[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 149 (Wednesday, October 3, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H11182-H11186]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 928, IMPROVING GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 701 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 701
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 928) to amend the Inspector General Act of
1978 to enhance the independence of the Inspectors General,
to create a Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency, and for other purposes. The first reading of
the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order against
consideration of the bill are waived except those arising
under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. General debate shall be
confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority
member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
After general debate the bill shall be considered for
amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to
consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment
under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a
substitute recommended by the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform now printed in the bill. The committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered
as read. All points of order against the committee amendment
in the nature of a substitute are waived except those arising
under clause 10 of rule XXI. Notwithstanding clause 11 of
rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee amendment in the
nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed
in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this
resolution. Each such amendment may be offered only in the
order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member
designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall
be debatable for the time specified in the report equally
divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent,
shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject
to a demand for division of the question in the House or in
the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against such
amendments are waived except those arising under clause 9 or
10 of rule XXI. At the conclusion of consideration of the
bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the
bill to the House with such amendments as may have been
adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House
on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the
bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute. The previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage
without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with
or without instructions.
Sec. 2. During consideration in the House of H.R. 928
pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of
the previous question, the Chair may postpone further
consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated
by the Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Ohio is recognized for
1 hour.
Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions). All
time yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only.
I yield myself such time as I may consume. I also ask unanimous
consent that all Members be given 5 legislative days in which to revise
and extend their remarks on House Resolution 701.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 701 provides for
consideration of H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act.
The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate controlled by the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The rule waives all
points of order against consideration of the bill except clauses 9 and
10 of rule XXI. The rule makes in
[[Page H11183]]
order the Oversight and Government Reform Committee reported
substitute. The rule makes in order all five germane amendments that
were submitted to the Rules Committee.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in favor of the rule and in favor of H.R.
928, the Improving Government Accountability Act. I am very proud to be
a Member of this new Congress because over the last 9 months we have
made huge strides to better our great country.
We have empowered our workers. We have fought to lift up our
citizens. And today, I am proud to join my colleagues once again as we
press for greater government accountability and work to restore the
trust of the American people in this great institution.
Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today will amend the Inspector
General Act of 1978 to ensure necessary government oversight and
strengthen the role of the Inspectors General.
Next year will mark the 30th anniversary of the Inspector General
Act. Offices of Inspector General now exist in more than 60 Federal
Departments and agencies where they work to combat waste, fraud and
abuse.
The Inspectors General have many vital tasks. They act as government
watchdogs, conducting audits and examining complaints from agency
employees. They actively promote efficiency in government programs, and
encourage employee disclosure of waste and fraud.
Our bill today acts to strengthen and clarify their tenure,
resources, authority, oversight and autonomy. It is an important action
that we are taking today. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, in recent years,
politics has crept into the inner workings of the Inspectors General
leaving the door open for political pressure and influence to prejudice
the job that they are supposed to perform.
Under President Bush, only 18 percent of the Inspectors General have
audit experience while 64 percent have political experience. This is in
comparison to President Clinton who appointed far more, 66 percent, of
Inspectors General with audit experience versus only 22 percent with
political experience.
And what's more, over one-half of the IGs appointed by President Bush
had made contributions to his campaign or to other Republican
candidates and over one-third had worked in a Republican White House
prior to their appointment; whereas none of the IGs appointed by
President Clinton had worked in a Democratic White House.
These statistics are concerning because the hallmark of Inspectors
General must be their independence from the departments and agencies
within which they are housed. This independence is crucial because the
inspectors are charged with submitting reports to the agency heads and
to Congress regarding any failures on the part of their agencies.
When this independence is compromised, the missions and goals of the
Inspectors General lose credibility. Their work is critical to ensuring
that taxpayer dollars are being used wisely and that our government is
working efficiently and effectively.
The Improving Government Accountability Act will strengthen the
independence of these important watchdogs. First, it clarifies when the
inspectors can be removed from their posts. Under current law, they
have limited protection from removal from office. In fact, inspectors
that are appointed by the President can be removed by the President
without cause. The only requirement is that the President must report
the removal to Congress after the removal has already been
accomplished. It is much more difficult to be independent when you know
that the head of the Department that you are critically evaluating can
remove you and that there are no checks on that power.
Our bill specifies that they may only be removed before the end of
their term for permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of duty,
malfeasance or conviction of a felony, or conduct involving moral
turpitude. This takes the politics out of a position and a decision-
making process where it never should have been in the first place.
Under this new law, removal of an Inspector General must be
communicated to both Houses of Congress at least 30 days before that
inspector's removal.
Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today encourages inspectors to remain
in office for at least 7 years by setting a fixed term of office and
allowing the inspectors to be renewed at the completion of their term.
This allows for greater continuity and increased independence on the
part of the inspectors.
Under this legislation, an Inspector General will be allowed to
submit budget requests directly to the Office of Management and Budget.
This is a vital change. Inspectors General must not be at the mercy of
administration officials who have the unbridled power to cut their
budget because of disagreement over their findings or improper
political influence. Budget autonomy is crucial to the independence of
these inspectors.
Further, H.R. 928 establishes the Council of the Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency. This council's task will be to increase
the professionalism and effectiveness of the Inspectors General staff.
The council will seek out fraud, waste and abuse in Federal programs.
Today, through the Improving Government Accountability Act, we will
give the Inspectors General more power to do their job and, more
importantly, to do so with heightened independence and integrity.
The trust of the American people is a precious thing. The bill today
guarantees that our departments and agencies are worthy of that trust.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this
modified closed rule that waives important portions of the
Congressional Budget Act.
Last night in the Rules Committee, we learned that this special rule
finds yet another way for the majority to break regular order. By
waiving section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act, this rule
undermines the integrity of the budgeting process by allowing
legislation within the Budget Committee's jurisdiction to be considered
by the House without the Budget Committee's review.
My friend from Pasco, Washington, Doc Hastings, asked the acting
chairman of the committee, Mr. McGovern, if the rule being considered
does indeed waive this budget rule that protects taxpayers and Members
of this House of Representatives. The answer came back simple and
clear: Yes, the rule waives this commonsense provision.
{time} 1130
I wish that I could say that I am surprised by the Democrat
leadership's decision to find yet another way to toss House rules and
procedures out the window. Unfortunately, this is precisely what has
come to be known as, and to expect from, the new broken promise
Democrat majority.
Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us has the noble goal of
strengthening and clarifying the authority, tenure, resources,
oversight and independence of the Inspectors General in the various
Federal Departments and agencies.
Many of the issues addressed by the legislation today enjoy
bipartisan support and are of great importance to me and a huge number
of my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle. The bill
establishes a council to identify, review and plan to promote
efficiency and address waste, fraud and abuse. It provides for greater
integrity by establishing a new committee to investigate allegations of
wrongdoing and to report on their efforts to the executive branch and
to Congress.
It requires reports to Congress on the cooperation of all Federal
agencies with the General Accountability Office and requires that
semiannual inspection and evaluation reports, in addition to audit
reports, be submitted to Congress.
Despite all of the noble goals of this legislation, I do regret that
this bill was not crafted in closer coordination with the
administration to resolve some of the outstanding issues that prevent
it from being signed into law.
Like me, the administration has publicly stated its strong support
for the work of Inspectors General and their overall mission to improve
agency performance and to eliminate waste, fraud and abuse. However,
the administration strongly objects to some of the provisions included
in this legislation that are likely unconstitutional.
The end-run contained in this legislation around article II of the
Constitution, which our Founding Fathers provided to the executive
branch to ensure that all of our Nation laws are faithfully executed,
guarantees that this
[[Page H11184]]
bill will not only be vetoed by the President but would also be
overturned by the Supreme Court if this bill were ever passed by the
House and the Senate.
Also, by requiring Inspectors General to circumvent the long-standing
and constitutionally based budgeting process that currently exists,
without even including the House Budget Committee in the decisionmaking
process, is a thinly veiled political stunt intended to draw a veto
threat from the President and to create a false disagreement over this
bill when it is clear that both Republicans and Democrats support
reducing waste, fraud and abuse at each of our Federal agencies.
Mr. Speaker, I insert in the Record a copy of the administration's
statement of policy regarding their position on this legislation.
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management
and Budget,
Washington, DC, October 1, 2007.
Statement of Administration Policy
H.R. 928--To amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 to enhance the
independence of the Inspectors General, to create a Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and for other purposes
The Administration appreciates the work of inspectors
general (IGs) and their mission to improve agency performance
and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. IGs play an important
role in Executive Branch efforts to measure and achieve
success in program performance. Each agency's Office of
Inspector General (OIG) fills a vital role in these efforts
by reviewing operations and making recommendations for
improvements and corrective actions. By providing objective
information to promote strong management, decision-making,
and accountability, OIGs contribute to the success of each
agency and the Federal government as a whole. The
Administration strongly supports efforts to ensure that IGs
have: the skills and training they need to perform their
duties; fair pay; findings and recommendations that are
transparent to the public; and access to necessary legal
advice.
H.R. 928, the ``Improving Government Accountability Act,''
would further some of these objectives. However, the
Administration strongly objects to provisions that are
inconsistent with these goals, and with broader policy
considerations and constitutional requirements. If H.R. 928
were presented to the President in its current form, the
President's senior advisors would recommend that he veto the
bill.
H.R. 928 would permit the President to remove IGs only for
cause. The Administration strongly objects to this intrusion
on the President's removal authority and his ability to hold
IGs accountable for their performance. The responsibility to
``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed''--which
Article II vests solely in the President--includes the
responsibility to supervise and guide how IGs and other
executive branch officers investigate and respond to
allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch. IGs
already have the independence necessary to perform their
investigative functions with respect to individual agencies,
because agency heads generally may not supervise IGs' conduct
of investigations. H.R. 928's attempt to extend this current
independence to include independence from supervision by the
President does not enhance the function of IGs and raises
grave constitutional concerns.
The Administration also strongly opposes provisions that
would authorize IGs to circumvent the President's
longstanding, and constitutionally based, control over
executive branch budget requests by allowing IGs to submit
their budget requests directly to Congress and by requiring
the President to include each IG's request as a separate line
item in the President's annual budget request. Since its
inception, the current executive branch coordination process
has worked well for both the President and the Congress. The
process is deliberative and results in an agency and
government-wide coordinated submission that accounts for
long-range planning and priorities.
IGs have been a part of this process since their creation
in 1978, and there is no evidence that the current process
results in budgets that fail to enable appropriate IG
performance.
The Administration also objects to provisions that would
establish within the Executive Branch a freestanding,
independent Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency. A similar council already exists under
Executive Orders. Statutory codification of such a council
would impede the President's ability to react swiftly and
effectively to problems with IGs or with the Council itself.
Furthermore, the council provisions in H.R. 928 raise
constitutional questions because they restrict the
President's authority to nominate individuals to serve on the
Council and contain ambiguous definitions of offices and
their respective roles and responsibilities. Finally, it is
critical that disclosure protections regarding the Witness
Security Program apply to the Department of Justice's
Inspector General's internal investigative procedures and
release of information, since the release of specific
information related to the program could endanger the
program's means and methods, personnel, and the continued
safety of the program's protected witnesses.
Mr. Speaker, I oppose the majority's unwillingness to work with the
administration in a bipartisan way to create a bill that all Members of
this body can support and that would also pass constitutional muster. I
also oppose the Democrat leadership's willingness to once again subvert
regular order for political purposes and to prevent my colleague from
The Woodlands in Texas, Congressman Kevin Brady, from having an
opportunity to offer his amendment to provide additional review of the
work product of our Federal agencies.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, I would inquire of the gentleman from Texas
if he has any remaining speakers.
Mr. SESSIONS. I appreciate the gentlewoman engaging me at this time.
Mr. Speaker, I would inform my colleague that I do not have any
additional speakers.
Ms. SUTTON. Okay. I'm the last speaker for my side, so I will reserve
my time until the gentleman has closed for his side and yielded back
his time.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Ohio and
enjoy working with her.
Mr. Speaker, I will be asking Members to oppose the previous question
so that I may amend the rule to allow for consideration of H. Res. 479,
a resolution that I like to call the Earmark Accountability Rule.
During last year's campaign and again at the beginning of this
Congress, promises were made to the American people and to the new
minority about the Democrats' supposedly new and improved earmark
rules. As the year has worn on, however, I have noticed that while the
Democrats' rules changes may sound good as a cynical sound bite for the
evening news, they haven't actually accomplished much since the
majority has repeatedly turned the other way when it comes to their own
actual enforcement.
We continue to see nondisclosed earmarks appearing in all sorts of
bills, and even the House Parliamentarian has determined that the
hastily drafted and passed Democrat earmark rule ``does not
comprehensively apply to all legislative propositions at all stages of
the legislative process.''
I will insert this letter from the House Parliamentarian, John
Sullivan, to the Rules Committee chairman, Louise Slaughter, into the
Record at this point.
House of Representatives,
Office of the Parliamentarian,
Washington, DC, October 2, 2007.
Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter,
Committee on Rules, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairwoman Slaughter: Thank you for your letter of
October 2, 2007, asking for an elucidation of our advice on
how best to word a special rule. As you also know, we have
advised the committee that language waiving all points of
order ``except those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI''
should not be adopted as boilerplate for all special rules,
notwithstanding that the committee may be resolved not to
recommend that the House waive the earmark-disclosure
requirements of clause 9.
In rule XXI, clause 9(a) establishes a point of order
against undisclosed earmarks in certain measures and clause
9(b) establishes a point of order against a special rule that
waives the application of clause 9(a). As illuminated in the
rulings of September 25 and 27, 2007, clause 9(a) of rule XXI
does not comprehensively apply to all legislative
propositions at all stages of the legislative process.
Clause 9(a) addresses the disclosure of earmarks in a bill
or joint resolution, in a conference report on a bill or
joint resolution, or in a so-called ``manager's amendment''
to a bill or joint resolution. Other forms of amendment--
whether they be floor amendments during initial House
consideration or later amendments between the Houses--are not
covered. (One might surmise that those who developed the rule
felt that proposals to amend are naturally subject to
immediate peer review, though they harbored reservations
about the so-called ``manager's amendment,'' i.e., one
offered at the outset of consideration for amendment by a
member of a committee of initial referral under the terms of
a special rule.)
The question of order on September 25 involved a special
rule providing for a motion to dispose of an amendment
between the Houses. As such, clause 9(a) was inapposite. It
had no application to the motion in the first instance.
Accordingly, Speaker pro
[[Page H11185]]
tempore Holden held that the special rule had no tendency to
waive any application of clause 9(a). The question of order
on September 27 involved a special rule providing (in
pertinent part) that an amendment be considered as adopted.
Speaker pro tempore Blumenauer employed the same rationale to
hold that, because clause 9(a) had no application to the
amendment in the first instance, the special rule had no
tendency to waive any application of clause 9(a).
The same would be true in the more common case of a
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute made in
order as original text for the purpose of further amendment.
Clause 9(a) of rule XXI is inapposite to such an amendment.
In none of these scenarios would a ruling by a presiding
officer hold that earmarks are or are not included in a
particular measure or proposition. Under clause 9(b) of rule
XXI, the threshold question for the Chair--the cognizability
of a point of order--turns on whether the earmark-disclosure
requirements of clause 9(a) of rule XXI apply to the object
of the special rule in the first place. Embedded in the
question whether a special rule waives the application of
clause 9(a) is the question whether clause 9(a) has any
application.
In these cases to which clause 9 of rule XXI has no
application in the first instance, stating a waiver of all
points of order except those arising under that rule--when
none can so arise--would be, at best, gratuitous. Its
negative implication would be that such a point of order
might lie. That would be as confusing as a waiver of all
points of order against provisions of an authorization bill
except those that can only arise in the case of a general
appropriation bill (e.g., clause 2 of role XXI). Both in this
area and as a general principle, we try hard not to use
language that yields a misleading implication.
I appreciate your consideration and trust that this
response is to be shared among all members of the committee.
Our office will share it with all inquiring parties.
Sincerely,
John V. Sullivan,
Parliamentarian.
Mr. Speaker, even the nonpartisan House Parliamentarian acknowledges
what Republicans have been saying since January: that the so-called
Democrat earmark rule has more holes than a bowl of Cheerios and that
earmark abuse by the broken promise Democrat majority continues to run
rampant.
This rules change would simply allow the House to debate openly and
honestly about the validity and accuracy of earmarks contained in all
bills, not just appropriations bills.
If we defeat the previous question, we then can address that problem
today and restore this Congress' nonexistent credibility when it comes
to the enforcement of its own rules.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the
amendment and extraneous material appear in the Congressional Record
just prior to the vote on the previous question.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, in 1978, the House committee that was then
known as Government Operations envisioned Inspectors General as
watchdogs to bring accountability and oversight to our agencies. Now,
almost 30 years later, we act to update and improve this valuable
program.
This important bill will not only bring enhanced continuity and
accountability to the Inspectors General; it will strengthen their most
important quality: their independence from the Departments and agencies
that they inspect.
The American people should have the utmost faith that their precious
taxpayer dollars are being used in the most efficient manner. This bill
ensures the accountability that our citizens demand and which they
deserve.
I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question and on the rule.
The material referred to previously by Mr. Sessions is as follows:
(The information contained herein was provided by
Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the
109th Congress.)
The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means
This vote; the vote on whether to order the previous
question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote.
A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote
against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow
the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an
alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be
debating.
Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of
Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the
previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or
control the consideration of the subject before the House
being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous
question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the
subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling
of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the
House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes
the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to
offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the
majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated
the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to
a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to
recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said:
``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to
yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first
recognition.''
Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic
majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is
simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on
adopting the resolution . . . . [and] has no substantive
legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is
not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of
the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual
published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress, (page
56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using
information form Congressional Quarterly's ``American
Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is
defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition
member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages
an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the
pending business.''
Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives,
the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a
refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a
special rule reported from the committee on Rules] opens the
resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21,
section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the
motion for the previous question on a resolution reported
from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member
leading the opposition to the previous question, who may
offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time
for debate thereon.''
Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does
have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only
available tools for those who oppose the Democratic
majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the
opportunity to offer an alternative plan.
____
Amendment to H. Res. 701 Offered by Mr. Sessions of Texas
At the end of the resolution, add the following:
Sec. 3. That immediately upon the adoption of this
resolution the House shall, without intervention of any point
of order, consider the resolution (H. Res. 479) to amend the
Rules of the House of Representatives to provide for
enforcement of clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives. The resolution shall be considered as
read. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on
the resolution to final adoption without intervening motion
or demand for division of the question except: (1) one hour
of debate equally divided and controlled by the chairman and
ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules; and (2)
one motion to recommit.
Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I
move the previous question on the resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous
question.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule
XX, this 15-minute vote on ordering the previous question on H. Res.
701 will be followed by 5-minute votes on adoption of H. Res. 701, if
ordered; ordering the previous question on H. Res. 702, by the yeas and
nays; adoption of H. Res. 702, if ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 216,
nays 192, not voting 24, as follows:
[Roll No. 932]
YEAS--216
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
[[Page H11186]]
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Dicks
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Mahoney (FL)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Richardson
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NAYS--192
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--24
Barrett (SC)
Bishop (UT)
Carson
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Delahunt
Dingell
Ellison
Frank (MA)
Hastert
Higgins
Jefferson
Jindal
Jones (OH)
Lee
Lynch
Maloney (NY)
McMorris Rodgers
Paul
Perlmutter
Pitts
Space
Tancredo
Waters
{time} 1202
Messrs. RYAN of Wisconsin, CASTLE, and HALL of Texas changed their
vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
So the previous question was ordered.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________