[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 149 (Wednesday, October 3, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12477-S12479]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAQ
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, last week a group of us, both Senators
and Members of the House, Republicans and Democrats, had the
opportunity to sit down with Frederick Kagan, who is a fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute, and listen to his comments about where
we are with respect to Iraq.
At the end of that very illuminating session, he gave us each a copy
of a new report that he has authored called ``No Middle Way, The
Challenge of Exit Strategies from Iraq.'' The report is too long for me
to ask consent that it be printed in the Record, but I recommend it to
all my colleagues. It is one of the most thorough and thoughtful
examinations of where we are in Iraq I have seen. I will be quoting
from it, but I wish to make a few observations about the situation in
Iraq before I do.
The Iraq debate seems to be mired down in arguments about past
decisions and whether they were right. These kinds of arguments are
useful, and they are particularly useful in the hands of historians who
are reviewing an entire situation from a vantage point of years
afterward, but they are not necessarily that valuable as we are
addressing the question of what do we do now.
If I can play the historian for a moment and give examples of how we
have entered into conflicts and seen the situation on the ground change
and, therefore, strategies change, let me go back to the Revolutionary
War. At the time of the Revolutionary War, the original strategies the
Commander in Chief, George Washington, applied didn't work. Indeed, the
Continental Army was defeated again and again and
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again by the British troops, and Washington was forced to acknowledge
that his original strategic decisions were the wrong ones. This did not
mean we lost the war because Washington adjusted to the conditions on
the ground, adopted new strategies, and ended up winning the war.
In the Civil War, when Abraham Lincoln made the decision to provision
Fort Sumter, he did not understand how long the war would last, how
difficult it would be, how much life and treasure it would claim. He
was forced to change again and again in reaction to the results that
came from the battlefield.
In Iraq, we made some decisions based on intelligence at the time
which have proved to be wrong. Spending our time in this Chamber
arguing over those decisions instead of recognizing how conditions have
changed on the ground becomes a self-defeating exercise.
As I look at the decisions that were made prior to the decision to go
into Iraq, the one that strikes me as being the most significant was
our failure to understand the degree to which Saddam Hussein had
destroyed that country, not just physically, not just in terms of its
infrastructure but psychologically.
We believed there were Iraqis who could step forward and lead a
resurgence of that country if we simply freed them from the heavy hand
of Saddam Hussein. That was a false belief. We found Iraqis so
shattered by 37 years of one of the most brutal dictatorships we have
ever seen that the leadership vacuum was huge. For us now to spend our
time saying, well, we made the mistake, therefore we have to cure the
mistake by getting out, is to ignore the conditions on the ground that
have evolved as a result of getting into the war in the first place.
Mr. Kagan makes the point that there is no middle way. We are trying
to find a middle way in these Chambers. There are those who say the
only way is to withdraw immediately, and there are others who say, no,
the only way is to stay the course. That phrase has been hackneyed; it
doesn't work anymore. So it is natural for many of us to say: Let's
find some middle way. Let's stay in there somewhat, but let's eliminate
a good portion of the American footprint in Iraq and see if that
doesn't help us get out without absolute withdrawal.
Mr. Kagan makes the point that the conditions on the ground rule out
such a middle way. I find his arguments persuasive, and I would like to
share some of them with my colleagues today.
He looks not at the question of did Saddam Hussein have anything to
do with 9/11, a question we hear debated a great deal. He says: Is al-
Qaida engaged now in Iraq? The answer is overwhelmingly yes. Whether
al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein had any ties prior to our invasion in Iraq
is now irrelevant. Al-Qaida is in Iraq. Al-Qaida is a major player in
Iraq.
There are those who say Iran is the major threat, and we should be
looking at Iran. He points out that Iran is very much involved in Iraq
at the present time. These are the conditions on the ground. We are not
debating 9/11. We are not debating the U.N. resolutions. We are
debating conditions on the ground that very much involve both al-Qaida
and Iran. So those are the conditions to which we need to pay
attention.
If I may quote from Mr. Kagan's report, he says:
A precipitous American withdrawal from Iraq will likely be
portrayed in the region as a defeat for the United States and
as a victory for Iran. Arab states are already concerned
about the growth in Iranian power and pretensions in the
region, but few have the capability to do more than
complain. The Saudis and the Gulf states are no match for
Iran militarily and would almost certainly seek an
accommodation with Tehran rather than allowing themselves
to be drawn into a major confrontation.
That is a very interesting thing to contemplate as you look ahead--
Iran expanding its power in the region, making some kind of
accommodation with the Saudis and the other Gulf States in order to
consolidate its power. Is that something America wants to look forward
to?
He goes on:
A possible side effect of the U.S. withdrawal is the
establishment of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East. Tehran
certainly seeks a predominant position in southern Iraq,
including Baghdad, and it would be in a position to put great
pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in the absence
of a large American presence in the region following a
visible U.S. defeat. That pressure might include efforts to
deny the U.S. the use of bases or to support Iranian
initiatives in the region and in the nuclear realm. The
perception of an American defeat at the hands of Iran is
likely to fuel seismic shifts in the politics of the Middle
East, none of them to our advantage.
We are having a great debate about what to do about Iran. We are
showing great concern about the possibility of Iran getting a nuclear
weapon. The new President of France, Mr. Sarkozy, has talked about the
unacceptability of Iran having a nuclear weapon, even to the point of
suggesting that military options should be on the table. Military
options with respect to an Iranian nuclear weapon, if it comes to that,
will undoubtedly involve more American troops and more American
treasure than are currently at stake in Iraq.
In the conclusion section of Mr. Kagan's report, he says:
It is simply not possible to design a militarily feasible
plan to draw down U.S. forces dramatically and on a rapid
timeline that still permits the accomplishment of America's
vital interests in Iraq and the region. The CNAS report--
The report he discusses in the group that tries to find a middle
way--
has raised the extremely important question of devising a
sound plan for transitioning to an advisory role, and this
question deserves a great deal of careful study in the months
ahead. But now is the time to start thinking about that
transition, not to start implementing it prematurely.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Kagan concludes:
Any plan that requires a withdrawal based on a timeline,
rather than conditions on the ground, is likely to lead to
failure. The notion that imposing timelines would somehow
force the Iraqi government to ``do the right thing'' and
thereby resolve the problems in the country is always
presented without any evidence. It is the logical argument
without substantiation that appears to be contradicted by
past precedent and by facts on the ground. It is a mirage
that some people cling to as a way of convincing themselves
and others that an action likely to lead to complete failure
in Iraq will instead lead to at least partial success. As the
president and Congress deliberate on the best way ahead for
the United States and Iraq, therefore, the choices are quite
stark. Either the United States can continue its efforts to
establish security while improving the capabilities of the
ISF or it can abandon those efforts, withdraw, and allow Iraq
to sink into chaos where terrorists can flourish.
I urge all Members of the Senate to pay attention to the wisdom of
Mr. Kagan's report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wished to, first of all, echo the comments
of my colleague from Utah. Fred Kagan is an expert, and what he had to
say in that report and in his subsequent summaries of it is something
all our colleagues should be familiar with because he makes the very
clear point that, as this mission is working, right now is not the time
to change the mission and go back to what it was prior to General
Petraeus's arrival on the scene.
Yet we still have Members of this body and the other body trying to
undercut the Petraeus plan in one way or another. The most recent
effort to do this is one which is especially distressing. Let me give a
little bit of background.
First, I wish to note that our Democratic colleagues have not taken
very long to reestablish their reputation--well deserved--as the tax-
and-spend party, as my colleague from Texas pointed out earlier. Now
that the Democratic Party is in control of the Congress, the agenda is
very clear. But yesterday, the chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee went a step too far because he proposed a new tax on every
American. This one, ostensibly, to fund the war.
Now, there are a lot of different excuses for raising taxes, as my
colleague from Texas pointed out a while ago, but I don't think we need
a new tax. If we did, our Democratic colleagues would not be proposing
$23 billion in more spending than the President proposed in his budget.
In other words, if a lack of revenue is the problem, then let us not
keep spending more than has been proposed in the budget. The tax-and-
spend priorities of the Democratic majority are very clear.
No, the real reason for Chairman Obey's plan to raise more taxes is
to
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change our strategy in Iraq, and that is very clear from his own
comments. Along with the tax he proposed, in fact, he announced he
would not allow his committee to move forward with the bill the
President has requested to fund the troops in Iraq.
This is not the Defense authorization or Defense appropriations bill,
which funds the Pentagon and all the military activities over the
course of next year. No, this is the money for the troops who are
fighting right now in Iraq. As I said, the chairman made it very clear
that was precisely what he intended. In fact, quoting from a Wall
Street Journal article today, he said:
Choosing not to move legislation is our strongest card at
this point.
Well, this is not a card game, and you shouldn't be playing with the
lives of our troops by cutting off their funding while they are out in
the field. If you wish to make a policy point that we should change our
strategy in Iraq, change our mission, there are ways to do it without
cutting off the funds while the troops are out there trying to perform
the mission we have sent them to perform.
I thought the comment of my colleague from New Mexico, Senator
Domenici, as reported in the Washington Times in a story this morning,
was charitable and interesting.
Senator Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico Republican, said Mr.
Obey's threat to block war funds was pretty gutsy. But I
don't see how it would work. In the end, you have to feed the
soldiers.
That is the point. You can cut back Pentagon funding, you can try to
pass resolutions that call for a change in strategy, but at the end of
the day, you have to feed the soldiers. You can't refuse to send the
money to Iraq while the troops are there or you are literally pulling
out the rug from under the troops.
My colleague, Senator Graham from South Carolina, put it this way:
The plan to starve the troops of funds would be cheered by
America's enemies. This would be a blessing to al-Qaida,
which is getting its brains beat out in Iraq.
I remember when Bob Dole ran for the Presidency, and he was trying to
make some pretty important points and people didn't appear to be
listening to him. At one point, he said: Where is the outrage? And that
is the question I ask here. Where is the outrage of pulling the rug out
from under our troops while they are in theater trying to do what we
have sent them there to do?
This is not just bad policy, it represents a failure to support the
troops. Everybody around here says: Well, we all support the troops, we
disagree with the policy of being in Iraq. Now we have come to the
point where we are going to try to change that policy by not supporting
the troops? I don't think this is good policy. I don't think it is fair
to the troops whom we have sent into harm's way, and it is consistent,
as I said before, with this whole tax-and-spend ideology.
Try to change policy by withdrawing support for the troops but raise
taxes on the American taxpayer? It makes no sense at all, unless you
put it in the context with where the Democratic leadership has been
going now for some time with respect to the Iraq war. Let me go back a
little and quote from an article yesterday in the Associated Press.
Hoping the political landscape changes in coming months,
Democratic leaders say they will renew their fight when
Congress considers the money Bush wants in war funding.
Well, it didn't take long for that to come true. The Associated Press
noted:
The difficulty facing Democrats in the Iraq debate: They
lack the votes to pass legislation ordering troops home and
are divided on whether to cut money for combat.
I might say the Speaker of the House has already announced her
opposition to this new tax plan. Democrats are indeed divided. But for
those who are in authority to refuse to move the legislation forward,
and who talk about it in terms of it is the best card I have to play,
have the ability to stop the funding at the very time that the troops
need the money in the field.
Progress in Iraq, obviously, has been widely reported. An editorial
today in Investors Business Daily says:
The new strategy being implemented by General Petraeus
seems to have worked extraordinarily well. Al-Qaida has been
backpedaling furiously.
So right at the time the strategy is working, we are going to pull
the money out? It makes no sense.
The Washington Post reports today:
The numbers of U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians reported
killed across the country last month fell to their lowest
levels in more than a year, a sharp decrease in violent
deaths that American military officials attribute in part to
the thousands of additional soldiers who have arrived here
this year.
And the New York Times today notes:
The number of violent civilian deaths in Iraq dropped
precipitously in September compared with the previous month.
So at a time when the strategy of General Petraeus is working, our
friends on the other side of the aisle are deciding to pull the funding
so we can no longer continue the operation. That makes no sense at all.
But it does fit in with this larger strategy, as I said, to find any
way they can to change the course in the war.
Let me conclude with this point. It is now October 3, past the
beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, and yet the Democratic
majority has not passed one single appropriations bill to the President
for his signature to fund the government next year. It appears to me
there is a reason for this.
The Associated Press noted the following in an article on September
30:
The most basic job of Congress is to pass the bills that
pay the costs of running the government. After criticizing
the Republicans for falling down on the job last year,
Democrats are now the ones stumbling.
And Roll Call had an editorial 3 days before, and I quote from part
of it:
Senate Democrats complain that Republican obstructionism
and President Bush's veto threats against nine House-passed
bills caused this year's delay. But the arguments don't hold
water.
Instead, it appears likely that the Democrats' failure to
pass these spending bills is part of the plan designed to
create a giant Omnibus appropriations bill which will
tie very directly into their tax-and-spend policies.
According to an editorial today in Congressional Quarterly:
Democrats may be planning to use a widely supported
veterans' bill as the vehicle for their additional spending.
Frustrated veterans' groups are trying to pressure Congress
to quickly pass a veterans' and military construction bill
and not use it as a vehicle for an omnibus measure.
Now, this wouldn't be the first time this kind of game has been
played, but especially if it is on the Veterans and Military
Construction bill, or if it is the Defense authorization bill that was
held up for so long, and now the measure to try to fund the troops in
Iraq, there is a very disturbing pattern here. Playing games with money
for veterans and the military in order to get more taxes and spending?
That is wrong. It is wrong. The American people need to know that at
the very time when General Petraeus's strategy is showing very positive
results in Iraq, it is the Democratic plan, at least in the House of
Representatives, to hold up that funding, not because there is a lack
of money, not because we need a tax increase to fund it but in order to
try to change the course of the President's strategy.
That is playing games with the money the troops need in the field.
Again, as Senator Domenici said, it is a pretty gutsy move, but in the
end, it would not work because you have to feed the soldiers.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, how much time remains on the Democratic
side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Nine minutes.
Mr. DURBIN. Nine minutes.
Mr. President, I yield whatever time the Senator from Massachusetts
would like.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
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