[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 140 (Thursday, September 20, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11914-S11917]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator 
from Massachusetts. I believe this matter is an important one. We have 
troops in the field who are executing the policies we have asked them 
to execute. We don't need to be using buzz words; we need to be talking 
about truth and facts and trying to make the right decisions for our 
country, and for the world for that matter.
  I detect fundamentally in the Senator's comments and from quite a 
number of others that they believe, as the Senator said, ``there is no 
real way out,'' and, in effect, we have a doomed

[[Page S11915]]

policy that will not be successful. Therefore, we should withdraw now. 
If that is the fact, I would agree we should withdraw now. So that is 
why I think we need to analyze this very point.
  Last fall, a lot of people were worried about what was happening in 
Iraq. I certainly was. I visited Iraq in October. I visited Al Anbar. 
It was a very troubling report we received from the marines. It caused 
me great concern. Remarkably, Al Anbar region has shown, almost 
overnight, tremendous progress.
  But let's go to the facts. The Congress asked General Jimmy Jones and 
his commission in May to independently evaluate Iraq when we did the 
funding for the surge. General Jimmy Jones's report dealt with the 
fundamentals we are facing. I asked him did he believe it was 
realistically possible that we could be successful in Iraq. And he 
said: Yes, sir. I asked him did a single member of his 20-member 
commission believe that we were doomed to failure in Iraq, and he 
looked around and asked his commission members, and none of them said 
that was their view. They all believed we had a realistic chance of 
success. I asked General Petraeus did he believe we had a realistic 
chance of success in Iraq, and he said, yes.
  So I guess what I would say is, some say we do not. I would say the 
people--the generals who are leading the effort there--say we have a 
realistic chance of success. The independent commission we sent over 
there of 20 members unanimously believes we do. So I think we should 
base our opinion on the best information we have. As for me, I have to 
accept that.
  I also factor into that rather dramatic improvements in the reduction 
of violence in Iraq, where within Baghdad we have seen a 70-percent 
reduction of civilian deaths and a 55-percent reduction of civilian 
deaths across the country of Iraq. That is very significant. It is a 
product of many different things. It is a product of the new strategy 
as well as the new troops we sent there.
  So I have to say to my friends and colleagues in the Senate: Yes, 
this is a tough vote. Yes, we need to worry and agonize and think 
carefully about the challenges we are now facing, and we need to make 
rational decisions. Based on the information I have and the committee 
hearings I have attended in Armed Services, my 6 visits to Iraq, I 
think we should not precipitously withdraw. Well, they say, this is not 
a precipitous withdrawal, it is a deadline, and that is going to make 
the Iraqis do better. But it is not a deadline; it is a precipitous 
withdrawal. I mean I just have to tell you, let's deal with facts.
  The Levin-Reed amendment says the Secretary of Defense shall commence 
the reduction of the number of U.S. forces in Iraq not later than 90 
days after the enactment of this act. And then it says: The Secretary 
of Defense shall complete the transition of the U.S. forces to a 
limited presence and missions by not later than 9 months after the 
enactment of this date. So this is basically a 9-month mandated 
withdrawal in Iraq, whether it creates instability and problems in 
places and puts our soldiers at greater risk or not. Unrelated to the 
facts on the ground, it is an absolute, mandated withdrawal.
  Now, if we were doomed to failure, maybe this is what we ought to do, 
but I don't believe we are doomed to failure. I believe, as Senator 
Lieberman said, there are a number of things that can cause us to feel 
better, and General Petraeus has certainly infused our effort with more 
leadership and effectiveness and purpose. His tactics utilizing 
counterinsurgency principles seem to have made some real progress.
  For example, he told us he is embedding his soldiers with the local 
people and the local forces to an extraordinary degree, compared to 
what we have done before. As a matter of fact, I asked him about that. 
I said: What are you doing differently? He seemed to, I have to say, 
appreciate the question because he had been asked so many other things. 
But he is doing things differently, and he explained some of the things 
he is doing. We are embedding our soldiers with their soldiers. They 
are living with them. They are in the neighborhoods. As a result, we 
are receiving more information, and the number of caches of weapons 
that have been seized so far this year put us on a pace to double the 
number of weapons and munitions seizures that we have achieved this 
year, doubling the previous rate. He said in his mind that may have 
something to do with the fact that attacks have been down and the 
number of IED attacks have dropped 37 percent. He didn't overpromise or 
declare that. He said it might have something to do with that, that we 
are obtaining twice as many caches of weapons and seizing those as a 
direct result of more and better information from the people of Iraq.
  So I would also join my colleague, Senator McCain, who certainly 
knows something about war firsthand, in concluding that the limited 
presence mandated in this amendment, the Reed-Levin amendment, that 
says that the mission of our forces that are left in Iraq can only be 
for the following purposes: No. 1, protecting U.S. and coalition 
personnel and infrastructure--base security, defending our bases--No. 
2, training, equipping, and providing logistic support to the Iraqi 
security forces; and No. 3, engaging in targeted--this is a legal 
mandate--targeted counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida, al-
Qaida-affiliated groups, and other international terrorist 
organizations. That is all they can do. As Senator McCain said, asking 
this question: Are they going to wear T-shirts that say: I am an al-
Qaida, I am a Shia, or a Sunni terrorist; I am a Baathist warrior, and 
we can only shoot at those--use force against those who wear the al-
Qaida T-shirts? This is not a practical, realistic directive to the 
U.S. military. We are not capable of deciding how to deploy the forces 
we have there. We are just not capable. This is a bunch of 
politicians--that is all we are--doing our best effort to serve the 
people. We don't have to be bound--I certainly agree--by a report from 
a general or the President.

  We can act if we choose to act. But we need to ask ourselves, are we 
going to dismiss the testimony of our top generals and the independent 
Jones commission about the progress that is being made and the 
realistic chance of success that exists? In fact, I think it may be a 
realistic fact that one reason Osama bin Laden is all over the 
television apparently in the last few days is because he is getting 
worried. The Sunni support area of Al Anbar in Iraq has turned against 
him and his people, and they are fighting against him and have 
devastated much of their capability in the Al Anbar region--a direct 
change from what I was told last October when that was not occurring. 
We are working with local police, local mayors, local tribal leaders, 
and that is yielding progress to a degree we have not seen before in 
Iraq. It appears to be a model that can lead us more successfully than 
trying to meet with a bunch of politicians in downtown Baghdad and 
trying to reach an accord that is going to affect something in Fallujah 
or Samarra or Mosul. Washington, DC, can't affect Alabama or Nebraska 
very well.
  But this country is not capable of issuing orders that can impact 
successfully the daily lives in these provinces and small towns. That 
is a product of the new nature of that Government and the lack of 
maturity it has. So we are using different tactics that seem to be 
working.
  Well, we have said our military is being damaged and our morale is 
bad and we have real problems there. Certainly, we have had a 
tremendous amount of our military personnel there, and they have 
performed with the greatest professionalism. They are well trained, 
well disciplined, well equipped, they know how to use the equipment 
with which they have trained, and they are performing in a magnificent 
way. They are at risk every day and they are doing their jobs 
effectively.
  For example, a few days ago, a group came to visit my office from 
Alabama. They were called Veterans for Freedom. It was made up of 
Alabama Army National Guardsmen and Army Reservists. I had the honor of 
being an Army Reservist for 10 years. I never served in combat, but I 
am honored to have been one of them. These are citizen soldiers. They 
recently returned from being mobilized in Iraq. These soldiers were all 
senior noncommissioned officers. They had demobilized and were back at 
their civilian jobs. They asked for a couple days off to visit the 
offices of Alabama's congressional delegation. They

[[Page S11916]]

had several messages for me. The first message was: We have to win this 
battle.
  The group truly believes the contribution their unit had made in the 
war effort was measurable and positive. One of the guardsmen had been 
wounded in an IED attack early in the deployment. Thankfully, he was 
not seriously wounded and he returned to duty. He noted that by the end 
of the deployment, IEDs were no longer a threat in his area of 
operation. The message was simply their service had made a difference.
  Another message to me was: We cannot afford to lose this fight by 
simply giving up. I didn't make up that phrase--that a precipitous 
withdrawal is equivalent to giving up. That is what four veterans of 
Iraq told me they perceived we were considering doing. They urged us 
not to do it. Certainly, Iraq cannot be another United States in a 
short time, they told us. But it can become self-governing and self-
sufficient.
  The group further stated it may be necessary for us to modify our 
objectives in this fight, but please don't quit. The senior NCOs 
finished by telling us they had at least one child, or spouse, on 
active duty or serving as a reservist or Guard member. This was a 
testimony--a form of saying to me they and their families believed in 
what they were doing, even if it meant they have to go back to Iraq 
again. After making this statement, they were quite polite. They 
thanked my team for the time they had with us and the few minutes they 
had to be heard. They came all the way up here to share that.
  I say that because I am not hearing the kind of talk from the people 
who are in Iraq serving our country now that I am hearing from the 
politicians in Congress. I am not hearing that.
  What about Jeff Emanuel, a former special operations veteran of Iraqi 
Freedom? He wrote an article in the Washington Times recently. He 
talked about the situation we find ourselves in today. The title of the 
article is: ``Iraqis show courage. Can Congress do the same?''
  My colleague from Massachusetts, I think, was a bit too dismissive of 
the challenges faced by the Iraqi military police and the Iraqi 
leaders. They have a very difficult challenge, I admit that. I 
certainly admit that. I think this Nation cannot pour resources into 
Iraq if we reach the decision it cannot be successful. We will have to 
extricate ourselves no matter what.
  But I have to tell you I don't see it that way right now. This is 
what Mr. Emanuel said:

        . . . Iraqis in many locations have shown amazing courage, 
     not only by providing an ever-increasing amount of 
     information on insurgent activity to coalition forces, but 
     also by working to rebuild what the insurgents have 
     destroyed, as well as by putting their lives on the line to 
     drive terrorists out of their own villages. They do this 
     despite the fact that they do not know whether they will wake 
     up the next day to find that the coalition--currently their 
     best source of protection--has succumbed to the calls from 
     home (which are heard here by civilians and terrorists alike) 
     to leave Iraq, and has abandoned them.

  So they are hearing the talk here. It creates instability and 
uncertainty for those who want to stand with us and help them to 
prevail and create a good and decent government in Iraq, if they think 
we may flee the country the next day. Mr. Emanuel says:

       In April and May of this year, and again from the beginning 
     of August through the present, I have been embedded [him 
     personally] in some of the most kinetic combat zones in Iraq, 
     observing General Petraeus's strategy from the ground level 
     in several different locations, and have seen clear evidence 
     of the strategy's effects on the situation there.
       I have personally observed clinics in which coalition 
     medics and doctors provided villagers with a level of care 
     that has long been unheard of in the country.

  He goes on to say this is still a broken and unstable country. That I 
do not doubt. Yet progress is inarguably being made, he said. He goes 
on to note this:

       A successful counterinsurgency is one thing, with a 
     timeline which is measured not in months, but in years. 
     However, to wage a successful counterinsurgency and then to 
     build a stable, autonomous and secure state, which we can 
     leave behind without risking its imminent collapse, is 
     another matter altogether.

  He went on to note we must not break faith with those who have stood 
with us and made their commitment.
  We all are concerned about the situation in Iraq. The people I talk 
to--the military people I talk to see us as having a realistic 
possibility of helping to establish a decent government in Iraq--maybe 
not the kind of democracy we would like to have seen but something that 
can work, be a bulwark against an aggressive Iran and be a bulwark in a 
hostile base against al-Qaida and the terrorists there, who could be an 
ally to the United States. We have allies in the region. We have a base 
in Qatar, Bahrain, and we have strong allies in Kuwait and other places 
in the Middle East. We continue to have those and we will continue to 
do so. But there is a danger, without a doubt, about an expansive Iran 
and its leadership who seem to be disconnected from reality in many 
different ways. Iran's President Ahmadi-Nejad declared a few days ago 
that U.S. political influence was collapsing rapidly and said Tehran 
was ready to help fill the power vacuum. He said:

       Soon, we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of 
     course, we are prepared to fill that gap.

  That is from the Philadelphia Inquirer of August 29. So the 
consequences of what we are doing are serious.
  Let me address one more time a rapid precipitous withdrawal and what 
it means as it is contained in the Levin-Reed amendment. Imagine you 
are a military commander and you have 160,000 troops in Iraq. You are 
told you have 9 months to withdraw everything but a token force to 
train Iraqis and to protect your own bases and to chase individual al-
Qaida members and those associated with them. We are talking about more 
than a brigade of 5,500 troops a month having to be pulled out. When 
you have an area of responsibility that has been assigned to a military 
brigade and you draw those down, then somebody has to assume the 
responsibility for that territory. How do you do that? That takes time, 
planning, and care. You can get in a withdrawal or a situation that 
costs lives and will completely destabilize any progress that has been 
made. The military commanders have told us it cannot be done. You 
cannot draw down more than a brigade a month. That is a too fast pace. 
Remember, it is a brigade that has an area of responsibility of 
interfacing with American and coalition forces all around it, plus it 
interfaces with local police, mayors, and tribal leaders, plus it 
interfaces with the Iraqi Army and Iraqi police.
  All of that is part of the responsibility and the relationship that 
has built up. To precipitously pull out in 9 months all these forces 
and draw them back to only a few bases and give them a limited 
responsibility, is a huge, reckless idea that can only result in chaos, 
confusion and unnecessary death and will destabilize Iraq, destabilize 
the region perhaps, and cost more lives.
  Why don't we listen to what our fabulous general, General Petraeus, 
has said? He said: I understand we need to draw down these troops. I 
plan to draw down troops in Iraq. That is certainly my goal.
  I will say what I have said many times. The surge was a bitter pill 
for me. I had certainly hoped that in 2006 we would be drawing down 
troops, not having to increase troop levels. But that is what we voted 
to do in this Congress by an 80-to-14 vote. We funded that surge, and 
now we are getting a report on it.
  He said: I have had success by reducing violence in Baghdad and in 
the country. I am not going to replace a Marine unit that will be 
departing within a few weeks. That will reduce the numbers. I will 
bring a brigade home before Christmas and that will be another 5,000-
plus personnel. I will continue to draw down next year according to my 
plan through the summer, and I believe I can achieve a 30,000 troop 
reduction by next summer.
  He said: In March, I will report to the Congress again, and I will 
tell you what further reductions we can achieve, and I hope to be able 
to announce further reductions.
  That is the kind of withdrawal that is consistent with our ultimate 
goal, to create a stable and decent Iraq in which the Iraqi Army and 
the Iraqi police can assume more and more responsibility.

[[Page S11917]]

  To me, the stakes are so high, the challenges and threats so great 
that we ought not be driven by polling data. We ought to ask ourselves: 
What is right for America? What is right for our soldiers? If they are 
pulled out and this country falls because we acted recklessly, there 
are going to be more morale problems than we can imagine in the United 
States military. There are going to be some angry people. They are 
going to be very disappointed in the Congress. They put their necks on 
the line because we asked them to. They lost friends and have wounded 
friends in this conflict, and then we up and jump away and undermine 
all that effort. It is not going to be pleasant, either.
  I say to my colleagues, I understand the purpose of this amendment. 
It wants reduction in forces. It wants to see us less engaged in the 
actual military operations in Iraq. We want to see more of that done by 
the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi police, and that is what General Petraeus 
wants. He has a plan to achieve that goal. This is a general who has 
written a manual for the Department of Defense on how to defeat an 
insurgency, a counterinsurgency manual. Let's give him that 
opportunity. He is making progress so far. Let's do our duty and watch.
  We are not bound by everything General Petraeus says. We are not 
bound by everything President Bush says. Yes, we are an independent 
body. We have individual responsibilities to make up our own minds. But 
if we do this, let's do it right. Let's don't be flip-flopping around. 
That is not worthy of a great nation. We cannot send troops in one day 
and jerk them out the next. Let's follow through in this difficult 
period and see if we can achieve that realistic chance of success that 
all 20 members of the Jones commission reported they believe is 
possible and as General Petraeus has told us he believes is possible. I 
believe it is the right thing for America to reject the Levin-Reed 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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