[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 144 (Wednesday, September 26, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12123-S12126]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008--Continued
Mr. McCONNELL. Are we back on the Defense bill?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Cloture Motion
Mr. McCONNELL. I send a motion to invoke cloture on the underlying
bill to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Calendar No.
189, H.R. 1585, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2008.
Mitch McConnell, C.S. Bond, David Vitter, Lisa Murkowski,
R.F. Bennett, John Coburn, Lindsey Graham, Norm
Coleman, Michael B. Enzi, John Thune, Jon Kyl, Richard
Burr, Wayne Allard, Ted Stevens, Jeff Sessions, J.M.
Inhofe, Thad Cochran.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I want to take a few brief moments to
explain my votes this afternoon on two amendments to the Defense
authorization bill. The first, a resolution offered by my good friend
from Delaware, and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Biden, expressed the Senate's support for helping the Iraqis to seek a
political solution to the current conflict in that country by
supporting three Federal regions in Iraq.
It is still my position that the United States should not impose a
political solution on the Iraqis to which Iraqis are opposed. According
to recent polling in Iraq, it seems as though Iraqis are not yet ready
to divide their country along these lines. However, sectarian divisions
are already occurring by huge internal displacements in Iraq which are
direct results of the level of carnage and violence in that country.
And if Iraqis should decide that they would like to devolve their
country into three separate sectarian regions, and if they choose this
method as the best means for ending the current conflict in that
country, then I would wholeheartedly support that decision. This
resolution calls for exploring that option, and if Iraqis decide to do
so, then I will strongly support such action.
I am deeply worried by the language contained in the Kyl-Lieberman
amendment, and for what purposes this language was introduced. Let me
be very clear, the Iranian regime is behaving in deeply troubling ways,
in its quest to secretly acquire nuclear weapons, to destabilize Iraq
and Lebanon, and by calling for the destruction of the State of Israel.
We must deal with the various threats Iran poses in an effective,
smart, and multilateral way, and I am prepared to do just that.
But we must also learn the lessons of the runup to the Iraq war, when
this body passed seemingly innocuous nonbinding language that ended up
having profound consequences. Our President must use robust diplomacy
to address our concerns with Iran, not turn to the language in the Kyl
amendment to justify his action if he decides to draw this country into
another disastrous war of choice.
I wholeheartedly agree that we should increase the economic pressure
on the Revolutionary Guard, or any other entity of Iran, and that is
why as chairman of the Banking Committee, I held a hearing to determine
how best to use targeted, robust, and effective sanctions against any
elements in the Iranian regime who are supporting and exporting
terrorism and extremism.
But this amendment would not increase economic pressure on the
Iranian regime--instead it would provide bellicose rhetoric which may
serve as the basis of future military action against Iran. For that
reason, I staunchly oppose it.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to speak to an amendment that
would increase the maximum Federal age limit at which a member of the
military, who has been honorably discharged, may become a Federal law
enforcement officer.
Military servicemembers make extraordinary sacrifices on our Nation's
behalf. They are the defenders of our freedoms, our liberties, and our
security. We owe each of them a great debt, and any appropriate
compensation we can offer is a step toward repaying that national
obligation.
Many of our brave soldiers joined the world's finest military when
they were 18 years of age. Large numbers of them become career
soldiers, serving 20 years or more before retiring.
However, current U.S. law states that applicants to Federal law
enforcement positions must be between 23 and 37 years old. A
servicemember who joins the military at the age of 18 and serves
honorably for 20 years falls outside this federally mandated age range.
I am sure my Senate colleagues would agree that members of the
military, with their training and experience, can be highly suited for
positions in Federal law enforcement, and if otherwise qualified should
not be prohibited from further serving their country by an arbitrary,
maximum age limit.
My amendment would increase the maximum age for Federal law
enforcement recruitment to 47 years old for military personnel who
receive an honorable discharge. This means that many more honorably
discharged military members will be able to seek employment with
Federal law enforcement agencies. This amendment is an important tool
in both recruiting and retaining fine servicemembers. It is my hope
that more would be willing to remain in the military, knowing that
after they complete 20 years in uniform, they will still have the
opportunity to serve our country as Federal law enforcement officers.
I have heard from several servicemembers who are considering an early
departure from the military so that they can become Federal law
enforcement officers. It should be remembered that many of these
soldiers already have the necessary security clearances for these
positions. Furthermore, I believe Federal law enforcement training
costs would be largely reduced because of the military training of
these individuals. The American people need qualified, competent law
enforcement officers, and what greater pool from which to draw than
experienced and professional military retirees? I am anxious to see
this arbitrary retirement limit changed for military personnel and I
encourage my colleagues to support this important amendment.
[[Page S12124]]
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, in recent years, our country has seen a
major shift in the way that our National Guard has been used.
Traditionally, our Guard units have supplemented our active duty troops
during a major war or conflict. But as America faces ever-increasing
military challenges, we see these citizen soldiers now replacing active
duty troops in operations around the world. Since September 11, many
Guard members have been called to active duty for multiple tours, and
this is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
The National Guard has played a critical role in Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Currently, almost 15,000
guardsmen and women are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and 242,271
have been deployed since the beginning of Operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. These tours have stretched our National Guard to the
limit, and have severely depleted our Guard's equipment. In reality,
much of the equipment that is sent into theater never returns with the
Guard units when their tour of duty is complete. This exacerbates the
issue of equipment reset.
While we consider the strain that our current operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan are placing on our National Guard, we must also remember
that the Guard has another important responsibility: providing security
at home. In the past few years, we have seen the valuable role that the
Army and Air National Guard play in providing support during domestic
emergencies. I know that in my State of New Jersey, the National Guard
came to the rescue during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and was also
instrumental in helping during the aftermath of the flooding that
wracked New Jersey last year. The guardsmen and women also provided
critical support in response to the hurricanes that severely damaged
the gulf coast in 2005. Unfortunately, our current military operations
abroad have left our National Guard without much of the equipment it
needs to respond to some of the domestic emergencies I have just
mentioned.
In February of this year, the National Guard Bureau released a report
entitled ``National Guard Equipment Requirements,'' which detailed the
``Essential 10'' equipment needs to support domestic missions. The
shortfalls in equipment total $4 billion, and cover areas including
logistics, security, transportation, communications, medical,
engineering, aviation, maintenance, civil support teams and force
protection, and join force headquarters and command and control.
Without the proper equipment, the National Guard will not be able to
respond as quickly and effectively in missions here at home.
We saw an example of this in May when tornadoes ripped through
Kansas. Although the Kansas National Guard was able to respond to the
disaster, Governor Sebelius spoke out about the challenges her State
faces due to the severe equipment shortages. National Guard units
throughout the country are facing such equipment shortfalls, and with
tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and forest fires affecting our nation
annually, it is imperative that the National Guard have the equipment
it needs to respond accordingly in the face of these emergencies.
That is why I introduced the recently passed amendment that expresses
the sense of Congress that the Army and Air National Guard should have
sufficient equipment available to achieve their missions inside the
United States and to protect the homeland.
This Congress always talks about supporting our troops--well we need
to remember that supporting our troops means supporting the National
Guard and providing them with the equipment they need not only for
missions abroad but here at home. In the coming months, I will be
working with my colleagues to see that this Congress provides the
necessary funding to address these severe equipment shortages. In the
meantime, I hope that the entire Senate will support this amendment.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, our Nation's bomber fleet is a vital
national asset. Bombers today offer global reach, operational
responsiveness, and close air support for troops on the ground in ways
that their designers could never have imagined. While our bomber fleet
is currently aging, there is virtually no chance that new long-range
bombers will enter service before 2020.
If we remove bombers from our active force and do not furnish them
with critical upgrade programs, they will be irretrievably lost. This
will create a ``bathtub'' in bomber capabilities that will last over a
decade.
Over the last 2 years, the administration has proposed dramatically
downsizing our bomber force, particularly by cutting the B-52 force
from 94 aircraft to 56. Neither the House nor the Senate found the
administration's arguments for cutting the bomber fleet persuasive.
They both concluded that making deep B-52 retirements would put at risk
our military's ability to carry out the national security strategy. Let
me quote from the House Armed Services Committee's report:
Committee also understands that the current B-52 combat
coded force structure is insufficient to meet combatant
commander requirements for conventional long range strike, if
the need should arise to conduct simultaneous operations in
two major regional conflicts.
The Senate Armed Services Committee had similar concerns:
The Committee is concerned that any further reduction in
the B-52H total aircraft inventory will create unacceptable
risk to national security and may prevent our ability to
strike the required conventional target set during times of
war.
Because of these concerns, last year Congress enacted defense
legislation allowing the retirement of only 18 B-52s, reducing the
fleet to 76. But the law required that the savings from those
retirements be devoted to modernizing the remaining bombers, and the
law prohibited any further retirements until a next generation bomber
was available--probably around 2018.
I will ask that section 131 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 be printed in the Record, along
with the relevant sections of the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees' reports on that law.
Unfortunately, there have been some efforts to try to find a way
around that law. For a while, it looked like there might be an effort
to play games with the assignments of the B-52 fleet, by doubling up
the assignments of aircraft that we now use for training and calling
them ``dual coded'' training and combat aircraft. Then, instead of
retiring B-52s, they would simply mothball them. But mothballed
aircraft will do nothing to preserve our ability to fight and win two
wars.
Based on the analysis of the Armed Services Committee and my own
staff's analysis, it is clear that slashing the size of our B-52 force
would significantly increase the risks we face in fighting and winning
two nearly simultaneous contingencies. If we retired 38 B-52s, it would
be impossible for the Air Force to deploy a bomber force comparable to
the one we used during the initial days of the war in Iraq. During the
initial 30 days of combat in Iraq, the Air Force used more than 80 B-
52s so it could sustain a deployed force of 42 B-52s at forward
operating locations overseas. Obviously, the Air Force could not repeat
that feat with just 56 B-52s.
Moreover, the war in Iraq has tied down a large share of our land
forces and increased our dependence on the Air Force for dealing with
any additional crises. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Peter Pace
has made the situation very clear. He said, ``If another, [conflict]
popped up tomorrow, regardless of where, . . . you would have the Navy
and the Air Force being able to get there very quickly.''
Because we were concerned about the risks to our warfighting ability,
last year Congress barred the Pentagon from retiring B-52s until the
submission of a comprehensive Bomber Roadmap study by an independent
research institution. That study still has not been completed.
Some people have tried to tie the B-52 issue to an altogether
different question: whether the Air Force will be allowed to retire a
long list of old aircraft in its inventory that currently have
restrictions on their operation or are even grounded. Let me be clear.
As chairman of the Budget Committee, I strongly agree that we need to
retire unserviceable aircraft. There is no point in paying to maintain
aircraft that we cannot fly.
The B-52 is not part of that problem. While it has flown for many
years, the B-52 is still a young aircraft in flying
[[Page S12125]]
hour terms. The Air Force has said that today's H-model B-52 is flyable
for another 30 to 40 years. Most commercial airliners have several
times as many cycles per aircraft and airframe hours as the B-52, which
spent most of the Cold War sitting alert on the ground.
In fact, the B-52 is in many ways the most valuable aircraft in our
inventory. Today's B-52 has been modernized and can carry the widest
range of weapons of any aircraft we own. It has the highest mission
capable rate in the bomber force, and it costs the least to operate of
any bomber. The FY 2006 reimbursement rate for the B-52 is $10,000 per
flying hour less than the B-1B and $4,000 per flying hour less than the
B-2.
Does it make sense to try to save money by cutting the portion of the
bomber force that is by far the least expensive to operate and has the
highest utilization and mission capable rates? I don't think so.
The B-52 is an indispensable tool for our nation's military, being
used in combat overseas on a daily basis. It is crucial that we
maintain a sizeable bomber force and that each plane is outfitted with
the most technologically advanced equipment.
The Conrad-Dorgan-Landrieu-Vitter amendment reinforces the law we
passed last year requiring a B-52 force of no less than 76 aircraft.
This amendment requires that the 76 aircraft B-52 force include 63
active aircraft, 11 backup aircraft and two reserve aircraft, just as
it did in 2006. It will prohibit the Pentagon from reducing the
maintenance status of some B-52s and creating ``hangar queens'' that
are not regularly flown.
The Conrad amendment also requires technological upgrades to the
entire B-52 fleet, ensuring the planes are using the latest in defense
technology. It states that the entire fleet must be kept in a ``common
configuration.'' The Senate and House Armed Services Committees have
already authorized additional funding for B-52s to ensure that the full
76 aircraft fleet is upgraded.
It makes absolutely no sense to try to save money by cutting the
cheapest bombers to operate. With ongoing conflicts in Iraq,
Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world, our Nation should
accelerate the modernization of our bomber force rather than shrinking
it.
I thank the distinguished managers of the bill for their support of
this amendment and look forward to working with them as the Defense
authorization bill moves toward enactment.
I ask unanimous consent that the material to which I referred be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
H.R. 5122 (National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007)
SEC. 131. BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE.
Requirement for B-52 Force Structure--
(1) Retirement limitation.--During the B-52 retirement
limitation period, the Secretary of the Air Force--
(A) may not retire more than 18 B-52 aircraft; and
(B) shall maintain not less than 44 such aircraft as
combat-coded aircraft.
(2) B-52 Retirement limitation period.--For purposes of
paragraph (1), the B-52 retirement limitation period is the
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and
ending on the date that is the earlier of--
(A) January 1, 2018
(A); and
(B) the date as of which a long-range strike replacement
aircraft with equal or greater capability than the B-52H
model aircraft has attained initial operational capability
status.
(b) Limitation on Retirement Pending Report on Bomber Force
Structure--
(1) Limitation.--No funds authorized to be appropriated for
the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for
retiring any of the 93 B-52H bomber aircraft in service in
the Air Force as of the date of the enactment of this Act
until 45 days after, the date on which the Secretary of the
Air Force submits the report specified in paragraph (2).
(2) Report.--A report specified in this subsection is a
report submitted by the Secretary of the Air Force to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the amount and type of bomber force
structure of the Air Force, including the matters specified
in paragraph (4).
(3) Amount and type of bomber force structure defined.--In
this subsection, the term ``amount and type of bomber force
structure'' means the number of each of the following types
of aircraft that are required to carry out the national
security strategy of the United States:
(A) B-2 bomber aircraft.
(B) B-52H bomber aircraft.
(C) B-1 bomber aircraft.
(4) Matter to be included.--A report under paragraph (2)
shall include the following:
(A) The plan of the Secretary of the Air Force for the
modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bomber aircraft
fleets.
(B) The amount and type of bomber force structure for the
conventional mission and strategic nuclear mission in
executing two overlapping ``swift defeat'' campaigns.
(C) A justification of the cost and projected savings of
any reductions to the B-52H bomber aircraft fleet as a result
of the retirement of the B-52H bomber aircraft covered by the
report.
(D) The life expectancy of each bomber aircraft to remain
in the bomber force structure.
(E) The capabilities of the bomber force structure that
would be replaced, augmented, or superseded by any new bomber
aircraft.
(5) Preparation of Report.--A report under paragraph (2)
shall be prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses and
submitted to the Secretary of the Air Force for submittal by
the Secretary in accordance with that paragraph.
____
House Report 109-452 on H.R. 5122 (National Defense Authorization Act
for FY 2007)
B-52 force structure
The budget request included a proposal to retire 18 B-52
aircraft in fiscal year 2007, and 20 B-52 aircraft in fiscal
year 2008.
The committee understands that the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review directed the Air Force to reduce the B-52 force to 56
aircraft and use the savings to fully modernize the remaining
B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s to support global strike operations.
However, the committee understands that the estimated $680.0
million savings garnered from the proposed B-52 retirement in
the remaining Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) has not
been reinvested into modernizing the current bomber force,
but has instead been applied towards Air Force
transformational activities. The committee also understands
that the current B-52 combat coded force structure is
insufficient to meet combatant commander requirements for
conventional long-range strike, if the need should arise to
conduct simultaneous operations in two major regional
conflicts.
Additionally, the committee is concerned that the decision
to retire 38 B-52 aircraft is primarily based on the nuclear
warfighting requirements of the Strategic Integrated
Operations Plan, and did not consider the role of the B-52 in
meeting combatant commander's conventional long-range strike
requirements. The committee disagrees with the decision to
reduce the B-52 force structure given that the Air Force has
not begun the planned analysis of alternatives to determine
what conventional long-range strike capabilities and
platforms will be needed to meet future requirements.
The committee is deeply concerned that retirement of any B-
52 aircraft prior to a replacement long-range strike aircraft
reaching initial operational capability status is premature.
Further, the committee strongly opposes a strategy to reduce
capability in present day conventional long-range strike
capability in order to provide funding for a replacement
capability that is not projected to achieve initial
operational capability until well into the future.
Therefore, the committee included a provision (section 131)
in this Act that would prohibit the Air Force from retiring
any B-52 aircraft, except for the one B-52 aircraft no longer
in use by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
for testing.
Additionally, this section would require the Air Force to
maintain a minimum B-52 force structure of 44 combat coded
aircraft until the year 2018, or until a long-range strike
replacement aircraft with equal or greater capability than
the B-52H model has attained initial operational capability
status.
____
Senate Report 109-254 on S. 2766 (National Defense Authorization Act
for FY 2007)
Limitation on retirement of B-52H bomber aircraft (sec. 144)
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of the Air Force to retire up to and including
18 B-52H aircraft of the Air Force. The committee expects the
remaining B-52H aircraft inventory to be maintained in a
common aircraft configuration that includes the Electronic
Countermeasure Improvement, the Avionics Mid-life
Improvement, and the Combat Network Communication Technology
modification efforts. The committee expects no further
reduction in the B-52H total aircraft inventory, including
the current inventory levels for combat coded Primary Mission
Aircraft Inventory and Primary Training Aircraft Inventory.
The committee is concerned that any further reduction in the
B-52H total aircraft inventory will create unacceptable risk
to our national security and may prevent our ability to
strike the required conventional target set during times of
war.
Retirement of B-52H bomber aircraft (sec. 145)
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the use of any funds available to the Department of Defense
from being obligated or expended for retiring or dismantling
any of the 93 B-52H bomber aircraft in service in the Air
Force as of June
[[Page S12126]]
1, 2006, until 30 days after the Secretary of the Air Force
submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives a report on the bomber force
structure. The committee directs that the report shall be
conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses and provided
to the Secretary of the Air Force for transmittal to
Congress. The committee is troubled that the Air Force would
reduce the B-52 bomber fleet without a comprehensive analysis
of the bomber force structure similar to the last
comprehensive long range bomber study, which was conducted in
1999.
____
Conference Report 109-702 on H.R. 5122 (National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 2007)
Bomber force structure (sec. 131)
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 131) that would
prohibit the Air Force from retiring any B-52 aircraft,
except for the one B-52 aircraft no longer in use by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration for testing.
The provision would require the Air Force to maintain a
minimum of 44 B-52H combat coded aircraft until the year 2018
or until a long-range strike replacement aircraft with equal
or greater capability than the B-52H model has attained
initial operational capability.
The Senate amendment contained similar provisions (secs.
144-145). Section 144 would allow the Secretary of the Air
Force to retire up to 18 B-52H bomber aircraft in fiscal year
2007. Section 145 would prevent the obligation or expenditure
of funds for the retirement or dismantling of any of the 93
B-52H bomber aircraft in service in the Air Force as of June
1, 2006, until the Secretary submits to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
a report on the amount and type of bomber force structure
required to carry out the National Security Strategy of the
United States.
The Senate recedes with an amendment that would authorize
the Secretary to retire up to 18 B-52H bomber aircraft, but
maintain not less than 44 combat coded B-52H bomber aircraft,
beginning 45 days after the Secretary submits to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives a report prepared by the Institute for
Defense Analyses on the amount and type of bomber force
structure required to carry out the National Security
Strategy of the United States. The amendment would also
prohibit retirement of more than 18 B-52s until a long-range
strike replacement aircraft with equal or greater capability
has attained initial operational capability status or until
January 1, 2018, whichever occurs first.
The conferees direct the Secretary to include in the
report:
(1) the plans to modernize the Air Force bomber fleets;
(2) the amount and type of bomber force required in
executing two overlapping `swift defeat' campaigns involving
both conventional and strategic nuclear missions;
(3) a justification of the cost and projected savings
associated with any reductions to the B-52H bomber aircraft
fleet;
(4) the life expectancy of each bomber aircraft to remain
in the bomber force structure; and
(5) the capabilities of the bomber force structure that
would be replaced, augmented, or superceded by any new bomber
aircraft.
The conferees expect the Secretary to maintain all retired
B-52H bomber aircraft, retired in fiscal year 2007 or later,
in a condition known as `Type-1000 storage' at the Aircraft
Maintenance and Regeneration Center.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
____________________