[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 173 (Thursday, November 8, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H13330-H13336]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 1400
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3355, HOMEOWNERS' DEFENSE ACT OF
2007
Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 802 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 802
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 3355) to ensure the availability and
affordability of homeowners' insurance coverage for
catastrophic events. The first reading of the bill shall be
dispensed with. All points of order against consideration of
the bill are waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10
of rule XXI. General debate shall be confined to the bill and
shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by
the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
Financial Services. After general debate the bill shall be
considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall
be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose
of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the
nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on
Financial Services now printed in the bill. The committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered
as read. All points of order against the committee amendment
in the nature of a substitute are waived except those arising
under clause 10 of rule XXI. Notwithstanding clause 11 of
rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee amendment in the
nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed
in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for
that purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII and except pro forma
amendments for the purpose of debate. Each amendment so
printed may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be
printed or a designee and shall be considered as read. At the
conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the
Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with
such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may
demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted
in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
Sec. 2. During consideration in the House of H.R. 3355
pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of
the previous question, the Chair may postpone further
consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated
by the Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ross). The gentlewoman from Florida is
recognized for 1 hour.
Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions). All
time
[[Page H13331]]
yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only.
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
General Leave
Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members be
given 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on
H. Res. 802.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 802 provides for consideration of
H.R. 3355, the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007, under an open rule with
a preprinting requirement. This rule allows for floor consideration of
any amendment that is in compliance with the House rules and the
Congressional Budget Act and has been preprinted in the Congressional
Record.
Mr. Speaker, in the face of natural catastrophes that too often
strike our communities, the Congress today will initiate a new planning
effort through H.R. 3355 and this rule. This new effort will assist our
communities and hopefully tackle the rising cost of homeowners property
insurance.
My colleagues from Florida, Representative Ron Klein and
Representative Tim Mahoney, have led this bipartisan effort. I thank
them for their tireless work and leadership, their leadership that
should help our neighbors back home and folks across this country find
affordable and available homeowners insurance.
Following some of the most expensive natural disasters in our
Nation's history, like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Wilma and the
fires and the floods and the earthquakes, homeowners across this
country have been subjected to wild fluctuations and horrendous cost
increases for their property insurance. Insurance premiums are out of
sight. They have skyrocketed. Well, we understand. We feel it in our
own bills.
I hear it from the retired older woman in West Tampa back home who
has owned her house for 30 years and is on a fixed income. But this
exponential increase in insurance that she has suffered may force her
to sell her long-time home.
I also hear it from the hardworking folks in south St. Petersburg who
have been cancelled by their insurance companies after decades of
paying their premiums without making any claim upon that insurer.
Due to all of the policy cancellations, we now have a crisis.
Insurers have fled the State. In some areas, insurance premiums have
gone beyond what any reasonable person would consider anything that
they can handle in their everyday lives. A rate increase of over 600
percent is not unheard of. Some of our neighbors are having to rethink
their retirements because they can no longer afford to live in their
homes. But if they tried to sell, nobody can afford to buy those homes.
And, unbelievably, the State of Florida is now the largest provider
of homeowners property insurance in our State. This problem is not
limited to the State of Florida, however. Across the country over the
past 5 years, homeowners insurance premiums have increased by over 45
percent on average. In Florida, that average increase is over 77
percent. And there seems to be no end in sight unless we work to create
innovative options, like this bill, that will bring stability back to
the marketplace and sanity back to insurance premiums.
Over 3 million loyal policyholders, many of whom have never submitted
a single claim, have received letters from their insurance companies,
nondescript envelopes that carry the message, ``Your policy is not
eligible to be renewed.''
Last month a story caught my eye entitled, ``Home Insurers Canceling
in the East.'' It said that insurance companies have essentially begun
to redraw the outline of the eastern United States somewhere west of
the Appalachian Trail.
Faced with the risk of their citizens being priced out or thrown out
of private insurance markets, States have begun to take action. The
State insurance program in Massachusetts has doubled as a result of the
insurance crisis. My home State of Florida is now insuring 1.3 million
policyholders. But the States did not ask to be put in this position.
They tried to reason with the private insurance companies. They created
incentives, they pushed, they urged them not to leave folks high and
dry and to keep insurance available and affordable. Even though the
insurance industry made record profits the year of Hurricane Katrina,
private insurers have still left the gulf coast.
Times of crisis like these often lead to innovative solutions,
however. My colleagues, Representative Ron Klein and Representative Tim
Mahoney, national insurance risk consortium that will allow States
better access to private capital as a backstop for these huge,
catastrophic losses. The consortium will help States work together to
bundle that risk into bonds that can succeed on the private capital
markets. Because this program is voluntary and relies on private
investment, the new consortiums should not expose Federal taxpayers to
any risk whatsoever. Catastrophe bonds through the consortium will help
stabilize insurance markets, bring down premiums, and move forward in
providing available, affordable insurance to our constituents.
The bill, with foresight and commonsense, also addresses the worst-
case scenario, because, God forbid, there will be another catastrophic
event and States will be on the hook to pay claims. And most of the
time this will not be a problem, but there are some disasters for which
no preparation is enough. In those cases, historically this body, the
Congress, has written emergency assistance bills, and it is right that
we should do so. But this bill allows States to take control of their
own fates by lessening the need for those Federal disaster
appropriations by making Federal loans available to help States pay
claims when that colossal disaster happens.
This is a compassionate, fiscally responsible way to ensure that
Americans are not left without aid in their time of greatest need. This
bill is a simple, effective way to tackle the crisis of skyrocketing
property insurance. I ask my colleagues to support the rule and the
underlying legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this rule
and to the underlying legislation which asks taxpayers from across the
country to subsidize the risky housing choices of residents of one
State at the expense of the private marketplace.
This legislation does nothing to promote responsible and effective
disaster mitigation standards or any other risk-reduction measures to
lower the costs in the terrible event of a natural disaster. Instead,
it promotes widespread moral hazard and inefficient decisionmaking by
distorting the costs associated with living in high-risk areas through
national subsidies.
These bail-out mechanisms will promote overdevelopment in areas most
vulnerable to hurricanes, flooding, and other natural disaster damage,
which is why groups like the National Wildlife Federation have come out
in opposition to this bill, recognizing that the legislation subsidies
will ``result in continued encouragement of risky development in our
Nation's coastal areas and floodplains,'' and that more development in
these areas will lead to ``more loss of life, more loss of property,
and more loss of wildlife habitat.''
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Congressional Record a letter signed
by the National Wildlife Federation and the chairman of The Florida
Coalition for Preservation, both of whom are opposing this bill.
National Wildlife Federation,
Washington, DC, September 24, 2007.
Hon. Barney Frank,
Chair, House Financial Services Committee, Washington, DC.
Hon. Spencer Bachus,
Ranking Member, House Financial Services Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Frank and Ranking Member Bachus: On behalf of
the National Wildlife Federation and the Florida Coalition
for Preservation, we write to express our opposition to H.R.
3355, the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007, as it is currently
drafted. For over 20 years, the environmental community has
worked to promote change in the public insurance arena,
especially through reform of the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP). We support reforms that promote ecologically-
sound floodplain management to reduce loss of life, property,
and important wildlife habitat.
We applaud Representatives Klein and Mahoney and the
Financial Services Committee for raising the Nation's
awareness of the increasing risks associated with coastal
[[Page H13332]]
storms, which are predicted to become more powerful and of
longer duration, due to rising sea levels and warming of the
climate. The UN-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) and many of the Nation's prominent climate
scientists have warned that the increasing intensity of such
destructive storms is a likely result from global warming due
to buildup of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide.
We understand that the devastating human toll that
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma created in 2005, plus the
four powerful hurricanes that struck Florida in 2004, have
increased the public's awareness of the need for adequate
insurance coverage after natural disasters. H.R. 3355
establishes a federally-chartered national catastrophe risk
consortium, where States can pool risk and sell catastrophe
bonds and reinsurance contracts. It also establishes a
national homeowners insurance stabilization program, which
mandates that the Secretary of the Treasury give liquidity
and catastrophe loans to State reinsurance and insurance
plans. We are concerned, however, that H.R. 3355's subsidies
could inadvertently result in continued encouragement of
risky development in our Nation's coastal areas and
floodplains. With more development in these environmentally-
sensitive areas, the bill could lead to more loss of life, of
property, and of wildlife habitat. The safety of our citizens
should be the number one priority of any government program
dealing with natural disasters. Unfortunately, H.R. 3355
falls short of this goal.
Specifically, we have the following concerns with H.R.
3355:
No Requirement for Meaningful Hazard Mitigation. As
currently drafted, H.R. 3355 does not require any
demonstration that a State has implemented meaningful hazard
mitigation reforms to be eligible to participate in the
consortium. Hazard mitigation must be a primary goal of any
Federal backstop for State insurance and reinsurance
programs. Effective hazard mitigation will save lives, reduce
damage, limit Federal taxpayers burdens, and will help reduce
the cost of insurance.
Low Interest Loans Provide Added Incentive for Increased
Risky Development in Hazard-Prone, Ecologically-Sensitive
Coastal Areas and Floodplains. We are concerned that the
liquidity and catastrophe loans in Title II of H.R. 3355 do
not have any real ceiling amounts, so that the taxpayers'
liability may be limitless. The loans are well below market
rates, mandatory, and of at least 5 to 10 years duration. The
Secretary of the Treasury may extend the loans upon a simple
request. These loans may also result in the creation of more
State catastrophe funds, which may unreasonably concentrate
risk at the State level, and effectively subsidize
development in high risk areas. According to the Insurance
Information Institute, for example, the State of Florida's
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, which was
supposed to be only the insurer of last resort, has become
Florida's largest homeowners' insurer. It is predicted
that Citizens will grow to nearly 2 million policyholders
by the end of the year, giving it more than one third of
the total market and exposure to loss of more than $400
billion. Citizens was expected to shrink gradually, but it
has expanded exponentially. Some critics of H.R. 3355 have
called this bill a ``pre-emptive bailout'' of Florida's
state insurance program and others have called it ``The
Developers' Dream Act.''
As Evidenced by the National Flood Insurance Program,
Continued Subsidized Risky Development in Ecologically-
Sensitive Areas Will Jeopardize Citizen Safety and
Unnecessarily Burden Taxpayers. The experience of the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) should provide some
degree of caution to the framers of H.R. 3355. We have been
concerned for many years that the NFIP is having severe
difficulties managing the growth of flood-related risk (as
well as the costs). Nearly a decade ago, the National
Wildlife Federation released a report called ``Higher
Ground'' on the problems of repetitive losses in the NFIP,
where, in thousands of communities, buildings were
experiencing repeated flood losses only to be reconstructed
again and again with little or no mitigation of risk, in part
for lack of incentive to ``move out of harm's way.'' Part of
the lack of incentive for mitigation was driven by rates that
are below (some of them far below) true actuarial rates,
flood hazard maps that are inaccurate or out of date and
failing to consider changing conditions, and failure of
communities and FEMA to enforce even minimum standards of the
program, let alone set higher standards to reduce or avoid
risk.
Today, we still find that after Congress passed amendments
in 2004 to reform the NFIP and began to provide funds to
address repetitive losses, the new program is still largely
not implemented and has failed to spend much of the funds
made available to start changing the pattern. Since 1998, the
number of repetitive loss properties has grown from 74,500 at
the time of the NWF study to now over 135,000 properties, and
the cost to the NFIP of these buildings has more than tripled
to over $8.5 billion in payments. The NFIP continues to face
enormous challenges, and public confidence is lacking in the
program's ability to reduce risks, manage costs and protect
the environment. Another taxpayer-funded ``backstop'' has the
potential to increase the myriad of problems with our current
public insurance programs.
We therefore oppose H.R. 3355 in its current form. We hope
that the Committee will address our concerns during mark-up,
and we urge the Committee to work with the Nation's private
insurance industry to assure that insurance adjustments are
completed quickly, fairly, and accurately after natural
disasters. We also urge the Committee to consider creating
incentives for homeowners in high risk areas to use a full
range of mitigation techniques, including retrofitting
properties to mitigate storm damage or to relocate out of
harm's way.
We believe that the intricacies of H.R. 3355 require
thoughtful assessment, and we urge the Committee not to rush
to judgment on a bill of this complexity. Safety is of
paramount importance to our organizations, and we cannot
support legislation that does not consider meaningful hazard
mitigation. Nor can we support public subsidies in this
legislation that, in turn, could further result in additional
loss of human life, property, and wildlife habitat in the
Nation's most ecologically-sensitive coastal areas and
floodplains. We stand ready to work with you to address these
concerns.
We very much appreciate your consideration of our views on
H.R. 3355.
Oppose H.R. 3355, the Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007
This bill does nothing to promote responsible and effective
mitigation standards or other risk-reduction measures.
Instead it creates a bailout mechanism which will promote
over-development in areas known to be vulnerable to
substantial damage resulting from hurricanes, flooding, and
other natural disasters.
This bill has no retained loss requirement for
participating State reinsurance funds. Once the trigger is
met, a fund may qualify for a loan, without any ``skin in the
game.'' This bill could be improved by requiring States to
first sustain a loss before receiving a loan from Treasury.
The loans could help States manage their losses above the
retained loss requirement.
Although the trigger has been raised for catastrophic
loans, according to the manager's amendment, a State
reinsurance fund is eligible for a liquidity loan if it has a
``capital liquidity shortage,'' no matter the size of the
event. This change makes the liquidity loan provision very
open-ended and could discourage States from sufficiently
capitalizing their reinsurance funds.
The Consortium created by this bill is unnecessary. States
can currently diversify their natural catastrophe risk right
now through the global reinsurance market. While there is no
indication that the Consortium would even work, it could
potentially dump billions of dollars in catastrophe bonds
into the market, irrespective of demand.
This bill will encourage States other than Florida to
create reinsurance funds in order to provide cheap
reinsurance, possibly crowding out the private reinsurance
market. Reinsurance is more expensive in States like Florida,
where the risk is higher. Masking the true cost of insurance
does nothing but encourage risky development, and in the case
of these Federal loans, could expose taxpayers to billions of
dollars in losses.
The loans created by this bill represent a transfer from
States that do not suffer frequent natural catastrophes to
those that do. If States suffer repeated losses and qualify
for multiple loans, there will be incredible pressure on
Congress to forgive the loan.
This bill mandates that Treasury provide open-ended,
subsidized loans to States, but ties its hands. It does not
grant Treasury the appropriate discretion to adjust the
program as conditions warrant.
Sincerely,
David R. Conrad,
Senior Water Resources Analyst, National Wildlife
Federation.
Honorable Thomas B. Evans, Jr.,
Chairman, The Florida Coalition for Preservation.
It is without doubt, Mr. Speaker, that as the Nation's most
hurricane-prone State, Florida has had a long-vested interest in
providing its residents with accessible and affordable property
insurance. Despite this desire, there has been a noticeable lack of
political will in Florida for enacting good public policies to
encourage this desired result.
State regulations that prevent insurers from charging risk-based
prices, limits on capital movement and well-founded uncertainty over
the legal and regulatory enforcement of contracts in Florida have
caused many private insurers to reduce their exposures to this
political risk by reducing new underwriting in the State.
But rather than addressing the root causes of this market failure,
Florida has decided to deal with the problem by creating a State-backed
insurer to compete with private companies in the delivery of this
coverage, which was billions of dollars in debt within 3 years of its
creation. Things have not gotten much better for the government entity
with its overwhelming exposure of almost $450 billion, which has
already been bailed out by Florida taxpayers at a cost of $715 million.
[[Page H13333]]
So now once again, instead of addressing the root causes of their
problem, Florida supporters of this fund have come to Congress to try
and spread their State's exposure nationwide, meaning to other States
and other States' taxpayers, by exposing them to massive liabilities
which would further encourage development along hurricane-prone
coastlines.
{time} 1415
Mr. Speaker, supporters of this legislation will undoubtedly come to
the floor to explain that participation in this Federal consortium is
voluntary. What they will undoubtedly omit, however, is that there is
nothing stopping States from engaging in this kind of partnership
already today and that only one additional value being placed on this
bill is an implicit Federal guarantee that provides a subsidy to this
government program and that the private sector does not enjoy and
places the Federal Government at risk for covering any potential losses
experienced by this program.
In other words, said another way, this new Democrat majority is
looking for other States to pay for taxpayers, caused by mistakes in
one State.
Mr. Speaker, I oppose this legislation that the Congressional Budget
Office estimates will cost taxpayers $120 million over the next 5 years
just to implement, and that is only counting what they will have to pay
before they are asked to bail out this program.
I insert the Congressional Budget Office's score of this legislation
into the Congressional Record at this point, as well as the
administration's Statement of Policy which makes it clear that the
President's senior advisers would advise this legislation's veto if it
makes it to the President's desk.
October 30, 2007.
Hon. Barney Frank,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3355, the
Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Daniel
Hoople.
Sincerely,
Peter R. Orszag.
Enclosure.
H.R. 3355--Homeowners' Defense Act of 2007
Summary: H.R. 3355 would authorize the appropriation of
$120 million over the 2008-2013 period to establish a
National Catastrophe Risk Consortium to help coordinate the
availability of reinsurance contracts between state
reinsurance entities and the private market. The consortium
also would act as an information repository for states on the
risk of natural disasters and research on the standardization
of risk-linked securities (for example, catastrophe bonds).
Assuming the appropriation of the specified amounts, CBO
estimates that implementing this provision would cost $75
million over the 2008-2012 period.
The bill also would establish two new federal direct loan
programs within the Department of the Treasury for state
reinsurance programs facing certain levels of insured losses
following a natural disaster. Loans could be made only if a
reinsurer could not access capital in the private market and
repayment was secured by the full faith and credit of the
state. Treasury would develop procedures for state
reinsurance programs to prequalify for loans, including the
assessment of fees to cover the cost of administering the
program. CBO expects that such loans would be made very
rarely and would involve a minimal subsidy cost under the
terms specified in the legislation. As such, CBO estimates
that loans made under the bill would have an insignificant
cost over the next five years. Enacting H.R. 3355 would not
affect direct spending or revenues.
This bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of this legislation is shown in the
following table. The costs of this legislation fall within
budget function 450 (community and regional development).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of
dollars--
---------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorization Level............. 20 20 20 20 20
Estimated Outlays............... 3 12 20 20 20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: H.R. 3355 also would authorize the appropriation of $20 million in
fiscal year 2013.
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the
bill will be enacted in early fiscal year 2008 and that the
necessary amounts will be appropriated for each fiscal year.
National Catastrophe Risk Consortium
H.R. 3355 would authorize the appropriation of $20 million
for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2013 to establish the
National Catastrophe Risk Consortium. The consortium would be
a federal entity managed by a board of directors made up of
designees from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and
Homeland Security, and members from each participating state.
Responsibilities of the Consortium would include: encouraging
and facilitating different avenues for state insurers to
enter into reinsurance agreements with the private market,
conducting research and analysis into the standardization of
risk-linked securities, and gathering insurance information.
Assuming the appropriation of the specified amounts, CBO
estimates that implementing this provision would cost $3
million in 2008 and $75 million over the 2008-2012 period for
staff and research expenses.
Liquidity and catastrophe loans for state reinsurance
programs
H.R. 3355 would establish two new direct loan programs
within the Department of Treasury for state reinsurance
programs facing a certain level of insured losses following a
natural disaster. Reinsurance programs insure primary
insurers or other reinsurers against losses in excess of
amounts specified by contract or law. Reinsurance programs
eligible for the new loan programs created under the bill
would only be those in which the authorizing state maintained
a financial interest. Examples of such reinsurance programs
include the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF) and the
California Earthquake Authority. In cases where a state does
not have a reinsurance program that meets the requirements
for a loan under the bill, a state residual insurer (for
example, wind pool programs) would be eligible to apply
during the five-year period following enactment.
Procedures to Establish Loan Eligibility. H.R. 3355 would
direct the Secretary of the Treasury to develop procedures
for reinsurance programs to establish loan eligibility prior
to a natural disaster. At a minimum, insurance entities
covered by the reinsurer would be required to establish rate
structures sufficient to cover expected annualized costs and
ensure that any new construction or substantial renovation of
insured properties comply with applicable state and local
building codes. As a part of the precertification process,
the Secretary would assess a fee on state reinsurance
programs to cover the costs of administering the loan
program. Those fees would be credited in the budget as an
offsetting collection and would be available upon subsequent
appropriation of a loan subsidy.
Based on information about the characteristics of existing
state reinsurance programs and on information from the
Treasury, CBO expects that most state reinsurance programs
would meet the eligibility requirements set forth under the
bill and thus would be eligible to receive loans. In
addition, other qualified reinsurance programs may be
established in the future that also would be eligible to
receive loans.
Liquidity Loans. Under H.R. 3355, a qualified reinsurance
program would be eligible to receive a liquidity loan if the
program demonstrates it is facing a liquidity shortage and is
not able to access capital at a reasonable rate in the
private market. The principal of such loans could not exceed
the ceiling coverage level--the maximum amount of liability
the program could incur under law. In addition, the full
faith and credit of the state in which the reinsurance
program is authorized would be required. Loans would be made
at a rate of not less than 3 percentage points above the
applicable Treasury rate and for a term of between five and
ten years.
Based on information from the state of Florida, CBO expects
that those loans would most likely be used to address short-
term liquidity shortages and would be repaid once adequate
capital became available through established reinsurance
agreements or through the private market. In cases where a
liquidity loan is held to term (which CBO expects would be
unlikely to occur because of the high interest rate of the
loan), CBO estimates that those loans would have no
significant cost to the federal government. As of June
2007, rating agencies like Standard and Poor's have not
issued a credit rating below ``A'' for new general
obligation bonds issued by a state. Based on historical
default rates and the minimum terms specified in the bill,
CBO estimates that the default risk associated with a
state's general obligation bond rating would have to
increase significantly before such a loan would be
estimated to have more than a negligible subsidy cost.
While the default risk of loans backed by the full faith
and credit of a state would likely increase following a
disaster, CBO expects that this increase would not be
significant. (Following Hurricane Katrina, for example,
Standard and Poor's announced it would adjust a state's
credit rating for the first time as a result of a natural
disaster by lowering Louisiana's rating from an A+ to an
A.) As such, CBO estimates that any liquidity loan made
under the bill would have an insignificant cost over the
next five years.
Catastrophe Loans. Under the bill, a qualified reinsurance
program would be eligible to receive a catastrophe loan
following a disaster if insured losses exceeded 150 percent
of the aggregate amount of premiums assessed (whether
collected or not) for private property and casualty insurance
issued in the state over the previous 12-month period. The
principal of such a loan could not exceed the difference
between the total insured loss and the program's ceiling
coverage level, and repayment would be afforded the full
faith and
[[Page H13334]]
credit of the state. Loans would be made at a rate of not
less than 20 basis points above the applicable Treasury rate
and for a term of not less than 10 years.
Based on information from the states, CBO expects that few,
if any, reinsurance programs would apply for a catastrophe
loan following a disaster. State insurance commissions and
rating agencies often require that primary insurers are able
to cover at least a 100-year event to maintain their credit
rating. As such, not only would losses exceeding the ceiling
coverage level be outside the responsibility of the
reinsurer, they likely would be covered through existing
reinsurance agreements between the primary insurer and the
private market.
For example, as a result of Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf
Coast faced insured losses of over $40 billion. Such losses
well exceeded the minimum eligibility threshold for a
catastrophe loan under the bill. (Based on the aggregate
amount of direct written premium for private property and
casualty insurance, CBO estimates that the threshold probably
would have been around $12 billion for Louisiana in 2005.)
However, CBO expects that there would have been little demand
for a catastrophe loan following Katrina because a state
reinsurance program (if one had existed) would not have been
responsible for losses above its ceiling coverage level.
Furthermore, such losses would have been covered by existing
reinsurance agreements between primary insurers and the
private market. For those reasons, CBO estimates that
implementing this provision would have no cost over the next
five years.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 3355
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or
tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Daniel Hoople; Impact
on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell;
Impact on the Private Sector: MarDestinee C. Perez.
Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
____
Statement of Administration Policy
h.r. 3355--homeowner's defense act
The Administration seeks to ensure that there is a stable
and well-developed private market for natural hazard
insurance and reinsurance. The Administration believes that
private markets are the most efficient, lowest cost, and most
innovative insurance providers. Therefore, the Administration
strongly opposes H.R. 3355, which creates a permanent role
for the Federal government in natural hazard insurance
markets. Accordingly, if H.R. 3355 were presented to the
President, his senior advisors would recommend that he veto
the bill.
The Administration strongly opposes provisions creating a
Federally-backed consortium of States in order to pool
catastrophe risk. Although pooling can be an effective
mechanism for managing risk, there is no need for a Federal
role because States are currently free to associate to
address catastrophe risk. Further, the consortium's Federal
charter would create an implicit guarantee that the Federal
government backstops the consortium's financial obligations.
This implicit guarantee would result in an inequitable
Federal subsidy for certain State insurance programs and
policyholders.
The Administration also strongly opposes provisions
establishing a Federal loan program to fund losses incurred
by State-sponsored reinsurance programs. This subsidized
Federal backstop would displace reinsurance currently
available from the private market and would clearly result in
a subsidy for insurers, State insurance programs, and their
policyholders. Federal subsidies for State insurance programs
would also encourage the creation of new State programs and
discourage States from charging risk-based rates, resulting
in the State programs crowding out the private sector.
Subsidized insurance rates also undermine economic incentives
to mitigate risks. Individuals facing subsidized rates would
be encouraged to take on risks that are inappropriate,
specifically putting themselves in harm's way because they do
not bear the full expected costs of potential damages.
Finally, shifting liabilities for catastrophe exposure from
the private sector and State insurance programs to the
Federal government would be fiscally irresponsible as the
Federal government could expect to face steep losses in
certain years. Financing these losses would require Federal
taxpayers to subsidize insurance rates for the benefit of
those people living in high-risk areas.
Mr. Speaker, once again, the new Democrat majority is bringing to the
floor something which will not only increase spending for all
taxpayers, in addition to the high taxation that this new majority is
already bringing to the floor, in addition to the rules and regulations
which the new Democrat majority is bringing to the floor, and today we
see an opportunity for the United States to bail out one State because
they've got problems with their private sector initiatives.
I will ask all of my colleagues to stand up for the American taxpayer
today, not to subsidize the homeowners of one specific State. I urge
them to vote ``no'' on this rule and the underlying legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I would inquire of the gentleman from Texas
if he has any additional speakers.
Mr. SESSIONS. I appreciate the gentlewoman asking. At this time, I do
not have any additional speakers.
Ms. CASTOR. Then I will reserve the balance of my time. Because I
have the right to close, I will wait for the gentleman from Texas to
make his closing remarks, and then I will make my closing statement.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I will be asking Members to oppose the
previous question so that I can amend the rule to have Speaker Pelosi,
in consultation with Republican Leader Boehner, immediately appoint
conferees to move forward a clean Military Construction and Veterans
Affairs appropriations bill for 2008.
Despite the fact that Veterans Day will likely come and go this year
without the House living up to its commitments to our Nation's
veterans, Democrats continue to play politics with this important
funding for their own political gain.
While the House Democrat leadership plays politics, however, our
Nation's veterans are the ones paying the price. The Senate has already
done its work and appointed conferees for the veterans appropriations
bill, and for every day that House Democrats allow the veterans funding
bill to languish without conferees for their own political agenda, our
Nation's veterans lose $18.5 million, money that could be used for
veterans housing, veterans health care, and other very important
veterans support activities.
The American Legion and the VFW already have, along with multiple
requests from this Member, as well as Republican Members of the House,
urged both Speaker Pelosi and Democrat Senate Majority Leader Reid to
end their PR campaign and begin conference work on this important
veterans funding issue.
Unfortunately, it appears as though all these commonsense requests
have fallen on deaf ears, and our Nation's veterans are being forced to
pay the price for continued Democrat partisanship and lack of
leadership on this issue.
I ask all of my colleagues to support this motion to defeat the
previous question so that we can put partisanship aside and move this
important legislation forward without any further gimmicks or games.
I know that this is a bold idea that hasn't yet been focused on by
groups around the Democrat Party or by pollsters or those who work with
moveon.org, but I think that our veterans deserve nothing less.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the
amendment and extraneous material appear in the Record just prior to
the vote on the previous question.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, we're here on the Homeowners' Defense Act of
2007 and this rule. This is an innovative solution crafted by my very
thoughtful colleagues from Florida, Representative Ron Klein and
Representative Tim Mahoney, to tackle the rising cost of property
insurance.
While the problem is especially acute in the State of Florida, it is
not limited to the State of Florida. Look all the way up the coastline
from Florida to Georgia, up through New York. Everyone is suffering
these double-digit percentage increases in their property insurance
bills. Look across the country to California and, yes, to Texas.
Florida is not alone and the gulf coast is not alone.
What this requires is some innovative, thoughtful thinking that
sometimes is all too often missing here in Washington, but thankfully
this new Congress has elected some self-starters who have experience in
business and know how business and government can work together to
bring real solutions for the American people.
These times of crisis demand innovative solutions, and my colleagues
from Florida and the Financial Services Committee that passed this bill
in a bipartisan vote, that has brought this to the floor today that we
can act on will provide a voluntary, not all States participate, it's a
voluntary national insurance risk consortium that will
[[Page H13335]]
allow States to tap private capital. Despite the protests from the
other side of the aisle, the way this bill is crafted is the taxpayers
will not be on the hook for additional disaster claims. To the
contrary, this is an attempt to alleviate having to come back to the
Congress time and time again in a time of natural disasters.
Now, will we be able to solve natural catastrophes in this bill? No.
But is it a smart tool to plan ahead, to try to put some money aside
early and create a backstop? Yes.
So I thank all of my colleagues from Florida, especially
Representative Klein and Representative Mahoney, because we have got to
do something, and this is a simple and effective way to tackle the
rising costs for property insurance. I ask my colleagues to support the
rule and to support this innovative solution.
I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question and on the rule.
The material referred to previously by Mr. Sessions is as follows:
Amendment to H. Res. 802 Offered By Mr. Sessions of Texas
At the end of the resolution, add the following:
Sec. 3. The House disagrees to the Senate amendment to the
bill, H.R. 2642, making appropriations for military
construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related
agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2008, and
for other purposes, and agrees to the conference requested by
the Senate thereon. The Speaker shall appoint conferees
immediately, but may declare a recess under clause 12(a) of
rule I for the purpose of consulting the Minority Leader
prior to such appointment. The motion to instruct conferees
otherwise in order pending the appointment of conferees
instead shall be in order only at a time designated by the
Speaker in the legislative schedule within two additional
legislative days after adoption of this resolution.
(The information contained herein was provided by
Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the
109th Congress.)
The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means
This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous
question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote.
A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote
against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow
the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an
alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be
debating.
Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of
Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the
previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or
control the consideration of the subject before the House
being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous
question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the
subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling
of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the
House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes
the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to
offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the
majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated
the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to
a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to
recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said:
``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to
yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first
recognition.''
Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic
majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is
simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on
adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive
legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is
not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of
the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual
published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress, (page
56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using
information from Congressional Quarterly's ``American
Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is
defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition
member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages
an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the
pending business.''
Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives,
the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a
refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a
special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the
resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21,
section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: ``Upon rejection of the
motion for the previous question on a resolution reported
from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member
leading the opposition to the previous question, who may
offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time
for debate thereon.''
Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does
have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only
available tools for those who oppose the Democratic
majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the
opportunity to offer an alternative plan.
Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I
move the previous question on the resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous
question.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule
XX, this 15-minute vote on ordering the previous question will be
followed by 5-minute votes on adoption of the resolution, if ordered,
and adoption of the motion to instruct on H.R. 3074, if ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 222,
nays 191, not voting 19, as follows:
[Roll No. 1065]
YEAS--222
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (PA)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Frank (MA)
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Richardson
Rodriguez
Ross
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Tsongas
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NAYS--191
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Keller
[[Page H13336]]
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Mack
Manzullo
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Mica
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--19
Bean
Boren
Braley (IA)
Buyer
Carson
Cubin
Dicks
Giffords
Hunter
Jindal
LaHood
Lantos
Levin
Lungren, Daniel E.
Marchant
McMorris Rodgers
Miller (FL)
Oberstar
Rothman
{time} 1449
Ms. GRANGER and Mr. ROGERS of Alabama changed their vote from ``yea''
to ``nay.''
So the previous question was ordered.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 225,
noes 190, not voting 17, as follows:
[Roll No. 1066]
AYES--225
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (PA)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Frank (MA)
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Richardson
Rodriguez
Ross
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Tsongas
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
Young (FL)
NOES--190
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
NOT VOTING--17
Bean
Boren
Braley (IA)
Buyer
Carson
Cubin
Giffords
Hunter
Jindal
LaHood
Lantos
Levin
Lungren, Daniel E.
McMorris Rodgers
Miller (FL)
Oberstar
Rothman
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there
are 2 minutes remaining on this vote.
{time} 1458
So the resolution was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________