[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 149 (Wednesday, October 3, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H11182-H11186]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 928, IMPROVING GOVERNMENT 
                           ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

  Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I 
call up House Resolution 701 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 701

       Resolved,  That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 928) to amend the Inspector General Act of 
     1978 to enhance the independence of the Inspectors General, 
     to create a Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
     and Efficiency, and for other purposes. The first reading of 
     the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of order against 
     consideration of the bill are waived except those arising 
     under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. General debate shall be 
     confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally 
     divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
     member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
     After general debate the bill shall be considered for 
     amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to 
     consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment 
     under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute recommended by the Committee on Oversight and 
     Government Reform now printed in the bill. The committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered 
     as read. All points of order against the committee amendment 
     in the nature of a substitute are waived except those arising 
     under clause 10 of rule XXI. Notwithstanding clause 11 of 
     rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee amendment in the 
     nature of a substitute shall be in order except those printed 
     in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
     resolution. Each such amendment may be offered only in the 
     order printed in the report, may be offered only by a Member 
     designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall 
     be debatable for the time specified in the report equally 
     divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, 
     shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject 
     to a demand for division of the question in the House or in 
     the Committee of the Whole. All points of order against such 
     amendments are waived except those arising under clause 9 or 
     10 of rule XXI. At the conclusion of consideration of the 
     bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the 
     bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
     adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House 
     on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the 
     bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute. The previous question shall be considered as 
     ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage 
     without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with 
     or without instructions.
       Sec. 2. During consideration in the House of H.R. 928 
     pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of 
     the previous question, the Chair may postpone further 
     consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated 
     by the Speaker.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Ohio is recognized for 
1 hour.
  Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions). All 
time yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only.
  I yield myself such time as I may consume. I also ask unanimous 
consent that all Members be given 5 legislative days in which to revise 
and extend their remarks on House Resolution 701.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 701 provides for 
consideration of H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act. 
The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate controlled by the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The rule waives all 
points of order against consideration of the bill except clauses 9 and 
10 of rule XXI. The rule makes in

[[Page H11183]]

order the Oversight and Government Reform Committee reported 
substitute. The rule makes in order all five germane amendments that 
were submitted to the Rules Committee.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in favor of the rule and in favor of H.R. 
928, the Improving Government Accountability Act. I am very proud to be 
a Member of this new Congress because over the last 9 months we have 
made huge strides to better our great country.
  We have empowered our workers. We have fought to lift up our 
citizens. And today, I am proud to join my colleagues once again as we 
press for greater government accountability and work to restore the 
trust of the American people in this great institution.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today will amend the Inspector 
General Act of 1978 to ensure necessary government oversight and 
strengthen the role of the Inspectors General.
  Next year will mark the 30th anniversary of the Inspector General 
Act. Offices of Inspector General now exist in more than 60 Federal 
Departments and agencies where they work to combat waste, fraud and 
abuse.
  The Inspectors General have many vital tasks. They act as government 
watchdogs, conducting audits and examining complaints from agency 
employees. They actively promote efficiency in government programs, and 
encourage employee disclosure of waste and fraud.
  Our bill today acts to strengthen and clarify their tenure, 
resources, authority, oversight and autonomy. It is an important action 
that we are taking today. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, in recent years, 
politics has crept into the inner workings of the Inspectors General 
leaving the door open for political pressure and influence to prejudice 
the job that they are supposed to perform.
  Under President Bush, only 18 percent of the Inspectors General have 
audit experience while 64 percent have political experience. This is in 
comparison to President Clinton who appointed far more, 66 percent, of 
Inspectors General with audit experience versus only 22 percent with 
political experience.
  And what's more, over one-half of the IGs appointed by President Bush 
had made contributions to his campaign or to other Republican 
candidates and over one-third had worked in a Republican White House 
prior to their appointment; whereas none of the IGs appointed by 
President Clinton had worked in a Democratic White House.
  These statistics are concerning because the hallmark of Inspectors 
General must be their independence from the departments and agencies 
within which they are housed. This independence is crucial because the 
inspectors are charged with submitting reports to the agency heads and 
to Congress regarding any failures on the part of their agencies.
  When this independence is compromised, the missions and goals of the 
Inspectors General lose credibility. Their work is critical to ensuring 
that taxpayer dollars are being used wisely and that our government is 
working efficiently and effectively.
  The Improving Government Accountability Act will strengthen the 
independence of these important watchdogs. First, it clarifies when the 
inspectors can be removed from their posts. Under current law, they 
have limited protection from removal from office. In fact, inspectors 
that are appointed by the President can be removed by the President 
without cause. The only requirement is that the President must report 
the removal to Congress after the removal has already been 
accomplished. It is much more difficult to be independent when you know 
that the head of the Department that you are critically evaluating can 
remove you and that there are no checks on that power.
  Our bill specifies that they may only be removed before the end of 
their term for permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of duty, 
malfeasance or conviction of a felony, or conduct involving moral 
turpitude. This takes the politics out of a position and a decision-
making process where it never should have been in the first place.
  Under this new law, removal of an Inspector General must be 
communicated to both Houses of Congress at least 30 days before that 
inspector's removal.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today encourages inspectors to remain 
in office for at least 7 years by setting a fixed term of office and 
allowing the inspectors to be renewed at the completion of their term. 
This allows for greater continuity and increased independence on the 
part of the inspectors.
  Under this legislation, an Inspector General will be allowed to 
submit budget requests directly to the Office of Management and Budget. 
This is a vital change. Inspectors General must not be at the mercy of 
administration officials who have the unbridled power to cut their 
budget because of disagreement over their findings or improper 
political influence. Budget autonomy is crucial to the independence of 
these inspectors.
  Further, H.R. 928 establishes the Council of the Inspectors General 
on Integrity and Efficiency. This council's task will be to increase 
the professionalism and effectiveness of the Inspectors General staff. 
The council will seek out fraud, waste and abuse in Federal programs.
  Today, through the Improving Government Accountability Act, we will 
give the Inspectors General more power to do their job and, more 
importantly, to do so with heightened independence and integrity.
  The trust of the American people is a precious thing. The bill today 
guarantees that our departments and agencies are worthy of that trust.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this 
modified closed rule that waives important portions of the 
Congressional Budget Act.
  Last night in the Rules Committee, we learned that this special rule 
finds yet another way for the majority to break regular order. By 
waiving section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act, this rule 
undermines the integrity of the budgeting process by allowing 
legislation within the Budget Committee's jurisdiction to be considered 
by the House without the Budget Committee's review.
  My friend from Pasco, Washington, Doc Hastings, asked the acting 
chairman of the committee, Mr. McGovern, if the rule being considered 
does indeed waive this budget rule that protects taxpayers and Members 
of this House of Representatives. The answer came back simple and 
clear: Yes, the rule waives this commonsense provision.

                              {time}  1130

  I wish that I could say that I am surprised by the Democrat 
leadership's decision to find yet another way to toss House rules and 
procedures out the window. Unfortunately, this is precisely what has 
come to be known as, and to expect from, the new broken promise 
Democrat majority.
  Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us has the noble goal of 
strengthening and clarifying the authority, tenure, resources, 
oversight and independence of the Inspectors General in the various 
Federal Departments and agencies.
  Many of the issues addressed by the legislation today enjoy 
bipartisan support and are of great importance to me and a huge number 
of my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle. The bill 
establishes a council to identify, review and plan to promote 
efficiency and address waste, fraud and abuse. It provides for greater 
integrity by establishing a new committee to investigate allegations of 
wrongdoing and to report on their efforts to the executive branch and 
to Congress.
  It requires reports to Congress on the cooperation of all Federal 
agencies with the General Accountability Office and requires that 
semiannual inspection and evaluation reports, in addition to audit 
reports, be submitted to Congress.
  Despite all of the noble goals of this legislation, I do regret that 
this bill was not crafted in closer coordination with the 
administration to resolve some of the outstanding issues that prevent 
it from being signed into law.
  Like me, the administration has publicly stated its strong support 
for the work of Inspectors General and their overall mission to improve 
agency performance and to eliminate waste, fraud and abuse. However, 
the administration strongly objects to some of the provisions included 
in this legislation that are likely unconstitutional.
  The end-run contained in this legislation around article II of the 
Constitution, which our Founding Fathers provided to the executive 
branch to ensure that all of our Nation laws are faithfully executed, 
guarantees that this

[[Page H11184]]

bill will not only be vetoed by the President but would also be 
overturned by the Supreme Court if this bill were ever passed by the 
House and the Senate.
  Also, by requiring Inspectors General to circumvent the long-standing 
and constitutionally based budgeting process that currently exists, 
without even including the House Budget Committee in the decisionmaking 
process, is a thinly veiled political stunt intended to draw a veto 
threat from the President and to create a false disagreement over this 
bill when it is clear that both Republicans and Democrats support 
reducing waste, fraud and abuse at each of our Federal agencies.
  Mr. Speaker, I insert in the Record a copy of the administration's 
statement of policy regarding their position on this legislation.
         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                  Washington, DC, October 1, 2007.

                   Statement of Administration Policy


  H.R. 928--To amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 to enhance the 
  independence of the Inspectors General, to create a Council of the 
 Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and for other purposes

       The Administration appreciates the work of inspectors 
     general (IGs) and their mission to improve agency performance 
     and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. IGs play an important 
     role in Executive Branch efforts to measure and achieve 
     success in program performance. Each agency's Office of 
     Inspector General (OIG) fills a vital role in these efforts 
     by reviewing operations and making recommendations for 
     improvements and corrective actions. By providing objective 
     information to promote strong management, decision-making, 
     and accountability, OIGs contribute to the success of each 
     agency and the Federal government as a whole. The 
     Administration strongly supports efforts to ensure that IGs 
     have: the skills and training they need to perform their 
     duties; fair pay; findings and recommendations that are 
     transparent to the public; and access to necessary legal 
     advice.
       H.R. 928, the ``Improving Government Accountability Act,'' 
     would further some of these objectives. However, the 
     Administration strongly objects to provisions that are 
     inconsistent with these goals, and with broader policy 
     considerations and constitutional requirements. If H.R. 928 
     were presented to the President in its current form, the 
     President's senior advisors would recommend that he veto the 
     bill.
       H.R. 928 would permit the President to remove IGs only for 
     cause. The Administration strongly objects to this intrusion 
     on the President's removal authority and his ability to hold 
     IGs accountable for their performance. The responsibility to 
     ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed''--which 
     Article II vests solely in the President--includes the 
     responsibility to supervise and guide how IGs and other 
     executive branch officers investigate and respond to 
     allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch. IGs 
     already have the independence necessary to perform their 
     investigative functions with respect to individual agencies, 
     because agency heads generally may not supervise IGs' conduct 
     of investigations. H.R. 928's attempt to extend this current 
     independence to include independence from supervision by the 
     President does not enhance the function of IGs and raises 
     grave constitutional concerns.
       The Administration also strongly opposes provisions that 
     would authorize IGs to circumvent the President's 
     longstanding, and constitutionally based, control over 
     executive branch budget requests by allowing IGs to submit 
     their budget requests directly to Congress and by requiring 
     the President to include each IG's request as a separate line 
     item in the President's annual budget request. Since its 
     inception, the current executive branch coordination process 
     has worked well for both the President and the Congress. The 
     process is deliberative and results in an agency and 
     government-wide coordinated submission that accounts for 
     long-range planning and priorities.
       IGs have been a part of this process since their creation 
     in 1978, and there is no evidence that the current process 
     results in budgets that fail to enable appropriate IG 
     performance.
       The Administration also objects to provisions that would 
     establish within the Executive Branch a freestanding, 
     independent Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
     and Efficiency. A similar council already exists under 
     Executive Orders. Statutory codification of such a council 
     would impede the President's ability to react swiftly and 
     effectively to problems with IGs or with the Council itself. 
     Furthermore, the council provisions in H.R. 928 raise 
     constitutional questions because they restrict the 
     President's authority to nominate individuals to serve on the 
     Council and contain ambiguous definitions of offices and 
     their respective roles and responsibilities. Finally, it is 
     critical that disclosure protections regarding the Witness 
     Security Program apply to the Department of Justice's 
     Inspector General's internal investigative procedures and 
     release of information, since the release of specific 
     information related to the program could endanger the 
     program's means and methods, personnel, and the continued 
     safety of the program's protected witnesses.

  Mr. Speaker, I oppose the majority's unwillingness to work with the 
administration in a bipartisan way to create a bill that all Members of 
this body can support and that would also pass constitutional muster. I 
also oppose the Democrat leadership's willingness to once again subvert 
regular order for political purposes and to prevent my colleague from 
The Woodlands in Texas, Congressman Kevin Brady, from having an 
opportunity to offer his amendment to provide additional review of the 
work product of our Federal agencies.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, I would inquire of the gentleman from Texas 
if he has any remaining speakers.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I appreciate the gentlewoman engaging me at this time. 
Mr. Speaker, I would inform my colleague that I do not have any 
additional speakers.
  Ms. SUTTON. Okay. I'm the last speaker for my side, so I will reserve 
my time until the gentleman has closed for his side and yielded back 
his time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Ohio and 
enjoy working with her.
  Mr. Speaker, I will be asking Members to oppose the previous question 
so that I may amend the rule to allow for consideration of H. Res. 479, 
a resolution that I like to call the Earmark Accountability Rule.
  During last year's campaign and again at the beginning of this 
Congress, promises were made to the American people and to the new 
minority about the Democrats' supposedly new and improved earmark 
rules. As the year has worn on, however, I have noticed that while the 
Democrats' rules changes may sound good as a cynical sound bite for the 
evening news, they haven't actually accomplished much since the 
majority has repeatedly turned the other way when it comes to their own 
actual enforcement.
  We continue to see nondisclosed earmarks appearing in all sorts of 
bills, and even the House Parliamentarian has determined that the 
hastily drafted and passed Democrat earmark rule ``does not 
comprehensively apply to all legislative propositions at all stages of 
the legislative process.''
  I will insert this letter from the House Parliamentarian, John 
Sullivan, to the Rules Committee chairman, Louise Slaughter, into the 
Record at this point.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                Office of the Parliamentarian,

                                  Washington, DC, October 2, 2007.
     Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter,
     Committee on Rules, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairwoman Slaughter: Thank you for your letter of 
     October 2, 2007, asking for an elucidation of our advice on 
     how best to word a special rule. As you also know, we have 
     advised the committee that language waiving all points of 
     order ``except those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI'' 
     should not be adopted as boilerplate for all special rules, 
     notwithstanding that the committee may be resolved not to 
     recommend that the House waive the earmark-disclosure 
     requirements of clause 9.
       In rule XXI, clause 9(a) establishes a point of order 
     against undisclosed earmarks in certain measures and clause 
     9(b) establishes a point of order against a special rule that 
     waives the application of clause 9(a). As illuminated in the 
     rulings of September 25 and 27, 2007, clause 9(a) of rule XXI 
     does not comprehensively apply to all legislative 
     propositions at all stages of the legislative process.
       Clause 9(a) addresses the disclosure of earmarks in a bill 
     or joint resolution, in a conference report on a bill or 
     joint resolution, or in a so-called ``manager's amendment'' 
     to a bill or joint resolution. Other forms of amendment--
     whether they be floor amendments during initial House 
     consideration or later amendments between the Houses--are not 
     covered. (One might surmise that those who developed the rule 
     felt that proposals to amend are naturally subject to 
     immediate peer review, though they harbored reservations 
     about the so-called ``manager's amendment,'' i.e., one 
     offered at the outset of consideration for amendment by a 
     member of a committee of initial referral under the terms of 
     a special rule.)
       The question of order on September 25 involved a special 
     rule providing for a motion to dispose of an amendment 
     between the Houses. As such, clause 9(a) was inapposite. It 
     had no application to the motion in the first instance. 
     Accordingly, Speaker pro

[[Page H11185]]

     tempore Holden held that the special rule had no tendency to 
     waive any application of clause 9(a). The question of order 
     on September 27 involved a special rule providing (in 
     pertinent part) that an amendment be considered as adopted. 
     Speaker pro tempore Blumenauer employed the same rationale to 
     hold that, because clause 9(a) had no application to the 
     amendment in the first instance, the special rule had no 
     tendency to waive any application of clause 9(a).
       The same would be true in the more common case of a 
     committee amendment in the nature of a substitute made in 
     order as original text for the purpose of further amendment. 
     Clause 9(a) of rule XXI is inapposite to such an amendment.
       In none of these scenarios would a ruling by a presiding 
     officer hold that earmarks are or are not included in a 
     particular measure or proposition. Under clause 9(b) of rule 
     XXI, the threshold question for the Chair--the cognizability 
     of a point of order--turns on whether the earmark-disclosure 
     requirements of clause 9(a) of rule XXI apply to the object 
     of the special rule in the first place. Embedded in the 
     question whether a special rule waives the application of 
     clause 9(a) is the question whether clause 9(a) has any 
     application.
       In these cases to which clause 9 of rule XXI has no 
     application in the first instance, stating a waiver of all 
     points of order except those arising under that rule--when 
     none can so arise--would be, at best, gratuitous. Its 
     negative implication would be that such a point of order 
     might lie. That would be as confusing as a waiver of all 
     points of order against provisions of an authorization bill 
     except those that can only arise in the case of a general 
     appropriation bill (e.g., clause 2 of role XXI). Both in this 
     area and as a general principle, we try hard not to use 
     language that yields a misleading implication.
       I appreciate your consideration and trust that this 
     response is to be shared among all members of the committee. 
     Our office will share it with all inquiring parties.
           Sincerely,
                                                 John V. Sullivan,
                                                  Parliamentarian.
  Mr. Speaker, even the nonpartisan House Parliamentarian acknowledges 
what Republicans have been saying since January: that the so-called 
Democrat earmark rule has more holes than a bowl of Cheerios and that 
earmark abuse by the broken promise Democrat majority continues to run 
rampant.
  This rules change would simply allow the House to debate openly and 
honestly about the validity and accuracy of earmarks contained in all 
bills, not just appropriations bills.
  If we defeat the previous question, we then can address that problem 
today and restore this Congress' nonexistent credibility when it comes 
to the enforcement of its own rules.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the 
amendment and extraneous material appear in the Congressional Record 
just prior to the vote on the previous question.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, in 1978, the House committee that was then 
known as Government Operations envisioned Inspectors General as 
watchdogs to bring accountability and oversight to our agencies. Now, 
almost 30 years later, we act to update and improve this valuable 
program.
  This important bill will not only bring enhanced continuity and 
accountability to the Inspectors General; it will strengthen their most 
important quality: their independence from the Departments and agencies 
that they inspect.
  The American people should have the utmost faith that their precious 
taxpayer dollars are being used in the most efficient manner. This bill 
ensures the accountability that our citizens demand and which they 
deserve.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question and on the rule.
  The material referred to previously by Mr. Sessions is as follows:
       (The information contained herein was provided by 
     Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the 
     109th Congress.)

        The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means

       This vote; the vote on whether to order the previous 
     question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote. 
     A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote 
     against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow 
     the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an 
     alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be 
     debating.
       Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of 
     Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the 
     previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or 
     control the consideration of the subject before the House 
     being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous 
     question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the 
     subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling 
     of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the 
     House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes 
     the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to 
     offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the 
     majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated 
     the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to 
     a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to 
     recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: 
     ``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman 
     from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to 
     yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first 
     recognition.''
       Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic 
     majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is 
     simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on 
     adopting the resolution . . . . [and] has no substantive 
     legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is 
     not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of 
     the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual 
     published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress, (page 
     56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using 
     information form Congressional Quarterly's ``American 
     Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is 
     defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition 
     member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages 
     an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the 
     pending business.''
       Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
     the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a 
     refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a 
     special rule reported from the committee on Rules] opens the 
     resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21, 
     section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the 
     motion for the previous question on a resolution reported 
     from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member 
     leading the opposition to the previous question, who may 
     offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time 
     for debate thereon.''
       Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does 
     have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only 
     available tools for those who oppose the Democratic 
     majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the 
     opportunity to offer an alternative plan.
                                  ____


       Amendment to H. Res. 701 Offered by Mr. Sessions of Texas

       At the end of the resolution, add the following:
       Sec. 3. That immediately upon the adoption of this 
     resolution the House shall, without intervention of any point 
     of order, consider the resolution (H. Res. 479) to amend the 
     Rules of the House of Representatives to provide for 
     enforcement of clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 
     of Representatives. The resolution shall be considered as 
     read. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on 
     the resolution to final adoption without intervening motion 
     or demand for division of the question except: (1) one hour 
     of debate equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
     ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules; and (2) 
     one motion to recommit.

  Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I 
move the previous question on the resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous 
question.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX, this 15-minute vote on ordering the previous question on H. Res. 
701 will be followed by 5-minute votes on adoption of H. Res. 701, if 
ordered; ordering the previous question on H. Res. 702, by the yeas and 
nays; adoption of H. Res. 702, if ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 216, 
nays 192, not voting 24, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 932]

                               YEAS--216

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)

[[Page H11186]]


     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Mahoney (FL)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--192

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--24

     Barrett (SC)
     Bishop (UT)
     Carson
     Cubin
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Delahunt
     Dingell
     Ellison
     Frank (MA)
     Hastert
     Higgins
     Jefferson
     Jindal
     Jones (OH)
     Lee
     Lynch
     Maloney (NY)
     McMorris Rodgers
     Paul
     Perlmutter
     Pitts
     Space
     Tancredo
     Waters

                              {time}  1202

  Messrs. RYAN of Wisconsin, CASTLE, and HALL of Texas changed their 
vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So the previous question was ordered.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________