[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 150 (Thursday, October 4, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12767-S12768]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a challenge
facing our military forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. These
forces are facing an urgent need for a precision indirect fire munition
organic to the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams and Stryker Brigade Combat
Teams.
In the last 3 months there have been two Operational Needs Statements
submitted by the units deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. I have
included these statements for the Record. Both of these documents
highlight the urgent need to field a precision capability for the 120mm
mortar: the main, and in some cases the only, indirect fire support
available to our infantry in the close fight.
The commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps wrote in July:
This capability is critically needed within the next 12
months. As troop levels in theater begin to drop, our units
can not afford to miss any opportunities to kill the enemy
due to lack of organic precision indirect fire. Without it,
IBCT's must resort to: slower reinforcing fires; committing
soldiers to an assault; or missing the opportunity
altogether.
In August the Commander of Joint Fires in Afghanistan described the
problem starkly:
The Rules of Engagement for the Afghanistan Theater of
Operations limits the use of conventional artillery and
mortar projectiles in support of combat operations. Recently,
COMISAF restricted all preparatory fires and pre-assault
fires to precision guided munitions and systems. Currently,
Afghanistan requires two Light Brigade Combat teams with no
organic surface precision strike capability. Our enemy takes
advantage of that gap by hiding among the local populace.
Additionally, the COIN environment in Afghanistan requires
the minimization of collateral damage.
Both of these field commanders specifically call for the fielding of
precision guided mortars for the existing 120mm mortar system as
quickly as possible.
It is my understanding that since the precision guided mortar
munition, PGMM, fell prey to the Army budget cutters, the program has
demonstrated remarkable test results. In fact, I thank the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee for rejecting the Army's request to
reprogram additional funding away from PGMM.
I ask that the subcommittee continue to carry this item forward to be
considered as part of a final conference report or supplemental,
pending the results of ongoing Army reviews of the program.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the two documents which I
referred to be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Department of the Army,
Fort Bragg, NC, July 19, 2007.
Memorandum thru Commander, United States Army Forces Command
(AFCS), 1777 Hardee Ave, SW., Fort McPherson, GA 30330-
1062.
For Headqurters, Department of the Army (DAMO-RQ), 400 Army
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0400.
Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for Organic
Precision Indirect for Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
(IBCT).
1. Reference: Memorandum, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort
Bragg, AFZA-CG, 21 November 2005, subject: ONS for Improved
105mm Projectiles.
2. Unit Identification Code (UIC): WAUKAA.
3. Ship to Address: Building 2-1138, Macomb and Hamilton
Streets, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310.
4. Problem: Termination of the Precision Guided Mortar
Munition (PGMM) has left IBCTs without the organic precision
indirect capability. In our current environment, our enemy
takes advantage of that gap by hiding among the local
populace. The tasks of finding, fixing, and killing or
capturing the enemy must be executed in rapid sucession or
the opportunity is lost. Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT)
and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) have organic option
(Excalibur) available; the IBCTs do not.
5. Justification:
a. The IBCTs' requirement for organic precision indirect
munitions is well documented. There is an approved
requirement for PGMM. The Army Field Artillery School is now
writing a requirement document for a precision guided 105mm
munition. This headquarters submitted an ONS for a precision
guided 105mm munition.
b. Lacking the required accuracy, IBCT's howitzers and
mortars remain silent while the IBCTs' headquarters request
GMLRS, close air support, or fires from an adjacent HBCT or
SBCT. Coordinating and directing fires through multiple
levels of commands consumes time and opportunity. Direct fire
missile systems (ITAS and JAVELIN) do not meet this
requirement due to their limited range and precision.
c. This capability is critically needed within the next 12
months. As troop levels in theater begin to drop, our units
cannot afford to miss any opportunity to kill the enemy due
to lack of organic precision indirect fire. Without it, IBCTs
must resort to: slower reinforcing fires; committing Soldiers
to an assault; or missing the opportunity altogether.
6. System Characteristics: Organic precision indirect
capability must: be organic to the IBCT and use existing
assets (i.e. mortars and howitzers); have accuracy consistent
with the Excalibur or GMLRS; have at least the range of the
current M120 120mm Mortar; and in the objective capability,
should have both GPS and laser guidance.
7. Operational Concept: An organic precision indirect
munition will allow comanders to engage targets in
environments that ordinarily require putting Soldiers and
non-combatants in harms way or cause unnecessary collateral
damage.
8. Organization Concept: The organic mortar platoons or
artillery battalion will fire this munition.
9. Support Requirements: If a munition uses laser guidance,
then there must be a corresponding increase in laser
designators. Full MTOE authorization, not Force Feasibility
Review sourcing levels, of the Lightweight Laser Designator
Rangefinder (LLDR) and M707 Knight is required to make a
laser guided capability viable.
10. Availability: Before its termination, the PGMM met the
requirement. There are also 105mm precision munitions
available.
11. Recommendation: Field an organic precision indirect
munition to deploying IBCTs within 12 months.
12. Point of contact is LTC Greg Rawlings, ACofS, G7 at DSN
236-9485, Commercial (910) 396-9485, or email:
[email protected].
Lloyd J. Austin III,
LTG, USA, Commanding.
____
Department of Defense,
Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, August 17, 2007.
Memorandum thru Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component
Command (CFLCC), C3. Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09304
For HQDA (DAMO-CIC), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-
0400
Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Fielding
of Precision Guided 105mm Howitzer and 120mm Mortar
Projectiles in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 07-
09.
1. Unit Identification Code (UIC) is W91M2D.
2. Ship to address: (W91M2D) Joy O'Brian, C4ISR CECOM RSC
(MANTECH) Thomas Fuller Compound, Bagram Airfield,
Afghanistan, APO AE 09354
3. Problem: The Rules of Engagement for the Afghanistan
Theater of Operations limits the use of conventional
artillery and mortar projectiles in support of combat
operations. Recently, COMISAF restricted all preparatory
fires and pre-assault fires to precision guided munitions and
systems. Currently Afghanistan requires two Light Brigade
Combat Teams with no organic surface to surface precision
strike capability. Our enemy takes advantage of that gap by
hiding among the local populace. Additionally, the COIN
environment in Afghanistan requires a minimization of
collateral damage whenever joint fires are employed.
4. Justification:
a. In order to meet theater ROE requirements for precision
guidance and provide our maneuver commanders with a dedicated
105mm and 120mm capability that minimizes collateral damage,
precision munitions for both the M119A2 and 120mm Mortar are
required.
b. The addition of the 105mm and 120mm PGM will give
commanders a more prolific economy of force. Currently the
limited Close Air Support (CAS) platforms are the only asset
with the ability to fire precision guided munitions. This
ability will give the BCT commanders the capability to strike
a
[[Page S12768]]
target where time is sensitive or awaiting CAS to arrive on
station will encumber a mission's accomplishment. This
capacity will minimize the number of CAS sorties from being
pulled from its original mission, thus economizing force.
c. CJTF-82's acquisition of 105mm/120mm PGMs will minimize
the volume of fire that is required to destroy a target with
surface to surface unguided munitions. Within a three day
period the average amount of munitions fired within the two
BCTs battlespace are: 97 high explosive 105mm rounds and 72
high explosive 120mm rounds. These PGM munitions will
ultimately reduce the amount of munitions required to destroy
targets. Providing commanders with precision strikes that
need no adjustment while lessening the amount of ammunition
resupply missions.
d. These precision guided munitions would provide CJTF-82
with a dedicated capability to attack various target sets
with precision by all of its major organic artillery and
mortar systems. The increased accuracy and effectiveness of
these munitions would provide the ground commander the
ability to employ fires in support of MOUT and troops in
close proximity of enemy forces while decreasing the
possibility of collateral damage.
5. System Characteristics: While several variants of
precision guided munitions are in the testing and development
phase for the 105mm howitzer and the 120mm mortar, a low
circular error probable (CEP) would be required for any
fielded munitions. Additionally, the nature of operations in
theater would require any precision guided munitions to use
both GPS based guidance system and laser guidance.
6. Operational Concept: The employment of these munitions
would be at numerous forward operating bases and combat
outposts cross the CJOA. This operational concept would
enhance the ground commanders' ability to conduct all weather
precision strikes against the enemy positions in keeping with
ISAF's restrictions on the use of indirect fires.
7. Organizational Concept: The 105mm howitzer precision
guided munitions will be issued to the field artillery and
battalions of each brigade combat team to support maneuver
elements with precision guided fires while minimizing of
collateral damage. The 120mm mortar precision guided
munitions will be issued to the battalions who own battle
space within each brigade combat team to support their
maneuver elements with precision guided fires while
minimizing of collateral damage
8. Procurement Objective: CJTF-82 urgently requests the
immediate procurement and fielding of these munitions in
order to meet COMISAF's restrictions for the application of
Joint Fires within the CJOA and provide organic indirect fire
support with precision strike capability for all maneuver
elements conducting combat operations in Afghanistan.
9. Support Requirements:
a. If a munition uses laser guidance, then there must be a
corresponding increase in laser designators. Full MTOE
authorization, not Force Feasibility Review sourcing levels,
of the Lightweight Laser Designator (LLDR) and M707 Knight is
required to make a laser guided capability viable.
b. CJTF-82 would require initial contractor and mobile
training team (MTT) support for this rapid fielding.
10. Availability: Production and fielding of the
projectiles is currently in the RDTE phase. These munitions
are not Army programs of record.
11. Recommendation: The Department of the Army approves and
endorses the procurement and rapid fielding of a Precision
Guided Munitions for the 105 mm howitzer and 120mm mortar in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom 07-09.
12. The point of contact for this memorandum is MAJ Kelly
Webster, CJ3 Chief of Fires, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan,
Kelly.I.[email protected], DSN 318-231-4024.
Mark A. Murray, COL. FA,
Joint Fires and Effects Coordinator.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today I filed an amendment which would
appropriate the necessary funds to require the Department of Homeland
Security to develop a pilot program to test entry document verification
technology. This technology allows border agents to quickly check
travel document such as drivers' licenses, passports, and visas against
a stored database of legitimate domestic and international travel
documents. L1 Communications, a company with a plant in Wilmington, MA,
is helping produce this technology and would be an eligible company for
this funding.
The 9/11 Commission Report stated that ``for terrorists, travel
documents are as important as weapons.'' The report concluded that
``better technology and training to detect terrorist travel documents
are the most important immediate steps to reduce America's
vulnerability to clandestine entry.'' It recommended that the
Government develop a strategy to thwart terrorist travel that would
incorporate better document authentication technology. Unfortunately,
the technology that Customs and Border Protection, CBP, uses to
authenticate travel documents is no better now than on 9/11.
The absence of advanced document authentication technology often
forces border agents to eyeball travel documents--a makeshift approach
that has proven to be inadequate. In 2006, investigators with the
Governmental Accountability Office, GAO, were able to enter the United
States from Canada and Mexico by showing CBP agents counterfeit
drivers' licenses and an expired, altered U.S. diplomatic passport. The
GAO used commercially available computer software to produce its travel
documents. Amazingly, the GAO found that it was easier for its
investigators to cross into the United States using fake travel
documents than during an identical 2003 investigation. The GAO is
currently drafting a followup report that will cite automated document
authentication technology as a method to improve border security.
My amendment requires DHS to develop a pilot program to test
automated document authentication technology at various ports of entry
within 6 months. This technology is already widely used by domestic
agencies, including the Coast Guard, NASA, and the Capitol Police, as
well as by foreign governments, such as Australia, Japan, and Sweden.
Referring to the 9/11 hijackers, the Commission reported that
``analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns
could have allowed authorities to intercept 4 to 15 hijackers.''
We must not allow another 9/11. At a time when protecting our
homeland against terrorists and other illicit actors remains the
paramount national security priority, I believe it is critical that we
implement this pilot program to test widely available document
authentication technology.
____________________