[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 144 (Wednesday, September 26, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12093-S12115]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
resume consideration of H.R. 1585, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 1585) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2008 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other 
     purposes.

  Pending:

       Nelson (NE)(for Levin) amendment No. 2011, in the nature of 
     a substitute.
       Warner (for Graham-Kyl) amendment No. 2064 (to amendment 
     No. 2011), to strike section 1023, relating to the granting 
     of civil rights to terror suspects.
       Kyl-Lieberman amendment No. 3017 (to amendment No. 2011), 
     to express the sense of the Senate regarding Iran.
       Biden amendment No. 2997 (to amendment No. 2011), to 
     express the sense of Congress on federalism in Iraq.
       Reid (for Kennedy-Smith) amendment No. 3035 (to the 
     language proposed to be stricken by amendment No. 2064), to 
     provide Federal assistance to States, local jurisdictions, 
     and Indian tribes to prosecute hate crimes.
       Motion to recommit the bill to the Committee on Armed 
     Services, with instructions to report back forthwith, with 
     Reid amendment No. 3038, to change the enactment date.
       Reid amendment No. 3039 (to the instructions of the motion 
     to recommit), of a technical nature.
       Reid amendment No. 3040 (to amendment No. 3039), of a 
     technical nature.
       Casey (for Hatch) amendment No. 3047 (to amendment No. 
     2011), to require comprehensive study and support for 
     criminal investigations and prosecutions by State and local 
     law enforcement officials.

  The amendments (No. 2997), as modified, and (No. 3017), as modified, 
are as follows:


                    Amendment NO. 2997, as modified

       At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1535. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FEDERALISM IN IRAQ.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Iraq continues to experience a self-sustaining cycle of 
     sectarian violence.
       (2) The ongoing sectarian violence presents a threat to 
     regional and world peace, and the longterm security interests 
     of the United States are best served by an Iraq that is 
     stable, not a haven for terrorists, and not a threat to its 
     neighbors.
       (3) A central focus of al Qaeda in Iraq has been to turn 
     sectarian divisions in Iraq into sectarian violence through a 
     concentrated series of attacks, the most significant being 
     the destruction of the Golden Dome of the Shia al-Askariyah 
     Mosque in Samarra in February 2006.
       (4) Iraqis must reach a comprehensive and sustainable 
     political settlement in order to achieve stability, and the 
     failure of the Iraqis to reach such a settlement is a primary 
     cause of violence in Iraq.
       (5) Article One of the Constitution of Iraq declares Iraq 
     to be a ``single, independent federal state''.
       (6) Section Five of the Constitution of Iraq declares that 
     the ``federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a 
     decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, and local 
     administrations'' and enumerates the expansive powers of 
     regions and the limited powers of the central government and 
     establishes the mechanisms for the creation of new federal 
     regions.
       (7) The federal system created by the Constitution of Iraq 
     would give Iraqis local control over their police and certain 
     laws, including those related to employment, education, 
     religion, and marriage.
       (8) The Constitution of Iraq recognizes the administrative 
     role of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 3 northern Iraqi 
     provinces, known also as the Kurdistan Region.
       (9) The Kurdistan region, recognized by the Constitution of 
     Iraq, is largely stable and peaceful.
       (10) The Iraqi Parliament approved a federalism law on 
     October 11th, 2006, which establishes procedures for the 
     creation of new federal regions and will go into effect 18 
     months after approval.
       (11) Iraqis recognize Baghdad as the capital of Iraq, and 
     the Constitution of Iraq stipulates that Baghdad may not 
     merge with any federal region.
       (12) Despite their differences, Iraq's sectarian and ethnic 
     groups support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
       (13) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on 
     November 27, 2006, ``[t]he crisis is political, and the ones 
     who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of 
     innocents are the politicians''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States should actively support a political 
     settlement in Iraq based on the final provisions of the 
     Constitution of Iraq that create a federal system of 
     government and allow for the creation of federal regions, 
     consistent with the wishes of the Iraqi people and their 
     elected leaders;
       (2) the active support referred to in paragraph (1) should 
     include--
       (A) calling on the international community, including 
     countries with troops in Iraq, the permanent 5 members of the 
     United Nations Security Council, members of the Gulf 
     Cooperation Council, and Iraq's neighbors--
       (i) to support an Iraqi political settlement based on 
     federalism;
       (ii) to acknowledge the sovereignty and territorial 
     integrity of Iraq; and
       (iii) to fulfill commitments for the urgent delivery of 
     significant assistance and debt relief to Iraq, especially 
     those made by the member states of the Gulf Cooperation 
     Council;
       (B) further calling on Iraq's neighbors to pledge not to 
     intervene in or destabilize Iraq and to agree to related 
     verification mechanisms; and
       (C) convening a conference for Iraqis to reach an agreement 
     on a comprehensive political settlement based on the 
     federalism law approved by the Iraqi Parliament on October 
     11, 2006;
       (3) the United States should urge the Government of Iraq to 
     quickly agree upon and implement a law providing for the 
     equitable distribution of oil revenues, which is a critical 
     component of a comprehensive political settlement based upon 
     federalism;
       (4) the steps described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) 
     could lead to an Iraq that is stable, not a haven for 
     terrorists, and not a threat to its neighbors; and
       (5) nothing in this Act should be construed in any way to 
     infringe on the sovereign rights of the nation of Iraq.
       At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National 
     Force-Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 
     2007, that ``[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coalition 
     and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian 
     Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a 
     militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its 
     interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and 
     coalition forces in Iraq''.
       (2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to 
     Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 
     2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While 
     claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively 
     undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies 
     of the Iraqi state''.
       (3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, 
     published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been 
     intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups 
     of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM [Jays al-
     Mahdi], since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively 
     formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.
       (4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the 
     Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007, 
     states that ``[t]he Commission concludes that the evidence of 
     Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the 
     country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. 
     . . It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated 
     weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes 
     across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.
       (5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent 
     Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in 
     testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``[w]e judge that the 
     goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of 
     extreme severity

[[Page S12094]]

     and have the potential of at least delaying our efforts 
     inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill 
     and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian 
     border''.
       (6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist 
     activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``[w]e know that it 
     goes as high as [Brig. Gen. Qassem] Suleimani, who is the 
     head of the Qods Force . . . We believe that he works 
     directly for the supreme leader of the country''.
       (7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on 
     August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence 
     in Iraq, that ``[t]he political power of the occupiers is 
     collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in 
     the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.
       (8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect 
     to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007, 
     that ``[t]he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for 
     extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese 
     Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our 
     force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty 
     clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and 
     is already trying to implement it to the best of his 
     ability''.
       (9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with 
     respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder 
     of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq, 
     that ``[t]e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when 
     we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy 
     commander, and others, and it's in black and white . . . We 
     interrogated these individuals. We have on tape . . . Qais 
     Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you 
     have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his 
     hands and laughs and says, of course not . . . So they told 
     us about the amounts of money that they have received. They 
     told us about the training that they received. They told us 
     about the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of 
     that that they received''.
       (10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007, 
     that ``[w]hat we have got is evidence. This is not 
     intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we 
     captured, documents and so forth . . . In one case, a 22-page 
     document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance, 
     rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted 
     that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala 
     back in January''.
       (11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled 
     ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on 
     September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public 
     Law 109-289, states that ``[t]here has been no decrease in 
     Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in 
     Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians . . 
     . Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest 
     impediments to progress on reconciliation''.
       (12) The Department of Defense report further states, with 
     respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in 
     Iraq, that ``[m]ost of the explosives and ammunition used by 
     these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force . . . For the period of 
     June through the end of August, [explosively formed 
     penetrator] events are projected to rise by 39 percent over 
     the period of March through May''.
       (13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three 
     rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with 
     representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran.
       (14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on 
     September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that 
     ``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that 
     was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on 
     Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues. 
     The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the 
     Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of 
     discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. 
     as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than 
     actually doing serious business . . . Right now, I haven't 
     seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian 
     side''.
       (15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on 
     September 11, 2007, stating that ``[w]e have seen nothing on 
     the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering 
     what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are 
     going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
       (1) that the manner in which the United States transitions 
     and structures its military presence in Iraq will have 
     critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian 
     Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the 
     capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects 
     for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of 
     the global economy;
       (2) that it is a critical national interest of the United 
     States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a 
     Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside 
     Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting 
     institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;
       (3) that the United States should designate Iran's Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist 
     organization under section 219 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
     Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, 
     as established under the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and
       (4) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all 
     possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities 
     targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
     1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and 
     March 24, 2007, respectively.
       Insert prior to section (6) the following:
       (16) Ambassador Crocker further testified before Congress 
     on September 11, 2007, with respect to talks with Iran, that 
     ``I think that it's an option that we want to preserve. Our 
     first couple of rounds did not produce anything. I don't 
     think that we should either, therefore, be in a big hurry to 
     have another round, nor do I think we should say we're not 
     going to talk anymore . . . I do believe it's important to 
     keep the option for further discussion on the table.''
       (17) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on September 
     16, 2007 that ``I think that the administration believes at 
     this point that continuing to try and deal with the Iranian 
     threat, the Iranian challenge, through diplomatic and 
     economic means is by far the preferable approach. That's the 
     one we are using . . . we always say all options are on the 
     table, but clearly, the diplomatic and economic approach is 
     the one that we are pursuing.''

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2 
minutes of debate equally divided and controlled between the two 
leaders or their designees on the Biden amendment.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Senator Biden will control the time.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield back my time.


                    Constitutional Review Commission

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have discussed with the Senator from 
Delaware modifying his amendment expressing the sense of Congress on 
Federalism in Iraq.
  My concern with the wording of the amendment stems from the fact that 
the Iraqi Sunnis did not participate fully in the drafting of the 
constitution of Iraq and the Sunni community voted overwhelmingly 
against it but were unable to prevent its adoption in a referendum. As 
a result of their dissatisfaction with the constitution, an agreement 
was made to convene a Constitutional Review Commission to review the 
constitution and to make recommendations for changes to the Iraqi 
Council of Representatives for submission to the Iraqi people. One of 
the benchmarks that the Iraqi political leaders agreed among themselves 
called for the Constitutional Review Commission to be formed by 
September 2006; for the Commission to complete its work by January 
2007; and for a constitutional amendments referendum to be held, if 
required, in March 2007.
  The Constitutional Review Commission has not completed its work 
despite several extensions of time; the most recent extension being 
until the end of this year. In recognition of the agreement to have a 
Constitutional Review Committee, the legislation establishing 
procedures for the creation of new federal regions in Iraq will not go 
into effect until 18 months after enactment of the legislation, which 
is April 2008.
  Accordingly, I appreciate the modifications that Senator Biden is 
making to his amendment to reflect that the political settlement 
regarding federalism referred to in his amendment should be based upon 
the ``final'' provisions of the Iraq constitution. This will allow for 
the possibility of changes being made as a result of the work of the 
Constitutional Review Commission. I also appreciate Senator Biden's 
modifying the amendment to note that whatever the political settlement 
is, be it pursuant to the current or revised constitutional provisions, 
it should be based on the ``wishes of the Iraqi people and their 
elected leaders'' as we don't want to suggest that we are trying to 
impose anything on the Iraqis.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague from Michigan 
for his suggestions. I believe that federalism and the creation of 
federal regions would be in the best interest of the Iraqi people and 
holds great promise for a political settlement among the Iraqi 
political leadership. I know that my friend is particularly concerned 
about the opposition of the Sunni community to the constitution. I 
agree with him that, at, the time of

[[Page S12095]]

adoption of the constitution, the Sunnis were opposed to many aspects 
of it including those provisions relating to federalism among others. 
But in my last visit to Iraq, my conversations with key Sunni leaders 
reveals a sea change in thinking. There is a growing recognition by the 
Sunni leadership that Sunnis will not get a fair shake if they are at 
the mercy of a strong central government controlled by their rivals in 
the Islamist Shiacamp. One key leader told me that he now understands 
that federalism is the best option for the Sunnis. Nonetheless, it is 
not my intention to forego the possibility that the Iraqi 
Constitutional Review Commission may recommend changes to their 
constitution nor that the United States should seek to impose a 
settlement on the Iraqis. I would note, however, at in the last draft 
proposed by the commission on May 23, 2007, none of the proposed 
changes would revoke any of the provisions of the constitution which 
permit the creation of federal regions. However, in deference to the 
Senator's concerns, I have amended the language to account for the 
possibility of the issue of regions being reopened by the Iraqis.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am checking to see if there is anybody on 
our side who wishes to speak for any amount of time.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question is on 
agreeing to the Biden amendment, as amended.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Obama) is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 75, nays 23, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 348 Leg.]

                                YEAS--75

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown
     Brownback
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Feinstein
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Tester
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--23

     Alexander
     Allard
     Barrasso
     Bond
     Bunning
     Burr
     Coburn
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dole
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Graham
     Hagel
     Inhofe
     Kyl
     Sessions
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich

                             NOT VOTING--2

     McCain
     Obama
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 75, the nays are 
23. Under the previous order, requiring 60 votes for the adoption of 
the amendment, the amendment is agreed to.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 3017

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2 
minutes of debate, equally divided, prior to a vote in relation to 
amendment No. 3017, offered by the Senator from Arizona.
  Who yields time?
  The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, very briefly, this amendment is a sense 
of the Senate introduced by Senator Kyl and me. The findings document 
the evidence that shows that Iran, working through its Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, has been training and equipping Iraqi 
extremists who are killing American soldiers--hundreds of them.
  This sense of the Senate calls on the administration to designate the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, allowing 
us to exert economic pressure on those terrorists who also do business 
and to stop them from killing Americans.
  Because some of our colleagues thought paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 
sense of the Senate may have opened the door to some kind of military 
action against Iran, Senator Kyl and I have struck them from the 
amendment. That is not our intention. In fact, our intention is to 
increase the economic pressure on Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps so that we will never have to consider the use of the 
military to stop them from what they are doing to kill our soldiers.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will oppose the Kyl-Lieberman amendment 
for one simple reason: this administration cannot be trusted.
  I am very concerned about the evidence that suggests that Iran is 
engaged in destabilizing activities inside Iraq. I believe that many of 
the steps the Senators from Connecticut and Arizona suggest be taken to 
end this activity can be taken today. We can and we should move to act 
against Iranian forces inside Iraq. We can and we should use economic 
pressure against those who aid and abet attacks on our forces and 
against Iraqis. The administration already has the authority to do 
these things and it should be doing them.
  Arguably, if we had a different President who abided by the meaning 
and intent of laws we pass, I might support this amendment. I fear, 
however, that this President might use the designation of Iran's 
Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist entity as a pretext to use 
force against Iran as he sees fit. While this may sound far-fetched to 
some, my colleagues should examine the record in two particular 
instances.
  First, is the misuse of the authority that we granted the President 
in 2002 to back our diplomacy with the threat of force. My colleagues 
will remember that, at the time, we voted to give the President a 
strong hand to play at the U.N. to get the world to speak with one 
voice to Saddam: let the inspectors back in and disarm or be disarmed. 
We thought that would make war less likely.
  But in the 5 months between our vote and the invasion of Iraq, the 
ideologues took over. The President went to war unnecessarily, without 
letting the weapons inspectors finish their work, without a real 
coalition, without enough troops, without the right equipment, and 
without a plan to secure the peace.
  The second example is the administration's twisting of our vote on 
the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 as an endorsement of military action 
against Iraq. Let me quote the Vice President from November 2005:

       Permit me to burden you with a bit more history: In August 
     of 1998, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution urging 
     President Clinton take `appropriate action' to compel Saddam 
     to come into compliance with his obligations to the Security 
     Council. Not a single senator voted no. Two months later, in 
     October of '98--again, without a single dissenting vote in 
     the United States Senate--the Congress passed the Iraq 
     Liberation Act. It explicitly adopted as American policy 
     supporting efforts to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from 
     power and promoting an Iraqi democracy in its place. And just 
     two months after signing the Iraq Liberation law, President 
     Clinton ordered that Iraq be bombed in an effort to destroy 
     facilities that he believed were connected to Saddam's 
     weapons of mass destruction programs.

  The Vice President made this argument despite this explicit section 
of the Iraq Liberation Act: ``Nothing in this Act shall be construed to 
authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed 
Forces.''
  These examples are relevant to the debate today.
  The Authorization for the Use of Military Force approved in September 
2001 would appear to limit the scope of authority it contains to the 
terrorists who conducted or aided the attacks of 9/11, or harbored 
them. But the President and his lawyers have frequently argued for a 
broad reading of this law,

[[Page S12096]]

and believe they are fighting a ``global'' war on terrorism. In letters 
to Congress under the war powers resolution, the President has stated 
that he will ``direct additional measures as necessary'' in the 
exercise of self-defense and ``to protect U.S. citizens and interests'' 
as part of this global war.
  I do not think the suggestion that the President designate an arm of 
the government of Iran as a ``terrorist'' entity provides any authority 
to do anything. After all, it is a nonbinding measure. But this 
administration already has an unduly broad view of the scope of 
executive power, particularly in time of war. I do not want to give the 
President and his lawyers any argument that Congress has somehow 
authorized military actions. The lesson of the last several years is 
that we must be cautious about acting impulsively on legislation which 
can be misconstrued, and misused to justify actions that Congress did 
not contemplate.
  With a different President who had a different track record, I could 
vote to support this amendment. But given this President's actions and 
misuse of authority, I cannot support the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I have grave concerns about this amendment. 
I spoke at length on the floor yesterday about them. We have never 
characterized an entity of a foreign government as a foreign terrorist 
organization. If we are saying that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is 
conducting terrorist activities, what we are saying, in effect, is that 
the Revolutionary Guard is conducting military activities against us. 
This has the danger of becoming a de facto authorization for military 
force against Iran.
  We have not had one hearing. I recommended yesterday that the 
amendment be withdrawn so we can consider it in the appropriate 
committees. I oppose passage at this time in the hope that we can get 
further discussion.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Obama) is 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Menendez). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 76, nays 22, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 349 Leg.]

                                YEAS--76

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Barrasso
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Whitehouse

                                NAYS--22

     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Dodd
     Feingold
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Leahy
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     McCaskill
     Sanders
     Tester
     Webb
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     McCain
     Obama
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 76, the nays are 
22. Under the previous order requiring 60 votes for the adoption of 
this amendment, the amendment is agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.


                Amendment No. 2196 to Amendment No. 2011

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
motion and amendments be set aside, and that amendment No. 2196 be 
called up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object--and I won't--is this the 
amendment which the unanimous consent agreement, previously arrived at, 
referred to?
  Mr. COBURN. It is.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Coburn] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2196.

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To eliminate wasteful spending and improve the management of 
                       counter-drug intelligence)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. NDIC CLOSURE.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, none of 
     the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
     used for the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) located 
     in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, except those activities related 
     to the permanent closing of the NDIC and to the relocation of 
     activities performed at NDIC deemed necessary or essential by 
     the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
     appropriate Federal agencies.

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be given 30 
minutes to speak on this subject. I have every intention of speaking 
less than that, but this is to allow me the flexibility to do so.
  I also plan on reserving that time until such time as we come back 
from our policy luncheon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, is there any time agreement 
on this amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is not.
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
motion and all pending amendments be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


         Amendment No. 2999, as Modified, to Amendment No. 2011

  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Webb and myself, 
I call up amendment No. 2999 and ask that the amendment be modified 
with the changes at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Missouri [Mrs. McCaskill], for Mr. Webb, 
     for himself, Mrs. McCaskill, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Brown, Mr. 
     Casey, Mr. Tester, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Sanders, 
     Mr. Levin, Mr. Carper, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Kerry, Mr. 
     Johnson, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Obama, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Harkin, Ms. 
     Stabenow, Mr. Dodd, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Bayh, Mr. 
     Pryor, and Mr. Byrd, proposes an amendment numbered 2999, as 
     modified, to amendment No. 2011.

  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
amendment is so modified.
  The amendment (No. 2999), as modified, is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

[[Page S12097]]

     SEC. 1535. STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF WARTIME CONTRACTS AND 
                   CONTRACTING PROCESSES IN OPERATION IRAQI 
                   FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

       (a) Commission on Wartime Contracting.--
       (1) Establishment.--There is hereby established a 
     commission to be known as the ``Commission on Wartime 
     Contracting'' (in this subsection referred to as the 
     ``Commission'').
       (2) Membership matters.--
       (A) Membership.--The Commission shall be composed of 8 
     members, as follows:
       (i) 2 members shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of 
     the Senate, in consultation with the Chairmen of the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
       (ii) 2 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives, in consultation with the Chairmen 
     of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Oversight and Government Reform of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (iii) 1 member shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of 
     the Senate, in consultation with the Ranking Minority Members 
     of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
       (iv) 1 member shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of 
     the House of Representatives, in consultation with the 
     Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Armed Services 
     and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (v) 1 member shall be appointed by the Secretary of 
     Defense.
       (vi) 1 member shall be appointed by the Secretary of State.
       (B) Deadline for appointments.--All appointments to the 
     Commission shall be made not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (C) Chairman and vice chairman.--
       (i) Chairman.--The chairman of the Commission shall be a 
     member of the Commission selected by the members appointed 
     under clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), but only if 
     approved by the vote of a majority of the members of the 
     Commission.
       (ii) Vice chairman.--The vice chairman of the Commission 
     shall be a member of the Commission selected by the members 
     appointed under clauses (iii) and (iv) of subparagraph (A), 
     but only if approved by the vote of a majority of the members 
     of the Commission.
       (D) In the event a Commission seat becomes vacant, the 
     nominee to fill the vacant seat must be of the same political 
     party as the departing commissioner.
       (3) Duties.--
       (A) General duties.--The Commission shall study and 
     investigate the following matters:
       (i) Federal agency contracting for the reconstruction of 
     Iraq and Afghanistan.
       (ii) Federal agency contracting for the logistical support 
     of coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 
     Enduring Freedom.
       (iii) Federal agency contracting for the performance of 
     security and intelligence functions in Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
       (B) Scope of contracting covered.--The Federal agency 
     contracting covered by this paragraph includes contracts 
     entered into both in the United States and abroad for the 
     performance of activities described in subparagraph (A), 
     whether performed in the United States or abroad.
       (C) Particular duties.--In carrying out the study under 
     this paragraph, the Commission shall assess--
       (i) the extent and impact of the reliance of the Federal 
     Government on contractors to perform functions (including 
     security, intelligence, and management functions) in 
     Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom;
       (ii) the performance of the contracts under review, and the 
     mechanisms used to manage the performance of the contracts 
     under review;
       (iii) the extent of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement 
     under such contracts;
       (iv) the extent to which those responsible for such waste, 
     fraud, abuse, or mismanagement have been held financially or 
     legally accountable;
       (v) the appropriateness of the organizational structure, 
     policies, practices, and resources of the Department of 
     Defense and the Department of State for handling contingency 
     contract management and support; and
       (vi) the extent of the misuse of force or violations of the 
     laws of war or federal statutes by contractors.
       (4) Reports.--
       (A) Interim report.--On January 15, 2009, the Commission 
     shall submit to Congress an interim report on the study 
     carried out under paragraph (3), including the results and 
     findings of the study as of that date.
       (B) Other reports.--The Commission may from time to time 
     submit to Congress such other reports on the study carried 
     out under paragraph (3) as the Commission considers 
     appropriate.
       (C) Final report.--Not later than two years after the date 
     of the appointment of all of the members of the Commission 
     under paragraph (2), the Commission shall submit to Congress 
     a report on the study carried out under paragraph (3). The 
     report shall--
       (i) include the findings of the Commission;
       (ii) identify lessons learned on the contracting covered by 
     the study; and
       (iii) include specific recommendations for improvements to 
     be made in--

       (I) the process for developing contract requirements for 
     wartime contracts and contracts for contingency operations;
       (II) the process for awarding contracts and task orders for 
     wartime contracts and contracts for contingency operations;
       (III) the process for managing and providing oversight for 
     the performance of wartime contracts and contracts for 
     contingency operations;
       (IV) the process for holding contractors and their 
     employees accountable for waste, fraud, abuse, or 
     mismanagement under wartime contracts and contracts for 
     contingency operations;
       (V) the process for determining which functions are 
     inherently governmental and which functions are appropriate 
     for performance by contractors in an area of combat 
     operations (including an area of a contingency operation), 
     including a determination whether the use of civilian 
     contractors to provide security in an area of combat 
     operations is a function that is inherently governmental;
       (VI) the organizational structure, resources, policies and 
     practices of the Department of Defense and the Department of 
     State handling contract management and support for wartime 
     contracts and contracts for contingency operations; and
       (VII) the process by which roles and responsibilities with 
     respect to wartime contracts and contracts for contingency 
     operations are distributed among the various departments and 
     agencies of the Federal Government, and interagency 
     coordination and communication mechanisms associated with 
     wartime contracts and contracts for contingency operations.

       (5) Other powers and authorities.--
       (A) Hearings and evidence.--The Commission or, on the 
     authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member 
     thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this 
     subsection--
       (i) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and 
     places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, 
     administer such oaths; and
       (ii) subject to subparagraph (B)(i), require, by subpoena 
     or otherwise, require the attendance and testimony of such 
     witnesses and the production of such books, records, 
     correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents,

     as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or 
     designated member may determine advisable.
       (B) Subpoenas.--
       (i) Issuance.--

       (I) In general.--A subpoena may be issued under 
     subparagraph (A) only--

       (aa) by the agreement of the chairman and the vice 
     chairman; or
       (bb) by the affirmative vote of 5 members of the 
     Commission.

       (II) Signature.--Subject to subclause (I), subpoenas issued 
     under this subparagraph may be issued under the signature of 
     the chairman or any member designated by a majority of the 
     Commission, and may be served by any person designated by the 
     chairman or by a member designated by a majority of the 
     Commission.

       (ii) Enforcement.--

       (I) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to 
     obey a subpoena issued under clause (i), the United States 
     district court for the judicial district in which the 
     subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or 
     where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order 
     requiring such person to appear at any designated place to 
     testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any 
     failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the 
     court as a contempt of that court.
       (II) Additional enforcement.--In the case of any failure of 
     any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when 
     summoned under authority of subclause (I) or this subclause, 
     the Commission may, by majority vote, certify a statement of 
     fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United 
     States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand 
     jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and 
     procedures as if the United States attorney had received a 
     certification under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised 
     Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).

       (C) Access to information.--The Commission may secure 
     directly from the Department of Defense and any other 
     department or agency of the Federal Government any 
     information or assistance that the Commission considers 
     necessary to enable the Commission to carry out the 
     requirements of this subsection. Upon request of the 
     Commission, the head of such department or agency shall 
     furnish such information expeditiously to the Commission. 
     Whenever information or assistance requested by the 
     Commission is unreasonably refused or not provided, the 
     Commission shall report the circumstances to Congress without 
     delay.
       (D) Personnel.--The Commission shall have the authorities 
     provided in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, and 
     shall be subject to the conditions set forth in such section, 
     except to the extent that such conditions would be 
     inconsistent with the requirements of this subsection.
       (E) Detailees.--Any employee of the Federal Government 
     employee may be detailed

[[Page S12098]]

     to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, 
     and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and 
     privileges of his or her regular employment without 
     interruption.
       (F) Security clearances.--The appropriate departments or 
     agencies of the Federal Government shall cooperate with the 
     Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission 
     members and staff appropriate security clearances to the 
     extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and 
     requirements, except that no person shall be provided with 
     access to classified information under this section without 
     the appropriate security clearances.
       (G) Violations of law.--
       (i) Referral to attorney general.--The Commission may refer 
     to the Attorney General any violation or potential violation 
     of law identified by the Commission in carrying out its 
     duties under this subsection.
       (ii) Reports on results of referral.--The Attorney General 
     shall submit to Congress a report on each prosecution, 
     conviction, resolution, or other disposition that results 
     from a referral made under this subparagraph.
       (6) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on the 
     date that is 60 days after the date of the submittal of its 
     final report under paragraph (4)(C).
       (7) Contingency operation defined.--In this subsection, the 
     term ``contingency operation'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 101 of title 10, United States Code.
       (b) Investigation of Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and 
     Mismanagement.--
       (1) In general.--The Special Inspector General for Iraq 
     Reconstruction shall, in collaboration with the Inspector 
     General of the Department of Defense, the Inspector General 
     of the Department of State, the Inspector General of the 
     United States Agency for International Development, the 
     Inspector General or the Director of National Intelligence, 
     the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
     the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and 
     in consultation with the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
     established by subsection (a), conduct a series of audits to 
     identify potential waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in 
     the performance of--
       (A) Department of Defense contracts and subcontracts for 
     the logistical support of coalition forces in Operation Iraqi 
     Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom; and
       (B) Federal agency contracts and subcontracts for the 
     performance of security, intelligence, and reconstruction 
     functions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
     Freedom.
       (2) Scope of audits of contracts.--Each audit conducted 
     pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) shall focus on a specific 
     contract, task order, or site of performance under a contract 
     or task order and shall examine, at a minimum, one or more of 
     the following issues:
       (A) The manner in which requirements were developed.
       (B) The procedures under which the contract or task order 
     was awarded.
       (C) The terms and conditions of the contract or task order.
       (D) The contractor's staffing and method of performance, 
     including cost controls.
       (E) The efficacy of Department of Defense management and 
     oversight, Department of State management and oversight, and 
     United States Agency for International Development management 
     and oversight, including the adequacy of staffing and 
     training of officials responsible for such management and 
     oversight.
       (F) The flow of information from the contractor to 
     officials responsible for contract management and oversight.
       (3) Scope of audits of other contracts.--Each audit 
     conducted pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) shall focus on a 
     specific contract, task order, or site of performance under a 
     contract or task order and shall examine, at a minimum, one 
     or more of the following issues:
       (A) The manner in which the requirements were developed and 
     the contract or task order was awarded.
       (B) The manner in which the Federal agency exercised 
     control over the contractor's performance.
       (C) The extent to which operational field commanders are 
     able to coordinate or direct the contractor's performance in 
     an area of combat operations.
       (D) The extent to which the functions performed were 
     appropriate for performance by a contractor.
       (E) The degree to which contractor employees were properly 
     screened, selected, trained, and equipped for the functions 
     to be performed.
       (F) The nature and extent of any incidents of misconduct or 
     unlawful activity by contractor employees.
       (G) The extent to which any incidents of misconduct or 
     unlawful activity were reported, documented, investigated, 
     and (where appropriate) prosecuted.
       (4) Continuation of special inspector general.--
       (A) In general.--Notwithstanding section 3001(o) of the 
     Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for 
     the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 
     108-106; 5 U.S.C. App. 8G note), the Office of the Special 
     Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction shall not terminate 
     until the date that is 60 days after the date of the 
     submittal under paragraph (4)(C) of subsection (a) of the 
     final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
     established by subsection (a).
       (B) Reaffirmation of certain duties and responsibilities.--
     Congress reaffirms that the Special Inspector General for 
     Iraq Reconstruction retains the duties and responsibilities 
     in sections 4 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App. 4; relating to reports of criminal violations to the 
     Attorney General) and section 5 of the Inspector General Act 
     of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 5; relating to reports to Congress) as 
     expressly provided in subsections (f)(3) and (i)(3), 
     respectively, of section 3001 of the Emergency Supplemental 
     Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 
     Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be required to carry out 
     the provisions of this section.

  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, today we have an important opportunity 
to do some good-government. It is so hard in the context of the 
conflict in Iraq to get beyond some of the political posturing that 
has, frankly, been inevitable. As campaigns have occurred, and we have 
campaigns looming next year, there has been a tendency for this body to 
separate at the middle and not find common ground.
  We have an opportunity this afternoon to find common ground, and my 
job over the next few minutes is to try to convince my colleagues that 
this attempt to create a War Contracting Commission is not about 
politics, it is about reform.
  It would be hard not to notice the scandals that have occurred in 
relationship to war contracting. I come to this as a student of history 
and a huge fan of Harry Truman. I am honored to stand at his desk as I 
speak today. I am honored to follow in his tradition when he said: War 
profiteering is unacceptable, especially when you realize it is 
skimming away and denying the men and women who are fighting resources.
  In a very modest fashion, at a time that he, frankly, was not 
supporting his President, who was of his party, he was saying to the 
President: We need to do some reform here, even though the President 
was a Democrat, just as he was, and he began looking at war 
profiteering. Frankly, that is where Harry Truman first made his mark 
in the history books of this country. It was because he realized this 
was so much bigger than being a Democrat or Republican; it was about 
how we behave when we place men and women in danger on behalf of our 
Nation. In that vein, this amendment is going to try to take the 
politics out of the issue of war contracting and try to make things 
better. Let me first summarize what the amendment is going to do.
  It will establish an independent and bipartisan eight-member 
Commission--bipartisan eight-member Commission, four Republicans and 
four Democrats. They will study and investigate Federal agency 
contracting for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, Federal funding 
and contracting for the logistical support of coalition forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, Federal contracting for the performance of security 
and intelligence functions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will expand the 
special inspector general's role to include the responsibility of 
logistical support and security and intelligence functions.
  Currently, the special inspector general, Stuart Bowen, only has 
jurisdiction over reconstruction funds in Iraq. Clearly, frankly, as I 
met with contracting officials on my trip to Iraq and Kuwait, where I 
spent most of my time talking to the people who have taken 
responsibility for issuing these contracts and monitoring these 
contracts, as I talked to all of them, I mean at every meeting I kind 
of just went: Oh, my gosh, this is so bad--except when I met with the 
SIGIR.
  When I met with the people who worked for the special inspector 
general, I was so comforted as an auditor. These were professional 
auditors, and they were on top of it. They were identifying the 
problem, they saw the shortcomings, whether they were in the way 
contracts were distributed or let or, frankly, not competed or whether 
they were in the monitoring of those contracts, the definitization of 
those contracts, the oversight of those contracts, or the way we 
actually pay bonuses on some of those contracts. All of those issues 
have been looked at by the SIGIR. They have been limited because their 
jurisdiction was limited. This will expand their jurisdiction and, most 
importantly, efficiently, it partners them with the Commission. So we

[[Page S12099]]

do not have to hire a huge staff for this Commission; they can utilize 
the work of SIGIR, the work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction, to come to conclusions about how we can do better.
  Honestly and sincerely--I know Senator Webb and I have talked about 
this at great length--this is not about ``gotcha,'' this is about 
turning the corner, because, let's be honest, will there ever be a time 
where we are not contracting at this kind of level? Will we ever go 
back to a time when we have Active military peeling potatoes and 
cleaning latrines? Will we ever go back to a time where we have Active 
military driving all of the supply trucks? Will we ever go back to a 
time where we have Active military providing all of the security needs? 
I am not sure we will because our struggle is to maintain a Volunteer 
military but provide them all the support they need in terms of 
logistics.
  Frankly, there are some efficiencies that could be gained if we were 
contracting in a way that took care of the taxpayer dollars. I do not 
argue that contracting might be necessary--in fact, better in some 
instances--but not the way we are doing it now.
  Now, you say: Well, there are a lot of people looking at this. That 
may be true. There have been a lot of journalists who have looked at 
it. We have certainly had various parts of the Department of Defense 
and the military, various inspectors general, and we certainly have 
SIGIR. But let me just point out one thing. As one of the generals said 
to me when I was in Iraq, sheepishly: You know, everything you are 
seeing in terms of mistakes that have been made, most of them were made 
in Bosnia. And by the way, there was a lesson learned after Bosnia, 
except there was one problem: They forgot to learn the lesson.
  So if we are going to elevate this problem to where we really 
acknowledge that it is systemic, it is overarching, and it is 
interagency, what do we have if we do a congressional hearing? Well, 
first of all, we are going to have a committee that has more Democrats 
than Republicans on it, so we have at the very outset the allegation 
that it is political. We also have battling turf. Is it Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs? Is it Armed Services? Is it Foreign 
Relations? Because all of the problems swirl around all of those 
committees. How do we get above the interagency issue if we do not have 
this kind of commission?
  The makeup of the Commission would be as follows: eight people--two 
people appointed by the majority leader in the Senate, two people 
appointed by the Speaker in the House, one person appointed by the 
minority leader in the Senate, one person appointed by the minority 
leader in the House--that gets you to six--and then one person 
appointed by the President of the United States and one person 
appointed by Secretary Gates at the Department of Defense.
  Now, are we going to have a long bureaucratic commission that just 
does a lot of testimony and we do not get to the end? No. They must 
finish their work within 2 years. And they must, as I mentioned before, 
partner with the SIGIR, partner with the Special Inspector General of 
Iraq Reconstruction, in a way that they can efficiently take the work 
that has been done by a number of different agencies and a number of 
different oversight entities, a number of different auditors and bring 
it together and identify how do we, in a contingency, contract in a way 
that takes care of taxpayers' money?

  Now, we have an election coming up. I have to tell you, I have talked 
to a couple of my friends across the aisle, and I am concerned about 
the vote on this amendment because there is a knee-jerk reaction. If we 
are talking about war contracting, this is political. This is a 
political witch hunt. It is the D's versus the R's. Let me say that I 
do not think they have taken time to look at how bipartisan this is 
because if they did, I think it would assure them that this is not an 
attempt to do this. We have to fix this, and we have to fix it as 
quickly as possible. It has to do the work within 2 years.
  We have modified the amendment to reassure my friends across the 
aisle that, first of all, if one of the President's appointments or if 
one of the other appointments who would represent the Republican Party 
on this Commission were to quit or for some reason not be able to 
continue to serve, someone of the same party must be appointed. So we 
are never going to get to a situation if we have a new President that 
the new President could say: I am going to appoint two. If the new 
President were a Democrat, you would end up with six to two.
  The other thing that is important to remember is we have modified the 
amendment so the report of this Commission will come out after next 
year's election, January of 2009. What a great way to start a new 
Congress and a new Presidential term. The new President and the new 
Congress can look at these recommendations--very similar to the 9/11 
Commission, very similar to the Baker-Hamilton Commission--and realize 
there are systemic institutional problems with the way we have been 
contacting and get it fixed.
  I have met with the special inspector general for Iraq, Mr. Bowen, 
and he has indicated his support for this approach. This is not about 
in any way diminishing the role of the special inspector general for 
Iraq--just the opposite. It is going to give the special inspector 
general a voice that is above the political din in order to issue 
recommendations. They are going to have their capping report ready next 
March. That will be a great starting point for this Commission, to look 
at SIGIR's capping report of all of their work on Iraq reconstruction.
  Let me give you a list of some of the groups that have supported this 
amendment, and we have had many, many groups that have come to the 
support of this.
  First, the Project on Government Oversight is very strongly in favor 
of it. POGO particularly supports the independent and bipartisan nature 
of this Commission and the recommended collaboration and consultation 
with the special inspector general and the expansion of the role of the 
special inspector general.
  OMB Watch, a Government transparency, fiscal policy, and regulatory 
watchdog nonprofit, wants to applaud the Commission on War Contracting 
Establishment Act; that is, in fact, this amendment.
  The Government Accountability Project also has indicated their 
support.
  The Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America have indicated their 
support.
  The Taxpayers for Common Sense has weighed in with their strong 
support of this amendment.
  The Federation of State PIRGs, public interest research groups, has 
weighed in with their support also, and Common Cause has indicated this 
is a good government, bipartisan way to fix a serious problem. I may 
return later to talk about some of the scandals. There have been many, 
many scandals. Some of them are heartbreaking. Some of them make you 
want to tear your hair out; whether it is the way some of the 
whistleblowers have been treated, whether it is contracts that have 
ballooned out of control, whether it is paying bonuses to companies 
that haven't done their work, $200 million in bonuses to companies that 
have not done their work. We obviously have issues with the security 
company Blackwater and who has authority over them and to whom are they 
accountable when they take action in the war zone. It is heartbreaking 
that some in our active military--unfortunately, more than a few--have 
been charged and pled guilty to actually taking bribes, tens of 
millions of dollars in their pocket. The Department of State IG, there 
are problems with whether the investigations have been conducted.
  Whether you agree that the investigations have occurred in the State 
Department or they have not, why not do a bipartisan commission that 
will look at this fairly under the light of transparency and good 
government, without the cloud of politics and accusations by one 
political party or another?
  I am especially proud of the fact that this is an amendment that was 
cosponsored by the nine freshmen Democrats who arrived here in January. 
We, frankly, probably are not as well versed or schooled in some of the 
turf fights that occur between committees. It will be a long time 
before any of us need to worry about whether our committee, as chairman 
or ranking member, has the ability to have a hearing. We look at it 
with the eyes of the general public. We come here fresh from

[[Page S12100]]

speaking with thousands and thousands of people we represent. We hear 
their frustration that billions of dollars have been lost, tens upon 
millions of dollars have been stolen, and an incredible amount of money 
wasted in the name of contracting. We also have 20 cosponsors on this 
amendment which we believe is very important. I welcome the support.
  I do emphasize that we can behave today like people probably expect. 
We can have a 50-50 vote, and the American public is going to sit back, 
if we have a 50-50 vote, and they are going to say: What in the name is 
going on? How do you get a 50-50 vote on an effort, with four 
Republicans and four Democrats, to get a handle on war contracting? How 
does that happen? We all sit around and talk--I know the Republicans 
talk about it; we talk about it--about our approval ratings and why our 
approval ratings are not higher. This is our chance. This is our chance 
to say to the American public: We are spending your money wisely, 
making sure the men and women who fight get the armor they need and the 
MRAPs they need on their humvees, instead of billions being wasted on 
war profiteering. This is our chance to show them we can come together 
and overcome the politics of this place for the good of our national 
security and the strength of our military.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WEBB. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cardin). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I would like to add to the comments made by 
my colleague from Missouri about the Truman Commission follow-on that 
we have jointly introduced, along with other freshmen Members on the 
Democratic side, the Independent side, and with a total of 27 
cosponsors as of this morning.
  I don't think there is a more important or volatile issue, in terms 
of Government accountability, than the issue of the expenditures that 
have gone into Iraq and Afghanistan and the accountability of not only 
contractors but of the quasi-military forces operating there. We have 
put a great deal of effort into designing a wartime commission that was 
inspired by the Truman Commission in World War II but has its own 
uniqueness, given the issues of today. I am very proud to be one of the 
original sponsors on this amendment. I hope Members on both sides of 
the aisle can support it.
  We are attempting, in a fair way, with experts in the field--not 
simply a group of Senators forming a panel, bringing in experts from 
the areas, experts in competence from the areas they would be looking 
at in a short period of time, 2 years--to examine the amounts of money 
that have been spent, where this money has gone, to try to bring some 
accountability into the system and to make their reports, in some cases 
with legal accountability, and then to wrap it up and go home. This is 
not an attempt to create a permanent standing organization but, rather, 
one that can come in with the right people, take a look at what went 
wrong, make a report to the American people and, in some cases, give 
them their money back, since all of these now nearly a trillion dollars 
have been spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan without a lot of 
accountability--that is taxpayer money--to try to find out how it was 
spent.
  In most cases, it has been spent properly. But in those cases where 
it has not, we want to get people their money back and get 
accountability to the people who did not spend it back. This is about 
improved transparency. It would be forward looking in terms of looking 
at systemic problems and attempting to address them.
  It is more than that. This amendment is supported by nearly every 
major taxpayer watchdog group. We are now, with the present state of 
the Department of Defense and of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
outsourcing war in ways that we have never seen before in our history. 
Hundreds of billions of dollars have been allocated for reconstruction 
and for wartime support, creating a strong potential for fraud, waste, 
and abuse. This commission will ensure financial accountability in 
those areas where there has been fraud, waste, and abuse with 
provisions that allow for legal accountability in cases of wrongdoing.
  It also will look at such organizations as Blackwater, which has 
recently been in the news for the alleged series of wrongful killings 
of Iraqis and excessive use of force. This is an area that has slid 
past us as a representative government which is a cause for great 
concern for anyone who has been involved in national security affairs 
over the years. We now have in Iraq 180,000 contractors working in a 
war where there are 160,000 troops. They are doing a whole panorama of 
chores that traditionally have been done by military people, all the 
way from operating the mess halls to providing security for even, on 
some occasions, General Petraeus himself. There is no accountability, 
none, in terms of legal accountability for actions that have been taken 
that result in inappropriate use of force and, in some cases, wrongful 
deaths of people in the area. This committee would help address that.

  We are also looking at basic contractor accountability. As one 
example, not long ago the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction reported that of the $32 billion at that time that had 
been spent on reconstruction and relief funds--this is State Department 
programs--$9 billion was unaccounted for. We need desperately to have 
an independent, fair, objective analysis of what has happened, what is 
happening, not only for accountability but also to help us design a 
structure for the future. Again, we are not trying to create a new 
bureaucracy. The commission will rely on the inspectors general in 
agencies that already exist for most of the analysis. We are sunsetting 
the provision at 2 years. We are very comfortable with SIGIR's 
excellent performance in uncovering waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq of 
reconstruction projects. We believe that is proof of the ability to do 
this on a more comprehensive and thorough level.
  I strongly urge our colleagues on both sides of the aisle to lay 
aside political differences and come together with the reality that all 
of us have an obligation to put accountability into the system for the 
American people and, in some cases, to give people back the money they 
spend in tax dollars for programs that were wrongfully carried out or, 
in some cases, not carried out at all.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COBURN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2196

  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, I have an amendment pending. This is a 
straightforward amendment. Over the last 10 years, we have spent a 
half-billion dollars of Defense Department money on a program run by 
the Justice Department that has achieved probably the least of any 
program in the entire budget of the Department. This is the National 
Drug Intelligence Center. It came into being initially through directed 
spending on a Defense appropriations bill. The reason for adding this 
amendment to the authorization bill is to preclude any further money on 
spending on this intelligence center and only allowing money to shut it 
down and have it consolidated with other intelligence centers.
  If we think about what $500 million could be doing for us now in the 
Defense Department in the true defense of our Nation and then look at 
the history of this center, this isn't about trying to direct things 
against any group of people or any Congressman or Senator. It is about 
the commonsense view that we ought to be spending money in a 
prioritized way that gets us results.

  By any measure--anyone's measure--including the Justice Department, 
all the other national drug intelligence centers--all of the others--
the former directors of this intelligence center, and the directors of 
others, this intelligence center has been looking for a mission and has 
accomplished very little.

[[Page S12101]]

  Of the two things they have accomplished, one is highly expensive and 
not accurate. The other is the investigation of intelligence 
information captures on drugs and could be well done at any other 
facility we have.
  The Department of Justice believes the drug center's operations are 
duplicative and reassigning their responsibilities would improve the 
management of counterdrug intelligence activities and would allow for 
funds to be spent on the additional hiring of more drug enforcement 
officers. So we are going to have anywhere from $30 million to $40 
million a year continued to be spent on this center. What this simply 
is, in the authorization, is a prohibition that we will not do this.
  When the Department of Justice, which is charged with running this 
center, says it does not work, it is not effective, it is not 
accomplished, and should be consolidated, we have to ask the question: 
Why does it continue? It continues through the force of directed 
spending in the Defense appropriations bill.
  Now, how is it we have drug enforcement funded through the Defense 
Department to give the money to the Department of Justice to run a 
program they say is ineffectual? The whole purpose for this amendment 
is to not castigate anyone but to say: Shouldn't we be spending the 
money more wisely? Shouldn't we be accomplishing, with that $500 
million we already spent, something of value to the American taxpayer 
rather than something not of value?
  This amendment would protect Defense dollars from being misspent and 
improve the management of our counterdrug intelligence efforts by 
eliminating the wasteful spending. It would also direct the necessary 
funds to close the NDIC. It also would say any activities that might be 
performed by the center that are deemed necessary, which are minimal--
let me emphasize that again: minimal in terms of all the experts we 
have throughout the rest of the Government--that they would, in fact, 
be transferred to the appropriate agencies.
  In 2002, this intelligence center received $42 million--$39 million, 
$44 million, $39 million, $38 million, $39 million--for a total of $509 
million since its inception. It is duplicative, it is unnecessary, and 
it is unworkable.
  Even the former director said: Most of the time the work was shoddy, 
of poor quality, and quite often wrong. This is the same director who 
is no longer there--a Mr. Horn--who was admonished by the Department of 
Justice for his excessive spending while he was there, on travel, on 
international things that had nothing to do with the NDIC's goals or 
direction.
  Mr. President, there have been numerous articles written, two of 
which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, one being 
a complete dossier on this agency from US News & World Report.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            [From the U.S. News & World Report, May 9, 2005]

                         A Drug War Boondoggle

                           (By Bret Schulte)


 the white house wants to kill it, but a little government agency may 
                           manage to live on

       It merits only the briefest of mentions in the president's 
     new budget, but those few lines of type could represent the 
     final chapter in a long and twisted Washington saga. Stashed 
     away on Page 1,181 is a paragraph that would effectively kill 
     the little-known National Drug Intelligence Center, located 
     in Johnstown, Pa., the site of the famous flood of 1889. 
     Bush's budget proposes that the center's $40 million annual 
     budget be slashed to $17 million--just enough to facilitate 
     ``the shutdown of the center and transfer of its 
     responsibilities. . . to other Department of Justice 
     elements.''
       If President Bush has his way, the center would be one of 
     154 programs eliminated or cut as part of his promise to curb 
     federal spending. But as any veteran of Washington's budget 
     wars will tell you, closing even a single federal program can 
     be a herculean task. Perhaps no example is more illuminating 
     than the NDIC, which, in its 12 years, has cost taxpayers at 
     least $350 million. The facility has run through six 
     directors, been rocked by scandal, and been subjected to 
     persistent criticisms that it should have never been created 
     at all.
       Pork? In the beginning, the Johnstown center did have some 
     friends in the White House. With the blessing of President 
     George Herbert Walker Bush, then drug czar William Bennett 
     proposed the creation of the NDIC in 1990. Its mission: to 
     collect and coordinate intelligence from often-feuding law 
     enforcement agencies in order to provide a strategic look at 
     the war on drugs. But the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
     worried that its pre-eminent role in the drug war was 
     slipping away, openly fought the idea. So did many on Capitol 
     Hill, arguing that the new center would duplicate the efforts 
     of existing intelligence centers, notably the El Paso 
     Intelligence Center, operated by the DEA. With little support 
     in the law enforcement community, the NDIC looked all but 
     dead. Enter Congressman John Murtha. The Pennsylvania 
     Democrat, who chaired the House Appropriations Subcommittee 
     for Defense, tucked the enabling legislation for the center 
     into a Pentagon authorization bill, with the caveat that it 
     would be placed in his district.
       The center was troubled from the start. Murtha's new drug 
     agency was funded by the Pentagon, but the Department of 
     Justice was authorized to run it--an arrangement bound to 
     cause problems. ``All of us wanted the NDIC,'' says John 
     Carnevale, a former official with the Office of National Drug 
     Control Policy, as the drug czar's office is known. ``But 
     none of us wanted it in Johnstown. We viewed it as a jobs 
     program that Mr. Murtha wanted [for his district].''
       Murtha bristles at implications that the Johnstown center 
     is a boondoggle. ``They say anything we do is pork barrel,'' 
     he fumes. The congressman argues that the federal government 
     should spread its facilities around the country, citing the 
     security risk of a centralized government and cheaper 
     operating costs elsewhere. But ``obviously,'' he says, ``I 
     wanted it in my district. I make no apologies for that.''
       Headquartered in a renovated department store downtown, the 
     center has brought nearly 400 federal jobs to Johnstown, a 
     struggling former steel-mill town. Law enforcement agencies, 
     ordered to send employees to the new center, had trouble 
     finding skilled analysts or executives who would agree to 
     live in Johnstown. Even the bosses didn't want to go. The 
     first director, former FBI official Doug Ball, traveled back 
     and forth from his home near Washington. His deputy, former 
     DEA agent Jim Milford, did the same and made no bones about 
     it. ``I've never come to terms,'' Milford says, ``with the 
     justification for the NDIC.''
       In 1993, when the NDIC officially opened, the congressional 
     General Accounting Office issued a damning report citing 
     duplication among 19 drug intelligence centers that already 
     existed. And many involved in the process said the idea of 
     gathering information from other law enforcement agencies for 
     strategic assessments on drug trafficking just wasn't 
     workable. In some cases, federal law prevented agencies from 
     sharing sensitive intelligence; in others, rival agencies 
     simply refused to give up proprietary information. ``The 
     bottom line,'' Milford said, ``was that we had to actually 
     search for a mission.''
       Stonewalled, the NDIC began operating, effectively, as an 
     extended staff for other drug agencies, working on projects 
     too cumbersome, peripheral, or time-consuming for their own 
     teams of intelligence analysts. The center was costing about 
     $30 million a year, but, as a former official of the drug 
     czar's office put it bluntly, ``we saw nothing'' from it.
       Former DEA official Dick Canas, who took over the NDIC in 
     1996--one of the few bosses who actually moved to Johnstown--
     was determined to elevate the facility's status. He began 
     collating and analyzing ``open-source information''--
     intelligence already available to the public--and pulling it 
     all together in one place. The plan was ``nonthreatening'' to 
     other agencies, Canas argued, and would at least provide 
     policymakers with a general overview of the war on drugs. 
     That project morphed into an annual report called the 
     National Drug Threat Assessment, which officials say is of 
     some real value.
       The Johnstown center racked up one other success. Its 
     ``document exploitation'' program regularly dispatched 
     analysts into the field to process files seized by other law-
     enforcement agencies using software it developed called RAID 
     (real-time analytical intelligence database). Johnstown 
     analysts used the software to organize data and help law 
     enforcement agencies develop investigative leads.
       Cronyism? In 2000, the Clinton administration tried to 
     define the center's role more sharply by releasing the 
     General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan, which restricted the 
     reach of the Johnstown center to domestic intelligence only. 
     Canas, gone by 1999, was replaced by another DEA executive, 
     Mike Horn, who was the fifth interim or permanent director in 
     six years; Horn kept an apartment in Johnstown but traveled 
     back to a home in the Washington area on weekends.
       Horn's tenure made everything that came before it seem 
     placid. Despite the NDIC's domestic mandate, Horn and his 
     assistant, Mary Lou Rodgers, made frequent trips abroad to 
     promote a new version of the RAID software in places like 
     Hong Kong, London, and Vienna, racking up nearly $164,000 in 
     travel expenses in less than four years. A Justice Department 
     investigation in 2003 admonished Horn for ``unprofessional 
     conduct in. . . dealings with Ms. Rodgers,'' but that wasn't 
     the end of it. A letter-writing campaign by NDIC employees 
     accused Horn of continued travel abuse and cronyism, 
     prompting another review by Justice lawyers last year. It was 
     also discovered that the new

[[Page S12102]]

     version of the RAID software promoted by Horn had yet to be 
     developed. Many NDIC insiders say morale was poor.
       In March 2004, Associate Deputy Attorney General David 
     Margolis suspended Horn's power to authorize travel for 
     Rodgers. In June 2004, Margolis fired Horn. The Justice 
     Department won't comment on the matter. Horn claims all 
     travel was approved and says he has not been made to pay 
     restitution. Horn blames the low morale on malcontents who 
     resented the quality of work he demanded. ``I recognized that 
     a lot of reports were God-awful, poorly written, poorly 
     researched, and, in some cases, wrong,'' he says. Some 
     insiders say that under Horn, the center got as close as it 
     ever would to producing some truly strategic intelligence 
     reports. Not surprisingly, in light of the morale and other 
     problems, others disagree.
       Either way, the White House appears to have had it with the 
     NDIC. In its budget report, the Office of Management and 
     Budget says ``the proliferation of intelligence centers 
     across the government has not necessarily led to more or 
     better intelligence, but rather more complications in the 
     management of information.'' For the Johnstown center, it's 
     an ironic coda, then, that the White House is simultaneously 
     supporting a new program--the multiagency Drug Intelligence 
     Fusion Center. Blessed by the DEA, the fusion center will be 
     located in the Washington area. It has already received $25 
     million from Congress in start-up costs and is slated to open 
     its doors later this year. The idea that a different agency 
     can do the job the NDIC failed to do has left some shaking 
     their heads. ``You have to ask, `What is the master plan?' '' 
     said a former official in the office of the drug czar. ``The 
     answer is there is no master plan.'' Proponents say the new 
     agency will succeed because its location makes sense.
       That doesn't mean the NDIC is finished. It has supporters 
     in state and local law enforcement, and even some federal 
     officials have come to respect its document exploitation 
     division. The NDIC's biggest supporter, though, is Murtha. 
     ``I can assure employees that the NDIC won't be closed,'' he 
     said in a public statement after Bush's budget was released. 
     While Murtha is no longer chair of the House Appropriations 
     Subcommittee on Defense, he remains the ranking Democrat and 
     a backroom dealer with few equals. In the Senate, 
     Pennsylvania Republican Arlen Specter will fight to keep the 
     center open from his seat on the Appropriations Committee. 
     The showdown could come as soon as next month, when 
     appropriations subcommittees begin tackling the budget.
       To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of Johnstown center's 
     death may be premature. ``Barring another flood,'' says a 
     former law-enforcement official, ``I doubty you'll see it go 
     anywhere.''
                                  ____


           [From the Centre Daily News, Sat., June 30, 2007]

      Official: Disputed Pa. Facility Plays Vital Part in Drug War

                          (By Daniel Lovering)

       For years, the National Drug Intelligence Center has 
     operated quietly on the upper floors of a former department 
     store, with scores of employees authorized at the highest 
     levels of government security.
       But the Justice Department facility, which blends into the 
     landscape of this once-thriving mill town 60 miles east of 
     Pittsburgh, has long caught the attention of critics in 
     Washington.
       Watchdog groups and lawmakers have blasted it as a pet 
     project of U.S. Rep. John Murtha, whose special funding 
     requests--or earmarks--have sustained the center since it 
     opened in his home district in the early 1990s.
       It has been derided as a product of pork barrel spending 
     and an unnecessary outgrowth of the war on drugs that 
     duplicates work done elsewhere. The Bush administration has 
     tried to close it, requesting millions to cover shutdown 
     costs.
       The latest salvo came last month, when Rep. Mike Rogers, R-
     Mich., tried to remove an earmark for the center, drawing 
     Murtha's ire.
       But the NDIC has persisted, despite lingering questions 
     about its effectiveness in coordinating the efforts of 
     federal authorities to collect and analyze intelligence on 
     the domestic trafficking of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine 
     and other drugs.
       Acting director Irene S. Hernandez insists the center plays 
     a critical and unique role in the nation's anti-drug effort, 
     and that its mission has evolved from an initial focus on 
     trafficking syndicates to its current emphasis on broad 
     trends.
       ``We can do an independent assessment of the drug 
     trafficking situation, and we can say this is what's 
     happening,'' Hernandez told The Associated Press in an 
     exclusive interview. ``There's nobody else positioned to do 
     what we do.''
       She said the center differs from other agencies, which may 
     be preoccupied with tactical operations, and informs policy 
     makers.
       Over the years, directors have come and gone, in one case 
     under a cloud of scandal. The current director, Michael F. 
     Walther, an army reservist and former federal prosecutor, is 
     currently serving in Iraq.
       The center's funding has been precarious--a factor that has 
     impeded hiring efforts, officials say. With a budget of $39 
     million annually, the center's survival again appears 
     uncertain as a spending bill moves through Congress.
       The NDIC conducts what it calls strategic assessments of 
     illicit drug trends. It analyzes evidence for federal 
     investigators and prosecutors, gathers intelligence, trains 
     law enforcement officers and produces a raft of reports. Some 
     of its work is classified.
       Its 268 employees have top secret security clearance and 
     include 121 intelligence analysts with backgrounds as diverse 
     as real estate, chemistry, banking and law. It also uses 
     contractors, some of whom are retired federal agents. In 
     their midst are a small number of analysts from the Drug 
     Enforcement Administration and other agencies.
       Hernandez, who joined the agency in 2004 after a 27-year 
     DEA career, points to the center's ability to cull 
     information from seized evidence--including ledgers, phone 
     and real estate records, computers and cell phones--and 
     funnel that data to investigators and prosecutors, helping 
     them build cases against suspects. The center has developed 
     its own software, including a program currently used by U.S. 
     military investigators in Iraq.
       It works with a broad range of law enforcement agencies, 
     from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Internal 
     Revenue Service, and supports the National Counter terrorism 
     Center's efforts to sever ties between drug traffickers and 
     terrorists.
       The NDIC assisted in an operation that led to the arrest of 
     one of the world's most hunted drug traffickers, Pablo Rayo 
     Montano, and helped detect growing abuse of the painkiller 
     OxyContin, officials said.
       Its marquee report, the National Drug Threat Assessment, 
     charts patterns of drug production, availability and demand. 
     Some law enforcement officials and academics praise the 
     report, but former drug officials question its value as a 
     policy instrument.
       Gary L. Fisher, a professor at the University of Nevada-
     Reno, called the report objective and independent. ``It 
     really accurately reflects how futile the (drug) supply 
     control efforts have been,'' he said. ``You'll find the DEA 
     reports are much more biased to fit their agenda.''
       Another professor, Matthew B. Robinson of North Carolina's 
     Appalachian State University, said he and a colleague used 
     the report to challenge assertions by the Office of National 
     Drug Control Policy, the White House agency responsible for 
     the drug war.
       The data showed illicit drugs are cheaper and purer today 
     than they were in the 1980s and 1990s, said Robinson, co-
     author of ``Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics: A 
     Critical Analysis of Claims Made by the Office of National 
     Drug Control Policy.'' Some local law enforcement officials 
     lauded the reports, saying they circulated them among their 
     analysts.
       But John Carnevale, a former ONDCP official who worked 
     under three administrations and four drug czars, said the 
     center's work was of no value to him when he was in 
     government, though he has since used its reports.
       ``I had access to the data well before they did,'' said 
     Carnevale, now a Maryland-based consultant. ``So I pretty 
     much ignored them.''
       Eric Sterling, president of the Criminal Justice Policy 
     Foundation, an advocacy group based in Maryland, said: ``In 
     many respects it seems that their stuff is out of date. . . . 
     I would describe it as a tool of limited value.''
       Critics have also questioned the center's location 140 
     miles from Washington, citing political maneuvering by 
     Murtha.
       ``I know what their capabilities are, I know what they can 
     do, but that didn't need to go to Johnstown, Pennsylvania,'' 
     said James Mavromatis, a former director of the El Paso 
     Intelligence Center, a Texas-based DEA agency.
       He said the center could have been housed at the El Paso 
     facility, closer to the U.S. border with Mexico, where most 
     illicit drugs enter the country. The NDIC had considered 
     moving a team there, he said.
       The NDIC's document analysis differs completely from EPIC's 
     work, he added, despite criticism they overlap completely.
       NDIC officials and others contend that the center's 
     Johnstown address is hardly a hindrance. It may be an asset, 
     they say, as its low cost of living appeals to job 
     candidates.
       Asa Hutchinson, a former DEA head and a former Republican 
     congressman, said he was ``a fan of folks performing 
     important government services, and not necessarily in 
     Washington.'' But he conceded the center may need 
     adjustments.
       ``I think it is underutilized,'' he said. ``I think they 
     can expand their mission, and I think that should be 
     examined.''
       An activist group, Citizens Against Government Waste, 
     recently chided Murtha for threatening fellow congressman 
     Rogers with legislative reprisals after Rogers tried to 
     strike a $23 million earmark for the center.
       ``We're not saying there shouldn't be an NDIC,'' said David 
     Williams, the group's vice president for policy. ``What we're 
     saying is, why should one member of Congress be able to set 
     up a field office like this?''
       Rogers said he believed the El Paso center was supposed to 
     be the main drug intelligence agency.
       ``I strongly believe it is not a good use of very valuable 
     intelligence resources,'' he told The Associated Press, 
     adding that $23 million amounted to the salaries of hundreds 
     of DEA agents.
       The Bush administration evidently agrees. Sean Kevelighan, 
     a spokesman for the Office of Management and Budget, said the 
     center has ``been slow to delineate a unique or useful role 
     within the drug intelligence community.''
       For that reason, the OMB's 2008 budget request ``fully 
     funds all shutdown costs'' of about $16 million he said.


[[Page S12103]]


  Mr. COBURN. I quote from the Centre Daily News of this last June:

        . . . the NDIC has persisted, despite lingering questions 
     about its effectiveness in coordinating the efforts of 
     federal authorities to collect and analyze intelligence on 
     the domestic trafficking of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, 
     and other drugs.

  What is at stake here? Running this center means we will not have 
enough DEA agents--and we do not. Running this center continues to 
spend $30 to $40 million a year that could do great things for our 
military. Why would we not want to redirect or at least prohibit the 
continued funding through this Defense authorization bill?
  Now, there are going to be some claims: Why are you doing this here? 
Why aren't you doing it on an appropriations bill when it comes 
through? We cannot have it both ways. We heard in the debate on WRDA 
that authorizations matter, and it is important for us to have 
priorities. So the claim is you should not be doing this here on the 
Defense authorization but, rather, on the appropriations bill. The 
authorization is the place to do this, to limit the expenditure of 
funds on something that does not pass muster by anybody's standard.
  So it is my hope that consideration will be given to this amendment, 
and that we will truly have the courage to make a vote to spend money 
wisely. To continue to spend money on this center means we are going to 
continue to throw $40 million away, according to the Department of 
Justice, which runs this center, in something that will not give them 
any benefit.
  I cannot think of a greater thing we could do than to start doing 
this and look at every program such as this that is not accomplishing 
any goals. There are no metrics to measure it, other than what the 
Department of Justice says.
  There will be claims saying it has programs that work. They have some 
programs, but they are highly expensive. They are not as efficient, and 
they are always late. So over the 12 or 13 years this center has 
existed, only two of those programs have been successful, and they are 
not as successful as the other programs within the Department of 
Justice in this very area. So it is hard to justify the basis for this 
center.


                           Amendment No. 2999

  Finally, Mr. President, I want to spend a minute talking about the 
Webb amendment. One of the things we know is that we do not do a good 
job on contracting. I know some of the Members on my side of the aisle 
perceive the potential for this commission to be used in a political 
framework. I am not worried about that. I do not think it is intended 
to be used in a political framework. I think it is intended to hold the 
agencies accountable for how they spend the money and whether we are 
going to get a handle on our contracting procedures, both through the 
State Department and the Defense Department so we can see we actually 
get value for the money we spend.
  I am highly supportive of the amendment because I think it is going 
to give us transparency, it is going to give us recommendations, and it 
is going to make clear where we have confusion now in how we contract 
and whether we get value for our money.
  With that, I reserve the remainder of my time and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.


                           Amendment No. 3035

  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise to speak on an amendment that we 
will have a cloture vote on at some point today or tomorrow, Senator 
Kennedy's and Senator Smith's Hate Crimes Prevention Act--a vote by 
which I hope the Senate will succeed, in a robust way, to invoke 
cloture and to move forward.
  Nine years ago, a young man sat in a bar having a good time, like 
many young men throughout America. Not unlike thousands of young adults 
at bars across America, this young man needed a ride home from the bar. 
So he asked two people he had befriended for a ride. They agreed. On 
the way home, they robbed him, they pistol whipped him, and tied him to 
a fence, leaving him for dead. They committed this brutal crime for one 
reason--and one reason only--because the victim was gay.
  Since that time, the Congress has been struggling to enact the 
Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act--a 
bill I am proud to cosponsor. It has received bipartisan support in 
both the House and the Senate. But for some reason, we have been unable 
to make the bill a law. Today--as soon as this vote takes place--I hope 
that will change.
  Hate crimes violate every principle upon which this country was 
founded. When our Declaration of Independence proclaimed that ``all men 
are created equal''--of course, I would take that to mean today all men 
and women are created equal--it did not go on to say, however, ``except 
Muslim or Sikh or homosexual Americans.'' It had no exceptions to the 
rights and liberties Americans had under the Constitution and that 
Declaration. The freedoms we often take for granted--freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, freedom of religion--become empty promises if 
we do not protect all those who seek to exercise these freedoms under 
the Constitution.

  Sadly, right now we are not protecting all of our citizens. This is 
not, by the way, about providing special rights. It is about ensuring 
constitutional rights.
  Local, State, and Federal governments need additional resources and 
authority to investigate and prosecute hate crimes based on race, 
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, disability, and gender 
identity. That is exactly what this bill will do. It will allow the 
Department of Justice to assist in these investigations and 
prosecutions, and it will provide grants for State and local 
governments struggling with the costs and logistics of prosecuting 
these crimes.
  Some people may not think hate crimes are a real problem in this 
country. They are absolutely mistaken. In 2005--the most recent year we 
have data on--8,380 hate crimes were reported. Of the single-bias 
incidents, 54.7 percent were racially motivated; 17.1 percent were 
motivated by religious bias; 14.2 percent resulted from sexual 
orientation bias; 13.2 percent by ethnicity or national origin bias; 
and a little under 1 percent by disability bias.
  My home State of New Jersey experienced at least 756 bias incidents, 
47 percent of which were based on racial bias, 36 percent were based on 
religious bias, and 11 percent were based on ethnic bias. I say ``at 
least 756 bias incidents'' because we do not know how many of these 
vile attacks have gone unnoticed and unprosecuted due to the scarce 
resources currently available to local law enforcement.
  Now, I am proud to have been the author of New Jersey's landmark bias 
crimes law when I was in the State legislature. We said then we could 
not eradicate hate or bigotry in New Jersey with a single law, but we 
could send a strong societal message that such acts would not be 
tolerated. With this law, we can do the same for our great Nation.
  Of course, you do not need to rely on my numbers or my experiences to 
know that hate crimes are alive and well in the United States. All you 
have to do is watch television.
  Last Thursday, thousands of protesters descended on the small town of 
Jena, LA, to protest the treatment of six young African Americans. The 
town was a picture of racial tension, all of which came to the surface 
months ago when three nooses were hung from a ``whites-only'' tree at 
the Jena High School. Perhaps if we had stronger hate crimes 
enforcement, this original action which provoked such violence and 
started the town down its path would have been properly handled and 
would have never escalated to the degree it did.
  Make no mistake about it, hate crimes are a serious problem in the 
United States--a problem we can no longer afford to ignore.
  Some may protest that this is not the time or place to be debating 
hate crimes legislation. I disagree. For some, it never seems to be the 
right time or the right place.
  Members of our military are not immune from hate crimes. To the 
contrary, hate crimes can happen anywhere there are emotions, anywhere 
there are people with the capability to hate. In 1992, a Navy sailor, 
Allen Schindler, was murdered by two fellow sailors because of his 
sexual orientation. In 1999, PFC Barry Winchell was similarly killed 
because his attackers believed--believed--he was gay. The military has 
recognized that hate

[[Page S12104]]

crimes are a problem and sought to prevent them, but more can and must 
be done.

  It is absolutely appropriate to protect members of our Armed Forces 
from the vicious attacks that constitute hate crimes while we are 
debating the Department of Defense authorization bill. It is absolutely 
the right time to enact this hate crimes legislation. After all, what 
are our men and women doing in uniform? They are fighting for us around 
the world to preserve our way of life and to promote democracy, and all 
of them take an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. Let the 
preservation of the rights of all Americans be the essence of what they 
are fighting for.
  I will vote to invoke cloture on the hate crimes amendment offered by 
Senator Kennedy and Senator Smith, and I urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2999

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to speak for a few minutes in 
support of the Webb-McCaskill amendment that would establish a 
contracting commission relative to contracting in Iraq, but it also 
does another very important thing, which is it broadens the 
jurisdiction of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 
or SIGIR. Over the last 4 years, the United States has spent more than 
$20 billion on reconstruction contracting in Iraq. In report after 
report, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR, 
has demonstrated that this effort was poorly planned, inadequately 
staffed, and poorly managed.
  For example, the special inspector general has reported that plumbing 
was so poorly installed at the Baghdad Police College that dripping 
sewage not only threatened the health of students and inspectors but 
could have affected the structural integrity of the building.
  The special inspector general reported that the security walls built 
for the Babylon Police Academy in Hilla were full of gaps and 
deficiencies, some of which were filled with sandbags; lighting systems 
and guard towers called for in the contract were never installed. As a 
result, the academy was vulnerable to attack.
  The special inspector general reported that a prison in Nasiriyah was 
originally supposed to house 4,400 inmates, but the scope was reduced 
to the point where it would only house 800. After most of the available 
money had been spent, the contract was terminated due to schedule 
delays and cost overruns.
  He reported that neither the government nor the contractor could 
verify the status of a new oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Baiji because 
project monitoring was very limited and sporadic. However, at least 25 
percent of the welds on the pipeline was defective, and one major canal 
crossing was only 10 percent complete. The failure to complete this 
project resulted in the loss of as much as $14.8 billion in oil 
revenues to the Iraqi Government.
  He reported that after the Army Corps of Engineers spent $186 million 
on primary health care centers throughout Iraq, the contract was 
terminated with only 6 health care centers completed, 135 partially 
constructed, and the remainder ``descoped.'' The special inspector 
general determined that the contractor had lacked qualified engineering 
staff, failed to check the capacity of its subcontractors, failed to 
properly supervise the work, and failed to enforce quality control 
requirements.
  The Department of Defense has spent even more money on logistical 
support contracts for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. There have 
been numerous indications of fraud, waste, and abuse in these contracts 
as well. For example, recent press reports indicate that the Department 
of Defense contracting officials in Iraq and Kuwait received millions 
of dollars in kickbacks, tainting several billion dollars of DOD 
logistics support contracts. Similarly, the Armed Services Committee 
held a hearing in April on Halliburton's LOGCAP contract for logistics 
support in Iraq. Our committee learned that the company was given work 
that appears to have far exceeded the scope of the contract. All of 
this added work was provided to the contractor without competition. The 
contractor resisted providing us with information that we needed to 
monitor and control costs. There are almost $2 billion of overcharges 
on the contract, and the contractor received highly favorable 
settlements on these overcharges.
  Unfortunately, the special inspector general does not have 
jurisdiction over Department of Defense logistic support contracts, and 
the Department of Defense inspector general who does have jurisdiction 
refused for several years to send auditors to Iraq and is now playing 
catchup. As a result, billions of dollars have been spent on these 
contracts without sufficient oversight.
  In addition, there have been numerous reports of abuses by private 
security contractors operating in Iraq. More recently, the Iraqi 
Government has complained about an incident in which employees of 
Blackwater, Inc., allegedly opened fire on innocent Iraqis in Baghdad. 
This incident is apparently the latest in a long series of similar 
cases in which Blackwater employees were alleged to have used excessive 
force.
  Unfortunately, the special inspector general does not have 
jurisdiction over private security contractors. The DOD inspector 
general does not have jurisdiction over State Department contractors 
like Blackwater either. Published reports in the last few weeks 
indicate that the State Department inspector general has systematically 
avoided looking into allegations of contract abuse in Iraq.
  In short, despite almost 5 years of allegations of waste, fraud, and 
abuse in Iraq contracting, we continue to have huge gaps in our 
oversight of these activities. The Webb-McCaskill amendment will 
address these gaps by, first, establishing an independent commission to 
look into Federal agency contracting for reconstruction, logistical 
support, and the performance of private security and intelligence 
functions in Iraq and Afghanistan; and, second, expanding the 
jurisdiction of the special inspector general to logistical support 
contracts and contracts for the performance of private security and 
intelligence functions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

  Under this provision, the special inspector general, in collaboration 
with other relevant inspectors general, would conduct a comprehensive 
series of audits of logistical support contracts and private security 
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan comparable to the audits the special 
inspector general has already conducted for Iraq reconstruction 
contracts. The commission would review these materials, conduct 
hearings, and issue a report identifying lessons learned and making 
specific recommendations for improvements that should be made in future 
contracting.
  So the Webb-McCaskill amendment would ensure that we finally have 
appropriate oversight over the full range of contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. It will ensure that we are in a position to learn from the 
mistakes we have made, and we will be better positioned to avoid making 
similar mistakes in the future. I hope there will be a broad bipartisan 
vote for Webb-McCaskill, just the way there is already broad bipartisan 
sponsorship for their amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could ask my distinguished chairman 
and longtime colleague a question, I read this amendment, and it seems 
to me it has laudatory goals. But it is--we are outsourcing the work of 
the Congress, and, most specifically, outsourcing the work of our Armed 
Services Committee. That is the thing that concerns me.
  We have two very distinguished sponsors, our colleague from Virginia 
and our other colleague on our committee. But I find it difficult to 
rationalize how this commission would function at the same time in a 
manner that literally outsources the responsibilities of our committee.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his question. Our 
committee, as the Senator knows perhaps better than any other Member of 
this body, has a huge responsibility month

[[Page S12105]]

after month, year after year, on the authorization bill. Most of our 
focus is on that bill in terms of staff assignments.
  We also from time to time do have oversight hearings. We have had a 
couple on Iraq, but in terms of what is needed with the immense fraud 
and abuse and waste that has gone on in Iraq, we could assign our 
committee nothing else and still not catch up to what needs to be done 
relative to the waste and the fraud and the abuse that has taken place 
in Iraq contracting. We have perhaps three or four staff members 
assigned to investigation. They are in the middle of an investigation 
now. They could not possibly--with the very small number of staffers 
assigned to that responsibility--take on the breadth of work which 
needs to be done relative to Iraq.
  Also, this amendment not only has a contracting commission, but it 
also is going to amend the Special Inspector General Act relative to 
Iraq to fill in a number of gaps which exist in the inspector general's 
jurisdiction.
  The areas which I just outlined that the current special inspector 
general does not have jurisdiction over, we must have a modification of 
that jurisdiction in order that the special inspector general will have 
that capability which is now omitted from the tasking of the special 
inspector general. As the Senator also knows because he was responsible 
for the appointment of a number of these commissions, our committee 
supports, and indeed has led the way, in the creation of independent 
commissions all the time. It was not an abdication of our jurisdiction 
or our authority when the Packard Commission was created, when the 
section 800 commission was created, or when the Service Acquisition 
Reform Act Commission was recently created. There are many commissions 
that we appoint, and we are leading the way and have led the way to 
have created, and in no way does that diminish the jurisdiction of our 
committee.
  In fact, it is quite the opposite. The creation of these commissions 
has been able to lead to reforms, legislative reforms at times, which 
our committee then is able to take up and adopt, hopefully, in many 
cases, and in fact has adopted in many cases.
  So there is nothing novel about the creation of commissions. As a 
matter of fact, I think the Senator from Virginia, perhaps almost on 
his own, was the creator of a commission which we recently heard from 
to give us the independent assessment of the military capability of the 
Iraqi military forces, the commission led by General Jones.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I acknowledge that, yes, I did conceive 
that idea, and successfully, with the help of Senator Byrd and others, 
got that legislation through. But that was for a tightly defined 
purpose within a prescribed short period of time.
  This one, I believe, is of 2 years duration. Mr. President, I say to 
my distinguished chairman, I have listened to him recount some of the 
commissions that our committee has sanctioned. But I am now prepared on 
this floor to tell my chairman, if you believe we need extra help, I 
will lead the effort with you to get more money from our committee to 
take over some of the responsibilities that the Senator is about to 
recommend to the Senate be outsourced to a commission.
  Mr. LEVIN. Did we outsource to the Packard Commission, the reforms 
they recommended?
  Mr. WARNER. I remember that Packard Commission very well, but that 
was a tightly knit commission for a specific purpose. I used to be at 
the Pentagon and worked under David Packard as Secretary of the Navy. 
We were fortunate to get him to do that. This seems to be an omnibus 
situation to me. I am concerned about having the inspector generals, 
which, again, is a creation by our committee, against some of the 
administration's wishes. They weren't overly keen on putting inspector 
generals in there. Our colleague from New Jersey has a bill to have an 
IG now for Iraq. I want to support that. But these inspector generals 
have to report to this Commission, I understand. I would not want to be 
a party to amending the law there. They were created by the Congress, 
and they should report to the Congress, not to a commission.
  Mr. LEVIN. I don't think working closely with the Commission 
collaboratively in any way means they are not going to report to us. 
They will continue to report to the Congress. There is no shift of the 
reporting function. As a matter of fact, the IG for Iraq does not have 
the authority which should have been given to him, and would now be 
given to him by this bill, for instance, on logistics support 
contracts. Why in heaven's name should the special IG not have 
logistics support contracts jurisdiction?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if you want to take those provisions out 
and make it a freestanding amendment, I would be supportive of 
modifying it.
  Mr. LEVIN. I have never seen as much fraud, waste, and abuse. There 
is no analogy in the history of this country, I don't believe, for the 
amount of fraud and waste and abuse that is taking place in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. I don't think our committee could do anything else if we 
took on that responsibility. I think we would be having hearings every 
week, when we need to have hearings on all of the other matters under 
our jurisdiction. I don't know that we could do an authorization bill 
properly if we took on this responsibility. It is too massive.
  I wonder whether the Senator can give me one example in American 
history where there has been this degree of waste, fraud, and abuse. We 
now see a massive investigation taking place because of the alleged 
fraud of a number of members of the armed services. I cannot remember 
anything comparable. This is a massive undertaking. It is most 
appropriate that we have a special commission to do that. There is no 
reason why they should not work in concert with an IG. We don't want 
them overlapping and conflicting.
  The issue is whether we are going to take on this responsibility one 
way or the other. This is only one practical way to do it. I wish we 
had the resources and time in our committee to do the kind of oversight 
that has to be done relative to Iraq. To me, it has been the most 
shocking abuse of the taxpayers' dollars that we have seen. As a 
practical matter, I think the former chairman of the committee would 
acknowledge it would take a huge amount of staff and committee time.
  I want to give one example. We have an ongoing investigation right 
now, and it is very small relative to the size and scope of this one. 
We wanted to talk to a witness. During this investigation, a number of 
witnesses talked to us voluntarily, but a few witnesses would not. In 
our committee, we don't even have subpoena power unless the full 
committee votes for it. The Senator from Virginia was very helpful to 
me, as he remembers, in getting the full committee to vote for a 
subpoena. I extended my appreciation to him then, and I do it publicly 
now for his cooperation and that of Senator McCain. Every one of those 
subpoenas required a vote. Then there had to be a hearing. We have to 
go through a hearing of our committee to hear from a witness that is 
subpoenaed, even though that should be through a discovery process. 
Even our rules are so limiting in our committee that we could not 
undertake an investigation of this scope.
  This is a massive undertaking. To me, it would be suggesting, for 
instance, that if there was an Iran-Contra Commission, somehow or other 
the appointment of that Iran-Contra Commission--there was a special 
committee of the Congress. Was that an abdication of the work of the 
existing committee? I don't think so. It fit a special need at that 
time. Each of the committees from which that special committee was 
drawn didn't have the resources to do it on their own. So each of these 
are designed for a purpose.
  I don't know why there would be objection. The reason for the length 
of time that the amendment takes is twofold: One is that this is a 
major investigation that will take a lot of time because its scope is 
huge. Secondly, we want to take it out of politics. I think the 
sponsors will speak to this, and perhaps already have. This should not 
be something where there is going to be a report in the middle of a 
Presidential campaign. It ought to end after that campaign is over. I 
think they provide for interim reporting, as I remember, in January 
after the Presidential campaign.
  So I hope there will be bipartisan support. It is not a political 
effort. The report comes after the Presidential

[[Page S12106]]

campaign. There is no practical way that our committee has the 
resources to undertake the travel and the responsibility and the scope 
of this. This is huge. There has never been this degree of waste that I 
know of in American history. I know enough about this already from our 
one hearing, on one matter, involving one contractor, involving the 
scope of a contract that we touched literally with the tail of an 
elephant or donkey. It is massive.
  I plead with the former chairman here, who knows exactly the 
responsibilities of our committee, who knows more than anyone in this 
body what responsibilities our committee has, that there is no 
practical way, given our bill that comes up every year, given our 
nominations process with which the Senator is fully familiar--we have 
four nominations that we have to hear tomorrow. We have dozens of 
nominations each year. On top of all of that, we have oversight, which 
we try to do in a number of areas. We had oversight on the Boeing 
contract. That was one contract that took a significant amount of time. 
We did some major good. I don't know the magnitude, but if you look at 
the Boeing contract, for instance, this contracting abuse scandal has 
to be a multiple of 10 to 100 times that one investigation. I plead 
with my friend to support this as the only practical way to get our 
hands around this situation.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I know our chairman has another 
engagement. We will return to this debate. This thing really poses, in 
my judgment, new ground for the committee, to outsource this much 
responsibility of oversight. At this point, I will yield the floor. I 
see our colleague seeking recognition.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, if I may address the question of the 
Senator from Virginia briefly, I think it is important to keep this in 
context.
  First, the Senator from Virginia worries that the Armed Services 
Committee was giving up jurisdiction in order to form this Commission. 
I think it is important to remember that this mess is not just the 
jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. This mess is also the 
jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is also the 
jurisdiction of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee. In fact, an argument can be made that this is the modern-day 
Truman Committee, and the chairman of that committee is none other than 
Senator Levin, who chairs the Special Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations.
  One could make the argument that the State Department should be 
answering to Foreign Relations for the messes in contracting in terms 
of reconstruction. One could argue that the active military should be 
answering to Armed Services. Government Affairs should be looking at 
the whole mess. The bottom line is that this Commission does two 
important things: First, it gets above all of the agencies to bring all 
of the problems to one place, so we don't have the turf fights over 
which committee has jurisdiction over this particular problem that we 
have encountered like never before. As the Senator from Michigan, 
chairman of the committee, said, we have never had this kind of problem 
before in terms of an armed conflict.
  The other thing to remember is that, unlike those committees, this is 
bipartisan. This Commission is four Democrats and four Republicans. It 
is not a commission where one party is going to take precedence over 
the other party. We have a representative of the President and the 
Secretary of Defense on this Commission. So the bipartisan nature 
allows us to get above this knee-jerk reaction we have around here that 
if they are for it, we are against it; and if they are against it, we 
are for it. This is way too important to engage in that.
  Finally, in terms of time period, this has a set time; it is only 2 
years. The first report is due after the Presidential election in 
January 2009--the first interim report. Next year, when the capping 
report is presented to us, they can give it to this Commission, and 
they can look it over. Stuart Bowen is onboard with this. We discussed 
it at length, and he thinks this is a great way to move forward and get 
this above each individual committee and above some of the 
partisanship. Frankly, we have engaged in it. We are not without sin 
here. My party has engaged in partisanship over this. I understand that 
it may feel that this is an effort to engage in partisanship. That is 
why we went out of our way to say it is going to be bipartisan in 
nature, limited in time, getting above the various committees that have 
jurisdiction here because of the State Department's involvement, DOD's 
involvement, and the involvement of the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee--three different committees, including 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The first interim report 
is due January 2009. The final report must be presented by January 
2010. This is a 2-year period of time to work and collaborate.
  By the way, I tried to count up--and I am sure the Senator from 
Virginia is aware of this--how many people we have working in the 
Department of Defense in auditing and auditing-related activities. 
There are 20,000 people. Now, if you think about that in the context of 
what has gone on, you realize we need some help. How do we have 20,000 
people in contracting and auditing and related investigative activities 
in the DOD and have the kind of runaway abuse that we have had.
  By the way, in talking to the generals in Iraq who are involved, they 
were focused on their mission. I have no ill will toward these 
commanders who were trying to get a job done in terms of a military 
context. That is why we need this Commission, to give the military 
clear guidance, along with the State Department, of how we fix this 
systemically. What kind of training do we need to do? These detailees 
within these various areas given the contract oversight responsibility, 
the CORs, are not trained right now. They don't have the core 
competency in terms of contract monitoring that we must have under 
these conditions where we are contracting at an unprecedented level. If 
you look at the modifications we have made, where we have actually said 
we are not ever going to allow this Commission, in terms of members 
leaving, to get to anything other than a four-four, we are never going 
to have a situation where it is not completely bipartisan and where 
they are not going to focus with expertise on ways they can guide our 
committee and guide the committee I serve on, Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs and guide the Foreign Relations Committee in 
making sure we help the State Department and Department of Defense and 
any other Government agencies involved, including inspector general 
agencies and other auditing agencies. Frankly, GAO does a lot of this 
work for Congress, and we take their reports.

  I think that in light of what has occurred and the scope of this 
beyond the jurisdiction of any one committee, 2 years is a reasonable 
finite time to come with concrete, meaningful suggestions that get us 
above this partisan rancor over the conflict in Iraq and using it as a 
political football that we have a tendency to throw around here with 
some frequency.
  The Senator's leadership on this particular issue is so key to us 
having success with this amendment. I ask the Senator to take some time 
to look at it. I will be happy to visit with him about the conversation 
I had with Stewart Bowen about the valid approach we are making that I 
think will bring about some of the same positive results that were 
brought about in the past, whether it was the 9/11 Commission, the 
Baker-Hamilton Commission or the other commissions the Senator from 
Michigan referenced that the Senator has been involved with and party 
to in terms of wanting outside eyes at some point to help us get beyond 
some of the stuff that goes on that we cannot help.
  I think it is tremendously important, and I implore the Senator from 
Virginia to take a look at it again and see if we haven't done the 
things that will reassure him this will be an augmentation of the Armed 
Services Committee's work instead of an abdication of their 
responsibility.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Missouri. I must say, having been on this Armed Services Committee now 
29 years with my good friend, Senator Levin, we ``old bulls,'' as we 
are referred to, are very much impressed with our new member, her 
vigor, her

[[Page S12107]]

foresight, her determination to get things done. She has stirred us up 
in a very constructive way, I might say.
  As to this measure, this will require a little more study on this 
side. But I am concerned with the fundamental proposition that we are 
abdicating the duties of the committee, but we are not quite there yet 
in this debate to try to reach some final determinations.
  An interesting observation: 20,000 individuals, and probably that is 
correct. They are scattered not just in Washington but all across 
America in military departments. The Department of the Army has its 
procurement center outside the Nation's Capital.
  In a sense, as the chairman said and I think the Senator from 
Missouri has said, the enormity of the problem out there--is the 
Senator suggesting that the enormity of that problem is a consequence 
of this 20,000 or so not performing their duties as prescribed?
  Mrs. McCASKILL. I believe that what happened was in an unprecedented 
fashion, we engaged in contracting--I know the Senator is a student of 
history, and if he looks back at the history of the Seabees and where 
the Seabees came from in terms of the idea that you are going to put 
people in the middle of a conflict who are not military personnel, in 
terms of doing ancillary activities apart from the direct military 
mission, it is unprecedented what we have done in this conflict in 
terms of the contracting.
  I don't think the active military was prepared for this kind of scope 
in terms of the types of contracts that were entered into, many of them 
not definitized, many of them not with the kind of oversight that one 
would expect for contracts that run into $15 billion, $20 billion per 
contract, in some instances. I think this was a matter of we need it 
now, we don't have the end strength to get everything done we need to 
get done; if we contract it, it is going to be cheaper in terms of 
legacy costs to get a worker to peel potatoes than to recruit a soldier 
to peel potatoes or to cook.
  I understand that was done long term because it had the potential for 
efficiencies, it had a potential to preserve our ground strength for 
the military mission and to allow us to not incur the legacy costs of 
another member of the active military.
  In reality, because they were not prepared in terms of their systems 
for this level of contracting and oversight, bad things happened--very 
bad things happened.
  If we are going to continue to contract at this level, why not at 
this fork in the road embark upon a limited 2-year exercise in a 
nonpartisan way to get concrete suggestions with expertise and not 
creating a new bureaucracy, because they can access those 20,000 
people, they can access the Army auditor, they can access the 
contracting agency within the Army, they can access all the inspectors 
general, they can access all the acquisition and procurement 
specialists. They can access that information, bring it together for 
the State Department and for DOD and say: If moving forward we are 
going to continue to contract at this level--and let's be honest, I 
think we are--then these are things we need to be doing.

  If the military could do this on its own, we wouldn't have the 
``lessons learned'' book in Bosnia not even getting to the people in 
Iraq until after they entered into most of these contracts. We remember 
the testimony from David Walker. He talked about the fact that even 
though they had drawn up the book and said these are all the mistakes 
we made in Bosnia, guess what. They forgot to look at the book before 
they began down the very same road in the Iraq conflict. That is what I 
want to prevent in the future.
  This is about looking forward and not about looking back. This is 
about figuring out a way forward that we can responsibly contract in a 
way that protects our military and the strength of our military, and, 
boy, would I like the help of the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for her analysis. As I 
read this, they can look backward, forward, sidewise, any way they wish 
and have one of the strongest powers Congress can confer on any 
commission--subpoena power--compelling persons against their wishes to 
come before that committee, take an oath, and provide testimony. That 
is something that Congress should consider very carefully before it 
confers that on--for the moment we know not who will be on this 
commission.
  As I say, we will require further deliberation. But I do point out 
that the Senator talked about the uniform side. Much of the military 
procurement system is performed by very able career civilians. From 
time to time, military officers are detailed as a part of their career 
and otherwise to work with those civilians. But I feel the Senator is 
putting on report an awful lot of people with a broad brush. I want to 
think about that. Having had the privilege of serving with those people 
in the Department of Defense--perhaps not the ones who are there now 
but many. I think at the time I was Secretary of the Navy, I had 
700,000 to 800,000 civilians in the Department of the Navy. They are 
very conscientious people. I acknowledge there have been a lot of 
unfortunate things in the rush to do what we felt was necessary with 
respect to Iraq and, to a lesser degree but nevertheless to a degree, 
Afghanistan.
  Haste makes waste is the old adage. For the moment, I have thoroughly 
been informed by the views of the Senator, and I hope to continue to 
have a dialog with the Senator as this matter is now before the full 
Senate.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia. I don't want to overemphasize his support, but there are few 
people around here who can get us past partisanship. I have noticed in 
my short time in the Senate he is one of the chosen ones. He can get us 
past that partisanship sometimes.
  I am very hopeful and remain optimistic that I can convince the 
Senator from Virginia this is a measured and appropriate way to provide 
some accountability to all those men and women to whom he referred who 
are trying to do the right thing. We have not figured this out yet, and 
I think we have to try something different to see if we can figure it 
out.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague from Missouri, the 
State in which my mother was born.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak about two matters, but I 
wish to, first of all, associate myself with the remarks by my 
distinguished colleague from the State of Missouri. Our first-year 
class of Senators has worked hard on a lot of issues. She and our 
colleague from Virginia, Mr. Webb, have worked hard on this issue. I 
appreciate her comments today, as well as the enlightening exchange and 
as well as Senator Levin's comments.


                           Amendment No. 2196

  Mr. President, I rise to speak first about amendment No. 2196 
pertaining to the National Drug Intelligence Center which is located in 
Johnstown, PA, in southwestern Pennsylvania. This center was created in 
1993 and provides Federal, State, and local law enforcement and 
national security agencies with crucial information about the 
structure, membership, finances, communications, and activities of 
drug-trafficking organizations.
  While a number of Federal agencies play different roles in combating 
illegal drug use and distribution, the National Drug Intelligence 
Center, which some know as NDIC, performs a unique role by providing 
independent information about drug use to other Federal, State, and 
local agencies.
  This center produces an annual national drug assessment report which 
is the principal report by which Federal policymakers evaluate trends 
in drug use and the overall drug threat faced by this Nation. Given the 
role drug trafficking plays in financing international terrorism, 
information compiled by the NDIC about drug distribution plays an 
important role in combating terrorism worldwide.
  Much has been made about the fact that the NDIC is located in 
Johnstown, PA. Let me speak for a few moments about the benefits of 
locating outside Washington.
  All the answers to our Nation's problems do not reside here. 
Sometimes there are a lot of good answers outside Washington. To some, 
that may be a news bulletin.
  First, the Johnstown location translates into reduced overhead and 
lower administrative costs.
  Second, being outside the beltway allows for greater coordination 
with

[[Page S12108]]

State and local law enforcement. The work done by NDIC does not have to 
be conducted in Washington and, I would argue, the Johnstown location 
offers greater cost savings for the Federal Government.
  This amendment comes at an interesting time where recently--
yesterday, actually--the Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA, announced that 
this center, in particular, played key roles in an international case 
targeting the global underground trade of anabolic steroids, human 
growth hormone, and insulin growth factors, in addition to some other 
information. The investigation included significant enforcement of 
illicit underground trafficking of ancillary and counterfeit 
medications.
  The investigation represents the largest steroid enforcement action 
in U.S. history, and it took place in conjunction with enforcement 
operations in nine countries worldwide.
  The information provided by this center in Johnstown, PA, played an 
important role in this investigation.
  I also wish to add my own feelings with regard to this particular 
center in Johnstown, PA. I am very proud of the people in Johnstown, 
PA. They share a heritage of hard work and sacrifice, they have 
overcome a lot, and they have a tremendous work ethic. Any investment 
in a city such as Johnstown, PA, is a prudent investment, not just 
because of economic activity but principally, and most importantly, the 
important work this center provides for law enforcement.
  If we want to do comparisons with other places around the country, I 
am sure that will be constructive. I rise to speak against this 
amendment and urge my colleagues to vote against it and also to 
highlight the value of having this center in the State of Pennsylvania 
for our Nation.


                           Amendment No. 3035

  I wish to change subjects. I have a second set of remarks which I 
wish to take the time to deliver.
  We are contemplating voting on legislation that pertains to hate 
crimes. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act at long last may be voted on in 
the Senate. There are a lot of reasons for me to stand up not only as a 
supporter of this legislation but a cosponsor; one of, at last count, 
43 bipartisan cosponsors. In the other body, there are more than 170, I 
am told.
  This act is simple but profoundly important. First of all, the Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act will strengthen--strengthen law enforcement's 
ability to crack down on these kinds of crimes by providing grants to 
local and State agencies to fight the particular evil that resides in 
the hearts of those who want to commit crimes based upon this kind of 
motivation--a motivation of hate, pure and simple. Secondly, in terms 
of the mechanics of how this will work, this legislation will help the 
Department of Justice work with local and State law enforcement 
agencies to assist in the prosecution of these crimes.
  But beyond the program and beyond the details of a government program 
lie some very personal stories. One story that all of America knows, 
but we need to be reminded sometimes about these stories, is one we saw 
play out in the 1990s.
  His name was Matthew Shepard. He was born on December 1, 1976, to 
Judy and Dennis Shepard in Casper, WY. He went to the University of 
Wyoming and had a great interest in politics and a great interest in 
the environment. In October of 1998, two men tied him to a split rail 
fence, tortured and beat him, and left him to die in freezing 
temperatures. He was found 18 hours later, and he died several days 
later in October of 1998 at the age of 21.
  I had the opportunity in September 2005 to meet Matthew Shepard's 
mother. We had a private meeting where she expressed her deep concern 
about this crime we see play out across the country. She, obviously, 
will probably never fully recover from the loss of her son and the way 
he died, but when I rise to speak about this, I think we have to 
consider who speaks for that mother if the Senate doesn't stand up and 
speak with one voice on an issue such as this.
  This is about combating hate, hate in the hearts of men and women 
across this country. We talk all the time about people from other parts 
of the world and how evil they can be, especially the terrorists, but 
there are examples in our country of real hate. If we do not stamp them 
out and prosecute vigorously these kinds of crimes, we cannot fully 
appreciate nor can we fully expect others to appreciate the feeling in 
our hearts about making sure we treat people with dignity, with 
respect, and acceptance, but that we do it in the spirit of brotherhood 
and sisterhood.
  When such a crime as this happens, I would hope the Senate would do 
everything possible to fully and vigorously prosecute and sanction 
anyone who engages in this activity. This legislation, the Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act, is one important step to achieving that goal, and I 
speak in support of that legislation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, would the Senator from Pennsylvania mind 
answering a couple of questions before he leaves?
  No. 1, I would note, just on the hate crimes legislation, that the 
perpetrators of the heinous crimes against Matthew Shepard had full 
justice carried out against them. That is true, is it not?
  Mr. CASEY. Well, there are a lot of ways to prosecute someone.
  Mr. COBURN. Were they prosecuted, I guess, and did they receive 
significant punishment?
  Mr. CASEY. Let me finish my thought. There are a lot of ways to 
prosecute a crime like that. But when you have legislation that is 
supported broadly across the country, including by law enforcement 
agencies, district attorneys, and police organizations across the 
country, I rely upon their judgment when it comes to what are the tools 
we need for law enforcement.


                           Amendment No. 2196

  Mr. COBURN. The second question--and I want to make sure you 
understand as the author of this that it doesn't say anything about 
Johnstown, PA, which has great folks. This amendment isn't about the 
people of Johnstown, PA, and what they can offer. They offer great 
things to our country, and it is not meant to degrade or delineate 
anything other than the utmost respect for them.
  What this amendment is about is, are we getting the value for what we 
are spending? And all you have to do is look at what the Department of 
Justice says, which is running this program, and what the DEA says, and 
what every other intelligence-run enforcement center is saying: that, 
in fact, there is not added value for the dollars that are spent there, 
and anything that is a positive contribution could be more effectively 
utilized at some other center.
  So it is not about the people of Pennsylvania and it is not about who 
did it or whether we all shouldn't try to get a Federal facility to 
help areas that are economically depressed across the country. That is 
not a bad idea. There is nothing wrong with that. The purpose of this 
amendment is to delineate that there is not good value for the half a 
billion dollars we have already spent and that taxpayers could get more 
value out of less money if, in fact, we did what the professionals and 
everyone else has said, including former directors of that center.
  Mr. CASEY. Let me just respond to my colleague, the distinguished 
Senator from Oklahoma, who has been on this floor for many years 
holding public agencies accountable, and we appreciate that and I share 
that concern. I only raised the question about Johnstown, I guess, 
because as a Senator from Pennsylvania, I want to make sure we are 
fighting for an important community. I am not saying that is the intent 
of the legislation. I just wanted to reiterate how much I appreciate 
the work ethic of that community.
  Every program that is funded with taxpayer dollars has to be 
accountable, and I appreciate that. We have an opportunity on this 
floor to debate programs where we spend significant sums of public 
dollars. When I was in State government, as Senator Coburn knows, my 
job for the better part of a decade was to do just that, and it is 
close to my heart, the kind of accountability I know the Senator is 
concerned about. But I would hope, in pursuing that, we don't 
unjustifiably have an impact on a facility that is providing a great 
benefit for law enforcement well beyond Pennsylvania and, secondly, 
that we work to be equitable about it. I know that is the intent, but I 
think we have

[[Page S12109]]

an honest disagreement about this particular center.
  Mr. COBURN. I thank the Senator for answering my question. I guess my 
debatable point is the offering of the value, in the judgment of the 
professionals who are running all of the Department, including the 
Department of Justice and the DEA, which says it doesn't measure up. 
That is my point. That is why I brought the amendment. It doesn't 
denigrate the work of the people there.
  The fact is, if we are really going to continue to send $30 million 
to $40 million a year, let's find them something that will give us 
better value. If we choose not to support this amendment, let's give 
them direction so that the $30 million or $40 million we do invest 
actually brings us something that is worth $30 million or $40 million.
  And it is not the employees there who are at fault. In fact, the 
direction and the mission has been one that hasn't been accomplished 
because it wasn't needed in the first place.
  Mr. CASEY. Quickly, by way of a response, I have to say that when I 
was the auditor general of Pennsylvania, our office authored lots of 
reports about waste, fraud, and abuse and about problems in spending. 
What we tried to do as well was not just point out where the problems 
were but also to point out and to list, actually in reports, a series 
of recommendations and corrective actions.
  I think there is ample reason in a lot of public programs to make 
changes and to have corrective action. I don't think that always should 
result in the defunding or the elimination of an entire program. But we 
might have a disagreement on this issue, and I respectfully submit 
that.
  Mr. COBURN. I thank the Senator for his words and his courtesy in 
answering my questions.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). The Senator from Montana.


                           Amendment No. 2999

  Mr. TESTER. Mr. President, I am proud to join with my Democratic 
colleagues in the freshmen class who are offering amendment No. 2999 
today. I wish to give my thanks in particular to Senator McCaskill, 
Senator Webb, as well as the other six freshmen Senators in the 
Democratic caucus in offering this amendment that deals with 
accountability as it applies to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  The nine of us were elected last fall in large measure because the 
people in this country were tired of the war in Iraq and tired of a 
lack of accountability for how our tax dollars have been spent in the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fact is, people in Montana and around 
the country work way too hard to have their tax dollars stolen from 
them by people who think they can take advantage of an environment 
where there is little or no oversight or accountability. This amendment 
will bring some much needed accountability in the way our tax dollars 
are spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we will do it in a way that 
takes this issue out of the political spotlight.
  This amendment will establish a bipartisan commission to review the 
contracts we have entered into in fighting the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The Commission will be outside of Congress and will be 
outside of the Bush administration. The amendment will also direct this 
new Commission to review the way new contracts are awarded and 
overseen. This will give us a chance to prevent future waste, fraud, 
and abuse.
  The Commission will work in consultation with the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction, which currently oversees only 
reconstruction contracts in Iraq, to review and investigate logistics, 
security, and intelligence work that has been contracted out by the 
Defense Department.
  According to the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office, we 
have squandered $10 billion in Iraq reconstruction funds due to 
contract overcharges and unsupported expenses. That means 1 out of 
every 6 reconstruction dollars spent in Iraq is not accounted for, and 
only now, after 5 years of war in Iraq, the Army is looking back at 
nearly $100 million in contracts to determine how these funds have been 
spent.
  I think it is important for folks to understand we are not coming at 
this with the idea that every contract is a bad one. There are many 
contractors who are doing a good job and who are being responsible with 
our tax dollars. But there are others who are not. At a time when we 
are struggling to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Afghani 
people, those who are deliberately overeating at the taxpayer trough, 
while our troops are fighting and dying in Iraq, are nothing short of 
treasonous.
  Many Americans have questioned how their tax dollars are being spent 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have wondered why it is that there are 
more contractors than troops in Iraq. They have wondered why some 
companies are enjoying record profits even though so many projects 
remain incomplete. For too long, the answer from the Government has 
been a deafening silence. This amendment is a long-overdue response to 
the cries for accountability and transparency in our contracting 
process. It should not be and is not a partisan issue. It is about good 
government. I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, first, let me concur with my colleague, 
Senator Tester, in support of the amendment being offered by Senators 
Webb and McCaskill and which Senator Levin also spoke on a little 
earlier, and that is the need for us to have this independent 
Commission look at what has happened in Iraq as far as the U.S. 
taxpayer dollars. I am proud that our new Members of the Senate have 
made this a priority. I think it is important that the taxpayers have 
confidence that the money we appropriate will be spent appropriately, 
and that has not been the case in the reconstruction of Iraq.


                           Amendment No. 3035

  I also take the floor to speak about an amendment offered by Senator 
Kennedy that will be voted on later. I spoke last week about hate 
crimes in America, and I talked about what is happening in our own 
communities. I spoke about an episode in College Park, MD, and we are 
all familiar with what happened in Jena, LA. The FBI has indicated that 
the number of hate crimes reported is unacceptably high in all 
communities in America today.
  Today, we are going to have an opportunity to do something about 
that. We are going to have an opportunity to support S. 1105, the 
Matthew Shepard Act. I am proud to be a cosponsor of that bill, and I 
thank the senior Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy, for bringing 
forward this issue. We will have a chance on this very important bill 
to speak about the moral commitment of our own country and what we 
stand for as a nation. This is an issue which we need to deal with 
because it speaks to what type of people we are in this country, that 
we will not tolerate hate crime activities.
  This legislation gives the Department of Justice jurisdiction over 
violent crimes where a perpetrator picks the victim on the basis of 
race, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or disability.
  Now, why do we give the Department of Justice jurisdiction in these 
areas? Well, we all know, first, that it will make it clear this is a 
national priority. Secondly, the Department of Justice is in a far 
better position, in many cases, than local law enforcement working by 
itself to successfully complete an investigation.
  This legislation gives additional tools to local law enforcement so 
they can get their job done. It gives them training dollars. It gives 
them other resources and assistance so that, in many cases, they can 
get the type of information necessary to pursue these cases 
successfully.
  It is what is needed in partnership with local government. But there 
are some States that are unable or unwilling to move forward with hate 
crime activities. Only 31 States and the District of Columbia include 
sexual orientation or disability as a basis for hate crimes 
prosecution. So we have voids in the Nation and this gives us an 
opportunity to move forward.
  This legislation is bipartisan. We have had support from both sides 
of the aisle to make it clear that in America we will not tolerate hate 
crimes activities. It strengthens the current law. It removes the 
limitation in the current law, the Federal law, that says you

[[Page S12110]]

only can move forward if it would involve a protected activity such as 
voting or attending school. That restriction is removed, so that we 
have more opportunities for the Federal Government to be of assistance 
in prosecuting hate crime activities. As I have indicated before, it 
includes sexual orientation, gender, gender identity or disability as 
categories of hate crime activities.
  I am very pleased it has broad support from many organizations and 
groups around the Nation, including the Federal Law Enforcement 
Officers Association, the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the National District Attorneys Association, and the National 
Sheriffs' Association. It also enjoys support from civil rights groups 
including the Anti-Defamation League, Human Rights Campaign, Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights, and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People. The U.S. Conference of Mayors also 
supports this legislation. It is also supported by the Consortium for 
Citizens with Disabilities, including the Maryland Disability Law 
Center.
  There is a broad group that supports this legislation because they 
know it is needed. They know we need to do a better job, and they know 
it is time for this Congress to act. Hate crimes are un-American. When 
they happen, we are all diminished and we have a responsibility to do 
something about it. It is time for the Senate to act.
  I thank Senator Kennedy for bringing this forward. I urge my 
colleagues to support it. The House has already taken similar action. 
It is time this legislation be submitted to the President.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


  Amendments Nos. 3016, 3010, 3043, 3009, as Modified; 3046, 3008, as 
          Modified; 3006, as Modified; 2251, and 2172 En Bloc

  Mrs. McCASKILL. I send a series of amendments to the desk which have 
been cleared by Chairman Levin and the ranking member. Therefore, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc, 
the amendments be agreed to and the motions to reconsider be laid upon 
the table. Finally, I ask that any statements relating to these 
individual amendments be printed in the Record.
  Mr. WARNER. No objection on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments were agreed to, as follows:


                           Amendment no. 3016

  (Purpose: To require a report on the solid rocket motor industrial 
                                 base)

       At the end of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1070. REPORT ON SOLID ROCKET MOTOR INDUSTRIAL BASE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 190 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to the congressional defense committees a report on the 
     status, capability, viability, and capacity of the solid 
     rocket motor industrial base in the United States.
       (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) An assessment of the ability to maintain the Minuteman 
     III intercontinental ballistic missile through its planned 
     operational life.
       (2) An assessment of the ability to maintain the Trident II 
     D-5 submarine launched ballistic missile through its planned 
     operational life.
       (3) An assessment of the ability to maintain all other 
     space launch, missile defense, and other vehicles with solid 
     rocket motors, through their planned operational lifetimes.
       (4) An assessment of the ability to support any future 
     requirements for vehicles with solid rocket motors to support 
     space launch, missile defense, or any range of ballistic 
     missiles determined to be necessary to meet defense needs or 
     other requirements of the United States Government.
       (5) An assessment of the required materials, the supplier 
     base, the production facilities, and the production workforce 
     needed to ensure that current and future requirements could 
     be met.
       (6) An assessment of the adequacy of the current and 
     anticipated programs to support an industrial base that would 
     be needed to support the range of future requirements.
       (c) Comptroller General Review.--Not later than 60 days 
     after submittal under subsection (a) of the report required 
     by that subsection, the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
     report setting forth the Comptroller General's assessment of 
     the matters contained in the report under subsection (a), 
     including an assessment of the consistency of the budget of 
     the President for fiscal year 2009, as submitted to Congress 
     pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, 
     with the matters contained in the report under subsection 
     (a).


                           AMENDMENT NO. 3010

  (Purpose: To require a report on the size and mix of the Air Force 
                      intertheater airlift force)

       At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1044. REPORT ON SIZE AND MIX OF AIR FORCE INTERTHEATER 
                   AIRLIFT FORCE.

       (a) Study Required.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a 
     study on various alternatives for the size and mix of assets 
     for the Air Force intertheater airlift force, with a 
     particular focus on current and planned capabilities and 
     costs of the C-5 aircraft and C-17 aircraft fleets.
       (2) Conduct of study.--
       (A) Use of ffrdc.--The Secretary shall select to conduct 
     the study required by subsection (a) a federally funded 
     research and development center (FFRDC) that has experience 
     and expertise in conducting studies similar to the study 
     required by subsection (a).
       (B) Development of study methodology.--Not later than 90 
     days after the date of enactment of this Act, the federally 
     funded research and development center selected for the 
     conduct of the study shall--
       (i) develop the methodology for the study; and
       (ii) submit the methodology to the Comptroller General of 
     the United States for review.
       (C) Comptroller general review.--Not later than 30 days 
     after receipt of the methodology under subparagraph (B), the 
     Comptroller General shall--
       (i) review the methodology for purposes of identifying any 
     flaws or weaknesses in the methodology; and
       (ii) submit to the federally funded research and 
     development center a report that--

       (I) sets forth any flaws or weaknesses in the methodology 
     identified by the Comptroller General in the review; and
       (II) makes any recommendations the Comptroller General 
     considers advisable for improvements to the methodology.

       (D) Modification of methodology.--Not later than 30 days 
     after receipt of the report under subparagraph (C), the 
     federally funded research and development center shall--
       (i) modify the methodology in order to address flaws or 
     weaknesses identified by the Comptroller General in the 
     report and to improve the methodology in accordance with the 
     recommendations, if any, made by the Comptroller General; and
       (ii) submit to the congressional defense committees a 
     report that--

       (I) describes the modifications of the methodology made by 
     the federally funded research and development center; and
       (II) if the federally funded research and development 
     center does not improve the methodology in accordance with 
     any particular recommendation of the Comptroller General, 
     sets forth a description and explanation of the reasons for 
     such action.

       (3) Utilization of other studies.--The study shall build 
     upon the results of the recent Mobility Capabilities Studies 
     of the Department of Defense, the on-going Intratheater 
     Airlift Fleet Mix Analysis, and other appropriate studies and 
     analyses. The study should also include any results reached 
     on the modified C-5A aircraft configured as part of the 
     Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) 
     configuration, as specified in section 132 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 
     108-136; 117 Stat. 1411).
       (b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall address 
     the following:
       (1) The state of the current intertheater airlift fleet of 
     the Air Force, including the extent to which the increased 
     use of heavy airlift aircraft in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
     Operation Enduring Freedom, and other ongoing operations is 
     affecting the aging of the aircraft of that fleet.
       (2) The adequacy of the current intertheater airlift force, 
     including whether or not the current target number of 301 
     airframes for the Air Force heavy lift aircraft fleet will be 
     sufficient to support future expeditionary combat and non-
     combat missions as well as domestic and training mission 
     demands consistent with the requirements of the National 
     Military Strategy.
       (3) The optimal mix of C-5 aircraft and C-17 aircraft for 
     the intertheater airlift fleet of the Air Force, and any 
     appropriate mix of C-5 aircraft and C-17 aircraft for 
     intratheater airlift missions, including an assessment of the 
     following:
       (A) The cost advantages and disadvantages of modernizing 
     the C-5 aircraft fleet when compared with procuring new C-17 
     aircraft, which assessment shall be performed in concert with 
     the Cost Analysis Improvement Group and be based on program 
     life cycle cost estimates for the respective aircraft.
       (B) The military capability of the C-5 aircraft and the C-
     17 aircraft, including number of lifetime flight hours, cargo 
     and passenger carrying capabilities, and mission capable 
     rates for such airframes. In the case of assumptions for the 
     C-5 aircraft, and any assumptions made for the mission 
     capable

[[Page S12111]]

     rates of the C-17 aircraft, sensitivity analyses shall also 
     be conducted to test assumptions. The military capability 
     study for the C-5 aircraft shall also include an assessment 
     of the mission capable rates after each of the following:
       (i) Successful completion of the Avionics Modernization 
     Program (AMP) and the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining 
     Program (RERP).
       (ii) Partially successful completion of the Avionics 
     Modernization Program and the Reliability Enhancement and Re-
     engining Program, with partially successful completion of 
     either such program being considered the point at which the 
     continued execution of such program is no longer supported by 
     cost-benefit analysis.
       (C) The tactical capabilities of strategic airlift 
     aircraft, the potential increase in use of strategic airlift 
     aircraft for tactical missions, and the value of such 
     capabilities to tactical operations.
       (D) The value of having more than one type of aircraft in 
     the strategic airlift fleet, and the potential need to pursue 
     a replacement aircraft for the C-5 aircraft that is larger 
     than the C-17 aircraft.
       (4) The means by which the Air Force was able to restart 
     the production line for the C-5 aircraft after having closed 
     the line for several years, and the actions to be taken to 
     ensure the production line for the C-17 aircraft could be 
     restarted if necessary, including--
       (A) an analysis of the costs of closing and re-opening the 
     production line for the C-5 aircraft; and
       (B) an assessment of the costs of closing and re-opening 
     the production line for the C-17 aircraft on a similar basis.
       (5) The financial effects of retiring, upgrading and 
     maintaining, or continuing current operations of the C-5A 
     aircraft fleet on procurement decisions relating to the C-17 
     aircraft.
       (6) The impact that increasing the role and use of 
     strategic airlift aircraft in intratheater operations will 
     have on the current target number for strategic airlift 
     aircraft of 301 airframes, including an analysis of the 
     following:
       (A) The appropriateness of using C-5 aircraft and C-17 
     aircraft for intratheater missions, as well as the efficacy 
     of these aircraft to perform current and projected future 
     intratheater missions.
       (B) The interplay of existing doctrinal intratheater 
     airlift aircraft (such as the C-130 aircraft and the future 
     Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)) with an increasing role for C-5 
     aircraft and C-17 aircraft in intratheater missions.
       (C) The most appropriate and likely missions for C-5 
     aircraft and C-17 aircraft in intratheater operations and the 
     potential for increased requirements in these mission areas.
       (D) Any intratheater mission sets best performed by 
     strategic airlift aircraft as opposed to traditional 
     intratheater airlift aircraft.
       (E) Any requirements for increased production or longevity 
     of C-5 aircraft and C-17 aircraft, or for a new strategic 
     airlift aircraft, in light of the matters analyzed under this 
     paragraph.
       (7) Taking into consideration all applicable factors, 
     whether or not the replacement of C-5 aircraft with C-17 
     aircraft on a one-for-one basis will result in the retention 
     of a comparable strategic airlift capability.
       (c) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to exclude from the study under subsection (a) 
     consideration of airlift assets other than the C-5 aircraft 
     or C-17 aircraft that do or may provide intratheater and 
     intertheater airlift, including the potential that such 
     current or future assets may reduce requirements for C-5 
     aircraft or C-17 aircraft.
       (d) Collaboration With Transcom.--The federally funded 
     research and development center selected under subsection (a) 
     shall conduct the study required by that subsection and make 
     the report required by subsection (e) in concert with the 
     United States Transportation Command.
       (e) Report by FFRDC.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than January 10, 2009, the 
     federally funded research and development center selected 
     under subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary of 
     Defense, the congressional defense committees, and the 
     Comptroller General of the United States a report on the 
     study required by subsection (a).
       (2) Review by gao.--Not later than 90 days after receipt of 
     the report under paragraph (1), the Comptroller General shall 
     submit to the congressional defense committee a report on the 
     study conducted under subsection (a) and the report under 
     paragraph (1). The report under this subsection shall include 
     an analysis of the study under subsection (a) and the report 
     under paragraph (1), including an assessment by the 
     Comptroller General of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
     study and report.
       (f) Report by Secretary of Defense.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after receipt of 
     the report under paragraph 1, 2009, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
     and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives a report on the study required by subsection 
     (a).
       (2) Elements.--The report shall include a comprehensive 
     discussion of the findings of the study, including a 
     particular focus on the following:
       (A) A description of lift requirements and operating 
     profiles for intertheater airlift aircraft required to meet 
     the National Military Strategy, including assumptions 
     regarding:
       (i) Current and future military combat and support 
     missions.
       (ii) The planned force structure growth of the Army and the 
     Marine Corps.
       (iii) Potential changes in lift requirements, including the 
     deployment of the Future Combat Systems by the Army.
       (iv) New capability in strategic airlift to be provided by 
     the KC(X) aircraft and the expected utilization of such 
     capability, including its use in intratheater lift.
       (v) The utilization of the heavy lift aircraft in 
     intratheater combat missions.
       (vi) The availability and application of Civil Reserve Air 
     Fleet assets in future military scenarios.
       (vii) Air mobility requirements associated with the Global 
     Rebasing Initiative of the Department of Defense.
       (viii) Air mobility requirements in support of peacekeeping 
     and humanitarian missions around the globe.
       (ix) Potential changes in lift requirements based on 
     equipment procured for Iraq and Afghanistan.
       (B) A description of the assumptions utilized in the study 
     regarding aircraft performances and loading factors.
       (C) A comprehensive statement of the data and assumptions 
     utilized in making program life cycle cost estimates.
       (D) A comparison of cost and risk associated with optimal 
     mix airlift fleet versus program of record airlift fleet.
       (3) Form.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified 
     form, but may include a classified annex.


                           amendment no. 3043

   (Purpose: To strengthen the nuclear forensics capabilities of the 
                             United States)

       On page 530, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

     SEC. 3126. AGREEMENTS AND REPORTS ON NUCLEAR FORENSICS 
                   CAPABILITIES.

       (a) International Agreements on Nuclear Weapons Data.--The 
     Secretary of Energy may, with the concurrence of the 
     Secretary of State and in coordination with the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director 
     of National Intelligence, enter into agreements with 
     countries or international organizations to conduct data 
     collection and analysis to determine accurately and in a 
     timely manner the source of any components of, or fissile 
     material used or attempted to be used in, a nuclear device or 
     weapon.
       (b) International Agreements on Information on Radioactive 
     Materials.--The Secretary of Energy may, with the concurrence 
     of the Secretary of State and in coordination with the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
     the Director of National Intelligence, enter into agreements 
     with countries or international organizations--
       (1) to acquire for the materials information program of the 
     Department of Energy validated information on the physical 
     characteristics of radioactive material produced, used, or 
     stored at various locations, in order to facilitate the 
     ability to determine accurately and in a timely manner the 
     source of any components of, or fissile material used or 
     attempted to be used in, a nuclear device or weapon; and
       (2) to obtain access to information described in paragraph 
     (1) in the event of--
       (A) a nuclear detonation; or
       (B) the interdiction or discovery of a nuclear device or 
     weapon or nuclear material.
       (c) Report on Agreements.--Not later than one year after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Energy shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 
     submit to Congress a report identifying--
       (1) the countries or international organizations with which 
     the Secretary has sought to make agreements pursuant to 
     subsections (a) and (b);
       (2) any countries or international organizations with which 
     such agreements have been finalized and the measures included 
     in such agreements; and
       (3) any major obstacles to completing such agreements with 
     other countries and international organizations.
       (d) Report on Standards and Capabilities.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall submit to Congress a report--
       (1) setting forth standards and procedures to be used in 
     determining accurately and in a timely manner any country or 
     group that knowingly or negligently provides to another 
     country or group--
       (A) a nuclear device or weapon;
       (B) a major component of a nuclear device or weapon; or
       (C) fissile material that could be used in a nuclear device 
     or weapon;
       (2) assessing the capability of the United States to 
     collect and analyze nuclear material or debris in a manner 
     consistent with the standards and procedures described in 
     paragraph (1); and
       (3) including a plan and proposed funding for rectifying 
     any shortfalls in the nuclear forensics capabilities of the 
     United States by September 30, 2010.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 3009, as modified

       At the end of title XXII, add the following:

     SEC. 2206. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT CERTAIN 
                   FISCAL YEAR 2005 PROJECT.

       (a) Modification.--The table in section 2201(a) of the 
     Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
     (division B of

[[Page S12112]]

     Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2105), as amended by section 
     2206 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2006 (division B of Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 
     3493) and section 2205 of the Military Construction 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (division B of Public 
     Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2452) is amended--
       (1) in the item relating to Strategic Weapons Facility 
     Pacific, Bangor, Washington, by striking ``$147,760,000'' in 
     the amount column and inserting ``$295,000,000''; and
       (2) by striking the amount identified as the total in the 
     amount column and inserting ``$972,719,000''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2204 of the Military 
     Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (division 
     B of Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2107), as amended by 
     section 2206 of the Military Construction Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2006 (division B of Public Law 109-163; 119 
     Stat. 3493) and section 2205 of the Military Construction 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (division B of Public 
     Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2453) is amended--(2) in subsection 
     (b)(6), by striking ``$95,320,000'' and inserting 
     ``$259,320,000''.


                           amendment no. 3046

  (Purpose: To improve and streamline the security clearance process)

       After section 1064, insert the following:

     SEC. 1065. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PROCESS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF 
                   SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       (a) Demonstration Project.--Not later than 6 months after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     implement a demonstration project that applies new and 
     innovative approaches to improve the processing of requests 
     for security clearances.
       (b) Evaluation.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall carry out an 
     evaluation of the process for issuing security clearances and 
     develop a specific plan and schedule for replacing such 
     process with an improved process.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     completion of the evaluation required by subsection (b), the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on--
       (1) the results of the demonstration project carried out 
     pursuant to subsection (a);
       (2) the results of the evaluation carried out under 
     subsection (b); and
       (3) the specific plan and schedule for replacing the 
     existing process for issuing security clearances with an 
     improved process.


                    AMENDMENT NO. 3008, as modified

       On page 445, in the table preceding line 1, in the item 
     relating to Naval Station, Bremerton, Washington, strike 
     ``$119,760,000'' and insert ``$190,960,000''.
       On page 447, line 5, strike ``Funds'' and insert ``(a) 
     Authorization of Appropriations.--Funds''.
       On page 449, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
       (b) Limitation on Total Cost of Construction Projects.--
     Notwithstanding the cost variations authorized by section 
     2853 of title 10, United States Code, and any other cost 
     variation authorized by law, the total cost of all projects 
     carried out under section 2201 of this Act may not exceed the 
     sum of the following:
       (1) The total amount authorized to be appropriated under 
     paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of subsection (a).
       (2) $71,200,000 (the balance of the amount authorized under 
     section 2201(a) for a nuclear aircraft carrier maintenance 
     pier at Naval Station Bremerton, Washington).


                    AMENDMENT NO. 3006, as modified

       At the end of subtitle E of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2854. TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION, FORMER NIKE MISSILE 
                   SITE, GROSSE ILE, MICHIGAN.

       (a) Transfer.--Administrative jurisdiction over the 
     property described in subsection (b) is hereby transferred 
     from the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
     to the Secretary of the Interior.
       (b) Property Described.--The property referred to in 
     subsection (a) is the former Nike missile site, consisting of 
     approximately 50 acres located at the southern end of Grosse 
     Ile, Michigan, as depicted on the map entitled ``07-CE'' on 
     file with the Environmental Protection Agency and dated May 
     16, 1984.
       (c) Administration of Property.--Subject to subsection (d), 
     the Secretary of the Interior shall administer the property 
     described in subsection (b)--
       (1) acting through the United States Fish and Wildlife 
     Service;
       (2) as part of the Detroit River International Wildlife 
     Refuge; and
       (3) for use as a habitat for fish and wildlife and as a 
     recreational property for outdoor education and environmental 
     appreciation.
       (d) Management Response.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     manage and carry out environmental response activities with 
     respect to the property described in subsection (b) as 
     expeditiously as possible, consistent with the Department's 
     prioritization of Formerly Used Defense Sites based on risk 
     and the requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental 
     Response, Compensation, and Liabiity Act of 1980 and the 
     Solid Waste Disposal Act, using amounts made available from 
     the account established by section 2703(a)(5) of title 10, 
     United States Code.
       (e) Savings Provision.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to affect or limit the application of, or any 
     obligation to comply with, any environmental law, including 
     the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
     Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) and the Solid 
     Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.).


                           AMENDMENT NO. 2251

 (Purpose: To provide justice for victims of state-sponsored terrorism)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. JUSTICE FOR MARINES AND OTHER VICTIMS OF STATE-
                   SPONSORED TERRORISM ACT.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Justice for Marines and Other Victims of State-Sponsored 
     Terrorism Act''.
       (b) Terrorism Exception to Immunity.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 97 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 1605 the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 1605A. Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional 
       immunity of a foreign state

       ``(a) In General.--
       ``(1) No immunity.--A foreign state shall not be immune 
     from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of 
     the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter 
     in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for 
     personal injury or death that was caused by an act of 
     torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
     taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as 
     defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such 
     act or provision of material support is engaged in by an 
     official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while 
     acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or 
     agency.
       ``(2) Claim heard.--The court shall hear a claim under this 
     section if--
       ``(A) the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor 
     of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration 
     Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405 (j)) or section 620A of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) at the time 
     the act occurred, unless later designated as a result of such 
     act;
       ``(B) the claimant or the victim was--
       ``(i) a national of the United States (as that term is 
     defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
       ``(ii) a member of the Armed Forces of the United States 
     (as that term is defined in section 976 of title 10); or
       ``(iii) otherwise an employee of the government of the 
     United States or one of its contractors acting within the 
     scope of their employment when the act upon which the claim 
     is based occurred; or
       ``(C) where the act occurred in the foreign state against 
     which the claim has been brought, the claimant has afforded 
     the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the 
     claim in accordance with the accepted international rules of 
     arbitration.
       ``(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) the terms `torture' and `extrajudicial killing' have 
     the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the Torture 
     Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note);
       ``(2) the term `hostage taking' has the meaning given that 
     term in Article 1 of the International Convention Against the 
     Taking of Hostages; and
       ``(3) the term `aircraft sabotage' has the meaning given 
     that term in Article 1 of the Convention for the Suppression 
     of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
       ``(c) Time Limit.--An action may be brought under this 
     section if the action is commenced not later than the latter 
     of--
       ``(1) 10 years after April 24, 1996; or
       ``(2) 10 years from the date on which the cause of action 
     arose.
       ``(d) Private Right of Action.--A private cause of action 
     may be brought against a foreign state designated under 
     section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
     U.S.C. 2405(j)), and any official, employee, or agent of said 
     foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her 
     office, employment, or agency which shall be liable to a 
     national of the United States (as that term is defined in 
     section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)), a member of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States (as that term is defined in section 976 of 
     title 10), or an employee of the government of the United 
     States or one of its contractors acting within the scope of 
     their employment or the legal representative of such a person 
     for personal injury or death caused by acts of that foreign 
     state or its official, employee, or agent for which the 
     courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under 
     this section for money damages which may include economic 
     damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages 
     if the acts were among those described in this section. A 
     foreign state shall be vicariously liable for the actions of 
     its officials, employees, or agents.
       ``(e) Additional Damages.--After an action has been brought 
     under subsection (d), actions may also be brought for 
     reasonably foreseeable property loss, whether insured or 
     uninsured, third party liability, and life and property 
     insurance policy loss claims.
       ``(f) Special Masters.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Courts of the United States may from 
     time to time appoint special masters to hear damage claims 
     brought under this section.
       ``(2) Transfer of funds.--The Attorney General shall 
     transfer, from funds available for the program under sections 
     1404C of the

[[Page S12113]]

     Victims Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603c) to the 
     Administrator of the United States District Court in which 
     any case is pending which has been brought pursuant to 
     section 1605(a)(7) such funds as may be required to carry out 
     the Orders of that United States District Court appointing 
     Special Masters in any case under this section. Any amount 
     paid in compensation to any such Special Master shall 
     constitute an item of court costs.
       ``(g) Appeal.--In an action brought under this section, 
     appeals from orders not conclusively ending the litigation 
     may only be taken pursuant to section 1292(b) of this title.
       ``(h) Property Disposition.--
       ``(1) In general.--In every action filed in a United States 
     district court in which jurisdiction is alleged under this 
     section, the filing of a notice of pending action pursuant to 
     this section, to which is attached a copy of the complaint 
     filed in the action, shall have the effect of establishing a 
     lien of lis pendens upon any real property or tangible 
     personal property located within that judicial district that 
     is titled in the name of any defendant, or titled in the name 
     of any entity controlled by any such defendant if such notice 
     contains a statement listing those controlled entities.
       ``(2) Notice.--A notice of pending action pursuant to this 
     section shall be filed by the clerk of the district court in 
     the same manner as any pending action and shall be indexed by 
     listing as defendants all named defendants and all entities 
     listed as controlled by any defendant.
       ``(3) Enforceability.--Liens established by reason of this 
     subsection shall be enforceable as provided in chapter 111 of 
     this title.''.
       (2) Amendment to chapter analysis.--The chapter analysis 
     for chapter 97 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after the item for section 1605 the following:

``1605A. Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a 
              foreign state.''.

       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Property.--Section 1610 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) Property in Certain Actions.--
       ``(1) In general.--The property of a foreign state, or 
     agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, against which a 
     judgment is entered under this section, including property 
     that is a separate juridical entity, is subject to execution 
     upon that judgment as provided in this section, regardless 
     of--
       ``(A) the level of economic control over the property by 
     the government of the foreign state;
       ``(B) whether the profits of the property go to that 
     government;
       ``(C) the degree to which officials of that government 
     manage the property or otherwise control its daily affairs;
       ``(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in 
     interest of the property; or
       ``(E) whether establishing the property as a separate 
     entity would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United 
     States courts while avoiding its obligations.
       ``(2) United states sovereign immunity inapplicable.--Any 
     property of a foreign state, or agency or instrumentality of 
     a foreign state, to which paragraph (1) applies shall not be 
     immune from execution upon a judgment entered under this 
     section because the property is regulated by the United 
     States Government by reason of action taken against that 
     foreign state under the Trading With the Enemy Act or the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act.''.
       (2) Victims of crime act.--Section 1404C(a)(3) of the 
     Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603c(a)(3)) is 
     amended by striking ``December 21, 1988, with respect to 
     which an investigation or'' and inserting ``October 23, 1983, 
     with respect to which an investigation or civil or 
     criminal''.
       (3) General exception.--Section 1605 of title 28, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) in paragraph (5)(B), by inserting ``or'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (ii) in paragraph (6)(D), by striking ``; or'' and 
     inserting a period; and
       (iii) by striking paragraph (7); and
       (B) by striking subsections (e) and (f).
       (d) Application to Pending Cases.--
       (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall 
     apply to any claim arising under section 1605A or 1605(g) of 
     title 28, United States Code, as added by this section.
       (2) Prior actions.--Any judgment or action brought under 
     section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, or 
     section 101(c) of Public Law 104-208 after the effective date 
     of such provisions relying on either of these provisions as 
     creating a cause of action, which has been adversely affected 
     on the grounds that either or both of these provisions fail 
     to create a cause of action opposable against the state, and 
     which is still before the courts in any form, including 
     appeal or motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 
     shall, on motion made to the Federal District Court where the 
     judgment or action was initially entered, be given effect as 
     if it had originally been filed pursuant to section 1605A(d) 
     of title 28, United States Code. The defenses of res 
     judicata, collateral estoppel and limitation period are 
     waived in any re-filed action described in this paragraph and 
     based on the such claim. Any such motion or re-filing must be 
     made not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 2172

   (Purpose: To modify limitations on the retirement of B-52 bomber 
                               aircraft)

       At the end of subtitle D of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 143. MODIFICATION OF LIMITATIONS ON RETIREMENT OF B-52 
                   BOMBER AIRCRAFT.

       (a) Maintenance of Primary and Backup Inventory of 
     Aircraft.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 131 of the John 
     Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2007 (Public Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2111) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph 
     (C):
       ``(C) shall maintain in a common configuration a primary 
     aircraft inventory of not less than 63 such aircraft and a 
     backup aircraft inventory of not less than 11 such 
     aircraft.''.
       (b) Notice of Retirement.--Subsection (b)(1) of such 
     section is amended by striking ``45 days'' and inserting ``60 
     days''.

  Mr. WARNER. That was a group of how many amendments?
  Mrs. McCASKILL. Nine.
  Mr. WARNER. We are making progress on this bill, but I strongly urge 
other colleagues to bring forward their amendments. We have a lot to do 
on this bill. We are dealing with a bill that is absolutely essential 
for the men and women of the Armed Forces and their families. We should 
move along as best we can to complete this important legislation.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. McCASKILL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2196

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to respond to 
the amendment offered by the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Coburn, to 
eliminate the National Drug Intelligence Center, which is located in 
Johnstown, PA. That center was created in 1992 and performs a very 
important function. The National Drug Intelligence Center, commonly 
referred to as the NDIC, partners with the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, to provide 
intelligence, to identify, track, and sever the nexus between drug 
trafficking and terrorism. The NDIC created an entity called 
HashKeeper, a company software program which is provided to the Federal 
Government for use in Iraq. The cost of this center is about one-third 
of what it would be if it were located in the Washington, DC, area.
  I think it makes good sense to decentralize Federal functions to the 
extent it is possible and practical. Everything does not have to be 
located in Washington, DC. Everything does not have to be located in a 
big city. Our country is more vulnerable when everything is 
concentrated in one area. Johnstown has the advantage of being much 
less expensive, being able to provide these vital Federal services for 
about one-third of the cost, while being reasonably close to 
Washington, DC, which is the location of many of the other entities 
with which it cooperates.
  The jobs which are provided are very substantial for my constituents 
in Pennsylvania; an obvious interest that I have as a Senator 
representing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. These are several 
hundred jobs; they are very important. It is a legitimate interest to 
want to maintain our industrial base in Pennsylvania and to maintain 
governmental activities in Pennsylvania. But there is good value in 
having the NDIC function, in general, and there is extra good value in 
having it function in Johnstown, PA.
  The NDIC has been complimented by a broad number of agencies. In a 
November 21, 2001, letter, the FBI praised the NDIC for its work on 
financial crimes, saying:

       Through the analysis of these documents, over 400 specific 
     intelligence products have been produced for the FBI, the 
     Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and U.S. 
     Attorney's Offices. The work NDIC produces continues to 
     initiate actionable leads and identify avenues of 
     investigation. NDIC has integrated seamlessly with the FBI 
     investigation and has enhanced the way the FBI will 
     investigate future financial cases. The participation of NDIC 
     . . . continues to be invaluable.


[[Page S12114]]


  In a June 23, 2006, letter, the Drug Enforcement Agency had this to 
say:

       The Fort Worth Resident Office--

that is of DEA--

     amassed thousands of documents, but was unable to properly 
     exploit the information they contained. The valuable report--

referring to the NDIC report--

     caused several of the principals to negotiate pleas to 
     pending charges. If not for the willingness of the members of 
     NDIC to confront these challenges in a cooperative effort, 
     this investigation would not have reached its current level 
     of success.

  There have been many plaudits given to the NDIC by the special agents 
in charge of FBI offices, such as the FBI agent in charge of the Tampa 
Field Division, the FBI special agent in charge of the Detroit Field 
Division, the DEA special agent in charge of the Dallas Field Division, 
the FBI special agent in charge of the Charlotte Division, and the DEA 
special agent in charge of the Oklahoma City District Office. This last 
is ironic, in a sense. In a March 25, 2006, DEA cable, the DEA Oklahoma 
City District Office had this to say.

       In support of phases one and two, NDIC deployed two teams 
     in Oklahoma, each consisting of one special agent, one 
     computer exploitation and five document exploitation 
     personnel. Actionable intelligence was generated and passed 
     to the appropriate DEA offices. The OKCDO thanks all NDIC 
     personnel--

that is the Oklahoma City District Office thanks all NDIC personnel--

     who planned and participated in this operation. The 
     intelligence and operational knowledge gained was beneficial 
     to OKCDO, and its law enforcement partners. . . .

  President, National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, HIDTA, 
Director's Association Executive Board: May 24, 2007, Letter to the 
Attorney General in support of NDIC:

       NDIC produced thirty-two HIDTA drug market analyses for the 
     HIDTA program. Production of the HIDTA drug market analyses 
     required a full-time effort of twenty-six analysts for 
     extended periods of time working side-by-side with the HIDTA 
     Intelligence Center personnel.
       NDIC is a very valuable asset in addressing the nation's 
     drug problem.
       This entire effort lead to a valuable working relationship 
     with not only the HIDTAs but federal, state and local drug 
     enforcement entities.

  FBI Special Agent in Charge--Tampa Field Division: January 16, 2007, 
Letter of Appreciation for NDIC assistance.

       The purpose of this letter is to recognize the assistance 
     of the National Drug Intelligence Center's (NDIC) Document 
     and Computer Exploitation Branch for the superb analytical 
     support they provided the Violent Crimes/Gang Squad on an 
     investigation into the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation.

  FBI Special Agent in Charge--Detroit Field Division: December 11, 
2006, Letter of Appreciation for NDIC:

       The teamwork displayed in working with investigators from 
     the DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a true 
     measure of what can be accomplished when agencies work 
     together. NDIC's analysis of the [redacted] Pharmacy evidence 
     assisted in obtaining a sixty-two count indictment . . .

  The FBI characterized NDIC's performance as exemplary in this letter.
  DEA Special Agent in Charge--Dallas Field Division: June 23, 2006, 
Letter of Commendation for Document Exploitation support to a major 
drug investigation:

       The Fort Worth Resident Office (DEA) amassed thousands of 
     documents, but was unable to properly exploit the information 
     they contained. The valuable [NDIC] report listed the seized 
     documents and collated them, which created a valuable tool 
     for Investigators and Prosecutors in this investigation.
       In conclusion, this effort caused several of the principals 
     to negotiate pleas to pending charges.
       Subsequently, 19 search warrants and over 100 seizure 
     warrants were executed, which resulted in the seizure of 
     approximately $20 million, in assets.
       If not for the willingness of the members of NDIC to 
     confront these challenges in a cooperative effort, this 
     investigation would not have reached its current level of 
     success.

  FBI Charlotte Division: May 2, 2006, Letter of Commendation for NDIC:

       In February 2006, your staff presented to the North 
     Carolina Law Enforcement Community, the most comprehensive 
     Intelligence Assessment ever conducted within the state of 
     North Carolina relating to gangs. I commend NDIC in exceeding 
     all expectations in providing this valuable assessment.

  Executive Office of the President--ONDCP Director: April 17, 2006, 
Letter of Commendation regarding drug market collection effort:

       I want to express my thanks for NDIC's domestic market 
     collection effort.
       I know that this was a serious, time consuming undertaking 
     by your agency, and I truly appreciate the efforts of 
     everyone involved.
       Thanks for the hard work.

  DEA Oklahoma City District Office: March 25, 2006, DEA cable:

       In support of phases one and two, NDIC deployed two teams 
     to Oklahoma, each consisting of one special agent, one 
     computer exploitation and five document exploitation 
     personnel.
       Actionable intelligence was generated and passed to the 
     appropriate DEA offices.
       The OKCDO thanks all NDIC personnel who planned and 
     participated in this operation. The intelligence and 
     operational knowledge gained was beneficial to the OKCDO and 
     its law enforcement partners in the state . . .

  Executive Office of the President--ONDCP Assistant Deputy Director: 
March 13, 2006, E-mail of Appreciation for drug market collection 
effort:

       Please, convey our thanks to your staff for their 
     outstanding job on the ONDCP Market Collection Effort.
       Once Again, we greatly appreciate the superb support and 
     please pass on our thanks for a job well done!

  U.S. Department of Justice--Assistant Attorney General: March 7, 
2006, Letter of Commendation regarding the National Drug Threat 
Assessment:

       In a letter to the Director of NDIC, the Assistant Attorney 
     General praised NDIC's National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA) 
     stating:
       The NDTA report is extremely helpful to me and prosecutors 
     who are charged with devising new and creative strategies to 
     achieve that goal.
       I know that you and your entire staff have put a tremendous 
     amount of work into creating the NDTA. I wanted to let you 
     know that the effort was well worth it.

  U.S. Attorney--District of New Mexico: January 18, 2006, Letter of 
Praise for NDIC:

       I am writing to express my thanks for a job not just well 
     done, but rather for an extraordinary, and in my career, 
     unprecedented collaborative effort to support the federal 
     prosecution of significant drug traffickers and money 
     launders.
       Once again, thank you for allowing your amazing staff to 
     dedicate their time, skills and NDIC resources to this 
     important case. The work done in support of this case by NDIC 
     is invaluable. . .

  U.S. Department of Treasury--Under Secretary, Office of Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence: December 28, 2005, Letter of Appreciation for 
support in completing the national U.S. Money Laundering Threat 
Assessment:

       I am very pleased to inform you that the Money Laundering 
     Threat Assessment is complete.
       [I]t is thanks to active and substantial contributions by 
     the NDIC and the other participants.
       I can't thank you enough for the extraordinary 
     contribution.

  Office of Counter Narcotics Enforcement/U.S. Interdiction 
Coordinator--Acting Director: September 7, 2005, Letter of Appreciation 
for support to a drug/terror tasking:

       As I am sure you are aware, NDIC is actively supporting the 
     expanded mission of the Office of Counter Narcotics 
     Enforcement (CNE) by aiding us in the response to the new 
     drug/terror nexus (DTX) tasking as assigned to my office in 
     the Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. I 
     wanted to take this opportunity to let you know how much I 
     appreciate NDIC's support to this office and to our country's 
     overall counterdrug interdiction efforts.

  FBI--Chief, Terrorist Financing Operations Section, TFOS: March 5, 
2003, Letter of Thanks for providing long term assistance to post-911 
investigations:

       As always, it is a pleasure to write to you, as it affords 
     those of us within the Terrorist Financing Operations Section 
     (TFOS) an opportunity to thank you for the continued 
     exceptional assistance NDIC provides to the Counterterrorism 
     Division here at FBI Headquarters.

  FBI--Chief, Financial Crimes Section: November 21, 2001, Letter of 
Appreciation to Deputy Attorney General commending NDIC:

       Since 09/20/2001, the NDIC team, consisting of NDIC 
     Intelligence Analysts and FBI Financial Analysts, has 
     analyzed over 75,000 subpoenaed financial documents. Through 
     the analysis of these documents, over 400 specific 
     intelligence products have been produced for the FBI, the 
     Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and U.S. 
     Attorney's Office. The work NDIC produces continues to 
     initiate actionable leads and identify avenues of 
     investigation. NDIC has integrated seamlessly with the FBI 
     investigation and has enhanced the way the FBI will 
     investigate future financial cases. The participation NDIC in 
     this investigation continues to be invaluable.


[[Page S12115]]


  In concluding--the two most popular words in any speech--I 
acknowledge and respect the work the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Coburn, 
is doing. He and I have worked very closely in his almost 3 years in 
the Senate. I observed his work in the House of Representatives, and I 
know his work as a medical professional. I understand what he is doing 
in subjecting to an analytical eye Federal expenditures. But I do not 
believe he should target the NDIC.
  I concur that we ought to be holding down Federal expenditures, and I 
think that close scrutiny of all such projects is very much in the 
national interest. But I believe the facts are very strong in support 
of continued operation of the NDIC in Johnstown, PA.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
  Mr. COBURN. Will the Senator yield so I can respond to the Senator 
from Pennsylvania and then we can get this off the floor?
  Ms. KLOBUCHAR. That is fine.
  Mr. COBURN. A couple of points. You should be down here defending 
this. This is something in your State and it is appropriate that you 
do. The point I raise is the HashKeeper system is ineffective and 
doesn't work near to the way every other component works. We know it 
doesn't work, and it costs about 18 times what the NARL system does, 
plus the NARL system is admissible in court and the HashKeeper system 
is not, which is developed by the NDIC.
  So there is no question that some of the work they do is valuable. 
But every example you cited was the DOCX program, which requires 
anybody there to travel somewhere else. So the location doesn't matter 
where.
  The other point I would make--and the significance of that is we are 
not, overall, getting as good a value as we could. The idea is not to 
relocate this to Washington, what the Justice Department is 
recommending this DOCX portion of it be where it needs to be--which is 
all across the country--and the rest of the areas that are deemed 
vital, which is about 10 percent of what the NIDC does, be relocated to 
El Paso where the drugs come in, where our border is, and where they 
need it.
  This is not a criticism of the people who work there or everything 
they do. What it is, the amendment as made is intended to give us a 
perspective about value that we are not getting. I have great respect 
and consider a friend the Senator from Pennsylvania. I understand his 
defense of this program. I do not believe it meets the scrutiny of any 
commonsense objective when you look at it, and what the Department of 
Justice, which runs it and manages it, and also the fact that in a time 
of war we can spend a whole lot less money and have that money 
available to defend this country.
  I thank the Senator for listening to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.


                           Amendment No. 2999

  Ms. KLOBUCHAR. Mr. President, I am here to speak in support of 
amendment No. 2999, as amended. This is an amendment that is very 
important to me, and I appreciate the leadership of my colleagues 
Senator McCaskill and Senator Webb, and in fact all of the freshmen 
Democrats who are supporting this legislation, the goal of which is to 
bring more public accountability to the way our Government does 
business.
  I think you and I both know, having spent the last 2 years going 
around our State, that people are yearning for more public 
accountability from our Government. They are yearning for more 
transparency. We heard calls for that--increased transparency. And here 
we have, in the area of Armed Services and the area of Government 
contracting, a chance to act on it.
  This amendment establishes an independent, bipartisan commission to 
strengthen Government oversight and examine the true costs of a 
contracting culture that the Federal Government relies upon in Iraq. 
This idea is not unprecedented.
  The legislation is inspired by the work of the Truman Commission and 
it is fitting Senator McCaskill is from Missouri, as was Truman. The 
Truman Commission, as you know, conducted hundreds of hearings and 
investigations into Government waste during World War II, at an 
estimated savings of more than $178 billion in today's dollars; $178 
billion. Think of what that would mean to the American taxpayer today 
at a time when we are spending somewhere between $10 to $12 billion a 
month in Iraq.
  There is, unfortunately, a natural tendency in this country toward 
excess and corporate excess. So when people are given sort of unlimited 
contracts, no-bid contracts, I think you can expect excess.
  I come from a prosecutor background. We know that when people are 
given leeway, and maybe even when they have the best intentions, the 
people in charge, the people on the ground, it leads to fraud and the 
Government is the one that is on the short end of the stick.
  I think it is more than just a cost of doing business when we are 
looking at what we have been seeing in Iraq with private contractors 
over the last 5 years. The number of contractors in Iraq, the last 
estimate I had, was 180,000. It now exceeds the number of American 
combat troops in Iraq. We need to look at the effects these logistical 
and security contractors have on our military.
  Now, I would say this: We are not talking about creating an 
additional bureaucracy. We are talking about expanding an 
infrastructure that already exists. The Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction, with the excellent performance that we have seen 
in uncovering waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq reconstruction projects, 
is proof of its ability to conduct more interagency examination of 
wartime contracts.
  The special inspector general has proven to be a powerful tool in 
investigating reconstruction contracts. In 2005 alone, he reported a 
loss of $9 billion tax due to a contractor's inefficiency and bad 
management.
  I can tell you this, in my job as county attorney, when we had a case 
in front of us, we would always say: Follow the money and you would 
find the bad guy.
  Well, we need to do more of that with Iraqi contractors. This motto 
could not be more true than it is today as the GAO, the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency, and news reports continue to expose gross 
mismanagement in defense contracting.
  That is why I am so proud to support this amendment. We have heard 
that of the $57 billion awarded in contracts for reconstruction in Iraq 
that was investigated, approximately $10 billion has been wasted; $4.9 
billion was lost through contractor overpricing and waste; $5.1 billion 
was lost through unsupported contract charges. Of this $10 billion, 
more than $2.7 billion was charged by Halliburton. This means almost 1 
in 6 Federal tax dollars sent to rebuild Iraq has been wasted. And 
while we have heard in dollars the staggering amount, this waste 
amount, $10 billion, the costs of mismanaged contracts extends beyond 
that.
  For instance, if you look at the electricity in Baghdad, you have 
seen the city only enjoying an average of 6.5 hours of electricity a 
day. It has actually gone down from where it was a year ago.
  Water. Congress has provided nearly $2 billion to provide clean 
drinking water and repair sewer systems. But according to the World 
Health Organization, 70 percent of Iraqis lack access to clean drinking 
water.
  With jobs, the Defense Department has estimated that the unemployment 
rate is anywhere from 13.6 percent to 60 percent. In a recent survey, 
only 16 percent of Iraqis said their current incomes met their basic 
needs. These costs in every way are unacceptable. They are unacceptable 
to the people of Iraq, and they are unacceptable to the taxpayers of 
this country.
  My colleagues and I--and you are one of them, Mr. President--came to 
Washington demanding accountability. Today I am proud to be part of a 
group that supports an important amendment to bring more transparency, 
to bring accountability to contracting in Iraq.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 
10 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.




                          ____________________