Congressional Record, Volume 153 Issue 157 (Wednesday, October 17, 2007)

[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 157 (Wednesday, October 17, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H11656-H11666]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

RESTORE ACT OF 2007

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 746, I call up
the bill (H.R. 3773) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain acquisitions
of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes, and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3773

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen,
Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of
2007''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States
persons outside the United States.
Sec. 3. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications of
non-United States persons located outside the United
States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of
non-United States persons located outside the United
States.
Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United
States persons located outside of the United States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc.
Sec. 7. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 8. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of
United States persons.
Sec. 9. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign
intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 10. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign
intelligence information.
Sec. 11. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 12. Sunset; transition procedures.

SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES.

Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105A. (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a court
order is not required for the acquisition of the contents of
any communication between persons that are not United States
persons and are not located within the United States for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information,
without respect to whether the communication passes through
the United States or the surveillance device is located
within the United States.
``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside
of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance
that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of
a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States and not a United States person for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as
defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by
targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or
105B; or
``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section
105 or 105C.''.

SEC. 3. PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105B. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the
court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order,
or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up
to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that
are reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States and not United States persons for the purpose of
collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in
paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those
persons.
``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under
subsection (a) shall include--
``(1) a certification by the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under this section are persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably
believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a
communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,
employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who
has authorized access to the communications to be acquired,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
such communications; and
``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1)
or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
``(2) a description of--
``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the
duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable
belief that the targets of the acquisition are persons that
are located outside the United States and not United States
persons;
``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the
identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition
will be directed;
``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of
minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with
respect to such acquisition; and
``(D) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an
application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required
by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to conduct
electronic surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be
located in the United States.
``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under
subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific
facilities, places, premises, or property at which the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be
directed.
``(d) Review of Application.--Not later than 15 days after
a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the
judge shall review such application and shall approve the
application if the judge finds that--
``(1) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection
(b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the
targets of the acquisition are located outside the United
States and not United States persons;
``(2) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in
subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h); and
``(3) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D)
are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is
filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act,
when the Federal Government seeks to conduct electronic
surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be located in
the United States.
``(e) Order.--
``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under
subsection (d) shall issue an order--
``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the
communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
``(B) requiring the communications service provider or
custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service
provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the
information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the acquisition to provide such information,
facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish
the

[[Page H11657]]

acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with the
services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or
agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
``(C) requiring such communications service provider,
custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of
the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved
by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the
aid furnished;
``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for
providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to
such order; and
``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing
the person to comply with the order to such person; and
``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as
proposed or as modified by the judge;
``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in
subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge;
and
``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D)
as proposed or as modified by the judge.
``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with
an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may
invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a)
to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order
of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of
court. Any process under this section may be served in any
judicial district in which the person may be found.
``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law,
no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person
for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in
accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National
Intelligence and the court established under subsection
103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a
period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such
order is issued.
``(5) Assessment of compliance with minimization
procedures.--At or before the end of the period of time for
which an acquisition is approved by an order or an extension
under this section, the judge may assess compliance with the
minimization procedures referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(ii)
and the guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(iii) by
reviewing the circumstances under which information
concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or
disseminated.''.

SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105C. (a) Application After Emergency
Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than
7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section,
an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in
accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge
referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval
of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B.
``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency
acquisition of foreign intelligence information for a period
of not more than 45 days if--
``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General jointly determine that--
``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an
authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an
order approving the acquisition under such section can with
due diligence be obtained;
``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under this section are persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably
believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
``(D) there are reasonable procedures in place for
determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information under this section will be acquired by targeting
only persons that are reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States and not United States persons;
``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a
communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,
employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who
has authorized access to the communications to be acquired,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
such communications;
``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1)
or (2)(A) of section 101(e));
``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to
such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h); and
``(H) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure that
an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise
required by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to
conduct electronic surveillance of a person reasonably
believed to be located in the United States; and
``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having
jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at
the time of the authorization under this section that the
decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence
information.
``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
Pursuant to an authorization of an acquisition under this
section, the Attorney General may direct a communications
service provider, custodian, or an officer, employee, or
agent of such service provider or custodian, who has the
lawful authority to access the information, facilities, or
technical assistance necessary to accomplish such acquisition
to--
``(1) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such
information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner
that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce
a minimum of interference with the services that provider,
custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the
target of the acquisition; and
``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
any records concerning the acquisition or the aid
furnished.''.

SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE
UNITED STATES.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
105C the following new section:

``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES
PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105D. (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not
later than 7 days after an application is submitted under
section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e),
the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
General shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress--
``(1) in the case of an application, a copy of the
application, including the certification made under section
105B(b)(1); and
``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order,
including the procedures and guidelines referred to in
section 105B(e)(1)(E).
``(b) Quarterly Audits.--
``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter
until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B,
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall
complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance
with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section
105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a)
the results of such audit, including, for each order
authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under
section 105B--
``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such
order that were later determined to be located in the United
States;
``(B) the number of persons located in the United States
whose communications have been acquired under such order;
``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated
containing information on a United States person that was
collected under such order; and
``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of
electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose
communications were acquired under such order.
``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion
of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the
court established under section 103(a) a report containing
the results of such audit.
``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days
thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under
section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a
report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the
previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this
section shall include a description of any incidents of non-
compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e),
including incidents of non-compliance by--
``(1) an element of the intelligence community with
minimization procedures referred to in section
105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
``(2) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
``(3) an element of the intelligence community with
guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance under such order.

[[Page H11658]]

``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
containing the number of emergency authorizations of
acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any
incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization
under such section.
``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress'
means--
``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
and
``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.''.

SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(g) In any case where the court established under
subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review
a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of
the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any
orders related to such matter.''.

SEC. 7. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

(a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs
of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of
communications conducted without a court order on or after
September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance
Program referred to by the President in a radio address on
December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all
documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda
concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations
of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers,
and court orders.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the
completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector
General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report
containing the results of such audit, including all documents
acquired pursuant to conducting such audit.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the
investigation and adjudication of an application by the
Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a
security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit
under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as
possible.

SEC. 8. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

(a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop
and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track
of--
(1) the instances where the identity of a United States
person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an
element of the intelligence community (as defined in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))
that collected the communications to other departments or
agencies of the United States; and
(2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government
and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
(b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created
under subsection (a), including the number of instances
referred to in paragraph (1).

SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of
Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector
General, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and
other appropriate elements of the National Security Division,
and the National Security Agency such sums as may be
necessary to meet the personnel and information technology
demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of--
(1) applications and other submissions to the court
established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));
(2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
(A) section 105D of such Act; and
(B) section 7; and
(3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements
under section 8.

SEC. 10. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR
GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

(a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence information.
(b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory
authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an
amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific
statutory authorization shall be the only exception to
subsection (a).

SEC. 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first
section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items
relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the
following new items:

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United
States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications
of non-United States persons located outside the United
States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications
of non-United States persons located outside the United
States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of persons
located outside of the United States.''.
(b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
(c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America
Act.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law
110-55) are hereby repealed.

SEC. 12. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

(a) Sunset of New Provisions.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
effective on December 31, 2009--
(A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) are hereby repealed; and
(B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act
is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A,
105B, 105C, and 105D.
(2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any
authorization or order issued under section 105B of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by
this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in
effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization
or order.
(b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.--
(1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this
Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall
remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such
authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of
enactment, whichever is earlier.
(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law
110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in
accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations,
including--
(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section
105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of
the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be
located in the United States;
(B) the number of persons located in the United States
whose communications have been acquired under such section;
(C) the number of reports disseminated containing
information on a United States person that was collected
under such section;
(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of
electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based
upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition
authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and
(E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with
an authorization under such section, including incidents of
non-compliance by--
(i) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
(ii) an element of the intelligence community with
minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of
such section; and

[[Page H11659]]

(iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
(3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection,
the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the
term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 746, in lieu of
the amendments recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence printed in the bill, the
amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part A of House
Report 110-385, modified by the amendment printed in part B of the
report, is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

H.R. 3773

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States
persons outside the United States.
Sec. 3. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of
non-United States persons located outside the United
States who may be communicating with persons inside the
United States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of
non-United States persons located outside the United
States who may be communicating with persons inside the
United States.
Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United
States persons located outside of the United States who
may be communicating with persons inside the United
States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc.
Sec. 7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court matters.
Sec. 8. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign
intelligence information.
Sec. 9. Enhancement of electronic surveillance authority in wartime and
other collection.
Sec. 10. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 11. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of
United States persons.
Sec. 12. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign
intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 13. Document management system for applications for orders
approving electronic surveillance.
Sec. 14. Training of intelligence community personnel in foreign
intelligence collection matters.
Sec. 15. Information for Congress on the terrorist surveillance program
and similar programs.
Sec. 16. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 17. Sunset; transition procedures.

SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES.

Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105A. (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, a court order is not required for electronic
surveillance directed at the acquisition of the contents of
any communication between persons that are not known to be
United States persons and are reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States for the purpose of
collecting foreign intelligence information, without respect
to whether the communication passes through the United States
or the surveillance device is located within the United
States.
``(2) Treatment of inadvertent interceptions.--If
electronic surveillance referred to in paragraph (1)
inadvertently collects a communication in which at least one
party to the communication is located inside the United
States or is a United States person, the contents of such
communication shall be handled in accordance with
minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General that
require that no contents of any communication to which a
United States person is a party shall be disclosed,
disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer
than 7 days unless a court order under section 105 is
obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the
information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily
harm to any person.
``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside
of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance
that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of
a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States and not a United States person for the
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as
defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by
targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or
105B; or
``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section
105 or 105C.''.

SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE
COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED
STATES.

Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE
COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105B. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the
court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order,
or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up
to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that
are reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States and not United States persons for the purpose of
collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in
paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those
persons.
``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under
subsection (a) shall include--
``(1) a certification by the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under this section are persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
who may be communicating with persons inside the United
States;
``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably
believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a
communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,
employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who
has authorized access to the communications to be acquired,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
such communications; and
``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1)
or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
``(2) a description of--
``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the
duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable
belief that the persons that are the targets of the
acquisition are located outside the United States and not
United States persons;
``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the
identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition
will be directed;
``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of
minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with
respect to such acquisition; and
``(D) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an
application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required
by this Act, when a significant purpose of an acquisition is
to acquire the communications of a specific United States
person reasonably believed to be located in the United
States.
``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under
subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific
facilities, places, premises, or property at which the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be
directed.
``(d) Review of ``Application; Appeals.--
``(1) Review of application.--Not later than 15 days after
a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the
judge shall review such application and shall approve the
application if the judge finds that--
``(A) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection
(b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the
targets of the acquisition are located outside the United
States and not United States persons;
``(B) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in
subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h); and
``(C) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D)
are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is
filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act,
when a significant purpose of an acquisition

[[Page H11660]]

is to acquire the communications of a specific United States
person reasonably believed to be located in the United
States.
``(2) Temporary order; appeals.--
``(A) Temporary order.--A judge denying an application
under paragraph (1) may, at the application of the United
States, issue a temporary order to authorize an acquisition
under section 105B in accordance with the application
submitted under subsection (a) during the pendency of any
appeal of the denial of such application.
``(B) Appeals.--The United States may appeal the denial of
an application for an order under paragraph (1) or a
temporary order under subparagraph (A) in accordance with
section 103.
``(e) Order.--
``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under
subsection (d) shall issue an order--
``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the
communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
``(B) requiring the communications service provider or
custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service
provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the
information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the acquisition to provide such information,
facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish
the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with
the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or
agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
``(C) requiring such communications service provider,
custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of
the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved
by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the
aid furnished;
``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for
providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to
such order;
``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing
the person to comply with the order to such person; and
``(iii) a certification stating that the acquisition is
authorized under this section and that all requirements of
this section have been met; and''.
``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as
proposed or as modified by the judge;
``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in
subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge;
and
``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D)
as proposed or as modified by the judge.
``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with
an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may
invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a)
to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order
of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of
court. Any process under this section may be served in any
judicial district in which the person may be found.
``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law,
no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person
for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in
accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National
Intelligence and the court established under subsection
103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a
period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such
order is issued.
``(5) Assessment of compliance with court order.--At or
before the end of the period of time for which an acquisition
is approved by an order or an extension under this section,
the court established under section 103(a) shall, not less
frequently than once each quarter, assess compliance with the
procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E) and
review the circumstances under which information concerning
United States persons was acquired, retained, or
disseminated.''.

SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE
COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED
STATES.

Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as
follows:

``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE
COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

``Sec. 105C. (a) Application After Emergency
Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than
7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section,
an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in
accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge
referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval
of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B.
``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency
acquisition of foreign intelligence information (as defined
in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) for a period of
not more than 45 days if--
``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General jointly determine that--
``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an
authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an
order approving the acquisition under such section can with
due diligence be obtained;
``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information under this section are persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
who may be communicating with persons inside the United
States;
``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably
believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
``(D) there are procedures in place that will be used by
the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
General during the duration of the authorization to determine
if there is a reasonable belief that the persons that are the
targets of the acquisition are located outside the United
States and not United States persons;
``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a
communications service provider or custodian, or an officer,
employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who
has authorized access to the communications to be acquired,
either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or
equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store
such communications;
``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1)
or (2)(A) of section 101(e));
``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to
such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h); and
``(H) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure that
an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise
required by this Act, when a significant purpose of an
acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific
United States person reasonably believed to be located in the
United States; and
``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having
jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at
the time of the authorization under this section that the
decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence
information.
``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
``(1) Directive.--Pursuant to an authorization of an
acquisition under this section, the Attorney General may
direct a communications service provider, custodian, or an
officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or
custodian, who has the lawful authority to access the
information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish such acquisition to--
``(A) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such
information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner
that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce
a minimum of interference with the services that provider,
custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the
target of the acquisition; and
``(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished.
``(2) Parameters; certifications.--The Attorney General
shall provide to any person directed to provide assistance
under paragraph (1) with--
``(A) a document setting forth the parameters of the
directive;
``(B) a certification stating that--
``(i) the emergency authorization has been issued pursuant
to this section;
``(ii) all requirements of this section have been met;
``(iii) a judge has been informed of the emergency
authorization in accordance with subsection (b)(2); and
``(iv) an application will be submitted in accordance with
subsection (a); and
``(C) a certification that the recipient of the directive
shall be compensated, at the prevailing rate, for providing
information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to such
directive.''.

SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE
UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH
PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
105C the following new section:

``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES
PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING
WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

[[Page H11661]]

``(B) a description of the primary purpose of the
acquisition for which the application is submitted; and
``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order,
including the procedures and guidelines referred to in
section 105B(e)(1)(E).
``(b) Regular Audits.--
``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter
until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B,
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall
complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance
with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section
105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a)
the results of such audit, including, for each order
authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under
section 105B--
``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such
order that were later determined to be located in the United
States;
``(B) the number of persons located in the United States
whose communications have been acquired under such order;
``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated
containing information on a United States person that was
collected under such order; and
``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of
electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose
communications were acquired under such order.
``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion
of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the
court established under section 103(a) a report containing
the results of such audit.
``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days
thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under
section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a
report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the
previous period. Each report submitted under this section
shall include a description of any incidents of non-
compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e),
including incidents of non-compliance by--
``(1) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
``(2) an element of the intelligence community with
minimization procedures referred to in section
105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
``(3) an element of the intelligence community with
guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance under such order.
``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of
National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
containing the number of emergency authorizations of
acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any
incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization
under such section.
``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress'
means--
``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
and
``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.''.

SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

SEC. 7. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT MATTERS.

(a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1803(a)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
(2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated)--
(A) by striking ``11'' and inserting ``15''; and
(B) by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United
States judicial circuits''; and
(3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3) and
indenting such paragraph, as so designated, two ems from the
left margin.
(b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section
is further amended by inserting after paragraph (1) (as
designated by subsection (a)(1)) the following new paragraph:
``(2) A judge of the court shall make a determination to
approve, deny, or modify an application submitted pursuant to
section 105(f), section 304(e), or section 403 not later than
24 hours after the receipt of such application by the
court.''.

SEC. 8. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR
GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

SEC. 9. ENHANCEMENT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY IN
WARTIME AND OTHER COLLECTION.

Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are
amended by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``Congress or
an authorization for the use of military force described in
section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.
1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific
authorization for foreign intelligence collection under this
section, or if the Congress is unable to convene because of
an attack upon the United States.''.

SEC. 10. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

SEC. 11. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

SEC. 12. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated
the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office
of the Inspector General, the appropriate elements of the
National Security Division, and the National Security Agency
such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and
information technology demands to ensure the timely and
efficient processing of--
(1) applications and other submissions to the court
established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));
(2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
(A) section 105D of such Act; and
(B) section 10; and
(3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements
under section 11.
(b) Additional Personnel for Preparation and Consideration
of Applications for Orders Approving Electronic Surveillance
and Physical Search.--

[[Page H11662]]

(1) National security division of the department of
justice.--
(A) Additional personnel.--The National Security Division
of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such
additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the
prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of
applications under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 for orders under that Act for foreign intelligence
purposes.
(B) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign
personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among
appropriate offices of the intelligence community (as defined
in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4))) in order that such personnel may directly
assist personnel of the Intelligence Community in preparing
applications described in that paragraph and conduct prompt
and effective oversight of the activities of such agencies
under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders.
(2) Director of national intelligence.--
(A) Additional legal and other personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence is hereby authorized such additional
legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out
the prompt and timely preparation of applications under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders
under that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes.
(B) Assignment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and
among the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))),
including the field offices of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in order that such personnel may directly
assist personnel of the intelligence community in preparing
applications described in that paragraph.
(3) Additional legal and other personnel for foreign
intelligence surveillance court.--There is hereby authorized
for the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a))
such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to
facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that court
of applications under such Act for orders under such Act
approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall
perform such duties relating to the consideration of such
applications as that court shall direct.
(4) Supplement not supplant.--The personnel authorized by
this section are in addition to any other personnel
authorized by law.

SEC. 13. DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR APPLICATIONS FOR
ORDERS APPROVING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

(a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and
implement a secure, classified document management system
that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review
by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security
Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States
Government of applications under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their
submission to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
(b) Scope of System.--The document management system
required by subsection (a) shall--
(1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of
applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and
(2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel
submitting applications described in paragraph (1), and
provide for the secure electronic storage and retrieval of
all such applications and related matters with the court and
for their secure transmission to the National Archives and
Records Administration.

SEC. 14. TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL IN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MATTERS.

The Director of National Intelligence shall, in
consultation with the Attorney General--
(1) develop regulations to establish procedures for
conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance,
physical search, and the installation and use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices on an emergency basis,
and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving
applications and orders under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978; and
(2) prescribe related training on the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 and related legal matters for the
personnel of the applicable agencies of the intelligence
community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))).

SEC. 15. INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS ON THE TERRORIST
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND SIMILAR PROGRAMS.

As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of
this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the
President shall fully inform each member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate on the following:
(1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National
Security Agency.
(2) Any program in existence from September 11, 2001, until
the effective date of this Act that involves, whether in part
or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States
persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or
other purposes, and which is conducted by any department,
agency, or other element of the United States Government, or
by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or
other element of the United States Government, without fully
complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States
Code.

SEC. 16. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United
States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications
of non-United States persons located outside the United
States who may be communicating with persons inside the
United States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications
of non-United States persons located outside the United
States who may be communicating with persons inside the
United States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United
States persons located outside of the United States who
may be communicating with persons inside the United
States.''.

(b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
(c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act
of 2007.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public
Law 110-55) are hereby repealed.

SEC. 17. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

[[Page H11663]]

effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act); and
(E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with
an authorization under such section, including incidents of
non-compliance by--
(i) an element of the intelligence community with
procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
(ii) an element of the intelligence community with
minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of
such section; and
(iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities,
or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
(3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection,
the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the
term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)).

SEC. __. CERTIFICATION TO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS
THAT ACQUISITIONS ARE AUTHORIZED UNDER FISA.

(a) Authorization Under Section 102.--Section 102(a) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1802(a)) is amended by striking ``furnishing such aid'' and
inserting ``furnishing such aid and shall provide such
carrier with a certification stating that the electronic
surveillance is authorized under this section and that all
requirements of this section have been met''.
(b) Authorization Under Section 105.--Section 105(c)(2) of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting ``;'';
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``aid.'' and inserting
``aid; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) that the applicant provide such carrier, landlord,
custodian, or other person with a certification stating that
the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section
and that all requirements of this section have been met.''.

SEC. __. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

(a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be
prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense under this
section unless the indictment is found or the information is
instituted not later than 10 years after the commission of
the offense.''.
(b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the
enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations
applicable to that offense has not run as of such date.

SEC. __. NO RIGHTS UNDER THE RESTORE ACT FOR UNLAWFUL
RESIDENTS.

Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act
shall be construed to prevent lawfully conducted surveillance
of or grant any rights to an alien not lawfully permitted to
be in or remain in the United States.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Debate shall not exceed 90 minutes, with 60
minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 30 minutes
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Smith) each will control 30 minutes and the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) each
will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).

{time} 1230

General Leave

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous material for the Record on H.R. 3773.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, 6 years ago the administration unilaterally chose to
engage in warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court
review. That decision created a legal and political quagmire. To fight
terrorism and prevent another 9/11, we need to have an effective and
legal system of intelligence gathering. That is what we are here to do
today.
When that old scheme broke down, the administration then forced
Congress to accept an equally flawed statute in August, the Protect
America Act. The Protect America Act granted broad, new powers to
engage in warrantless searches within the United States, including
physical searches of our homes, computers, offices, libraries and
medical records. There was a valiant fight against it, but we did not
prevail.
Mr. Speaker, at this time I want to acknowledge the great work of the
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes, for what he
did, and on the Judiciary Committee I am quite proud of Jerry Nadler of
New York, the chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, and Sheila
Jackson-Lee, the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas. Also the
chairman of the Crime subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia.
The PATRIOT Act granted broad new powers to engage in warrantless
searches within the United States. It included, as I said, physical
searches of our homes, of our computers, offices, libraries, and even
medical records. The law contained no meaningful oversight whatsoever
and went around the FISA Court. It should not be made permanent. That
is why we are here today with the RESTORE Act, to create a framework
for legal surveillance that includes the FISA Court.
Careful consideration by the Judiciary and by the Intelligence
Committees addresses the need for flexibility in intelligence gathering
and delivers the ability to deal with the modern communications
networks. More importantly, it is consistent with the rule of law, the
Constitution, and our democratic values.
Let's be clear about how the RESTORE Act's ``basket'' court orders
work. These orders are not individual warrants for Osama bin Laden or
other terrorists. They allow surveillance of an entire terrorist group
or other foreign power through a flexible court process. This act
prohibits reverse targeting to engage in warrantless spying on
Americans. In approving the order, the court must also approve the
guidelines and procedures that will be used to protect the rights of
Americans under the Constitution and under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.
When the intelligence community turns its attention to Americans at
home, they will have to get a warrant. That isn't just good policy;
this is the critically important fourth amendment in action. So RESTORE
even brings the court into the emergency provisions. NSA must notify
the court when they start emergency acquisition, and they must seek a
court order within seven days. This is not a secret process. The court
knows when it is started and is awaiting the application.
Mr. Speaker, the phone company can't even turn on the switch unless
it has a certification from the government that they are actively
seeking that court order. If the application is turned down, the
surveillance shuts off, unless the court specifically stays their
ruling, pending appeal. That appeal must be resolved within 45 days.
These emergency authorizations are not a backdoor way to avoid court
review. In fact, the court will be looking at the emergency from the
very first day.
The bill also provides other critical safeguards: periodic audits by
the inspector general; narrow scope of authority to security threats,
not just anything. It protects privacy of Americans traveling abroad
and, most important, sunsets the legislation in December of the year
2009 so that we can review it one more time.
Importantly, the bill has no retroactive immunity for
telecommunications carriers whatsoever. Why? Because we have been
refused the documents to determine whether retroactive immunity has any
place or not. Interestingly enough, that was delivered to the Senate.
They have the documents. We, begging, pleading, screaming, we don't
have the documents. So no retroactive immunity. Until we receive these
underlying documents, there is no way we can begin any consideration of
that request. So the legislation before us today is a very, very
important start-over improving the measure, the Protect America Act,
that still exists.
Please join with me in a careful consideration of everything in this
measure.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, the Democratic leadership calls the RESTORE Act of 2007
a compromise. Well, I agree. It compromises our national security.
Why do Democrats want to make it more difficult to gather
intelligence

[[Page H11664]]

about terrorists after 9/11 than before
9/11? Since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted 30
years ago, our terrorist fighting agencies have been able to gather
information about terrorists without obtaining a court order. Why
burden our intelligence agencies now? Why make it harder to find Osama
bin Laden? Why protect terrorists?
This bill, for the first time, requires a court order to monitor
foreign persons outside the United States. If Osama bin Laden makes a
call and we don't know who it is to, a court order must be obtained.
That takes many hours and could well mean we miss an opportunity to
stop an attack.
The bill omits liability protection for telephone companies that
provided the Federal Government with critical information after 9/11.
These companies deserve our thanks, not a flurry of frivolous lawsuits.
The bill sunsets in 4 years, yet our agencies need certainty and
permanence so they can develop new procedures and train employees.
Mr. Speaker, we don't need the RESTORE Act. We do need to restore the
ability of the Federal Government to gather information about
terrorists and to stop them.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the minority whip, the gentleman
from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, the law in place today, the law that we brought up to
today's technical standards in August, is essentially the law that the
Congress passed in 1978, a Congress that had a majority of Democrats in
it. Jimmy Carter, President Carter, signed that bill, and it has worked
for 30 years now.
The way this bill is drafted, the administration would be forced to
seek warrants, as Mr. Smith just said, for foreign targets in case they
might call the United States. If Osama bin Laden calls the United
States, we should know it. If Osama bin Laden calls and it turns out to
be a call that didn't matter, there are ways to minimize that. In all
likelihood, if Osama bin Laden called, it shouldn't be a matter that we
shouldn't know about. If he calls to order a pizza and says ``deliver
the pizza to cave 56 in Bora Bora,'' that is something we ought to know
at that minute. We should not have to go to court to monitor these
calls, just in case they call somebody in the United States.
Granting what in essence is de facto fourth amendment constitutional
rights to noncitizens who are not in this country makes no sense at
all. It is not the right direction. We need a permanent fix.
This bill does not contain, as my good friend Mr. Conyers said,
retroactive liability. We need to have liability for those companies
that stepped up after 9/11 and immediately helped the country begin to
monitor the things we needed to monitor. We still don't clarify in this
bill what our intelligence agencies do.
This does not solve any problems. It creates problems. When you have
a system that has worked in one way, and effectively, for 30 years,
there is no reason to change that system. This bill makes needless,
dangerous changes.
I hope we vote ``no'' on this bill today, and get down, as we did in
late July, to the reality of what we have to do to defend the country.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, 6 years after the tragic attacks of 9/11, Osama bin
Laden remains at large. The minority whip may make light about ordering
pizza, but the reality is we still haven't gotten Osama bin Laden and
America faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups.
Just this week, Admiral Scott Redd, Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, said that the Iraq war has created a giant
recruiting tool for al Qaeda. When asked if we are safer as a result of
our invasion of Iraq, Admiral Redd said, ``Tactically, probably not.''
Mindful of this threat, our committees have drafted the RESTORE Act.
I wish to thank Chairman Conyers and members of both committees for
their great work in drafting this legislation. The RESTORE Act arms our
intelligence community with powerful new authorities to conduct
electronic surveillance of terrorist targets around the world, but it
also restores essential constitutional protections for Americans that
were sharply eroded when the President signed the Protect America Act,
or PAA, last August.
Some on the other side want to extend the PAA permanently. That would
be a huge mistake. According to expert testimony we have received in
our committee, the PAA authorizes warrantless domestic searches of
Americans' homes, mail, computers and medical records, as the chairman
of the Judiciary Committee observed earlier.
Although we don't have any information at this time that the Bush
administration is using this authority in this way, we must guard
against the possibility of abuse in the future. Our committee heard
testimony that the PAA even allows spying without probable cause on our
own soldiers deployed overseas talking to their families back home.
That, Mr. Speaker, is wrong.
The RESTORE Act helps restore the balance between security and
liberty. The RESTORE Act puts the FISA Court back in the business of
protecting Americans' constitutional rights, after the President and
Vice President put the court out of business 6 years ago.
Some will try to portray this bill as extending rights to terrorists.
We have heard that this morning. That is absolutely false. This bill
does not require individual warrants for terrorists such as Osama bin
Laden. The bill does not extend fourth amendment rights to foreigners.
What the RESTORE Act does is allow ``block surveillance'' of
terrorists overseas with speed and agility. And we will never go dark,
because the bill includes an emergency provision that allows
surveillance to continue for 45 days, even before the court approves
the procedures to protect Americans.
This legislation will restore accountability and oversight in all
three branches. It restores regular audits and reports by the
Department of Justice, which will be reviewed by the Congress. It also
requires an audit of the President's Domestic Surveillance Program and
other warrantless surveillance programs.
Perhaps most importantly, it ensures that when an American is the
target of surveillance, an individualized warrant is required.
Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle prefer an
approach that would allow the administration to police itself. This
simply is unacceptable. If we have learned anything from the past 6
years, it is that unchecked executive power is a recipe for abuse and
it has not made us safer.

{time} 1245

Mr. Speaker, I have served my country as a soldier in combat in
Vietnam, as a law enforcement professional on our southern border, and
as a Member of Congress for the past decade. I have seen the great
strength of our country; and in my view, the source of that great
strength is our Constitution. The RESTORE Act provides tools to keep
this Nation safe and upholds our Constitution and our laws. So I urge
my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the RESTORE Act.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the former
chairman and current ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee,
the gentleman from New York (Mr. King).
Mr. KING of New York. I thank the ranking member for yielding and,
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, the United States has been at war with Islamic terrorism
since September 11, 2001. This is a war which threatens our survival as
a civilization, and it is a war where it is essential that we maximize
the use of electronic surveillance which is one of the strongest
weapons in our arsenal. It is a weapon which should not be trivialized,
nor should the struggle be trivialized by using such terms as
``spying'' and ``snooping.''
It is important we keep in mind who the real enemy is. The real enemy
is al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism, not the men and women of our own
government who are working so hard to protect us.
Mr. Speaker, the Protect America Act, which was passed less than 3
months ago, updated FISA and struck the appropriate balance between
protecting our citizens from terrorist attacks and protecting our civil
liberties.

[[Page H11665]]

Tragically, today's bill, the RESTORE Act, marks an undeniable retreat
in the war against Islamic terrorism. It limits the type of foreign
intelligence information that may be acquired and actually gives
foreign targets more protections than Americans get in criminal cases
here at home.
By sunsetting this legislation in 2 years, the RESTORE Act fails to
provide permanency and guidance to the intelligence community. The
RESTORE Act also fails to provide legal protection and immunity to
those American companies who answered the call of this administration
and also answered the call of an administration which believed that
this policy was legal, and not only this administration, but high-
ranking officials from previous administrations, Democrat and
Republican, who believed that these policies were legal and
constitutional. There was no personal gain for these companies. To
allow them to be subjected to lawsuits for answering the Nation's call
in time of great peril is mean-spirited, vindictive and shortsighted.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge defeat of this misguided legislation.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to recognize the chairman of the
Crime Subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia, for 3 minutes.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding and appreciate his leadership in efforts to address
warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, or FISA, and for introducing a bill that corrects many of the
shortcomings of the bill that passed the House last August.
The RESTORE Act establishes a strong framework, much stronger than
the administration's bill, to fight terrorism effectively, while
providing reasonable safeguards to protect personal privacy. There are
several important clarifications made in the bill.
One important change draws the appropriate distinctions based on
physical location and types of targets. There has never been any
controversy over the fact that surveillance directed at people, all of
whom are overseas, you don't need a warrant in that situation.
The second is that the bill removes vague and overbroad language in
the bill that passed last August that would allow wiretapping of
conversations without a warrant if the communication was concerning a
foreign target. That by its own wording suggests that if two citizens
are in the United States talking about someone overseas, you could
wiretap their communications without a warrant. The bill before us
makes it clear that the persons involved in the conversation must be
overseas, not just that the subject of the conversation must be
overseas.
Third, the RESTORE Act goes a step further than the administration's
bill and only allows expanded wiretapping authority in cases involving
foreign intelligence unless it relates specifically to national
security, as opposed to the overexpansive nature of foreign
intelligence. Foreign intelligence can include anything, a trade deal
or anything of general foreign affairs activities. If you are talking
about national security, let's talk about national security.
Finally, the RESTORE Act was made even stronger in the committee by
requiring the Department of Justice in its application to the court to
specify the primary purpose of the wiretapping. Under FISA, when an
agent wanted to obtain a warrant, he had to certify the purpose of the
wiretap. The standard was altered in the PATRIOT Act which says it only
has to be a significant purpose.
We have to put this change in context because the Department of
Justice has not credibly refuted the allegations that some U.S.
Attorneys were fired because they failed to indict Democrats in time to
affect an upcoming election. So if the Department of Justice wiretapped
someone when foreign intelligence is not the primary purpose, you have
to wonder what the primary purpose is. This bill would require the
administration to reveal the true purpose of the wiretap.
Mr. Speaker, in the fight against terrorism, we do not have to
sacrifice constitutional protections or trust this administration to
secretly protect the rights of Americans without public accountability.
It is important to note that everything that the administration can do
in its own bill it can do under this bill. We just require them to get
a warrant before they do it or get a warrant after they do it if they
are in a hurry, but they can wiretap and get the information. We just
provide a little modicum of oversight to ensure that the laws are being
obeyed.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), the ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism
and Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, as you listen to this debate and those
watching at home listen to it, the only thing that they hear are
Democrats saying one thing and Republicans saying another thing. They
don't know who to believe. They listen to the debate and they hear
hatred of the Presidency and hatred of Republicans. But, Mr. Speaker,
we just invite you today, take a moment and a breath and put all of
that hatred on the shelf for just a second, and to remember that the
Director of National Intelligence, not an appointee from President Bush
but from President Clinton, has stated that their approach will be
devastating to the intelligence-gathering capability of the United
States.
Mr. Speaker, here are the facts that we know. In the late 1990s, we
cut intelligence. Then we had 9/11 where we had the worst terrorist
attack to ever hit our shores. Since that time, regardless of who did
it and deserves the credit, we have not had a major terrorist attack
hit the United States, and now we are trying to repeat the cycle and
cut intelligence-gathering capability again. We all know what is going
to happen if, and some would say when, another terrorist attack hits.
We are going to bring law enforcement in and we are going to point our
finger at them and say: Why didn't you stop it?
Mr. Speaker, just recently we had one of our NFL football coaches get
in trouble because he was trying to steal the signals of an opposing
team. Everyone argued and agreed that wasn't fair. And they were right;
but that was a game. Mr. Speaker, in this particular situation it is
not a game. We don't want a fair fight. We want to steal every signal
we can from enemies who are trying to harm this Nation, and we want to
know what they are doing before they do it so we can protect and defend
this country.
Mr. Speaker, I just invite us to take the hatred off the shelf, take
the rhetoric off the shelf, and to exchange it for ration and reason so
we can do what we need to do to gather the intelligence to keep our
people safe.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), a fellow Vietnam veteran, a
member of the House Intelligence Committee.
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, first I support this bill. It is a good
bill, and it protects the Constitution.
I would like to speak principally to my colleagues who, like me, are
concerned about what the bill does and the fact that it does not
address fully the issue of carrier liability. As you know, the
administration and telecommunication companies have requested that we
provide them with immunity from lawsuits or prosecutions arising out of
information and assistance they may have provided to the intelligence
community.
Now, we don't precisely know what information they have provided. We
don't know what they were told by the administration about the legality
of what they were doing. I hope and believe those companies acted in
good faith with patriotism. They were trying to do their part for
national security, and I think they deserve our appreciation. I take
seriously their concerns that they might be subject to liability.
That being said, I don't believe it should be the responsibility of
the telecommunications companies to prove that they provided the
information in a legal way if the Federal Government fails to meet the
burden of proof that the demand or request for information is brought
forth in a legal manner. If that burden of proof is not met, it should
be the government that should be held primarily accountable.
I believe that eventually we should be able to take care of any
company who acted in good faith and cooperated in the name of
protecting our Nation.

[[Page H11666]]

No one who acted out of good faith with a desire to protect America
should be punished. But we must know what brought forth their action,
and under what circumstances, and what pressure, if any, they acted. As
this process moves forward, I expect to get more information from the
administration on their generation of the demands or requests for
information. Support the bill.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague
and the former district judge from Texas (Mr. Gohmert), who is also the
deputy ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. GOHMERT. I thank the ranking member.
I appreciate Chairman Reyes' service to this country. I believe
people on the other side of the aisle mean well when they say they want
to protect the Constitution. The problem is this extends the
Constitution beyond America to our enemies on foreign soil who cut off
heads of Americans. That's just the way it is. It does that.
Now, we keep hearing across the aisle: This has nothing to do with
foreign-to-foreign calls; it has nothing to do with foreign terrorists
on foreign soil calling foreign terrorists, and it says that in the
bill. You don't have to worry about that. You don't need a warrant for
that.
The trouble is there is no conceivable time that an honest
intelligence gatherer overseas can swear that a foreign terrorist that
he wants to surveil will never under any circumstances call the United
States. Since he can't swear to that and since there is a chance,
especially since this law is public and the terrorists will know all
they need to do is call America, order flowers, call time and
temperature, they have made a call on American soil and they come
within the requirement of getting a court order. It is very clear.
This doesn't extend the Constitution in a way that it should be on
American soil. It protects enemies. I know people on the other side,
you just want to protect civil liberties, but what scares me is what
will happen when a terrorist attack in the nature of 9/11 comes again.
People will rush to take away civil liberties, and people will
voluntarily give up civil liberties for protection, liberties that were
so hard fought.
So for those who are really going to be protected, I don't understand
the concern. This is going to protect also Americans who get calls from
foreign terrorists on foreign soil. That is what this is really going
to do.
I don't think it is too much in the interest of America, tell your
American friends to tell their terrorist friends on foreign soil, don't
call me, use some other means of communication.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to recognize the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) whose experience in
intelligence matters and FISA in particular are well known, and I yield
to her 2\1/2\ minutes.

{time} 1300

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Conyers for yielding to me
and commend him, Chairman Reyes, and others for their work on this
bill.
Though I no longer serve on the Intelligence Committee, I have
followed this issue with intense interest. This bill contains many
provisions that I and others authored over recent years. It is a strong
bill and I strongly support it.
It amends FISA to permit more speed and agility in the effort to
conduct surveillance of those who would do us harm, but it also
provides more resources in a court-approved framework to assure that
the constitutional rights of Americans are protected.
I continue to follow the intelligence in my role as Chair of the
Homeland Security Intelligence Subcommittee, and threats against our
homeland are real. Westerners are training in al Qaeda camps in the
tribal areas of Pakistan. Europe, especially Britain, may experience
more attacks. Plots have recently been foiled in Denmark and Germany.
We helped Britain disrupt the so-called ``liquid bomb plot'' in August
of 2006, a plot that could have killed more Americans than were killed
on 9/11 as they flew on U.S.-bound airlines from England.
Mr. Speaker, all Members want to protect America. All Members want to
protect America. So it deeply saddens me that this is yet another
partisan debate. It could have been otherwise.
For several weeks, Pete Hoekstra, who chaired the Intelligence
Committee when I was privileged to serve as ranking member, and I tried
to fashion a bipartisan bill. Our list of principles could, I believe,
have garnered broad support in both caucuses and led to a veto-proof
majority in this House.
Americans want Congress on a bipartisan basis to assure we disrupt
plots to harm us and protect our Constitution. We could do both and we
must do both. This is a strong bill. It does both. Vote ``aye.''
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the
RESTORE Act, which reauthorizes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
program. As a Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I am
deeply troubled that the majority has determined to handcuff the
ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to collect foreign
intelligence information.
Forgive me for stating the obvious, but ladies and gentleman, we are
at war. We should be helping the IC in their efforts to protect
Americans and fight the war on terror; this legislation needlessly ties
our hands in collecting foreign intelligence information.
Here are a few of the problems with this bill: No liability
protection for the telecommunications companies who have responded to
the IC's call for help since the 9/11 attacks; extends constitutional
(4th Amendment) protections for terrorists by requiring FISA court
approval to monitor individuals outside the U.S.; new and cumbersome
FISA court guidelines for IC operations; Justice Department audits of
IC activities and operations; onerous and duplicative reporting
requirements by the DNI; and the list goes on . . . .
Mr. Speaker, under this legislation, the Majority has made it clear
that our Intelligence agencies should be guided by the tenants of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) when monitoring terrorist
activity.
This policy is reckless and I urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. BACA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ask for support of the RESTORE
Act. It provides important tools to support U.S. intelligence gathering
efforts and protects against terrorists. And it does so while
safeguarding Americans' civil liberties.
I hope that as the legislative process plays out, the issue of
carrier immunity is dealt with in a manner that will facilitate
cooperation. Obtaining intelligence to protect our country against
terrorists is the ultimate goal and this bill does this in a fair and
balanced manner. Innocent Americans will have stronger protections and
the intelligence needed to protect our country will not be compromised.
Accountability is always a good thing.
We will have much needed congressional oversight, compliance reports
from the Attorney General and audit reports by the Inspector General of
the Department of Justice.
The RESTORE Act is a great balance and a positive move in the right
direction.
Please support this important legislation.
Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Speaker, while I am pleased to stand here today and
support the RESTORE Act of 2007 because I believe it is critical as
part of our nation's defense, I urge us to work together in the coming
weeks to end the uncertainty facing some of our corporate citizens in
dealing with the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalists.
Particularly, I am referring to our nation's telecommunications
carriers, companies that historically have been a critical piece of our
successful national security apparatus. These U.S. companies, who
combined employ well over half a million Americans, should be treated
with appreciation for the cooperation they display in the effort to
keep our people safe.
In the confusion and muddied backdrop of the debate, what has clearly
been left aside is the longstanding and consistent policy of Congress
and the courts that governs the way these companies may lawfully
provide assistance to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This
policy is that telecommunications carriers are authorized to assist
government agencies in a wide variety of circumstances; public policy
encourages such cooperation; and, consistent with that policy, when a
carrier cooperates in good faith with a duly authorized request for
assistance, the carrier is immune from liability to third-parties. In
the interest of our nation's security, these carriers should continue
to have immunity when cooperating in good faith.
We must work together over the coming weeks to clarify the role of
carriers in this debate, and specifically offer the appropriate path to
immunity when such highly sensitive matters are involved.
Telecommunications carriers are nothing less than patriotic citizens
fulfilling their role in our global struggle against terrorism.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution
746, further proceedings on the bill will be postponed.

____________________