[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 144 (Wednesday, September 26, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12123-S12126]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008--Continued

  Mr. McCONNELL. Are we back on the Defense bill?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.


                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. I send a motion to invoke cloture on the underlying 
bill to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Calendar No. 
     189, H.R. 1585, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
     year 2008.
         Mitch McConnell, C.S. Bond, David Vitter, Lisa Murkowski, 
           R.F. Bennett, John Coburn, Lindsey Graham, Norm 
           Coleman, Michael B. Enzi, John Thune, Jon Kyl, Richard 
           Burr, Wayne Allard, Ted Stevens, Jeff Sessions, J.M. 
           Inhofe, Thad Cochran.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I want to take a few brief moments to 
explain my votes this afternoon on two amendments to the Defense 
authorization bill. The first, a resolution offered by my good friend 
from Delaware, and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Biden, expressed the Senate's support for helping the Iraqis to seek a 
political solution to the current conflict in that country by 
supporting three Federal regions in Iraq.
  It is still my position that the United States should not impose a 
political solution on the Iraqis to which Iraqis are opposed. According 
to recent polling in Iraq, it seems as though Iraqis are not yet ready 
to divide their country along these lines. However, sectarian divisions 
are already occurring by huge internal displacements in Iraq which are 
direct results of the level of carnage and violence in that country. 
And if Iraqis should decide that they would like to devolve their 
country into three separate sectarian regions, and if they choose this 
method as the best means for ending the current conflict in that 
country, then I would wholeheartedly support that decision. This 
resolution calls for exploring that option, and if Iraqis decide to do 
so, then I will strongly support such action.
  I am deeply worried by the language contained in the Kyl-Lieberman 
amendment, and for what purposes this language was introduced. Let me 
be very clear, the Iranian regime is behaving in deeply troubling ways, 
in its quest to secretly acquire nuclear weapons, to destabilize Iraq 
and Lebanon, and by calling for the destruction of the State of Israel. 
We must deal with the various threats Iran poses in an effective, 
smart, and multilateral way, and I am prepared to do just that.
  But we must also learn the lessons of the runup to the Iraq war, when 
this body passed seemingly innocuous nonbinding language that ended up 
having profound consequences. Our President must use robust diplomacy 
to address our concerns with Iran, not turn to the language in the Kyl 
amendment to justify his action if he decides to draw this country into 
another disastrous war of choice.
  I wholeheartedly agree that we should increase the economic pressure 
on the Revolutionary Guard, or any other entity of Iran, and that is 
why as chairman of the Banking Committee, I held a hearing to determine 
how best to use targeted, robust, and effective sanctions against any 
elements in the Iranian regime who are supporting and exporting 
terrorism and extremism.
  But this amendment would not increase economic pressure on the 
Iranian regime--instead it would provide bellicose rhetoric which may 
serve as the basis of future military action against Iran. For that 
reason, I staunchly oppose it.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to speak to an amendment that 
would increase the maximum Federal age limit at which a member of the 
military, who has been honorably discharged, may become a Federal law 
enforcement officer.
  Military servicemembers make extraordinary sacrifices on our Nation's 
behalf. They are the defenders of our freedoms, our liberties, and our 
security. We owe each of them a great debt, and any appropriate 
compensation we can offer is a step toward repaying that national 
obligation.
  Many of our brave soldiers joined the world's finest military when 
they were 18 years of age. Large numbers of them become career 
soldiers, serving 20 years or more before retiring.
  However, current U.S. law states that applicants to Federal law 
enforcement positions must be between 23 and 37 years old. A 
servicemember who joins the military at the age of 18 and serves 
honorably for 20 years falls outside this federally mandated age range. 
I am sure my Senate colleagues would agree that members of the 
military, with their training and experience, can be highly suited for 
positions in Federal law enforcement, and if otherwise qualified should 
not be prohibited from further serving their country by an arbitrary, 
maximum age limit.
  My amendment would increase the maximum age for Federal law 
enforcement recruitment to 47 years old for military personnel who 
receive an honorable discharge. This means that many more honorably 
discharged military members will be able to seek employment with 
Federal law enforcement agencies. This amendment is an important tool 
in both recruiting and retaining fine servicemembers. It is my hope 
that more would be willing to remain in the military, knowing that 
after they complete 20 years in uniform, they will still have the 
opportunity to serve our country as Federal law enforcement officers.
  I have heard from several servicemembers who are considering an early 
departure from the military so that they can become Federal law 
enforcement officers. It should be remembered that many of these 
soldiers already have the necessary security clearances for these 
positions. Furthermore, I believe Federal law enforcement training 
costs would be largely reduced because of the military training of 
these individuals. The American people need qualified, competent law 
enforcement officers, and what greater pool from which to draw than 
experienced and professional military retirees? I am anxious to see 
this arbitrary retirement limit changed for military personnel and I 
encourage my colleagues to support this important amendment.

[[Page S12124]]

  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, in recent years, our country has seen a 
major shift in the way that our National Guard has been used. 
Traditionally, our Guard units have supplemented our active duty troops 
during a major war or conflict. But as America faces ever-increasing 
military challenges, we see these citizen soldiers now replacing active 
duty troops in operations around the world. Since September 11, many 
Guard members have been called to active duty for multiple tours, and 
this is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
  The National Guard has played a critical role in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Currently, almost 15,000 
guardsmen and women are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and 242,271 
have been deployed since the beginning of Operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. These tours have stretched our National Guard to the 
limit, and have severely depleted our Guard's equipment. In reality, 
much of the equipment that is sent into theater never returns with the 
Guard units when their tour of duty is complete. This exacerbates the 
issue of equipment reset.
  While we consider the strain that our current operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are placing on our National Guard, we must also remember 
that the Guard has another important responsibility: providing security 
at home. In the past few years, we have seen the valuable role that the 
Army and Air National Guard play in providing support during domestic 
emergencies. I know that in my State of New Jersey, the National Guard 
came to the rescue during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and was also 
instrumental in helping during the aftermath of the flooding that 
wracked New Jersey last year. The guardsmen and women also provided 
critical support in response to the hurricanes that severely damaged 
the gulf coast in 2005. Unfortunately, our current military operations 
abroad have left our National Guard without much of the equipment it 
needs to respond to some of the domestic emergencies I have just 
mentioned.
  In February of this year, the National Guard Bureau released a report 
entitled ``National Guard Equipment Requirements,'' which detailed the 
``Essential 10'' equipment needs to support domestic missions. The 
shortfalls in equipment total $4 billion, and cover areas including 
logistics, security, transportation, communications, medical, 
engineering, aviation, maintenance, civil support teams and force 
protection, and join force headquarters and command and control. 
Without the proper equipment, the National Guard will not be able to 
respond as quickly and effectively in missions here at home.
  We saw an example of this in May when tornadoes ripped through 
Kansas. Although the Kansas National Guard was able to respond to the 
disaster, Governor Sebelius spoke out about the challenges her State 
faces due to the severe equipment shortages. National Guard units 
throughout the country are facing such equipment shortfalls, and with 
tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and forest fires affecting our nation 
annually, it is imperative that the National Guard have the equipment 
it needs to respond accordingly in the face of these emergencies.
  That is why I introduced the recently passed amendment that expresses 
the sense of Congress that the Army and Air National Guard should have 
sufficient equipment available to achieve their missions inside the 
United States and to protect the homeland.
  This Congress always talks about supporting our troops--well we need 
to remember that supporting our troops means supporting the National 
Guard and providing them with the equipment they need not only for 
missions abroad but here at home. In the coming months, I will be 
working with my colleagues to see that this Congress provides the 
necessary funding to address these severe equipment shortages. In the 
meantime, I hope that the entire Senate will support this amendment.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, our Nation's bomber fleet is a vital 
national asset. Bombers today offer global reach, operational 
responsiveness, and close air support for troops on the ground in ways 
that their designers could never have imagined. While our bomber fleet 
is currently aging, there is virtually no chance that new long-range 
bombers will enter service before 2020.
  If we remove bombers from our active force and do not furnish them 
with critical upgrade programs, they will be irretrievably lost. This 
will create a ``bathtub'' in bomber capabilities that will last over a 
decade.
  Over the last 2 years, the administration has proposed dramatically 
downsizing our bomber force, particularly by cutting the B-52 force 
from 94 aircraft to 56. Neither the House nor the Senate found the 
administration's arguments for cutting the bomber fleet persuasive. 
They both concluded that making deep B-52 retirements would put at risk 
our military's ability to carry out the national security strategy. Let 
me quote from the House Armed Services Committee's report:

       Committee also understands that the current B-52 combat 
     coded force structure is insufficient to meet combatant 
     commander requirements for conventional long range strike, if 
     the need should arise to conduct simultaneous operations in 
     two major regional conflicts.

  The Senate Armed Services Committee had similar concerns:

       The Committee is concerned that any further reduction in 
     the B-52H total aircraft inventory will create unacceptable 
     risk to national security and may prevent our ability to 
     strike the required conventional target set during times of 
     war.

  Because of these concerns, last year Congress enacted defense 
legislation allowing the retirement of only 18 B-52s, reducing the 
fleet to 76. But the law required that the savings from those 
retirements be devoted to modernizing the remaining bombers, and the 
law prohibited any further retirements until a next generation bomber 
was available--probably around 2018.
  I will ask that section 131 of the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 be printed in the Record, along 
with the relevant sections of the House and Senate Armed Services 
Committees' reports on that law.
  Unfortunately, there have been some efforts to try to find a way 
around that law. For a while, it looked like there might be an effort 
to play games with the assignments of the B-52 fleet, by doubling up 
the assignments of aircraft that we now use for training and calling 
them ``dual coded'' training and combat aircraft. Then, instead of 
retiring B-52s, they would simply mothball them. But mothballed 
aircraft will do nothing to preserve our ability to fight and win two 
wars.
  Based on the analysis of the Armed Services Committee and my own 
staff's analysis, it is clear that slashing the size of our B-52 force 
would significantly increase the risks we face in fighting and winning 
two nearly simultaneous contingencies. If we retired 38 B-52s, it would 
be impossible for the Air Force to deploy a bomber force comparable to 
the one we used during the initial days of the war in Iraq. During the 
initial 30 days of combat in Iraq, the Air Force used more than 80 B-
52s so it could sustain a deployed force of 42 B-52s at forward 
operating locations overseas. Obviously, the Air Force could not repeat 
that feat with just 56 B-52s.
  Moreover, the war in Iraq has tied down a large share of our land 
forces and increased our dependence on the Air Force for dealing with 
any additional crises. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Peter Pace 
has made the situation very clear. He said, ``If another, [conflict] 
popped up tomorrow, regardless of where, . . . you would have the Navy 
and the Air Force being able to get there very quickly.''
  Because we were concerned about the risks to our warfighting ability, 
last year Congress barred the Pentagon from retiring B-52s until the 
submission of a comprehensive Bomber Roadmap study by an independent 
research institution. That study still has not been completed.
  Some people have tried to tie the B-52 issue to an altogether 
different question: whether the Air Force will be allowed to retire a 
long list of old aircraft in its inventory that currently have 
restrictions on their operation or are even grounded. Let me be clear. 
As chairman of the Budget Committee, I strongly agree that we need to 
retire unserviceable aircraft. There is no point in paying to maintain 
aircraft that we cannot fly.
  The B-52 is not part of that problem. While it has flown for many 
years, the B-52 is still a young aircraft in flying

[[Page S12125]]

hour terms. The Air Force has said that today's H-model B-52 is flyable 
for another 30 to 40 years. Most commercial airliners have several 
times as many cycles per aircraft and airframe hours as the B-52, which 
spent most of the Cold War sitting alert on the ground.

  In fact, the B-52 is in many ways the most valuable aircraft in our 
inventory. Today's B-52 has been modernized and can carry the widest 
range of weapons of any aircraft we own. It has the highest mission 
capable rate in the bomber force, and it costs the least to operate of 
any bomber. The FY 2006 reimbursement rate for the B-52 is $10,000 per 
flying hour less than the B-1B and $4,000 per flying hour less than the 
B-2.
  Does it make sense to try to save money by cutting the portion of the 
bomber force that is by far the least expensive to operate and has the 
highest utilization and mission capable rates? I don't think so.
  The B-52 is an indispensable tool for our nation's military, being 
used in combat overseas on a daily basis. It is crucial that we 
maintain a sizeable bomber force and that each plane is outfitted with 
the most technologically advanced equipment.
  The Conrad-Dorgan-Landrieu-Vitter amendment reinforces the law we 
passed last year requiring a B-52 force of no less than 76 aircraft. 
This amendment requires that the 76 aircraft B-52 force include 63 
active aircraft, 11 backup aircraft and two reserve aircraft, just as 
it did in 2006. It will prohibit the Pentagon from reducing the 
maintenance status of some B-52s and creating ``hangar queens'' that 
are not regularly flown.
  The Conrad amendment also requires technological upgrades to the 
entire B-52 fleet, ensuring the planes are using the latest in defense 
technology. It states that the entire fleet must be kept in a ``common 
configuration.'' The Senate and House Armed Services Committees have 
already authorized additional funding for B-52s to ensure that the full 
76 aircraft fleet is upgraded.
  It makes absolutely no sense to try to save money by cutting the 
cheapest bombers to operate. With ongoing conflicts in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world, our Nation should 
accelerate the modernization of our bomber force rather than shrinking 
it.
  I thank the distinguished managers of the bill for their support of 
this amendment and look forward to working with them as the Defense 
authorization bill moves toward enactment.
  I ask unanimous consent that the material to which I referred be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       H.R. 5122 (National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007)

     SEC. 131. BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE.

       Requirement for B-52 Force Structure--
       (1) Retirement limitation.--During the B-52 retirement 
     limitation period, the Secretary of the Air Force--
       (A) may not retire more than 18 B-52 aircraft; and
       (B) shall maintain not less than 44 such aircraft as 
     combat-coded aircraft.
       (2) B-52 Retirement limitation period.--For purposes of 
     paragraph (1), the B-52 retirement limitation period is the 
     period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     ending on the date that is the earlier of--
       (A) January 1, 2018
       (A); and
       (B) the date as of which a long-range strike replacement 
     aircraft with equal or greater capability than the B-52H 
     model aircraft has attained initial operational capability 
     status.
       (b) Limitation on Retirement Pending Report on Bomber Force 
     Structure--
       (1) Limitation.--No funds authorized to be appropriated for 
     the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for 
     retiring any of the 93 B-52H bomber aircraft in service in 
     the Air Force as of the date of the enactment of this Act 
     until 45 days after, the date on which the Secretary of the 
     Air Force submits the report specified in paragraph (2).
       (2) Report.--A report specified in this subsection is a 
     report submitted by the Secretary of the Air Force to the 
     Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives on the amount and type of bomber force 
     structure of the Air Force, including the matters specified 
     in paragraph (4).
       (3) Amount and type of bomber force structure defined.--In 
     this subsection, the term ``amount and type of bomber force 
     structure'' means the number of each of the following types 
     of aircraft that are required to carry out the national 
     security strategy of the United States:
       (A) B-2 bomber aircraft.
       (B) B-52H bomber aircraft.
       (C) B-1 bomber aircraft.
       (4) Matter to be included.--A report under paragraph (2) 
     shall include the following:
       (A) The plan of the Secretary of the Air Force for the 
     modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bomber aircraft 
     fleets.
       (B) The amount and type of bomber force structure for the 
     conventional mission and strategic nuclear mission in 
     executing two overlapping ``swift defeat'' campaigns.
       (C) A justification of the cost and projected savings of 
     any reductions to the B-52H bomber aircraft fleet as a result 
     of the retirement of the B-52H bomber aircraft covered by the 
     report.
       (D) The life expectancy of each bomber aircraft to remain 
     in the bomber force structure.
       (E) The capabilities of the bomber force structure that 
     would be replaced, augmented, or superseded by any new bomber 
     aircraft.
       (5) Preparation of Report.--A report under paragraph (2) 
     shall be prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses and 
     submitted to the Secretary of the Air Force for submittal by 
     the Secretary in accordance with that paragraph.
                                  ____


 House Report 109-452 on H.R. 5122 (National Defense Authorization Act 
                              for FY 2007)


                          B-52 force structure

       The budget request included a proposal to retire 18 B-52 
     aircraft in fiscal year 2007, and 20 B-52 aircraft in fiscal 
     year 2008.
       The committee understands that the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
     Review directed the Air Force to reduce the B-52 force to 56 
     aircraft and use the savings to fully modernize the remaining 
     B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s to support global strike operations. 
     However, the committee understands that the estimated $680.0 
     million savings garnered from the proposed B-52 retirement in 
     the remaining Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) has not 
     been reinvested into modernizing the current bomber force, 
     but has instead been applied towards Air Force 
     transformational activities. The committee also understands 
     that the current B-52 combat coded force structure is 
     insufficient to meet combatant commander requirements for 
     conventional long-range strike, if the need should arise to 
     conduct simultaneous operations in two major regional 
     conflicts.
       Additionally, the committee is concerned that the decision 
     to retire 38 B-52 aircraft is primarily based on the nuclear 
     warfighting requirements of the Strategic Integrated 
     Operations Plan, and did not consider the role of the B-52 in 
     meeting combatant commander's conventional long-range strike 
     requirements. The committee disagrees with the decision to 
     reduce the B-52 force structure given that the Air Force has 
     not begun the planned analysis of alternatives to determine 
     what conventional long-range strike capabilities and 
     platforms will be needed to meet future requirements.
       The committee is deeply concerned that retirement of any B-
     52 aircraft prior to a replacement long-range strike aircraft 
     reaching initial operational capability status is premature. 
     Further, the committee strongly opposes a strategy to reduce 
     capability in present day conventional long-range strike 
     capability in order to provide funding for a replacement 
     capability that is not projected to achieve initial 
     operational capability until well into the future.
       Therefore, the committee included a provision (section 131) 
     in this Act that would prohibit the Air Force from retiring 
     any B-52 aircraft, except for the one B-52 aircraft no longer 
     in use by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
     for testing.
       Additionally, this section would require the Air Force to 
     maintain a minimum B-52 force structure of 44 combat coded 
     aircraft until the year 2018, or until a long-range strike 
     replacement aircraft with equal or greater capability than 
     the B-52H model has attained initial operational capability 
     status.
                                  ____


 Senate Report 109-254 on S. 2766 (National Defense Authorization Act 
                              for FY 2007)


      Limitation on retirement of B-52H bomber aircraft (sec. 144)

       The committee recommends a provision that would authorize 
     the Secretary of the Air Force to retire up to and including 
     18 B-52H aircraft of the Air Force. The committee expects the 
     remaining B-52H aircraft inventory to be maintained in a 
     common aircraft configuration that includes the Electronic 
     Countermeasure Improvement, the Avionics Mid-life 
     Improvement, and the Combat Network Communication Technology 
     modification efforts. The committee expects no further 
     reduction in the B-52H total aircraft inventory, including 
     the current inventory levels for combat coded Primary Mission 
     Aircraft Inventory and Primary Training Aircraft Inventory. 
     The committee is concerned that any further reduction in the 
     B-52H total aircraft inventory will create unacceptable risk 
     to our national security and may prevent our ability to 
     strike the required conventional target set during times of 
     war.


             Retirement of B-52H bomber aircraft (sec. 145)

       The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit 
     the use of any funds available to the Department of Defense 
     from being obligated or expended for retiring or dismantling 
     any of the 93 B-52H bomber aircraft in service in the Air 
     Force as of June

[[Page S12126]]

     1, 2006, until 30 days after the Secretary of the Air Force 
     submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives a report on the bomber force 
     structure. The committee directs that the report shall be 
     conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses and provided 
     to the Secretary of the Air Force for transmittal to 
     Congress. The committee is troubled that the Air Force would 
     reduce the B-52 bomber fleet without a comprehensive analysis 
     of the bomber force structure similar to the last 
     comprehensive long range bomber study, which was conducted in 
     1999.
                                  ____


Conference Report 109-702 on H.R. 5122 (National Defense Authorization 
                            Act for FY 2007)


                   Bomber force structure (sec. 131)

       The House bill contained a provision (sec. 131) that would 
     prohibit the Air Force from retiring any B-52 aircraft, 
     except for the one B-52 aircraft no longer in use by the 
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration for testing. 
     The provision would require the Air Force to maintain a 
     minimum of 44 B-52H combat coded aircraft until the year 2018 
     or until a long-range strike replacement aircraft with equal 
     or greater capability than the B-52H model has attained 
     initial operational capability.
       The Senate amendment contained similar provisions (secs. 
     144-145). Section 144 would allow the Secretary of the Air 
     Force to retire up to 18 B-52H bomber aircraft in fiscal year 
     2007. Section 145 would prevent the obligation or expenditure 
     of funds for the retirement or dismantling of any of the 93 
     B-52H bomber aircraft in service in the Air Force as of June 
     1, 2006, until the Secretary submits to the Committees on 
     Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
     a report on the amount and type of bomber force structure 
     required to carry out the National Security Strategy of the 
     United States.
       The Senate recedes with an amendment that would authorize 
     the Secretary to retire up to 18 B-52H bomber aircraft, but 
     maintain not less than 44 combat coded B-52H bomber aircraft, 
     beginning 45 days after the Secretary submits to the 
     Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives a report prepared by the Institute for 
     Defense Analyses on the amount and type of bomber force 
     structure required to carry out the National Security 
     Strategy of the United States. The amendment would also 
     prohibit retirement of more than 18 B-52s until a long-range 
     strike replacement aircraft with equal or greater capability 
     has attained initial operational capability status or until 
     January 1, 2018, whichever occurs first.
       The conferees direct the Secretary to include in the 
     report:
       (1) the plans to modernize the Air Force bomber fleets;
       (2) the amount and type of bomber force required in 
     executing two overlapping `swift defeat' campaigns involving 
     both conventional and strategic nuclear missions;
       (3) a justification of the cost and projected savings 
     associated with any reductions to the B-52H bomber aircraft 
     fleet;
       (4) the life expectancy of each bomber aircraft to remain 
     in the bomber force structure; and
       (5) the capabilities of the bomber force structure that 
     would be replaced, augmented, or superceded by any new bomber 
     aircraft.
       The conferees expect the Secretary to maintain all retired 
     B-52H bomber aircraft, retired in fiscal year 2007 or later, 
     in a condition known as `Type-1000 storage' at the Aircraft 
     Maintenance and Regeneration Center.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

                          ____________________