[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 140 (Thursday, September 20, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11785-S11831]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             CHANGE OF VOTE

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, on rollcall No. 343, I voted ``yea.'' I 
intended to vote ``nay.'' Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to change my vote. This will not affect the outcome of the 
vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The foregoing tally has been changed to reflect the above order.)


                           Amendment No. 2934

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2 
minutes of debate equally divided prior a vote in relation the 
amendment No. 2934, offered by the Senator from Texas.
  The Republican leader is recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I would like to proceed for a few 
minutes on my leader time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, it has been more than a week since the 
junior Senator from Texas offered an amendment condemning an ad by 
MoveOn.org that appeared last Monday in the New York Times.
  The ad was, by any standard--by any standard--abhorrent. It accused a 
four-star general, who has the trust and respect of 160,000 men and 
women in Iraq, of betraying that mission and those troops, of lying to 
them and to us.
  Who would have ever expected anybody would go after a general in the 
field at a time of war, launch a smear campaign against a man we have 
entrusted with our mission in Iraq?
  Any group that does this sort of thing ought to be condemned.
  Let's take sides: General Petraeus or MoveOn.org. Which one are we 
going to believe? Which one are we going to condemn? That is the 
choice.
  MoveOn says he is a traitor. If we believe that, we should condemn 
him. If we do not believe that, then we ought to be condemning them, 
not him.
  Now, here is what we know about this group. I will bet you a lot of 
our Democratic colleagues do not know everything MoveOn is for. I think 
you probably know they try to come to your aid from time to time, but I 
bet you do not know everything they advocate.
  In the days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, it urged--
MoveOn.org urged--a pacifist response to al-Qaida.
  They rejected the idea that governments should be held responsible 
for terrorists such as al-Qaida who operate within their borders.
  This is the group that called defeating the PATRIOT Act ``a success 
story,'' the group that ran an ad on its Web site equating the 
President to Adolf Hitler, the group that thinks organizations such as 
the U.N. will rid the world of al-Qaida.
  That is MoveOn.org. This is what we are dealing with. I cannot 
believe those are the views of a vast majority of my friends and 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle.
  Now, what do we know about General Petraeus? Commander of the Multi-
National Force-Iraq; been in Iraq for about 4 years; literally wrote 
the U.S. counterinsurgency manual; commanded the 101st Airborne 
Division

[[Page S11786]]

during the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom; Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Operations of the NATO Stabilization Force and Deputy 
Commander of the U.S. Joint Interagency Counter-Terrorism Task Force in 
Bosnia; Assistant Division Commander for Operations of the 82nd 
Airborne Division at Fort Bragg; West Point; aide to the Chief of Staff 
of the Army; battalion, brigade, and division operations officer; 
Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe; Distinguished Service 
Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Bronze Medal 
for Valor; NATO Meritorious Service Medal; one of America's 25 Best 
Leaders, according to US News & World Report; and a four-star general 
of the Army.
  That is what we know about General Petraeus.
  Here is what our friends on the other side of the aisle said about 
General Petraeus when they confirmed him back in January.
  The junior Senator from California called him ``an amazing man.''
  The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the senior Senator 
from Delaware, said: ``I don't know anybody better than Petraeus.''
  The senior Senator from Massachusetts said he is ``an outstanding 
military officer, and our soldiers really deserve the best, and I think 
they're getting it with your service,'' referring to General Petraeus.
  The chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the senior Senator from 
Michigan, said: ``General Petraeus is widely recognized for the depth 
and breadth of his education, training, and operational experience.''
  They praised him up and down in January, confirmed him unanimously, 
funded his mission, and sent him the troops.
  So now is the time to be heard. Is it right to call General Petraeus 
a traitor or not? That is what this vote is about. Is it right to call 
General Petraeus a traitor or not?
  This group, MoveOn.org, is crowing all over the papers. They say they 
have my colleagues on the other side of the aisle on a leash. They brag 
about it. Their executive director has said, referring to the party on 
the other side of the aisle, they are ``Our party.'' MoveOn.org says: 
``we bought it, we own it, and we're going to take it back.'' That is 
MoveOn.org saying that about our friends on the other side of the 
aisle.
  They claim to be in constant contact with people on the other side of 
the aisle. I do not believe this group is telling all these great 
Senators on the other side of the aisle what to do. I do not believe 
that. This is an opportunity to demonstrate it.
  So this amendment gives our colleagues a chance to distance 
themselves from these despicable tactics, distance themselves from the 
notion that some group literally has them on a leash, akin to a puppet 
on a string.
  It is time to take a stand--not to dredge up political battles of the 
past but to condemn this ad.
  What about this ad should not be condemned? Is there anything about 
this ad that should not be condemned?
  I urge my colleagues to stand with General Petraeus and against this 
ad.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse). The majority leader is 
recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the only thing my friend left off regarding 
General Petraeus, he also has a Ph.D. from Princeton. He is a man we 
all have great regard for. I think no one disputes that General 
Petraeus is a good soldier. He follows orders, and that is what 
soldiers are supposed to do, even a general. This general follows the 
orders of the Commander in Chief, and that is the way it should be.
  This is not the Petraeus war. It is the Bush war. I would say my 
friend from Kentucky, my dear friend, my counterpart, is talking about 
an organization that has more than 3 million members. I do not know 
what any one of them may have said at any given time. I certainly 
cannot support everything they say, that is for sure.
  But understand, the amendment that was offered by my friend, Senator 
Boxer, is very clear. It says the September 10, 2007, advertisement in 
the New York Times ``was an unwarranted personal attack on General 
Petraeus.'' That is what it says. We just voted on that. I cannot 
imagine why some of my colleagues on the other side voted against this. 
That is what it says. One reason, maybe it brought up some things from 
the past, the recent past, such as yesterday.
  For a party that endorsed longer troop time in Iraq for our soldiers; 
that is, our people who are serving us so valiantly in Iraq cannot stay 
home for the same amount of time they go over there--that is what this 
party voted against. They voted in favor of second and third and fourth 
tours of duty for these young men and women.
  We condemn all attacks on our valiant soldiers. That is what the 
amendment we voted on said. I read what it says about the ad. We don't 
support that ad. We clearly voted accordingly.

  But we also said we should remember--as I hope we remember the vote 
yesterday endorsing longer tours for our soldiers--I hope we also 
remember what happened to Max Cleland, a man who lost three limbs. 
Every day of his life, including today, he wakes up and spends 2 hours 
getting dressed. He dresses himself. He does his exercise, running on a 
mattress, with his stumps. He was decorated for heroism. But he wasn't 
patriotic enough to serve in the Senate, according to people who are in 
this Chamber. They ran ads against Max Cleland. John Kerry: Two Silver 
Stars, two Purple Hearts. Did I hear my friends complaining about these 
vicious ads against John Kerry when he was running for President? Not a 
single murmur. Some were cheering on the Swift Boat demons.
  So as we say in this resolution, we do not support any unwarranted 
attack on General Petraeus or any other of our military members. But 
what we want to do here is talk about the war--the war. The policy is 
bad. We will soon be starting the sixth year of this war, costing this 
country right now about three-quarters of a trillion dollars, and we 
are fighting for pennies for children's health, pennies for doing 
things about the environment, and education. The President is 
complaining because what we want to do in our appropriations bills is 
$21 billion over this magic number he came up with, $21 billion in an 
approximately $1 trillion bill, ultimately how much it will be for 
taking care of things the Government wants. But we are going to have in 
a few days another supplemental appropriations bill for Iraq 
approaching about two hundred billion more dollars.
  The American people are fed up with this. No one over here endorses 
the ad that was in that newspaper. None of us do. But we want to talk 
about the war. They want to talk about an ad in a newspaper. None of us 
in any way criticized General Petraeus. He is a soldier. He is 
following a policy set by the Commander in Chief. But that doesn't take 
away from the problems the American people feel are as a result of this 
war: death, injury to men and women. So I hope--we are on the Defense 
authorization bill--we can proceed on the Defense authorization bill, 
complete this legislation, have civil debate on Iraq policy, and we 
hope to do that. I say respectfully to my friends, focus on the policy 
of this war, not on an ad we had nothing to do with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. REID. If we have time left, I yield it back, and I ask for the 
yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, could I ask what the parliamentary 
situation is? I thought Senator Cornyn was going to have an amendment 
and I was going to have an amendment this morning. Is that accurate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2 
minutes of debate equally divided prior to a vote in relation to 
amendment No. 2934 offered by the Senator from Texas, Mr. Cornyn.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  At the moment, there is not a sufficient second.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, this amendment is about the difference 
between a uniformed leader of our U.S. military, GEN David Petraeus, 
the difference between him and a political candidate. Surely our 
colleagues--all of us in the Chamber understand, having run for office 
ourselves, that there

[[Page S11787]]

are things said in political campaigns which many of us regret. But our 
focus should not be distracted from this character assassination 
against a great American patriot. I can't believe any Member of this 
Senate would vote against this amendment which condemns this character 
assassination and by their vote against this amendment would say it is 
OK.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, John Kerry and Max Cleland are great 
heroes. My colleagues on the other side voted not to condemn the 
attacks against them, even though the Senator from Arizona did so, and 
I have the chart of what he said.
  This is about politics, let's face it. Since when are we the ad 
police who go after organizations by name and wave around their name? 
What are we going to do next when there is a health care debate? Are we 
going to condemn one organization on one side and one on the other, or 
are we going to do it on choice and hold up some very tough ads that we 
see running all over this country? I would hope not.
  This is the United States of America. We condemn all attacks against 
our men and women serving honorably in the military, not just one 
organization. We condemn all the attacks. I hope our colleagues will 
vote ``no.'' Otherwise, we are starting a terrible precedent around 
here we will regret.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2934. The yeas and nays 
are ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden), 
the Senator from Washington (Ms. Cantwell) and the Senator from 
Illinois (Mr. Obama) are necessarly absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 72, nays 25, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 344 Leg.]

                                YEAS--72

     Alexander
     Allard
     Barrasso
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Tester
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb

                                NAYS--25

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown
     Byrd
     Clinton
     Dodd
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Menendez
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Biden
     Cantwell
     Obama
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 72, the nays are 
25. Under the previous order, requiring 60 votes for the adoption of 
the amendment, amendment No. 2934 is agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. McCAIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate considers Feingold amendment No. 2924, which I understand will 
now be the matter before the Senate, there will be 2 hours of debate, 
with the time divided as follows: 90 minutes under the control of 
Senator Feingold or his designee, 30 minutes under the control of 
Senator McCain or his designee; that no amendment be in order to the 
amendment prior to the vote; that upon the--Mr. President, I suggest 
the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, it is our understanding--and Senator McCain 
and I have discussed this--that Senator Feingold will be recognized to 
offer amendment No. 2924.
  I ask unanimous consent that there be 2 hours of debate, with the 
time divided as follows: 90 minutes under the control of Senator 
Feingold or his designee, 30 minutes under the control of Senator 
McCain or his designee; that no amendment be in order to the amendment 
prior to the vote; that upon the use or yielding back of time, without 
further intervening action or debate, the Senate proceed to vote in 
relation to the amendment, and that if the amendment doesn't receive 60 
votes, it be withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will 
not object, I thank the distinguished chairman, Senator Levin. I want 
to mention this: Is it the chairman's understanding that after that, we 
would probably go to the Levin-Reed amendment and have a time agreement 
following that? Is it also the chairman's understanding that any Iraq-
related amendment would probably be a 60-vote requirement? Finally, is 
it also the understanding of the chairman that at 3 p.m. today we would 
expect all amendments to be filed on this bill?
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield.
  Mr. McCAIN. I do not object.
  Mr. LEVIN. It is our hope to work out an arrangement so we can 
proceed next to the Levin-Reed amendment. If that is the situation, we 
would hope to work out a time agreement as well on that amendment. 
There are two other matters that we may want to try to dispose of--at 
least one other matter--prior to the Levin-Reed amendment. It is our 
hope as well, as the Senator from Arizona expects, that amendments that 
are Iraq related include the 60-vote requirement.
  Mr. McCAIN. Also, if I could be recognized briefly.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the unanimous consent 
agreement is agreed to.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I remind my colleagues--and I again thank 
the chairman, Senator Levin. I think we have had an excellent degree of 
accommodation, with occasional differences of opinion. But I appreciate 
his leadership. I remind my colleagues this is the 12th day of debate 
on this bill. The total time of debate has been 69 hours. We still have 
not gotten to the body of the legislation. That is 12 days, 69 hours.
  I know this is called a ``deliberative'' body, but we are now 
reaching the limits of that description. So I hope all of our 
colleagues will work with us to dispose--hopefully today--of the Iraq-
related amendments, and then we can close out the filing of amendments 
on the bill itself and, hopefully, have some kind of agreement to 
dispose of this legislation.
  Again, as we have pointed out several times, on this legislation is 
the Wounded Warrior legislation, for our veterans, a pay raise, and so 
many other important aspects of the legislation. We don't want us, for 
the first time in more than 46 years, not to pass this important bill.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me also add one comment to Senators. We 
have already, on this side, hotlined a unanimous consent agreement that 
no amendment would be in order to this bill, unless it is filed by 4 
p.m. this afternoon--no first-degree amendment would be in order. We 
don't know what the response is. We hope all of the Democrats will 
agree to that. We believe that a similar unanimous consent request has 
been hotlined on the Republican side, but the ranking member would know 
that.
  We hope that works, for the reason the Senator gave, which is that 
this bill is extremely important. We have been on it a long time. We 
are going to need a number of days, obviously, to resolve the hundreds 
of amendments

[[Page S11788]]

that are still filed and have not been resolved. We are working to 
clear amendments, and we need the cooperation of everybody.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, one final comment. I am not sure I will 
need all the time on this side for this amendment. We have debated this 
amendment before, and I alert my colleagues that perhaps we can vote 
earlier than the 2-hour time that is involved.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. McCaskill). The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 2064.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Amendment No. 2064?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Correct.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment 
be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                Amendment No. 2924 to Amendment No. 2011

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I now call up amendment No. 2924.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself, Mr. 
     Reid, Mr. Leahy, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Harkin, Mr. 
     Sanders, and Mr. Schumer, proposes an amendment numbered 2924 
     to amendment No. 2011.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

      (Purpose: To safely redeploy United States troops from Iraq)

       At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1535. SAFE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS FROM 
                   IRAQ.

       (a) Transition of Mission.--The President shall promptly 
     transition the mission of the United States Armed Forces in 
     Iraq to the limited and temporary purposes set forth in 
     subsection (d).
       (b) Commencement of Safe, Phased Redeployment From Iraq.--
     The President shall commence the safe, phased redeployment of 
     members of the United States Armed Forces from Iraq who are 
     not essential to the limited and temporary purposes set forth 
     in subsection (d). Such redeployment shall begin not later 
     than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
     shall be carried out in a manner that protects the safety and 
     security of United States troops.
       (c) Use of Funds.--No funds appropriated or otherwise made 
     available under any provision of law may be obligated or 
     expended to continue the deployment in Iraq of members of the 
     United States Armed Forces after June 30, 2008.
       (d) Exception for Limited and Temporary Purposes.--The 
     prohibition under subsection (c) shall not apply to the 
     obligation or expenditure of funds for the following limited 
     and temporary purposes:
       (1) To conduct targeted operations, limited in duration and 
     scope, against members of al Qaeda and affiliated 
     international terrorist organizations.
       (2) To provide security for United States Government 
     personnel and infrastructure.
       (3) To provide training to members of the Iraqi Security 
     Forces who have not been involved in sectarian violence or in 
     attacks upon the United States Armed Forces, provided that 
     such training does not involve members of the United States 
     Armed Forces taking part in combat operations or being 
     embedded with Iraqi forces.
       (4) To provide training, equipment, or other materiel to 
     members of the United States Armed Forces to ensure, 
     maintain, or improve their safety and security.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, last week, as the administration was 
trying to convince us to stay the latest course in Iraq, it made very 
little mention of the fact that in every month this year, January 
through August, substantially more U.S. troops have died in Iraq than 
in the corresponding month in 2006.
  It also had little to say about the British survey released last week 
which found that nearly one in two Baghdad households has lost at least 
one member to war-related violence and that 22 percent of surveyed 
households across the nation have endured at least one death. Based on 
the number of households in Iraq, this could mean that upwards of 1 
million civilian deaths have occurred as a result of the war in Iraq.
  Despite these facts, this administration assures us that violence is 
decreasing and that the security situation in Iraq is getting better. 
They tell us success is within reach and that we are closer to 
attaining our objectives, even though those objectives keep changing--
most recently from supporting a strong central government to a more 
bottom-up and local approach. Just give us more time, they say, just as 
they said in 2004 and in 2005 and in 2006. The slogan may be different. 
We have had ``Mission Accomplished'' and ``Stay the Course'' and ``The 
New Way Forward'' and now ``Return on Success.'' But each time, we are 
told we are on the right road until, that is, we reach another dead end 
and then a new slogan is invented to justify our open-ended presence in 
Iraq. As the administration blunders from one mistake to another, brave 
American troops are being injured and killed in Iraq, our military is 
being overstretched, countless billions of dollars are being spent, the 
American people are growing more and more frustrated and outraged, and 
our national security, quite frankly, is being undermined.
  Our top national security priority should be going after al-Qaida and 
its affiliates. They are waging a global campaign from north Africa to 
Southeast Asia. We cannot afford to continue to focus so much of our 
resources on one single country without a legitimate strategy for 
dealing with the threats posed by al-Qaida's global reach.
  Instead of seeing the big picture, instead of placing Iraq in the 
actual context of a comprehensive and global campaign against a 
ruthless enemy, this administration persists in the tragic mistake it 
made over 4 years ago when it took this country to war in Iraq. That 
war has led to the deaths of more than 3,700 Americans and perhaps as 
many as 1 million Iraqi civilians, it has deepened instability 
throughout the Middle East, it has jeopardized our credibility, and it 
has clearly alienated our friends and allies.
  This summer's declassified National Intelligence Estimate confirms 
that al-Qaida remains the most serious threat to the United States. 
Indeed, key elements of that threat have been regenerated, have even 
been enhanced. While we have been distracted by the war in Iraq, al-
Qaida has protected, rebuilt, and strengthened its safe haven in the 
border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan and has increased its 
collaboration with regional terrorist groups in other parts of the 
world. With its safe haven, al-Qaida is working to expand its network 
and, therefore, its ability to strike Western targets, including ones 
right here in the United States.
  The administration has much to say about al-Qaida in Iraq. They will 
not tell you al-Qaida in Iraq is an al-Qaida affiliate which was 
spawned by this disastrous war, however, and they would rather not talk 
about al-Qaida's safe haven in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region or even 
recognize the serious global threat that continues to exist and that 
has even been strengthened while our troops are dying in Iraq. That 
tells you all you need to know about the administration's painfully 
narrow focus on Iraq.
  The war in Iraq is not making us safer. It is making us more 
vulnerable. It is stretching our military to the breaking point and 
inflaming tensions and anti-American sentiment in an important and 
volatile part of the world. It is playing into the hands of our 
enemies, as even the State Department recognized when it said the war 
in Iraq is ``used as a rallying cry for radicalization and extremist 
activity in neighboring countries.''
  Of course, it would be easy to put all the blame on the 
administration, but I am afraid Congress is complicit too. Congress 
authorized the war. Congress has so far allowed it to continue despite 
strong efforts from the new Democratic leadership. Now, once again, it 
is up to us in Congress to reverse this President's intractable policy, 
to listen to the American people, to save American lives, and to 
protect our Nation's security by redeploying our troops from Iraq. We 
have the power and the responsibility to act, and we must act now.
  I am not suggesting that we abandon the people of Iraq or that we 
ignore the political stalemate there and the rapidly unfolding 
humanitarian crisis which has displaced more than 4 million Iraqis from 
their homes. These critical issues require the attention and 
constructive engagement of U.S.

[[Page S11789]]

policymakers, key regional players, and the international community. 
But such turbulence cannot and will not be resolved by a massive 
military engagement. The administration's surge is another dead end. 
The surge was supposedly aimed at creating the space necessary for 
political compromise, but the Iraqi Government is no more reconciled 
than it was when the surge began, and American troops are dying in 
greater numbers--greater numbers--than last year or the year before.
  That is why I am again offering an amendment, with the majority 
leader, Harry Reid, and Senators Leahy, Boxer, Whitehouse, Harkin, 
Sanders, Schumer, Dodd, Durbin, and Menendez. Our amendment, which is 
similar to legislation we introduced earlier this year, would require 
the President to begin safely redeploying U.S. troops from Iraq within 
90 days of enactment, and it would require the redeployment to be 
completed by June 30, 2008.
  At that point, with our troops safely out of Iraq--and I repeat 
that--at that point, with our troops safely out of Iraq, funding for 
the war would be ended, with four narrow exceptions: providing security 
for U.S. Government personnel and infrastructure, training the Iraqi 
security forces, providing training and equipment to U.S. service men 
and women to ensure their safety and security, and conducting targeted 
operations limited in duration and scope against members of al-Qaida 
and other affiliated international terrorist organizations.
  By enacting Feingold-Reid, we can finally focus on what should be our 
top national security priority--waging a global campaign against al-
Qaida and its affiliates. Our amendment will allow targeted missions 
against al-Qaida in Iraq, but it will not allow the administration to 
maintain substantial numbers of U.S. troops in that country.

  The amendment will also allow training of Iraqis who have taken steps 
to address serious concerns about the loyalties of the ISF. The 
Government Accountability Office has found that the ISF have been 
infiltrated by Shia militia, and General Jones's recent report 
indicated ISF are compromised by militia and sectarian alliances. In 
addition, there have been several reports of ISF attacks upon U.S. 
troops. That is why we do not allow training for Iraqis who have been 
involved in sectarian violence or attacks upon Americans.
  We also prevent the ``training'' exception from being used as a 
loophole to keep tens of thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq. We do this 
by stipulating that U.S. troops providing training cannot be embedded 
or take part in combat operations with the ISF. Training should be 
training, not a ruse for keeping American troops on the front lines of 
the Iraqi civil war. Of course, U.S. troops can take part in combat 
operations specifically against al-Qaida and its affiliates.
  Some of my colleagues will oppose this amendment. That is their 
right. But I hope none of them will suggest that Feingold-Reid would 
hurt the troops by denying them equipment or support. Why do I hope 
they don't say that? Because there is no truth to the argument. None. 
This is an absolutely phony argument used time and again to try to get 
away from what this amendment actually does. Passing this legislation 
will result in our troops being safely redeployed by the deadline we 
set. At that point, with the troops safely out of Iraq, funding for the 
war would end, with the narrow exceptions I listed. That is what 
Congress did in 1993 when it voted overwhelmingly to bring our military 
mission in Somalia to an end by setting a deadline after which funding 
for that mission would end. And that is what Congress must do again to 
terminate the President's unending mission in Iraq.
  In order to make clear our legislation will protect the troops, we 
have added language requiring that redeployment ``shall be carried out 
in a manner that protects the safety and security of United States 
troops,'' and we have specified that nothing in this amendment will 
prevent U.S. troops from receiving the training or equipment they need 
``to ensure, maintain, or improve their safety and security.'' So I 
hope we will not be hearing any more phony arguments about troops on 
the battlefield somehow not getting the supplies they need.
  Other amendments might set goals for redeployment or merely call for 
a change in mission, but those proposals do not go far enough. Nor is 
it sufficient to pass legislation that allows substantial numbers of 
U.S. troops to remain in Iraq indefinitely. As the President's Iraq 
policy continues unchecked, we need to invoke the power and the 
responsibility bestowed upon us by the Constitution and bring this to a 
close.
  This war doesn't make sense. It is hurting our country, our military, 
and our credibility. It is time for this war to end. The American 
people know this, and they are looking to us to act. I hope we will not 
let them down again.
  Madam President, I reserve the remainder of my time. I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered 
by my good friend from Wisconsin. I would prefer to be discussing other 
reform issues with him than this one, but this is an important 
amendment.
  As usual, the Senator from Wisconsin makes a passionate and 
persuasive case. Unfortunately, the pending amendment would mandate a 
withdrawal of U.S. combat forces within 90 days of enactment and cut 
off funds for our troops in Iraq after June 30, 2008. One exception 
would be for a small force authorized only to carry out narrowly 
defined missions.
  The Senate, once again, faces a simple choice: Do we build on the 
successes of our new strategy and give General Petraeus and the troops 
under his command the time and support needed to carry out their 
mission or do we ignore the realities on the ground and legislate a 
premature end to our efforts in Iraq, accepting thereby all the 
terrible consequences that will ensue? That is the choice we must make, 
and though politics and popular opinion may be pushing us in one 
direction, we have a greater responsibility, in my view, a duty to make 
decisions with the security of this great and good Nation foremost in 
our minds.
  We now have the benefit of the long-anticipated testimony delivered 
by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, testimony that reported 
unambiguously that the new strategy is succeeding in Iraq. 
Understanding what we know now--that our military is making progress on 
the ground and that their commanders request from us the time and 
support necessary to succeed in Iraq--it is inconceivable that we in 
Congress would end this strategy just as it is beginning to show real 
results.
  We see today that after nearly 4 years of mismanaged war, the 
situation on the ground in Iraq is showing demonstrable signs of 
progress. The final reinforcements needed to implement General 
Petraeus's new counterinsurgency plan have been in place for over 2 
months, and our military, in cooperation with the Iraqi security 
forces, is making significant gains in a number of areas.
  General Petraeus reported in detail on these gains during his 
testimony in both Houses and in countless interviews. The No. 2 U.S. 
commander in Iraq, GEN Ray Odierno, said today--Madam President, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article today by AP 
concerning General Odierno's comments saying ``that a seven-month old 
security operation has reduced violence by 50 percent in Baghdad but he 
acknowledged that civilians were still dying at too high a rate.''
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                U.S. Commander: Violence Down in Baghdad

                         (By Katarina Kratovac)

       The No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq said Thursday that a 
     seven-month-old security operation has reduced violence by 50 
     percent in Baghdad but he acknowledged that civilians were 
     still dying at too high a rate.
       The comments came as relations between the U.S. and Iraqi 
     governments remained strained in the wake of Sunday's 
     shooting involving Blackwater USA security guards, which 
     Iraqi officials said left at least 11 people dead. Prime 
     Minister Nouri al-Maliki suggested the U.S. Embassy find 
     another company to protect its diplomats.
       The Moyock, N.C.-based company has said its employees acted 
     ``lawfully and appropriately'' in response to an armed attack 
     against a State Department convoy.
       But a survivor who said he was three cars away from the 
     convoy denied the American guards were under fire, claiming 
     they apparently started shooting to disperse more than

[[Page S11790]]

     two dozen cars that were stuck in a traffic jam.
       ``It is not true when they say that they were attacked. We 
     did not hear any gunshots before they started shooting,'' 
     lawyer Hassan Jabir said from his hospital bed.
       On Thursday, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno told reporters that 
     car bombs and suicide attacks in Baghdad have fallen to their 
     lowest level in a year, and civilian casualties have dropped 
     from a high of about 32 to 12 per day.
       He also said violence in Baghdad had seen a 50 percent 
     decrease, although he did not provide details about how the 
     numbers were obtained and said that was short of the 
     military's objectives.
       ``What we do know is that there has been a decline in 
     civilian casualties, but I would say again that it's not at 
     the level we want it to be,'' Odierno said. ``There are still 
     way too many civilian casualties inside of Baghdad and 
     Iraq.''
       Al-Qaida in Iraq was ``increasingly being pushed out of 
     Baghdad, ``seeking refuge outside'' the capital and ``even 
     fleeing Iraq,'' Odierno said.
       Lt. Gen. Abboud Qanbar, the Iraqi military commander, said 
     that before the troop buildup, one-third of Baghdad's 507 
     districts were under insurgent control.
       ``Now, only five to six districts can be called hot 
     areas,'' he said. ``Al-Qaida now is left only with booby-
     trapped cars and roadside bombs as their only weapon, which 
     cannot be called quality operations, and they do not worry 
     us.''
       Qanbar also reported the release of 1,686 detainees from 
     Iraqi jails.
       Odierno said the U.S. military had separately released at 
     least 50 detainees per day, or a total of at least 250, since 
     beginning an amnesty program for inmates as a goodwill 
     gesture linked to the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.
       Meanwhile, a U.S. soldier died Wednesday in a non-combat 
     incident in Anbar west of Baghdad, the military said, adding 
     that the incident was under investigation.
       After the shooting Sunday in the Mansour district of 
     western Baghdad, Blackwater spokeswoman Anne E. Tyrrell said 
     the employees acted ``lawfully and appropriately'' in 
     response to an armed attack against a U.S. State Department 
     convoy.
       But Iraqi witnesses claim seeing Blackwater security guards 
     fire at civilians randomly.
       Speaking from his bed in the Yarmouk hospital four days 
     after the incident, Jabir said he was one of the wounded when 
     Blackwater's security guards opened fire in Nisoor Square.
       He said he was stuck in a traffic jam near Nisoor Square in 
     western Baghdad when he saw the American convoy of armored 
     vehicles and black SUVs parked about 20 yards away at an 
     intersection, apparently following an explosion.
       Jabir said the Americans began yelling to disperse the 
     vehicles, then opened fire as the cars were trying to turn 
     around.
       ``Some people, including women and children, left their 
     cars and began crawling on the street to avoid being shot but 
     many of them were killed. I saw a 10-year-old boy jumping in 
     fear from one of the minibuses and he was shot in his head. 
     His mother jumped after him and was also killed,'' Jabir 
     said, adding that his car flipped over in the chaos.
       The incident has angered Iraqis, uniting them in blaming 
     U.S. forces for the violence in their country and backing the 
     government's announcement to ban Blackwater from Iraq.
       U.S. and Iraqi officials announced they would form a joint 
     committee to try to reconcile widely differing versions of 
     the incident. Conflicting accounts were circulating among 
     Iraqi officials themselves.
       Land travel by U.S. diplomats and other civilian officials 
     outside the fortified Green Zone was suspended following the 
     Iraqi government order that Blackwater stop working.
       The U.S.-based company is the main provider of bodyguards 
     and armed escorts for American government civilian employees 
     in Iraq and banning it from Iraq would hamper and make 
     movement of U.S. diplomats and others difficult.
       Al-Maliki, who disputed Blackwater's version of what 
     happened, spoke out sharply against the company Wednesday, 
     saying the government would not tolerate the killing of its 
     citizens ``in cold blood.''
       He also said the shootings had generated such ``widespread 
     anger and hatred'' that it would be ``in everyone's interest 
     if the embassy used another company while the company is 
     suspended.''
       Eager to contain the crisis, the State Department said 
     Wednesday a joint U.S.-Iraqi commission will be formed.
       The size and composition of the commission have yet to be 
     determined but its members are charged with assessing the 
     results of both U.S. and Iraqi investigations of Sunday's 
     incident, reaching a common conclusion about what happened 
     and recommending possible changes to the way in which the 
     embassy and its contractors handle security, the State 
     Department said.

  Mr. McCAIN. He said that the violence, as I said, has been reduced by 
some 50 percent, that car bombs and suicide attacks in Baghdad have 
fallen to their lowest levels in a year, and that civilian casualties 
have dropped from a high of 32 per day to 12 per day.
  His comments were echoed by LTG Abboud Qanbar, the Iraqi commander, 
who said that before the surge began, one-third of Baghdad's 507 
districts were under insurgents' control. Today, he said, only five to 
six districts can be called hot areas.
  I want to be clear to my friend from Wisconsin and my colleagues, 
none of this is to argue that Baghdad or other regions have suddenly 
become safe or that violence has come down to acceptable levels. As 
General Odierno pointed out, violence is still too high and there are 
many unsafe areas. Nevertheless, such positive developments illustrate 
General Petraeus's contention last week that American and Iraqi forces 
have achieved substantial progress under their new strategy.
  The road in Iraq remains, as it always has been, long and hard. The 
Maliki government remains paralyzed and unwilling to function as it 
must, and other difficulties abound. No one can guarantee success or be 
certain about its prospects. We can be sure, however, that should the 
Congress succeed in terminating the new strategy by legislating an 
abrupt withdrawal and a transition to a new, less effective, and more 
dangerous course--should we do that, then we will fail for certain.
  I wish to remind all of my colleagues of a statement made by the 
President of Iran approximately 1 week ago. Every American should hear 
this statement. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad declared 
yesterday that U.S. political influence in Iraq was ``collapsing 
rapidly,'' and said Tehran was ready to help fill any power vacuum. He 
stated at a news conference in Tehran, referring to U.S. troops in 
Iraq:

       The political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. 
     Soon, we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of 
     course, we are prepared to fill the gap, with the help of 
     neighbors and regional friends like Saudi Arabia, and with 
     the help of the Iraqi Nation.

  That is what this is about. That is what this is about. Let us make 
no mistake about the cost of such an American failure in Iraq. In his 
testimony before the Armed Services Committee last week, General 
Petraeus referred to an August Defense Intelligence Agency report that 
stated:

       A rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of 
     strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of 
     dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of 
     the Iraqi Security Forces; a rapid deterioration of local 
     security initiatives; al-Qaida-Iraq regaining lost ground and 
     freedom of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and 
     further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; and 
     exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, 
     especially with respect to Iran.

  These are the likely consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, and I 
hope the supporters of such a move will tell us how they intend to 
address the chaos and catastrophe that would surely follow such a 
course of action. Should this amendment become law, and U.S. troops 
begin withdrawing, do they believe Iraq would become more or less 
stable? That the Iraqi people become more or less safe? That genocide 
becomes a more remote possibility or even likelier? That al-Qaida will 
find it easier to gather, plan, and carry out attacks from Iraqi soil, 
or that our withdrawal will somehow make this less likely?
  No matter where my colleagues came down in 2002 about the centrality 
of Iraq to the war on terror, there can simply be no debate that our 
efforts in Iraq today are critical to the wider struggle against 
violent Islamic extremism. Earlier this month, GEN Jim Jones, who was 
widely quoted by opponents of this new strategy, testified before the 
Armed Services Committee and outlined what he believes to be the 
consequences of such a course.

       A precipitous departure which results in a failed state in 
     Iraq, will have a significant boost in the numbers of 
     extremists, jihadists in the world, who will believe they 
     will have toppled the major power on earth and that all else 
     is possible. And I think it will not only make us less safe; 
     it will make our friends and allies less safe. And the 
     struggle will continue. It will simply be done in different 
     and in other areas.

  I don't see how General Jones could have made himself more clear and 
succinct, and yet I continue to hear selective quotes from his 
commissioned reports and his testimony that somehow would lead people 
to believe he would support such a proposal as being made today by my 
friend from Wisconsin.

[[Page S11791]]

  Should we leave Iraq before there is a basic level of stability, we 
invite chaos, genocide, terrorist safe havens, and regional war. We 
invite further Iranian influence at a time when Iranian operatives are 
already moving weapons, training fighters, providing resources, and 
helping plan operations to kill American soldiers and damage our 
efforts to bring stability to Iraq. If our notions of national security 
have any meaning, they cannot include permitting the establishment of 
an Iranian-dominated Middle East that is roiled by wider regional war 
and riddled with terrorist safe havens.
  The supporters of this amendment respond they do not by any means 
intend to cede the battlefield to al-Qaida. On the contrary, their 
legislation would allow U.S. forces, presumably holed up in forward 
operating bases, to carry out ``targeted operations, limited in 
duration and scope, against members of al-Qaida and other international 
terrorist organizations.'' But such a provision draws a false 
distinction between terrorism and sectarian violence. Let us think 
about the implications of ordering American soldiers to target 
``terrorists'' but not those who foment sectarian violence. Was the 
attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra a terrorist operation or the 
expression of sectarian violence? When the Madhi army attacks 
government police stations, are they acting as terrorists or as a 
militia? When AQI attacks a Shia village along the Diyala River, is 
that terrorism or sectarian violence? What about when an American 
soldier comes across some unknown assailant burying an IED in the road? 
Must he check for an al-Qaida identity card before responding?
  The obvious answer is such acts very often constitute terrorism in 
Iraq and sectarian violence in Iraq. The two are deeply intertwined. To 
try to make an artificial distinction between terrorism and sectarian 
violence is to fundamentally misunderstand al-Qaida's strategy, which 
is to incite sectarian violence. It is interesting that some supporters 
of this amendment embrace the recent GAO report, which said it could 
not distinguish between sectarian violence and other forms of violence 
because that would require determining an intent--an impossible task. 
Yet these same supporters would have our troops in the field attempt to 
do just that. Our military commanders say trying to artificially 
separate counterterrorism from counterinsurgency will not succeed, and 
that moving in with search-and-destroy missions to kill and capture 
terrorists only to immediately cede the territory to the enemy is the 
failed strategy of the past 4 years. We should not and must not return 
to such a disastrous course.

  The strategy General Petraeus has put into place--a traditional 
counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes protecting the population, 
which gets our troops out of the bases and into the areas they are 
trying to protect, and which supplies sufficient force levels to carry 
out the mission--is the correct one. It has become clear by now we 
cannot set a date for withdrawal without setting a date for surrender.
  This fight is about Iraq, but not about Iraq alone. It is greater 
than that and more important still about whether America still has the 
political courage to fight for victory or whether we will settle for 
defeat, with all the terrible things that accompany it. We cannot walk 
away gracefully from defeat in this war. Consider one final statement 
from the August National Intelligence Estimate. It reads:

       We assess that changing the mission of the Coalition forces 
     from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to 
     a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and 
     counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing 
     a safe haven would erode any security gains achieved thus 
     far.

  Should we pass this amendment, we would erode the security gains our 
brave men and women have fought so hard to achieve and embark on the 
road of surrender. For the sake of American interests, our national 
values, the future of Iraq, and the stability of the Middle East, we 
must not send our country down this disastrous course. All of us want 
our troops to come home, and to come home as soon as possible. But we 
should want our soldiers to return to us with honor, the honor of 
victory that is due all of those who have paid with the ultimate 
sacrifice. We have many responsibilities to the people who elected us, 
but one responsibility outweighs all the others, and that is to protect 
this great and good Nation from all enemies foreign and domestic. I 
urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the Feingold amendment.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I surely agree with the Senator from 
Arizona. I also wish we were out here working on something else, 
perhaps one of our political reform bills. We had started working on 
our campaign finance reform bill long before 9/11, and we are still 
working on those issues together. It is certainly tragic for this 
country that, instead, we are mired in a situation in Iraq that takes 
us away not only from our national security issues but also our 
domestic issues that need attention.
  But I thank my colleague from Arizona. He argues on the merits. He 
doesn't hide behind the resume of a general or talk about or use some 
other person as a human shield. He talks about the merits of the issue. 
He and I have had a chance, thanks to his invitation on two occasions, 
to visit Iraq and look at what was happening. Frankly, we just come to 
different conclusions. In fact, we couldn't be more far apart on this 
issue. Nonetheless, I respect the way he argues and the way we discuss 
this, and I thank him for it.
  In a moment, I will turn to one of my colleagues to speak, but I want 
to briefly respond to a couple of the issues that were brought up by 
the Senator from Arizona. The Senator from Arizona and I agree 
absolutely on something: We fear failure in the fight against 
terrorism. We want to defeat those who attacked us on 9/11.
  For me, the fight is a global fight, which we have been distracted 
from due to Iraq. So what I am concerned about is that a continued 
effort in Iraq could lead to the ultimate failure in the fight against 
those who attacked us on 9/11. It could lead to a surrender, a true 
surrender against those who declared war on our country on September 
11, 2001. So that is the failure I fear. That is the failure I want to 
make sure doesn't happen, because we have to protect the American 
people.
  The Senator from Arizona points out the very difficult problem of 
Iran, which is related to but also separate from the question of al-
Qaida.
  He says: What happens if we leave Iraq?
  Let me tell you something. What we are doing in Iraq right now is the 
best deal Iran ever had. We take all the hits, we lose the people, we 
pay for everything, and their influence in Iraq increases every day. 
And they do not have to worry about a restive Sunni population in their 
country because they are not moving into Iraq directly. But if we left, 
they would have to think twice about their own stability, if they tried 
to mess around in Iraq directly.
  So, almost unbelievably, our strategy in Iraq plays into both the 
hands of al-Qaida and Iran. It is the most foolish move we could make 
in the fight against those who attacked us on 9/11 and against those 
who are being very threatening to us at this point in the name of the 
Iranian leader. It is the wrong strategy in both regards.
  The Senator from Arizona asks: How are we going to get other 
countries engaged if we leave Iraq? It is the reverse. None of these 
bordering countries are going to get serious. None of them are going to 
become engaged if they think we are going to just stay there--for a 
couple of reasons. One is, Why should they? We are there putting up 
with all the violence and difficulties and taking all the losses. They 
don't have to spend anything.
  The Senator from Arizona and I heard the Kuwaitis talk about this in 
Kuwait, saying: Well, you know, you went in there; now you deal with 
it. If we are not in there, not only Iran and Syria, Jordan and others 
have a definite interest in Iraq not being chaotic. That is when they 
start to perform.
  The other problem is, How can these Islamic countries help stabilize 
Iraq now when in their countries our involvement in Iraq is perceived 
as an occupation of an Islamic country? So our very strategy stymies 
the potential for stability being assisted by the other countries in 
the region.
  Those are just a couple of responses on the merits to some of the 
points

[[Page S11792]]

made by the Senator from Arizona. I firmly believe our strategy is 
hurting our country desperately in terms of our national security, and 
that is why I and others offer the amendment.
  At this point, I would like to yield 10 minutes to one of the 
strongest advocates for this policy of trying to terminate this 
involvement, the Senator from Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Salazar). The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me say to both my colleague from 
Wisconsin and my colleague from Arizona, I was the floor manager of the 
McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform legislation. I feel as though, 
in a sense here, I am assuming the role again as the manager between 
the McCain and Feingold camps on this question. They were two people 
who joined forces together on a critical issue before our country, and 
I was honored and pleased to manage the legislation which was named for 
them.
  We find ourselves here again on a different subject matter and 
assuming different roles. I am not managing the issue, but I would be 
remiss if I didn't also express my deep respect for my colleague, the 
Senator from Wisconsin, for his leadership and my affection and respect 
for my colleague from Arizona, with whom I have worked on a number of 
issues over the years.
  I rise in support of the Feingold-Reid amendment. I believe it is a 
very important amendment. This may be the critical vote, candidly, on 
whether we are going to persist over the coming months, until January 
2009, in a policy that has failed--or whether we can actually make a 
difference here, and change the direction of this policy, and give our 
Nation a sense of new hope, new optimism, and give those who have 
served so valiantly an opportunity to come home or to engage in an area 
where their leadership is needed. This is the moment. This may be the 
one opportunity we have between now and 2009 to make a difference on 
this issue. This is no small proposal; this is a serious one.
  For those who would like to wish it were a little bit this way or 
that way, that is no reason to be against it. Senator Feingold, once 
again, has offered us an opportunity here to make a difference in this 
policy. This may be the one real opportunity we get to do that. My hope 
is that in the next hour and a half, those who are listening to this 
debate, thinking about this, will understand the moment before us, and 
take advantage of this opportunity, and make a decision that could 
affect the future of our country in this century.
  Out of 2 full days General Petraeus spent testifying before Congress, 
I think the most telling exchange took only four lines. There were 
hearings that went on in the House of Representatives. We had hearings 
in the Foreign Relations Committee and hearings in the Armed Services 
Committee. There were very good questions raised by members of both 
parties, but I commend my colleague from Virginia, Senator John Warner, 
the former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the ranking member 
today, for his simple question. We have often seen this happen in 
history. It is one simple sentence, one simple question--not the 
complicated, multiphrase question, which gets into all the nuances and 
details of an issue--that will shed the most light on where we stand.
  Senator McCain said something a minute ago with which I totally 
agree, and Senator Feingold reiterated it. The primary purpose, the 
fundamental issue before this body, before every Member here and 
certainly before the President of the United States, is the issue of 
the safety and security of our country. That is our paramount 
responsibility above all else--to keep our country safe and secure. So 
the four-line question that was raised to General Petraeus in his 
testimony on September 11 was the most important question, in many 
ways, that was asked of him.

       Senator Warner: Do you feel that [the Iraq war] is making 
     America safer?
       General Petraeus: I believe that this is indeed the best 
     course of action to achieve our objectives in Iraq.
       Senator Warner: Does it make America safer?
       General Petraeus: I don't know, actually.

  ``I don't know, actually.'' It could be the epitaph of this war. And 
to the families of the 3,791 men and women who lost their lives in 
Iraq, it must be cold comfort indeed that the commanding general has 
not even convinced himself that this war serves our security. But in 
another sense, General Petraeus gave precisely the right answer. He has 
no opinion because it is his job to have none.
  His job is to execute a mission--work that he has done with great 
fortitude and intellect. But the job of deciding whether the mission 
serves our interests--deciding what our interests are, deciding what 
the mission itself will be--that is a task for the general's 
superiors--that is, the President of the United States, this body and 
the other, and the American people, who are our superiors.
  This amendment is our best attempt--maybe the only attempt--to give 
voice to their shared conclusion: that our current course has failed to 
make Iraq safer, has failed to make America safer, and so must change 
dramatically. The amendment would accomplish two critical things.
  One: Redeploy combat forces from Iraq.
  Two: Focus those forces remaining on counterterrorism, training Iraqi 
forces, and force protection for U.S. personnel and infrastructure.
  I will not rehearse for you the administration's ever-shifting 
justifications and stalling and stonewalling that have brought us, with 
a battered military and an equally battered reputation, to this sad 
point. It is enough to say that they have been given every chance. For 
months and months, they denied that there was a civil war in Iraq. 
Then, when denial became impossible, and when the bipartisan Iraq Study 
Group report gave them a unique chance to change course, they scrapped 
the report and gambled on a surge.
  Then we were told that, despite the administration's catastrophic 
policy failures, we should take their word for it--that we couldn't 
judge this new tactic's success until American forces had ``surged'' to 
their maximum levels. And that would take up 6 months.
  Once the surge was at full force, we were told yet again that the 
time wasn't right, that we had to withhold judgment again and wait 
until General Petraeus's report. And last week, General Petraus came 
before Congress and told us--to wait some more.
  For what?
  Early this month, Comptroller General David Walker testified that 
``the primary point of the surge was to improve security . . . in order 
to provide political breathing room'' for the Iraqi Government.
  Seven hundred American service men and women sacrificed their lives 
for that breathing room, and nearly 4,400 took wounds for it. What has 
the Iraqi Government done with it? It failed to meet its own political 
benchmarks, failed to enact oil legislation, sustained a mass 
resignation of Sunni politicians, leaving more than half of its cabinet 
seats vacant, and enjoyed a month-long vacation.
  At the height of the surge, a BBC poll reported that 60 percent of 
Iraqis--and 93 percent of Sunnis--think it is justified to kill 
American troops. It is no surprise that Walker concluded that ``as of 
this point in time, [the surge] has not achieved its desired outcome.''
  That is what the surge has gotten us. What has it gotten Iraqis? At 
the very best, a reduction in violence to still-catastrophic early-2006 
levels. And even so, the statistics we saw last week were extremely 
subject--as are all statistics--to the biases of those compiling and 
categorizing them. According to the Washington Post, ``Intelligence 
analysts . . . are puzzled over how the military designated attacks as 
combat, sectarian, or criminal''--difficult categorizations that, I 
might add, make all the difference to selling the surge as success, or 
recognizing it as a failure.
  Comptroller General Walker added that ``there are several different 
sources in the administration on violence, and those sources do not 
agree.'' One intelligence official put it succinctly: ``Depending on 
which numbers you pick, you get a different outcome.'' In that context, 
it is significant that the military cannot track, and does not track, 
Shiite-on-Shiite and Sunni-on-Sunni violence. And in Baghdad alone, 
according to the Iraqi Red Crescent, ``almost a million people . . .

[[Page S11793]]

have fled their homes in search of security, shelter, water, 
electricity, functioning schools or jobs to support their families.''
  And those are the results with the surge--a surge that, given the 
exhausted state of our military, cannot physically be sustained. The 
administration's supporters need to explain to us: Without the surge, 
what could possibly happen, that has not taken place already, to bring 
political reconciliation to Iraq?
  What more could possibly happen to quell the violence between and 
among Iraq's Sunnis and Shiites? What new development could possibly 
change the face of this war? We all know the honest answers to those 
questions.
  And so the choice we have today is not, as some would have it, 
between victory and defeat. That has never been the issue. We can 
choose indefinite war for invisible gains; or we can choose to cut our 
losses here and recognize that there is a better opportunity with a 
different course of action. I can't remember a more painful choice in 
all my years in this body. But to govern is to make just such painful 
choices, without fear or flinching. And I believe the American people 
are far ahead of us on this issue--they've made their choice. We must 
make ours as their Representatives.
  This amendment seeks to put that choice into action and to stop 
Iraq's downward spiral. First, it sets firm and enforceable timelines 
for the phased redeployment of combat troops out of Iraq.
  The redeployed forces would be comprised of a majority of the 
deployed Army Brigade Combat Teams and the Marine Expeditionary Force 
currently in theater. Some may claim that such a redeployment is 
logistically impossible within the timeframes laid out in the 
amendment. But I would remind them that in the ramp-up to the first 
gulf war, the Department of Defense coordinated the movement of over 
500,000 troops, and 10 million tons of cargo and fuel in the same 
timeframe that this amendment grants to redeploy a force one-fifth the 
size.
  In January of 1991--1 month alone--the Transportation Command moved 
132,000 troops and 910,000 tons of equipment. So it is clear that we 
have the wherewithal to end this war, if Congress could find the will. 
At the same time, we cannot simply wish the conflict away. We do have 
enemies in Iraq, enemies equally committed to killing Americans and 
sowing sectarian violence. That is why this amendment carves out 
exceptions to the general redeployment.
  Using the name of al-Qaida is a means to frighten Americans into 
buying a far broader agenda of continuous occupation. It's no 
coincidence that, in President Bush's televised remarks on Iraq last 
week, the word ``al-Qaida'' crossed his lips some 12 times in a speech 
roughly 15 minutes long.
  The amendment makes three noncombat exceptions: first, conducting 
counterterrorism operations; second, training and Iraqi forces; and 
third, protecting U.S. personnel and infrastructure.
  It is beyond clear that continuing our course in Iraq harms America 
in the broader fight against terrorism. In an article in the Financial 
Times, Gideon Rachman summarized the key ways the war in Iraq has 
actually strengthened terrorism: by diverting resources from fighting 
al-Qaida in Afghanistan; by turning Iraq into a failed state and 
terrorist-incubator; by delivering al-Qaida a potent recruiting tool; 
and by harming America's standing with its traditional allies, whose 
cooperation is necessary to foil terrorists. All four reasons are 
clearly being enhanced because of our continued military presence in 
Iraq.
  On the other side of the coin, tightly focusing our Iraq mission 
actually aids our security in the long run.
  That certainly is the case when you consider the quote from a recent 
IPS article on CENTCOM's commander, ADM William Fallon--General 
Petraeus's superior, I might add. Admiral Fallon ``believed the United 
States should be withdrawing troops from Iraq urgently, largely because 
he saw greater dangers elsewhere in the region.'' With al-Qaida 
reconstituting itself on the Pakistan-Afghan border, I could not agree 
more.
  With redeployment complete, I want our military to begin to regather 
its strength. After a one-time redeployment cost estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office at $7 billion, which is about equal to this 
war's cost every month, our Armed Forces will have the resources needed 
to prepare for future challenges.
  Those resources are sorely needed. Long, arduous deployments are not 
only testing the morale of our troops and families, they are taxing 
critical stocks of aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment. Two-thirds 
of the U.S. Army--two-thirds of the U.S. Army--is unable to report for 
combat duty.
  According to the National Guard Bureau Chief, LTG Steven Blum, ``88 
percent''--his words, not mine--``88 percent of the Army National Guard 
forces that are back here in the United States are very poorly equipped 
today.''
  That shortage affects National Guard units in every State, and every 
one of our colleagues knows it. It is the picture of a military that 
has been ground into the dirt, unit by unit, machine by machine, 
soldier by soldier.
  Do the President's supporters think this can go on forever? Will they 
come to this floor and claim we are invulnerable? If General Petraeus 
does not know, actually, whether this war is making us safer, let's ask 
another question: Is this war endangering our security?
  Our military's top generals and admirals know the answer to that 
question. They have submitted to Congress a list of critical priorities 
that President Bush's budget ignores. As we squander billions of 
dollars every week in Iraq, they are calling out for help to meet our 
military's needs to repair the damage this administration has caused.
  Our top generals and admirals know better than anyone how deeply our 
military is hurting. We must meet these obligations to our war-fighters 
because it is, in the end, our obligation to keep safe the people we 
represent.
  As I said at the outset, the question from Senator John Warner--the 
simple, one-line question asked of General Petraeus--was the single 
most important question asked during 2 days of hearings: Are we safer? 
The answer, tragically, is no. What a disaster if this war of choice 
ultimately left us unready and unarmed to fight a war we did not 
choose.
  Clear data, long experience, and common sense tell us all how to 
answer the question that General Petraeus could not. I do not blame him 
for staying silent. It is his duty, in that moment, to be agnostic. I 
understand that. But it is our duty not to be agnostic. We do not have 
that luxury as Members of the Senate charged with the responsibility of 
deciding whether this conflict goes on.
  We cannot remain silent. We cannot beg off the answer to that 
question: Are we safer? Are we more secure? We know what the answer is. 
Now we bear the responsibility to this generation and to history to 
answer the question. It is our duty to choose, a duty to choose at this 
moment, even when there is heartache in either hand. I choose to draw 
the line here because I cannot stand to lose one more life in the name 
of misplaced hope and blind faith.
  I call on our colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, not to lose 
this moment. This will be the only moment, I suspect, before January of 
2009 to answer this question. How many more lives will be irreparably 
damaged and lost because we failed to answer the question posed by our 
colleague from Wisconsin, which I am proud to join him in asking today. 
Let us bring this tragic chapter in our history to a close and offer 
new hope to this country, and the Iraqis, and that desperate region.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Lincoln). The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Connecticut 
for his very strong statement in support of our amendment, and even 
more for his extremely passionate and consistent support all year.
  I yield 10 minutes to another cosponsor of the amendment, the 
assistant majority leader, Senator Durbin.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, will the Chair please advise me when I 
have 2 minutes remaining?
  Madam President, this room we work in, this Chamber where the Senate 
meets, is a Chamber that has seen a lot of history in its time. There 
have been moments of great pride, and, unfortunately, moments I am sure 
where the

[[Page S11794]]

opposite has occurred in the history of this great Chamber.
  It has been my honor to represent the wonderful State of Illinois for 
10 years as a Senator. Fewer than 2,000 Americans have ever had this 
chance to serve as a Senator. But the men and women who have been given 
the opportunity are also given a responsibility far beyond the 
responsibility of any individual citizen.
  Votes come and go. If you put me on the spot and say: Tell me all 
your votes from 2 weeks ago, I would be hard pressed to remember. But 
there are some votes you can never forget. Whether as a Member of the 
House of Representatives or a Member of the Senate, I have found the 
votes that gnaw into my conscience and keep me awake at night are votes 
related to war because when you vote on war, you know that at the end 
of the day, if you move forward, people will die. It may be the enemy, 
but it is likely to also include many of your own and innocent people.
  So in October of 2002, just weeks before reelection, we gathered in 
this Chamber late at night, with the President who insisted that we 
vote to give him authority to go to war in Iraq. It was not that long 
after we had given him the authority to go after those responsible for 
9/11, our current war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaida.
  But sadly before that vote, the American people were misled; misled 
by the President, the Vice President, the Cabinet, and the leaders of 
our Nation about the war in Iraq. The information given us about that 
war was wrong. We were told that Saddam Hussein was a threat to the 
United States of America. That was not true. He was a bloody tyrant, 
ruthless with his own people. He would certainly not win the approval 
of anyone in this Chamber for what he had done to his nation, but he 
was not a threat to us.

  We were told about weapons of mass destruction that beat the drums of 
war and had our people anxious to respond quickly to protect us. People 
in the White House were talking about mushroom-shaped clouds and 
chemical weapons and biological weapons and stockpiles and aerial 
photographs to prove that they all existed. It turned out none of that 
was true.
  The most grievous sin in a democracy is to mislead the American 
people into a war, and that is what occurred. We were misled into a war 
that night with a vote in this Chamber. On that evening there were 23 
of us who voted against that war. There were a variety of reasons, but 
most of us believed the President had not made a solid case for the 
war, for the invasion of Iraq, and that he had not thought through what 
might occur if we made that invasion.
  I can recall one of my colleagues saying: It is far easier to get 
into a war than it is to get out. In the fifth year of this war, that 
certainly has been proven true.
  I voted against the war that evening, 1 of 22 Democrats, less than a 
majority of our own, with 1 Republican. Of all the votes that I have 
ever cast in the House and Senate, it is the one of which I am the 
proudest. I have never looked back with any doubt about that vote, not 
one time.
  Look what has happened since. Almost 3,800 of our best and brightest 
sons and daughters of Illinois and every State in the Union have died 
in Iraq. Thousands have been injured, some gravely injured. I visit 
their hospital rooms, I meet with their families, I watch as they 
struggle to make life out of a broken body, trying to regain the spirit 
to look forward instead of backward. It is a bitter struggle.
  Today, Senator Feingold of Wisconsin gives us a clear choice. Will we 
continue this war or will we bring it to a close? Will we change our 
mission and start to bring our troops home or will we allow this war to 
continue?
  I sincerely hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will look 
carefully at his amendment. He has worked long and hard on it.
  He makes it clear that we are not going to pick up and leave 
tomorrow. We are going to redeploy in an orderly fashion. We are going 
to make certain our war against al-Qaida can still be waged within Iraq 
and wherever they raise their ugly heads. He is also going to make sure 
that we protect our own and make certain that we provide training 
assistance, limited, but training assistance to the Iraqis so they can 
stand up and defend their own country.
  So many of our colleagues have come to the floor and said: Do not 
change a thing. Stick with the strategy. Well, I have been there three 
times now. I was just there a few weeks ago. It is a grim, sad, 
horrific situation in Iraq. And there is no way to sugarcoat it. No 
report from any general or any ambassador can change the reality of 
what is happening on the ground there.
  To be given body armor when you go into Iraq, and a helmet, and be 
told: You better wear this wherever you go, tells me this is not a safe 
country. In the fifth year of this war, the safest area in Baghdad, in 
the Green Zone, they tell you: Put the body armor and helmet down at 
the end of the bed because when the sirens go off you have 4 to 6 
seconds to put it on.
  See, we cannot have rocket attacks into what we call the safest area 
of Baghdad. There are parts of that city where they would not even 
consider sending a Congressman or a Senator, just too dangerous, in the 
fifth year of this war with 160,000 or 170,000 of the best soldiers in 
the world.
  This administration is in complete denial about what is occurring in 
Iraq. They are in complete denial about what the American people feel 
about this war. And they are in complete denial about the utter failure 
of the Iraqi Government to lead its own people forward.
  The Iraqis need to make some fundamental decisions before we can 
celebrate democracy in Iraq. And the first question they have to 
resolve is, are they Iraqis first or are they members of a religious 
sect first? I do not think that question has been resolved. It 
certainly has not been resolved in parts of the Muslim world for 14 
centuries, and sadly the crucible of this battle now is Iraq.
  Our soldiers, our men and women in uniform, have been tossed into 
this bloody, deadly sectarian fight that continues by the day. The 
Iraqi Government finds excuse after excuse not to produce the most 
basic elements of governance, and as they plunder and blunder away, our 
soldiers die in the streets of their cities.
  I have had it. Someone said to me earlier: Well, are the American 
people putting a lot of pressure on you about this war?
  I said in response: The American people could not put more pressure 
on me about this war than I already feel. I feel for every one of those 
soldiers I sat down with for lunch in that country. I feel for all of 
them I see shipping out from my State and all across America. I feel 
for every wife and husband back home, trying to keep these kids 
together during a lengthy deployment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. DURBIN. I feel it is time for a change. I cannot in good 
conscience continue to give this President a blank check for this war 
because I know what he is going to do with that money. He is going to 
continue this failed policy with no end in sight. We are going to 
continue to lose 100 or more soldiers every single month until he can 
back out of the exit of this Presidency on January 20, 2009.
  I am sorry, but I can no longer be party to financing what I consider 
to be the worst foreign policy mistake in our history. I will support 
Senator Feingold. I will provide the funds for the orderly redeployment 
of our troops to make sure that the terrorists are fought where they 
should be fought and to do what we can to help the Iraqis. But in the 
fifth year of this war, it is time to change.
  Now, I listen on the floor of the Senate while many of my colleagues 
want to change the subject. They want to talk about ads and newspapers 
about General Petraeus. Well, let me tell you something. I respect 
General Petraeus. But we have more important things to do than debate 
ads in newspapers. And instead of looking for ways to change the 
subject, we need to join together in a bipartisan fashion to change the 
war. That is why we are here. That is what we will be judged by. And 
the question is whether we will stand up now that we have a choice and 
a vote. Will we march in blind allegiance to a President who has 
brought us to this sad, tragic moment in our history or will we in the 
Senate have the courage, on a bipartisan basis, to stand up for people 
across America, for our soldiers and their families who need a change 
in

[[Page S11795]]

policy, need a change in direction, and need to be brought home?
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield 3 minutes to the cosponsor of the Feingold-Reid 
amendment, the Senator from New York, Mr. Schumer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Salazar). The Senator from New York.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the situation in 
Iraq and the continuing efforts of this administration and my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle to paint a rosy picture, when 
the situation in Iraq suggests otherwise.
  First, I thank Senator Carl Levin for the good work that he and the 
committee have done on drafting the Defense authorization bill. Next, I 
would like to take a few minutes to discuss Senator Feingold's 
amendment.
  I am a cosponsor of the Feingold amendment because I believe it is 
imperative that we change the mission in Iraq to reflect the ugly 
reality on the ground.
  We are worse off today in Iraq than we were 6 months ago. The 
position of America, democracy and stability continue to erode. If 
there was ever a need for a change of course in Iraq, it is now.
  Despite the fact that 70 percent of Iraqis believe that the surge has 
worsened the overall security and political situation of their country, 
it remains terribly clear that President Bush and my colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle are equally determined to maintain our present, 
failing course in Iraq.
  Months ago, the violence in Iraq devolved into a civil war between 
the Shiites and the Sunnis, and U.S. troops are still stuck in the 
middle. Our troops have no business policing a civil war.
  And the fundamentals in Iraq stay the same: there is no central 
government and the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds dislike one 
another far more than they like or want any central government. This 
dooms the administration's policy in Iraq to failure.

  That is why I am here in support of the Feingold amendment. This 
amendment will ensure that most our troops will be safely redeployed 
from Iraq by next summer, and those that remain will undertake a 
mission that reflects the reality in Iraq.
  U.S. troops will conduct limited counterterrorism missions, and they 
will train Iraqi security forces that support the U.S. mission. We will 
not train Iraqis that have attacked U.S. troops.
  This amendment will make sure that U.S. troops are no longer policing 
a civil war between the Sunnis and the Shiites. It will let the Maliki 
Government know that U.S. troops will not, nor cannot, remain in Iraq 
indefinitely. Only that understanding will make the Maliki Government 
move forward in the difficult process of political reconciliation that 
Iraq needs.
  The Democratic Congress will continue to fight this administration's 
failing policy, and help chart a new way forward in Iraq. This 
amendment is the first step in that direction, and I strongly urge all 
my colleagues to support it.
  I salute my colleague from Wisconsin for his undaunted leadership. He 
is way ahead of his time on this issue. I am a cosponsor of the 
Feingold amendment because I believe it is imperative we change the 
mission in Iraq to reflect the ugly reality on the ground. We are worse 
off today in Iraq than we were 6 months ago. Our troops are doing an 
excellent job--make no mistake about it--but if the whole purpose was 
to strengthen the Government, by every standard the Government is 
weaker. Despite the fact that 70 percent of Iraqis believe the surge 
has worsened the overall security and political situation of their 
country, it remains terribly clear that President Bush and my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle are equally determined to 
maintain our present failing course in Iraq. To change that course does 
not require weak medicine. It requires strong medicine. That is what 
the Feingold amendment is.
  Months ago, the violence in Iraq devolved into a civil war between 
the Shiites and Sunnis, and U.S. troops are stuck in the middle. Our 
troops have no business policing a civil war, and we should not 
continue to do that with our troops, with our dollars, and with the 
heart and soul of this Nation. We must change course, and we must do 
what it takes to change course.
  That is why I support the Feingold amendment. It will ensure that 
most of our troops will be safely redeployed from Iraq by next summer, 
and those who remain will undertake a mission that reflects the reality 
in Iraq. This amendment will make sure U.S. troops are no longer 
policing a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. It will let the Maliki 
Government know U.S. troops will not remain in Iraq indefinitely. Only 
that understanding will make the Iraqi Government move forward.
  The Democratic Congress will continue to fight this administration's 
failing policy until we change it. One of the best tools we have to do 
that is the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New York for 
his support and his very strong, effective statement about how 
important it is that we move forward on this amendment.
  I now yield to another of our excellent cosponsors and supporters 
throughout this process, the Senator from New Jersey, 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Wisconsin for his leadership on this issue. As someone who voted 
against this war from its outset, I rise in strong support of the 
Feingold-Reid amendment. The last time we gathered to vote on a change 
of course in Iraq was July 18, approximately 2 months ago. Since that 
day, the Iraqi Parliament, with its country in the grips of a civil 
war, with much work to do to achieve political reconciliation, took a 
month-long vacation. Since that day, four bombs were set off in concert 
in northern Iraq, leaving more than 500 dead, the deadliest coordinated 
attack since the beginning of the war. Since that day, despite a much 
ballyhooed cease-fire in Al Anbar, Shiek Abu Risha, our main ally in 
the province, was murdered, a mere 10 days after he shook hands with 
President Bush. Since that day in July when we last had a chance to 
change course, another 160 sons and daughters of America have lost 
their lives in Iraq. Another 160 flag-draped caskets flown to Dover, 
another 160 renditions of ``Taps'' played at tear-soaked funerals, 
another 160 American families who will have an empty seat at the table 
come Thanksgiving.
  So here we are again. The calendar changes but the challenges do not. 
Yet again we meet on the Senate floor to consider another proposal to 
responsibly and safely transition our mission in Iraq and bring our 
troops home, out of another country's civil war. Yet again, as we have 
heard many times before through the course of this failed war policy, 
the President and his loyalists in this Chamber are using that tired 
refrain: The plan is working. It needs more time. We cannot leave.
  Now, as then, these words ring hollow. The administration that 
brought us the search for weapons of mass destruction, the 
``cakewalk,'' and ``last throes'' is now pitching ``a return on 
success.'' But this President lost his credibility on Iraq about the 
time he stood on an aircraft carrier underneath a banner reading 
``mission accomplished,'' almost 4\1/2\ long years ago. The 
administration may be shopping a new catch phrase, but we are not 
buying anything they are selling anymore. The President, armed with 
questionable statistics, presented us an open-ended, no-exit plan for 
the sons and daughters of America who continue to fight and die in 
Iraq. As a matter of fact, he said it will be up to the next President, 
in 2009 and beyond.
  The reality is that ``a return on success'' is ``staying the course'' 
by another name. We have tried this road. We have gone down it for 4\1/
2\ years, with no turn of the wheel. Going down this road has diverted 
attention from Osama bin Laden, who is back in business and roaming 
free in a safe zone along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It has 
fomented terrorism, creating a training ground in Iraq and allowing al-
Qaida to regroup to its strongest level since September 11, according 
to intelligence estimates. It has stretched our military thin, wearing 
down troops serving extended

[[Page S11796]]

tours, depleting our Reserves and National Guard, and compromising 
national security with a diminished preparedness to tackle other 
international threats. It has cost us dearly in national treasure and, 
most importantly, precious lives.
  Going down this road has not brought stability to Iraq nor made us 
any safer at home. It is clear we are being driven down a dead-end 
street by an administration without a roadmap for a lasting peace. Now 
they expect the American people to buy the no-exit occupation they are 
selling, the deployment of more than 130,000 American troops for as far 
in the future as the eye can see. No end in sight?

  Today we are living with the consequences of the administration's 
failed policy. Over 3,700 troops have been killed in Iraq since the 
beginning of the war, including 97 servicemembers with ties to the 
State of New Jersey. We have now spent over $450 billion on the war in 
Iraq, with a burn rate of $10 billion a month. Frankly, I never 
believed the administration's estimate that the so-called surge would 
only cost $5.6 billion, and these new numbers only prove once again we 
have been misled.
  Despite the meager improvements in the Anbar Province cited in 
General Petraeus's report last week, the situation in Iraq continues to 
grow worse. Sectarian violence surrounding Baghdad has surged this past 
week in connection with the holy month of Ramadan. At least 22 people 
have been killed in a series of bombings and shootings in Diyala and 
Kirkuk. Moreover, GEN William Caldwell has reported there is evidence 
Sunni extremist groups in Iraq have been receiving funds from Iran. In 
terms of reconstruction, oil production in Iraq is still lower than it 
was before the war 4\1/2\ years ago, and Baghdad is getting 
approximately 7 hours of electricity a day, significantly less than 
before the war.
  How can we be expected to support a war plan about which every 
independent report portrays a situation of chaos far away from 
stability or political reconciliation? In fact, according to the latest 
report card on Iraqi progress, the President's war policy is still 
flunking. Even if the debatable metrics used to compile the report are 
solid, half of the benchmarks have not even seen a minimal amount of 
progress. Now that it is clear the benchmarks are perhaps impossible to 
achieve with our current strategy, we see a concerted effort to play 
them down in terms of their importance.
  In General Petraeus's testimony, it was evident. The original goals 
of the escalation, to give the Iraqi Government and political factions 
breathing room to achieve reconciliation, have not been met. The 
benchmarks are now an afterthought and success is being measured in 
different and less stringent terms. It is a recurring pattern that no 
longer fools anyone: Make a bold proclamation, fail to meet 
expectations, fail to meet legally established benchmarks brought in by 
the Iraqi Government as well as our own, passed in law by the Congress, 
signed by the President, change the discussion. Moving the goalposts 
may appease some in this Chamber, but it does not help us achieve a 
lasting peace that is ultimately more important.
  When all else fails, the President and his supporters often respond 
to rightful criticism of their disastrous war plan with a question 
meant to change the subject: What are your ideas? What they fail to 
realize is a majority of Congress and an overwhelming majority of the 
American public have long been unified behind a course of action that 
we believe gives us the best chance for success and security, both in 
Iraq and at home. That is the purpose of this amendment. A responsible 
transition of our mission and withdrawal of our troops from Iraq on one 
hand gives a sense of urgency to the Iraqi Government and security 
forces that is currently absent. Until they actually believe we will 
not be there forever, they will not take control of their own country. 
At the same time, bringing our troops home allows our overburdened 
military to regroup. It allows us to have the capability to respond to 
other threats in the world that might arise. It allows the 
replenishment of our National Guard which is currently stretched so 
thin that response to disasters in the homeland has been affected. 
Yesterday it was announced that half the Army National Guard in my 
State of New Jersey--that is 6,200 soldiers--will be deployed as soon 
as next year, almost 2 years before the deployment was originally 
scheduled. That will leave our National Guard at half strength in a 
State at serious risk for a terrorist attack. That is 6,200 soldiers 
taken away from their loved ones to be tossed into another country's 
civil war.
  Most important about our plan and this amendment, it allows American 
families who have been separated and stressed by an ill-conceived war 
to be made whole again. The alternative is an endless occupation in 
Iraq with more American blood spilled and no light at the end of the 
tunnel.
  Throughout this war many have drawn the obvious parallels between 
this failed war policy and another quagmire 40 years ago. The 
comparison in some respects is valid and important. It is said those 
who do not learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat it. 
Because I fear history is being repeated, I wish to draw upon the words 
of Robert Kennedy, who served in this Chamber and delivered this 
statement about the Vietnam War in March of 1968:

       We are entitled to ask--we are required to ask--how many 
     more men, how many more lives, how much more destruction will 
     be asked, to provide the military victory that is always just 
     around the corner, to pour into this bottomless pit of our 
     dreams?
       But this question the Administration does not and cannot 
     answer, it has no answer. It has no answer--none but the 
     ever-expanding use of military force and the lives of our 
     brave soldiers in a conflict where military force has failed 
     to solve anything in the past.

  Our past teaches us our current struggle and our current predicament 
are best solved by a new course. Future generations will judge this war 
policy and the choice to continue it indefinitely harshly. They will 
still be paying the price. We have another opportunity today to write 
an end to this sad chapter, to turn the page and recommit to 
strengthening the military and targeting Osama bin Laden. We have the 
opportunity to change history for the better.
  I urge my colleagues to begin that change today and vote for a new 
course in Iraq by supporting the Feingold amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Jersey for 
his sponsorship of our amendment and for his powerful statement on its 
behalf, recognizing the reality of what is happening in Iraq and our 
need to change course.
  How much time do we have remaining on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 32 minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and 
suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be recognized 
for 5 minutes to speak in opposition to the Feingold amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, as to the author of the amendment, no one 
should ever question his motivation, his patriotism. He has been a firm 
believer that we should be out of Iraq as soon as possible. Senator 
Feingold believes our continued presence in Iraq is creating more 
terrorism in terms of solving the problem; it is creating the problem 
in a larger sense. I personally disagree.
  The reason al-Qaida went to Iraq is not because we were in Iraq. They 
went to Iraq because of what the Iraqi people are trying to do. We are 
all over the world. They have not followed us to every country we have 
been in. They have decided to make Iraq a central battlefront in their 
war against moderation because they fear a successful outcome among the 
Iraqis. The biggest fear of an al-Qaida member is that a group of 
Muslims will get together and be tolerant of each others' differences 
when it comes to religion, and elevate

[[Page S11797]]

the role of a woman so she can have a say about her children. That is 
why al-Qaida is in Iraq.
  The military surge has produced results beyond my expectation. The 
old strategy clearly was going nowhere. After about my third visit to 
Iraq, after the fall of Baghdad, I had lost faith in the old strategy 
and those who were proposing it was working. This new general has come 
up with a new idea. This is not more of the same with more people. You 
are getting out behind walls. You are getting out into the community. 
We are living with the Iraqi Army and police force--very good gains in 
terms of operational capabilities of the Iraqi Army. We are going to 
have to start all over with the police.
  But the surge has allowed a real diminishment of the al-Qaida 
footprint in Anbar Province. Anytime Sunni Arabs turn on al-Qaida 
anywhere in the world, that is good news. So the surge has provided us 
a level of security not known before. It has been al-Qaida's worst 
nightmare. There is still a long way to go.
  Senator Feingold's amendment would basically bring the surge to a 
halt. It would withdraw troops at a very rapid pace. We would be out of 
Iraq by June of next year. My big fear is, instead of reinforcing 
reconciliation, it would freeze every effort to reconcile and people 
would start making political decisions based on what happens to their 
country when there is no security.
  The American mistake of the ages was letting Iraq get out of control, 
not having enough troops. We paid heavily for that mistake. Now we have 
it turned around. Militarily, politically they are not where they need 
to be in terms of the Iraqis. But the best way, I believe, to get 
political reconciliation to happen in Baghdad is to make sure those who 
are trying to reconcile their country--families--are not killed. So the 
better the security you can provide, the more likely the 
reconciliation.
  One thing is for sure: more troops have helped embolden the Iraqi 
people in terms of extremists. They are taking on extremists after the 
surge better than they had ever done before the surge. I think this 
confidence given to the Iraqi people by a surge of military support has 
paid dividends.
  We need political, economic, and military support to continue, not 
just because of Iraq but because of our own national interest. If I 
thought it were only about who ran Iraq, I would be willing to leave. 
It is not about who controls Iraq. It is about whether we can create a 
stable, functioning government in Iraq that would contain Iran and deny 
al-Qaida a safe haven. If it were only about sectarian differences and 
a power struggle for Iraq, it would be a totally different dynamic.
  To me, Iran is ready to fill a vacuum. If we have a failed state, 
that is a military, political, and economic problem far worse than the 
ones we are dealing with now. A failed state is a state that breaks 
apart, people stop trying to work with each other, and regional players 
come in and take sides.
  A dysfunctional government is what we have in Iraq, probably what we 
have here. A dysfunctional government has hope of getting better 
because people keep trying. So the way to have a government go from a 
dysfunctional status to a secure, stable status is to provide security. 
I want this dysfunctional government to act sooner rather than later, 
just as you do, I say to the Presiding Officer. The best way to make 
that happen is to ensure that the politicians involved understand we 
have a commitment to their cause that will embolden them.
  The Feingold amendment, no matter how well intentioned, will 
reenergize an enemy on the mat and make it harder to reconcile Iraq. 
That is why I urge a ``no'' vote.
  I yield back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to speak as in morning business for up to 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Ms. Collins are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask 
unanimous consent that the time in the quorum call be equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Michigan, Ms. Stabenow.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I first thank my friend and colleague 
from Wisconsin for his foresight and his leadership on this very 
critical issue, the most critical issue facing our country.
  I rise today to support the Feingold amendment, as I have in the 
past. The American people want us to stop this direction we are going 
in and to, in fact, bring our military home so they can be effectively 
refocused, to redeploy to address the real threats that are facing 
America.
  We all heard during the Armed Services hearing the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia, Mr. Warner, ask what I think is the most 
important question to General Petraeus. After General Petraeus had laid 
out the strategy and what was happening on the surge, Senator Warner 
asked him: General, are we safer? Is America safer? He then first began 
to answer that question by talking about the fact that he was 
proceeding on the mission that had been given to him.
  Then he was asked again, and I believe it was the third time he was 
asked by the Senator. He was asked: Is America safer? The general said: 
I don't know.
  Three-quarters of a trillion dollars spent, lives lost--thousands of 
lives, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and innocent civilians--and the 
answer is: I don't know. I think the American people do know.
  I think the American people understand that when we are directing our 
forces--our brave men and women, the best trained, the most highly 
recognized and effective troops in the world--when we are placing them 
in the middle of a civil war in Iraq, and then we turn on our 
television sets and we see the man who has the organization that 
attacked us and killed over 3,000 Americans on American soil speaking 
to us through a video, commenting on American politics and what is 
happening here in the Senate, they are appalled. People understand we 
should be addressing ourselves to the people who attacked us and the 
real threats we have. We know where they are, at least close to where 
they are. We know the region, and we need to redeploy our troops to 
address the threats that have, in fact, been serious for America--not 
the middle of a civil war, but the people who attacked us, and those 
now who have joined them in their cause.
  My husband is a veteran of the Air Force and the Air National Guard; 
14 years. He reminds me all the time that our men and women in uniform 
are doing their duty to complete the mission that is laid out for them 
in a democratic society by their civilian leaders, by their President, 
by their Congress. They look to us, they are counting on us to make 
sure it is the right one, to give them what they need, but to also give 
them a strategy that makes sense. They are counting on us to ask tough 
questions, to probe. They are there putting their lives on the line 
every single day. Their families are at home sacrificing every single 
day, and they are counting on us to get this right.

  As one of the people who voted no on going into this war in Iraq, I 
now join with colleagues in saying: Enough is enough. This has to 
change. There are real threats. We need to refocus and redeploy in the 
name of safety for Americans. But we need to make sure we are ending 
this civil war participation we have put our soldiers into. The 
Feingold amendment does this. It brings our troops home and refocuses 
them, redeploys them, as we should, in a way that will truly focus on 
the ways to keep us safe for the future, so that

[[Page S11798]]

when the next general is testifying before the Armed Services Committee 
and that general is asked: Is America safer, we can join together and 
say yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am very grateful to the Senator from 
Michigan for her support and for her statement as well.
  At this point, I want to turn to the majority leader. I am delighted 
that he has joined me on this amendment and has been such a strong 
leader over the many months since the election in trying to end this 
war in Iraq. I thank him for his courage and his leadership, and I 
yield him 10 minutes.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I, too, appreciate the work of the junior 
Senator from Michigan on this legislation. She is truly a great Senator 
and does so much to help her State and our great country.
  I don't seek any attention. I get some on occasion, but I don't seek 
it. But, today, I want everyone to understand. On this amendment, I 
want this amendment to be known as the Feingold-Reid amendment. I 
proudly add my name, as I have from the very beginning, to this 
amendment. This is the future. We must proceed, and we will, at some 
time with this legislation.
  Yesterday, the Senate voted, once again, on legislation with real 
teeth that would protect our troops and prevent the President from 
irresponsibly overburdening these troops. It was a good amendment. It 
simply said: If you are in country for 15 months in a war in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, then come home and spend at least 15 months. The old rule 
used to be you would be home twice that long, three times that long, 
but now, no, we have our troops going back on fourth tours of duty 
within a couple of years. This has led to all kinds of problems in our 
States.
  Look at the people who have been killed and injured during their 
second tour of duty or their third tour of duty. I can't get out of my 
mind, and I never will, Anthony Schober from Las Vegas--no, he was from 
northern Nevada--I am sorry. He knew he wasn't going to come back from 
his fourth tour of duty. He told everybody. He told his family. He 
said: I have been too lucky. I have had explosions next to me. I have 
survived them all. I have seen my buddies killed. I am not going to 
come back. And he didn't. He was killed. That is what the Webb 
amendment was all about.
  The vote yesterday wasn't a vote of symbolism; it was a binding 
national policy. Yet, again, the Republican minority filibustered the 
Webb amendment. The reason I say ``filibustered the Webb amendment'' is 
because a majority in the House and the Senate support a change in 
direction of the war in Iraq. A majority in the House and a majority in 
the Senate have voted time and time again to change direction, to bring 
our troops home.
  The rules in the Senate are such as they are, and I live by them, and 
I love this institution. The fact is, the Republicans have stopped us 
from enacting policies supported by a majority in the Senate and in the 
House and, by far, the American people by filibustering the Webb 
amendment, the amendment about which I just spoke.
  We don't have to take my word for this. Headlines from newspapers 
from around the country--from the Wall Street Journal: ``Republicans 
Block Troop Measure.'' From the Associated Press: ``GOP Opposes Bill 
Regulating Combat Tours.'' From Reuters: ``Senate Republicans Block 
Iraq Bill.'' Headline after headline all across this country--``Senate 
Republicans Block Iraq Bill.''
  I understand the Senate is a deliberative body that was created to 
prevent haste and promote consensus. But what we are seeing here on 
this issue, the issue of the war in Iraq, is a far cry from 
deliberation. It is obstructionism, strictly outright obstructionism. 
That is what we saw yesterday, and except for a courageous few, that is 
what we continue to see from the Republican Senate. They represent a 
small minority of the American people.
  Countless Republicans have said the right thing. Countless Senators 
who are Republicans say the right things when they go home. They say: 
We must support our troops, we must protect our national security, and 
we must change course in Iraq. But here, these same Republican 
Senators, when they come back to Washington, have consistently voted 
the wrong way. They have voted to put their arms around the Bush war 
and to make it also their war. Back home, they assert their 
independence, but in Washington, they walk in lockstep with the 
President and continue to support his failed war.
  General Petraeus, whom we have talked about all morning, has said the 
war cannot be won militarily. That is what he said. Can we work 
together? Of course we can. We have proven that. Not on this, not on 
the Iraq war, but we have worked together this year on bipartisan 
issues. We have made progress. We hope to have next week the SCHIP 
health care for children. We have done stem cell research on a 
bipartisan basis. We passed an energy bill with 62 votes; student 
financial aid--the largest probably since the GI bill of rights; 
minimum wage; mental health parity. We have done a lot of good things 
working together. The issue dealing with Iraq has been one side against 
the other.
  I very much appreciate the Presiding Officer. The Presiding Officer 
has worked his heart out trying to come up with something that would 
change the course of the war in Iraq, and I admire and appreciate his 
having done this. He is continuing to do it. As we speak, he has people 
working to try to come up with something, a bipartisan consensus that 
would change the course of the war in Iraq.
  I have reached out to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
time and time again. With the exception of about five or six courageous 
Senate Republicans, these efforts have been rebuffed. That is their 
right. I understand that. There is nothing the Democratic majority can 
do to force the Republican colleagues to vote the responsible way. When 
I talk about the Democratic majority, remember, it is a slim majority--
51 to 49. With Senator Johnson ill until a week or so ago, it was 50 to 
49. But so long as young Americans continue to fight and die and be 
wounded in another nation's civil war with no end in sight, we are 
going to keep fighting to responsibly bring them home, rebuild our 
military, and return our focus to fighting the real war on terror 
against Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida network.

  By the way, we hear today he has another video coming. I don't know 
if he will be gray-bearded this time or black-bearded, but he has 
another video coming, and it is on its way within a matter of a few 
days.
  The President and his Republican supporters here in the Senate say we 
should just continue the current policy; things are going OK, so 
couldn't we just let things keep going on as they are, and hopefully--I 
guess they think things will turn out OK. But tell that to the 20,000 
Iraqis who flee their country every month, left homeless and hopeless. 
Tell that to the families of innocent civilians, 1.2 million of them 
who have been killed in this war. Tell that to the 2 million Iraqi 
refugees who are in Jordan and Syria and anyplace they can find. Tell 
that to the families of 3,800 dead American troops, that things are 
going OK. Tell the families of the countless thousands who have been 
grievously wounded in this war that it is OK, we just need a little 
more patience and a little more time. Tell our troops who have served 
us so bravely, so bravely without proper equipment on occasion or rest, 
that now is not the time to change course of the war.
  Today, we have another chance to forge a responsible and binding path 
out of Iraq. The amendment before us is the best path for the United 
States and for the people of Iraq. Should we care about the people of 
Iraq? Of course we should. The worst foreign policy blunder in the 
history of this country was the invasion of Iraq. Am I glad we are rid 
of Saddam Hussein? Of course I am. What we have done to that country I 
have outlined in some detail here this afternoon. This amendment 
changes our fundamental mission away from policing the civil war, 
reduces our large combat footprint, and focuses on those missions which 
are in the national security interests of our country. It uses 
Congress's powers, its constitutional powers to limit funding after 
June 1 of next year--that is well into the sixth year of the war--to 
counterterrorism, force protection, and targeted training of Iraqi 
forces.

[[Page S11799]]

  This amendment recognizes we have interests in Iraq, but it does not 
facilitate the open-ended role of U.S. forces in a civil war. I urge my 
colleagues to support this responsible legislation. It is one more 
chance for the Senate to chart a new way forward in Iraq.
  President John Kennedy:

       A man does what he must--in spite of personal consequences, 
     in spite of obstacles and dangers and pressures--and that is 
     the basis of all morality.

  If we send this amendment to the President, those who voted for it 
can return home, look their constituents in the eyes, and tell them 
they had the courage to finally do what is right for our troops and for 
our country.
  Let me close by saying this: As my good friend knows, the comanager 
of this bill, we came to the Congress on the same day of the same year 
25 years ago. I respect the senior Senator from Arizona because he 
doesn't hide what he stands for. I admire him. He stands for what he 
thinks is the right thing to do. I disagree with him, but what I am 
criticizing is not my friend from Arizona. I am reaching out to my 
friends across the aisle who say one thing at home, issue press 
releases one way, and then come here and vote another way.
  So it is time we do the right thing. I believe it is the right thing. 
Look what has happened to our country since this invasion took place. 
We are mired in civil war in Israel with Palestinians fighting each 
other, we have a near civil war in Lebanon, and we have this terrible 
situation in Iraq. We have Iran thumbing their nose at us, and our 
standing in the world community has gone down, down, down.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Nebraska). Who yields time?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Feingold and echo the words 
of the Democratic leader, the majority leader, Harry Reid, and his 
comments about this war and about the future of our country and what we 
need to do. I rise in support of the Feingold amendment.
  General Petraeus confirmed that our troops, operating under horrific 
conditions, are displaying the courage and the skill that define this 
whole engagement. Our troops have been courageous. Our troops have been 
skillful. Our troops have been effective. Our troops have been 
selfless. Our troops have done everything we have asked them to.
  But the civilians at the Pentagon and the politicians at the White 
House have bungled this war. The administration is selling one war and 
fighting another. They are selling a war where they are saying with a 
little more patience, we can truly say ``mission accomplished,'' as if 
we didn't hear that last year and the year before and the year before 
that. The President's fighting of the war is one step forward, two 
steps back, and one that will require perhaps a decade-long engagement.
  More than anything, Americans deserve the truth. We are losing men 
and women, without a clear idea of whether or when we can bring our 
troops home. We are refraining from redeploying troops based on 
possibilities--possibilities that are no worse than the realities we 
are facing now.
  Especially and mostly, we have lost our focus. We have lost our focus 
on Afghanistan, on rooting out al-Qaida, finding Osama bin Laden, and 
protecting our borders. Instead, we spend $2.5 billion a week on a 
war--$2.5 billion a week on a war that even General Petraeus, by not 
answering Senator Warner's question, acknowledges this war is making us 
no safer. So we spend $2.5 billion a week and the war is not making us 
safer and we are not doing what we should be in Afghanistan, what we 
should be doing in rooting out al-Qaida, what we should be doing in 
finding Osama bin Laden, and what we should be doing in protecting our 
borders.
  Instead, we are mired in a civil war, with no end in sight. As long 
as the Iraqis, as Senator Feingold said, and so many of us who have 
wanted to have a plan to redeploy our troops out of Iraq for 2 or 3 
years now--as long as our commitment looks open-ended, as long as there 
is no end in sight to this civil war, there is no incentive for the 
Iraqis to do what they need to do; there is no incentive for a 
political settlement, where Sunnis and Shia and Kurds work together on 
a political settlement with a political compromise, and there is no 
incentive for the Iraqis because they think we are always going to be 
there in this open-ended commitment to the civil war. There is no 
incentive for them to do what they need to do to build a military 
security and police security force until the Iraqis know that, yes, 
there is an end date. We need to pass the Feingold amendment and the 
message will be that U.S. troops are going to redeploy out of Iraq, so 
it is now incumbent upon the Iraqis to do what they need to do through 
political compromise and through building their military and police 
security forces, and then Iraq can move forward. As long as we stay 
mired in a civil war and they think it is an open-ended commitment, we 
will continue to see this lack of progress.
  Military victories we can win, and have, and our soldiers and marines 
have waged and won those battles. But until we have a political 
victory, a compromise, a settlement, and the Iraqis build up their own 
security forces, the war goes on and on. It is time to bring our troops 
home in the safest and most orderly way we can, as Iraq accomplishes 
other urgent goals, such as border security, and we address the issues 
in Afghanistan and with al-Qaida.
  I support the Feingold amendment. It makes sense that we finally 
change course in Iraq and do the right thing for the Iraqi people and 
for our country.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I strongly support the Feingold amendment, 
of which I am a cosponsor. This is the strongest amendment for changing 
course in Iraq among the proposals that we will consider this week. It 
is the only proposal that addresses the President's failed Iraq policy 
head on, and that would begin the much needed redeployment of our 
forces within 90 days.
  The invasion of Iraq, and the catastrophe it has caused for the Iraqi 
people, for Iraq's neighbors, and for the United States, must end. It 
has been a failure--a failure in terms of our strategic interests, a 
failure in making us safer, a failure in terms of the President's naive 
goal of imposing a new Iraqi Government by force.
  Our troops have stepped up time and time again, many of them 
sacrificing their lives, and many more suffering severe injuries. Their 
performance has been superb. Despite what the President and some who 
defend his policies say, our troops are not the issue. The issues are 
the glaring shortfalls, and the appalling incompetence, of the 
President's strategy.
  The ``surge'' has not brought the Iraqi factions any closer to 
political reconciliation, which after all is the ultimate goal of the 
surge strategy. In fact, the divisions among the Iraqi people--already 
deep because of the brutal manipulations of the Saddam Hussein regime--
seem to be worsening. The White House seems to have no idea how to call 
things off and get our troops out from the middle of Iraq's civil war.
  The cold hard truth is that the President has presented the American 
people with no real option, just more of the same. If the President is 
going to ignore our true national interests by prolonging this 
conflict, if the Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces is not going to 
take responsibility, then Congress, as representatives of the people, 
must be the catalyst to chart a new course.
  The Iraqi Government is only getting more dependent on a continued 
American presence. It is the consensus view of our intelligence 
community, as reflected in the latest National Intelligence Assessment, 
that there is no prospect that in the next year the Iraqis will come 
together and reach a political settlement.
  Even the new White House report, buttressed in part by the 
nonpartisan and professional General Accountability Office, shows that 
Iraq is getting a failing grade in its ability to meet key military and 
political metrics on its path toward reconciliation and stability.
  The administration cites the positive developments in Anbar Province 
as justification for continuing this perpetual deployment of American 
forces. There has been progress there, much of it pre-dating the so-
called ``surge.'' Hundreds of members of the Vermont National Guard 
know how bad the situation was in Anbar less than a year and a half

[[Page S11800]]

ago, when these soldiers helped make up Task Force Saber in Ramadi. 
They were in the worst place in Iraq at the worst time. Since then the 
situation has clearly improved, and our troops and their commanders 
deserve credit and our thanks for that tough and dangerous work.
  But the new-found calm is based on a set of agreements between Sunni 
tribes and American forces, not with the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi 
Government sees newly organized and perhaps newly armed groups of 
Sunnis as a threat to its power, and it is doubtful that will change 
any time soon.
  In the meantime, the situation elsewhere continues to implode.
  Passage of the Feingold amendment would force the Iraqis--and 
neighboring nations with a stake in Iraq's future--to recognize that 
the open-ended deployment of U.S. forces is ending. The drawdown of our 
forces, coupled with a strong U.S.-led diplomatic initiative, might 
bring about the political reconciliation that no amount of additional 
military force can bring about.
  It might also cause Iraq's warring ethnic factions to go their own 
way, splitting the country into separate states. But that is where they 
are currently headed anyway. The administration's policies and 
incompetence have brought us to the point where there are no good 
options. But either of these scenarios is better than the future 
offered by the President. His war is costing us horrific casualties and 
enormous sums that could be better spent repairing our frayed 
international reputation and strengthening our security at home.
  I urge my colleagues to take the only responsible step and pass this 
amendment that will finally bring our troops home.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Feingold-Reid 
amendment.
  This amendment would remove our troops from the middle of a civil war 
and give them three achievable missions. First, to conduct targeted 
operations against al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist organizations; 
second, to train and equip Iraqi security forces that have not been 
involved in sectarian fighting or attacks against our forces; and 
third, to provide security for U.S. personnel and infrastructure. For 
all other U.S. forces not essential to these three missions, the 
amendment calls for their safe redeployment beginning in 3 months and 
to be completed by June 30, 2008.
  On May 16, the Senate failed to end a filibuster on the Feingold 
amendment by a vote of 29-67. Since that time, 389 Americans have been 
killed in Iraq. In fact this has been the deadliest summer for U.S. 
forces since the war began.
  Our troops have done everything asked of them. They achieved every 
mission they have been given. When they were given a clear task, it was 
accomplished. Our military forces defeated the Iraqi army, hunted for 
nonexistent stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, captured Saddam 
Hussein and his sons, provided security for three elections, and 
trained 350,000 Iraq police and army.
  But there are some missions that are beyond the capacity of our 
military. Our military cannot give the Iraqi people the political will 
to achieve a national reconciliation among Sunni, Shia and Kurds. And, 
our military cannot convince Iraq's neighbors to play a positive role 
in ending the violence in Iraq.
  The Iraqi people do not want us in Iraq and 70 percent of them 
believe that the surge has made the security situation worse.
  Passage of the Feingold-Reid amendment will allow us to renew our 
focus on al-Qaida.
  I voted to go to war against al-Qaida. I strongly supported the 
decision to use military force in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban 
government. But then this administration made one of the biggest 
strategic blunders in the history of this nation. It took its eye off 
of al-Qaida and became obsessed with Iraq, a country that had no links 
to al-Qaida.
  The cochairs of the 9/11 Commission, Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, 
recently wrote, ``no conflict drains more time, attention, blood, 
treasure and support from our worldwide counterterrorism efforts than 
the war in Iraq. It has become a powerful recruiting and training tool 
for al-Qaida.''
  It is finally time to change the mission in Iraq and redeploy our 
troops out of the middle of this civil war.
  And so, Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the Feingold-Reid 
amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I agree with much of the Feingold 
amendment, particularly as it relates to the desire to transition the 
mission of U.S. forces in Iraq and to commence the reduction of U.S. 
forces from Iraq. Indeed, I have long sought those actions in an 
attempt to put the Iraqi security forces in the lead and to bring 
pressure on the Iraqi Government to make the political compromises 
necessary for reconciliation among the three main Iraqi groups.
  My concerns with the Feingold amendment are principally two. First of 
all, the mission to which U.S. forces would be limited after June 30, 
2008, are too narrowly drawn and would not, in my view, allow our 
forces to carry out the missions that would be required. For example, I 
don't believe we should limit the duration and scope of targeted 
operations against al-Qaida as the amendment provides. I also don't 
believe we should preclude our forces from being embedded with Iraqi 
forces. I also believe the continuing mission of U.S. forces should 
include providing logistic support to the Iraqi security forces, which 
is prohibited by the Feingold amendment. In that regard, I would note 
that the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq that was 
led by retired Marine general Jim Jones specifically pointed out the 
logistic shortfalls of the Iraqi security forces and that they would 
need to rely on Coalition support for this function.
  My second chief concern is that restricting appropriations for our 
military sends the wrong message to our troops who are performing so 
heroically on the battlefield in Iraq. It would also pose 
extraordinarily difficult decisions for our field commanders. They 
could be faced, for instance, with determining whether a member of the 
Iraqi security forces has ever been involved in sectarian violence or 
in attacks against U.S. forces, because if they were they could not be 
trained by our forces under the terms of the amendment. Indeed, an 
incorrect determination could subject the commander to violations of 
our antideficiency laws which prohibit the expenditures of appropriated 
funds except to specified purposes.
  It is concerns such as these which lead me to vote ``no'' on the 
Feingold amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Ohio for his important 
statement. I am grateful to him. I suggest the absence of a quorum and 
ask unanimous consent that the time be equally divided between the two 
sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, we are about to have a vote. I again thank 
my friend from Wisconsin for the level of this debate. My only comment 
and conclusion is that I urge my colleagues to reject an amendment that 
basically returns the failed strategy we had for nearly 4 years. I keep 
hearing, as I did from the majority leader, it is time to change 
course, time to change course. Well, we did change course, thank God; 
that new course has been succeeding. Do we have a long, hard struggle 
ahead? Of course we do. After a few months of the new strategy--and I 
recognize the other challenges, such as the political one and the 
Maliki Government and the police. But I am convinced the new strategy 
can succeed and the consequences of failure, as outlined by people who 
were opponents for the war in Iraq initially--this course of action, 
going back to the old failed strategy would lead to chaos, destruction, 
deterioration, and an eventual return on the part of American military 
people with further service and sacrifice.
  I again thank my friend from Wisconsin for his level of debate. I 
respect

[[Page S11801]]

very much his commitment to the security of this Nation.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I, too, thank the Senator from Arizona 
for the quality of the debate and, in particular, on such a difficult 
and emotional issue. I thank all the leadership on our side for 
speaking on behalf of our amendment.
  I appreciate, in particular, the Senator's last comment. He and I 
share one top priority, and that is the national security of the United 
States of America. We disagree on what role this Iraq situation plays. 
I think it weakens our country; he happens to think it will strengthen 
our country. But our goals are the same.
  This amendment is a reflection of my belief and the majority leader's 
belief that the only way to truly respond to those who attacked us on 
9/11 and stop them from continuing activities is to stop the 
hemorrhaging of our country regarding the Iraq intervention.
  With that, I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden) and 
the Senator from Washington (Ms. Cantwell) are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Washington (Ms. Cantwell) would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Klobuchar). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 28, nays 70, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 345 Leg.]

                                YEAS--28

     Akaka
     Boxer
     Brown
     Byrd
     Cardin
     Clinton
     Dodd
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Menendez
     Murray
     Obama
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--70

     Alexander
     Allard
     Barrasso
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Carper
     Casey
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McCain
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Roberts
     Salazar
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Tester
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Biden
     Cantwell
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, requiring 60 votes 
for the adoption of this amendment, the amendment is withdrawn.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote and to lay 
that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, for the information of all Members, the 
two managers are trying to work out a consent agreement that we would 
move next to the Levin-Reed amendment, and we would debate that this 
afternoon and vote on that in the morning. We are having a difficult 
time trying to figure out what time to do it in the morning. Some want 
early, some want late, but it won't be earlier than 10:30. We will work 
that out in just a bit, as soon as the two managers have this under 
control.
  After that, with the permission of the minority, after we finish the 
Levin-Reed amendment, we will move to the Biden amendment. The managers 
of the bill know what that amendment is about, and we will have further 
information later, but that at least outlines today and tomorrow.
  The Republican leader and I are talking about how to work through 
Monday. There are different scenarios we are working on. One thing is 
for sure, we are going to do WRDA. We are going to move to that 
tomorrow, and we will complete that sometime Monday or Tuesday.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, there will be no more votes today.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate resumes consideration of H.R. 1585 tomorrow, Friday, September 
21, that the time until 9:50 a.m. be equally divided and controlled 
between myself and Senator McCain or our designees; that the time from 
9:50 to 10 a.m. be under the control of the two leaders or their 
designees, with the majority leader or his designee controlling the 
final 5 minutes; that at 10 a.m., without further intervening action or 
debate, the Senate proceed to vote in relation to the Levin amendment, 
with no amendment in order to the amendment prior to the vote; that the 
amendment be subject to a 60-vote threshold, and if it does not achieve 
that threshold, the amendment be withdrawn; that upon disposition of 
the Levin-Reed amendment, Senator Biden be recognized to offer his 
amendment; that whenever the Senate resumes consideration of the Biden 
amendment, there be 30 minutes of debate prior to a vote in relation to 
the amendment, with the time equally divided and controlled between 
Senators Biden and McCain, or their designees, with no amendment in 
order to the amendment prior to the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, I will not object. I wish 
to make it clear, according to the discussions the chairman and I had, 
the next amendment that would be offered would be the Lieberman-Kyl 
amendment, and this--we are not exactly sure when that happens, because 
we are not sure at what point we return to the Biden amendment. It 
could be possible, if we are not prepared to resume debate on the Biden 
amendment, we could begin debate on the Kyl-Lieberman amendment. But, 
in any case, the Kyl-Lieberman amendment would be scheduled for 
consideration depending on how it fits in with the Biden amendment.
  I hope I was not confusing in that comment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask the Senator to yield.
  It is my understanding we are attempting to go back and forth when 
there are amendments on both sides, and that the floor manager, Senator 
McCain, would have the opportunity in any event to designate Senator 
Kyl to offer an amendment.
  I would agree that that then be the next amendment, if that is his 
intent, after the Biden amendment is either disposed of or is pending, 
and for reasons that are obvious needs to be set aside, because it is 
not ready for resolution, then we would go to the Kyl-Lieberman 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, we were of the understanding that we had 
worked something out on WRDA, and hopefully that is the case, that we 
would not have to do the cloture vote

[[Page S11802]]

at noon on Monday, that we would have a vote on final passage of the 
bill at 5:30. But everyone should be aware that it appears someone on 
the minority side has objected to that. If that is the case, we are 
going to go ahead and have our noon vote. I thought we had worked that 
out and I hope we can. But in fairness, whoever is holding this up, let 
us know one way or the other, because Members need to know about what 
their schedule is going to be on Monday. We have people coming in from 
all over the country. Some people have to take all-night flights to get 
back for that 12 o'clock vote. Whoever is trying to make a decision on 
this, I wish they would do it as quickly as possible--today is 
Thursday--in fairness, so people can make their weekend plans. We 
should know if, in fact, we are going to have a vote at noon on Monday.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry: Under the 
unanimous consent that is now in operation, it is my understanding the 
Levin-Reed amendment would be called up. Is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.


                Amendment No. 2898 to Amendment No. 2011

  Mr. LEVIN. I call up the Levin-Reed amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself and Mr. 
     Reed, proposes an amendment numbered 2898 to amendment No. 
     2011.

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To provide for a reduction and transition of United States 
                            forces in Iraq)

       At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1535. REDUCTION AND TRANSITION OF UNITED STATES FORCES 
                   IN IRAQ.

       (a) Deadline for Commencement of Reduction.--The Secretary 
     of Defense shall commence the reduction of the number of 
     United States forces in Iraq not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Implementation of Reduction Along With a Comprehensive 
     Strategy.--The reduction of forces required by this section 
     shall be implemented along with a comprehensive diplomatic, 
     political, and economic strategy that includes sustained 
     engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the international 
     community for the purpose of working collectively to bring 
     stability to Iraq. As part of this effort, the President 
     shall direct the United States Special Representative to the 
     United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
     United States to seek the appointment of an international 
     mediator in Iraq, under the auspices of the United Nations 
     Security Council, who has the authority of the international 
     community to engage political, religious, ethnic and tribal 
     leaders in Iraq in an inclusive political process.
       (c) Limited Presence After Reduction and Transition.--After 
     the conclusion of the reduction and transition of United 
     States forces to a limited presence as required by this 
     section, the Secretary of Defense may deploy or maintain 
     members of the Armed Forces in Iraq only for the following 
     missions:
       (1) Protecting United States and Coalition personnel and 
     infrastructure.
       (2) Training, equipping, and providing logistic support to 
     the Iraqi Security Forces.
       (3) Engaging in targeted counterterrorism operations 
     against al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliated groups, and other 
     international terrorist organizations.
       (d) Completion of Transition.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall complete the transition of United States forces to a 
     limited presence and missions as described in subsection (c) 
     by not later than nine months after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, as I understand it, there is no time 
agreement on this, other than that we complete debate today on the 
Levin-Reed amendment, except for the time allocated tomorrow morning?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. REED. Madam President, I rise in support of the proposal my 
colleague Senator Levin has offered. I participated in this with him. 
This is a legislative proposal we have advanced in various forms for 
over a year. It seeks, quite simply, to initiate a withdrawal of our 
forces from Iraq. I think it is interesting to note that General 
Petraeus announced he too is recommending a withdrawal of forces, about 
5,700 troops, before the end of this year, which essentially complies 
with at least a portion of our proposal dating back over a year.
  But it goes further than that. It would require a transition to three 
discrete missions from the open-ended war-based mission that today our 
forces are pursuing.
  The first mission would be counterterrorism, which is essential not 
only in Iraq but across the globe. That requires attention, energy, and 
persistence, and we would urge and support such a mission in Iraq; not 
just in Iraq, but, frankly, worldwide.
  The second mission would be to continue to train Iraqi security 
forces and provide robust training, support for those forces, because 
we need to provide the Iraqis the ability to defend themselves and 
pursue opponents of the legitimate Government of Iraq. Third, and 
something that is essential every time we deploy our forces, is to 
protect our forces, to give commanders in Iraq the ability and the 
forces needed to ensure that American forces will be protected. Those 
three missions represent not only what is in the long-term interest of 
the United States but also within the capacity of the United States to 
effectively carry out not just in the next several weeks or months but 
for a period of time.
  My perspective has always been that the President is much more 
comfortable with slogans than strategies. We have a new one now, 
``return on success.'' It follows a long line of slogans, ranging from 
``when they stand up, we will stand down,'' ``mission accomplished,'' 
and many others. But what we need now at the national level, not at the 
circumscribed level of just Iraq, is a national strategy that in the 
long run will deal with the significant threats that face this country.
  In the interim of our involvement with Iraq, starting several years 
ago, we have seen some remarkable developments which suggest very 
strongly that the strategy the President pursued is deeply flawed. We 
have seen the resurgence of al-Qaida. That is not the opinion of myself 
alone. It is the conclusion of the National Intelligence Estimate most 
recently released to the public. We are seeing a virtual--in fact, a 
real safe haven in Pakistan for bin Laden, Zawahiri, and others. And 
from that relative area of safety for them, unfortunately, they are 
able both to direct in a limited way actions across the globe and also 
to inspire other unrelated cells who are conducting these operations.
  We just witnessed recently in Germany where, through good police and 
intelligence work, the capture of a cell comprising ethnic Germans who 
converted to Islam and Turks, who were contemplating a major terrorist 
attack against American facilities, not perhaps directly related to al-
Qaida but certainly inspired. And there is evidence that suggests 
perhaps there was even some remote link. But they are there in Pakistan 
in a safe haven. It seems to me ironic that the President would talk 
about creating a safe haven in Iraq when, for all intents and purposes, 
we are at least acknowledging, recognizing, perhaps even not 
effectively acting against the safe haven in Pakistan.
  Also, when it comes to the discussion of a safe haven for Sunni 
jihadists in Iraq, we have to recognize, too, that one of the benefits 
of the last several weeks in Iraq has been what is required and called 
the Sunni awakening. That has been an incidental result of our 
increased troop presence. It was not the purpose, but certainly it is a 
favorable development. That is simply the result of Sunni sheiks 
realizing that Sunni jihadists of al-Qaida are more a threat to them, 
to their families, and to their way of life than the new government in 
Baghdad or the presence of American forces. Through the able and 
effective and courageous work of American soldiers and marines, these 
sheiks have been enlisted to attack and are attacking al-Qaida 
elements. That is a positive sign and tends, in my view, to mitigate 
against those dire warnings that there will be an automatic and 
predictable reflexive creation of a safe haven for al-Qaida in Iraq.
  In addition, there is a Shia government there that is committed to 
certainly disrupting and eliminating Sunni insurgents, particularly al-
Qaida

[[Page S11803]]

insurgents. So we see, in terms of the strategic picture, a virtual or 
a real safe haven in Pakistan, arguably problems in Iraq, but certainly 
I think showing how our preoccupation in Iraq is taking our eye off a 
much more serious and potential threat.
  The other very serious threat that faces us in the region and 
worldwide is the growth of Iran. That growth has been fueled by oil 
prices at $80 a barrel. That makes their bottom line look a lot better 
and gives them a greater sense of confidence as they look out and 
pursue their plans.
  Second, frankly, is our vulnerabilities in Iraq, the fact that the 
Iranians have strong influence in that country, the fact that the 
government in Baghdad, the Maliki government, has not just associations 
but long-time associations with Iranians. They are coreligionists. I am 
not trying to suggest that they are agents or clones, but there 
certainly is a rapport and understanding and an appreciation of the 
proximity of the Iranians and their potential impact in Iraq. That 
situation has given rise to a resurgence and a strategically more 
empowered Iran. So you have a strategy that the President has pursued 
that has not mitigated these major threats against the United States 
but actually has enhanced them. That might be the definition of a bad 
strategy.
  So our involvement in Iraq has taken us away from critical threats. 
In that term alone, we have to begin to think seriously about our 
approach forward. The status quo has not worked. There is scant 
evidence it will in the next several months.
  There is another issue we have to look at. That is not only in terms 
of the strategic threats, but it is our capacity. The real driving 
factor in the proposal that General Petraeus made is not what is 
happening on the ground in Iraq, it is the force structure. It is the 
number of Army and marines that we have to commit. If you talked to 
anyone months ago, they could have told you essentially what General 
Petraeus was going to say, which is by next spring, beginning in April 
and going through July, we would have to reduce by 30,000 our forces in 
Iraq; that the surge had an end point unrelated to what was happening 
on the ground, to the success or lack of success. Simply we could not 
sustain that large a combat force on the ground. That is essentially 
what General Petraeus confirmed in his testimony to the Congress when 
he returned from his mission in Baghdad.

  So we are limited in what we can do. That is not a function of 
success, return on success, or anything else. In fact, I was always 
under the impression that in a military context, when you have success, 
you reinforce it. You don't talk about a return on success, you 
reinforce it. But, quite frankly, we do not have the resources 
available to reinforce. So we are being driven by the constraints of 
our military forces more than what is happening on the ground. We have 
to respond to that.
  It also drives the real question: In the next several months, after 
the surge is over and it has been announced it is over, what missions 
can we responsibly take on, what missions will support our national 
security, and what missions will be within the grasp of our manpower 
and personnel resources? Again, that underscores the need for change 
and underscores the need for adoption of limited missions as we propose 
in the Reed-Levin amendment.
  When General Petraeus came before the committee, he made several 
points. First, he would recommend a redeployment of forces this year. 
That is something we have been arguing for and urging for over a year, 
many of us. Many accusations have been hurled at us that we were 
irresponsible and reckless. They are not being hurled at General 
Petraeus. But the reality is, he, too, recognizes that we have to begin 
to redeploy our forces. Second, he is talking about reducing the forces 
by 30,000. If you recall, the military premise of the surge was, if you 
inserted 30,000 additional troops focused on Baghdad, you would have 
now sufficient forces to conduct a different type of mission, 
population protection. You could disperse them in the localities. You 
could conduct more aggressive patrolling.
  I think the announcement by General Petraeus that those troops are 
coming out begs the obvious question: How do you maintain that 
population protection mission without those 30,000 troops, and 
particularly without, as most people recognize, the ability of the 
Government of Iraq to replace our forces with reliable Iraqi security 
forces? In a sense, the progress we have seen--and there is progress on 
the ground; there is tactical momentum. No one should be surprised when 
we commit American forces to a mission that they obtain dramatic and 
immediate results. But the real question is, are those successes 
permanent or transitory? Are they reversible or irreversible?
  My sense is that they are highly reversible, that as we depart, 
insurgents, opponents of the Government in Iraq, will move back in and 
try to exploit the absence. Without a sufficient and reliable Iraqi 
security force, that probably could be accomplished. So I think that 
just the numbers drive us to start thinking about missions that we can 
perform.
  The other factor of General Petraeus's testimony is that he very 
clearly begged off from any suggestion of what do we do after next June 
or July. Frankly, we have to have a strategy, a plan that goes beyond 
the next 6 months. It is unsatisfactory that both, it seems, the 
President and, indeed, the commander on the ground will say simply they 
don't know. No one knows perfectly, but we have to have at least their 
sense of what their best guidance is beyond that in terms of troop 
levels, in terms of some of the questions I have raised.
  Going back, again, to this notion of troop levels, if you recall, the 
focal point of the surge was stabilizing Baghdad, a large city, stable 
population. But the operations since then necessarily have taken our 
forces well beyond Baghdad, and the areas in dispute in Iraq are well 
beyond Baghdad. So the simple calculation of military forces versus 
population has been thrown out the window in the sense of the 
appropriate level of forces versus the real population and the real 
area that we are trying to stabilize.
  In this regard, we have to recognize what is happening in the south; 
that is, the British forces are, for all intents and purposes, 
withdrawing into base camps. Their presence has shrunk dramatically, 
roughly 5,000 troops. That area now is becoming an area that is 
extremely hospitable to Shia militia, to Iranian influences, and has a 
long-term potential to provide further instability in the country. Yet 
we don't have the forces to go down there. We are not attempting to go 
down there, and yet that poses a real challenge to the long-run 
security and safety and stability of the country.
  I sense, for all these different reasons, that we do have to change 
our course. That is at the heart of the Levin-Reed amendment, to 
identify, first, clearly the direction of our forces, which is to begin 
a phased redeployment; second, to focus on missions that are within our 
capacity and will, to the best of our capacity, advance our interests 
in the region, not just in Iraq but in the whole region.
  We all were waiting for the report of General Petraeus and Ambassador 
Crocker. There were other reports. General Jones and the General 
Accounting Office came forth almost simultaneously. We hoped these 
reports would provide both the President and the Congress with the 
information they needed to begin to change our direction in Iraq.
  Unfortunately, it appears at this juncture, unless we are successful 
with this amendment, that change is not going to take place.
  The GAO was the first to release their report, and it was sobering by 
anyone's standards. Of the 18 economic, security, and legislative 
benchmarks set by the Iraqis themselves last January, GAO found that 3 
had been met, 4 had been partially met, and 11 had not been met.
  I think it is important to emphasize--because now the benchmarks were 
being seen as, oh, just some interesting construct of the Congress 
unrelated to what was happening in Iraq, et cetera--but these were the 
points the Iraqis stressed as critical to their progress. They were the 
points that were deliberately embraced by the President of the United 
States.
  In January, when he talked about the surge, part of that--a large 
part of it--

[[Page S11804]]

was to allow the Iraqis the political space, the time to achieve these 
benchmarks. What appears to have happened, having failed the test, the 
President decided the test was not worth giving, and he ignores the 
results. But those results, I think, speak volumes.
  For example, the Iraqi Government still has not completed revisions 
to the constitution, or enacted legislation on de-baathification, oil 
revenue-sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or military 
disarmament.
  When Ambassador Crocker was here, he said: Well, we have not done it 
formally out there, but they informally are distributing the oil 
revenues. That goes, I think, to the point I have tried to suggest in 
other contexts. If it is informal, then it is highly reversible. If it 
is informal, it is transitory. Legislation is not as reversible and 
transitory. We do a lot of that around here, but at least you have to 
go back through the legislative process. But these informal 
arrangements may be just temporary and expedient, and probably are 
temporary and expedient. But the real work, the commitment the 
Government of Iraq made months ago to make these changes, has not been 
accomplished.
  The Iraqi Government has not eliminated militia control of local 
security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, 
ensured evenhanded enforcement of the law, increased Army units capable 
of independent operations or ensured that political authorities made no 
false accusations against security forces.
  Again, we have been engaged for years in training Iraqi security 
forces. At the entry level of that training--to give the ability of a 
squad leader to read a map, to call indirect fire, to call a medevac--
we have made progress. To give the skills for an individual infantryman 
to low-crawl, to clear a building, we have made progress. But it is at 
the critical levels where politics and security intersect that there 
has not been the adequate progress. That is the most decisive level. 
Until there is a force in Iraq that is not only technically capable but 
can operate with a certain degree of independence, then their ability 
is, I think, undermined. We are making progress in that direction.
  The Levin-Reed amendment calls for the continued training to achieve 
not just technical proficiency but we hope some day a force that is 
professionally capable and deployed in a way where they can secure the 
country of Iraq--their country--without fear or favor with respect to 
political or sectarian allegiance.
  Now, the Iraqi Government also pledged to spend $10 billion of their 
own money on reconstruction. We have sent billions of American dollars 
over there for reconstruction. To date, only $1.5 billion of Iraqi 
funds has been allocated to do that. I think it raises the question 
among many Americans: If we are spending all these billions of 
dollars--and the President is going to send the supplemental up shortly 
asking for billions and billions of dollars more--why cannot the Iraqis 
spend at least their own money they have for their own people for their 
own needs? I think it is a question that the longer it goes unanswered, 
the more unsettling it is to the American public.
  The GAO also noted:

       It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has 
     decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to 
     measure the perpetrators intent and other measures of 
     population security show differing trends.

  The situation, which is understandable given the chaotic nature, 
given the conflicting motivations that are engulfing the country and 
producing violence--it is hard to say what is criminality, what is a 
politically motivated event, what is the mixture of the two--but these 
measures, I think from our perspective, whether they go up or down, 
probably do not suggest the atmosphere which most Iraqis endure, which 
is an atmosphere of violence, potential violence, of fear. It is an 
atmosphere that has caused 2 million people to be external refugees, 2 
million people, roughly, to be internally displaced.
  It also is reflected in polling conducted within Iraq about the sense 
of security and the sense of the future the Iraqi people have. These 
numbers have been declining. It was at a zenith, obviously, after the 
operations in March 2003. But since then there has been, I think, a 
significant and continued deterioration. Because this violence--to us 
it makes a difference that it is sectarian versus criminal--but to 
someone on the street, it is violence. Again, the progress in 
stabilizing the country that the Iraqi Government said they were 
committed to has not materially been changed throughout the country.
  Now, General Petraeus and General Jones did report improvements in 
the Iraqi security forces, and they should be recognized. But the 
progress is uneven and slow. I suggested at the zenith, where it is 
most critical in terms of stability of the country, where it is 
commanders, not squad leaders, who are making decisions, that is the 
most difficult to achieve, and it is, so far, lagging based upon the 
reports we have heard.
  Now, we recognize the last 2 years have been enormously challenging 
for the Government of Iraq and our participation there. We recognize, 
too, that both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker came with great 
experience, great professional acumen, and great patriotic service to 
the country, and gave us their best report.

  There is another aspect of this debate which is as important as what 
is going on in Iraq, and that is what is going on in the United States. 
Frankly, the support for our operations has rapidly faded since the 
heady days of March 2003. Before the September reports by Ambassador 
Crocker and General Petraeus and the speech by the President, 64 
percent of Americans polled by CBS felt things were going badly in 
Iraq; after the reports and speech, 63 percent.
  My point is, that is an important factor in the conduct of any 
national security policy: the support of the American people. In fact, 
the manual General Petraeus helped author at Fort Leavenworth, the 
counterinsurgency manual, makes that point specifically, that public 
support within the United States is a critical--critical--attribute for 
policy, particularly long-term policy in a counterinsurgency conflict.
  We have seen, frankly, the American public being quite concerned, in 
fact disheartened, about what is happening in Iraq. I think that also 
calls--in addition to what is happening on the ground--for a change in 
our policy, for a change in the direction Senator Levin and I are 
suggesting.
  It is very difficult and some would argue impossible for any 
administration to carry out a policy without the strong support of the 
United States, particularly a policy that does not seem to be matched 
by an equal commitment by those whom we are trying to help. I believe 
we do need a change of policy, not only because it is a more effective 
way to go forward, but it, I think, would represent to the American 
people a needed sense that we have heard them, we are moving forward, 
and we are moving forward in a way that can be sustained and be 
supported by the American people.
  Everyone has to recognize the extraordinary contribution of our 
military forces. They are serving well, and they continue to serve 
well. But I think their effort has to be matched by a wiser policy on 
our part. That policy, I think, is necessary. I hope we can do that 
within the context of the amendment we propose.
  There is another issue here, too, and that is not just public support 
but also the financial support. We are spending $12 billion a month in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, et cetera. That price keeps going up. We understand 
the costs are not short term. There are hundreds of thousands of 
veterans coming out of the gulf who for the next 50 years will require 
support and assistance. This is not going to be something that when we 
look back 5 or 10 years, even when the fighting stops, we can ignore. 
We have a long-term commitment to these individuals and a long-term 
costly commitment. We have to measure our policy against our resources, 
not just the brave men and women who serve, but our ability to finance 
their operations and finance their long-term care as they come back.
  This amendment, as I indicated previously, calls for a transition 
which I believe is long overdue, a transition to counterterrorism, a 
transition to training Iraqi security forces, and protection of our 
forces, coalition forces. I think the transition will help us in terms 
of what is happening on the ground, what is happening in the country, 
and what should be happening in the region.

[[Page S11805]]

  Also, our amendment talks about a very aggressive diplomatic 
approach, something I think has been missing. We have to engage the 
regional community and the world community to help us. I think there 
might be an opportunity, indeed, when we talk about the context of 
training, to go forward to our allies in NATO and say: You could help 
us on this training mission. This is not a direct combat operation. 
This is something well within the capacity of your armies across the 
globe. This could put an international approach to our problems, which 
would be very helpful not only in terms of putting men and women on the 
ground to assist the Iraqi security forces, but indicating this is not 
America's problem alone, this is an issue that should be addressed by 
all the nations of the world.
  Now, for 5 years our military forces have fought with valor, courage, 
and sacrifice. Their families have borne their absences. They have 
supported them remarkably and magnificently, and I think that has to be 
recognized. But we have to provide them a diplomatic support that has 
been lacking all these years.
  Many of my colleagues have traveled to Iraq many times. I have. Since 
the beginning, there has not been an adequate complement through 
diplomats and AID personnel and agronomists, and all the specialists 
you need to provide the public nonkinetic--as military people describe 
it--aspects of counterinsurgency. Those forces have been lacking. There 
have been efforts recently to improve them, but they are still 
significantly lacking.
  So for many years--all these years--we have had an Army and Marine 
Corps at war, supported--I should say not just supported but it has 
intimately involved all our services--but we have not had the full 
commitment of our national resources. We have not had a full commitment 
of our civilian agencies that is so necessary. Today, that, I think, is 
not being manifested enough. So for that reason, also, I think we have 
to recognize a change is necessary.
  I hope we can change the policy. I think in the long term it will be 
beneficial to the United States. I hope we will allow ourselves to 
begin to focus more resources on threats that are, I think, much more 
severe: the virtual safe haven in Pakistan from where bin Laden sends 
tapes to us and al-Zawahiri sends tapes to us that inspire terrorist 
organizations in Europe that are approaching closer and closer to the 
United States--that was, I think, the whole premise for our global war 
on terrorism, to effectively prevent another attack on our homeland--
the growing power of Iran, not only in terms of its influence in the 
region, its connection to other terrorist groups, but its aspirations 
to be a nuclear power, which we are finding very difficult to counter 
diplomatically.
  I hope we can refocus our efforts in Iraq, and we can also refocus 
our efforts to meet these other emerging and very dangerous threats.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered 
by the chairman and the Senator from Rhode Island that would mandate a 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
  Again, we find ourselves on the floor of this Chamber debating an 
amendment that is nearly identical to one that failed 2 months ago. The 
pending amendment would mandate a withdrawal of U.S. combat forces 
within 90 days of enactment, leaving a smaller force authorized only to 
carry out narrowly defined missions. And the Senate faces, once again--
faces again--a simple choice: whether to build on the successes of our 
new strategy and give General Petraeus and the troops under his command 
the time and support needed to carry out their mission or to ignore the 
realities on the ground and legislate a premature end to our efforts in 
Iraq, accepting thereby all the terrible consequences that will ensue.
  Many Senators wished to postpone this choice, preferring to await the 
testimony of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Last week, these 
two career officers reported unambiguously that the new strategy is 
succeeding in Iraq. Knowing what we now know--that our military is 
making progress on the ground, and that their commanders request from 
us the time and support necessary to succeed in Iraq--a measure of 
courage is required, not the great courage exhibited by those brave men 
and women fighting on our behalf but a smaller measure, the courage 
necessary to put America's interests before every personal or political 
consideration.

  It is important that as we proceed with consideration of this 
amendment, we spend a few moments reviewing the current state of 
affairs in Iraq. We see today that after nearly 4 years of mismanaged 
war, the situation on the ground in Iraq shows demonstrable signs of 
progress. The final reinforcements needed to implement General 
Petraeus's new counterinsurgency plan have been in place for over 2 
months, and our military, in cooperation with the Iraqi security 
forces, is making significant gains in a number of areas.
  General Petraeus reported in detail on these gains during his 
testimony in both Houses and in countless interviews. The No. 2 U.S. 
commander in Iraq, LT GEN Ray Odierno, said today the 7-month-old 
security operation has reduced violence in Baghdad by some 50 percent, 
car bombings and suicide attacks in Baghdad have fallen to their lowest 
level in a year, and civilian casualties have dropped from a high of 32 
per day to 12 per day. His comments are echoed by LT GEN Abboud Qanbar, 
the Iraqi commander who said that before the surge began, one-third of 
Baghdad's 507 districts were under insurgent control. Today, he said: 
``Only 5 to 6 districts can be called hot areas.'' Anyone who has 
traveled recently to Anbar, Diyala or Baghdad can see the improvements 
that have taken place over the past months. With violence down, 
commerce has risen, and bottom-up efforts to forge counterterrorism 
alliances are bearing tangible fruit.
  None of this is to argue that Baghdad or other regions have suddenly 
become safe or that violence has come down to acceptable levels. As 
General Odierno pointed out, violence is still too high and there are 
many unsafe areas. Nevertheless, such positive developments illustrate 
General Petraeus's contention last week that American and Iraqi forces 
have achieved substantial progress under their new strategy.
  It is instructive to reflect on how far some areas have come. One 
year ago, in September of 2006--1 year ago, September 2006--The 
Washington Post ran a story titled: ``Situation Called Dire in West 
Iraq; Anbar is Lost Politically, Marine Analyst Says.'' After an 
offensive by U.S. and Iraqi troops cleaned al-Qaida fighters out of 
Ramadi and other areas of western Anbar, the province's tribal sheiks, 
disgusted by the brutality and blatant disregard for human life 
exhibited by their aggressors, broke formally with the terrorists and 
joined the coalition side. As a result, Anbar, which last year stood as 
Iraq's most dangerous province, is now one of its safest.
  By the way, many critics of the war say that change would have 
happened without the surge. That is patently false. The fact is, when 
the sheiks decided to come over to our side, a brave colonel named 
MacFarland immediately sent 4,000 marines to protect them, and General 
Petraeus has testified that if they hadn't had those troops, then we 
probably would not have seen Anbar in the condition that it is in 
today.
  I asked General Petraeus, and he said the following:

       The success in Anbar Province, correctly, is a political 
     success--

  By the way, something we all seek----

       But it is a political success that has been enabled, very 
     much, by our forces who have been enabled by having 
     additional forces in Anbar Province.

  Ambassador Crocker added:

       Such scenes are also unfolding in parts of Diyala and 
     Ninewa, where Iraqis have immobilized with the help of 
     Coalition and Iraqi security forces.

  So as we all know, without military security, there is no political 
progress, and that political progress is only enabled by the 
substantial military presence that was provided by the surge.
  As in Anbar and elsewhere, where local populations have turned on al-
Qaida's brutal methods, there are reports of Shia extremists 
encountering a similar reception. Recent attacks by the Mahdi Army on 
worshipers in the holy city of Karbala prompted a public backlash that 
led Muqtada al-Sadr to

[[Page S11806]]

order a suspension of all military actions by his followers against 
Iraqi and coalition forces.
  In Baghdad, the military, in cooperation with Iraqi security forces, 
continues to man joint security stations and deploy throughout the city 
in order to bring violence under control. These efforts have produced 
positive results. Sectarian violence has fallen since the beginning of 
the year. The total number of car bombings and suicide attacks 
declined, and the number of locals coming forward with intelligence 
tips has risen.
  None of this is to suggest the road in Iraq remains anything but long 
and hard. Violence remains at unacceptable levels, the Maliki 
Government remains paralyzed and unwilling to function as it must, and 
other difficulties abound. No one can guarantee success or be certain 
about its prospects. We can be sure, however, that should the Congress 
succeed in terminating the strategy by legislating an abrupt withdrawal 
and a transition to a new, less effective and more dangerous course--
should we do that, then we will fail for certain.
  Let's make no mistakes about the costs of such an American failure in 
Iraq. Many of my colleagues would like to believe that should the 
amendment we are currently considering become law, it would mark the 
end of this long effort. They are wrong. Should the Congress force a 
precipitous withdrawal from Iraq, it would mark a new beginning, the 
start of a new, more dangerous effort to contain the forces unleashed 
by our disengagement. If we leave, we will be back in Iraq and 
elsewhere. That is not just my view but that of General Jones and 
others, in many more desperate fights to protect our security and add 
an even greater cost in American lives and treasure.
  In testimony before the Armed Services Committee last week, General 
Petraeus referred to an August Defense Intelligence Agency report that 
stated:

       A rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of 
     strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of 
     dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of 
     the Iraqi security forces, a rapid deterioration of local 
     security initiatives, al-Qaida-Iraq regaining lost ground and 
     freedom of maneuver, a marked increase in violence, and 
     further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; an 
     exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, 
     especially with respect to Iran.

  Those are the likely consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, and I 
hope the supporters of such a move will tell us how they intend to 
address the chaos and catastrophe that would surely follow such a 
course of action.

  No matter where my colleagues came down in 2003 about the centrality 
of Iraq to the war on terror, there can simply be no debate that our 
efforts in Iraq today are critical to the wider struggle against 
violent Islamic extremism. Earlier this month, GEN Jim Jones testified 
before the Armed Services Committee on the effects of such a course.
  The supporters of this amendment respond that they do not by any 
means intend to cede the battlefield to al-Qaida. On the contrary, 
their legislation would allow U.S. forces, presumably holed up in 
forward-operating bases, to carry out targeted counterterrorism 
operations. But our own military commanders say this approach will not 
succeed and that moving in with search-and-destroy missions to kill and 
capture terrorists, only to immediately cede the territory to the 
enemy, is the failed Rumsfeld strategy of the past nearly 4 years. We 
should not and must not return to such a disastrous course.
  It has become clear by now that we cannot set a date for withdrawal 
without setting a date for surrender. Should we leave Iraq before there 
is a basic level of stability, we invite chaos, genocide, terrorist 
safe havens, and regional war. We invite further Iranian influence at a 
time when Iranian operatives are already moving weapons, training 
fighters, providing resources, and helping plan operations to kill 
American soldiers and damage our efforts to bring stability to Iraq. If 
any of my colleagues remain unsure of Iran's intentions in the region, 
may I direct them to the recent remarks of the Iranian President who 
said:

       The political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. 
     Soon, we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of 
     course, we are prepared to fill the gap.

  If our notions of national security have any meaning, they cannot 
include permitting the establishment of an Iranian-dominated Middle 
East that is roiled by a wider regional war and riddled with terrorist 
safe havens.
  The hour is indeed late in Iraq. How we have arrived at this critical 
and desperate moment has been well chronicled, and history's judgment 
about the long catalog of mistakes in the prosecution of this war will 
be stern and unforgiving. But history will revere the honor and 
sacrifice of those Americans who, despite the mistakes and failures of 
both civilian and military leaders, shouldered a rifle and risked 
everything so the country they love so well might not suffer the many 
dangerous consequences of defeat.
  That is what General Petraeus and the Americans he has the honor to 
command are trying to do--to fight smarter and better in a way that 
addresses and doesn't strengthen the tactics of the enemy and to give 
the Iraqis the security and opportunity to make the necessary political 
decisions to save their country from the abyss of genocide and a 
permanent and spreading war. Now is not the time for us to lose our 
resolve. We must remain steadfast in this new mission, for we do not 
fight only for the interests of Iraqis, we fight for ours as well.
  In this moment of serious peril for America, we must all of us 
remember to whom and what we owe our first allegiance--to the security 
of the American people and the ideals upon which our Nation was 
founded.
  This is the same amendment that was rejected 2 months ago. In the 
intervening 2 months, our opposition to this amendment has been 
validated by the progress on the ground of the military strategy which 
General Petraeus designed and our brave young Americans who are serving 
have implemented. So we are here 2 months later with tangible success 
on the ground and addressing the same amendment. The effect of this 
amendment would return us to the failed strategy of nearly 4 years ago. 
If there was any doubt the last time in anybody's mind about whether we 
should go back to that failed strategy of the past or we should 
continue with this successful strategy, I think the events of the last 
2 months, since we rejected this amendment the last time, should 
convince the objective observers.
  So I hope my colleagues will understand this debate and this 
amendment is very important, and it is very important to the security 
of the United States of America, the region. We must never forget that 
if we fail--if we fail--Americans will be called back sooner or later 
and called upon to make greater service and sacrifice.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Biden 
amendment identified in a previous consent agreement be subject to a 
60-vote threshold, and that if the amendment does not receive 60 votes, 
it be withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, there isn't any dispute about whether a 
stable and independent Iraq is in our national interest. Some of us 
disagreed with the way we went to war with Iraq 4\1/2\ years ago. We 
have disagreed, many of us, with many of the Bush administration's 
policies in Iraq since then, including ignoring the advice of senior 
military leaders such as General Shinseki in planning the invasion, 
failing to properly plan for the occupation and its aftermath, 
disbanding the Iraqi Army, banning low-level Baath Party members from 
post-Saddam Government employment, failing to pressure the Iraqi 
leaders to meet the benchmarks and the timetable they set for 
themselves and, most recently, increasing the U.S. military presence in 
Iraq with the so-called surge, when we should be reducing our military 
presence.
  But the challenge facing us now, given where we are today, is what is 
the best way to promote a stable and independent Iraq. Is the course we 
are on succeeding? So while the opponents of changing course argue that 
those of us who want to change course don't see the importance of a 
stable and independent Iraq, they are exactly wrong. We see the 
importance of it, but we see the current policy is failing to move us 
in the direction of a stable and independent Iraq. It is the status 
quo--

[[Page S11807]]

staying the course--that jeopardizes the goal of a stable and 
independent Iraq. So while there is disagreement on whether the current 
course is leading to a stable and independent Iraq, there is 
agreement--broad consensus--on the desirability of that goal.
  There has also been a consensus for some time that there is no 
military solution to the sectarian violence in Iraq, and that the key 
to ending the violence lies in bringing about a political settlement 
among the various factions in Iraq today. Even Prime Minister Maliki 
recognized that fact a few months ago. This is what he said:

       The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the 
     cycle of blood letting of innocents are the Iraqi 
     politicians.

  That is the Prime Minister of Iraq pointing out that it is the 
failure of the Iraqi politicians that is resulting in the ongoing 
violence. President Bush said this last January. He said the purpose of 
the surge--the explicit purpose, the stated purpose of the surge--was 
to give Iraqi politicians ``breathing space'' to work out a political 
settlement.
  It is also pretty much undisputed that the stated purpose of the 
surge--that explicitly stated purpose about giving the Iraqi 
politicians breathing space to work out their political settlement--has 
not been achieved. There are going to be arguments back and forth about 
how much military progress there has been on the ground, and there are 
statistics both ways. I accept General Petraeus's assessment--and I 
have been there recently--that there has been some military progress on 
the ground. But the purpose of the surge, the goal of the surge was to 
provide breathing space to the Iraqi politicians; and the more the 
surge has succeeded, the less excuse there is for the Iraqi politicians 
not working out their political misunderstandings.
  So it works exactly the opposite way from what the opponents of this 
amendment say. To the extent the surge has succeeded militarily, it 
makes it less understandable, less excusable, and less acceptable for 
the Iraqi politicians to continue to dawdle. By the way, the President 
has kind of shifted ground in terms of the purpose of the surge, 
anyway. Now the goal of the surge is to provide security and help Iraqi 
forces to maintain it. So having failed in its purpose, which was to 
give the Iraqi politicians room to work out their political 
misunderstandings, now we have a much more open-ended goal: to provide 
security and help the Iraqi forces to maintain it.
  Madam President, General Petraeus agreed in his testimony last week 
that the purpose of the surge--to provide breathing space to work out a 
political settlement--has not been achieved. He was asked a direct 
question and he gave that answer. He acknowledged the political 
settlement has not been achieved and that that was the stated purpose 
of the surge.
  There has been a lot of debate on whether the current situation on 
the ground in Iraq shows significant progress in terms of security--by 
the way, even though, as I said, this can be argued back and forth, 
there has been a public opinion poll taken in Iraq. The Iraqi people 
have been asked that question--not by supporters or opponents of the 
policy but by ABC News. Here is what the poll results were, and this is 
the Iraqi citizens being asked whether they feel more or less secure as 
a result of the surge. Here is the analysis by ABC News:

       The surge broadly is seen to have done more harm than good, 
     with 65 to 70 percent [of Iraqis] saying it's worsened rather 
     than improved security in surge areas, security in other 
     areas, conditions for political dialog, the ability of the 
     Iraqi government to do its work, the pace of reconstruction, 
     and the pace of economic development.

  The result of the surge--or more accurately, the lack of political 
results--underscores the reality that there is going to be no end to 
the violence until Iraqi national leaders work out their political 
differences. As the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of 
Iraq, under the leadership of retired Marine General Jim Jones, 
reported last week:

       Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian 
     violence in Iraq.

  The Iraqi politicians surely haven't done that. They have not kept 
the commitments they made to achieve political reconciliation by 
adopting legislation setting the dates for provincial elections, 
approving a hydrocarbon law, a debaathification law, and submitting 
constitutional amendments to a referendum.
  I want to emphasize that the Iraqis' commitments to work out their 
key differences and the timetable to do so were their commitments and 
their timetable. So when Prime Minister Maliki complains that outsiders 
are not going to dictate to the Iraqi Government, what he is trying to 
do is obscure the fact that his own government set the benchmarks and 
timetables for themselves.
  Back in January, when President Bush proposed the surge, this is what 
he said about the benchmarks and the need for the Iraqis to meet them:

       America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it 
     has announced.

  Last Thursday, we heard the same old song from the President. He 
said:

       The [Iraqi] government has not met its own legislative 
     benchmarks, and in my meeting with Iraq leaders, I have made 
     it clear that they must.

  Eight months after saying we are going to hold the Iraqi Government 
to the benchmarks, the President's words ring hollow. We are not 
insisting the Iraqi leaders keep their commitments, and there have been 
absolutely no consequences for the Iraqi leaders' failure to do so. 
James Baker, Lee Hamilton, and the rest of the Iraq Study Group 
recommended the following:

       If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress 
     toward the achievement of milestones on national 
     reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States 
     should reduce its political, military, or economic support 
     for the Iraqi government.

  Now, those were the words of the Iraq Study Group. That is exactly 
what is needed: consequences--clear, direct, and understandable 
consequences. But the only response to the Iraqi politicians' continued 
dawdling has been the repeated calls by the President for patience.
  I make reference to a letter from the Secretary of State, Condoleezza 
Rice, dated January 30, 2007. The question had been raised whether the 
timelines that were set by the Iraqi Government were in fact their 
timelines or ours. This is what Secretary Rice said about the 
timelines:

        . . . Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed 
     upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks 
     and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were 
     reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006, and 
     referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the relevant document 
     (enclosed) was posted at that time on the President of Iraq's 
     website.

  Madam President, we have been told by the--at least the public has 
been told by, I believe, the Prime Minister of Iraq that they are not 
going to accept America's timeline, that we are not going to impose a 
timeline on Iraq. What Secretary Rice's letter to me confirmed very 
precisely is that the Presidency Council of Iraq on October 16, 2006, 
adopted, reaffirmed--in her words, ``Iraq's Policy Committee on 
National Security agreed upon a set of . . . timelines.''
  The dates are here. Here is the timeline.
  September 2006: To form a review committee and to agree on a 
political timetable.
  October 2006: Approve a hydrocarbon law and approve a provincial 
election law.
  November 2006: Approve a debaathification law and approve provincial 
council authorities law.
  December 2006: Approve amnesty, militias, and other armed formations 
law.
  January 2007: Constitutional Review Committee completes its work.
  February 2007: Form independent commissions in accordance with the 
constitution.
  March 2007: Constitutional amendments referendum.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Rice to me 
dated January 30, 2007, be printed in the Record at this point, which 
makes the very clear statement that, No. 1, the timelines I have 
referred to attached to her letter are the Iraqi Government's 
timelines, and they formally adopted those.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                                       Washington.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your recent letters 
     regarding the way forward in

[[Page S11808]]

     Iraq and the role of benchmarks for political issues Iraq 
     must solve. The President has also asked that I reply on his 
     behalf to your December 12, 2006, letter to him concerning 
     the importance of announcing a deadline for beginning a 
     phased redeployment from Iraq.
       I share your view that the Iraqi Government must meet the 
     goal it has set for itself--establishing a democratic, 
     unified, and secure Iraq. We believe the Iraqi Government 
     understands very well the consequences of failing to make the 
     tough decisions necessary to allow all Iraqis to live in 
     peace and security. President Bush has been clear with Prime 
     Minister Maliki on this score, as have I and other senior 
     officials in discussions with our counterparts. We expect the 
     Prime Minister to follow through on his pledges to the 
     President that he would take difficult decisions.
       In his January 10 address, the President stated that after 
     careful consideration he had decided that announcing a phased 
     withdrawal of our combat forces at this time would open the 
     door to a collapse of the Iraqi Government and the country 
     being torn apart. The New Way Forward in Iraq that the 
     President announced on January 10 is designed to help the 
     Government of Iraq to succeed. This strategy has the strong 
     support of General Petraeus and his commanders, and we must 
     give the strategy time to succeed.
       On your point about a political solution being critical to 
     long-term success, I also agree. However, with violence in 
     the capital at the levels we have seen since the Samarra 
     attack on February 22, 2006, extremists and terrorists have 
     been able to hold the political process hostage. The 
     President's strategy is designed to dampen the present level 
     of violence in Baghdad and ensure that Iraq's political 
     center has the security and stability it needs to negotiate 
     lasting political accommodations through Iraq's new 
     democratic institutions.
       At the same time, the President has made clear to the Prime 
     Minister and other Iraqi leaders that America's commitment is 
     not open-ended. It is essential that the Government of Iraq--
     with our help, but its lead--set out measurable, achievable 
     goals and objectives on each of three critical, strategic 
     tracks: political, security, and economic. In this regard, 
     Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a 
     set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an 
     associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed 
     by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006, and referenced 
     by the Iraq Study Group; the relevant document (enclosed) was 
     posted at that time on the President of Iraq's website.
       Beyond that, as the President said, Prime Minister Maliki 
     made a number of additional commitments including: Non-
     interference in operations of the Iraqi Security Forces; 
     Prosecution of all who violate the law, regardless of sect or 
     religion; Deployment of three additional Iraqi army brigades 
     to Baghdad; and Use of $10 billion for reconstruction.
       We will continually assess Iraq's progress in meeting these 
     commitments as well as other initiatives critical to Iraq's 
     development.
           Sincerely,
     Condoleezza Rice.
                                  ____


                         Unofficial Translation


                      National Political Timeline

       September 2006: Form Constitutional Review Committee; 
     Approve law on procedures to form regions; Agree on political 
     timetable; Approve the law for Independent High Electoral 
     Commission (IHEC); and Approve the Investment Law.
       October 2006: Approve provincial elections law and set date 
     for provincial elections; and Approve a hydrocarbon law.
       November 2006: Approve de-Ba'athification law; Approve 
     provincial council authorities law; and Approve a flag, 
     emblem and national anthem law.
       December 2006: Approve Coalition Provisional Authority 
     Order 91 concerning armed forces and militias; Council of 
     Representatives to address amnesty, militias and other armed 
     formations; and Approve amnesty, militias and other armed 
     formations law.
       January 2007: Constitutional Review Committee completes its 
     work.
       February 2007: Form independent commissions in accordance 
     with the Constitution.
       March 2007: Constitutional amendments referendum (if 
     required).

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that another 
letter that I will read a part of be printed in the Record at this 
point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                    Washington, DC, June 13, 2007.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter inquiring 
     about the benchmarks that the Government of Iraq set for 
     itself last fall.
       As you mentioned, I sent to you a letter in January in 
     which I noted that Iraq's Political Committee on National 
     Security agreed upon a set of benchmarks and an associated 
     timeline, which were reaffirmed by the Iraqi Presidency 
     Council in October 2006.
       We have confirmed with Iraqi President Talabani's Chief of 
     Staff that the benchmarks were formally approved last fall by 
     the Iraqi Political Committee on National Security. This 
     committee includes the Presidency Council--the President and 
     the two Vice Presidents--as well as the leaders of all the 
     major political blocs in Iraq. The Iraqi Presidency Council 
     then posted the benchmarks on its website for several months.
       Thank you for your interest in this issue. Please feel free 
     to contact us on this or any matter of concern to you.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Condoleezza Rice.

  Mr. LEVIN. This is a June 13, 2007, letter to me from Secretary Rice. 
The setting for this--before I read this paragraph--is that Iraq said 
they never adopted those timelines, they never adopted those 
benchmarks. They contested what Secretary Rice said to me in the letter 
I am making part of the Record, dated January 30. I asked Secretary 
Rice about that. I said the Iraqis are saying you are wrong, that they 
didn't adopt the benchmarks. They say you are wrong, Secretary Rice. 
What do you have to say about that? She wrote me back:

       Thank you for your letter inquiring about the benchmarks 
     that the Government for Iraq set for itself last fall.

  I emphasize the words ``set for itself last fall.''
  Addressing me, she wrote:

       As you mentioned, I sent to you a letter in January in 
     which I noted that Iraq's Political Committee on National 
     Security agreed upon a set of benchmarks and an associated 
     timeline, which were reaffirmed by the Iraqi Presidency 
     Council in October 2006.

  She continued:

       We have confirmed with Iraqi President Talibani's Chief of 
     Staff that the benchmarks were formally approved last fall by 
     the Iraqi Political Committee on National Security. This 
     committee includes the Presidency Council--the President and 
     two Vice Presidents--as well as the leaders of all major 
     political blocs in Iraq. The Iraqi Presidency Council then 
     posted the benchmarks on its website for several months.

  I have already made this part of the Record.
  I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the Secretary, which 
precipitated this response on June 13 also be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                      Washington, DC, May 9, 2007.
     Hon. Condoleezza Rice,
     Secretary of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Madam Secretary: I am writing in connection with your 
     letter of January 20, 2007 in which you advised me regarding 
     a set of benchmarks that the Government of Iraq has set for 
     itself.
       You wrote that ``Iraq's Policy Committee on National 
     Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and 
     economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 
     2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on 
     October 16, 2006, and referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the 
     relevant document (enclosed) was posted at that time on the 
     President of Iraq's website.''
       Yesterday, I met with Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Prime Minister 
     Maliki's national security adviser. During the course of our 
     meeting, Dr. Rubaie stated that the Presidency Council never 
     reaffirmed the benchmarks. He was adamant on this point even 
     after I showed him the statement in your letter.
       This is an important point as the Presidency Council, whose 
     three members, President Jalal Talabani (Kurd), Deputy 
     President `Adil `Abd al-Mahdi (Shia Muslim) and Deputy 
     President Tariq al-Hashimi (Sunni Muslim), are elected by the 
     Council of Representatives and represent the three major 
     ethnic groups of the country.
       Earlier today, State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack 
     stated ``These are the benchmarks that they've laid out for 
     themselves. We didn't come up with them. They came up with 
     them. And they need to be seen in the eyes of the Iraqi 
     people as delivering for the Iraqi people.''
       It seems to me that it would make a difference if the 
     benchmarks and associated timeline were only approved by an 
     advisory group as compared to the Presidency Council.
       Accordingly, please confirm that the benchmarks and 
     associated timeline, which you attached to your January 30, 
     2007 letter, were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council after 
     being agreed upon by the Policy Committee on National 
     Security, as stated in your letter.
       Thank you for your assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Carl Levin,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. LEVIN. Success in Iraq--creating a stable, independent Iraq--
depends on Iraqi leaders finally seeing the end of the open-ended U.S. 
commitment. The Iraq Study Group correctly pointed out almost a year 
ago that ``An open-ended

[[Page S11809]]

commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi government 
the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the 
best chance of quelling sectarian violence.'' In the absence of such an 
     incentive, the Iraqi Government might continue to delay 
     taking those actions.

  The President's current strategy is nothing less than stagnant 
because it is open-ended. It lacks the key ingredient of an action-
forcing mechanism aimed at getting the Iraqi leaders to resolve their 
political differences. What is that mechanism? What is the mechanism 
that will finally force the Iraqi leaders to get on with the job of 
negotiating their political differences? It is action on our part, not 
just rhetoric, that clearly demonstrates to the Iraqi Government that 
our open-ended commitment to the American troops in the middle of their 
civil war is over, and that while we will provide support to their 
army, we have decided, as did the British, to transfer principal 
responsibility for security to Iraqi forces.
  It is not good enough to do what the President did a few days ago and 
say we are going to take another look next March. That maintains the 
open-ended commitment. That does not have a timetable for the reduction 
of our troops to the levels which are necessary to carry on the 
missions which are identified.
  The Jones Commission reported that ``The Iraqi armed forces . . . are 
increasingly effective and are capable of assuming greater 
responsibility for the internal security of Iraq.'' The Commission went 
on to say that a number of Iraqi Army battalions that are capable of 
taking the lead are not in the lead. That was a fact acknowledged by 
General Petraeus in our hearings about a week ago.
  The Commission did one other thing: The Jones Commission also 
recommended--and these are the keywords--``the size of our national 
footprint in Iraq be reconsidered'' and that ``significant reductions . 
. . appear to be possible and prudent.'' Those are the words of General 
Jones and his Commission that significant reductions in our presence 
appear to be prudent. This is a group of retired generals and police 
officers.
  I asked General Petraeus about whether there are these units of the 
Iraqi Army that are capable of assuming greater responsibility, as 
General Jones's Commission said, but they have not done so. General 
Petraeus acknowledged that there were such Iraqi units. I asked him how 
many, and he said he would supply that number for the record.
  The Jones Commission emphasized that ``there is a fine line between 
assistance and dependence.'' When I was in Iraq last month, I asked a 
young American soldier who is on his third deployment to Iraq what his 
ideas were about transferring greater responsibility to the Iraqis. His 
answer was:

       The Iraqi soldiers will let U.S. soldiers do the job that 
     they're supposed to be doing forever, and we need to let them 
     do it on their own.

  I could not agree more.
  In addition to getting our troops out of the middle of their civil 
war, success also depends on a transition of missions. According to the 
Iraq Study Group:

       By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected 
     developments in the security situation on the ground, all 
     combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be 
     out of Iraq.

  That Commission proposed that a far smaller U.S. military presence 
would remain only for limited missions to include force protection, 
counterterrorism, and training the Iraqi security forces. I believe it 
is essential that transition to the limited missions be announced now 
as a way of ending this open-ended commitment which the Iraqi political 
leaders have taken to be such a security blanket and have taken them 
off the hook from doing something that only they can do--work out the 
political differences that divide them which, in the words of their own 
Prime Minister, the failure to do has resulted in the continuation of 
violence.
  Everybody seems to agree that there is no military solution, and yet 
when it comes to telling the Iraqi political leaders that the open-
ended commitment is over, we are not only going to begin to reduce our 
troops, but we are going to transition their mission and complete that 
transition in a reasonable period of time, not precipitous but in a 
reasonable period of time, and our amendment provides 9 months after 
enactment of this law, it is the only way--the only way--that this 
open-ended commitment can finally be brought to an end. So we not only 
have to transition to the limited missions and announce it now, we have 
to adopt a timetable for the completion of that transition.
  Those are the key provisions of the amendment before us. It is the 
key to ending the open-endedness, and it is long overdue. Presenting 
Iraq's political leaders with a timetable to begin withdrawing our 
forces and transitioning those that remain from mainly combat to mainly 
support roles is the only hope that Iraqi leaders will realize their 
future is in their hands, not in the hands of our brave men and women 
who proudly wear the uniform of our country.
  Taking this step will also recognize another fact of life: that the 
stress on our forces--especially the wear and tear on the Army and 
Marines--must be reduced. We cannot continue to deploy our forces at 
the current level without seriously weakening our ability to respond to 
other challenges that might confront us.
  So how can Congress bring about a change of course in Iraq when 
President Bush delays and delays and delays making any change? A clear 
majority of the Senate indicated support for Levin-Reed last July when 
we voted 53 to 46 to cut off the filibuster of the Republican 
leadership against the Levin-Reed amendment. Madam President, 53 to 46 
was the vote.
  The Levin-Reed amendment required the Secretary of Defense to begin a 
reduction in the number of U.S. forces in Iraq not later than 120 days 
after the date of enactment. It would have also required a transition 
to a limited presence only to carry out the missions of protecting U.S. 
and coalition personnel and infrastructure, training, equipping, and 
providing logistics support--and those are important words--to the 
Iraqi security forces and engaging in targeted counterterrorism 
operations against al-Qaida, al-Qaida affiliated groups, and other 
international terrorist organizations. The transition to the limited 
presence in mission would have had to have been completed by April 30, 
2008. This reduction would have been implemented along with a 
comprehensive diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that 
includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the 
international community.
  The continued inability of the Iraqi Government to make any progress 
toward a political settlement and the refusal of the Bush 
administration to change course reinforces the need for the Levin-Reed 
amendment. So that amendment is now before us. It is essentially the 
same as the amendment we voted on last July. The changes in the 
timetable are slight to accommodate the fact that we are voting at a 
later time, essentially. We would require the reduction to begin no 
later than 90 days after the date of enactment and to be completed 
within 9 months of the date of enactment in order to adjust the 
timetable to be both clear and to respond to the fact that we will be 
voting on this months later than the last vote in July.

  The challenge before us is to get to the 60 votes. Sixty votes is the 
goal that I guess almost all our Iraq legislation has to meet because 
of the filibuster that took place the last time we offered Levin-Reed 
and because the threat of that filibuster exists again.
  The reality is that we are going to continue to plug away to get to 
those 60 votes. We hope we can get them on this version of Levin-Reed. 
It is a version which finally, if we can get to the 60 votes and defeat 
this filibuster, will change course in Iraq. The majority of us in this 
Senate have voted to change course in Iraq, in effect, when there were 
53 of us who voted to end the filibuster last July.
  The majority of the American people clearly want a change of course 
in Iraq. They do not want a precipitous withdrawal. They understand we 
are going to need some troops there for force protection and for 
training of the Iraqi Army and for providing logistics to the Iraqi 
Army and for some targeted counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaida, 
their affiliates, and other terrorist groups. The American people 
understand. They want something that is

[[Page S11810]]

planned in terms of reduction of our forces, and they want a timetable. 
What they want more than anything else is to get the Iraqi leaders to 
end their dawdling so our troops can come home.
  Everybody wants a stable, independent Iraq. The course we are on now, 
the course of status quo, an open-ended course, the course of, ``well, 
we will figure out next July whether we want to go further, whether we 
want to go below the presurge level,'' that stagnant course is exactly 
the wrong signal to the Iraqi leaders.
  The course the President is on keeps that open-ended commitment of 
American forces. It does not do what we must do, and because the 
President will not do it, Congress must do it, which is to tell the 
Iraqis that the future of their country is in their hands and we will 
continue to be helpful.
  We have given them an opportunity they have not seized, and 4\1/2\ 
years later, almost 4,000 American troops have been killed, 7 times 
that many wounded, $600 billion now spent, $10 billion more every 
month. It has to come to an end. We want to bring it to a successful 
end. We cannot do it militarily. Every military leader says there is no 
military solution. There is only a political solution, and only the 
Iraqi political leaders can achieve it.
  That is what this amendment will help to bring about, that final 
statement to the Iraqi leaders: We cannot save you from yourselves.
  I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Whitehouse.) The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


 Amendments Nos. 2875, 2865, 2867, 2868, 2871, 2866, 2869, 2293, 2285, 
  2880, 2892, 2278, 2119, 2123, 2921, 2233, as Modified, 2299, 2300, 
 2864, 2262, 2939, 2940, 2893, and 2941 to Amendment No. 2011, En Bloc

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send a series of 24 amendments to the 
desk which have been cleared on both sides. I ask unanimous consent 
that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc; that the amendments 
be agreed to; that the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table; 
and that any statements relating to any of these individual amendments 
be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. GRAHAM. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments were agreed to, as follows:


                           amendment no. 2875

 (Purpose: To provide certain limitations to the issuance of security 
                              clearances)

       Strike section 1064 and insert the following:

     SEC. 1064. SECURITY CLEARANCES; LIMITATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Title III of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b) is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 3002. SECURITY CLEARANCES; LIMITATIONS.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Controlled substance.--The term `controlled 
     substance' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802).
       ``(2) Covered person.--The term `covered person' means--
       ``(A) an officer or employee of a Federal agency;
       ``(B) a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine 
     Corps who is on active duty or is in an active status; and
       ``(C) an officer or employee of a contractor of a Federal 
     agency.
       ``(3) Restricted data.--The term `Restricted Data' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 11 of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014).
       ``(4) Special access program.--The term `special access 
     program' has the meaning given that term in section 4.1 of 
     Executive Order 12958 (60 Fed. Reg. 19825).
       ``(b) Prohibition.--After January 1, 2008, the head of a 
     Federal agency may not grant or renew a security clearance 
     for a covered person who is--
       ``(1) an unlawful user of, or is addicted to, a controlled 
     substance; or
       ``(2) mentally incompetent, as determined by an 
     adjudicating authority, based on an evaluation by a duly 
     qualified mental health professional employed by, or 
     acceptable to and approved by, the United States government 
     and in accordance with the adjudicative guidelines required 
     by subsection (d).
       ``(c) Disqualification.--
       ``(1) In general.--After January 1, 2008, absent an express 
     written waiver granted in accordance with paragraph (2), the 
     head of a Federal agency may not grant or renew a security 
     clearance described in paragraph (3) for a covered person who 
     has been--
       ``(A) convicted in any court of the United States of a 
     crime, was sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 
     year, and was incarcerated as a result of that sentence for 
     not less than 1 year; or
       ``(B) discharged or dismissed from the Armed Forces under 
     dishonorable conditions.
       ``(2) Waiver authority.--In a meritorious case, an 
     exception to the disqualification in this subsection may be 
     authorized if there are mitigating factors. Any such waiver 
     may be authorized only in accordance with standards and 
     procedures prescribed by, or under the authority of, an 
     Executive Order or other guidance issued by the President.
       ``(3) Covered security clearances.--This subsection applies 
     to security clearances that provide for access to--
       ``(A) special access programs;
       ``(B) Restricted Data; or
       ``(C) any other information commonly referred to as 
     `sensitive compartmented information'.
       ``(4) Annual report.--
       ``(A) Requirement for report.--Not later than February 1 of 
     each year, the head of a Federal agency shall submit a report 
     to the appropriate committees of Congress if such agency 
     employs or employed a person for whom a waiver was granted in 
     accordance with paragraph (2) during the preceding year. Such 
     annual report shall not reveal the identity of such person, 
     but shall include for each waiver issued the disqualifying 
     factor under paragraph (1) and the reasons for the waiver of 
     the disqualifying factor.
       ``(B) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
       ``(i) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     `appropriate committees of Congress' means, with respect to a 
     report submitted under subparagraph (A) by the head of a 
     Federal agency--

       ``(I) the congressional intelligence committees;
       ``(II) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate;
       ``(III) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of 
     the House of Representatives; and
       ``(IV) each Committee of the Senate or the House of 
     Representatives with oversight authority over such Federal 
     agency.

       ``(ii) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     `congressional intelligence committees' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401a).
       ``(d) Adjudicative Guidelines.--
       ``(1) Requirement to establish.--The President shall 
     establish adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility 
     for access to classified information.
       ``(2) Requirements related to mental health.--The 
     guidelines required by paragraph (1) shall--
       ``(A) include procedures and standards under which a 
     covered person is determined to be mentally incompetent and 
     provide a means to appeal such a determination; and
       ``(B) require that no negative inference concerning the 
     standards in the guidelines may be raised solely on the basis 
     of seeking mental health counseling.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Repeal.--Section 986 of title 10, United States Code, 
     is repealed.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 49 of such title is amended by striking 
     the item relating to section 986.
       (3) Effective date.--The amendments made by this subsection 
     shall take effect on January 1, 2008.


                           amendment no. 2865

 (Purpose: To authorize the Secretary of Defense to expand the persons 
            eligible for continued health benefits coverage)

       At the end of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 703. AUTHORITY FOR EXPANSION OF PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR 
                   CONTINUED HEALTH BENEFITS COVERAGE.

       (a) Authority To Specify Additional Eligible Persons.--
     Subsection (b) of section 1078a of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) Any other person specified in regulations prescribed 
     by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of this paragraph 
     who loses entitlement to health care services under this 
     chapter or section 1145 of this title, subject to such terms 
     and conditions as the Secretary shall prescribe in the 
     regulations.''.
       (b) Election of Coverage.--Subsection (d) of such section 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) In the case of a person described in subsection 
     (b)(4), by such date as the Secretary shall prescribe in the 
     regulations required for purposes of that subsection.''.
       (c) Period of Coverage.--Subsection (g)(1) of such section 
     is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) in the case of a person described in subsection 
     (b)(4), the date that is 36 months after the date on which 
     the person loses entitlement to health care services as 
     described in that subsection.''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 2867

(Purpose: To repeal the authority for payment of a uniform allowance to 
            civilian employees of the Department of Defense)

       At the end of title XI, add the following:

[[Page S11811]]

     SEC. 1107. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY FOR PAYMENT OF UNIFORM 
                   ALLOWANCE TO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Repeal.--Section 1593 of title 10, United States Code, 
     is repealed.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 81 of such title is amended by striking 
     the item relating to section 1593.


                           amendment no. 2868

   (Purpose: To provide for a continuation of eligiblity for TRICARE 
     Standard coverage for certain members of the Selected Reserve)

       At the end of title VII, add the following:

     SEC. 703. CONTINUATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR TRICARE STANDARD 
                   COVERAGE FOR CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE SELECTED 
                   RESERVE.

       (a) In General.--Section 706(f) of the John Warner National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 
     109-364; 120 Stat. 2282; 10 U.S.C. 1076d note) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Enrollments'' and inserting ``(1) Except 
     as provided in paragraph (2), enrollments''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) The enrollment of a member in TRICARE Standard that 
     is in effect on the day before health care under TRICARE 
     Standard is provided pursuant to the effective date in 
     subsection (g) shall not be terminated by operation of the 
     exclusion of eligibility under subsection (a)(2) of such 
     section 1076d, as so amended, for the duration of the 
     eligibility of the member under TRICARE Standard as in effect 
     on October 16, 2006.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on October 1, 2007.


                           amendment no. 2871

(Purpose: To provide flexibility in paying annuities to certain Federal 
                      retirees who return to work)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. FLEXIBILITY IN PAYING ANNUITIES TO CERTAIN FEDERAL 
                   RETIREES WHO RETURN TO WORK.

       (a) In General.--Section 9902(j) of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(j) Provisions Relating to Reemployment.--
       ``(1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), if an 
     annuitant receiving an annuity from the Civil Service 
     Retirement and Disability Fund becomes employed in a position 
     within the Department of Defense, his annuity shall continue. 
     An annuitant so reemployed shall not be considered an 
     employee for purposes of chapter 83 or 84.
       ``(2)(A) An annuitant receiving an annuity from the Civil 
     Service Retirement and Disability Fund who becomes employed 
     in a position within the Department of Defense following 
     retirement under section 8336(d)(1) or 8414(b)(1)(A) shall be 
     subject to section 8344 or 8468.
       ``(B) The Secretary of Defense may, under procedures and 
     criteria prescribed under subparagraph (C), waive the 
     application of the provisions of section 8344 or 8468 on a 
     case-by-case or group basis, for employment of an annuitant 
     referred to in subparagraph (A) in a position in the 
     Department of Defense.
       ``(C) The Secretary shall prescribe procedures for the 
     exercise of any authority under this paragraph, including 
     criteria for any exercise of authority and procedures for a 
     delegation of authority.
       ``(D) An employee as to whom a waiver under this paragraph 
     is in effect shall not be considered an employee for purposes 
     of subchapter III of chapter 83 or chapter 84.
       ``(3)(A) An annuitant retired under section 8336(d)(1) or 
     8414(b)(1)(A) receiving an annuity from the Civil Service 
     Retirement and Disability Fund, who is employed in a position 
     within the Department of Defense after the date of enactment 
     of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2004 (Public Law 108-136), may elect to begin coverage under 
     paragraph (2) of this subsection.
       ``(B) An election for coverage under this paragraph shall 
     be filed not later than the later of 90 days after the date 
     the Department of Defense--
       ``(i) prescribes regulations to carry out this subsection; 
     or
       ``(ii) takes reasonable actions to notify employees who may 
     file an election.
       ``(C) If an employee files an election under this 
     paragraph, coverage shall be effective beginning on the date 
     of the filing of the election.
       ``(D) Paragraph (1) shall apply to an individual who is 
     eligible to file an election under subparagraph (A) of this 
     paragraph and does not file a timely election under 
     subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.''.
       (b) Regulations.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     prescribe regulations to carry out the amendment made by this 
     section.


                           amendment no. 2866

   (Purpose: To authorize demonstration projects on the provision of 
          services to military dependent children with autism)

       At the end of subtitle H of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 594. DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS ON THE PROVISION OF SERVICES 
                   TO MILITARY DEPENDENT CHILDREN WITH AUTISM.

       (a) Demonstration Projects Authorized.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense may conduct one 
     or more demonstration projects to evaluate improved 
     approaches to the provision of education and treatment 
     services to military dependent children with autism.
       (2) Purpose.--The purpose of any demonstration project 
     carried out under this section shall be to evaluate 
     strategies for integrated treatment and case manager services 
     that include early intervention and diagnosis, medical care, 
     parent involvement, special education services, intensive 
     behavioral intervention, and language, communications, and 
     other interventions considered appropriate by the Secretary.
       (b) Review of Best Practices.--In carrying out 
     demonstration projects under this section, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
     Education, conduct a review of best practices in the United 
     States in the provision of education and treatment services 
     for children with autism, including an assessment of Federal 
     and State education and treatment services for children with 
     autism in each State, with an emphasis on locations where 
     members of the Armed Forces who qualify for enrollment in the 
     Exceptional Family Member Program of the Department of 
     Defense are assigned.
       (c) Elements.--
       (1) Enrollment in exceptional family member program.--
     Military dependent children may participate in a 
     demonstration project under this section only if their 
     military sponsor is enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member 
     Program of the Department of Defense.
       (2) Case managers.--Each demonstration project shall 
     include the assignment of both medical and special education 
     services case managers which shall be required under the 
     Exceptional Family Member Program pursuant to the policy 
     established by the Secretary of Defense.
       (3) Individualized services plan.--Each demonstration 
     project shall provide for the voluntary development for 
     military dependent children with autism participating in such 
     demonstration project of individualized autism services plans 
     for use by Department of Defense medical and special 
     education services case managers, caregivers, and families to 
     ensure continuity of services throughout the active military 
     service of their military sponsor.
       (4) Supervisory level providers.--The Secretary of Defense 
     may utilize for purposes of the demonstration projects 
     personnel who are professionals with a level (as determined 
     by the Secretary) of post-secondary education that is 
     appropriate for the provision of safe and effective services 
     for autism and who are from an accredited educational 
     facility in the mental health, human development, social 
     work, or education field to act as supervisory level 
     providers of behavioral intervention services for autism. In 
     so acting, such personnel may be authorized--
       (A) to develop and monitor intensive behavior intervention 
     plans for military dependent children with autism who are 
     participating in the demonstration projects; and
       (B) to provide appropriate training in the provision of 
     approved services to such children.
       (5) Services under corporate services provider model.--(A) 
     In carrying out the demonstration projects, the Secretary may 
     utilize a corporate services provider model.
       (B) Employees of a provider under a model referred to in 
     subparagraph (A) shall include personnel who implement 
     special educational and behavioral intervention plans for 
     military dependent children with autism that are developed, 
     reviewed, and maintained by supervisory level providers 
     approved by the Secretary.
       (C) In authorizing such a model, the Secretary shall 
     establish--
       (i) minimum education, training, and experience criteria 
     required to be met by employees who provide services to 
     military dependent children with autism;
       (ii) requirements for supervisory personnel and 
     supervision, including requirements for supervisor 
     credentials and for the frequency and intensity of 
     supervision; and
       (iii) such other requirements as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate to ensure safety and the protection of the 
     children who receive services from such employees under the 
     demonstration projects.
       (6) Construction with other services.--Services provided to 
     military dependent children with autism under the 
     demonstration projects under this section shall be in 
     addition to any other publicly-funded special education 
     services available in a location in which their military 
     sponsor resides.
       (d) Period.--
       (1) Commencement.--If the Secretary determines to conduct 
     demonstration projects under this section, the Secretary 
     shall commence any such demonstration projects not later than 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) Minimum period.--Any demonstration projects conducted 
     under this section shall be conducted for not less than two 
     years.
       (e) Evaluation.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct an evaluation 
     of each demonstration project conducted under this section.
       (2) Elements.--The evaluation of a demonstration project 
     under this subsection shall include the following:
       (A) An assessment of the extent to which the activities 
     under the demonstration project contributed to positive 
     outcomes for military dependent children with autism and 
     their families.

[[Page S11812]]

       (B) An assessment of the extent to which the activities 
     under the demonstration project led to improvements in 
     services and continuity of care for children with autism.
       (C) An assessment of the extent to which the activities 
     under the demonstration project improved military family 
     readiness and enhanced military retention.
       (f) Reports.--Not later than 30 months after the 
     commencement of any demonstration project authorized by this 
     section, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on 
     Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
     a report on such demonstration project. The report on a 
     demonstration project shall include a description of such 
     project, the results of the evaluation under subsection (e) 
     with respect to such project, and a description of plans for 
     the further provision of services for military dependent 
     children with autism under such project.


                           Amendment No. 2869

 (Purpose: To authorize increases in compensation for the faculty and 
   staff of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences)

       At the end of title XI, add the following:

     SEC. 1107. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED COMPENSATION FOR 
                   FACULTY AND STAFF OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES 
                   UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES.

       Section 2113(f) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``so as'' and inserting ``after 
     consideration of the compensation necessary''; and
       (B) by striking ``within the vicinity of the District of 
     Columbia'' and inserting ``identified by the Secretary for 
     purposes of this paragraph''; and
       (2) in paragraph (4)--
       (A) by striking ``section 5373'' and inserting ``sections 
     5307 and 5373''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``In 
     no case may the total amount of compensation paid under 
     paragraph (1) in any year exceed the total amount of annual 
     compensation (excluding expenses) specified in section 102 of 
     title 3.''.


                           Amendment No. 2293

(Purpose: To authorize the transfer to the Government of Iraq of three 
                   C--130E tactical airlift aircraft)

       At the end of subtitle D of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 143. TRANSFER TO GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ OF THREE C-130E 
                   TACTICAL AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT.

       The Secretary of the Air Force may transfer not more than 
     three C-130E tactical airlift aircraft, allowed to be retired 
     under the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364), to the Government of 
     Iraq.


                           Amendment No. 2285

(Purpose: To require recurring reports on the readiness of the National 
                    Guard for domestic emergencies)

       At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 358. REPORTS ON NATIONAL GUARD READINESS FOR DOMESTIC 
                   EMERGENCIES.

       (a) Annual Reports on Equipment.--Section 10541(b) of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraphs:
       ``(9) An assessment of the extent to which the National 
     Guard possesses the equipment required to respond to domestic 
     emergencies, including large scale, multi-State disasters and 
     terrorist attacks.
       ``(10) An assessment of the shortfalls, if any, in National 
     Guard equipment throughout the United States, and an 
     assessment of the effect of such shortfalls on the capacity 
     of the National Guard to respond to domestic emergencies.
       ``(11) Strategies and investment priorities for equipment 
     for the National Guard to ensure that the National Guard 
     possesses the equipment required to respond in a timely and 
     effective way to domestic emergencies.''.
       (b) Inclusion of National Guard Readiness in Quarterly 
     Personnel and Unit Readiness Report.--Section 482 of such 
     title is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``and (e)'' and 
     inserting ``(e), and (f)'';
       (2) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g);
       (3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
     subsection (f):
       ``(f) Readiness of National Guard to Perform Civil Support 
     Missions.--(1) Each report shall also include an assessment 
     of the readiness of the National Guard to perform tasks 
     required to support the National Response Plan for support to 
     civil authorities.
       ``(2) Any information in a report under this subsection 
     that is relevant to the National Guard of a particular State 
     shall also be made available to the Governor of that 
     State.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a) 
     and (b) shall apply with respect to reports submitted after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (d) Report on Implementation.--
       (1) In general.--As part of the budget justification 
     materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget of 
     the President for fiscal year 2009 (as submitted under 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code), the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
     committees a report on actions taken by the Secretary to 
     achieve the implementation of the amendments made by this 
     section.
       (2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include 
     a description of the mechanisms to be utilized by the 
     Secretary for assessing the personnel, equipment, and 
     training readiness of the National Guard, including the 
     standards and measures that will be applied and mechanisms 
     for sharing information on such matters with the Governors of 
     the States.


                           amendment no. 2880

 (Purpose: To require a report on the High-Altitude Aviation Training 
                            Site, Colorado)

       At the end of subtitle E of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 358. REPORT ON HIGH-ALTITUDE AVIATION TRAINING SITE, 
                   COLORADO.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall 
     submit to the congressional defense committees a report on 
     the High-Altitude Aviation Training Site at Gypsum, Colorado.
       (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) a summary of costs for each of the previous 5 years 
     associated with transporting aircraft to and from the High-
     Altitude Aviation Training Site for training purposes; and
       (2) an analysis of potential cost savings and operational 
     benefits, if any, of permanently stationing no less than 4 
     UH-60, 2 CH-47, and 2 LUH-72 aircraft at the High-Altitude 
     Aviation Training Site.


                           amendment no. 2892

 (Purpose: To require information regarding asymmetric capabilities in 
  the annual report on the military power of the People's Republic of 
                                 China)

       At the end of subtitle C of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1234. INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON ASYMMETRIC 
                   CAPABILITIES IN ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER 
                   OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9) Developments in asymmetric capabilities, including 
     cyberwarfare, including--
       ``(A) detailed analyses of the countries targeted;
       ``(B) the specific vulnerabilities targeted in these 
     countries;
       ``(C) the tactical and strategic effects sought by 
     developing threats to such targets; and
       ``(D) an appendix detailing specific examples of tests and 
     development of these asymmetric capabilities.''.


                           Amendment no. 2278

      (Purpose: To authorize a land exchange in Detroit, Michigan)

       At the end of subtitle E of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2854. LAND EXCHANGE, DETROIT, MICHIGAN.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the 
     Administrator of General Services.
       (2) City.--The term ``City'' means the city of Detroit, 
     Michigan.
       (3) City land.--The term ``City land'' means the 
     approximately 0.741 acres of real property, including any 
     improvement thereon, as depicted on the exchange maps, that 
     is commonly identified as 110 Mount Elliott Street, Detroit, 
     Michigan.
       (4) Commandant.--The term ``Commandant'' means the 
     Commandant of the United States Coast Guard.
       (5) EDC.--The term ``EDC'' means the Economic Development 
     Corporation of the City of Detroit.
       (6) Exchange maps.--The term ``exchange maps'' means the 
     maps entitled ``Atwater Street Land Exchange Maps'' prepared 
     pursuant to subsection (h).
       (7) Federal land.--The term ``Federal land'' means 
     approximately 1.26 acres of real property, including any 
     improvements thereon, as depicted on the exchange maps, that 
     is commonly identified as 2660 Atwater Street, Detroit, 
     Michigan, and under the administrative control of the United 
     States Coast Guard.
       (8) Sector detroit.--The term ``Sector Detroit'' means 
     Coast Guard Sector Detroit of the Ninth Coast Guard District.
       (b) Conveyance Authorized.--The Commandant of the Coast 
     Guard, in coordination with the Administrator, may convey to 
     the EDC all right, title, and interest in and to the Federal 
     land.
       (c) Consideration.--
       (1) In general.--As consideration for the conveyance under 
     subsection (b)--
       (A) the City shall convey to the United States all right, 
     title, and interest in and to the City land; and
       (B) the EDC shall construct a facility and parking lot 
     acceptable to the Commandant of the Coast Guard.
       (2) Equalization payment option.--
       (A) In general.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard may, 
     upon the agreement of the City and the EDC, waive the 
     requirement to construct a facility and parking lot under 
     paragraph (1)(B) and accept in lieu thereof an equalization 
     payment from the City equal to the difference between the 
     value, as determined by the Administrator at the time of 
     transfer, of the Federal land and the City land.

[[Page S11813]]

       (B) Availability of funds.--Any amounts received pursuant 
     to subparagraph (A) shall be available without further 
     appropriation and shall remain available until expended to 
     construct, expand, or improve facilities related to Sector 
     Detroit's aids to navigation or vessel maintenance.
       (d) Conditions of Exchange.--
       (1) Covenants.--All conditions placed within the deeds of 
     title shall be construed as covenants running with the land.
       (2) Authority to accept quitclaim deed.--The Commandant may 
     accept a quitclaim deed for the City land and may convey the 
     Federal land by quitclaim deed.
       (3) Environmental remediation.--Prior to the time of the 
     exchange, the Coast Guard and the City shall remediate any 
     and all contaminants existing on their respective properties 
     to levels required by applicable state and Federal law.
       (e) Authority to Enter Into License or Lease.--The 
     Commandant may enter into a license or lease agreement with 
     the Detroit Riverfront Conservancy for the use of a portion 
     of the Federal land for the Detroit Riverfront Walk. Such 
     license or lease shall be at no cost to the City and upon 
     such other terms that are acceptable to the Commandant, and 
     shall terminate upon the exchange authorized by this section, 
     or the date specified in subsection (h), whichever occurs 
     earlier.
       (f) Map and Legal Descriptions of Land.--
       (1) In general.--As soon as practicable after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Commandant shall file with the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
     of the House of Representatives maps, entitled ``Atwater 
     Street Land Exchange Maps,'' which depict the Federal land 
     and the City lands and provide a legal description of each 
     property to be exchanged.
       (2) Force of law.--The maps and legal descriptions filed 
     under paragraph (1) shall have the same force and effect as 
     if included in this Act, except that the Commandant may 
     correct typographical errors in the maps and each legal 
     description.
       (3) Public availability.--Each map and legal description 
     filed under paragraph (1) shall be on file and available for 
     public inspection in the appropriate offices of the Coast 
     Guard and the City of Detroit.
       (g) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Commandant may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the exchange under this section as the Commandant 
     considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United 
     States.
       (h) Expiration of Authority To Convey.--The authority to 
     enter into an exchange authorized by this section shall 
     expire 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 2119

    (Purpose: To require a report from the Inspector General of the 
 Department of Defense on a pilot program for the imposition of fines 
    for noncompliance of contractor personnel with requirements for 
contractor personnel performing private security functions in areas of 
                           combat operations)

       At the end of section 871(b), add following:
       (5) Inspector general report on pilot program on imposition 
     of fines for noncompliance of personnel with clause.--Not 
     later than January 30, 2008, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Defense shall submit to Congress a report 
     assessing the feasibility and advisability of carrying out a 
     pilot program for the imposition of fines on contractors or 
     subcontractors for personnel who violate or fail to comply 
     with applicable requirements of the clause required by this 
     section as a mechanism for enhancing the compliance of such 
     personnel with the clause. The report shall include--
       (A) an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of 
     carrying out the pilot program; and
       (B) if the Inspector General determines that carrying out 
     the pilot program is feasible and advisable--
       (i) recommendations on the range of contracts and 
     subcontracts to which the pilot program should apply; and
       (ii) a schedule of fines to be imposed under the pilot 
     program for various types of personnel actions or failures.


                           amendment no. 2123

   (Purpose: To provide for training on contingency contracting for 
    contractor personnel outside the defense acquisition workforce)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VIII, add the following:

     SEC. 865. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL 
                   OUTSIDE THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE.

       (a) Training Requirement.--Section 2333 of title 10, United 
     States Code is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection (e):
       ``(e) Training for Personnel Outside Acquisition 
     Workforce.--(1) The joint policy for requirements definition, 
     contingency program management, and contingency contracting 
     required by subsection (a) shall provide for training of 
     military personnel outside the acquisition workforce 
     (including operational field commanders and officers 
     performing key staff functions for operational field 
     commanders) who are expected to have acquisition 
     responsibility, including oversight duties associated with 
     contracts or contractors, during combat operations, post-
     conflict operations, and contingency operations.
       ``(2) Training under paragraph (1) shall be sufficient to 
     ensure that the military personnel referred to in that 
     paragraph understand the scope and scale of contractor 
     support they will experience in contingency operations and 
     are prepared for their roles and responsibilities with regard 
     to requirements definition, program management (including 
     contractor oversight), and contingency contracting.
       ``(3) The joint policy shall also provide for the 
     incorporation of contractors and contract operations in 
     mission readiness exercises for operations that will include 
     contracting and contractor support.''.
       (b) Comptroller General Report.--Section 854(c) of the John 
     Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2007 (Public Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2346) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Comptroller general report.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits the 
     final report required by paragraph (2), the Comptroller 
     General of the United States shall--
       ``(A) review the joint policies developed by the Secretary, 
     including the implementation of such policies; and
       ``(B) submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the 
     Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the 
     extent to which such policies. and the implementation of such 
     policies, comply with the requirements of section 2333 of 
     title 10, United States Code (as so added).''.


                           amendment no. 2921

  (Purpose: To require a plan for the participation of members of the 
 National Guard and the Reserves in the benefits delivery at discharge 
                                program)

       At the end of subtitle F of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 683. PLAN FOR PARTICIPATION OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL 
                   GUARD AND THE RESERVES IN THE BENEFITS DELIVERY 
                   AT DISCHARGE PROGRAM.

       (a) Plan To Maximize Participation.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
     shall jointly submit to Congress a plan to maximize access to 
     the benefits delivery at discharge program for members of the 
     reserve components of the Armed Forces who have been called 
     or ordered to active duty at any time since September 11, 
     2001.
       (b) Elements.--The plan submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include a description of efforts to ensure that 
     services under the benefits delivery at discharge program are 
     provided, to the maximum extent practicable--
       (1) at appropriate military installations;
       (2) at appropriate armories and military family support 
     centers of the National Guard;
       (3) at appropriate military medical care facilities at 
     which members of the Armed Forces are separated or discharged 
     from the Armed Forces;
       (4) in the case of a member on the temporary disability 
     retired list under section 1202 or 1205 of title 10, United 
     States Code, who is being retired under another provision of 
     such title or is being discharged, at a location reasonably 
     convenient to the member; and
       (5) that services described in the plan can be provided 
     within resources available to the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Veterans Affairs in the appropriate fiscal 
     year.
       (c) Benefits Delivery at Discharge Program Defined.--In 
     this section, the term ``benefits delivery at discharge 
     program'' means a program administered jointly by the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to 
     provide information and assistance on available benefits and 
     other transition assistance to members of the Armed Forces 
     who are separating from the Armed Forces, including 
     assistance to obtain any disability benefits for which such 
     members may be eligible.


                    amendment no. 2233, as modified

       At the end of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1070. REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF HOUSING A NATIONAL 
                   DISASTER RESPONSE CENTER AT KELLY AIR FIELD, 
                   SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than March 31, 2008, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report on the feasibility of utilizing 
     existing infrastructure or installing new infrastructure at 
     Kelly Air Field, San Antonio, Texas, to house a National 
     Disaster Response Center for responding to man-made and 
     natural disasters in the United States.
       (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) A determination of how the National Disaster Response 
     Center would organize and leverage capabilities of the 
     following currently co-located organizations, facilities, and 
     forces located in San Antonio, Texas:
       (A) Lackland Air Force Base.
       (B) Fort Sam Houston.
       (C) Brooke Army Medical Center.
       (D) Wilford Hall Medical Center.
       (E) Audie Murphy Veterans Administration Medical Center.
       (F) 433rd Airlift Wing C-5 Heavy Lift Aircraft.
       (G) 149 Fighter Wing and Texas Air National Guard F-16 
     fighter aircraft.
       (H) Army Northern Command.
       (I) The National Trauma Institute's three level 1 trauma 
     centers.
       (J) Texas Medical Rangers.

[[Page S11814]]

       (K) San Antonio Metro Health Department.
       (L) The University of Texas Health Science Center at San 
     Antonio.
       (M) The Air Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
     Agency at Lackland Air Force Base.
       (N) The United States Air Force Security Police Training 
     Department at Lackland Air Force Base.
       (O) The large manpower pools and blood donor pools from the 
     more than 6,000 trainees at Lackland Air Force Base.
       (2) Determine the number of military and civilian personnel 
     required to be mobilized to run the logistics, planning, and 
     maintenance of the National Disaster Response Center during a 
     time of disaster recovery.
       (3) Determine the number of military and civilian personnel 
     required to run the logistics, planning, and maintenance of 
     the National Disaster Response Center during a time when no 
     disaster is occurring.
       (4) Determine the cost of improving the current 
     infrastructure at Kelly Air Field to meet the needs of 
     displaced victims of a disaster equivalent to that of 
     Hurricanes Katrina and Rita or a natural or man-made disaster 
     of similar scope, including adequate beds, food stores, and 
     decontamination stations to triage radiation or other 
     chemical or biological agent contamination victims.
       (5) An evaluation of the current capability of the 
     Department of Defense to respond to these mission 
     requirements and an assessment of any additional capabilities 
     that are required.
       (6) An assessment of the costs and benefits of adding such 
     capabilities at Kelly Air Field to the costs and benefits of 
     other locations.


                           amendment no. 2299

   (Purpose: To require consideration of small business concerns in 
evaluating actions that should be taken to address any disadvantage in 
 the performance of contracts to actual and potential contractors and 
  subcontractors of the Department of Defense when employees of such 
contractors and subcontractors are mobilized as part of a United States 
                      military operation overseas)

       On page 235, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:
       (4) For any action addressed under paragraph (3)--
       (A) the impact of that action on small business concerns 
     (as that term is defined in section 3 of the Small Business 
     Act (15 U.S.C. 632)); and
       (B) how contractors and subcontractors that are small 
     business concerns may assist in addressing any such 
     disadvantage.


                           amendment no. 2300

(Purpose: To require relevant reports to be submitted to the Committee 
         on Small Business and Entrepreneurship of the Senate)

       On page 351, strike lines 7 through 10 and insert the 
     following:
       (v) the Committee on Foreign Relations;
       (vi) the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship; 
     and
       (vii) the Select Committee on Intelligence.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 2864

(Purpose: To modify the provisions relating to mandatory separation for 
years of service of Reserve officers in the grade of lieutenant general 
                            or vice admiral)

       On page 96, line 6, insert after ``commissioned service'' 
     the following: ``or on the fifth anniversary of the date of 
     the officer's appointment in the grade of lieutenant general 
     or vice admiral, whichever is later''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 2262

(Purpose: To modify the sunset date for the Office of the Ombudsman of 
    the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program)

       At the end of title XXXI, add the following:

     SEC. 3126. MODIFICATION OF SUNSET DATE OF THE OFFICE OF THE 
                   OMBUDSMAN OF THE ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL 
                   ILLNESS COMPENSATION PROGRAM.

       Section 3686(g) of the Energy Employees Occupational 
     Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 7385s-
     15(g)) is amended by striking ``on the date that is 3 years 
     after the date of the enactment of this section'' and 
     inserting ``October 28, 2012''.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 2939

 (Purpose: To provide for independent management reviews of contracts 
                             for services)

       At the end of subtitle C of title VIII, add the following:

     SEC. 847. INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT REVIEWS OF CONTRACTS FOR 
                   SERVICES.

       (a) Guidance and Instructions.--Not later than 120 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall issue guidance, with detailed implementation 
     instructions, for the Department of Defense to provide for 
     periodic independent management reviews of contracts for 
     services. The independent management review procedures issued 
     pursuant to this section shall be designed to evaluate, at a 
     minimum--
       (1) contract performance in terms of cost, schedule, and 
     requirements;
       (2) the use of contracting mechanisms, including the use of 
     competition, the contract structure and type, the definition 
     of contract requirements, cost or pricing methods, the award 
     and negotiation of task orders, and management and oversight 
     mechanisms;
       (3) the contractor's use, management, and oversight of 
     subcontractors; and
       (4) the staffing of contract management and oversight 
     functions.
       (b) Elements.--The guidance and instructions issued 
     pursuant to subsection (a) shall address, at a minimum--
       (1) the contracts subject to independent management 
     reviews, including any applicable thresholds and exceptions;
       (2) the frequency with which independent management reviews 
     shall be conducted;
       (3) the composition of teams designated to perform 
     independent management reviews;
       (4) any phase-in requirements needed to ensure that 
     qualified staff are available to perform independent 
     management reviews;
       (5) procedures for tracking the implementation of 
     recommendations made by independent management review teams; 
     and
       (6) procedures for developing and disseminating lessons 
     learned from independent management reviews.
       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Report on guidance and instruction.--Not later than 150 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report setting forth the guidance and 
     instructions issued pursuant to subsection (a).
       (2) GAO report on implementation.--Not later than two years 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller 
     General of the United States shall submit to the 
     congressional defense committees a report on the 
     implementation of the guidance and instructions issued 
     pursuant to subsection (a).


                           AMENDMENT NO. 2940

(Purpose: To provide for the enforcement of requirements applicable to 
                   undefinitized contractual action)

       At the end of subtitle C of title VIII, add the following:

     SEC. 847. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS 
                   APPLICABLE TO UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTUAL 
                   ACTIONS.

       (a) Guidance and Instructions.--Not later than 120 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall issue guidance, with detailed implementation 
     instructions, for the Department of Defense to ensure the 
     implementation and enforcement of requirements applicable to 
     undefinitized contractual actions.
       (b) Elements.--The guidance and instructions issued 
     pursuant to subsection (a) shall address, at a minimum--
       (1) the circumstances in which it is, and is not, 
     appropriate for Department of Defense officials to use 
     undefinitized contractual actions;
       (2) approval requirements (including thresholds) for the 
     use of undefinitized contractual actions;
       (3) procedures for ensuring that schedules for the 
     definitization of undefinitized contractual actions are not 
     exceeded;
       (4) procedures for ensuring compliance with limitations on 
     the obligation of funds pursuant to undefinitized contractual 
     actions (including, where feasible, the obligation of less 
     than the maximum allowed at time of award);
       (5) procedures (including appropriate documentation 
     requirements) for ensuring that reduced risk is taken into 
     account in negotiating profit or fee with respect to costs 
     incurred before the definitization of an undefinitized 
     contractual action; and
       (6) reporting requirements for undefinitized contractual 
     actions that fail to meet required schedules or limitations 
     on the obligation of funds.
       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Report on guidance and instructions.--Not later than 
     150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report setting forth the guidance and 
     instructions issued pursuant to subsection (a).
       (2) GAO report.--Not later than two years after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall submit to the congressional defense 
     committees a report on the extent to which the guidance and 
     instructions issued pursuant to subsection (a) have resulted 
     in improvements to--
       (A) the level of insight that senior Department of Defense 
     officials have into the use of undefinitized contractual 
     actions;
       (B) the appropriate use of undefinitized contractual 
     actions;
       (C) the timely definitization of undefinitized contractual 
     actions; and
       (D) the negotiation of appropriate profits and fees for 
     undefinitized contractual actions.


                           Amendment No. 2893

 (Purpose: To enhance the national defense through empowerment of the 
Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the enhancement of the functions 
                     of the National Guard Bureau)

       At the end of division A, add the following:

      TITLE XVI--NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS

     SEC. 1601. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``National Guard Empowerment 
     Act of 2007''.

[[Page S11815]]

     SEC. 1602. EXPANDED AUTHORITY OF CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD 
                   BUREAU AND EXPANDED FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL 
                   GUARD BUREAU.

       (a) Expanded Authority.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 10501 of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended by striking ``joint bureau 
     of the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air 
     Force'' and inserting ``joint activity of the Department of 
     Defense''.
       (2) Purpose.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by 
     striking ``between'' and all that follows and inserting 
     ``between--
       ``(1)(A) the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands of the 
     United States, and (B) the Department of the Army and the 
     Department of the Air Force; and
       ``(2) the several States.''.
       (b) Enhancements of Position of Chief of National Guard 
     Bureau.--
       (1) Advisory function on national guard matters.--
     Subsection (c) of section 10502 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting ``to the Secretary of Defense, 
     to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,'' after 
     ``principal adviser''.
       (2) Grade.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended by 
     striking ``lieutenant general'' and inserting ``general''.
       (3) Annual report to congress on validated requirements.--
     Section 10504 of such title is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Annual Report on Validated Requirements.--Not later 
     than December 31 each year, the Chief of the National Guard 
     Bureau shall submit to Congress a report on the following:
       ``(1) The requirements validated under section 10503a(b)(1) 
     of this title during the preceding fiscal year.
       ``(2) The requirements referred to in paragraph (1) for 
     which funding is to be requested in the next budget for a 
     fiscal year under section 10544 of this title.
       ``(3) The requirements referred to in paragraph (1) for 
     which funding will not be requested in the next budget for a 
     fiscal year under section 10544 of this title.''.
       (c) Enhancement of Functions of National Guard Bureau.--
       (1) Additional general functions.--Section 10503 of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (12) as paragraph (13); and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (11) the following new 
     paragraph (12):
       ``(12) Facilitating and coordinating with other Federal 
     agencies, and with the several States, the use of National 
     Guard personnel and resources for and in contingency 
     operations, military operations other than war, natural 
     disasters, support of civil authorities, and other 
     circumstances.''.
       (2) Military assistance for civil authorities.--Chapter 
     1011 of such title is further amended by inserting after 
     section 10503 the following new section:

     ``Sec. 10503a. Functions of National Guard Bureau: military 
       assistance to civil authorities

       ``(a) Identification of Additional Necessary Assistance.--
     The Chief of the National Guard Bureau shall--
       ``(1) identify gaps between Federal and State capabilities 
     to prepare for and respond to emergencies; and
       ``(2) make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 
     programs and activities of the National Guard for military 
     assistance to civil authorities to address such gaps.
       ``(b) Scope of Responsibilities.--In meeting the 
     requirements of subsection (a), the Chief of the National 
     Guard Bureau shall, in coordination with the adjutants 
     general of the States, have responsibilities as follows:
       ``(1) To validate the requirements of the several States 
     and Territories with respect to military assistance to civil 
     authorities.
       ``(2) To develop doctrine and training requirements 
     relating to the provision of military assistance to civil 
     authorities.
       ``(3) To acquire equipment, materiel, and other supplies 
     and services for the provision of military assistance to 
     civil authorities.
       ``(4) To assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing the 
     budget required under section 10544 of this title.
       ``(5) To administer amounts provided the National Guard for 
     the provision of military assistance to civil authorities.
       ``(6) To carry out any other responsibility relating to the 
     provision of military assistance to civil authorities as the 
     Secretary of Defense shall specify.
       ``(c) Consultation.--The Chief of the National Guard Bureau 
     shall carry out activities under this section in consultation 
     with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air 
     Force.''.
       (3) Budgeting for training and equipment for military 
     assistance to civil authorities and other domestic 
     missions.--Chapter 1013 of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``Sec. 10544. National Guard training and equipment: budget 
       for military assistance to civil authorities and for other 
       domestic operations

       ``(a) In General.--The budget justification documents 
     materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget of 
     the President for a fiscal year (as submitted with the budget 
     of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31) shall 
     specify separate amounts for training and equipment for the 
     National Guard for purposes of military assistance to civil 
     authorities and for other domestic operations during such 
     fiscal year.
       ``(b) Scope of Funding.--The amounts specified under 
     subsection (a) for a fiscal year shall be sufficient for 
     purposes as follows:
       ``(1) The development and implementation of doctrine and 
     training requirements applicable to the assistance and 
     operations described in subsection (a) for such fiscal year.
       ``(2) The acquisition of equipment, materiel, and other 
     supplies and services necessary for the provision of such 
     assistance and such operations in such fiscal year.''.
       (4) Limitation on increase in personnel of national guard 
     bureau.--The Secretary of Defense shall, to the extent 
     practicable, ensure that no additional personnel are assigned 
     to the National Guard Bureau in order to address 
     administrative or other requirements arising out of the 
     amendments made by this subsection.
       (d) Conforming and Clerical Amendments.--
       (1) Conforming amendment.--The heading of section 10503 of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 10503. Functions of National Guard Bureau: charter''.

       (2) Clerical amendments.--(A) The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 1011 of such title is amended by 
     striking the item relating to section 10503 and inserting the 
     following new items:

``10503. Functions of National Guard Bureau: charter.
``10503a. Functions of National Guard Bureau: military assistance to 
              civil authorities.''.
       (B) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 1013 
     of such title is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new item:

``10544. National Guard training and equipment: budget for military 
              assistance to civil authorities and for other domestic 
              operations.''.

     SEC. 1603. PROMOTION OF ELIGIBLE RESERVE OFFICERS TO 
                   LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND VICE ADMIRAL GRADES ON 
                   THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, 
     whenever officers are considered for promotion to the grade 
     of lieutenant general, or vice admiral in the case of the 
     Navy, on the active duty list, officers of the reserve 
     components of the Armed Forces who are eligible for promotion 
     to such grade should be considered for promotion to such 
     grade.
       (b) Proposal.--The Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
     Congress a proposal for mechanisms to achieve the objective 
     specified in subsection (a). The proposal shall include such 
     recommendations for legislative or administrative action as 
     the Secretary considers appropriate in order to achieve that 
     objective.
       (c) Notice Accompanying Nominations.--The President shall 
     include with each nomination of an officer to the grade of 
     lieutenant general, or vice admiral in the case of the Navy, 
     on the active-duty list that is submitted to the Senate for 
     consideration a certification that all reserve officers who 
     were eligible for consideration for promotion to such grade 
     were considered in the making of such nomination.

     SEC. 1604. PROMOTION OF RESERVE OFFICERS TO LIEUTENANT 
                   GENERAL GRADE.

       (a) Treatment of Service as Adjutant General as Joint Duty 
     Experience.--
       (1) Directors of army and air national guard.--Section 
     10506(a)(3) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E) as 
     subparagraphs (D), (E), and (F), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
     subparagraph (C):
       ``(C) Service of an officer as adjutant general shall be 
     treated as joint duty experience for purposes of subparagraph 
     (B)(ii).''.
       (2) Other officers.--The service of an officer of the Armed 
     Forces as adjutant general, or as an officer (other than 
     adjutant general) of the National Guard of a State who 
     performs the duties of adjutant general under the laws of 
     such State, shall be treated as joint duty or joint duty 
     experience for purposes of any provisions of law required 
     such duty or experience as a condition of promotion.
       (b) Reports on Promotion of Reserve Major Generals to 
     Lieutenant General Grade.--
       (1) Review required.--The Secretary of the Army and the 
     Secretary of the Air Force shall each conduct a review of the 
     promotion practices of the military department concerned in 
     order to identify and assess the practices of such military 
     department in the promotion of reserve officers from major 
     general grade to lieutenant general grade.
       (2) Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army and the 
     Secretary of the Air Force shall each submit to the 
     congressional defense committees a report on the review 
     conducted by such official under paragraph (1). Each report 
     shall set forth--
       (A) the results of such review; and
       (B) a description of the actions intended to be taken by 
     such official to encourage and facilitate the promotion of 
     additional reserve officers from major general grade to 
     lieutenant general grade.

[[Page S11816]]

     SEC. 1605. REQUIREMENT THAT POSITION OF DEPUTY COMMANDER OF 
                   THE UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND BE FILLED BY 
                   A QUALIFIED NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER.

       (a) In General.--A position of Deputy Commander of the 
     United States Northern Command shall be filled by a qualified 
     officer of the National Guard who is eligible for promotion 
     to the grade of lieutenant general.
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the requirement in subsection 
     (a) is to ensure that information received from the National 
     Guard Bureau regarding the operation of the National Guard of 
     the several States is integrated into the plans and 
     operations of the United States Northern Command.

     SEC. 1606. REQUIREMENT FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO PREPARE 
                   ANNUAL PLAN FOR RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS 
                   AND TERRORIST EVENTS.

       (a) Requirement for Annual Plan.--Not later than March 1, 
     2008, and each March 1 thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, 
     in consultation with the commander of the United States 
     Northern Command and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 
     shall prepare and submit to Congress a plan for coordinating 
     the use of the National Guard and members of the Armed Forces 
     on active duty when responding to natural disasters, acts of 
     terrorism, and other man-made disasters as identified in the 
     national planning scenarios described in subsection (e).
       (b) Information To Be Provided to Secretary.--To assist the 
     Secretary of Defense in preparing the plan, the National 
     Guard Bureau, pursuant to its purpose as channel of 
     communications as set forth in section 10501(b) of title 10, 
     United States Code, shall provide to the Secretary 
     information gathered from Governors, adjutants general of 
     States, and other State civil authorities responsible for 
     homeland preparation and response to natural and man-made 
     disasters.
       (c) Two Versions.--The plan shall set forth two versions of 
     response, one using only members of the National Guard, and 
     one using both members of the National Guard and members of 
     the regular components of the Armed Forces.
       (d) Matters Covered.--The plan shall cover, at a minimum, 
     the following:
       (1) Protocols for the Department of Defense, the National 
     Guard Bureau, and the Governors of the several States to 
     carry out operations in coordination with each other and to 
     ensure that Governors and local communities are properly 
     informed and remain in control in their respective States and 
     communities.
       (2) An identification of operational procedures, command 
     structures, and lines of communication to ensure a 
     coordinated, efficient response to contingencies.
       (3) An identification of the training and equipment needed 
     for both National Guard personnel and members of the Armed 
     Forces on active duty to provide military assistance to civil 
     authorities and for other domestic operations to respond to 
     hazards identified in the national planning scenarios.
       (e) National Planning Scenarios.--The plan shall provide 
     for response to the following hazards:
       (1) Nuclear detonation, biological attack, biological 
     disease outbreak/pandemic flu, the plague, chemical attack-
     blister agent, chemical attack-toxic industrial chemicals, 
     chemical attack-nerve agent, chemical attack-chlorine tank 
     explosion, major hurricane, major earthquake, radiological 
     attack-radiological dispersal device, explosives attack-
     bombing using improvised explosive device, biological attack-
     food contamination, biological attack-foreign animal disease 
     and cyber attack.
       (2) Any other hazards identified in a national planning 
     scenario developed by the Homeland Security Council.

     SEC. 1607. ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO 
                   NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT.

       Section 10541 of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Each report under this section concerning equipment 
     of the National Guard shall also include the following:
       ``(1) A statement of the accuracy of the projections 
     required by subsection (b)(5)(D) contained in earlier reports 
     under this section, and an explanation, if the projection was 
     not met, of why the projection was not met.
       ``(2) A certification from the Chief of the National Guard 
     Bureau setting forth an inventory for the preceding fiscal 
     year of each item of equipment--
       ``(A) for which funds were appropriated;
       ``(B) which was due to be procured for the National Guard 
     during that fiscal year; and
       ``(C) which has not been received by a National Guard unit 
     as of the close of that fiscal year.''.


                           amendment no. 2941

 (Purpose: To modify the termination of assistance to State and local 
 governments after completion of the destruction of the United States 
                      chemical weapons stockpile)

       At the end of subtitle D of title XIV, add the following:

     SEC. 1434. MODIFICATION OF TERMINATION OF ASSISTANCE TO STATE 
                   AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AFTER COMPLETION OF THE 
                   DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES CHEMICAL 
                   WEAPONS STOCKPILE.

       Subparagraph (B) of section 1412(c)(5) of the Department of 
     Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (50 U.S.C. 1521(c)(5)) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) Assistance may be provided under this paragraph for 
     capabilities to respond to emergencies involving an 
     installation or facility as described in subparagraph (A) 
     until the earlier of the following:
       ``(i) The date of the completion of all grants and 
     cooperative agreements with respect to the installation or 
     facility for purposes of this paragraph between the Federal 
     Emergency Management Agency and the State and local 
     governments concerned.
       ``(ii) The date that is 180 days after the date of the 
     completion of the destruction of lethal chemical agents and 
     munitions at the installation or facility.''.

  Mr. GRAHAM. Let's call it a day.
  Mr. LEVIN. There are several Senators on the way over. The Presiding 
Officer, I know, looks forward to the continuation of the session with 
his good nature.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, while we are awaiting other Senators to 
arrive, I would like a few minutes to speak against my good friend's 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator withdraw his request for a 
quorum call?
  Mr. LEVIN. Of course, I withdraw the request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                           Amendment No. 2898

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, the choice for the Congress is whether or 
not we retreat from a policy that appears to be working by adopting 
this amendment which would redeploy troops in a fashion very 
inconsistent with what we are doing on the ground. What we are doing 
now is a long overdue change in strategy. We have more forces than we 
have ever had before, and they are very much needed.

  The one thing I can say without any doubt is the old strategy, before 
the surge, was not producing the results we were hoping for in terms of 
security and political reconciliation. After about the third trip to 
Baghdad, it was obvious to me the game plan we had in place after the 
fall of Baghdad was not working. I was told time and time again, we 
have enough troops, the insurgency is in its last throes, and there are 
a few dead-enders. Well, that was the furthest thing from the truth.
  The truth is the security environment in Iraq got completely out of 
hand, al-Qaida flourished under the old strategy, they were able to 
thrive in parts of Anbar, and it was evolving into complete chaos. 
Thank God we had the ability and the willingness as a nation, through 
our Commander in Chief and through this Congress, to appoint a new 
general with a new idea. The idea that he is employing now is long 
overdue. More troops have provided better security, and they have been 
able to accomplish this by partnering with the Iraqi Army in a new way.
  The old strategy, which we are trying to go back to with this 
amendment, had us in a training role. We were living behind walls, 
training during the day, and pretty much disengaged from the fight. We 
are now out from behind those walls, living with the Iraqi troops in 
joint security stations all over Baghdad and all over the country. We 
are living, eating, training, and fighting with the Iraqi Army. And 
General Jones tells us they are getting better.
  Anbar Province is dramatically different. Six months ago, it was 
reported by the Marine Corps to have been lost to the enemy called al-
Qaida. Well, a couple of things happened that are indeed good news. No. 
1, the people who lived in Anbar, who had a taste of al-Qaida life, 
decided they did not want to live that way. Why? Well, what happened in 
Anbar Province when al-Qaida was in charge? Awful, terrible, vicious 
things that really cannot even be talked about on the floor of the 
Senate. They imposed a way of life on the Anbar Sunnis that did not 
meet the test of human decency, and the people living in Anbar rejected 
al-Qaida because they overplayed their hand.
  The difference between us and our enemy in Iraq, al-Qaida, is pretty 
obvious. This organization that is tied to bin Laden, but also has 
Iraqi members, they are the type of people if you don't do what they 
say, they will take the family out into the street, take a 5-year-old 
child in the presence of the parents, cover the child in gasoline, and 
set the child on fire. That is our enemy. That is the enemy of 
everybody

[[Page S11817]]

who loves freedom and human decency. That happened in Anbar, and things 
like that happened time and time again.
  The agenda that al-Qaida has for the world is a very dark view of the 
world, particularly for women. And, thank God, it has been rejected by 
those in Anbar. The surge gave the ability to those living in Anbar to 
make a choice they never had before. The additional military support 
provided by the surge came along at a magic moment in time when the 
people in Anbar were ready to take on al-Qaida. This additional combat 
capacity cannot be underestimated in terms of how it has changed Iraq. 
It certainly liberated Anbar from the clutches of al-Qaida. And the 
fact that Sunni Arabs are willing to turn on al-Qaida and join 
coalition forces is good news for the world.
  This amendment would basically undo many of the successes we have had 
in terms of adding more combat power. Things are getting better around 
Baghdad. There is still a lot of fighting. Al-Qaida has not been 
completely vanquished, but they are certainly diminished. Iran is 
playing hard in Iraq right now. They understand what is going on on the 
floor of the Senate.
  Why are the Iranians trying to kill American forces? What is the goal 
of the Iranian regime when it comes to Iraq? I think the goal is to 
drive us out. Does Iran want a completely chaotic Iraq? No. Does Iran 
want a representative government in Iraq? Absolutely not, because the 
biggest threat to this Iranian theocracy would be a representative 
government on their border where Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds would live 
together and elect their own leaders. The biggest threat to Syria, this 
dictatorship in Syria, would be a representative democracy on their 
border.
  So if you are waiting on Iran and Syria to come in and help us form a 
moderate way of doing business, where people can elect their leaders 
and accept each other's differences and live together with tolerance, 
you can forget it because it is a threat to the dictatorships and the 
theocracies that exist.
  I think it is in our national security interests to allow General 
Petraeus to continue a strategy that is bringing about better security 
than we have ever seen before. Now is not the time to pull back. Now is 
the time to recommit American forces, and the political, military, and 
economic power to finish the job that has been started.
  I think the idea that the war in Iraq is a civil war just misses the 
boat. The truth is, there are many things going on in Iraq. Some of 
them are local to Iraq, but many of them have international 
implications and longstanding national security consequences for this 
country. Why did the Iranian President say he stood ready to fill any 
vacuum created in Iraq? Because he would like to expand his power. The 
question for us is, is it in our national security interest to allow a 
vacuum to be created?
  Now, my good friend, Senator Levin, has a view that the more troops 
we have in Iraq, the longer we stay there with large numbers, the less 
likely the politicians in Baghdad will reconcile their differences 
through the political process. I have a totally opposite view. I 
understand what he is saying, but there is no evidence that less troops 
will provide quicker reconciliation. The Iraqis are dying three to one 
compared to our deaths and our injuries. The sacrifices of this country 
are enormous, but do not forget the Iraqi people are fighting and dying 
against extremist forces, and they are not indifferent to their fate.
  The political reconciliation necessary to occur to bring this war to 
a successful conclusion has not occurred in Baghdad, but it is 
occurring at the local level. So, in my opinion, it is just a matter of 
time before the local reconciliation we see in Anbar and other places 
in Iraq comes to Baghdad. And the best pressure to put on any 
politician in any place in the world where people vote to elect their 
politicians is for all people to speak up and put pressure on their 
elected officials--not for Senator Graham or Senator Levin or Senator 
Clinton or Senator McCain to tell the Maliki government what to do, but 
their own people telling them what to do.

  After being there eight times, the people in Iraq I meet are more war 
weary than ever. They are coming together more at the local level than 
at any other time. Better security is emboldening the Iraqi people to 
make the hard decisions that will eventually reconcile their country. 
The idea of terminating this operation now, putting a deadline or a 
timeline to withdraw will undercut everything we have achieved. The 
politicians will change their attitude. Instead of looking at how to 
reconcile their country, they will be looking at how to protect their 
families when the Americans leave.
  So I am not for an unending, unlimited commitment of 160,000 troops. 
I am for keeping an American military presence in Iraq that helps my 
country--helps our country. We need to look at every decision we make 
in Iraq now and in the future from the viewpoint of, does it enhance 
our national security? Is it better to have 160,000 American forces in 
Iraq now to stabilize a dysfunctional government or is it better to 
bring them home, knowing the most likely result will be a failed state?
  A dysfunctional government exists in Iraq and here in Washington. But 
there is a big difference between a dysfunctional government and a 
failed state. A dysfunctional government is one that keeps trying but 
fails to do the hard things. A failed state is a place where no one 
tries anymore. They go back to the corners of their own country and the 
regional players begin to take sides and you have absolute chaos. Iran 
is the biggest winner of a failed state because they will dominate the 
southern part of Iraq.
  Another problem of a failed state is that the Kurds will likely go to 
war with Turkey over an independent movement in the north. If the 
Sunnis think they are going to win in Iraq and have the good old days 
of Saddam come back by using force, they are crazy and they are naive. 
If the Shias think they are going to create a theocracy in Iraq, like 
Iran, and no one will say anything about it, they misunderstand the 
region.
  I am convinced all three groups are better off working together than 
trying to work apart. I know this: We are better off if they do that. 
If they break apart and this country becomes a failed state, 160,000 
troops for a limited period of time will not be what our country will 
be faced with in terms of choices. We will have a large American 
military presence in the Mideast, containing a variety of conflicts 
that do not exist today because the problems in Iraq will spill over in 
the region.
  I believe that is a likely consequence. That is a reasonable 
consequence of a failed state. I cannot promise that they will go from 
a dysfunctional government to a stable government, a secure government, 
one that is an ally on the war on terror with us that would reject al-
Qaida and contain Iran. But I believe this: the best shot to bring that 
about is to continue the mission and the surge as planned out by 
General Petraeus, to continue the strategy that we have now that has 
shown results we have never known before. If we pull back now, it will 
undo all the accomplishments that have come from a lot of sacrifice, a 
lot of blood, and a lot of treasure.
  At the end of the day, the Iraqi political leadership has to embrace 
the hard decisions necessary to pull their country together. They are 
more likely to do that when they are less worried about their families 
being killed as they reach across the aisle.
  It is hard to reach across the aisle here. The Presiding Officer and 
I have worked on immigration. We know how hard it is. We will keep 
coming back and bringing up hard issues such as Social Security and 
immigration until we find a solution. But imagine reaching across the 
aisle in Iraq where the consequence would be that your family is 
murdered.
  The better security we can bring about in terms of Iraq for the 
judges, the politicians, and the population as a whole, the more likely 
they are to do the hard things. And I do believe they are ready to do 
the hard things because they have had a hard life. The Iraqi people are 
not perfect. I don't think we realized how hard it was to have lived in 
that country under Saddam Hussein. The fear that if your daughter 
walked down the street, she might catch the eye of one of Saddam's 
sons; the way they have had to live under Saddam Hussein is 
unimaginable, and the chaos that they have experienced from al-Qaida 
coming there, throwing bombs at different mosques and bringing up old

[[Page S11818]]

wounds has been very difficult to deal with. But they keep trying. When 
one police officer is killed, someone else takes their place. When an 
army person is killed, someone else joins the army. When a judge is 
assassinated, somebody else comes forward to be a judge.
  They are trying. And I do believe, if we will continue the strategy 
employed by General Petraeus, even though political reconciliation is 
lagging behind security, it will not be much longer until the 
politicians in Baghdad embrace the hard decisions necessary to bring 
reconciliation to their country. And I believe that for a couple of 
reasons. No. 1, their people want it; and, No. 2, they have the 
opportunity now, through better security, to bring it about.
  So to my good friend, Senator Levin, I understand exactly his 
concern. It is a judgment call. I think when you are dealing with 
extremists, when you are dealing with the Iranian President, the last 
thing in the world you do is to show weakness. You make sure they 
understand, al-Qaida and Iran, and any other extremist group, that 
America is going to do what is necessary to defend her vital interests 
and that we are going to stand with forces in moderation.
  My biggest fear, if we begin to withdraw now and redeploy to the old 
mission, is that all of those who have risked their lives to help us 
will surely meet the fate of that 5-year-old boy. And that is not in 
our national interest. That is not the right thing to do. We will come 
home. But as Senator McCain says, we need to come home with honor. 
Equally important, we need to come home with a more secure America.
  I think we are on the road to bringing about withdrawal with honor 
and a more secure America by having a more stable Iraq. The worst thing 
to do now is to go back to a strategy that has failed when the one that 
we have in place is beginning to work.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.


                 Unanimous Consent Agreement--H.R. 1495

  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday, 
September 24, at 3 p.m., the Senate turn to the consideration of the 
conference report on the water resources bill, H.R. 1495; that the time 
until 5:45 p.m. be divided for debate as follows: 30 minutes under 
Senator Feingold's control, with the remainder of the time under the 
control of the two leaders or their designees; and that at 5:45 p.m. 
the Senate, without any intervening action or debate, vote on passage 
of the conference report.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the war in 
Iraq, and in particular to speak about an amendment that we will be 
voting on tomorrow, the Reed-Levin amendment.
  I want to note, first of all, that this amendment has been offered 
before. We voted on similar amendments over the course of this year, 
and I am glad we are voting on it again because I think the American 
people, time and again, have told us it is time, at long last, to 
change the course in Iraq and to focus on a new policy.
  Sometimes we talk about this amendment and we fail to mention 
something about the sponsors of this amendment. We are talking about 
two Members of the Senate with broad experience in this body, 
tremendous years of public service, but also a lot of years on the 
Armed Services Committee and other committees that have informed their 
judgment. The two Members of the Senate, Jack Reed and Carl Levin, I am 
speaking about, have both been to Iraq innumerable times, learning 
about what is happening there and focused in a real way on helping us 
get this policy right.
  Our troops have done everything we asked of them, time and again. 
Every mission, every battle, they have done their job. It is about time 
the Congress of the United States and the President of the United 
States do our job to change the course in Iraq and to focus on a new 
policy.
  Fortunately, this amendment, I think, has tremendous support in the 
Senate. We have already seen this before. Much more than a majority of 
Senators will vote for this amendment. I hope we can get it to 60 votes 
at long last.
  Let's talk about it for a moment. This is a very basic amendment, 
which fundamentally says we have to change the course in Iraq; we have 
to begin to redeploy our combat forces so the Iraqi forces can 
takeover, ultimately. But it also focuses in a real way on 
transitioning this mission. Our mission should be about a couple of 
things our soldiers have already proven time and again that they do 
very well. The mission should be transitioned to a much more focused 
mission: First of all, to hunt down and kill terrorists in Iraq. That 
is fundamental to our mission. Our mission has to include training of 
the Iraqi security forces. We see in report after report, especially at 
the level 1 of readiness, the ability for the Iraqi forces to 
independently, without help from American forces, take over the fight 
against the enemy. We have to make sure that training moves forward 
much more aggressively and in a much more focused way than we have seen 
already. But that is not happening. So we need to train the Iraqi 
security forces.
  Finally, we have to make sure we protect our troops and their 
infrastructure and also the civilian personnel we have in Iraq. We have 
seen all those personnel doing a great job as well--from the State 
Department and other parts of our Government. But if we can focus, as 
we should, on a redeployment of our combat forces and focus on the 
terrorists, focus on training, and focus on diplomacy--which I will 
talk about at length a few minutes later--that has to be the mission we 
should focus on in Iraq.
  That is what Reed-Levin does, among other things. It focuses at long 
last on a mission that we know our troops can continue to achieve. But 
also it focuses in a real way on transitioning this mission and 
focusing on a redeployment of our forces, our combat forces.
  I think some of what has formed the way I vote and the way lot of us 
vote is our time in Iraq. I spent a day and a half in Iraq. Some people 
can say: What can you learn in a day and a half? You can learn a lot 
about Iraq in that short amount of time. I learned, not just in the 
meetings we had but a good part of our time in Iraq--Senator Durbin and 
I were there in the early part of August--a good part of our time was 
outside the Green Zone. You get a sense, a fleeting sense, a glimpse, 
but you get a sense of the insecurity of Baghdad when you are outside 
of that Green Zone.
  I have heard a lot of discussion about things that have been 
happening in Anbar. Frankly, our marines have done a great job there 
and our troops have done a great job in Baghdad. But Baghdad is a lot 
more complicated than Anbar, and we should recognize that. It is a lot 
more difficult assignment going forward.
  What do we see in Baghdad? Every time you go outside the Green Zone 
you travel in a convoy. We were given great protection, not only by 
those who were traveling with us but also by people from the State 
Department and others. We appreciated that. But you wear body armor 
wherever you go--inside the vehicle, outside the vehicle. You wear a 
combat helmet, a Kevlar helmet. You are surrounded by people with 
weapons to protect you. So you get a sense of the insecurity there.
  Then, when we were traveling to the President's house our second day 
there, almost the entire trip to President Talabani's house where he 
resides was in a military convoy with helicopters flying overhead to 
protect us. When I got on a Blackhawk helicopter to go from an airport 
to a patrol base outside the city of Baghdad where our forces are doing 
a great job against al-Qaida, what do we have to do? We get into a 
Blackhawk helicopter and fly at a very high rate of speed over the 
rooftops to avoid being attacked. We saw in the last couple of weeks 
what happened to a C-130, with distinguished Members of the Senate, 
some of them here on the floor today, being fired upon by the enemy.
  You see the insecurity all around you. You see the insecurity when we 
were meeting at the patrol base and a missile landed and we heard the 
explosion 400 yards from us.
  What I am trying to convey is the sense we had of the insecurity of 
Baghdad. It is a real presence there, that feeling of insecurity. It is 
a fact. We should recognize this mission is very

[[Page S11819]]

difficult for our troops. They have met every assignment.
  What we have to do is give our troops a policy and a strategy which 
matches their valor. We don't have that right now. The President should 
start acting more like a Commander in Chief instead of someone who is 
reading talking points for his side of the argument. When I was 
listening to the President the other night, unfortunately, what he 
conveyed to me was a sense that he was selling a message instead of 
leading. I don't think he has led in a way that has brought this 
Congress together, frankly. It is about time we had a mission and a 
strategy that matched the brilliance and the valor of our troops.
  When I was in Iraq, we would hear these phrases from the Iraqi 
leaders: We need more time. You need to be patient in America. I heard 
this phrase I have never heard before, we need ``strategic patience.'' 
I still don't know what that means, but the Iraqi political leaders 
were telling us that over and over again. I have to say, on behalf of 
the people of Pennsylvania and on behalf of the 175 families who lost 
someone in Iraq already, I have to say to these Iraqi leaders: We have 
shown strategic patience, whatever that means. We have shown patience 
and forbearance and our troops and their families have sacrificed over 
and over again. It is about time for you, Mr. or Mrs. Iraqi Leader, to 
get your act together and take overt responsibility of taking on this 
enemy for the next generation, taking the corruption out of your police 
force, and governing your country so you can have a government of 
national unity.

  But all they ask for is patience. Whenever the Iraqi political 
leaders ask for patience, the one who pays most of the price is not 
anybody in Congress. It isn't anybody in the White House. The people 
who pay the price are the troops and their families--over and over 
again. We are reaching the end of our patience, I think I would say and 
have said to those Iraqi leaders.
  Finally--I don't wish to spend too much time on our trip--one of the 
most poignant parts of our trip, and it has connection and relevance to 
what we voted on today and yesterday and will tomorrow, is the sense 
you get from our troops. You know the bravery of those troops--troops 
from Pennsylvania, from small towns in Bradford County, way up in 
northeastern Pennsylvania, troops from the inner city of Philadelphia, 
who were in the same mission, sitting at the same table to have what 
goes for lunch over there--very simple food that they have to eat every 
day. But what I got from our troops was a real sense of commitment, a 
real sense of focus on their mission. We have to do everything we can 
to make sure they have the resources they need.
  But a lot of our troops are being asked to referee a civil war. No 
American fighting men or woman has ever been asked to referee someone 
else's civil war. We have asked them to do that. I heard language in 
this Chamber, and we heard it from the President--he talks about 
victory, victory, victory. He uses phrases such as that and some people 
here have used those phrases.
  Do you know what. I think the more accurate phrase and the more 
descriptive, to describe what is happening there, is what Ambassador 
Crocker said to me in Baghdad. I challenged him and General Petraeus, 
and they both said: No, that is not the right language. What the 
mission has to be is to stabilize that Government, not to have some 
Hollywood victory that sets our troops up for something not achievable. 
Our troops have done their job. It is about time we have the right 
policy and the right language that matches the valor of our troops.
  We see what these troops and their families have sacrificed, and we 
see some of the horror of battle. We went into the combat support 
hospital, right in the middle of Baghdad. You see in that hospital 
doctors and nurses, enlisted men and women who are doing that job 24 
hours a day under the most difficult circumstances. In one case, taking 
care of a little child, a girl who had been left in the streets of 
Baghdad when her parents were killed. These doctors and nurses were 
ministering to her, just like they minister to the troops who come in 
from the battlefield.
  We think of a lot of lessons from history. We remember what Abraham 
Lincoln said when he was talking about the Civil War. He talked about 
what happens to those who die or are wounded in battle--especially 
those who die. He talked, at the time, about making sure we are doing 
everything possible to remember and to help the families of those who 
perished. As Abraham Lincoln said: `` . . . to help him who has borne 
the battle, and his widow and his orphan.''
  When we debate on this floor about this policy, debate about veterans 
health care, we are trying to do our best to enact policy that is 
supportive of those troops who have perished in battle and those 
families.
  We have to make sure we do everything possible to get this policy 
right. I believe a giant step forward to doing that would be to support 
the Reed-Levin amendment and to support other measures that help us 
change our course. We lost an opportunity yesterday when we didn't get 
to 60 votes on the Webb amendment. That was a bad day in the Senate. 
But we have to keep trying, and we will try again tomorrow on this 
vote.
  I wish to conclude with some remarks about an amendment I have 
offered along with Senator Murkowski, an amendment which focuses on 
something we all talk about a lot but, frankly, the administration has 
not done nearly enough about, and that is diplomacy. This amendment is 
a sense-of-the-Senate amendment expressing a very simple notion that it 
is time we implement a diplomatic surge that matches any military 
surge. It sends a crystal-clear message to the White House: The time 
for sustained regional diplomacy is now, and it deserves the highest 
priority of the President, President Bush, and the Secretary of State, 
Secretary Rice.
  We all recognize in hindsight how diplomacy was critically missing 
from the strategic planning of the United States in the runup to this 
war. We all know that now. That is almost not even debated anymore. Yet 
we have paid little heed to diplomacy in the frustrating years since 
our initial invasion. The United States continues to treat Iraq as some 
kind of isolated box, failing to recognize the complex linkages between 
the various sectarian groups inside Iraq and their patrons and 
supporters in the broader Middle East region. It is time we made Iraq 
less America's problem and more a responsibility for its regional 
neighbors and the international community.
  Let me highlight quickly the elements of this amendment, very 
specific steps. First of all, the United States should implement a 
comprehensive diplomatic offensive. It has not been done yet. No. 2, 
the United States should bring together Iraq's neighbors through a 
regional conference or other mechanism. That has not been done yet--
part of it has, but it has not been done as it should. No. 3 definitely 
has not been done, especially when it pertains to the President: The 
President and the Secretary of State should invest their personal time 
and energy in these diplomatic efforts. This cannot be done by proxy or 
surrogate. They have to be engaged fully. In addition to that, the 
President, I believe, and Senator Murkowski believes, should appoint a 
high-level Presidential envoy to the region. The U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations should seek the appointment of an international mediator 
in Iraq to engage the political, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaders 
in Iraq.
  Finally, the United States should more directly press Iraq's 
neighbors to open fully operating embassies in Baghdad.
  I will conclude with that. There is so much that has to be done on 
diplomacy and there is so much more we have to do. We have to keep 
debating this issue, keep pushing forward to achieve a better policy.
  I believe two parts of that are the enactment of the Reed-Levin 
amendment, first of all, and in addition to that the amendment that I 
and Senator Murkowski have worked together on, to have a real 
diplomatic surge in Iraq.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tester). The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators now 
be recognized in the following order: Senator Lieberman, Senator Smith, 
Senator Kyl.

[[Page S11820]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak against the amendment 
introduced by Senators Levin and Reed, my friends. I actually say that 
with full meaning. I have great respect for the Senators from Michigan 
and Rhode Island. I even like them. But in this case, I am in deep 
disagreement about the amendment they have offered.
  This is the most recent iteration of a series of amendments Senators 
Levin and Reed have put in. It changes slightly from earlier versions, 
but the strategy is essentially the same, and in doing so, it ignores, 
I say respectfully, all the changes that have occurred in Iraq on the 
ground in the months that have gone by since the first Levin-Reed 
amendment was introduced. It also ignores the clearly stated counsel of 
the National Intelligence Estimate, of the head of the independent 
Commission to evaluate Iraqi security forces, GEN Jim Jones, and it 
ignores much of the testimony General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, 
who live on the ground, gave to Congress and the American people last 
week.
  I rise to oppose it because I think it does not reflect the successes 
we have had, and if it ever passed, it would take us from this strategy 
which is bringing success to a strategy which would bring us to 
failure. It orders a change of a strategy that is working and puts us 
on a course to a strategy that I believe will fail disastrously. But at 
least everyone would have to acknowledge that we do not know how it 
will work as compared to the Petraeus strategy that is now working.
  This amendment, as has been said, would first order the beginning of 
a reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq not later than 90 days from its 
enactment. Well, the interesting thing to say is that General Petraeus 
and President Bush announced last week that a withdrawal of American 
forces will begin this month. It will reach over 5,000 by the end of 
this year, by Christmastime. Quite remarkable. Unexpected. Not 
predicted. But why is it happening? It is happening because the surge 
strategy, combined with the improvement in the performance of the Iraqi 
security forces, has allowed our commander on the ground to recommend 
to the Commander in Chief, who has accepted the recommendation, that we 
can reduce some of our troop presence in Iraq without compromising the 
mission and the security of Iraq.
  But General Petraeus said very clearly that he is not for 
congressionally-mandated deadlines, including this one; that as a 
general principle of war, not just to support his own position, he 
feels--and I could not agree with him more--that withdrawals of 
American troops in battle ought to be made on the basis of what is 
happening on the battlefield and at the recommendation of the 
commanders on the battlefield.
  Then the Levin-Reed amendment represents essentially a transition of 
U.S. forces to a limited presence, undefined number, to carry out the 
following missions: to protect the U.S. and coalition personnel and 
infrastructure, training, equipping, providing logistical support to 
the Iraqi security forces, and engaging in targeted counterterrorism 
operations against al-Qaida, al-Qaida affiliated groups, and other 
international terrorist organizations.
  As I will make clear in a moment, I am particularly troubled that 
that does not include the groups Iran is training, equipping, and then 
sending back into Iraq which have killed hundreds of American soldiers 
and thousands of Iraqi soldiers and civilians.
  In ordering a withdrawal within 90 days, in ordering a transition 
from a strategy that is working to a strategy that I believe will fail, 
as I said at the outset, this amendment ignores the best evidence and 
judgment we have based on what is happening on the ground.
  The National Intelligence Estimate commented quite clearly about what 
would happen if we limited the mission our solders in Iraq were allowed 
to undertake prematurely. It warned us in no uncertain terms that:

       Changing the mission of coalition forces from a primarily 
     counterinsurgency and stabilization role [which is the 
     current Petraeus strategy] to a primary combat support role 
     for Iraqi forces and counterterrorism operations [which is 
     the strategy that would be imposed by this amendment] would 
     erode the security gains achieved so far.

  Not ``might'' but ``would'' erode the security gains achieved thus 
far.
  General Jones made very clear in testimony he gave just 2 weeks ago 
that:

       Deadlines can work against us. I think a deadline of this 
     magnitude would be against our national interests.

  General Petraeus warned us last week that:

       We need to ensure that we do not surrender a gain for which 
     we fought very, very hard by being locked into a timetable.

  Likewise, we heard from General Petraeus, who bluntly told us:

       While one may argue that the best way to speed the process 
     in Iraq is to change the mission from one that emphasizes 
     population security, counterterrorism and transition, to one 
     that is strictly focused on transition and 
     counterterrorism, making that change now would, in our 
     view, be premature.

  That is diplomatic language chosen by a military man speaking to 
Congress last week: ``would be premature.''
  Look, as our mission in Iraq succeeds and hopefully continues to 
succeed as it is now both in terms of stabilizing the country, reducing 
victims of sectarian violence, chasing al-Qaida, and, most 
significantly, improving the capacity of the Iraqi security forces, we 
will transition our mission because the Iraqis and the environment will 
allow us to do that, and there will be transition to something, I would 
guess, quite like the goal of this amendment. But if you force this by 
congressional action before the commanders on the ground tell us it can 
be safely implemented, it will be more than General Petraeus's 
diplomatic term, ``premature,'' and probably more than the NIE's direct 
term, ``would erode the security gains achieved so far.'' I think it 
would begin to unwind Iraq and lead to a victory for al-Qaida and 
Iranian-backed terrorists. I think it is particularly unjustified for 
Congress to take up this amendment now, the moment we are seeing 
evidence of real progress in Iraq.
  I know some of the supporters of the amendment suggest that by 
withdrawing forces, we would force the Iraqi Government to achieve the 
political progress we all want. There is no military solution, only a 
political solution that will ultimately end this. That is true. But let 
me say this: That misses one powerful reality in Iraq today. We are now 
not just fighting to give Iraqis the stability to reach political 
reconciliation and the ability to self-govern, we are fighting al-Qaida 
and Iranian-backed terrorists. That requires a military solution. So to 
say the goal here is just to make sure the Iraqi leadership reaches 
some accommodations with one another--that is not the end of it. You 
can have that happen, and if we pulled out prematurely, al-Qaida and 
Iran could blow the whole thing apart, and it would be a devastating 
loss for Iraq, for the region, and for the security of the people of 
the United States.
  But listen to what Ambassador Crocker said about this idea to 
Congress last week:

       An approach that says we are going to start pulling troops 
     out regardless of the objective conditions on the ground and 
     what might happen in consequence of that could actually push 
     the Iraqis in the wrong direction, to make them less likely 
     to compromise, rather than more likely. It would make them 
     far more focused on building the walls, stacking the 
     ammunition, and getting ready for a big nasty fight without 
     us around, than it would push them toward compromise and 
     accommodation with the people who would be on the other side 
     of that fight.

  That is Ambassador Crocker, who lives with those people every day, 
the leaders, the political leaders of Iraq, and he is saying: Watch 
out, a premature withdrawal by the U.S. forces would do exactly the 
opposite. It would not encourage the Iraqis to political 
reconciliation; it would basically lead them to hunker down for a civil 
war they fear would be following.
  You know what, from this distance, although I have been there six or 
seven times now, it seems like common sense and human nature that if we 
pull out too soon, they are not going to wake up and suddenly make 
difficult political agreements; they are going to get ready for civil 
war. This amendment is based on a premise that disregards exactly what 
our Ambassador, a nonpolitical career person, an expert on the Middle 
East, is telling us would happen.
  I would also point out, as I mentioned briefly at the beginning, that

[[Page S11821]]

the amendment, I fear, would leave our troops unable, even in their 
reduced mission role, to respond to and go after Iranian operatives and 
Iranian-backed militias, the so-called special groups that are in the 
midst of fighting a vicious proxy war against American troops and 
Iraqis in Iraq.
  General Petraeus testified last week that:

       These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi 
     governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with 
     advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and 
     indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the international zone 
     and elsewhere.

  So even in the reduced mission, it does provide for allowing our 
troops to go after al-Qaida but not the Iranian-backed operatives. And 
as Senator McCain I think quite compellingly pointed out on the floor 
earlier today, what are our troops supposed to do when they see someone 
walking along with an IED? Go up to them and say: Excuse me, sir, are 
you a member of a sectarian militia or are you al-Qaida? If you are 
sectarian militia, go ahead. If you are al-Qaida, I am sorry, I am 
going to have to capture you.
  That is not going to work.
  I am sure my colleagues, including the sponsors of this amendment, 
agree that the United States has a vital national interest in 
preventing the dominance of Iraq by the fanatical anti-American regime 
in Tehran, and yet this amendment would give our forces, as I read it, 
no authority to deal with that critical mission after the transition 
period is over.
  I just want to say that at the end of last year, after too many 
months, too many months of a strategy that was not working in Iraq, 
President Bush, as the Commander in Chief, finally said: I have to 
change the strategy. He called in a lot of people to ask how should he 
change it in response to the reality on the ground, which is that what 
we were doing was not working, was not succeeding. He met General 
Petraeus, a man who had been in Iraq before, had disagreed with the 
prevailing strategy, and instead of being honored, he was sent out to 
Fort Leavenworth, where he did some great work. It is a great place. 
But he really should have been raised up to continue the fight in Iraq. 
President Bush brought him back to Iraq, accepted his ideas for a new 
strategy of counterinsurgency, of stabilizing Iraq. He gave him the 
30,000-plus troops, and it has worked. Remarkable.
  We all know Iraq has not reached the goals we want it to reach, but 
assassinations are down, deaths from sectarian violence are down. 
American and Iraqi forces are in control of most of Baghdad now, not 
the militias.
  Most significantly, al-Qaida is on the run. I heard bin Laden and 
Zawahiri put out other tapes today. I wonder whether these tapes are a 
sign not of confidence but of insecurity by al-Qaida's leaders. I am 
beginning to wonder whether they are worried about the fact that they 
are essentially being chased out of an Arab country, Iraq, particularly 
painful for them, chased out of an enormous Sunni Arab province, 
because they are all Sunni Muslims, and that they are on the verge of 
what could be a humiliating defeat, if we continue to move this 
strategy forward against them. As we all know in our own lives, 
sometimes the people who bark the loudest are the ones who are the most 
insecure. I am beginning to wonder whether bin Laden and Zawahiri, who 
masterminded the attack against us on 9/11, are now, on what has become 
the central battlefield of the war with Islamist extremism, al-Qaida, 
whether they are badly losing that war.
  What I am saying is, after a long time President Bush looked at the 
facts, changed the strategy, and the new strategy is working. This 
amendment, respectfully to its sponsors, does not regard the facts, 
does not look at the facts, does not accept the changes that have 
occurred in our strategy and the success it is bringing and basically 
continues as if nothing had changed. In doing so, if adopted, it would 
do a disservice to our forces in Iraq who are succeeding, to the cause 
of freedom in Iraq and throughout the Muslim world, and to the cause of 
security of every American threatened by al-Qaida who we know is 
working, plotting, and intends to strike us again, and the fanatics 
who, unfortunately, control the Government of a great country, Iran, 
who lead thousands and tens of thousands on any occasion they can in 
chants to ``death to America.'' That is what is on the line. That is 
what would be jeopardized if this amendment were passed. That is why I 
respectfully ask my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the Levin-Reed 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Florida). The Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Before Senator Kyl is recognized, before Senator Smith is 
recognized, under the current UC, we would then go to Senator Kyl. I 
ask unanimous consent that after Senator Kyl, Senator Kennedy be 
recognized on this side of the issue and that after Senator Kennedy, 
Senator Bill Nelson be recognized as the next speaker in support of the 
Levin amendment. If there is a speaker in opposition after Senator 
Kennedy, that Senator would then come immediately after Senator Kennedy 
and before Senator Nelson.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a speaker at 
that point before Senator Nelson. But if Senator Lott wishes to speak, 
I will yield to him.
  Mr. LEVIN. With that amendment, I offer that UC.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise today as the lead Republican on the 
Levin-Reed amendment. I am proud to cosponsor this amendment because it 
calls for what I have been stating all year. It sets up a timetable--a 
timetable we all know is inevitable--to draw down our troops. Last week 
General Petraeus's testimony highlighted what I consider to be the 
remaining primary function of American troops in Iraq: to defeat al-
Qaida, our mortal enemy. The organization which attacked us on 9/11 is 
being hounded from its refuge in Anbar, fleeing from a lethal mix of 
American forces and their own destructive ideology. American troops 
should by all means continue this assault on al-Qaida. But Anbar 
Province is not all of Iraq. In past years supporters of the war have 
pointed to areas other than Anbar, such as the Shia and Kurdish 
provinces, to show that things are not going as badly as they were in 
Fallujah and Ramadi. Today they point to Anbar to show that things are 
not going as badly as the violence in Baghdad.
  I have visited Iraq numerous times; and wherever I am with our 
troops, I am inspired by them. I have also become increasingly 
conscious of the fact that I am in the eye of the hurricane. Relative 
peace wherever our troops are, but outside of us are swirling the winds 
of hatred and violence such of which the American people can scarcely 
imagine.
  This amendment explicitly defines the role of the U.S. military in 
Iraq as threefold. An appropriate amount of troops will remain to 
protect our diplomats, our military installations, and our 
infrastructure. We will continue to train, equip, and provide 
logistical and intelligence support to Iraqi security forces, sharing 
intelligence with them. Thirdly, and most importantly, we will be there 
to turn over every rock, every crevice, and seek out every al-Qaida 
killer who wishes to harm Americans.
  As I have spoken out pleading for a new course in Iraq, there has 
been a great cacophony of noise about how to go forward. Some of my 
colleagues have wanted to cut off funding. In fact, we voted that plan 
down resoundingly. Such a course, in my view, would be more than 
dishonorable; it would be dangerous. Some, on the other hand, say: 
Let's stay the course. I find that troubling as well. What ``stay the 
course'' means is, we will continue to spend $12 billion a month. We 
will lose roughly three American soldiers a day, some of them 
Oregonians. In addition, there will be countless traumatized, wounded, 
and maimed for life, for which I cannot find a number.

  Underpinning the current course and the argument of many of my 
colleagues is the hope, the predicate, that at the end of the road 
there will be an Iraqi Government that will govern effectively and 
democratically. I believe President Bush's formulation that we will 
stand down when they can stand up has it backwards. I have come to the 
reluctant conclusion that based on my numerous trips to Iraq, they will

[[Page S11822]]

not stand up politically until we begin standing down militarily. Like 
many of my colleagues, I have been to Iraq repeatedly. To be with the 
troops, again, is to be inspired, to be humbled in their presence 
because of the remarkable work they are doing and the cause for which 
they are fighting. As inspiring as that is, it is equally depressing to 
meet with Iraqi political leaders, democratically elected, who we think 
ought to be focused on reconciliation. What I have found is they are 
focused on revenge.
  In Iraq there is ancient sectarian strife which has produced a low-
grade civil war, a war which is not ours to win and not one we can win. 
It is theirs to win. We won the first war--Saddam was overthrown. 
Iraqis must now win the peace. Civil wars end in one of two ways: One 
side wins and the other loses, or they fight it out until they figure 
it out. My belief is that we delay the day for them figuring it out 
with our current posture.
  I would love to be proven wrong. I pray President Bush is right. But 
I believe it is our obligation to have this debate to help change the 
course in the policy of the United States Government, and more 
importantly, to help change also the course in the policy of the Iraqi 
Government. I intend to use all my leverage as a Senator to change that 
course in Iraq, to get their Government to govern.
  My fear is that what our presence and current posture are doing is 
simply keeping their civil war at a low-grade level, a no-win situation 
for American troops in Iraq. There is no good option for how we come 
home, but it does seem to me this amendment best expresses my own 
conclusions. That is why I cosponsored the amendment, to recognize al-
Qaida as our mortal foe. We must take them on wherever we can, even now 
in Iraq, but ultimately we have to get capable and effective Iraqi 
political leaders, too, to do the most basic kinds of governing: 
debaathification, setting up of local elections, allowing the processes 
of democracy to work, establishing a rule of law that gives people 
confidence, spending their oil revenue money for the restructuring and 
the rebuilding of their own country. We cannot want functioning 
democracy for Iraqis more than they want it for themselves. What they 
seem bent on now is ethnic cleansing of their neighborhoods and 
religious division. Ultimately, those are their decisions, not ours. As 
long as we say--we will take the bullet, we will take it first--they 
will let us.
  The Reed-Levin amendment provides a different way forward with a 
responsible division of labor. Let the Iraqi forces we have trained and 
equipped handle their security in Baghdad and in other communities. Let 
us help them and ourselves by taking on al-Qaida as we find it in Iraq.
  This should not be a Republican-Democratic debate. I do not want to 
sling mud around this Chamber and point fingers at which parties and 
which voters and which Government branch got us where we are. That 
should not be the focus of our discussion today. But for the sake of 
the American people, we should be discussing the way forward, a way 
that includes a United States victory over al-Qaida. Therefore, I rise 
as a Republican from Oregon to support the amendment. I believe this 
legislation strikes the right balance between the same old stay the 
course policy and a panicked flight to the exit.
  Do we have moral and strategic interests in Iraq? Of course, we do. 
Will we have those interests in the future? Of course, we will. Should 
we ignore those interests? Of course not. This language addresses those 
concerns, the language of the Reed-Levin amendment. I believe this 
legislation is the best, most effective, most responsible way forward.
  I urge the amendment's adoption and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted 
to be the next Democrat to speak after the Chair, who is already in 
line in the order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Arizona is to 
be recognized next.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, in view of the fact that there are a series 
of other speakers who wish to address this matter, I am going to ask 
unanimous consent to put an article in the Record to respond to one of 
the arguments that has been made, and then I will briefly respond to 
the others.
  To the point that this is a civil war in Iraq and that is the 
justification for American forces being withdrawn, I ask unanimous 
consent that an article by Frederick Kagan entitled ``Al Qaeda in 
Iraq,'' dated September 10 and appearing in the Weekly Standard, be 
printed in the Record after my comments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. KYL. Fred Kagan is a respected expert, a resident scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute. The point he makes in this erudite 
article is that the primary problem for our forces in Iraq is al-Qaida 
in Iraq. It is the Iraq component of al-Qaida, that either we are 
fighting the al-Qaida forces directly--about 90 percent of whom are 
Iraqis, though the leadership significantly primarily comes from other 
places--Egypt, Jordan, and so on--or we are fighting to maintain peace 
between people whom al-Qaida in Iraq have instigated a conflict with, 
as they did when they bombed the Golden Mosque in Samarra, and that our 
primary effort, therefore, is in defeating al-Qaida in Iraq.

  The reason I bring that point up here is also to go to the heart of 
one of the points of the Levin-Reed amendment which is, we need to 
change our mission. Part of it is to change the mission to deal 
primarily with the counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida and al-
Qaida affiliated groups. That would be certainly al-Qaida in Iraq and 
other international terrorist organizations. That is going to be one of 
the three new missions in addition to protecting U.S. and coalition 
forces and infrastructure and training and equipping the Iraqis.
  All three of those are part of our mission today. It is simply not 
the case that we can separate our mission today from this mission in 
any meaningful way. As General Petraeus testified when he was asked 
about a new mission, he said counterterrorism requires not just the 
special operations forces--a relatively small force that would be left 
behind under the proposal that is pending before us here--but it 
requires other forces as well, including the kind of combat operations 
we engage in today, our general conventional forces, along with 
intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and all of the other 
forces, which also include logistical support, that are currently used 
in the operations against al-Qaida and the other terrorists who are 
there.
  So it is simply a mistake in concept here that somehow we are 
performing a different mission today than would be performed in the 
future, that that is a counterterrorism mission and it can be performed 
with different and less troops. General Petraeus has said that is 
simply not true.
  If you stop and think about it for a moment, you have heard reports 
of the way some of these operations are conducted. You get good 
intelligence from a predator aircraft or a human source or someone you 
have an Iraqi, al-Qaida, or other terrorist group that is going to be 
planting an IED in a location or they are making explosives in a 
location, and you have an F-16 that has been up in the air for an hour 
or two, and they get this information, and they relay it to the F-16, 
and they say: Go to these coordinates and drop a bomb on those 
coordinates, and he does that.
  Now, it is not some special forces thing that deals with al-Qaida, in 
other words, as a counterterrorism type of war that is totally 
different than anything else. You use many of the same kinds of 
personnel and tactics and equipment you use in conventional warfare. 
That is the point General Petraeus was trying to make. It is an 
artificial distinction to say there is going to be a new and different 
mission under the Levin-Reed proposal than exists today and it can be 
done with a much smaller and different kind of force. General Petraeus 
says: It is simply not so. That is the primary reason

[[Page S11823]]

I have trouble with this proposal that is pending. I hope my colleagues 
will defeat it.
  I did want to also make this point in the debate: We sometimes get so 
wrapped up in discussing what we think that we do not stop and think 
about the people who are actually doing the fighting there. I have in 
mind both our troops and the very fine officers who lead the troops. We 
have all visited them in Iraq. We have visited those who have been 
wounded, and we grieve with the families of those who have been lost. 
These are America's finest, and they are fighting the worst of the 
worst. They are fighting killers who prey on innocent people, have no 
conscience in killing anyone who is necessary to suit their needs.
  This is a brutal war against a brutal enemy. We are asking some of 
our finest young men and women to go into harm's way to perform this 
mission. They want to know what they have done so far--the gains they 
have produced, as General Petraeus called them--will not have been won 
in vain, that those gains can be helped.
  What General Petraeus said in his testimony--I am going to summarize 
these quick four points--``the military objectives of the surge are, in 
large measure, being met,'' ``that Coalition and Iraqi forces have 
dealt significant blows to al-Qaeda-Iraq''--incidentally, it is a point 
Frederick Kagan makes in some detail in this article I am having 
printed in the Record--third, ``Iraqi elements have been standing and 
fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in 
operations in many areas,'' and, finally--this is the point I am 
leading up to--``we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge 
level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the 
security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.''
  That is the key, and that is what the President said should unite us. 
We would all like to bring our troops home, as many as soon as 
possible. The more success we have, the better we are able to do that. 
But we do not want to do it if it means we lose what we have fought so 
hard to gain. I think almost all of us can agree with that proposition. 
But that is why I reached the conclusion that the particular amendment 
that has been proposed here would be counterproductive.
  Fortunately, polls of the American people are beginning to show they 
support the Petraeus recommendations. In fact, I was told of a new Pew 
poll within the last few days that had the American people supporting 
the Petraeus recommended troop reductions by the number 57 to 28. That 
is an astounding change from American public opinion of a few months 
ago.
  So the American public supports what our troops are accomplishing 
now. To try to find some way to politically triangulate between an 
immediate withdrawal and following the Petraeus recommendations, which 
is essentially what I gather the amendment before us would attempt to 
do, is to try to impose an artificial political construct in a very 
dangerous and very complex environment. There is an old saying that for 
every complex problem there is a simple and wrong solution. I think 
that is what we have here. We have a very complex situation, a very 
brutal enemy, and an attempt to try to triangulate it in order to get a 
certain number of votes in the Senate, to suggest that we can change 
the mission with a different mix of force than we have, contrary to 
General Petraeus's testimony, I think would be a big mistake.
  So I urge my colleagues to take these considerations into account 
when they cast their vote and, in particular, again, go back to what 
General Petraeus said. There was a lot of wisdom in his testimony. I 
think all of us here recognize General Petraeus, General Odierno, and 
all of the other fine officers who are in Iraq have given us a path to 
achieve success in Iraq. The sooner that success can be consolidated, 
the sooner our troops can come home.

                               Exhibit 1

               [From the Weekly Standard, Sept. 10, 2007]

       Al Qaeda in Iraq--How To Understand It. How To Defeat It.

                        (By Frederick W. Kagan)

       Al Qaeda In Iraq is part of the global al Qaeda movement. 
     AQI, as the U.S. military calls it, is around 90 percent 
     Iraqi. Foreign fighters, however, predominate in the 
     leadership and among the suicide bombers, of whom they 
     comprise up to 90 percent, U.S. commanders say. The leader of 
     AQI is Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian. His predecessor, Abu 
     Musab al Zarqawi, was a Jordanian.
       Because the members of AQI are overwhelmingly Iraqis--often 
     thugs and misfits recruited or dragooned into the 
     organization (along with some clerics and more educated 
     leaders)--it is argued that AQI is not really part of the 
     global al Qaeda movement. Therefore, it is said, the war in 
     Iraq is not part of the global war on terror: The ``real'' al 
     Qaeda--Osama bin Laden's band, off in its safe havens in the 
     Pakistani tribal areas of Waziristan and Baluchistan--is the 
     group to fight. Furthermore, argue critics of this 
     persuasion, we should be doing this fighting through precise, 
     intelligence-driven airstrikes or Special Forces attacks on 
     key leaders, not the deployment of large conventional forces, 
     which only stirs resentment in Muslim countries and creates 
     more terrorists.
       Over the past four years, the war in Iraq has provided 
     abundant evidence to dispute these assertions.


                           AL QAEDA WORLDWIDE

       Al Qaeda is an organization pursuing an ideology. Both the 
     organization and the ideology must be defeated. Just as, in 
     the Cold War, the contest between the United States and its 
     allies and the Soviet Union and its captive nations was the 
     real-world manifestation of an ideological struggle, so 
     today, the global war on terror is a real-world contest 
     between the United States and its allies and al Qaeda and its 
     enablers. We can hope to defeat the ideology only by 
     defeating its champion, al Qaeda.
       Al Qaeda's ideology is the lineal descendant of a school of 
     thought articulated most compellingly by the Egyptian 
     revolutionary Sayyid Qutb in the 1950s and 1960s, with an 
     admixture of Wahhabism, Deobandi thought, or simple, 
     mainstream Sunni chauvinism, depending on where and by what 
     group it is propounded.
       Qutb blended a radical interpretation of Muslim theology 
     with the Marxism-Leninism and anticolonial fervor of the 
     Egypt of his day to produce an Islamic revolutionary 
     movement. He argued that the secularism and licentious (by 
     his extreme standards) behavior of most Muslims was 
     destroying the true faith and returning the Islamic world to 
     the state of jahiliyyah, or ignorance of the word of God, 
     which prevailed before Muhammad. The growing secularism of 
     Muslim states particularly bothered him. According to his 
     interpretation, God alone has the power to make laws and to 
     judge. When men make laws and judge each other according to 
     secular criteria, they are usurping God's prerogatives. All 
     who obey such leaders, according to Qutb, are treating their 
     leaders as gods and therefore are guilty of the worst sin--
     polytheism. Thus they are--and this is the key point--not 
     true Muslims, but unbelievers, regardless of whether they 
     otherwise obey Muslim law and practice.
       This is the defining characteristic of al Qaeda's ideology, 
     which is properly called ``takfirism'' (even though al Qaeda 
     fighters do not use the term). The word ``takfir'' designates 
     the process of declaring a person to be an unbeliever because 
     of the way he practices his faith. Takfir violates the 
     religious understanding of most of the world's Muslims, for 
     the Koran prescribes only five requirements for a Muslim 
     (acknowledgment of the oneness of God, prayer, charitable 
     giving, the fast, and the pilgrimage to Mecca) and specifies 
     that anyone who observes them is a Muslim. The takfiris 
     insist that anyone who obeys a human government is a 
     polytheist and therefore violates the first premise of 
     Islam, the shahada (the assertion that ``There is no god 
     but God''), even though Muslims have lived in states with 
     temporal rulers for most of their history. The chief 
     reason al Qaeda has limited support in the Muslim world is 
     that the global Muslim community overwhelmingly rejects 
     the premise that anyone obeying a temporal ruler is ipso 
     facto an unbeliever.
       Today's takfiris carry Qutb's basic principles further. 
     Some pious Muslims believe that human governments should 
     support or enforce sharia law. This is why Saudi Arabia has 
     no law but sharia. But to Osama bin Laden and his senior 
     lieutenant, Ayman al Zawahiri, it is not enough for a state 
     to rule according to sharia. To be legitimate in the eyes of 
     these revolutionaries, a state must also work actively to 
     spread ``righteous rule'' across the earth. This demand means 
     that only states aligned with the takfiris and supporting the 
     spread of takfirism--such as the Taliban when it was in 
     power--are legitimate, whereas states aligned with 
     unbelievers, like Saudi Arabia, are illegitimate even if they 
     strictly enforce sharia law. Some takfiris, particularly in 
     Iraq as we shall see, argue in addition that all Shia are 
     polytheists, and therefore apostates, because they 
     ``worship'' Ali and Hussein and their successor imams. This 
     distorted view of Shiism reflects the continual movement of 
     takfiri thought toward extremes.
       These distinctions are no mere theoretical niceties. The 
     Koran and Muslim tradition forbid Muslims from killing one 
     another except in narrowly specified circumstances. They also 
     restrict the conditions under which Muslims can kill non-
     Muslims. Takfiris, however, claim that the groups and 
     individuals they condemn are not really Muslims but 
     unbelievers who endanger the true faith. They therefore claim 
     to be exercising the right to defend the faith, granted

[[Page S11824]]

     by the Koran and Muslim tradition, when they endorse the 
     killing of these false Muslims and the Westerners who either 
     seduce them into apostasy or support them in it. This is the 
     primary theological justification for al Qaeda's terrorism.
       Takfirism is a radical reinterpretation of Islam that 
     discards over a thousand years of Islamic scholarship and 
     cautious tradition in favor of a literal reading of the Koran 
     and Hadith that allows any layman--such as Osama bin Laden, 
     who has no clerical standing--to usurp the role of Islam's 
     scholars and issue fatwas and exercise other such clerical 
     prerogatives. Interestingly, ``takfirism'' is what the Muslim 
     enemies of this movement call it. Iraqis, for example, 
     commonly refer to the members of AQI as ``takfiris.'' This 
     term has a strong negative connotation, implying as it does 
     the right of a small group to determine who is a Muslim 
     and to kill those who do not practice their religion in a 
     particular manner. (Iraqis also sometimes call the 
     terrorists ``khawaraj,'' a reference to the Kharajites of 
     early Muslim history that is extremely derogatory, 
     implying as it does that al Qaeda members are schismatics, 
     well outside of the mainstream of Islam.)
       While takfirism is the primary theological justification 
     for the actions of al Qaeda, it is not the only important 
     component of the terrorists' ideology. Western concepts are 
     deeply embedded in the movement as well, primarily Leninism. 
     Qutb was familiar with the concept of the Bolshevik party as 
     the ``vanguard of the proletariat''--the small group that 
     understood the interests of the proletariat better than the 
     workers themselves, that would seize power in their name, 
     then would help them to achieve their own ``class 
     consciousness'' while creating a society that was just and 
     suitable for them. Qutb thought of his ideology in the same 
     terms: He explicitly referred to his movement as a vanguard 
     that would seize power in the name of the true faith and then 
     reeducate Muslims who had gone astray.
       Bin Laden underscored this aspect of the ideology in naming 
     his organization ``al Qaeda,'' which means ``the base.'' Qutb 
     and bin Laden envisaged a small revolutionary movement that 
     would seize power in a Muslim state and then gradually work 
     to expand its control to the entire Muslim world, while 
     reeducating lapsed Muslims under its power. Al Qaeda's 
     frequent references to reestablishing the caliphate are tied 
     to this concept. The goal is to recapture the purity of the 
     ``Rashidun,'' the period when Muhammad and his immediate 
     successors ruled. This was the last time the Muslim world was 
     united and governed, as bin Laden sees it, according to the 
     true precepts of Islam.
       Leninism (along with the practical challenges faced by 
     revolutionaries in a hostile world) has informed the 
     organizational structure as well as the thinking of al Qaeda. 
     The group is cellular and highly decentralized, as the 
     Bolsheviks were supposed to be. It focuses on seizing power 
     in weakened states, as Communist movements did in Russia and 
     China, and on weakening stronger states to make them more 
     susceptible to attack, as the Communist movement did around 
     the world after its triumph in the Soviet Union. Al Qaeda's 
     center of gravity is its ideology, which means that 
     individual cells can pursue the common aim with little or no 
     relationship to the center. It is nevertheless a linked 
     movement, with leaders directing the flow of some resources 
     and ordering or forbidding particular operations around the 
     world.
       These, then, are the key characteristics of al Qaeda: It is 
     based on the principle of takfirism. It sees itself as a 
     Muslim revolutionary vanguard. It aims to take power in weak 
     states and to weaken strong states. It is cellular and 
     decentralized, but with a networked global leadership that 
     influences its activities without necessarily controlling 
     them. How does Al Qaeda In Iraq fit into this scheme?


                            AL QAEDA IN IRAQ

       AQI is part of the global al Qaeda movement both 
     ideologically and practically. Ideologically, it lies on the 
     extreme end of the takfiri spectrum. It was initially called 
     the ``Movement of Monotheism (tawhid) and Jihad,'' referring 
     to the takfiri principle that human government (and Shiism) 
     are polytheist. From its inception, AQI has targeted mainly 
     Iraqis; it has killed many times more Muslims than Americans. 
     Its preferred weapon is the suicide car-bomb or truck-bomb 
     aimed at places where large numbers of Iraqi civilians, 
     especially Shia, congregate. When the movement began in 2003 
     it primarily targeted Shia. Zarqawi sought to provoke a Shia-
     Sunni civil war that he expected would mobilize the Sunni to 
     full-scale jihad. He also delighted in killing Shia, whom he 
     saw as intolerable ``rejectionists,'' who had received the 
     message of the Koran and rejected it. Even worse than 
     ignorance of the word of God is deliberate apostasy. The duty 
     to convert or kill apostates supersedes even the duty to wage 
     war against the regular unbeliever--hence Zarqawi's 
     insistence that the Shia were more dangerous than the 
     ``Zionists and Crusaders.''
       Bin Laden's associate Zawahiri remonstrated with Zarqawi on 
     this point in a series of exchanges that became public. He 
     argued that Zarqawi erred in attacking Shia, who should 
     rather be exhorted and enticed to join the larger movement he 
     hoped to create. Zawahiri's arguments were more tactical and 
     strategic than ideological. He has no objection to killing 
     unfaithful Muslims, but he has been eager to focus the 
     movement on what he calls the ``far enemy,'' America and the 
     West.
       Zarqawi too pursued attacks on Western targets, of course. 
     He was implicated in the 2002 murder of USAID official 
     Lawrence Foley in Jordan, and in the bombing of the United 
     Nations office in Baghdad on August 19, 2003. But Zarqawi 
     concentrated on attacking Iraqi Shia. A blast at the end of 
     August 2003, for example, killed 85 Shia in Najaf, including 
     Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim (older brother of Abd al-
     Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic 
     Council, the largest Shia party in the Council of 
     Representatives), and a series of attacks on Shia mosques 
     during the Ashura holiday in March 2004 killed over 180. He 
     finally succeeded in provoking a significant Shia backlash 
     with the destruction of the golden dome of the Shia al-
     Askariyah Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. Zarqawi was 
     killed by coalition forces Sunni areas to the north and 
     south, Diyala, Salah-ad-Din, and Ninewa. AQI bases in 
     Falluja, Tal Afar, and Baquba included media centers, 
     torture houses, sharia courts, and all the other niceties 
     of AQI occupation that would be familiar to students of 
     the Taliban in Afghanistan and takfiri groups elsewhere. 
     Local thugs flocked to the banner, and those who resisted 
     were brutally tortured and murdered. Imams in local 
     mosques--radicalized in the 1990s by Saddam Hussein's 
     ``return to the faith'' initiative (to shore up his highly 
     secular government by wrapping it in the aura of Islam)--
     preached takfirism and resistance to the Americans.
       The presence of large numbers of Iraqis in the movement has 
     contributed to confusion about the relationship between AQI 
     and al Qaeda. Apart from the radicalized clerics and some 
     leaders, most of the Iraqis in the organization are misfits 
     and ne'er-do-wells, younger sons without sense or 
     intelligence who fall under the spell of violent leaders. The 
     recruitment process in many areas is like that of any street-
     gang, where the leaders combine exhortation and promises with 
     exemplary violence against those who obstinately refuse to 
     join. In this regard, AQI is subtly different from the al 
     Qaeda movement that developed in Afghanistan. The takfiri 
     elements of the mujahedeen who fought the Soviet invader in 
     Afghanistan were highly diverse in origin. That war attracted 
     anti-Soviet fighters from across the Muslim world. They did 
     not fit easily into Afghanistan's xenophobic society, and so 
     concentrated themselves in training camps removed from the 
     population centers after the Soviet withdrawal and the rise 
     of the Taliban. Americans saw these foreign fighters in their 
     camps as the ``real'' al Qaeda, the one that attacked the 
     United States in 2001.
       But al Qaeda was only part of the story in Afghanistan. The 
     Taliban forces that seized power in 1994 imposed a radical 
     interpretation of Islam upon the population and attacked the 
     symbols of other religions in a country that had 
     traditionally tolerated different faiths and diverse 
     practices. Like their AQI counterparts today, the Taliban 
     tended to be ill-educated, violent, and radical. And they 
     were just as necessary to sustaining al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
     as the Iraqi foot soldiers of AQI have been to supporting 
     that movement. Bin Laden provided essential support, both 
     military and financial, to put the Taliban in power and keep 
     it there. In return, the Taliban allowed him to operate with 
     impunity and protected him from foreign intervention. The war 
     began in 2001 when Taliban leader Mullah Omar refused to 
     yield the al Qaeda members responsible for 9/11 even though 
     the Taliban itself had not been involved in the attacks.
       Afghanistan's extremist thugs and misfits, once in power, 
     facilitated the foreign-led al Qaeda's training, planning, 
     and preparation for attacks against Western targets around 
     the world, including the attacks on two U.S. embassies in 
     Africa in 1998, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and 9/
     11. In return, al Qaeda's foreign fighters fiercely defended 
     the Taliban regime when U.S. forces attacked in 2001, even 
     forming up in conventional battle lines against America's 
     Afghan allies supported by U.S. Special Forces and airpower. 
     In Afghanistan the relationship between al Qaeda and the 
     Taliban was symbiotic, mutually dependent, and mutually 
     reinforcing. It included a shared world view and a 
     willingness to fight common enemies. There was a close bond 
     between indigenous Afghan extremists and the internationalist 
     takfiris. Al Qaeda in Iraq benefits from just such a bond.
       Yet there is a difference between the two movements in this 
     regard: Whereas in Afghanistan al Qaeda remained separate 
     from Afghan society for the most part, interacting with it 
     primarily through the Taliban, AQI directly incorporates 
     Iraqis. Indeed, the foreign origins of AQI's leaders are a 
     handicap, of which their names are a constant reminder: 
     Zarqawi's nom de guerre identified him immediately as a 
     Jordanian, and the ``al-Masri'' in Abu Ayyub al-Masri means 
     ``the Egyptian.'' The takfiris clumsily addressed this 
     problem by announcing their ``Islamic State of Iraq,'' which 
     they presented as an umbrella movement Iraqi in nature but 
     which was in fact a thin disguise for AQI, and by inventing a 
     fictitious leader with a hyper-Iraqi, hyper-Sunni name, Abu 
     Omar al-Baghdadi.
       As for its local recruits, they undergo extensive training 
     that is designed to brainwash them and prepare them to 
     support and engage in vicious violence. One of the reasons 
     some Iraqi Sunnis have turned against AQI has been this 
     practice of making their

[[Page S11825]]

     sons into monsters. Many Iraqis have come to feel about AQI 
     the way the parents of young gang members tend to feel about 
     gangs.
       These AQI recruits often remain local. Young Anbaris do not 
     on the whole venture out of Anbar to attack Americans or Shia 
     beyond their province; AQI recruits in Arab Jabour or Salah-
     ad-Din tend to stay near their homes, even if temporarily 
     driven off by U.S. operations. The leaders, however, travel a 
     great deal--Zarqawi went from Jordan to Germany to 
     Afghanistan to Iraq, and within Iraq from Falluja to Baquba 
     and beyond, and his subordinates and successors have covered 
     many miles at home and abroad. The presence of AQI cells in 
     each area facilitates this movement, as well as the movement 
     of foreign fighters into and through Iraq and the movement of 
     weapons, supplies, and intelligence. AQI facilitators provide 
     safe houses and means of communication. Some build car bombs 
     that are passed from cell to cell until they are mated with 
     the foreign fighters who will detonate them, perhaps far from 
     where they were built. Even though most members of AQI remain 
     near their homes, the sum of all of the cells, plus the 
     foreign leadership and foreign fighters, is a movement 
     that can plan and conduct attacks rapidly across the 
     country and around the region, and that can regenerate 
     destroyed cells within weeks. The leaders themselves are 
     hooked into the global al Qaeda movement.
       The integration of AQI into the population makes it harder 
     to root out than al Qaeda was in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, 
     American leaders could launch missile strikes against al 
     Qaeda training bases (as President Clinton did, to little 
     effect), and U.S. Special Forces could target those camps 
     with or without indigenous help. Not so in Iraq.
       Intermingled with the population, AQI maintains no large 
     training areas and thus offers few targets suitable for 
     missile strikes. American and Iraqi Special Forces have been 
     effective at killing particular AQI leaders, but this has not 
     destroyed the movement or even severely degraded its ability 
     to conduct attacks across the country. New leaders spring up, 
     and the facilitation networks continue their work.
       When the Taliban fell in Afghanistan, al Qaeda lost its 
     freedom of movement throughout the country. Most surviving al 
     Qaeda fighters fled to Pakistan's largely ungoverned tribal 
     areas, where they could count on enough local support to 
     sustain themselves. Today there is little support for al 
     Qaeda in Afghanistan, no large permanent al Qaeda training 
     camp, and certainly no ability to conduct large-scale or 
     countrywide operations against U.S. or Afghan forces.
       The recent turn against Al Qaeda In Iraq by key Iraqis has 
     produced less dramatic results because of the different means 
     by which AQI maintains itself. Although much of AQI's support 
     originally came from locals who sought its aid, by 2006 the 
     takfiris had made themselves so unpopular that their 
     continued presence relied on their continuous use of violence 
     against their hosts. As Anbari tribal leaders began for 
     various reasons to resist AQI's advances, AQI started 
     attacking them and their families. Outside of Anbar Province, 
     AQI regularly uses exemplary torture and murder to keep 
     locals in line. The principles of takfirism justify this, as 
     anyone who resists AQI's attempts to impose its vision of 
     Islam becomes an enemy of Islam. AQI then has the right and 
     obligation to kill such a person, since, in the takfiri view, 
     execution is the proper punishment for apostasy. It is a 
     little harder to see the pseudo-religious justification for 
     torture, but AQI is not deterred by such fine points.
       Like al Qaeda in Afghanistan, then, AQI initially relied on 
     support from the population more or less freely offered. 
     Unlike al Qaeda in Afghanistan--but like the Taliban--it also 
     developed means of coercing support when this was no longer 
     given freely. As a result, Iraq's Sunnis cannot simply decide 
     to turn against al Qaeda on their own, for doing so condemns 
     them to outrageous punishments. To defeat Al Qaeda In Iraq, 
     therefore, it is not enough to attack takfiri ideology or 
     persuade the Iraqi government to address the Sunnis' 
     legitimate grievances. Those approaches must be combined with 
     a concerted effort to protect Sunni populations from AQI's 
     terrorism.


                           HOW TO DEFEAT AQI

       One of the first questions Iraqis ask when American forces 
     move into AQI strongholds to fight the takfiris is: Are you 
     going to stay this time? In the past, coalition forces have 
     cleared takfiri centers, often with local help, but have 
     departed soon after, leaving the locals vulnerable to vicious 
     AQI retaliation. This pattern created a legacy of distrust, 
     and a concomitant hesitancy to commit to backing coalition 
     forces.
       This cycle was broken first in Anbar, for three reasons: 
     The depth of AQI's control there led the group to commit some 
     of its worst excesses in its attempt to hold on to power; the 
     strength of the tribal structures in the province created the 
     possibility of effective local resistance when the mood swung 
     against the takfiris; and the sustained presence and 
     determination of soldiers and Marines in the province gave 
     the locals hope of assistance once they began to turn against 
     the terrorists.
       The movement against the takfiris began as AQI tried to 
     solidify its position in Anbar by marrying some of its senior 
     leaders to the daughters of Anbari tribal leaders, as al 
     Qaeda has done in South Asia. When the sheikhs resisted, AQI 
     began to attack them and their families, assassinating one 
     prominent sheikh, then preventing his relatives from burying 
     him within the 24 hours prescribed by Muslim law. In the 
     tribal society of Anbar, this and related actions led to the 
     rise of numerous blood-feuds between AQI and Anbari families. 
     The viciousness of AQI's retaliation and the relative 
     weakness of the Anbari tribes as a military or police force 
     put the locals in a difficult position, from which they were 
     rescued by the determined work of coalition and Iraqi 
     security forces.
       Throughout 2006, U.S. soldiers and Marines in Anbar refused 
     to cede the province's capital and major population centers 
     to the insurgents. Officers like Colonel Sean MacFarland 
     worked to establish bases in Ramadi, protect key positions 
     within the city, and generally contest AQI's control. At the 
     same time, Marine commanders strove to reach out to Anbaris 
     increasingly disenchanted with AQI. Commanders in the 
     province now acknowledge that they probably missed several 
     early overtures from tribal leaders, but they clearly grasped 
     the more obvious signals the sheikhs sent in late 2006 and 
     early 2007 indicating their interest in working together 
     against the common foe.
       The change in U.S. strategy announced in January 2007 and 
     the surge of forces over the ensuing months did not create 
     this shift in Anbar, but accelerated its development. The 
     surge meant that American commanders did not have to shift 
     forces out of Anbar to protect Baghdad, as had happened in 
     previous operations. MacFarland's successor, Colonel John 
     Charlton, was able to build on MacFarland's success when he 
     took command in early 2007. He moved beyond the limited bases 
     MacFarland's soldiers had established and began pushing his 
     troops into key neighborhoods in Ramadi, establishing Joint 
     Security Stations, and clearing the city. Marine forces in 
     the province were augmented by two battalions in the spring 
     and a battalion-sized Marine Expeditionary Unit in the 
     summer. The latter has been attacking the last bastions of 
     AQI in northeastern Anbar.
       The increased U.S. presence and the more aggressive 
     operations of American forces--working with Iraqi army units 
     that, although heavily Shia, were able to function 
     effectively with U.S. troops even in Sunni Anbar--allowed the 
     tribal turn against AQI to pick up steam. By late spring 
     2007, all of the major Anbari tribes had sworn to oppose AQI 
     and had begun sending their sons to volunteer for service in 
     the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police. By summer, the coalition 
     had established a new training base in Habbaniya to receive 
     these recruits, and the Iraqi army units had begun balancing 
     their sectarian mix by incorporating Anbari Sunnis into their 
     formations. Thousands of Anbaris began patrolling the streets 
     of their own cities and towns to protect against AQI, and 
     coalition commanders were flooded with information about the 
     presence and movements of takfiris. By the beginning of 
     August, AQI had been driven out of all of Anbar's major 
     population centers, and its attempts to regroup in the 
     hinterland have been fitful and dangerous for the takfiris. 
     The mosques in Anbar's major cities have stopped preaching 
     anti-American and pro-takfiri sermons on the whole, switching 
     either to neutral messages or to support for peace and even 
     for the coalition.
       The battle is by no means over. AQI has made clear its 
     determination to reestablish itself in Anbar or to punish the 
     Anbaris for their betrayal, and AQI cells in rural Anbar and 
     surrounding provinces are still trying to regenerate. But the 
     takfiri movement that once nearly controlled the province by 
     blending in with its people has lost almost all popular 
     support and has been driven to desperate measures to maintain 
     a precarious foothold. The combination of local 
     disenchantment with takfiri extremism, a remarkable lack of 
     cultural sensitivity by the takfiris themselves, 
     and effective counterinsurgency operations by coalition 
     forces working to protect the population have turned the 
     tide.
       Anbar is a unique province in that its population is almost 
     entirely Sunni Arab and its tribal structures remain strong 
     despite years of Saddam's oppression. The ``Anbar 
     Awakening,'' as the Anbari turn against the takfiris is 
     usually called, has spread to almost all of Iraq's Sunni 
     areas, but in different forms reflecting their different 
     circumstances. Sunni Arabs in Baghdad, Babil, Salah-ad-Din, 
     and Diyala provinces have long suffered from AQI, but they 
     also face a significant Shia Arab presence, including violent 
     elements of the Jaysh al-Mahdi, or Mahdi Army, the most 
     extreme Shia militia. Diyala, Ninewa, and Kirkuk provinces 
     also have ethnic fault lines where Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds 
     meet and occasionally fight. Tribal structures in these areas 
     vary in strength, but are everywhere less cohesive than those 
     of Anbar.
       Extreme elements of the Jaysh al-Mahdi, particularly the 
     Iranian-controlled ``secret cells,'' have been exerting 
     pressure against Sunni populations in mixed provinces at 
     least since early 2006. Some formerly Sunni cities like 
     Mahmudiya have become Shia (and Jaysh al-Mahdi) strongholds. 
     Mixed areas in Baghdad have tended to become more 
     homogeneous. AQI has benefited from this struggle, which it 
     helped to produce, posing as the defender of the Sunni 
     against the Jaysh al-Mahdi even as it terrorizes Sunnis into 
     supporting it. AQI's hold cannot be broken without addressing 
     the pressure of Shia extremists on these Sunni communities, 
     as well as defending the local population against AQI 
     attacks.

[[Page S11826]]

       This task is dauntingly complex, but not beyond the power 
     of coalition forces to understand and execute. American and 
     Iraqi troops throughout central Iraq have been working 
     aggressively to destroy AQI strongholds like those in Arab 
     Jabour, Baquba, Karma, and Tarmiya and in the Baghdad 
     neighborhoods of Ameriyah, Ghazaliya, and Dora, and have 
     largely driven the takfiris out of the major population 
     centers and even parts of the hinterland. As U.S. forces have 
     arrived in strength and promised to stay, thousands of Sunnis 
     have volunteered to fight the terrorists and to protect their 
     neighborhoods by joining the Iraqi army, police, or auxiliary 
     ``neighborhood watch'' units set up by U.S. forces. In these 
     areas, however, coalition forces have also had to work to 
     protect the local Sunni from attacks by the secret cells of 
     the Shia militia and by Shia militia members who have 
     penetrated the Iraqi national and local police forces. The 
     continued presence of American forces among the population is 
     a key guarantor against attack by the Jaysh al-Mahdi as well 
     as AQI reprisals. Indeed, the Sunni insist upon it as the 
     condition for their participation in the struggle against the 
     takfiris.
       The description of the new U.S. strategy as ``protecting 
     the population'' is shorthand for this complex, variable, and 
     multifaceted approach to the problem of separating AQI from 
     the population and supporting the rising indigenous movement 
     against the takfiris. It has been extremely successful in a 
     short period of time--Anbar in general and Ramadi in 
     particular have gone within six months from being among the 
     most dangerous areas in Iraq to among the safest. AQI 
     strongholds like Arab Jabour and Baquba are now mostly free 
     of large-scale terrorist infiltration, and their populations 
     are working with the coalition to keep the takfiris out. The 
     overall struggle to establish peace and stability in Iraq 
     clearly goes beyond this fight against AQI, but from the 
     standpoint of American interests in the global war on terror, 
     it is vital to recognize our success against the takfiris and 
     the reasons for it.


                              THE OUTLOOK

       AQI--and therefore the larger al Qaeda movement--has 
     suffered a stunning defeat in Iraq over the past six months. 
     It has lost all of its urban strongholds and is engaged in a 
     desperate attempt to reestablish a foothold even in the 
     countryside. The movement is unlikely to accept this defeat 
     tamely. Even now, AQI cells scattered throughout the country 
     are working to reconstitute themselves and to continue mass-
     casualty attacks in the hope of restarting widespread 
     sectarian conflict from which they hope to benefit. If the 
     coalition abandoned its efforts to finish off these cells and 
     to prevent them from rebuilding their networks, it is quite 
     possible that they could terrify their victims into taking 
     them back in some areas, although AQI is unlikely to be 
     viewed sympathetically by most Iraqis for a long time to 
     come.
       If, on the other hand, coalition forces complete the work 
     they have begun by finishing off the last pockets of takfiris 
     and continuing to build local Iraqi security forces that can 
     sustain the fight against the terrorists after American 
     troops pull back, then success against the terrorists in Iraq 
     is likely. That success will come at a price, of course. The 
     takfiris have only the proverbial hammer in Iraq at this 
     point, and they are now in the position of seeing every 
     problem as the proverbial nail. Their hammer can be effective 
     only if no one is around to protect the population: Their 
     violence consistently drives Iraqi sentiment against them and 
     their ideology. So the prospect of a thorough and decisive 
     defeat of the terrorists in Iraq is real.
       It is too soon to declare victory in this struggle, still 
     less in the larger struggle to stabilize Iraq and win the 
     global war on terror. AQI can again become a serious threat 
     if America chooses to let it get up off the mat. Other 
     significant takfiri threats remain outside Iraq, such as the 
     al Qaeda cell that has been battling Lebanese military 
     forces from the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and 
     the aggressive al Qaeda group in the Islamic Maghreb that 
     has proclaimed its intention of conquering all of North 
     Africa and restoring Muslim rule to Spain. Each al Qaeda 
     franchise is subtly different from the others, and there 
     is no one-size-fits-all solution to defeating them. But 
     our experience in Iraq already offers lessons for the 
     larger fight.
       The notion that there is some ``real'' al Qaeda with which 
     we should be more concerned than with AQI or any of the other 
     takfiri franchises is demonstrably false. All of these 
     cellular organizations are interlinked at the top, even as 
     they depend on local facilitators and fighters in particular 
     places. The Iraqi-ness of AQI does not make it any less a 
     part of the global movement. On the contrary, if we do not 
     defeat AQI, we can expect it to start performing the same 
     international functions that al Qaeda and the Taliban did in 
     Afghanistan: Locally active AQI cells will facilitate the 
     training, planning, and preparation for attacks on Western 
     and secular Muslim targets around the world. As has often 
     been noted, the overwhelming majority of the September 11 
     attackers were Saudis, yet their attacks were made possible 
     by facilitators who never left Afghanistan. AQI, if allowed 
     to flourish, would be no different. It has posed less of a 
     threat outside Iraq because of the intensity of the struggle 
     within Iraq--just as the takfiris among the Afghan mujahedeen 
     posed little threat outside that country as long as they had 
     the Soviet army to fight. If the United States lets up on 
     this determined enemy now and allows it to regain a position 
     within Iraqi society, it is likely that AQI cells will soon 
     be facilitating global attacks.
       The idea that targeting these cells from the air or through 
     special operations is an adequate substitute for assisting 
     the local population to fight them is also mistaken. 
     Coalition forces have relied on just this approach against al 
     Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 9/11, with 
     questionable results. Granted, there have been few successful 
     attacks against Western powers, none of them in the United 
     States, for which this aggressive targeting is surely in part 
     responsible. But recent intelligence estimates suggest a 
     strengthening of the al Qaeda movement. In Iraq, years of 
     targeting AQI leaders weakened the movement and led it to 
     make a number of key mistakes, but did not stop mass-casualty 
     attacks or stimulate effective popular resistance to the 
     takfiris. It seems doubtful that Muslim communities--even 
     those that reject the takfiri ideology--are capable of 
     standing up to the terrorists on their own or with only the 
     support of intelligence-driven raids against terrorist 
     leaders and isolated cells.
       Iraq has also disproved the shibboleth that the presence of 
     American military forces in Muslim countries is inherently 
     counterproductive in the fight against takfiris. Certainly 
     the terrorists used our presence as a recruiting tool and 
     benefited from the Sunni Arab nationalist insurgency against 
     our forces. But there is no reason to think that Iraq would 
     have remained free of takfiri fighters had the United States 
     drawn down its forces (or should it draw them down now); it 
     is even open to question whether a continued Baathist regime 
     would have kept the takfiris out. The takfiris go where 
     American forces are, to be sure, but they also go where we 
     are not: Somalia, Lebanon, North Africa, Indonesia, and more. 
     The introduction of Western forces does not inevitably spur 
     takfiri sentiment. When used properly and in the right 
     circumstances, Western military forces can play an essential 
     role in combatting takfirism.
       This is not to say that the United States should invade 
     Waziristan and Baluchistan, or launch preemptive conventional 
     assaults against (or in defense of) weak Muslim regimes 
     around the world. Each response must be tailored to 
     circumstance. But we must break free of a consensus about how 
     to fight the terrorists that has been growing steadily since 
     9/11 which emphasizes ``small footprints,'' working 
     exclusively through local partners, and avoiding conventional 
     operations to protect populations. In some cases, traditional 
     counterinsurgency operations using conventional forces are 
     the only way to defeat this 21st-century foe.
       Muslims can dislike al Qaeda, reject takfirism, and desire 
     peace, yet still be unable to defend themselves alone against 
     the terrorists. In such cases, our assistance, suitably 
     adapted to the realities on the ground, can enable Muslims 
     who hate what the takfiris are doing to their religion and 
     their people--the overwhelming majority of Muslims--to 
     succeed. Helping them is the best way to rid the world of 
     this scourge.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. KERRY. Is the Senator from Arizona suggesting there is not a 
civil war in Iraq?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, what I am saying is the primary conflict that 
concerns the United States of America forces right now is defeating al-
Qaida in Iraq and the conflicts that al-Qaida in Iraq have instigated, 
which include conflicts between Sunnis and Shias.
  Mr. KERRY. Is the Senator aware that 60 percent of Iraq is Shia, that 
Shia are viewed by al-Qaida as complete apostates outside of Islam, 
that they do not get along, that the Kurds do not get along--and they 
are 20 percent of Iraq; therefore, 80 percent of Iraq will have nothing 
to do with al-Qaida--and now the Sunni in Anbar decided they do not 
want anything to do with al-Qaida, and that most of the injuries to our 
troops are from IEDs, and that most of the conflict in Iraq that has 
moved 2 million people out of Iraq and 2 million people within Iraq and 
changed Baghdad from 60 percent Sunni to 75 percent Shia--is he aware 
that, in fact, al-Qaida is not responsible for that, but it is the 
Jaysh al-Mahdi and it is the militia and it is the Badr army and 
everybody except for, fundamentally, al-Qaida that is doing that?
  That is the fundamental violence and conflict which requires the 
political settlement General Petraeus cannot produce, only the Iraqi 
politicians can produce. Is he aware of that?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will be happy to respond by saying, I am 
aware that many of the things asserted by the Senator from 
Massachusetts are incorrect.
  I am aware al-Qaida in Iraq is a major force----

[[Page S11827]]

  Mr. KERRY. Let me ask the Senator--
  Mr. KYL. May I complete my answer to the Senator's lengthy question?
  Mr. KERRY. How many al-Qaida are in Iraq?
  Mr. KYL. Al-Qaida in Iraq--as is evident from the article I had 
printed in the Record; and I would be happy to share a copy of that 
article with my friend from Massachusetts--is a major force in Iraq, 
and is, in addition to being part of the force we are fighting, an 
instigator of violence between some of the groups the Senator from 
Massachusetts mentioned.
  Now, let me say one other thing. I intended to conclude my remarks by 
laying down an amendment which Senator Lieberman and I are prepared to 
debate tomorrow, not right now. But the Senator from Massachusetts 
mentioned the IEDs. Of course, I know the Senator is aware that a lot 
of the newest equipment and training, and in particular this virulent, 
this very destructive IED that is being used in Iraq, is coming from 
Iran, and that part of what we need to do is to deal with Iran in the 
context of this conflict in Iraq as well, and in particular the group 
in Iran that is supplying this equipment. For that reason--
  Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. KYL. I will be happy to yield the floor to the Senator as soon as 
I conclude my business. Then the Senator from Massachusetts can go 
ahead and make his full statement, if that would be all right.


                Amendment No. 3017 To Amendment No. 2011

  Mr. President, what I want to do, in concluding my remarks, is, on 
behalf of Senator Lieberman and Senator Coleman and myself, send an 
amendment to the desk that is a sense of the Senate on Iran, which is 
how it is titled.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to setting aside the 
pending amendment?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I understand this is going to be simply 
sent to the desk, it is then going to be read, and then we are going to 
set aside that amendment. That is understood by the Senator from 
Arizona?
  Mr. KYL. That is correct, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], for himself, Mr. 
     Lieberman, and Mr. Coleman, proposes an amendment numbered 
     3017.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

      (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding Iran)

       At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National 
     Force Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 
     2007, that ``[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coalition 
     and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian 
     Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a 
     militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its 
     interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and 
     coalition forces in Iraq''.
       (2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to 
     Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 
     2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While 
     claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively 
     undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies 
     of the Iraqi state''.
       (3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, 
     published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been 
     intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups 
     of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM [Jaysh al-
     Mahdi], since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively 
     formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.
       (4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the 
     Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007, 
     states that ``[t]he Commission concludes that the evidence of 
     Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the 
     country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. 
     . . It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated 
     weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes 
     across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.
       (5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent 
     Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in 
     testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``[w]e judge that the 
     goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of 
     extreme severity and have the potential of at least delaying 
     our efforts inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons 
     that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from across the 
     Iranian border''.
       (6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist 
     activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``[w]e know that it 
     goes as high as [Brig. Gen. Qassem] Suleimani, who is the 
     head of the Qods Force. . . We believe that he works directly 
     for the supreme leader of the country''.
       (7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on 
     August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence 
     in Iraq, that ``[t]he political power of the occupiers is 
     collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in 
     the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.
       (8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect 
     to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007, 
     that ``[t]he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for 
     extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese 
     Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our 
     force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty 
     clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and 
     is already trying to implement it to the best of his 
     ability''.
       (9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with 
     respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder 
     of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq, 
     that ``[t]e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when 
     we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy 
     commander, and others, and it's in black and white. . . We 
     interrogated these individuals. We have on tape. . . Qais 
     Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you 
     have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his 
     hands and laughs and says, of course not. . . So they told us 
     about the amounts of money that they have received. They told 
     us about the training that they received. They told us about 
     the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of that 
     that they received''.
       (10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007, 
     that ``[w]hat we have got is evidence. This is not 
     intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we 
     captured, documents and so forth. . . In one case, a 22-page 
     document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance, 
     rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted 
     that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala 
     back in January''.
       (11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled 
     ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on 
     September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public 
     Law 109-289, states that ``[t]here has been no decrease in 
     Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in 
     Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians. . 
     . Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest 
     impediments to progress on reconciliation''.
       (12) The Department of Defense report further states, with 
     respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in 
     Iraq, that ``[m]ost of the explosives and ammunition used by 
     these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force. . . For the period of 
     June through the end of August, [explosively formed 
     penetrator] events are projected to rise by 39 percent over 
     the period of March through May''.
       (13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three 
     rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with 
     representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran.
       (14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on 
     September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that 
     ``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that 
     was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on 
     Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues. 
     The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the 
     Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of 
     discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. 
     as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than 
     actually doing serious business...Right now, I haven't seen 
     any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian side''.
       (15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on 
     September 11, 2007, stating that ``[w]e have seen nothing on 
     the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering 
     what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are 
     going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
       (1) that the manner in which the United States transitions 
     and structures its military presence in Iraq will have 
     critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian 
     Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the 
     capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
     to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects 
     for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of 
     the global economy;
       (2) that it is a vital national interest of the United 
     States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a

[[Page S11828]]

     Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside 
     Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting 
     institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;
       (3) that it should be the policy of the United States to 
     combat, contain, and roll back the violent activities and 
     destabilizing influence inside Iraq of the Government of the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, its foreign facilitators such as 
     Lebanese Hezbollah, and its indigenous Iraqi proxies;
       (4) to support the prudent and calibrated use of all 
     instruments of United States national power in Iraq, 
     including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military 
     instruments, in support of the policy described in paragraph 
     (3) with respect to the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
     Iran and its proxies;
       (5) that the United States should designate the Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist 
     organization under section 219 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
     Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, 
     as established under the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and
       (6) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all 
     possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities 
     targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
     1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and 
     March 24, 2007, respectively.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as I said, the chairman of the committee is 
correct, the intention was to simply lay this amendment down tonight on 
behalf of Senators Lieberman, Coleman, and myself. We will debate it 
after we have concluded further business.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment be 
set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2898

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there is no time agreement. As I 
understand, there is an order of speakers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  The Senator from Massachusetts is now recognized.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support this amendment.
  As we continue debating how best to support America's brave military 
forces in Iraq, we must be clear where we stand on the war. I strongly 
support our troops, but I strongly oppose the war. The best way to 
protect our troops and our national security is to put the Iraqis on 
notice that they need to take responsibility for their future so we can 
bring troops back home to America.
  The administration's policy has put our troops in an untenable and 
unwinnable situation. They are being held hostage to Iraqi politics in 
which sectarian leaders are unable or unwilling to make the tough 
judgments needed to lift Iraq out of its downward spiral. We are 
spending hundreds of billions of dollars on a failed policy that is 
making America more vulnerable and putting our troops at greater risk.
  We have lost our focus on apprehending terrorists and on capturing 
those who seek to destroy America. Osama bin Laden remains at large. 
The war in Iraq has enabled al-Qaida to recruit terrorists more 
effectively to work against America.
  Our policy in Iraq continues to exact a devastating toll. Nearly 
4,000 American troops have died--80 in my State of Massachusetts--and 
30,000 have been injured. We need to have a policy that is worthy of 
the valor of the brave men and women who have been fighting there for 
the last 4\1/2\ years. The toll on Iraqis is immense. Tens of thousands 
of Iraqis have been killed or injured, and more than 4 million Iraqis 
have been forced to flee their homes. If that were in American terms, 
it would be 45 million Americans who would have lost their homes, 
effectively 20 Katrinas would have taken place here in the United 
States--when we look at what has happened to the Iraqi families during 
this period of time. Nearly a half trillion dollars has been spent 
fighting this war. Our generals have acknowledged over and over again 
that a military solution alone is not the answer to Iraq's problems. 
After four bloody years, political reconciliation remains illusive, and 
Iraqi politicians are not being held accountable to any standard of 
progress or success. Yet the President unacceptably continues to impose 
the enormous burden of Iraq's sectarian violence on the backs of 
American troops, with an open-ended commitment--with an open-ended 
commitment.

  Our military is stretched to its limits; it is nearing its breaking 
point. The American public has lost confidence in the current direction 
of the war. They are tired of a war based upon a failed policy that has 
made America no safer and that is subjecting our military to Iraq's 
intractable civil war. They are tired of the administration's promises 
that success is just around the corner. They want to know when the 
nightmare of Iraq will end.
  How much longer will President Bush insist that our troops be held 
hostage to the abysmal failure of the Iraqi Government to make the 
political compromises essential to end violence, especially when there 
is no indication--no indication--that they will do so any time soon? 
How many more brave Americans must die? How many more billions of 
taxpayers' dollars must we spend? How much more of a burden must we 
place on our military?
  We all know what is going on. President Bush's strategy is delay and 
delay. We never should have gone to war in the first place, and his 
misguided war has now gone on for more than 4 years. The situation is 
not improving; it is worsening. It is not showing signs of meaningful 
progress. Year after year, it has failed to deliver political 
reconciliation. The President finally admitted to Congress and the 
American people last week that his successor, the next American 
President, will inherit the war in Iraq. He calls himself a decider, 
but he refuses to make the decision to end the war.
  President Harry Truman said: ``The buck stops here.'' The last thing 
President Bush wants is for the buck to stop on his desk. He is 
desperately trying to buy time in order to pass the buck to his 
successor in the White House.
  The first President Bush went to war with Iraq after 52 Senators 
voted in favor of a resolution of approval. Now, 53 Senators have voted 
for a timetable to end the war. But this President vetoed the bill 
because he refuses to accept responsibility to end a war he never 
should have started.
  It is time to stop this madness. This amendment does that. It 
requires our combat troops to begin to come home in 90 days. It 
requires a change in mission for our military. It requires the vast 
majority of our combat troops to come home in 9 months. It is up to us 
to end the open-ended commitment of our troops that the President has 
been making year after year. The Iraqis need to take responsibility for 
their own future, resolve their own political differences, and enable 
our troops to come home.
  We need to tell the Iraqis now that we are going to leave, and leave 
soon. Only such a step can add the urgency that is so clearly necessary 
to end their differences. We can't allow the President to drag this 
process out any longer, and I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, any American I know should be, and is, 
vitally interested in what is happening in Iraq and what our policy 
should be. There is no doubt that good people can disagree about how we 
should handle this important and difficult situation. Nobody's 
patriotism should be questioned in this process. But I would urge that 
these disagreements that might be expressed be expressed in ways that 
minimize the negative impact on what may be, and will be the decided 
policy of the United States. In other words, we need to be sure that as 
we conduct this debate--we have a policy in this country, and we need 
to make sure that we execute it in a way that most likely will provide 
us a method of success.
  Let me recap the history of how we got here because I think it is 
important. By more than a three-fourths vote, 77 Senators in this body 
authorized the use of military force in Iraq. The initial invasion and 
removal of Saddam Hussein went well, surprisingly well--better than 
most would ever have expected. But the postinvasion situation has been 
much more difficult than expected. My personal view, for what it is 
worth--and it

[[Page S11829]]

may not be worth much--is that we underestimated the difficulties of 
establishing a functioning democracy in an undeveloped nation that had 
deep sectarian divides, that had no history of law or democracy, and 
that had been traumatized by years of oppression in a war. So we can 
look back and say there are a lot of mistakes out there that have been 
made, but I think the real problem is we are facing a difficult job 
that is not going to be easy, and no one should underestimate the 
challenge.
  But we must honestly evaluate our current position and use this time 
in this Congress right now to decide what we are going to do. I know 
good people will disagree, but we will reach a decision before this 
debate is out. So we owe nothing less to those fabulous men and women 
who serve us in Iraq than to give this our best judgment, our hardest 
work, our most sincere consideration. There can be no doubt but that 
this is the correct time for a national evaluation.
  Remember how we got here. In May--May 24 of this year--in a 
bipartisan vote, we voted to clearly affirm the surge; 80 to 14 was 
what that vote was. We debated the question. We knew General Petraeus 
was there. The President asked that we fund 30,000 additional troops as 
part of this surge, and we decided to do so. We voted for it. This 
Congress said we will execute that surge. I remember Senator Reid and 
Speaker Pelosi meeting with the President and working on the deal, and 
we agreed to do the surge 80 to 14 on final vote. So it is really not 
President Bush's surge or General Petraeus's surge, it was and is 
America's surge, and our troops are carrying out America's policies. I 
hope our colleagues here won't be adopting the reasoning of MoveOn.Org 
instead of recognizing the responsibilities that we all have to those 
we have sent into harm's way.
  Now, no one in May was sure how things would work out. Things had not 
gone well in 2006 and in early 2007. All of us were worried about what 
was happening. Violence had increased, the uncertainty had increased, 
and I think Congress rightly was concerned. After debate, we decided to 
execute the surge operation which was more than just increased troops, 
and I will talk about that in a minute. We decided that, for the 
purpose of openness and accountability, as part of the funding of this 
war that we had appropriated, we wanted some reports. In fact, we asked 
for five separate reports. Those reports have been produced as 
required. A report was required on the status of 18 benchmarks 
submitted by July 15. A report was required for an 
independent commission of experts to report not later than September 1 
analyzing the progress of the Iraqi security forces. That was the 
General Jones commission, former supreme allied commander in Europe, 
former commander of the United States Marine Corps, and 20 other 
experts compiled that report. A report from the GAO, the comptroller 
general, on whether the 18 benchmarks had been achieved by September 1; 
a followup on the benchmarks report submitted by September 15. Then 
public testimony was required from the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the 
commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq, General Petraeus, not later 
than September 15.

  We have had all of that in the Armed Services Committee, of which I 
am a member. We had Mr. Walker from GAO give the GAO report. We had 
General Jones and his commission give their report, and we had General 
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker give their reports. They testified 
before the House. They testified before other committees. We have had 
now a national discussion about this situation, and it is time for us 
to begin to make some decisions. So what I hope we will do is make a 
decision, and we will stick by it, and next week we would not have 
leaders in this body saying it is a failure before it ever gets 
started, as we have had in the past.
  Let me summarize the reports that came in briefly. The administration 
report on benchmarks, as well as a GAO report, shows that we had some 
progress on some matters but that there had been limited political 
progress in Iraq. I would note that the GAO report, which was valuable 
and I think not inaccurate but could be misinterpreted, was important. 
It did not, however, incorporate data from August and early September 
from Iraq. That data shows remarkable progress in those recent weeks, 
and it was not part of its report. So the progress on the military 
front that they reported was not as significant as the later reports 
would show. It only measured whether the goals of each one of the 
benchmarks were fully achieved. It didn't measure whether progress had 
been made.
  Ambassador Crocker, on the benchmarks, made some important comments. 
Those I would point out to my colleagues. One, he said, yes, an oil law 
had not been passed by the Iraqi Parliament. They couldn't get together 
on that. Sometimes we can't get together in this body and agree on 
things. So what happened is, they are indeed sharing oil revenue 
throughout the provinces in a fair and just way, although they have not 
yet been able to pass an overall oil law. So we are saying, according 
to benchmarks, they haven't met the benchmarks because the benchmarks 
said they must pass an oil law that would share their resources. But, 
in fact, they are sharing.
  He talked about a benchmark dealing with reconciliation with former 
members of the Baathist Party and the Saddam Hussein regime. He said, 
no, they had not been able to pass in the parliament the legislation 
that would effectuate, as we would like to see it, a reconciliation 
among the former Baathists and the current leadership in Iraq, but it 
was happening out there. He said in various different places throughout 
Iraq former members of Baathist activities are coming into the 
government, Sunnis who allied with al-Qaida are coming in and working 
with the American military, and at the grassroots level real progress 
is being made and reconciliation is occurring in a lot of different 
places in Iraq.
  Now, the Jones commission was a very valuable commission. General 
Jones is a very distinguished, 40-year veteran of the U.S. Marine 
Corps, former commandant. He served as supreme allied commander of 
Europe and commander of USOCOM. This bipartisan commission he headed 
was composed of 20 members representing senior military leaders, 
civilian officials, former chiefs of police, former DC Police Chief 
Charles Ramsey, former TRADOC Commander General John Abrams, and Mr. 
John Hamre, former Under Secretary of Defense in the Clinton 
administration, a respected voice on defense matters. Between them, the 
commissioners had more than 500 years of collective military experience 
and more than 150 years of police experience.
  The Commission reported strong progress within the Iraqi Army but 
much weaker progress among the national police--in fact, unacceptable 
activity within the police. They called for massive reform and 
restructuring of the Iraqi police forces.
  I asked General Jones and his colleagues in this fashion--I told him 
that before General Petraeus went to Iraq to take over the effort 
there, he told us he would define the challenge as being ``difficult, 
but not impossible.'' So I asked General Jones:

       What are our realistic prospects for a long-term situation 
     in which there is some stability and a functioning government 
     that is not threatening to the United States?

  This is what General Jones said:

       Senator, I think that General Petraeus's words were 
     correct. I think it is a difficult situation that is 
     multifaceted. It is about bringing about in Iraq not only 
     safe and secure conditions, but a completely different method 
     of government, jump-starting an economy, rule of law. The 
     whole aspect of transition is just enormously complex.

  He added this:

       And regardless of how we got there, we are where we are. It 
     is, strategically, enormously important not only nationally, 
     but regionally and globally, for this to come out and be seen 
     as a success. And our report, I think, not only unanimous but 
     very hard-hitting in certain areas, intentionally makes the 
     point that there are some good things happening and that we 
     are all excited to see that. That is certainly encouraging, 
     but there is more work that needs to be done. We wanted to be 
     very specific about where we think that work should be done. 
     It doesn't mean it can't be done.

  They call for a massive overhaul of the Iraqi police. He said it is 
difficult and it needs to be done. More progress needs to be made, but 
it is not impossible. So I followed up with that. I said:

       Did any of your commission members, or any significant 
     number of them, conclude that this could not work, that this 
     was a failed effort, or that we ought to just figure

[[Page S11830]]

     a way to get out of there regardless of the consequences?

  Here is General Jones's answer:

       I don't believe that there is a commissioner that feels 
     that way. But let me just take a poll right now.

  He turned around and surveyed the Commissioners, and they all agreed 
with General Jones.
  Then General Petraeus and Ambassador Corker came before us last week 
to give their report, which detailed progress on a number of different 
levels. General Petraeus is one of our most distinguished officers in 
the Armed Forces. He graduated as an academically ``distinguished 
cadet'' from West Point. He was the General George C. Marshall Award 
winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, class of 1983. He also has a master's and a Ph.D. from 
Princeton, and he served as a professor at West Point. He is on his 
third tour in Iraq.
  I know a lot of people in this body think they have figured out how 
to deal with Iraq. He spent 2 full years there and now over a half a 
year again in Iraq dealing with these circumstances. He is a very 
capable person, as anyone can well see.
  Well, I have been to Iraq six times. On the first trip, I met General 
Petraeus. He commanded the 101st Airborne in Mosul. They were achieving 
some fine success and reconciliation. They were able to catch Saddam's 
sons, Uday and Qusay. He worked with Alabama engineering National Guard 
units impressively, in my opinion, to bring them on line in an 
effective way. I was impressed in my meeting with him.
  The next year, he came home, and then they asked him to go back to 
train the Iraqi Army. He went back and took charge of that operation 
and spent a year doing that in Iraq, meeting people in Baghdad and 
getting a real feel for that country. Then he came home.
  When he got home, he wrote the counterinsurgency manual for the U.S. 
Department of Defense, which details the principles and tactics that 
can work to defeat an insurgency. In fact, insurgencies can be defeated 
if you have a sustained and intelligent policy that is well led. So he 
wrote that manual, and President Bush met with him and decided to send 
him back a third time in January, and he asked him to lead this effort. 
He has been doing so with integrity, skill, and effectiveness. As a 
matter of fact, one commentator said even in the early months you could 
feel that there was a new atmosphere and a new strategic vision and new 
leadership. It was filtering down throughout the system.
  So to have a group like MoveOn.org suggest--not suggest but call him 
a traitor and a liar, that is despicable. I cannot imagine anybody who 
would not condemn such a statement. This is a patriot of the highest 
order. We have asked him to go into harm's way for the third time to 
serve the national interests of the United States, not serve President 
Bush--to serve this Congress, by a 80-to-14 vote in May.
  So I am telling you that we need to get serious. We sent him there by 
a unanimous vote, confirmed him to be commander, and we voted to fund 
the operation, fund the surge. That wasn't President Bush who put up 
the money; we put it up. We asked him to come back and give us a report 
on how well it is going. We asked an independent commission to give us 
another report. We asked the GAO to give us a report. We have gotten 
those reports, and it is now time for this Congress to make some 
decisions. It is just that serious. This is a very important matter for 
the United States. It is important for us.
  You tell me about the morale of the military. People say the morale 
of the military is not well. They are doing beyond anything I could 
expect. Reenlistments remain very high. I have to be amazed at that, 
and I know others are. We have a good reenlistment rate, and we are 
able to retain people and bring people into the military. They are 
going to Iraq and serving ably. As a matter of fact, in a moment, I 
will share a report from some of our Alabama people who came by to see 
me and what they had to say about their tour there. So we have done 
this, and we are now at a point where we have to make some decisions.

  I have been asked: Well, has the situation changed since General 
Petraeus has made his report? I think it has, mainly because of what he 
said, not how he said it. I asked him back in January at his 
confirmation hearing would he always be truthful with the Congress and 
the American people about the status of this war and would he tell us 
if he didn't think he could be successful. He said that he would.
  I asked him at this hearing: General Petraeus, when you came before 
us in January, before you went to Iraq, you had previously told me that 
no matter what happened, you would tell the Congress the truth. He told 
me that in private the night before. So the next morning, I asked him: 
Will you tell the truth to the American people? He committed that he 
would. So at this hearing last week, I asked him:

       Have you, to the best of your ability, told this Congress 
     the truth about the situation in Iraq today?

  He said:

       I have, yes, sir.

  You can call him a liar if you want to. I don't. I believe he gave us 
the truth as he had the ability to give it to us.
  I asked him further:

       General Petraeus, in your opinion, is there a circumstance 
     in which--in your opinion, is this effort in Iraq such that 
     we cannot be successful, that we would be putting more effort 
     in a losing cause if we continue it, or, in your opinion, do 
     we have a realistic chance to be successful in this very 
     important endeavor?

  He replied:

       Sir, I believe we have a realistic chance of achieving our 
     objectives in Iraq.

  So we received the reports and the information. What did some of that 
information tell us? I cannot tell my colleagues or the American people 
that this will continue, but, remarkably, violence in Baghdad is down 
dramatically. Remember, it was the President and everybody who 
acknowledged that if the large capital city could not be stable and was 
sinking into violence, there is no way we could have a peaceful 
settlement in Iraq and reconciliation and make progress. We had to 
reduce violence in Iraq. The report General Petraeus gave us and the 
charts he produced showed that civilian deaths in Iraq, in Baghdad, 
were down 70 percent. In his report, he declared that civilian deaths 
throughout the nation of Iraq were down 55 percent. Now, that is really 
big. Remember, the surge didn't reach full strength until June or July. 
He has only had the full surge in place for a month or two. So this is 
really big.
  Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Yes.
  Mr. KERRY. On his own charts, he showed that two-thirds of the 
reduction of violence took place before our troops even got there; 
isn't that right?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will respond to that. I don't believe 
that is accurate.
  Mr. KERRY. That is the chart, Mr. President.
  Mr. SESSIONS. The most dramatic reductions in violence occurred in 
the last months of August and September. Regardless of that, I would 
say the Senator is making a point I think I can agree to--that it is 
not just the number of troops that are affected. General Petraeus is 
executing a strategy utilizing counterinsurgency tactics that are more 
suited to the problems in Iraq and are proving to be more effective in 
reducing violence and protecting the civilian people in Iraq.
  Mr. KERRY. I further ask the Senator, if the civilian deaths are down 
to such a degree that Baghdad is such a security success, why did the 
Iraqi Legislature not reconcile on the issue of oil or 
debaathification?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I will give my best answer to that. We had the 
President of the United States and the majority leader in the Senate 
say we had to have an immigration bill. They tried to pass it right 
here on the floor of the Senate. They could not pass it. The President 
could have stood on his head, and that bill would not pass.
  Just because we think we can order the Iraqi Parliament to vote out 
some law doesn't mean they can do that. So I am really worried about 
it, frankly. I am fully willing to acknowledge that it is a very 
troublesome development that the Iraqi Parliament hasn't been able to 
pass laws to carry out some of these needed reforms. But I don't think 
they are going to be more likely to be effective in passing legislation 
if we precipitously withdraw, allowing violence to increase again and 
whatever

[[Page S11831]]

else might happen, with Iran expanding its influence.
  I have to tell you that the substantial reduction in violence we have 
seen is not small. This is really large. If you told me when the surge 
started that we would see a 70-percent reduction in civilian deaths in 
Baghdad, I would not have believed it. I would have thought that would 
be more optimistic than I was prepared to be. So whether it will hold, 
I don't know. We have seen some improvement.
  I know the Senator from Massachusetts would like to speak. I will 
just conclude by saying, OK, we have had these reports, we have seen 
this progress, and we know what the difficulties are. I have decided, 
based on General Petraeus's testimony, the Crocker testimony, the Jones 
Commission report, and other information we have, that things are 
moving in a better direction.
  I personally believe it is the new tactics, not so much the number of 
soldiers. I am very happy General Petraeus has concluded he can draw 
down troops while maintaining this progress of reducing violence. In 
fact, he has recommended that within the next few weeks, a Marine unit 
not be replaced. So that represents an initial reduction in our forces 
within a few weeks. Then the next reduction will come before Christmas 
will be an Army brigade, and he would have 30,000 troops withdrawn by 
next summer and would report to us again in March on whether he could 
continue this rate of reduction or accelerate it.
  There is not that much difference, I say to my colleagues, in what we 
want. Senator Levin wants to see troops withdrawn. He wants to see a 
stable Iraq. The question is, Do we do it with a mandated withdrawal 
rate dictated by Congress or do we do it in harmony with the situation 
on the ground that leaves us in the best possible position to allow a 
stable, peaceful Iraq, an ally to the United States, to exist?
  I think we should accept the report. We should see this as good news, 
celebrate that some progress has been made and recognize that serious 
challenges are out there. I do believe Congress has every right to 
monitor this situation closely. We have every right to reject the 
President's recommendation, to reject General Petraeus's 
recommendation, to cut off funds and order our troops home if we so 
desire. I think that would not be a good decision. I think it would not 
be in the long-term interests of the United States of America. 
Therefore, I oppose the Levin amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanders). The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I believe Senator Nelson was scheduled to 
be the next speaker on this side of the aisle. He had to do that before 
7 o'clock, so he will be unable to take that position. Senator Kerry is 
next in line on this side. However, I understand he is going to yield 
to Senator Kennedy for a couple minutes for him to offer a unanimous 
consent agreement.
  I thank Senator Kerry for his patience, as always. There is a lot of 
confusion and difficulty in scheduling speakers. He has been extremely 
patient. I appreciate it a great deal.
  I wonder if Senator Kennedy can be recognized for a couple of moments 
to propound a unanimous consent request, and then Senator Kerry can be 
recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I thank Senator Levin and my colleague 
and friend, Senator Kerry.

                          ____________________