[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 150 (Thursday, October 4, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12767-S12768]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS

  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a challenge 
facing our military forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. These 
forces are facing an urgent need for a precision indirect fire munition 
organic to the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams and Stryker Brigade Combat 
Teams.
  In the last 3 months there have been two Operational Needs Statements 
submitted by the units deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. I have 
included these statements for the Record. Both of these documents 
highlight the urgent need to field a precision capability for the 120mm 
mortar: the main, and in some cases the only, indirect fire support 
available to our infantry in the close fight.
  The commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps wrote in July:

       This capability is critically needed within the next 12 
     months. As troop levels in theater begin to drop, our units 
     can not afford to miss any opportunities to kill the enemy 
     due to lack of organic precision indirect fire. Without it, 
     IBCT's must resort to: slower reinforcing fires; committing 
     soldiers to an assault; or missing the opportunity 
     altogether.

  In August the Commander of Joint Fires in Afghanistan described the 
problem starkly:

       The Rules of Engagement for the Afghanistan Theater of 
     Operations limits the use of conventional artillery and 
     mortar projectiles in support of combat operations. Recently, 
     COMISAF restricted all preparatory fires and pre-assault 
     fires to precision guided munitions and systems. Currently, 
     Afghanistan requires two Light Brigade Combat teams with no 
     organic surface precision strike capability. Our enemy takes 
     advantage of that gap by hiding among the local populace. 
     Additionally, the COIN environment in Afghanistan requires 
     the minimization of collateral damage.

  Both of these field commanders specifically call for the fielding of 
precision guided mortars for the existing 120mm mortar system as 
quickly as possible.
  It is my understanding that since the precision guided mortar 
munition, PGMM, fell prey to the Army budget cutters, the program has 
demonstrated remarkable test results. In fact, I thank the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee for rejecting the Army's request to 
reprogram additional funding away from PGMM.
  I ask that the subcommittee continue to carry this item forward to be 
considered as part of a final conference report or supplemental, 
pending the results of ongoing Army reviews of the program.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the two documents which I 
referred to be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                       Department of the Army,

                                    Fort Bragg, NC, July 19, 2007.
     Memorandum thru Commander, United States Army Forces Command 
         (AFCS), 1777 Hardee Ave, SW., Fort McPherson, GA 30330-
         1062.
     For Headqurters, Department of the Army (DAMO-RQ), 400 Army 
         Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0400.
     Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for Organic 
         Precision Indirect for Infantry Brigade Combat Teams 
         (IBCT).
       1. Reference: Memorandum, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort 
     Bragg, AFZA-CG, 21 November 2005, subject: ONS for Improved 
     105mm Projectiles.
       2. Unit Identification Code (UIC): WAUKAA.
       3. Ship to Address: Building 2-1138, Macomb and Hamilton 
     Streets, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310.
       4. Problem: Termination of the Precision Guided Mortar 
     Munition (PGMM) has left IBCTs without the organic precision 
     indirect capability. In our current environment, our enemy 
     takes advantage of that gap by hiding among the local 
     populace. The tasks of finding, fixing, and killing or 
     capturing the enemy must be executed in rapid sucession or 
     the opportunity is lost. Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) 
     and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) have organic option 
     (Excalibur) available; the IBCTs do not.
       5. Justification:
       a. The IBCTs' requirement for organic precision indirect 
     munitions is well documented. There is an approved 
     requirement for PGMM. The Army Field Artillery School is now 
     writing a requirement document for a precision guided 105mm 
     munition. This headquarters submitted an ONS for a precision 
     guided 105mm munition.
       b. Lacking the required accuracy, IBCT's howitzers and 
     mortars remain silent while the IBCTs' headquarters request 
     GMLRS, close air support, or fires from an adjacent HBCT or 
     SBCT. Coordinating and directing fires through multiple 
     levels of commands consumes time and opportunity. Direct fire 
     missile systems (ITAS and JAVELIN) do not meet this 
     requirement due to their limited range and precision.
       c. This capability is critically needed within the next 12 
     months. As troop levels in theater begin to drop, our units 
     cannot afford to miss any opportunity to kill the enemy due 
     to lack of organic precision indirect fire. Without it, IBCTs 
     must resort to: slower reinforcing fires; committing Soldiers 
     to an assault; or missing the opportunity altogether.
       6. System Characteristics: Organic precision indirect 
     capability must: be organic to the IBCT and use existing 
     assets (i.e. mortars and howitzers); have accuracy consistent 
     with the Excalibur or GMLRS; have at least the range of the 
     current M120 120mm Mortar; and in the objective capability, 
     should have both GPS and laser guidance.
       7. Operational Concept: An organic precision indirect 
     munition will allow comanders to engage targets in 
     environments that ordinarily require putting Soldiers and 
     non-combatants in harms way or cause unnecessary collateral 
     damage.
       8. Organization Concept: The organic mortar platoons or 
     artillery battalion will fire this munition.
       9. Support Requirements: If a munition uses laser guidance, 
     then there must be a corresponding increase in laser 
     designators. Full MTOE authorization, not Force Feasibility 
     Review sourcing levels, of the Lightweight Laser Designator 
     Rangefinder (LLDR) and M707 Knight is required to make a 
     laser guided capability viable.
       10. Availability: Before its termination, the PGMM met the 
     requirement. There are also 105mm precision munitions 
     available.
       11. Recommendation: Field an organic precision indirect 
     munition to deploying IBCTs within 12 months.
       12. Point of contact is LTC Greg Rawlings, ACofS, G7 at DSN 
     236-9485, Commercial (910) 396-9485, or email: 
     [email protected].
                                              Lloyd J. Austin III,
     LTG, USA, Commanding.
                                  ____



                                        Department of Defense,

                    Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, August 17, 2007.
     Memorandum thru Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component 
         Command (CFLCC), C3. Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09304
     For HQDA (DAMO-CIC), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-
         0400
     Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Fielding 
         of Precision Guided 105mm Howitzer and 120mm Mortar 
         Projectiles in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 07-
         09.
       1. Unit Identification Code (UIC) is W91M2D.
       2. Ship to address: (W91M2D) Joy O'Brian, C4ISR CECOM RSC 
     (MANTECH) Thomas Fuller Compound, Bagram Airfield, 
     Afghanistan, APO AE 09354
       3. Problem: The Rules of Engagement for the Afghanistan 
     Theater of Operations limits the use of conventional 
     artillery and mortar projectiles in support of combat 
     operations. Recently, COMISAF restricted all preparatory 
     fires and pre-assault fires to precision guided munitions and 
     systems. Currently Afghanistan requires two Light Brigade 
     Combat Teams with no organic surface to surface precision 
     strike capability. Our enemy takes advantage of that gap by 
     hiding among the local populace. Additionally, the COIN 
     environment in Afghanistan requires a minimization of 
     collateral damage whenever joint fires are employed.
       4. Justification:
       a. In order to meet theater ROE requirements for precision 
     guidance and provide our maneuver commanders with a dedicated 
     105mm and 120mm capability that minimizes collateral damage, 
     precision munitions for both the M119A2 and 120mm Mortar are 
     required.
       b. The addition of the 105mm and 120mm PGM will give 
     commanders a more prolific economy of force. Currently the 
     limited Close Air Support (CAS) platforms are the only asset 
     with the ability to fire precision guided munitions. This 
     ability will give the BCT commanders the capability to strike 
     a

[[Page S12768]]

     target where time is sensitive or awaiting CAS to arrive on 
     station will encumber a mission's accomplishment. This 
     capacity will minimize the number of CAS sorties from being 
     pulled from its original mission, thus economizing force.
       c. CJTF-82's acquisition of 105mm/120mm PGMs will minimize 
     the volume of fire that is required to destroy a target with 
     surface to surface unguided munitions. Within a three day 
     period the average amount of munitions fired within the two 
     BCTs battlespace are: 97 high explosive 105mm rounds and 72 
     high explosive 120mm rounds. These PGM munitions will 
     ultimately reduce the amount of munitions required to destroy 
     targets. Providing commanders with precision strikes that 
     need no adjustment while lessening the amount of ammunition 
     resupply missions.
       d. These precision guided munitions would provide CJTF-82 
     with a dedicated capability to attack various target sets 
     with precision by all of its major organic artillery and 
     mortar systems. The increased accuracy and effectiveness of 
     these munitions would provide the ground commander the 
     ability to employ fires in support of MOUT and troops in 
     close proximity of enemy forces while decreasing the 
     possibility of collateral damage.
       5. System Characteristics: While several variants of 
     precision guided munitions are in the testing and development 
     phase for the 105mm howitzer and the 120mm mortar, a low 
     circular error probable (CEP) would be required for any 
     fielded munitions. Additionally, the nature of operations in 
     theater would require any precision guided munitions to use 
     both GPS based guidance system and laser guidance.
       6. Operational Concept: The employment of these munitions 
     would be at numerous forward operating bases and combat 
     outposts cross the CJOA. This operational concept would 
     enhance the ground commanders' ability to conduct all weather 
     precision strikes against the enemy positions in keeping with 
     ISAF's restrictions on the use of indirect fires.
       7. Organizational Concept: The 105mm howitzer precision 
     guided munitions will be issued to the field artillery and 
     battalions of each brigade combat team to support maneuver 
     elements with precision guided fires while minimizing of 
     collateral damage. The 120mm mortar precision guided 
     munitions will be issued to the battalions who own battle 
     space within each brigade combat team to support their 
     maneuver elements with precision guided fires while 
     minimizing of collateral damage
       8. Procurement Objective: CJTF-82 urgently requests the 
     immediate procurement and fielding of these munitions in 
     order to meet COMISAF's restrictions for the application of 
     Joint Fires within the CJOA and provide organic indirect fire 
     support with precision strike capability for all maneuver 
     elements conducting combat operations in Afghanistan.
       9. Support Requirements:
       a. If a munition uses laser guidance, then there must be a 
     corresponding increase in laser designators. Full MTOE 
     authorization, not Force Feasibility Review sourcing levels, 
     of the Lightweight Laser Designator (LLDR) and M707 Knight is 
     required to make a laser guided capability viable.
       b. CJTF-82 would require initial contractor and mobile 
     training team (MTT) support for this rapid fielding.
       10. Availability: Production and fielding of the 
     projectiles is currently in the RDTE phase. These munitions 
     are not Army programs of record.
       11. Recommendation: The Department of the Army approves and 
     endorses the procurement and rapid fielding of a Precision 
     Guided Munitions for the 105 mm howitzer and 120mm mortar in 
     support of Operation Enduring Freedom 07-09.
       12. The point of contact for this memorandum is MAJ Kelly 
     Webster, CJ3 Chief of Fires, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, 
     Kelly.I.[email protected], DSN 318-231-4024.
                                          Mark A. Murray, COL. FA,
                              Joint Fires and Effects Coordinator.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today I filed an amendment which would 
appropriate the necessary funds to require the Department of Homeland 
Security to develop a pilot program to test entry document verification 
technology. This technology allows border agents to quickly check 
travel document such as drivers' licenses, passports, and visas against 
a stored database of legitimate domestic and international travel 
documents. L1 Communications, a company with a plant in Wilmington, MA, 
is helping produce this technology and would be an eligible company for 
this funding.
  The 9/11 Commission Report stated that ``for terrorists, travel 
documents are as important as weapons.'' The report concluded that 
``better technology and training to detect terrorist travel documents 
are the most important immediate steps to reduce America's 
vulnerability to clandestine entry.'' It recommended that the 
Government develop a strategy to thwart terrorist travel that would 
incorporate better document authentication technology. Unfortunately, 
the technology that Customs and Border Protection, CBP, uses to 
authenticate travel documents is no better now than on 9/11.
  The absence of advanced document authentication technology often 
forces border agents to eyeball travel documents--a makeshift approach 
that has proven to be inadequate. In 2006, investigators with the 
Governmental Accountability Office, GAO, were able to enter the United 
States from Canada and Mexico by showing CBP agents counterfeit 
drivers' licenses and an expired, altered U.S. diplomatic passport. The 
GAO used commercially available computer software to produce its travel 
documents. Amazingly, the GAO found that it was easier for its 
investigators to cross into the United States using fake travel 
documents than during an identical 2003 investigation. The GAO is 
currently drafting a followup report that will cite automated document 
authentication technology as a method to improve border security.
  My amendment requires DHS to develop a pilot program to test 
automated document authentication technology at various ports of entry 
within 6 months. This technology is already widely used by domestic 
agencies, including the Coast Guard, NASA, and the Capitol Police, as 
well as by foreign governments, such as Australia, Japan, and Sweden. 
Referring to the 9/11 hijackers, the Commission reported that 
``analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns 
could have allowed authorities to intercept 4 to 15 hijackers.''
  We must not allow another 9/11. At a time when protecting our 
homeland against terrorists and other illicit actors remains the 
paramount national security priority, I believe it is critical that we 
implement this pilot program to test widely available document 
authentication technology.

                          ____________________