[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 168 (Thursday, November 1, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13678-S13679]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to call the attention of the 
Senate to the most-underreported story of the year: the continuing 
success of our troops in Iraq. In particular, I would like to call my 
colleagues' attention to an article by the American Enterprise 
Institute's Fred Kagan in this week's Weekly Standard, which 
articulately speaks to the magnitude of the change in direction that 
has taken place in Iraq.
  The article reports how our soldiers and marines turned an imminent 
victory for al-Qaida in Iraq into a humiliating defeat for them and 
thereby created an opportunity for further progress not only in Iraq 
but also in the global struggle against terror. In the past 5 months we 
have seen stunning results from the Petraeus strategy: terrorist 
operations in and around Baghdad have dropped by 59 percent; car bomb 
deaths are down by 81 percent; casualties from enemy attacks dropped 77 
percent; and, violence during the just-completed season of Ramadan--
traditionally a peak of terrorist attacks was the lowest in 3 years.
  However, Mr. President, winning a battle is not the same as winning a 
war. Our commanders and soldiers are continuing the fight to ensure 
that al-Qaida does not recover even as they turn their attention to the 
next battle: the fight against Shia militias sponsored by Iran.
  What's more, these victories are not irreversible. Al-Qaida is a 
resourceful organization. If we let up, they can still recover. That is 
why our strategy on the ground must be based on the advice and 
experience of our generals and not the political necessities of the 
majority party here in Washington. We must resist politically-motivated 
maneuvering, whether it be in the form of artificial timelines for 
withdrawal or efforts to have politicians in Congress change the 
mission that has been delivering results.
  I ask unanimous consent that the attached article be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Weekly Standard, Nov. 5, 2007]

Winning One Battle, Fighting the Next: America Needs To Be Heartened by 
                Our Success in Iraq, and Seize a Victory

                        (By Frederick W. Kagan)

       America has won an important battle in the war on terror. 
     We turned an imminent

[[Page S13679]]

     victory for Al Qaeda In Iraq into a humiliating defeat for 
     them and thereby created an opportunity for further progress 
     not only in Iraq, but also in the global struggle. In the 
     past five months, terrorist operations in and around Baghdad 
     have dropped by 59 percent. Car bomb deaths are down by 81 
     percent. Casualties from enemy attacks dropped 77 percent. 
     And violence during the just-completed season of Ramadan--
     traditionally a peak of terrorist attacks--was the lowest in 
     three years.
       Winning a battle is not the same as winning a war. Our 
     commanders and soldiers are continuing the fight to ensure 
     that al Qaeda does not recover even as they turn their 
     attention to the next battle: against Shia militias sponsored 
     by Iran. Beyond Iraq, battles in Afghanistan and elsewhere 
     demand our attention. But let us properly take stock of what 
     has been accomplished.
       At the end of 2006, the United States was headed for defeat 
     in Iraq. Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent leaders proclaimed 
     their imminent triumph. Our own intelligence analysts and 
     commanders agreed that our previous strategies had failed. 
     The notion that a ``surge'' of a few brigades and a change of 
     mission could transform the security situation in Iraq was 
     ridiculed. Many experts and politicians proclaimed the 
     futility of further military effort in Iraq. Imagine if they 
     had been heeded.
       Had al Qaeda been allowed to drive us from Iraq in 
     disgrace, it would control safe havens throughout Anbar, in 
     Baghdad, up the Tigris River valley, in Baquba, and in the 
     ``triangle of death.'' Al Qaeda In Iraq had already 
     proclaimed a puppet state, the Islamic State of Iraq, and was 
     sending money and fighters to the international al Qaeda 
     movement even as it was supplied with foreign suicide 
     bombers and leaders by that movement. The boasts of Osama 
     bin Laden that his movement had defeated the Soviet Union 
     were silly--al Qaeda did not exist when the Soviet Union 
     fell--but they were still a powerful recruiting tool. How 
     much more powerful a tool would have been the actual 
     defeat of the United States, the last remaining 
     superpower, at the hands of Al Qaeda In Iraq? How much 
     more dangerous would have been a terrorist movement with 
     bases in an oil-rich Arab country at the heart of al 
     Qaeda's mythical ``Caliphate'' than al Qaeda was when 
     based in barren, poverty-stricken Afghanistan, a country 
     where Arabs are seen as untrustworthy outsiders?
       Instead, Al Qaeda In Iraq today is broken. Individual al 
     Qaeda cells persist, in steadily shrinking areas of the 
     country, but they can no longer mount the sort of coherent 
     operations across Iraq that had become the norm in 2006. The 
     elimination of key leaders and experts has led to a 
     significant reduction in the effectiveness of the al Qaeda 
     bombings that do occur, hence the steady and dramatic 
     declines in overall casualty rates.
       Al Qaeda leaders seem aware of their defeat. General Ray 
     Odierno noted in a recent briefing that some of al Qaeda's 
     foreign leaders have begun to flee Iraq. Documents recovered 
     from a senior Al Qaeda In Iraq leader, Abu Usama al-Tunisi, 
     portray a movement that has lost the initiative and is 
     steadily losing its last places to hide. According to 
     Brigadier General Joseph Anderson, chief of staff for the 
     multinational coalition in Iraq, al-Tunisi wrote that ``he is 
     surrounded, communications have been cut, and he is desperate 
     for help.''
       How did we achieve this success? Before the surge began, 
     American forces in Iraq had attempted to fight al Qaeda 
     primarily with the sort of intelligence-driven, targeted 
     raids that many advocates of immediate withdrawal claim they 
     want to continue. Those efforts failed. Our skilled soldiers 
     captured and killed many al Qaeda leaders, including Abu 
     Musab al Zarqawi, but the terrorists were able to replace 
     them faster than we could kill them. Success came with a new 
     strategy.
       Al Qaeda excesses in Anbar Province and elsewhere had 
     already begun to generate local resentment, but those local 
     movements could not advance without our help. The takfiris--
     as the Iraqis call the sectarian extremists of al Qaeda--
     brutally murdered and tortured any local Sunni leaders who 
     dared to speak against them, until American troops began to 
     work to clear the terrorist strongholds in Ramadi in late 
     2006. But there were not enough U.S. forces in Anbar to 
     complete even that task, let alone to protect local 
     populations throughout the province and in the Sunni areas of 
     Iraq. The surge of forces into Anbar and the Baghdad belts 
     allowed American troops to complete the clearing of Ramadi 
     and to clear Falluja and other takfiri strongholds.
       The additional troops also allowed American commanders to 
     pursue defeated al Qaeda cells and prevent them from 
     reestablishing safe-havens. The so-called ``water balloon 
     effect,'' in which terrorists were simply squeezed from one 
     area of the country to another, did not occur in 2007 because 
     our commanders finally had the resources to go after the 
     terrorists wherever they fled. After the clearing of the city 
     of Baquba this year, al Qaeda fighters attempted to flee up 
     the Diyala River valley and take refuge in the Hamrin 
     Ridge. Spectacular bombings in small villages in that 
     area, including the massive devastation in the Turkmen 
     village of Amerli, roughly 100 miles north of Baghdad, 
     that killed hundreds, were intended to provide al Qaeda 
     with the terror wedge it needed to gain a foothold in the 
     area. But with American troops in hot pursuit, the 
     terrorists had to stay on the run, breaking their movement 
     into smaller and more disaggregated cells. The addition of 
     more forces, the change in strategy to focus on protecting 
     the population, both Sunni and Shia, and the planning and 
     execution of multiple simultaneous, and sequential 
     operations across the entire theater combined with a shift 
     in attitudes among the Sunni population to revolutionize 
     the situation.
       Some now say that, although America's soldiers were 
     successful in this task, the next battle is hopeless. We 
     cannot control the Shia militias, they say. The Iraqis will 
     never ``reconcile.'' The government will not make the 
     decisions it must make to sustain the current progress, and 
     all will collapse. Perhaps. But those who now proclaim the 
     hopelessness of future efforts also ridiculed the possibility 
     of the success we have just achieved. If one predicts failure 
     long enough, one may turn out to be right. But the 
     credibility of the prophets of doom--those who questioned the 
     veracity and integrity of General David Petraeus when he 
     dared to report progress--is at a low ebb.
       There is a long struggle ahead in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and 
     elsewhere against al Qaeda and its allies in extremism. We 
     can still lose. American forces and Afghan allies defeated al 
     Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 as completely as we are 
     defeating it in Iraq. But mistakes and a lack of commitment 
     by both the United States and the NATO forces to whom we 
     handed off responsibility have allowed a resurgence of 
     terrorism in Afghanistan. We must not repeat that mistake in 
     Iraq where the stakes are so much higher. America must not 
     try to pocket the success we have achieved in Iraq and 
     declare a premature and meaningless victory. Instead, let us 
     be heartened by success. We have avoided for the moment a 
     terrible danger and created a dramatic opportunity. Let's 
     seize it.

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