of
accountability that has been sorely lacking for too long. For these
reasons, I support the vitally necessary RESTORE Act.
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I voted against the original Patriot Act, I
voted against the reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 2005, I voted
against the President's Protect America Act that was signed into law
last August, and I was prepared to vote against the RESTORE Act if it
did not adequately protect our constitutionally guaranteed civil
rights. I had strong reservations about this legislation when it was
first reported out of Committee, particularly with respect to the
degree it appeared to give the Administration the ability to monitor
the conversations of U.S. citizens without an individualized warrant.
However, after reviewing the changes made to this legislation in the
managers' amendment, I am satisfied that the RESTORE Act now contains
adequate Fourth Amendment protections.
I applaud Congressman Holt for working with Chairmen Conyers and
Reyes to address this issue. While this legislation is not perfect, I
believe that it represents a substantial improvement over existing law.
I realize it is likely we will find ourselves revisiting this issue
again in the coming months when the Senate is finished with its own
legislation on this matter. As this debate continues, I will continue
to insist that any legislation I support contains adequate protections
for civil rights.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the RESTORE Act.
Unlike past national security measures, this bill will prevent the
administration from violating our basic civil liberties in the name of
its phony war on terror.
I appreciate the hard work of my colleagues, Chairmen Conyers, Reyes
and Holt. Thanks to their efforts, this bill is a marked improvement
from the legislation President Bush requested and from the Orwellian
``Protect America Act'' the House passed in August.
Unlike the President's proposal and the legislation I voted against,
the RESTORE Act will prevent domestic spying. As its name implies, this
bill restores the judiciary's vital role in checking the
administration's desire to conduct surveillance on whomever they want,
whenever they want.
It prohibits the government from spying on Americans without the
explicit approval of the FISA court. It also empowers the FISA court to
determine if domestic communications picked up during blanket sweeps
directed at international correspondence can be seized or searched.
Importantly, this bill does not grant immunity to telecommunications
companies. The RESTORE Act will allow individuals who have had their
rights violated to sue the telecommunications companies that made
spying possible by sharing telephone conversations and email
correspondence with the government.
The President has made it clear that he believes the three branches
of government are ``me, myself, and I.'' Thankfully, this legislation
dissolves him of that notion and firmly re-establishing the important
and necessary role that the judiciary plays in protecting our civil
liberties.
I urge my colleagues to stand up in opposition to this President and
vote yes to protect our civil liberties.
Mr. GORDON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I would submit the following
editorial from the Los Angeles Times for the Record.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 15, 2007]

When the CIA Comes Calling

(By R. James Woolsey)

When I was director of Central Intelligence during
President Clinton's first term, I had occasion to go hat in
hand to the private sector several times. In one case, it was
a detail that, if made public, could have caused a valuable
source to be captured or killed; in another, there was a
technical feature of a system in production that, slightly
modified, was of great help to the nation. In these several
cases, executives of American companies heard me out and
willingly met my requests, to the substantial benefit of our
national security.
They had no legal requirement to do so, and they knew it.
They were helping solely out of a sense of patriotism and an
understanding that some steps that the nation needs to take
in a dangerous world cannot be taken in public, simply
because informing the public informs an opponent or an enemy.
Shortly after 9/11, something similar happened. Senior U.S.
officials asked telecommunications companies to assist the
government in intercepts involving terrorist groups such as
those that had just attacked us and killed thousands of
people. In these cases, President Bush authorized the
intercepts and the senior officials gave written assurances
to the companies that their cooperation was legal.
In my judgment, the president acted properly; he had the
authority under the Constitution to ask for such intercepts.
In addition, his request was reasonable because surveillance
of enemy-to-American communications is a time-honored means
of intelligence gathering in the U.S. George Washington did
it; those under his command intercepted and read
correspondence between Benedict Arnold and his spy handler,
foiling the plot to turn the fort at West Point over to the
British.
But even if one believes the request was illegal and
unreasonable--and there are distinguished constitutional
lawyers and patriotic citizens on both sides of this debate--
the issue currently before the Senate Judiciary Committee is
much narrower. It is whether the telecommunications companies
that complied with the president's request and trusted the
government's assurances of legality should be granted
immunity from about 40 lawsuits demanding billions of
dollars.
Sen. John D. ``Jay'' Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, has stated that companies ``should
not be dragged through the courts for their help with
national security.'' And now Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-
Calif.), a member of the Judiciary Committee, has endorsed
his statement, saying that the companies should not be ``held
hostage to costly litigation in what is essentially a
complaint about [Bush] administration activities.''
Feinstein is a member of the one-vote Democratic majority
on the Judiciary Committee, and it is possible that her
position will determine the outcome. I hope it does. Her
stance is farsighted. Having once, when I was practicing law,
taken depositions for months about a single one-hour meeting,
I know something about how burdensome litigation can be. If,
in the end, the surveillance request made by the government
is deemed improper, the government should be held
accountable, not those who complied with its request.
We live in a world of terrorism, the possible proliferation
of nuclear weapons and a host of other risks to our security.
Intelligence, and the cooperation of the private sector in
obtaining and protecting it, will be among our most important
tools to avoid catastrophes such as 9/11 or worse.
If some future senior government official needs to make a
call on a CEO of the sort I did, and that others did after 9/
11, we and our children will be better off if the official
can answer the question ``Can you guarantee that my company
won't be sued if we help the country?'' with ``If it happens,
we'll get protective legislation approved as in 2007.'' We
would be in much more danger if, because companies that
helped after 9/11 became ensnared in years of litigation and
financial losses, that official has to answer the question
with a shrug.

Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I have reservations about this
bill, but I will vote for it today.
It is similar to one that I supported earlier this year but that
failed to receive the two-thids vote necessary for passage under the
procedure that applied to its consideration.
In my opinion, the RESTORE Act is far preferable to the legislation--
the so-called ``Protect America Act''--that I voted against but which
the House, to my regret, approved and is now law.
Fortunately, that law will expire early next year, so we have the
opportunity--and, I would say, the responsibility--to replace it with a
better, more balanced measure.
By a more balanced measure, I mean one that fulfills two equally
important requirements--first, that of enabling our intelligence
community to do its job to protect us against terrorism and other
threats, and second, respecting and safeguarding the rights and
liberties of all Americans.
And while this bill is not perfect, I think it does meet those tests
and deserves to be passed today.
It is based on the legislation I supported earlier this year but in
several important ways it is even better than that bill.
For example, it is more carefully focused, applying not to all
foreign intelligence but specifically to intelligence collection
related to terrorism, espionage, sabotage and threats to national
security. It also provides that the minimization rules--the steps
agencies will take to limit their actions so as to avoid inadvertent or
unnecessary surveillance--as well as the guidelines for intelligence
collection regarding all targets must be approved by the FISA court,
not merely by an administrative monitor.
It includes critical language that says that actions in compliance
with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and with that law's

[[Page H14059]]

procedural safeguards, will be the exclusive means to conduct
surveillance for intelligence purposes. And the bill restates current
law stipulating that surveillance targeting Americans requires an
individualized FISA court order.
It takes a great step toward greater accountability by requiring an
audit of past surveillance activities by the National Security Agency
and by mandating record-keeping on any interception of communications
by American citizens and legal residents.
The bill eliminates ambiguous language in the ``Protect America Act''
that appeared to authorize warrantless searches inside the United
States, including physical searches of homes, offices, and medical
records. And it makes clear that the Administration cannot conduct
surveillance against Americans without probable cause--even if they are
outside the United States.
Furthermore, this bill, like the one hastily passed earlier this
year, is not permanent but will expire at the end of 2009, at which
time Congress will be able to reconsider it with the benefit of greater
knowledge of how it has worked in practice and whether further
refinements should be made.
Also important is what the bill doesn't do. It does not provide
constitutional protections to foreign terrorists. The bill does not
require the government to obtain a FISA order in order to intercept
``foreign to foreign'' communications of suspected terrorists, even if
these communications pass through the United States. Nor does this bill
permit the National Security Agency to collect the communications of
Americans through a ``basket'' court order. Instead, the bill requires
the Administration to certify that the targets are not Americans, and
if it wants to conduct surveillance on Americans, the Administration
must get a formal FISA order.
And, as now amended, it includes additional language to make clear
that there are other things it will not do. Specifically, it will not
prevent the lawful surveillance necessary to: prevent Osama Bin Laden,
al Qaeda, or any other terrorist organization from attacking our
country, our people, any of our allies. It will not prevent
surveillance needed to ensure the safety and security of our Armed
Forces or other national security or intelligence personnel. It will
not prevent surveillance needed to protect the United States, the
American people, or any of our allies from the threat of weapons of
mass destruction or any other threats to national security. And it will
not prohibit surveillance of, or grant any rights to, undocumented
aliens.
The bill does grant authority to the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General to apply to the FISA court for a
single court order, or a ``basket'' order, authorizing surveillance of
a suspected terrorist organization abroad for up to one year, as long
as there are procedures in place to ensure that only foreigners are
targeted and the rights of Americans are preserved.
In general, I am wary of the concept of broad scope ``basket
warrants,'' which are not normal under our laws. But I am prepared to
support this part of the bill on the understanding that it is limited
in scope and not applicable within the United States and with the
expectation that the question will be revisited if the audits indicate
a need for reconsideration of this part of the legislation. In this
context, I am glad to note that this legislation is not permanent and
will expire at the end of 2009.
President Bush has criticized the bill, in part because it does not
include a provision granting retroactive immunity for
telecommunications companies that assisted in the Administration's
secret surveillance program without a warrant. I think it might be
appropriate to consider such a provision, but not until the Bush
Administration responds to bipartisan requests for information about
the past activities of these companies under the program. I am not
ready to grant immunity for the companies' past activities while we
don't know what activities would be covered.
Mr. Speaker, this bill is not perfect, but I am not prepared to
insist on perfection at this point. I believe we must do all we can to
correct the shortcomings of the ``Protect America Act,'' even if it
takes Congress a number of attempts to get it right. The RESTORE Act
will give the Administration the authority it says it needs to conduct
surveillance on terrorist targets--while restoring many of the
protections that the ``Protect America Act'' has taken away. For that
reason, I will vote for this bill today.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 746, the previous question is ordered on
the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.

Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Smith of Texas

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the
desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. SMITH of Texas. I am in its current form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. Smith of Texas moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 3773,
to the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report
the same back to the House promptly with the following
amendments:
In section 18 in the heading, strike ``ALIENS'' and insert
``ALIENS, STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, OR AGENTS OF STATE
SPONSORS OF TERRORISM''.
In section 18, strike ``This Act and'' and insert ``(a) In
General.--This Act and''.
In section 18, strike ``United States'' and insert ``United
States, a State sponsor of terrorism, or an agent of a State
sponsor of terrorism''.
At the end of section 18 add the following new subsection:
(b) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section,
the term ``State sponsor of terrorism'' means a country the
government of which the Secretary of State has determined,
for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act) (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), section
40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371),
or any other provision of law, to be a government that has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
In paragraph (1) of the undesignated section relating to
Surveillance to Protect the United States added to the bill
pursuant to the adoption of House Resolution 824, insert
``members of the al-Quds Iranian Revolutionary Guard,'' after
``al Qaeda,''.
In the undesignated section relating to Surveillance to
Protect the United States added to the bill pursuant to the
adoption of House Resolution 824, strike ``This Act and'' and
insert ``(a) This Act and''.
At the end of the undesignated section relating to
Surveillance to Protect the United States added to the bill
pursuant to the adoption of House Resolution 824 add the
following new subsection:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, or the
amendments made by this Act, the intelligence community (as
defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) shall be permitted to conduct
surveillance of any person concerning an imminent attack on
the United States, any United States person, including a
member of the United States Armed Forces, or an ally of the
United States by Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, members of the
al-Quds Iranian Revolutionary Guard, or any other terrorist
or foreign terrorist organization designated under section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Mr. SMITH of Texas (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous
consent that the motion be considered as read.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas?
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point of order, and I object to
waiving the reading of the motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The point of order is reserved.
The Clerk will read.
The Clerk concluded the reading of the motion.

{time} 2015

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Texas is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit says
``promptly,'' because the bill needs to go back to committee
immediately. Members were given almost no notice of what was going to
be in this bill. There are many questions remaining about the text
because it has not gone through the regular committee process.
This motion addresses a major problem created by the manager's
amendment. Under existing law, court orders are required to conduct
certain surveillance of illegal immigrants within the United States.
Section 18 of the manager's amendment strips away any rights that
illegal immigrants have under FISA, stating clearly that there will be
``no rights under the RESTORE Act for undocumented aliens.''
If that is really what the Democratic leadership wants to do, then we
should ensure that the legislation does not treat terrorists more
favorably than illegal immigrants. To fix this problem, the motion adds
``state sponsors of terrorism and their agents'' to section 18

[[Page H14060]]

to ensure that they are treated equally. There is no reason that the
law should provide greater protection to terrorists than to illegal
immigrants.
Also, the motion preserves the ability of our intelligence community
to conduct surveillance of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard, and other terrorist organizations to protect
America from an imminent terrorist attack. When faced with a life-or-
death situation, a ticking bomb, an imminent threat of attack, do we
really want to subject intelligence agents to unnecessary legal hurdles
in order to protect our country?
The RESTORE Act hinders our intelligence community's ability to
collect foreign intelligence needed to prevent al Qaeda and other
terrorists from attacking our country. It requires the government to
obtain court orders to conduct surveillance of overseas terrorists. The
implication of this requirement, Mr. Speaker, could be catastrophic.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), who is the ranking member of the Intelligence
Committee.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, the new manager's amendment that self-
executed with a rule this morning included broad new language that
would treat illegal immigrants differently than other threats to the
homeland. This was a poorly conceived and ill-advised provision that
has created a lot of confusion.
Through the day, when we discussed the rule this morning, as we had
the debate tonight, I had a series of questions: Would this amendment
allow surveillance against possible illegal aliens for law enforcement
purposes? Would it allow surveillance to determine whether someone is
an alien not permitted to be in or remain in the United States?
During the rule, I was told I would get the answers during general
debate. During general debate there was nothing but silence.
If we take a look at the bill, for a month we have been dealing with
a bill that provided protections and legal protections to terrorists.
Overseas terrorists having access to the courts, having warrants, and
those types of things were moved. Then today, at the last minute, or
yesterday at the last minute, we get an amendment, a manager's
amendment, that provides or, it appears, rips away any type of
protection for another threat.
Is the majority saying that the threat to the homeland is greater for
aliens, illegal aliens living in the United States, than state sponsors
of terrorism? It appears that it does because they have 40 or 50 pages
of protections and a paragraph of exceptions that says: ``No rights
under the RESTORE Act for undocumented aliens.'' Many on our side may
think that that is a good idea.
What this manager's amendment says very simply is if there are no
rights under the RESTORE Act for undocumented aliens, maybe we should
put that same provision in here for state sponsors of terrorism and
agents of sponsors of terrorism. It's very clear. We think that if a
threat to the homeland, as identified by the other side, are illegal
aliens, perhaps it's also time that we recognize that state sponsors of
terrorism pose the same type of threat to the United States.
Is the majority saying that illegal aliens are a greater threat to
the United States than Cuba, than Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria?
It appears from the bill that we have before us tonight that is exactly
what they are saying, because they have 50 pages of protections and one
page of exceptions.
Let's make sure that we treat illegal aliens the same way we treat
North Korea and Cuba.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Michigan continue to
maintain his reservation?
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I do not insist upon my point of order.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The reservation is withdrawn.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to respond to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the motion to
recommit?
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen of the House, here we
are again at another one of these so-called motions to recommit.
Approach them with great care. I strongly oppose this motion.
The minority has just made it clear that they are not seeking to
change the bill; they are seeking to kill the bill. The tactic is
getting pretty old in the House of Representatives. If they wanted to
vote on their proposal today, they would have used the word, doesn't
everybody know it now, ``forthwith,'' as I have suggested. But they
have refused under well-established House rules and precedents.
Other words do not have that effect, even if they sound like they
should. The minority used the word ``promptly.'' It's no accident that
they chose that word. The authors of this motion know full well the
effect of choosing this word, and so do we. That is why they chose it.
They wanted to send the bill back to the graveyard, which is what will
happen if this motion is adopted.
I would now yield to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Zoe
Lofgren).
Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California. Mr. Speaker, I would note that the
motion to recommit itself leads to a nonsense sentence, adding ``United
States, a State sponsor of terrorism,'' to section 18. It's
inexplicable nonsense. It also guts the bill.
On August 2, I rushed to the floor to say that we were passing a bill
that was a terrible offense to the Constitution. It gutted the fourth
amendment. This bill does not. Mr. Speaker, I urge its passage.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield to the distinguished
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Reyes).
Mr. REYES. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, this is a sham solution in search of a problem. This
language is unnecessary, and it would kill this bill. The bill already
states that this act and the amendments made by this act shall not be
construed to prohibit the intelligence community from conducting lawful
surveillance that is necessary, one, to prevent Osama bin Laden, al
Qaeda, or any other terrorist or terrorist organization from attacking
the United States. It also provides the means to protect the United
States, any United States person or any ally of the United States from
threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or other threats of
national security.
Mr. Speaker, the answer to the ranking member's question about
undocumented aliens, all they have to do is check section 235 and 287
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. This does not confer any
additional rights not provided by the Constitution.
Mr. CONYERS. I thank the chairman.
I am really moved by the sudden concern for immigration rights that
the other side has begun to display, to my surprise.
I yield now to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I think this has been
an interesting debate. I have sat through every minute of it. During
the debate on the rule, I spoke for this bill and for the rule; and now
I speak strongly against this motion to recommit. As you have already
heard, it is redundant. We have inserted language in this bill that
takes care of the problem. In the manager's amendment, language was
added at the request of the Blue Dogs, and I am proud to be a co-chair
of the Blue Dog Coalition, and that language specifically refers to
terrorist organizations, and the Revolutionary Guards are one such
organization.
So I would like to say for two reasons there's no need to support
this motion to recommit: one, it kills the bill by using the word
``promptly''; number two, it is redundant with excellent language that
we added to the bill in the manager's amendment. As I have said before,
this is not a zero sum game. We don't get more security and less
liberty or more liberty and less security. We either get more of both
or less of both.
These amendments carefully restore, it's called the RESTORE Act, the
balance of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which Congress
wisely

[[Page H14061]]

passed 20 years ago. Vote for this bill and against the motion to
recommit. We will restore that balance.

Parliamentary Inquiries

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. Mr. Speaker, is it not true that if indeed this
motion passed, this bill could be reported back to the two respective
committees to which it is designated and that the bill could be
reported back to the House on the next legislative day?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. As the Chair reaffirmed on October 10, 2007,
the adoption of a motion to recommit with instructions to report back
promptly sends the bill to committee, whose eventual report, if any,
would not be immediately before the House. Unlike the case of a motion
to recommit with instructions to report back forthwith, a motion to
recommit with ``non-forthwith'' instructions does not operate in real
time. As the Chair put it on May 24, 2000: ``At some subsequent time
the committee could meet and report the bill back to the House.''
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, would adoption of the motion
to recommit promptly have the effect of suspending any of the committee
or House rules which require certain numbers of days before action can
be taken?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Although the Chair does not interpret the
substance of a pending proposition, the Chair can make an observation
about its procedural attributes. Thus, the Chair will observe that an
order of recommital does not necessarily forestall the operation of a
committee rule otherwise applicable to further proceedings.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. Mr. Speaker, further parliamentary inquiry. Is it
not true that different committees have different rules and that some
committees have emergency rules where these bills can be brought back
to the floor as early as the next legislative day?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair cannot say what in the rules of a
committee might constrain the timing of any action it might take.
Neither can the Chair render an advisory opinion whether points of
order available under the rules of the House might preclude further
proceedings on the floor.
Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to
recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by
5-minute votes on passage of H.R. 3773, if ordered; and motion to
suspend the rules on H.R. 4136.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 194,
nays 222, not voting 16, as follows:

[Roll No. 1119]

YEAS--194

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bean
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Donnelly
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Ellsworth
Emerson
English (PA)
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
Lampson
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NAYS--222

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Edwards
Ellison
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Flake
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Richardson
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Tsongas
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth

NOT VOTING--16

Bono
Carson
Cubin
Doyle
Everett
Jindal
Kucinich
LaHood
Mack
McCaul (TX)
Nunes
Oberstar
Paul
Slaughter
Taylor
Weller

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Two minutes remain in the
vote.

{time} 2048

Messrs. Ellison and Olver changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. Crenshaw, Johnson of Illinois and McHenry changed their vote
from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 1119, had I been present,
I would have voted ``nay.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.

[[Page H14062]]

Recorded Vote

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 227,
noes 189, not voting 16, as follows:

[Roll No. 1120]

AYES--227

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Duncan
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Flake
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Richardson
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Tsongas
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth

NOES--189

Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capuano
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Issa
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
Lampson
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--16

Bono
Carson
Cubin
Deal (GA)
Doyle
Everett
Hayes
Higgins
Hunter
Jindal
Kucinich
LaHood
Mack
Oberstar
Paul
Weller

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Two minutes remain on this
vote.

{time} 2055

So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 1120, I was unavoidably
detained and missed the vote on bill H.R. 3773, the Restore Act. Had I
been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on passage.
Stated against:
Mr. HAYES. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 1120, had I been present, I
would have voted ``no.''

____________________