[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 139 (Wednesday, September 19, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H10526-H10551]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE REVISION AND EXTENSION ACT OF 2007

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 660 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2761.

                              {time}  1215


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 2761) to extend the Terrorism Insurance Program of the Department 
of the Treasury, and for other purposes, with Mr. Israel in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) and the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Bachus) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, this is a continuation of a 
program that the Congress adopted in one of the previous Congresses to 
provide insurance in case of a terrorist attack. We had, obviously, the 
terrible murderous attack on America in 2001.
  Substantial damage was done. Obviously, the overwhelming cost of that 
was in the human lives caused by these murderers, but we also had 
property damage. And I believe that it is unrealistic to think, and in 
fact inappropriate to urge, that the private insurance market, which 
functions very well in this country and serves us well, that that ought 
to be used in response to terrorism. We bring a bill forward that would 
provide both for life and property insurance from the Federal 
Government worked out in various ways.
  There are two arguments for continuing this on an ongoing basis. 
Everybody agrees that it needs to be extended for a while. Some have 
said phase it out, let the private market ultimately take it over. I 
believe there are two reasons why that is not a good idea.
  First, virtually no entities that are in the private insurance market 
believe that the private market could handle this well. Not only do the 
insurers believe that, but the customers of the insurance believe it. 
And primarily, by the way, the customers here are commercial real 
estate developers. People who are going to build large commercial 
buildings with tens, hundreds of millions of dollars in construction 
costs cannot build without a bank loan, and the banks will not lend and 
would not be allowed to lend by the regulators without fully insuring 
against all risks, including the risks of the terrorism that we wish 
were not around but clearly still is.
  We do not believe, based on extensive conversations with virtually 
everyone in the marketplace, that this will work. In fact, I submit for 
printing in the Record a letter from the head of Goldman Sachs in 2005, 
that very important financial institution, clearly an entity that knows 
a great deal about the market. And in 2005, only 2 years ago, after we 
had TRIA for a while and the question was coming up about whether or 
not to continue it, he wrote to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. 
Baker), then Chair of the Capital Market Subcommittee, that:
  ``Current data suggests that reinsurance, and consequently insurance, 
participation in the terrorism insurance market will decline if the 
Federal backstop is left to expire.
  ``Some have suggested that private markets for terrorism can 
successfully utilize risk transfer mechanisms such as catastrophe 
bonds.
  ``There is no evidence to suggest that the rating agencies or capital 
markets investors will be able to quantify the risk.''
  And what he says is that he does not believe the market can do this.

                                The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,

                                      New York, NY, July 26, 2005.
     Hon. Richard Baker,
     Chairman, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
         Government Sponsored Enterprises, House of 
         Representatives, Cannon House Office Building, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, 
     lnc., a leading global investment banking, securities and 
     investment management firm, I am writing to express my 
     support for maintaining a federal terrorism insurance 
     backstop.
       The federal terrorism insurance program, enacted by the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), has helped 
     provide the underpinning to a robust economic recovery 
     despite the ongoing threat of terrorism. Notwithstanding 
     Treasury's conclusion that TRIA has achieved its original 
     purpose, we are not aware of any meaningful evidence showing 
     that private terrorism risk insurance or reinsurance markets 
     have developed ample capacity to rationally price and insure 
     against terrorism on a scale that would adequately protect 
     our nation's economy. In fact, current data suggests that 
     reinsurance, and consequently insurance, participation in the 
     terrorism insurance market likely will decline significantly 
     if the federal terrorism insurance backstop is left to 
     expire.
       Some have suggested that private markets for terrorism risk 
     can successfully utilize risk transfer mechanisms such as 
     catastrophe bonds (CAT bonds) that transfer risk from 
     insurers to capital markets. Such securitization vehicles, 
     however, represent a minor percentage of the overall 
     insurance market and have been used mainly for natural 
     disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes. There is no 
     evidence to suggest that the rating agencies or capital 
     markets investors will be able to more effectively quantify 
     the risk of terrorism than insurers or reinsurers. As such, 
     CAT bonds and other risk transfer mechanisms are unlikely to 
     offer, at this time, the broad capacity necessary to insure 
     America's businesses, workers and property owners against the 
     risk of terrorism.
       With less than five months remaining in the current 
     program, American businesses soon will be forced to compete 
     for portions of a severely constrained private insurance 
     market and risk the possibility of being left with inadequate 
     levels of terrorism insurance. In short, we simply cannot 
     afford to let the private sector be economically exposed.
       I appreciate your attention to this very important matter.
           Sincerely,
                                            Henry M. Paulson, Jr.,
                             Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

  The CEO of Goldman Sachs who signed this is a very distinguished 
expert, Henry M. Paulson, Jr. He is no longer the chief of Goldman 
Sachs; he is now the Secretary of the Treasury and has somewhat 
different views, but this is a letter that he sent in late July 2005.
  So we don't think the market can handle it. But I want to argue that 
even if you thought the market could handle it, we shouldn't ask it to 
for this reason: If you insure against risk, you ultimately pass the 
costs along to the people who are at risk. Insurance allows you to 
spread that risk out among those who are at risk. But the more you are 
at risk, the more you pay in insurance.
  If we were to adopt a purely market solution, that would mean that 
those parts of the country which were calculated to be likelier targets 
of terrorism would pay more. That is the insurance principle. If you 
are more likely to be the victim of terrorism, then you should pay 
more.
  I do not think we should allow vicious fanatics who hate this country 
and seek to inflict severe physical damage on us to decide where it 
should be more expensive to do business in our country and where it 
should not. But if you use the private insurance mechanism, that is 
what you get.
  There is another problem with the private insurance mechanism, not a 
problem, a good facet, that doesn't apply here. What you can do with 
private insurance is to say to these entities: You know what, if you 
lower your risk, we will lower your insurance costs. But people who 
have large office buildings cannot significantly lower their risk of 
being attacked by terrorists. If they could, we wouldn't want them to 
be. We wouldn't want people in

[[Page H10527]]

America in the business sector to be told, well, why don't you try to 
appease the terrorists so they don't blow you up. So it ought to be a 
public program.
  Now, we have had significant debate in the committee. We had in the 
subcommittee and committee two full markups, an unusual degree of 
attention. A number of amendments were adopted from both parties. It is 
a different and, I believe, better bill now than it was when it was 
introduced. There are still some philosophical differences.
  There is one issue, though, that came up after the committee 
consideration, and to our surprise the Congressional Budget Office said 
that this is going to cost a certain amount of money. I will get the 
estimate. I think they said $10 billion over a period of 10 years. That 
is a very odd thing to say. A terrorist attack will cost hundreds of 
billions if it happens; it will cost nothing if it doesn't. They 
apparently used some calculation of probability, which I think is in 
itself kind of dubious. Nobody, I think, can realistically talk about 
the probability of a terrorist attack, to give us the number that it 
will cost $3.5 billion over 5 years and $8.4 billion over 10 years.
  One thing we know for sure is that these estimates are wrong. It will 
either cost a lot more, or nothing. CBO did its job, I don't think very 
well. Maybe that is because of the constraints they operate under. I 
don't make a personal criticism of them. But we have this PAYGO rule.
  I will say that my own preference as an individual Member would have 
been to grant an emergency waiver, because if a terrorist attack is an 
emergency, then we shouldn't have that in there. I do not represent the 
thinking of the majority as of now on this or the Democratic 
leadership. That is an open question to evolve. So we did the next best 
thing, which is to adopt a set of procedures to deal with what will 
happen if the Federal Government has to make a payout under this.
  I will say that I think that was a good effort, given the time frame. 
And I think it is important, given the potential expiration or the 
expiration date, that we should move forward, and maybe it will 
encourage our colleagues across the Capitol to act.
  I do not believe that what we have in here will be the final answer. 
We have one possibility: Maybe a consensus will develop on a waiver. I 
can't say that I have confidence in that, but I certainly will advocate 
for it. If we can't get a waiver, we will within the framework of the 
PAYGO requirement, $3 billion over 5 years, try to work something out. 
And I know that is what the Democratic leadership has assured the 
Members from New York in particular, that they will do their best 
within the context of PAYGO to work this out. And I believe we can 
improve on where we are. We will reduce the risk that there won't be 
payment to the minimum amount possible, and then maybe we share that 
risk.
  So I do not believe that what we have in this bill will be the final 
version. I think it is important to move this process along. I think 
this is as good an effort to do it as we could now. We will have to be 
consulting with the various parties in interest, including the cities, 
including the insurers, including the insured and others, and we will 
move forward on that. So I do believe it is very important to move 
forward now.
  The only reason to vote against this bill at this point is not 
because of disagreement on some of the specifics. They will evolve as 
we go forward, particularly in the PAYGO response. But if you believe 
this is something that should be left to the market, and I do not 
believe that the market can or should be asked to handle terrorism. 
Adam Smith is one of the great intellectual contributors to thought in 
this world, but I don't think he knew much about terrorism, luckily for 
him. I do not think that the free market was adopted or is adaptable to 
murderous attacks of the sort we had on September 11.
  So I believe this is the best we can do at this point. It is a very 
good bill, I believe, not perfect, with regard to the PAYGO fix, but 
that is something that I believe will evolve. I have every confidence 
that we will be able to do it better as we go forward, and I hope the 
bill passes.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, as one of the original authors of the first TRIA 
legislation back in 2002, which passed this House with a strong vote, 
and also as a supporter of the extension in 2005, which I also 
cosponsored, I am disappointed that I have to rise today in opposition 
to the present bill. But I do so sincerely.
  The whole idea of TRIA, the 2002 bill, the 2005 extension, was to 
create a short-term government backstop which would allow the insurance 
industry, the private market to adjust to the 9/11 reality.
  By any objective measure, people on both sides of the aisle have said 
TRIA has been a success. Secretary Hank Paulson supported a TRIA which 
was a government backstop as the government continued to process the 
stepping back.
  The terrorist insurance markets have stabilized. We have heard this 
debate, this word today of the gentleman from New York and the 
leadership and the Democratic Party and some of their differences. Even 
in correspondence which I have seen, he said terrorist insurance, the 
approach we have has been working. It is giving us insurance. The 
markets have stabilized. Policyholders are requesting and they are 
receiving coverage. Prices have declined. Reinsurance has become more 
available. The private marketplace is diversifying, and it is absorbing 
additional risk exposure every day.
  This past July, Secretary Paulson, which, as I said, he supported 
TRIA, he doesn't support this legislation because it essentially 
preempts the private market. But he made this statement to me: It is my 
belief that the most efficient, lowest cost, and most innovative 
methods of providing terrorist risk insurance will come from the 
private sector.
  I agree, and it is therefore that reason that I must oppose the bill 
before us today, because it works at cross-purposes with that whole 
philosophy of allowing a temporary backstop as the private market fills 
in and meets the need for terrorist risk insurance.
  We presently have a TRIA program in place that relies on that private 
sector first and the government only as a backstop and, as I said, it 
is working very well. It is effectively creating what is a temporary 
assistance or a hand up, not a permanent handout. However, this bill 
replaces what has been a successful and temporary mechanism which has 
worked so well to allow the insurance marketplace to adopt to the 9/11 
realities. It replaces it with legislation that, instead of scaling 
back the Federal backstop, it expands it greatly. It increases the 
government growth greatly. It increases taxpayers' exposure 
tremendously, so much so that we are not going to pay for it here 
today. We are going to disregard PAYGO. And I understand there is some 
private deal that may have been agreed to out of the public domain and 
unknown to Members. That is not how legislation should function. But it 
is a flawed bill that is, unfortunately, a departure from what has 
heretofore been a very successful bipartisan consensus effort on behalf 
of this Congress that we have all come together and adopted in the 
past.
  TRIA should not be a partisan issue. Our division on this legislation 
reflects a philosophical difference and disagreement over how, how much 
and for how long middle-class America should subsidize the cost of 
terrorist insurance for both insurers and for urban developers.

                              {time}  1230

  And what is the taxpayer role?
  I had hoped that we could consider a number of important amendments 
today to scale back these new Federal subsidies; i.e., taxpayer-
supported guaranteed benefits. I had hoped that we could ask that the 
insurance companies pay a greater percentage; that they collect an 
increased amount. Unfortunately, the Democratic leadership has decided 
not to even allow a fair and free debate on these amendments.
  The expanded Federal subsidies provided for in this bill are so 
expensive that they violate the House's budget rules. But, as I said, 
instead of admitting this violation, or even waiving it, which would be 
a more honest approach, or finding a way to pay for the costs to the 
taxpayers, the majority has turned to what I call a ``fantasy fix'' 
that mandates various terrorist coverage, but removes any certainty in 
the Federal payment.

[[Page H10528]]

  Even the most ardent proponents of TRIA are opposed to this so-called 
solution to the PAYGO problem. One Democratic colleague that's on the 
floor today has made this statement which I associate myself with: 
``Making the entire program contingent on Congress passing a second 
piece of legislation completely undermines the intent and desired 
effect of the legislation.'' He went on to say, and I quote, ``It would 
render the legislation almost completely useless.'' That's the 
legislation we have before us. That's it. That's what we're considering 
today.
  We heard as we debated the rule that there have been some assurances 
given in a letter which none of us have seen from the majority leader 
to the Member that they're going to fix this, that they're going to fix 
it in conference. We're just asked to take a leap of faith. To me, that 
violates not only the promises that the Democratic majority made in 
this campaign to have an open, honest process with full disclosure, not 
back-room agreements. We don't even know what we're voting on. We're 
told, vote for something on blind faith. It'll be fixed. Yes, it's 
flawed. Yes, it won't work. Yes, we know we're not paying for it, but 
we'll do that later. Trust us.
  You know, it's one thing to ask Members of Congress, it's another 
thing to ask the American people for their representatives to pass 
something they have no idea entirely what it is; to act on the 
assurance of a letter that 433 Members have not seen, surely not the 
210 in the minority.
  Policyholders are also shortchanged in this legislation. If an 
insurance company's losses exceed a certain level, the new bill that 
Members saw for the first time last night says that the consumer gets 
no more money until a later Congress acts, regardless of what the 
insurance policy says or what the company agreed to pay. In other 
words, they're writing a policy, the company is agreeing to pay a 
certain amount, but all of it is contingent upon Congress then coming 
in and paying for it. I'm not sure that's even constitutional, that we 
as a legislative body would say, go out and write insurance policies, 
tell policyholders this is their coverage, and another legislative 
body, 5, 10, 15 years down the road, they'll come in and they'll pay 
for it. How do we know that? What will the policy read? It will be 
interesting to see what the policy says. All this is contingent upon an 
act of Congress. How about all of this is contingent upon the ability 
of the United States to write such a check, or the willingness of the 
people to do that? What if these policies are extended and then we have 
a new Congress and that Congress says ``no''? The policyholders have 
paid for something and they have no assurance they'll ever receive a 
dime.
  While I am a strong supporter of what has to this date been the 
approach of Congress for short-term extensions of this program that 
continues down the road of phasing out the government backstop, the 
taxpayer funding, and phases in greater private sector participation, 
and by private sector participation, I simply mean that those who are 
provided the coverage pay for the coverage, not someone in rural Kansas 
or New Mexico or Georgia, but that who's getting the benefit pays the 
price, not the American people.
  I cannot support this bill. It extends the program for 15 years, in 
other words, more or less basically permanent. It writes a blank check, 
asks the taxpayers to pay it, but doesn't pay for it now. It makes no 
provisions for paying for it, other than a letter from the majority 
leader to a member of the New York delegation saying, in a month or 
two, we know this is a flawed bill, it's a no go, but we'll fix it. But 
vote for it right now. I cannot do that. I cannot ask the Members of 
the minority to do that.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just say in closing that Members on this side of 
the aisle are prepared and we have been prepared to strongly support an 
extension of the TRIA program that is fiscally responsible, that does 
the right thing for taxpayers. But we're not going to vote for 
something we have no idea what we have, other than an assurance in a 
letter we have not seen.
  While we have complete bipartisan agreement on the merits of the 
current TRIA program, we know that in the aftermath of 9/11 there was a 
need to act. We acted. We've been successful. Let's not change 
something that's proven to work well with a blank check from the 
taxpayers. This bill is a gimmick. It increases government subsidies 
without providing greater certainty in the marketplace. I urge my 
colleagues to oppose this legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself first 30 
seconds to note that I was impressed when the gentleman said he was 
going to vote against this bill because of this new amendment. But he 
voted against the bill the last time, so apparently my friend from 
Alabama intends to vote against this bill twice, because he voted 
against it in committee. So no one should think that the effort to deal 
with PAYGO is the reason he's voting against it.
  Secondly, no one is asking anybody to accept any blank checks, and 
that is a misrepresentation of the legislative process. Changes will be 
made, I hope, in an open way. There will be an open conference, in 
total contrast to the way in which his party operated. I guarantee 
Members, as chairman of this committee, that we will have a conference 
committee, it will be a legitimate conference committee, and everything 
will be done openly, and votes will be taken. So no one is asking 
anybody to do anything in secret.
  And again, the gentleman, having already voted against the bill, 
there are only so many bases you can claim on which you vote against 
the bill. He says he's not going to vote for the bill. We never thought 
he would. He voted against it the last time.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Ackerman).
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, on September 11, in addition to the 
enormous loss of human life, the value of which cannot be measured, our 
Nation suffered catastrophic economic losses. The attacks of September 
11 resulted in $30 billion worth of insured losses, the largest 
catastrophic insurance loss in the history of the United States, larger 
than any blizzard, tornado or hurricane. As a result, insurers and 
reinsurers began to worry about the likelihood and the cost of a future 
terrorist attack.
  Worrying about risk and then monetizing that risk is the key to the 
insurance industry, which is an essential element in a modern dynamic 
economy. As happened, businesses with legitimate concerns about their 
solvency, insurance and reinsurance firms withdrew from the market 
where the attack took place. As the supply of terrorism insurance 
rapidly decreased, New York City developers, for whom terrorism 
insurance was essential to secure financing for their projects, were 
put in a precarious position. They needed terrorism insurance to 
continue building, but the market for insurance simply did not have 
enough supply to meet their demand. Similar shortages began occurring 
throughout the country. In simple terms, there was a market failure.
  It was out of this dilemma that the critical need to address that 
original version of TRIA was born. TRIA increased the availability of 
terrorism insurance coverage by creating a Federal backstop that would 
share the burden of losses caused by any future attacks of terrorism 
with the insurance industry.
  In the wake of 9/11, we had hoped that a temporary, 3-year program 
would provide enough of a shield to allow the market to fully recover. 
By late 2005, however, the Financial Services Committee and others in 
Congress realized that TRIA had not resulted in as quick or as robust a 
recovery of the market as was originally hoped. TRIA was extended for 
an additional 2 years, and is currently set to expire on December 31 of 
this year.
  Mr. Chairman, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act 
is a major achievement. It eliminates the distinction between foreign 
and domestic acts of terror. It incorporates group life insurance into 
the program. And, most importantly, this legislation extends TRIA for 
another 15 years.
  Let us be clear: the enemy of business is uncertainty. This is 
particularly true for multi-million or multi-billion dollar real estate 
development projects, the kind that breathe life into our Nation. 
Designing, securing capital and then contracting for construction

[[Page H10529]]

is a multi-year process, and if we want these kinds of projects to go 
forward during these uncertain times, there is simply no alternative to 
providing a long-term terrorism insurance backstop.
  Extending TRIA by 15 years is not a whim. It is not an arbitrary 
number. A 15-year extension would allow developers to secure 10- and 
15-year bonds when financing their projects and would cover the life 
span of construction for our Nation's most innovative and remarkable 
development projects.
  Equally as important to our Nation's developers, insurers and 
reinsurers is the inclusion of the so-called ``reset mechanism'' in 
this legislation. This language ensures that, in the aftermath of 
another catastrophic terrorist attack, the affected area or areas do 
not experience the same capacity problems that we experienced in New 
York following September 11.
  To be clear, however, the reset mechanism included in H.R. 2761 is 
not a special favor extended to New York. Under the language I worked 
out with Mr. Baker, representing the minority side, in the event of a 
terrorist attack with losses of $1 billion or greater, the deductibles 
for any insurance company that pays out losses due to the event 
immediately would lower to 5 percent, while the nationwide trigger for 
any insurer for any future event drops to $5 million.
  Mr. Baker and I also reached agreement on my proposal to enable the 
Secretary of the Treasury to aggregate the total losses for two or more 
attacks that occur in the same geographic area in the same year, if the 
Secretary so chooses, so that if the total insured losses for those 
events are over $1 billion, the reset mechanism would be triggered. 
Permitting the Secretary of the Treasury to aggregate the losses of two 
or more attacks in the same year is absolutely essential to protect our 
Nation's developers, insurers and reinsurers from a scenario in which 
the same area suffers a loss of $1 billion in insured losses, either 
from two or more medium-scale attacks or from one large-scale attack.
  The reset language is a true bipartisan compromise with the minority, 
accommodating a vast number of their concerns, and one in which I think 
Members of both sides should be very pleased. The new language 
simultaneously addresses the need to boost capacity in our Nation's 
highest risk areas, while recognizing that in case America suffers 
another catastrophic terrorist attack anywhere in this Nation, capacity 
shortages could be expected not only in the geographic area surrounding 
the site of the attack but also, quite possibly, throughout the Nation 
as a whole.
  The chairman has asserted that he would accommodate the needs of 
those who have complained about the openness of the process, which I 
assure everybody is open. And as the leader of the conference, when the 
House goes into conference on this matter, Mr. Chairman, could you give 
us your assurance that this bill will come back in the kind of form 
that we will not have an issue?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Absolutely.
  Let me just say, first of all, having grown up in New Jersey, I'm 
used to complaints from New Yorkers. But in this particular case I 
believe they are entirely legitimate and justified, and I can assure 
the gentleman that we will work together in an open way to resolve it.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I would yield the gentleman from New York 
30 seconds to answer an inquiry if he would allow me.
  I would ask the gentleman, this letter that we heard of earlier from 
Mr. Hoyer to yourself, could you share a copy of that letter with the 
minority?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. This is a private letter from the leadership to myself. 
I will be glad to show it to a Member of the minority side that signed 
the letter.
  Mr. BACHUS. Could we see it now?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I will share it with a Member of the minority side who 
signed the letter.
  Mr. BACHUS. Could we make a copy of it?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I think you have heard my answer.
  Mr. BACHUS. So this is a private sort of agreement between the two of 
you?
  Mr. ACKERMAN. This is the word of the majority leader to our 
delegation.

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. Pearce).
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, just as a disclaimer to the chairman of the 
committee, I did vote against this bill in committee and am still 
talking against the bill. Mr. Chairman, that is always a shock to you, 
and I'm just trying to settle your nerves down here at the beginning of 
my comments.
  I am supportive of the TRIA concept in general. I understand the 
market is not yet where it needs to be. As I explained in committee, 
our company was one of the companies who had to renew our insurance 30 
days after 9/11. On October 11 every year we had to renew insurance. So 
we were some of the first to encounter the problem that some insurances 
simply weren't going to write insurance if we did not have some 
solutions. So I understood the concept. But we put into place some 
legislative changes that were slowly moving the marketplace to where it 
needed to be.
  And the market was responding. The marketplace was increasing the 
deductible percentages. The trigger limit was raised between the first 
two versions of the TRIA bill, and the industry retention level was 
raised, the Federal co-share was lowered, and those were all positive 
signs because we all recognized that the last thing we want to do is 
have, say, an agency like the Postal Service in charge of risk 
insurance. It does not meet the standards for a very mobile market.
  So in the long term, we would like to have the private sector 
handling this problem. It's where the responsibility then would fall on 
the people who are getting the benefit.
  As it is written, this bill begins to move us far beyond that 
concept. It begins to increase the mission, providing what should have 
been a temporary solution making it into a 15-year solution and with 
decreasing amounts of private sector employment or utilization. So 
responsibility in the end should be borne by the people who are buying 
the insurance and the insurance companies.
  And, again, I would speak against the bill, and I thank the gentleman 
for yielding.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes now to a 
senior member of our committee, the Chair of the Subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, someone who has worked a 
great deal on this, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank our chairman for his 
heroic leadership on this, along with the New York delegation, Gary 
Ackerman, and many, many others. This is an absolutely necessity for 
New York City and for our country and for our economy.
  After 9/11, I have never seen this body so united and determined, and 
I thank you for all of your help. But by far, the most important action 
by this Congress was enacting TRIA. Before TRIA, we could not even 
build a Popsicle stand in lower Manhattan. No one could build anything. 
Critical to our economic recovery was the passage of this Federal 
backstop, and I implore my colleagues to join the leadership, Mr. Frank 
and others, in passing this.
  They say it is not needed, but I hear from businesses in New York 
they cannot get insurance. Some have gone to Lloyd's of London. They 
get insurance policies that say you have this policy on the condition 
that TRIA is reauthorized. This is critically important.
  And I would like to stress to my colleagues that a very important 
part of our homeland security is our economic security. TRIA not only 
helped the rebuilding of New York City, it created jobs and helped 
America's economy grow despite the continuing terrorist threats against 
the United States.
  TRIA has no cost to the taxpayer unless there is a terrorist attack. 
And in that terrible event, if it happens, and I hope it doesn't, TRIA 
saves the government money by structuring what would otherwise be 
hastily drafted emergency spending. Of course, setting up a public/
private partnership to provide insurance coverage is more cost-
effective than throwing money at the disaster after the fact.

[[Page H10530]]

  So this is very important. I would like to be associated with the 
comments of my colleagues Mr. Ackerman and Mr. Frank on the reset and 
the need for long-term planning, 15 years. I thank my colleagues for 
your help after 9/11. Give our economy help now. Vote for this.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Hensarling).
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I 
certainly thank him for his leadership in this area.
  If I could paraphrase President Ronald Reagan, the closest thing to 
eternal life on Earth is a Federal program. And certainly the 
legislation that comes before us today helps prove this.
  When TRIA was brought to the floor, and I, admittedly, was not here 
but I have read the Record, supposedly it was to be a temporary program 
at a time of great economic hardship to our Nation.
  I just heard the gentlewoman from New York speak very eloquently on 
the subject. But I recall from the Record her own words: ``We are 
simply working to keep our economy on track with a short-term program 
that addresses the new terrorist threat.''
  Now we are being asked for a 15-year extension on what has already 
been a 5-year program.
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania, who is now our chairman of the 
Capital Markets Subcommittee: ``We wisely designed the TRIA Act as a 
temporary backstop to get our Nation through a period of economic 
uncertainty until the private sector could develop models.''
  Now, maybe those on the other side of the aisle have a different 
definition of ``temporary.'' I was here to vote for the TRIA extension, 
and I voted for it. I thought that the market needed some time to 
develop. But let's face it. If we vote for this, we are voting for a 
permanent, a de facto permanent, huge government insurance program on 
top of those that we already have, none of which, none of which, are 
financially sound.
  And we have to remember when we are hearing debate on the floor about 
how critical it is in the fight against terror that we have terrorism 
reinsurance. I believe terrorism reinsurance is important, but I think 
even more important in fighting terror is prevention, ensuring it 
doesn't happen in the first place. And yet we have Member after Member 
after Member on the other side of the aisle that would make it more 
difficult for our government to monitor the conversations of suspected 
terrorists. We have Member after Member on the other side of the aisle 
voting to assure that a portion of our intelligence budget, to 
paraphrase the former Director of the CIA, goes to spying on bugs and 
bunnies instead of terrorists. Prevention is what is key in the fight 
against this terror.
  Now, of course, reinsurance is important, and, again, as I said, I 
voted for another extension. But to hear those on the other side of the 
aisle, they would say, well, there is no way that the market can 
develop this. I'm not sure I agree with that, and I know that the 
President's working group on financial markets doesn't agree with that. 
They say that the availability and affordability of terrorism risk 
insurance has improved since the terrorist attacks. Despite increases 
in risk retentions under TRIA, insurers have allocated additional 
capacity to terrorism risk, prices have declined, and take-up rates 
have increased.
  And let me quote here from this working group: ``The presence of 
subsidized Federal reinsurance through TRIA appears to negatively 
affect the emergence of private reinsurance capacity because it dilutes 
demand for private sector reinsurance.''
  Now, the chairman, whom I certainly respect, and he is entitled to 
his own opinions, he doesn't believe the market could ever develop. 
Well, I would respectfully say to our chairman: How are we ever going 
to know? How are we ever going to know when you are giving away 
something for free that the market otherwise would charge for and all 
of the signs are there that the market can develop?
  Some tell us this is a new risk that we don't know how to model for. 
Well, there was a time when the insurance industry didn't know how to 
model for airline catasrophes. They didn't know how to model for data 
processing collapses. And this is not the first time in our Nation's 
history that we have faced great threats. How did we model the Cold War 
when thousands of nuclear arms were pointed at us and somehow 
construction still took place in America?
  Construction has taken place in New York based upon a 3-year 
extension, not a de facto permanent extension, but based on a 3-year 
extension with higher deductibles and with less government subsidy.
  So I don't believe that building is going to come to a complete stop. 
But if there is a market failure, we could have worked on a bipartisan 
basis for something restricted that was temporary, dealing with 
nuclear, chemical, and biological, with large deductibles and large 
industry retentions.
  Instead, we are going to create a massive new insurance program that 
threatens the taxpayer, another great threat to this Nation. We should 
oppose this bill.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 2 minutes to 
another member of the committee, whose district in Jersey City is as 
close to the site of the terrorism attack of 2001 as any, other than 
the district in which it happened.
  Mr. SIRES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
  As you know, my district is in northern New Jersey, right across the 
river from New York City. I also represent parts of Newark and Jersey 
City, which are both considered high-threat areas. As a matter of fact, 
the New York Times has called parts of my district as containing two of 
the most dangerous miles in the country. As you can imagine, my 
constituents deal with the threat of terrorism every day.
  When I was Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly, I made homeland 
security a top priority. Already in my first year in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, we have tackled important national security issues. 
The reauthorization of TRIA is another step in the process and 
something of great importance to the businesses of my congressional 
district and to this country.
  I believe that the Financial Services Committee has thoroughly 
considered this reauthorization. We held hearings in New York City back 
in March where we had the opportunity to hear directly from the mayor 
of New York, Mayor Bloomberg, and Senator Schumer about the need for 
TRIA reauthorization. I am confident that H.R. 2761 takes their 
suggestions into consideration. The work of the Financial Services 
Committee that led to the drafting of this bill makes me proud to be a 
cosponsor. I think this legislation addresses all the major issues 
involved in the reauthorization, while maintaining the system that 
continues to ensure that there is coverage for terrorist attacks.
  I want to thank Chairman Frank and Congressman Capuano for 
introducing the reauthorization legislation, and I look forward to 
working with the committee and the leadership to make sure that this 
bill passes.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Culberson).
  Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. Chairman, this bill should be defeated because it 
is irresponsible and absolutely fiscally dangerous to pass a piece of 
legislation like this with an open-ended obligation on the U.S. 
Treasury. The bill should be defeated because, for all practical 
purposes, no private insurer will ever write coverage again in this 
area because they can now count on the U.S. Treasury to pay for this 
coverage. And the bill should be defeated because of its massive 
potential cost that the CBO has scored it, a 10-year cost of about 
$10.4 billion.
  But I think probably the most important reason this bill should be 
defeated is one that we, as stewards of the Treasury, need to keep in 
mind on every bill, on every amendment, on every vote that involves 
spending a dollar of the taxpayers' money, that all of us in Congress 
should keep in mind the single, in my mind, most important fact that I 
have run across as a Member of Congress, and that is that David Walker, 
the Comptroller General of the United States, the director of the 
Government Accountability Office, has estimated that in order to pay 
off the existing obligations of the Federal Government, both direct and 
indirect, the existing obligations of the Federal

[[Page H10531]]

Government are so massive that every American would have to buy 
$170,000 worth of Treasury bills today in order to pay off the debt, 
the interest on the national debt, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security. 
All the existing obligations, the Federal programs that are out there 
in existence today, those obligations are so massive that every living 
American would have to buy $170,000 in Treasury bills in order to pay 
them off.

                              {time}  1300

  It is absolutely imperative that this Congress on every bill, every 
amendment and every vote do everything we can to prevent adding to that 
burden, and to subtract from it as much as we can as, in our private 
lives, if you had a second mortgage on a house and the credit cards 
were all topped out, you would only spend money on the bare essentials. 
We have the same obligation, and even higher, a greater obligation here 
in Congress, as stewards of the Federal Treasury, to ensure that we're 
not passing on obligations to future generations, or adding to that 
$170,000 burden. And I don't want to hear the proponents of this bill 
come back and say, well, this administration added a lot to that 
burden. I can tell you personally I voted against almost every one of 
those big spending initiatives that the White House proposed. My 
district opposed a lot of the expansions of these big new spending 
programs. I voted against No Child Left Behind as a violation of the 
10th amendment and spending money we didn't have. I voted against the 
Medicare prescription drug bill as spending money we didn't have. I 
voted against the farm bill as spending money we didn't have and I'm 
not going to pass that on to my daughter or future generations.
  Most of us on this side, the fiscal conservatives in this House, have 
consistently opposed big new spending programs, and this bill is 
probably the worst I've seen so far. It is, in my mind, a perfect 
illustration of a liberal Democrat fiscal policy that they have passed 
an open-ended obligation onto future generations, a blank check on the 
U.S. Treasury. It's an utterly irresponsible and dangerous piece of 
legislation and it should be defeated.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I will give myself 15 
seconds to say I was waiting for the gentleman to tell me he voted 
against the war in Iraq. He talked about all these things he voted 
against. Added together and doubled, they don't add up to the war in 
Iraq, the continuing indefinite drain. Hundreds of billions of dollars 
have already gone, and they are committed to spending hundreds of 
billions more to make us worse off.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from North 
Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
  Mr. POMEROY. I thank my friend, the chairman, for yielding.
  I commend the last two speakers on the Republican side because they 
have at last made it clear what this debate is really about: Is there a 
Federal role for assisting the private sector in dealing with the 
management of the infinite risk of terror, or is there not?
  I'm really surprised to hear in this debate how firmly my friends on 
the other side of the aisle cling to the notion that the market and the 
market alone can work this one out.
  I used to be an insurance commissioner. What I know about insurance 
is that infinite risk cannot be priced, it cannot be underwritten, it 
cannot be reserved, it doesn't work. And that is why, right across the 
face of the insurance industry, we have heard as a body from the 
experts that they cannot make this coverage work private sector alone. 
They can whittle away at the edges basically by backing away from risk, 
coshares, enormous deductibles, the rest of it, but they have not told 
us they can make this market function.
  But in the face of what reality holds forth, the minority is unmoved. 
They don't like government making business work. And so even in the 
face of a very uncertain construction sector, they would pull this 
coverage away.
  Pass this bill.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire as to the remaining 
time on our side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama has 8 minutes left; the 
gentleman from Massachusetts has 9\1/4\ minutes left.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3\1/2\ 
minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Baker).
  Mr. BAKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding and am appreciative of 
this time.
  I wish to express my appreciation to committee leadership for 
attempting to address a most difficult subject matter. I have had some 
interest in this matter for a period of years, and understand the 
difficulty of crafting a remedy to which all Members may agree.
  However, I have been troubled by the characterization that there 
would be Members, if voting ``no'' on this measure, would be ideologues 
voting for some unusual reason rather than in the Nation's best 
interests or in the Nation's recovery effort in the great city of New 
York.
  It would be of note, I think, to the body to recall that it was 
November 29, 2001, at 4:37 p.m., in this august body when the House had 
a recorded vote 2 months after 9/11 on the adoption of the very first 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program. You will find in the Record, which I 
have a copy of should it be needed for review, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. 
Clyburn, Mr. Crowley, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Israel, Mr. 
Kanjorski, Mrs. Maloney, Mrs. McCarthy, Ms. Pelosi, Mr. Serrano, Ms. 
Slaughter, Mr. Weiner, Ms. Waters, Ms. Velazquez, Mr. Meeks, Mr. 
McNulty, Mr. Engel, Mr. Frank all found it appropriate and the right 
discharge of duty to vote ``no'' on the terrorism reinsurance proposal 
adopted two months after 9/11.
  Now, I have no criticism to be made of those Members for taking that 
action. They did what they thought best for their constituents in that 
window of responsibility. I would merely point out that in the bills 
that we have passed on two occasions in this House under Republican 
leadership, we looked upon this responsibility as a loan to the 
industry to help them at a time of serious liquidity crisis to be able 
to withstand this assault, meet their financial obligations to the 
insureds, and move forward. But at such time as it was determined the 
crisis had passed, there was a mandatory obligation to repay the 
taxpayers of the United States the generosity that was extended in the 
form of a bridge loan and to give back to the taxpayers their 
generosity which enabled the industry to survive.
  This bill does not require mandatory repayment of assistance. It is, 
in fact, a gift to the industry in a time of crisis, which is 
appropriate. But in the period of time in which the industry returns to 
profitability, is it wrong to say, ``Taxpayers, here's your money back. 
You helped us in a crisis, now it's time for us to repay your 
generosity''? I think that is a pivotal cornerstone of whatever we do 
going forward in assisting sectors of our economy which have untoward 
experiences that we cannot predict, where there is serious economic 
dislocation. But it is not right to give away the taxpayers' money 
without accountability.
  For that reason alone, I suggest Members, who may choose to do so, 
could oppose this legislation and do so on a philosophical basis that 
is purely defensible. There are many other reasons why some may have 
concern.
  Now, I will be quick to acknowledge that I worked with the gentleman 
from New York in addressing one serious flaw, and I appreciate the 
gentleman's willingness to extend that courtesy and fix that one 
significant difficulty with a legislative proposal. I am appreciative 
of that, and I look forward to working with him as they go forward 
through this process.
  The bill today is flawed, and I would hope you would seriously 
consider a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from 
New York to make a response.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman.
  My name was cited, along with a list of other New Yorkers having 
opposed the original TRIA when it came to the floor. The reason we did 
so is not because of TRIA, it was because the minority side, the 
Republican side at the time, tried to use this as a vehicle to move 
tort reform and added all sorts of tort reform provisions to the TRIA 
bill, which we absolutely opposed because it was a politically 
motivated move and not because of TRIA.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield 3\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman 
from

[[Page H10532]]

Pennsylvania, the chairman of the subcommittee who guided this bill 
through a very thoughtful bipartisan markup.
  (Mr. KANJORSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2761, the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act. Because the supply 
of terrorism reinsurance has not returned to its pre-September 11 
levels, we must now act to extend TRIA before the law expires on 
December 31.
  Terrorism insurance plays a critical role in protecting jobs and 
promoting our Nation's economic security. While this legislation may 
contain a few provisions that cause me concern, passage of this bill 
today will move the process forward. This extension makes several 
meaningful and necessary reforms to the program.
  First, this bill eliminates the distinction between foreign and 
domestic acts of terrorism. Terrorism, regardless of its cause or 
perpetrator, aims to destabilize the government. We must protect 
against that risk.
  Second, H.R. 2761 incorporates group life insurance as a covered 
line. The original TRIA did not include group life. I am pleased that 
this House, as it did in 2005, has decided to correct that oversight. 
We need to protect individuals, not just buildings they work in, by 
adding group life to TRIA.
  Third, the bill improves protection against acts of nuclear, 
biological, chemical and radiological terrorism. This coverage properly 
represents the most significant reform of this extension effort.
  We designed TRIA to protect the economic security of our Nation 
against terrorist threats. Congress, therefore, should address the 
possible threat of an attack by nuclear, biological, chemical or 
radiological means. Recognizing insurers' difficulty of modeling and 
pricing these events, this package limits the exposure of insurers on 
this risk, but allows the market to grow over time. H.R. 2761 further 
allows Treasury to exempt certain small insurers from this requirement. 
We need each of these prior modifications in order to sustain our 
Nation's economic recovery after a terrorist event.
  This legislation is not about helping the insurance industry. The 
Terrorist Risk Insurance Program is about the continued availability 
and affordability of terrorism coverage and keeping America's markets 
strong.
  That said, I do have some lingering concerns about some provisions in 
the product before us. When considering this legislation in the 
Financial Services Committee, I recognized the need for a longer 
extension period, but a 15-year extension is too long in my view.
  Additionally, we should improve the bill's reset mechanism going 
forward. A reset mechanism can help both the area suffering an attack 
and the Nation to recover after a terrorist event. It can also help 
insurers to rebuild capacity. However, we ought to make sure that the 
size of the reset is in proportion to the size of the loss and to 
rebuild private capacity as quickly as possible.
  In closing, Mr. Chairman, this is not a Democratic or a Republican 
issue. As I have previously said on this floor, it is an American 
issue, a business issue, an economic security issue.
  I encourage my colleagues, including Mr. Baker, to put your doubts 
aside and help us move this process forward so that over the next 110 
days we can provide the coverage necessary to keep the American economy 
growing.
  Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan).
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this. My friend from North 
Dakota said in the debate a minute ago that the minority doesn't want 
the government to help business. That was kind of an odd 
characterization. Here's what the minority wants: We want Congress to 
keep its word. And what do I mean when I say that? In the beginning of 
this Congress, Congress said that they were going to pay for things as 
they go. We were going to have this vaunted PAYGO rule that when we 
commit new spending, we will pay for it. We won't do deficit spending. 
What does this bill do? This bill thumbs its nose at the PAYGO system.
  I think the best description of how this bill is not paid for was 
written in Congress Daily this morning, and I quote: ``The House will 
take up legislation today to renew the Federal Government's Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Program despite concerns that it violates PAYGO rules. 
CBO has ruled that the bill, which would reauthorize and expand the 
program for 15 years and cost the Federal government $3.7 billion over 
5 years, $10.4 billion over a 10-year period. House leaders pulled the 
bill last week because it carried no offsets, but Democratic leaders 
found a way around the problem by requiring that if an attack occurred, 
Congress would have to vote again in a fast-track procedure to release 
the funds contained in the bill.'' Well, to do it justice, it's about 
$8.4 billion net cost, just to set the record straight for the 
minority.
  What they're basically doing here is they're declaring this an 
emergency when an emergency hasn't even occurred yet. They're basically 
declaring this emergency spending, outside of the budget rules, not 
paid for, $8.4 billion, before an emergency has even occurred.
  I've seen gimmicks in my day, Mr. Chairman, but this one takes the 
cake. This violates PAYGO. If it doesn't do it technically, it sure 
does it in spirit. So if we're going to say we're going to pay for 
legislation, then, by golly, let's pay for legislation. This doesn't do 
that. Not to mention the fact that this crowds out the private sector. 
Not to mention the fact that this tells all the insurers, go ahead and 
release this insurance, and if a terrorist attack occurs, we'll have 
some emergency legislation that pays for it after the fact. It's kind 
of like telling the homeowner, you don't have to pay premiums on your 
insurance until after your house has been burnt down, then pay your 
premiums and then we'll give you your payback. It doesn't work like 
that. That's not how insurance works. That's not how taxpayers pay 
their bills. That's not how Congress should operate. And, more 
importantly, that is not the rules that this Congress said it would 
operate under.
  This violates those rules. If not technically, it sure does so in 
spirit. And I think when Congress says it's a new day, that we're going 
to pay for our spending, by golly, that's exactly what Congress ought 
to do, and that is not what this Congress is doing.

                              {time}  1315

  For this and many other reasons, Mr. Chairman, this legislation is 
flawed. It should be defeated. It encourages a crowding out of the 
private sector. And more importantly, it doesn't pay for the promises 
that are being committed here today. That is wrong. That violates the 
rhetoric and the principles that the majority has set out for itself.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).
  Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman to engage in 
a colloquy.
  On the travel fairness language included in the bill, there are two 
provisions which I believe require additional work and which I hope the 
gentleman will be willing to work on with me as the bill progresses 
toward conference, the war exception and the impact on existing State 
laws.
  The first is the exception allowing denial or limitation of coverage 
for people traveling to areas under intense armed conflict. The current 
language uses the term ``ongoing military conflict''; however, this 
term is not defined in statute or any other legislation. We must make 
sure the language reflects the most accurate description of the 
conflict areas in question and not unintentionally include areas that 
do not rise to the definition of war zone.
  Secondly, on another point that I want to try to ask for the 
gentleman's assistance in conference is the issue of how this law will 
affect the States with similar laws. The current provision is silent on 
the issue of States with stronger travel fairness laws on the book, 
States such as Florida, Colorado, and Washington. As representatives of 
the Federal Government, Congress should not attempt to preempt State 
laws with Federal legislation when the State law provides greater 
protection. In other words, the Federal law should act as a floor, not 
as a ceiling, a base level of protection for the consumer.

[[Page H10533]]

  I would appreciate the gentleman's willingness to work to address 
these two issues in the conference.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I agree with the gentlewoman on both 
points. First, there is nothing in this language, and I should say that 
this issue of preventing unfair denials of life insurance, she was the 
one who brought it up. She brought it up in the prior Congress. And now 
that we are in the majority, we are able to accommodate it.
  I appreciate the fact that the gentlewoman worked with us as we 
worked with the life insurance companies. I believe we have an 
acceptable set of principles. She is right that this language does need 
a little bit more, I think, refinement on conflict. I think there's a 
conceptual agreement. I agree with her as to the need for definition.
  As a preemption, that is very simple. I am a strong believer we 
should not be preempting unless we say so explicitly. There has been an 
excess of subtle preemption. By itself, this bill does not do that. 
Insurance has been primarily a State issue. This is a Federal 
statement, but it is not at all meant to be preemptive.
  Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. I thank the gentleman and Mr. Bachus both for 
their support.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, TRIA is working well as a temporary matter. 
The insurance market is beginning to fill out and, sadly, this is a 
step in the wrong direction.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Before I yield to the gentleman from 
Vermont (Mr. Welch), I would just point out that when we voted on this 
in committee before we had the PAYGO glitch, the vote on the Republican 
side was 19 opposed, 14 in favor, so it was hardly a one-sided partisan 
bill. It partly reflects the work that the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Kanjorski) did in accommodating a lot of the concerns.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. WELCH of Vermont. May I engage in a colloquy with the gentleman 
from Massachusetts?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Yes.
  Mr. WELCH of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, among other things, your bill 
balances the needs of smaller insurers and larger insurers. You have 
two provisions in there to try to help the small insurers play their 
part but not be overly burdened.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Get to the question.
  Mr. WELCH of Vermont. The question is this: Our small insurers in 
Vermont that do business in a good and friendly way usually are in the 
range of $100 million. That is above your limit. The requirement that 
they will have to, in effect, indicate an insolvency risk threatens 
their rating which would adversely affect their business.
  My question is, as you go forward, and as new information becomes 
available, my hope is that you and the committee would be willing to 
make what adjustments are feasible within the context of the overall 
goal.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. If the gentleman would yield, he has 
pointed to a very important issue. We did try to make some 
accommodation with the small insurers, but I don't think we have 
finally done that. But I would say, you know, the notion that a bill 
that comes to the floor is not graven in stone shouldn't come as a 
surprise to people. We have a Senate. We have a genuine conference. It 
will be an open conference.
  I should say I understand why some of my colleagues on the Republican 
side were somewhat puzzled at the notion that we might go to conference 
and, in an open way in conference, further amend the bill. They didn't 
believe in that. They didn't have any. So for them, that was all done 
in secret.
  We will have an open conference to address these. And this is one of 
the issues. I do believe that it is legitimate. We will be meeting 
with, and the staffs will be meeting with, the smaller private 
insurers. To the extent possible consistent with the purpose of the 
bill, we will seek to improve on the accommodation.
  Mr. WELCH of Vermont. I very much appreciate that.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my 
time to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized for 1\1/
4\ minutes.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I truly do thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for 
yielding and the minority for granting the unanimous consent request.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007. This critical bill 
reauthorizes the Federal Terrorism Insurance Program, which backs up 
private insurers in the event of a terrorist attack and extends the 
measure for 15 years. As chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee 
on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, I am 
certainly pleased that this bill would ensure coverage in the event of 
a nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological attack.
  While no one wants to ever imagine that a nuclear, chemical, 
biological, radiological event could occur, the possibility is, 
unfortunately, a reality. Therefore, we must not only protect against 
this risk, but ensure that our Nation can recover financially if the 
unthinkable does happen.
  This measure takes an important step forward by lowering the 
deductible from 20 percent to 3.5 percent for insurance coverage 
against NCBR attacks, and I am certainly proud to support this 
important measure.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Chairman Frank for his leadership on 
this important issue.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in part A of 
House Report 110-333, is adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be 
considered as an original bill for the purpose of further amendment 
under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 2761

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Revision and Extension Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 2. TERMINATION OF PROGRAM.

       Subsection (a) of section 108 of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is amended by 
     striking ``December 31, 2007'' and inserting ``December 31, 
     2022''.

     SEC. 3. REVISION OF TERRORISM INSURANCE PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
     is amended--
       (1) by striking sections 101, 102, and 103 and inserting 
     the following new sections:

     ``SEC. 101. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

       ``(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       ``(1) the ability of businesses and individuals to obtain 
     property and casualty insurance at reasonable and predictable 
     prices, in order to spread the risk of both routine and 
     catastrophic loss, is critical to economic growth, urban 
     development, and the construction and maintenance of public 
     and private housing, as well as to the promotion of United 
     States exports and foreign trade in an increasingly 
     interconnected world;
       ``(2) property and casualty insurance firms are important 
     financial institutions, the products of which allow 
     mutualization of risk and the efficient use of financial 
     resources and enhance the ability of the economy to maintain 
     stability, while responding to a variety of economic, 
     political, environmental, and other risks with a minimum of 
     disruption;
       ``(3) the ability of the insurance industry to cover the 
     unprecedented financial risks presented by potential acts of 
     terrorism in the United States can be a major factor in the 
     recovery from terrorist attacks, while maintaining the 
     stability of the economy;
       ``(4) widespread financial market uncertainties have arisen 
     following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
     including the absence of information from which financial 
     institutions can make statistically valid estimates of the 
     probability and cost of future terrorist events, and 
     therefore the size, funding, and allocation of the risk of 
     loss caused by such acts of terrorism;
       ``(5) a decision by property and casualty insurers to deal 
     with such uncertainties, either by terminating property and 
     casualty coverage for losses arising from terrorist events, 
     or by radically escalating premium coverage to compensate for 
     risks of loss that are not readily predictable, could 
     seriously hamper ongoing and planned construction, property 
     acquisition, and other business projects, generate a dramatic 
     increase in rents, and otherwise suppress economic activity;
       ``(6) the United States Government should coordinate with 
     insurers to provide financial compensation to insured parties 
     for losses from acts of terrorism, contributing to the 
     stabilization of the United States economy in a time of 
     national crisis, and periodically assess the ability of the 
     financial services industry to develop the systems, 
     mechanisms, products, and programs necessary to create a 
     viable financial services market for private terrorism risk 
     insurance that will

[[Page H10534]]

     lessen the financial participation of the United States 
     Government;
       ``(7) in addition to a terrorist attack on the United 
     States using conventional means or weapons, there is and 
     continues to be a potential threat of a terrorist attack 
     involving the use of unconventional means or weapons, such as 
     nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological agents;
       ``(8) as nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological 
     acts of terrorism (known as NBCR terrorism) present a threat 
     of loss of life, injury, disease, and property damage 
     potentially unparalleled in scope and complexity by any prior 
     event, natural or man-made, the Federal Government's 
     responsibility in providing for and preserving national 
     economic security calls for a strong Federal role in ensuring 
     financial compensation and economic recovery in the event of 
     such an attack;
       ``(9) a report issued by the Government Accountability 
     Office in September 2006 concluded that `any purely market-
     driven expansion of coverage' for NBCR terrorism risk is 
     `highly unlikely in the foreseeable future', and the 
     September 2006 report from the President's Working Group on 
     Financial Markets concluded that reinsurance for NBCR 
     terrorist events is virtually unavailable and that `[g]iven 
     the general reluctance of insurance companies to provide 
     coverage for these types of risks, there may be little 
     potential for future market development';
       ``(10) group life insurance companies are important 
     financial institutions whose products make life insurance 
     coverage affordable for millions of Americans and often serve 
     as their only life insurance benefit;
       ``(11) the group life insurance industry, in the event of a 
     severe act of terrorism, is vulnerable to insolvency because 
     high concentrations of covered employees work in the same 
     locations, because primary group life insurers do not exclude 
     conventional and NBCR terrorism risks while most catastrophic 
     reinsurance does exclude such terrorism risks, and because a 
     large-scale loss of life would fall outside of actuarial 
     expectations of death; and
       ``(12) the United States Government should provide 
     temporary financial compensation to insured parties, 
     contributing to the stabilization of the United States 
     economy in a time of national crisis, while the financial 
     services industry develops the systems, mechanisms, products, 
     and programs necessary to create a viable financial services 
     market for private terrorism risk insurance.
       ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to establish a 
     temporary Federal program that provides for a transparent 
     system of shared public and private compensation for insured 
     losses resulting from acts of terrorism, in order to--
       ``(1) protect consumers by addressing market disruptions 
     and ensure the continued widespread availability and 
     affordability of property and casualty insurance and group 
     life insurance for all types of terrorism risk, including 
     conventional terrorism risk and nuclear, biological, 
     chemical, and radiological terrorism risk;
       ``(2) allow for a transitional period for the private 
     markets to stabilize, resume pricing of such insurance, and 
     build capacity to absorb any future losses, while preserving 
     State insurance regulation and consumer protections (unless 
     otherwise preempted by this Act); and
       ``(3) provide finite liability limits for terrorism 
     insurance losses for insurers and the United States 
     Government.

     ``SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this title, the following definitions shall apply:
       ``(1) Act of terrorism.--
       ``(A) Certification.--The term `act of terrorism' means any 
     act that is certified by the Secretary, in concurrence with 
     the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     and the Attorney General of the United States--
       ``(i) to be an act of terrorism;
       ``(ii) to be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to--

       ``(I) human life;
       ``(II) property; or
       ``(III) infrastructure;

       ``(iii) to have resulted in damage within the United 
     States, or outside of the United States in the case of--

       ``(I) an air carrier or vessel described in paragraph 
     (9)(B); or
       ``(II) the premises of a United States mission; and

       ``(iv) to have been committed by an individual or 
     individuals as part of an effort to coerce the civilian 
     population of the United States or to influence the policy or 
     affect the conduct of the United States Government by 
     coercion.
       ``(B) Limitation.--No act shall be certified by the 
     Secretary as an act of terrorism if--
       ``(i) the act is committed as part of the course of a war 
     declared by the Congress, except that this clause shall not 
     apply with respect to any coverage for workers' compensation; 
     or
       ``(ii) property and casualty insurance and group life 
     insurance losses resulting from the act, in the aggregate, do 
     not exceed $5,000,000.
       ``(C) Certification of act of nbcr terrorism.--Upon 
     certification of an act of terrorism, the Secretary, in 
     concurrence with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, and the Attorney General of the United 
     States, shall determine whether the act of terrorism meets 
     the definition of NBCR terrorism in this section. If such 
     determination is that the act does meet such definition, the 
     Secretary shall further certify such act of terrorism as an 
     act of NBCR terrorism.
       ``(D) Determinations final.--Any certification of, or 
     determination not to certify, an act as an act of terrorism 
     or as an act of NBCR terrorism under this paragraph shall be 
     final, and shall not be subject to judicial review.
       ``(E) Nondelegation.--The Secretary may not delegate or 
     designate to any other officer, employee, or person, any 
     determination under this paragraph of whether, during the 
     effective period of the Program, an act of terrorism, 
     including an act of NBCR terrorism, has occurred.
       ``(F) Compensation subject to further congressional 
     action.--Nothwithstanding any certification of an act under 
     this paragraph as an act of terrorism or an act of NBCR 
     terrorism, Federal compensation under the Program shall be 
     subject to the provisions of section 103(h).
       ``(G) Submission of certification under this paragraph.--
     Upon any certification under subparagraph (A), the Secretary 
     shall submit such certification to the Congress.''.
       ``(2) Affiliate.--The term `affiliate' means, with respect 
     to an insurer, any entity that controls, is controlled by, or 
     is under common control with the insurer.
       ``(3) Amount at risk.--The term `amount at risk' means face 
     amount less statutory policy reserves for group life 
     insurance issued by any insurer for insurance against losses 
     occurring at the locations described in subparagraph (A) of 
     paragraph (9).
       ``(4) Control.--An entity has `control' over another 
     entity, if--
       ``(A) the entity directly or indirectly or acting through 1 
     or more other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 
     percent or more of any class of voting securities of the 
     other entity;
       ``(B) the entity controls in any manner the election of a 
     majority of the directors or trustees of the other entity; or
       ``(C) the Secretary determines, after notice and 
     opportunity for hearing, that the entity directly or 
     indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the 
     management or policies of the other entity; except that for 
     purposes of any proceeding under this subparagraph, there 
     shall be a presumption that any entity which directly or 
     indirectly owns, controls, or has power to vote less than 5 
     percent of any class of voting securities of another entity 
     does not have control over that entity.
       ``(5) Covered lines.--The term `covered lines' means 
     property and casualty insurance and group life insurance, as 
     defined in this section.
       ``(6) Direct earned premium.--The term `direct earned 
     premium' means a direct earned premium for property and 
     casualty insurance issued by any insurer for insurance 
     against losses occurring at the locations described in 
     subparagraph (A) of paragraph (9).
       ``(7) Excess insured loss.--The term `excess insured loss' 
     means, with respect to a Program Year, any portion of the 
     amount of insured losses during such Program Year that 
     exceeds the cap on annual liability under section 
     103(e)(2)(A).
       ``(8) Group life insurance.--The term `group life 
     insurance' means an insurance contract that provides life 
     insurance coverage, including term life insurance coverage, 
     universal life insurance coverage, variable universal life 
     insurance coverage, and accidental death coverage, or a 
     combination thereof, for a number of individuals under a 
     single contract, on the basis of a group selection of risks, 
     but does not include `Corporate Owned Life Insurance' or 
     `Business Owned Life Insurance,' each as defined under the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any similar product, or 
     group life reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance.
       ``(9) Insured loss.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the term `insured loss' means any loss resulting from an act 
     of terrorism (including an act of war, in the case of 
     workers' compensation) that is covered by primary or excess 
     property and casualty insurance, or group life insurance to 
     the extent of the amount at risk, issued by an insurer, if 
     such loss--
       ``(i) occurs within the United States; or
       ``(ii) occurs to an air carrier (as defined in section 
     40102 of title 49, United States Code), to a United States 
     flag vessel (or a vessel based principally in the United 
     States, on which United States income tax is paid and whose 
     insurance coverage is subject to regulation in the United 
     States), regardless of where the loss occurs, or at the 
     premises of any United States mission.
       ``(B) Limitation for group life insurance.--Such term shall 
     not include any losses of an insurer resulting from coverage 
     of any single certificate holder under any group life 
     insurance coverages of the insurer to the extent such losses 
     are not compensated under the Program by reason of section 
     103(e)(1)(D).
       ``(10) Insurer.--The term `insurer' means any entity, 
     including any affiliate thereof--
       ``(A) that is--
       ``(i) licensed or admitted to engage in the business of 
     providing primary or excess insurance, or group life 
     insurance, in any State;
       ``(ii) not licensed or admitted as described in clause (i), 
     if it is an eligible surplus line carrier listed on the 
     Quarterly Listing of Alien Insurers of the NAIC, or any 
     successor thereto;
       ``(iii) approved for the purpose of offering property and 
     casualty insurance by a Federal agency in connection with 
     maritime, energy, or aviation activity;
       ``(iv) a State residual market insurance entity or State 
     workers' compensation fund; or
       ``(v) any other entity described in section 103(f), to the 
     extent provided in the rules of the Secretary issued under 
     section 103(f);
       ``(B) that receives direct earned premiums for any type of 
     commercial property and casualty insurance coverage, or, in 
     the case of group life insurance, that receives direct 
     premiums, other than in the case of entities described in 
     sections 103(d) and 103(f); and
       ``(C) that meets any other criteria that the Secretary may 
     reasonably prescribe.
       ``(11) Insurer deductible.--The term `insurer deductible' 
     means--
       ``(A) for the Transition Period, the value of an insurer's 
     direct earned premiums over the calendar year immediately 
     preceding the date of enactment of this Act, multiplied by 1 
     percent;

[[Page H10535]]

       ``(B) for Program Year 1, the value of an insurer's direct 
     earned premiums over the calendar year immediately preceding 
     Program Year 1, multiplied by 7 percent;
       ``(C) for Program Year 2, the value of an insurer's direct 
     earned premiums over the calendar year immediately preceding 
     Program Year 2, multiplied by 10 percent;
       ``(D) for Program Year 3, the value of an insurer's direct 
     earned premiums over the calendar year immediately preceding 
     Program Year 3, multiplied by 15 percent;
       ``(E) for Program Year 4, the value of an insurer's direct 
     earned premiums over the calendar year immediately preceding 
     Program Year 4, multiplied by 17.5 percent;
       ``(F) for Program Year 5, the value of an insurer's direct 
     earned premiums over the calendar year immediately preceding 
     Program Year 5, multiplied by 20 percent;
       ``(G) for each additional Program Year--
       ``(i) with respect to property and casualty insurance, the 
     value of an insurer's direct earned premiums over the 
     calendar year immediately preceding such Program Year, 
     multiplied by 20 percent; and
       ``(ii) with respect to group life insurance, the value of 
     an insurer's amount at risk over the calendar year 
     immediately preceding such Program Year, multiplied by 0.0351 
     percent;
       ``(H) notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) through (G), for 
     the Transition Period or any Program Year, if an insurer has 
     not had a full year of operations during the calendar year 
     immediately preceding such Period or Program Year, such 
     portion of the direct earned premiums with respect to 
     property and casualty insurance, and such portion of the 
     amounts at risk with respect to group life insurance, of the 
     insurer as the Secretary determines appropriate, subject to 
     appropriate methodologies established by the Secretary for 
     measuring such direct earned premiums and amounts at risk;
       ``(I) notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) through (H) and 
     (J), in the case of any act of NBCR terrorism, for any 
     additional Program Year--
       ``(i) with respect to property and casualty insurance, the 
     value of an insurer's direct earned premiums over the 
     calendar year immediately preceding such Program Year, 
     multiplied by a percentage, which--

       ``(I) for the second additional Program Year, shall be 3.5 
     percent; and
       ``(II) for each succeeding Program Year thereafter, shall 
     be 50 basis points greater than the percentage applicable to 
     the preceding additional Program Year; and

       ``(ii) with respect to group life insurance, the value of 
     an insurer's amount at risk over the calendar year 
     immediately preceding such Program Year, multiplied by a 
     percentage, which--

       ``(I) for the first additional Program Year, shall be 
     0.00614 percent; and
       ``(II) for each succeeding Program Year thereafter, shall 
     be 0.088 basis point greater than the percentage applicable 
     to the preceding additional Program Year; and

       ``(J) notwithstanding subparagraph (G)(i), if aggregate 
     industry insured losses resulting from a certified act of 
     terrorism exceed $1,000,000,000, for any insurer that 
     sustains insured losses resulting from such act of terrorism, 
     the value of such insurer's direct earned premiums over the 
     calendar year immediately preceding the Program Year, 
     multiplied by a percentage, which--
       ``(i) for the first additional Program Year shall be 5 
     percent;
       ``(ii) for each additional Program Year thereafter, shall 
     be 50 basis points greater than the percentage applicable to 
     the preceding additional Program Year, except that if an act 
     of terrorism occurs during any additional Program Year that 
     results in aggregate industry insured losses exceeding 
     $1,000,000,000, the percentage for the succeeding additional 
     Program Year shall be 5 percent and the increase under this 
     clause shall apply to additional Program Years thereafter;

     except that for purposes of determining under this 
     subparagraph whether aggregate industry insured losses exceed 
     $1,000,000,000, the Secretary may combine insured losses 
     resulting from two or more certified acts of terrorism 
     occurring during such Program Year in the same geographic 
     area (with such area determined by the Secretary), in which 
     case such insurer shall be permitted to combine insured 
     losses resulting from such acts of terrorism for purposes of 
     satisfying its insurer deductible under this subparagraph; 
     and except that the insurer deductible under this 
     subparagraph shall apply only with respect to compensation of 
     insured losses resulting from such certified act, or combined 
     certified acts, and that for purposes of compensation of any 
     other insured losses occurring in the same Program Year, the 
     insurer deductible determined under subparagraph (G)(i) or 
     (I) shall apply.
       ``(12) NAIC.--The term `NAIC' means the National 
     Association of Insurance Commissioners.
       ``(13) NBCR terrorism.--The term `NBCR terrorism' means an 
     act of terrorism that involves nuclear, biological, chemical, 
     or radiological reactions, releases, or contaminations, to 
     the extent any insured losses result from any such reactions, 
     releases, or contaminations.
       ``(14) Person.--The term `person' means any individual, 
     business or nonprofit entity (including those organized in 
     the form of a partnership, limited liability company, 
     corporation, or association), trust or estate, or a State or 
     political subdivision of a State or other governmental unit.
       ``(15) Program.--The term `Program' means the Terrorism 
     Insurance Program established by this title.
       ``(16) Program years.--
       ``(A) Transition period.--The term `Transition Period' 
     means the period beginning on the date of enactment of this 
     Act and ending on December 31, 2002.
       ``(B) Program year 1.--The term `Program Year 1' means the 
     period beginning on January 1, 2003 and ending on December 
     31, 2003.
       ``(C) Program year 2.--The term `Program Year 2' means the 
     period beginning on January 1, 2004 and ending on December 
     31, 2004.
       ``(D) Program year 3.--The term `Program Year 3' means the 
     period beginning on January 1, 2005 and ending on December 
     31, 2005.
       ``(E) Program year 4.--The term `Program Year 4' means the 
     period beginning on January 1, 2006 and ending on December 
     31, 2006.
       ``(F) Program year 5.--The term `Program Year 5' means the 
     period beginning on January 1, 2007 and ending on December 
     31, 2007.
       ``(G) Additional program year.--The term `additional 
     Program Year' means any additional one-year period after 
     Program Year 5 during which the Program is in effect, which 
     period shall begin on January 1 and end on December 31 of the 
     same calendar year.
       ``(17) Property and casualty insurance.--The term `property 
     and casualty insurance'--
       ``(A) means commercial lines of property and casualty 
     insurance, including excess insurance, workers' compensation 
     insurance, and directors and officers liability insurance; 
     and
       ``(B) does not include--
       ``(i) Federal crop insurance issued or reinsured under the 
     Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.), or any 
     other type of crop or livestock insurance that is privately 
     issued or reinsured;
       ``(ii) private mortgage insurance (as that term is defined 
     in section 2 of the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 (12 
     U.S.C. 4901)) or title insurance;
       ``(iii) financial guaranty insurance issued by monoline 
     financial guaranty insurance corporations;
       ``(iv) insurance for medical malpractice;
       ``(v) health or life insurance, including group life 
     insurance;
       ``(vi) flood insurance provided under the National Flood 
     Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4001 et seq.);
       ``(vii) reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance;
       ``(viii) commercial automobile insurance;
       ``(ix) burglary and theft insurance;
       ``(x) surety insurance; or
       ``(xi) professional liability insurance.
       ``(18) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary 
     of the Treasury.
       ``(19) State.--The term `State' means any State of the 
     United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
     Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
     Islands, American Samoa, Guam, each of the United States 
     Virgin Islands, and any territory or possession of the United 
     States.
       ``(20) United states.--The term `United States' means the 
     several States, and includes the territorial sea and the 
     continental shelf of the United States, as those terms are 
     defined in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
     of 1994 (18 U.S.C. 2280, 2281).
       ``(21) Rule of construction for dates.--With respect to any 
     reference to a date in this title, such day shall be 
     construed--
       ``(A) to begin at 12:01 a.m. on that date; and
       ``(B) to end at midnight on that date.

     ``SEC. 103. TERRORISM INSURANCE PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Establishment of Program.--
       ``(1) In general.--There is established in the Department 
     of the Treasury the Terrorism Insurance Program.
       ``(2) Authority of the secretary.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of State or Federal law, the Secretary shall 
     administer the Program, and, subject only to subsection 
     (h)(1), shall pay the Federal share of compensation for 
     insured losses in accordance with subsection (e).
       ``(3) Mandatory participation.--Each entity that meets the 
     definition of an insurer under this title shall participate 
     in the Program.
       ``(4) NBCR exemption for certain insurers.--Notwithstanding 
     the requirements of paragraph (3):
       ``(A) Eligibility.--Upon request, the Secretary may provide 
     an exemption from the requirements of subparagraph (B) of 
     subsection (c)(1) in the Program to an entity that otherwise 
     meets the definition of an insurer under this title if--
       ``(i) such insurer's direct earned premium is less than 
     $50,000,000 in the calendar year immediately preceding the 
     current additional Program Year; and
       ``(ii) the Secretary makes the determination set forth in 
     subparagraph (D).
       ``(B) Insurer group.--For purposes of subparagraph (A)(i), 
     the direct earned premium of any insurer shall include the 
     direct earned premiums of every affiliate of that insurer.
       ``(C) Information and consultation.--Any insurer requesting 
     an exemption pursuant to this paragraph shall provide any 
     information the Secretary may require to establish its 
     eligibility for the exemption. In developing standards for 
     evaluating eligibility for the exemption under this 
     paragraph, the Secretary shall consult with the NAIC.
       ``(D) Determination.--In making any determination regarding 
     eligibility for exemption under this paragraph, the Secretary 
     shall consult with the insurance commissioner of the State or 
     other appropriate State regulatory authority where the 
     insurer is domiciled and determine whether the insurer has 
     demonstrated that it would become insolvent if it were 
     required, in the event of an act of NBCR terrorism, to 
     satisfy--
       ``(i) its deductible and maximum applicable share above the 
     deductible pursuant to sections 102(11)(I) and 103(e)(1)(B), 
     respectively, for such act of NBCR terrorism resulting in 
     aggregate industry insured losses above the trigger 
     established in section 103(e)(1)(C); or
       ``(ii) its maximum payment obligations for insured losses 
     for such act of NBCR terrorism resulting in aggregate 
     industry insured losses below the trigger established in 
     section 103(e)(1)(C).

[[Page H10536]]

       ``(E) Workers' compensation and other compulsory insurance 
     law.--In granting an exemption under this paragraph, the 
     Secretary shall not approve any request for exemption with 
     regard to State workers' compensation insurance or other 
     compulsory insurance law requiring coverage of the risks 
     described in subparagraph (B) of subsection (c)(1).
       ``(F) Exemption period.--
       ``(i) In general.--Any exemption granted to an insurer by 
     the Secretary under this paragraph shall have a duration of 
     not longer than 2 years.
       ``(ii) Extension.--Notwithstanding clause (i), the 
     Secretary may, upon application by an insurer granted an 
     exemption under this paragraph, extend such exemption for 
     additional periods of not longer than 2 years.
       ``(b) Conditions for Federal Payments.--No payment may be 
     made by the Secretary under this section with respect to an 
     insured loss that is covered by an insurer, unless--
       ``(1) there is enacted a joint resolution for payment of 
     Federal compensation with respect to the act of terroism that 
     resulted in the insured loss;
       ``(2) the person that suffers the insured loss, or a person 
     acting on behalf of that person, files a claim with the 
     insurer;
       ``(3) the insurer provides clear and conspicuous disclosure 
     to the policyholder of the premium charged for insured losses 
     covered by the Program (including the additional premium, if 
     any, charged for the coverage for insured losses resulting 
     from acts of NBCR terrorism as made available pursuant to 
     subsection (c)(1)(B)) and the Federal share of compensation 
     for insured losses under the Program--
       ``(A) in the case of any policy that is issued before the 
     date of enactment of this Act, not later than 90 days after 
     that date of enactment;
       ``(B) in the case of any policy that is issued within 90 
     days of the date of enactment of this Act, at the time of 
     offer, purchase, and renewal of the policy; and
       ``(C) in the case of any policy that is issued more than 90 
     days after the date of enactment of this Act, on a separate 
     line item in the policy, at the time of offer, purchase, and 
     renewal of the policy;
       ``(4) the insurer processes the claim for the insured loss 
     in accordance with appropriate business practices, and any 
     reasonable procedures that the Secretary may prescribe; and
       ``(5) the insurer submits to the Secretary, in accordance 
     with such reasonable procedures as the Secretary may 
     establish--
       ``(A) a claim for payment of the Federal share of 
     compensation for insured losses under the Program;
       ``(B) written certification--
       ``(i) of the underlying claim; and
       ``(ii) of all payments made for insured losses; and
       ``(C) certification of its compliance with the provisions 
     of this subsection.
       ``(c) Mandatory Availability.--
       ``(1) Availability of coverage for insured losses.--Subject 
     to paragraph (3), during each Program Year, each entity that 
     meets the definition of an insurer under section 102 shall 
     make available--
       ``(A) in all of its insurance policies for covered lines, 
     coverage for insured losses that does not differ materially 
     from the terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations 
     applicable to losses arising from events other than acts of 
     terrorism; and
       ``(B) in insurance policies for covered lines for which the 
     coverage described in subparagraph (A) is provided, 
     exceptions to the pollution and nuclear hazard exclusions of 
     such policies that render such exclusions inapplicable only 
     as to insured losses arising from acts of NBCR terrorism.
       ``(2) Allowable exclusions in other coverage.--Subject to 
     paragraph (3) and notwithstanding any other provision of 
     Federal or State law, including any State workers' 
     compensation and other compulsory insurance law, if a person 
     elects not to purchase an insurance policy with the coverage 
     described in paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) an insurer may exclude coverage for all losses from 
     acts of terrorism including acts of NBCR terrorism, except 
     for State workers' compensation and other compulsory 
     insurance law requiring coverage of the risks described in 
     subsection (c)(1) (unless permitted by State law); or
       ``(B) an insurer may offer other options for coverage that 
     differ materially from the terms, amounts, and other coverage 
     limitations applicable to losses arising from events other 
     than acts of terrorism;

     except that nothing in this paragraph shall affect paragraph 
     (4).
       ``(3) Applicability for nbcr terrorism.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of this Act, paragraphs (1)(B) and (2) 
     shall apply, beginning upon January 1, 2009, with respect to 
     coverage for acts of NBCR terrorism, that is purchased or 
     renewed on or after such date.
       ``(4) Availability of life insurance without regard to 
     lawful foreign travel.--During each Program Year, each entity 
     that meets the definition of an insurer under section 102 
     shall make available, in all of its life insurance policies 
     issued after the date of the enactment of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007 under which the 
     insured person is a citizen of the United States or an alien 
     lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United 
     States, coverage that neither considers past, nor precludes 
     future, lawful foreign travel by the person insured, and 
     shall not decline such coverage based on past or future, 
     lawful foreign travel by the person insured or charge a 
     premium for such coverage that is excessive and not based on 
     a good faith actuarial analysis, except that an insurer may 
     decline or, upon inception or renewal of a policy, limit the 
     amount of coverage provided under any life insurance policy 
     based on plans to engage in future lawful foreign travel to 
     occur within 12 months of such inception or renewal of the 
     policy but only if, at time of application--
       ``(A) such declination is based on, or such limitation 
     applies only with respect to, travel to a foreign 
     destination--
       ``(i) for which the Director of the Centers for Disease 
     Control and Prevention of the Department of Health and Human 
     Services has issued a highest level alert or warning, 
     including a recommendation against non-essential travel, due 
     to a serious health-related condition;
       ``(ii) in which there is an ongoing military conflict 
     involving the armed forces of a sovereign nation other than 
     the nation to which the insured person is traveling; or
       ``(iii)(I) that the insurer has specifically designated in 
     the terms of the life insurance policy at the inception of 
     the policy or at renewal, as applicable; and
       ``(II) with respect to which the insurer has made a good-
     faith determination that--

       ``(aa) a serious unlawful situation exists which is 
     ongoing; and
       ``(bb) the credibility of information by which the insurer 
     can verify the death of the insured person is compromised; 
     and

       ``(B) in the case of any limitation of coverage, such 
     limitation is specifically stated in the terms of the life 
     insurance policy at the inception of the policy or at 
     renewal, as applicable.
       ``(d) State Residual Market Insurance Entities.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall issue regulations, 
     as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, that apply the provisions of this title to State 
     residual market insurance entities and State workers' 
     compensation funds.
       ``(2) Treatment of certain entities.--For purposes of the 
     regulations issued pursuant to paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) a State residual market insurance entity that does 
     not share its profits and losses with private sector insurers 
     shall be treated as a separate insurer; and
       ``(B) a State residual market insurance entity that shares 
     its profits and losses with private sector insurers shall not 
     be treated as a separate insurer, and shall report to each 
     private sector insurance participant its share of the insured 
     losses of the entity, which shall be included in each private 
     sector insurer's insured losses.
       ``(3) Treatment of participation in certain entities.--Any 
     insurer that participates in sharing profits and losses of a 
     State residual market insurance entity shall include in its 
     calculations of premiums any premiums distributed to the 
     insurer by the State residual market insurance entity.
       ``(e) Insured Loss Shared Compensation.--
       ``(1) Federal share.--
       ``(A) Conventional terrorism.--Except as provided in 
     subparagraph (B), the Federal share of compensation under the 
     Program to be paid by the Secretary subject to subsection 
     (h)(1), for insured losses of an insurer during any 
     additional Program Year shall be equal to the sum of--
       ``(i) 85 percent of that portion of the amount of such 
     insured losses that--

       ``(I) exceeds the applicable insurer deductible required to 
     be paid during such Program Year; and
       ``(II) based upon pro rata determinations pursuant to 
     paragraph (2)(B), does not result in aggregate industry 
     insured losses during such Program Year exceeding 
     $100,000,000,000; and

       ``(ii) 100 percent of the insured losses of the insurer 
     that, based upon pro rata determinations pursuant to 
     paragraph (2)(B), result in aggregate industry insured losses 
     during such Program Year exceeding $100,000,000,000, up to 
     the limit under paragraph (2)(A).
       ``(B) NBCR terrorism.--
       ``(i) Amount of compensation.--The Federal share of 
     compensation under the Program to be paid by the Secretary 
     for insured losses of an insurer resulting from NBCR 
     terrorism during any additional Program Year shall be equal 
     to the sum of--

       ``(I) the amount of qualified NBCR losses (as such term is 
     defined in clause (ii)) of the insurer, multiplied by a 
     percentage based on the aggregate industry qualified NBCR 
     losses for the Program Year, which percentage shall be--

       ``(aa) 85 percent of such aggregate industry qualified NBCR 
     losses of less than $10,000,000,000;
       ``(bb) 87.5 percent of such aggregate industry qualified 
     NBCR losses between $10,000,000,000 and $20,000,000,000;
       ``(cc) 90 percent of such aggregate industry qualified NBCR 
     losses between $20,000,000,000 and $40,000,000,000;
       ``(dd) 92.5 percent of such aggregate industry qualified 
     NBCR losses of between $40,000,000,000 and $60,000,000,000; 
     and
       ``(ee) 95 percent of such aggregate industry qualified NBCR 
     losses of more than $60,000,000,000;

     and shall be prorated per insurer based on each insurer's 
     percentage of the aggregate industry qualified NBCR losses 
     for such additional Program Year; and
       ``(II) 100 percent of the insured losses of the insurer 
     resulting from NBCR terrorism that, based upon pro rata 
     determinations pursuant to paragraph (2)(B), result in 
     aggregate industry insured losses during such Program Year 
     exceeding $100,000,000,000, up to the limit under paragraph 
     (2)(A).

       ``(ii) Qualified nbcr losses.--For purposes of this 
     subparagraph, the term `qualified NBCR losses' means, with 
     respect to insured losses of an insurer resulting from NBCR 
     terrorism during an additional Program Year, that portion of 
     the amount of such insured losses that--

       ``(I) exceeds the applicable insurer deductible required to 
     be paid during such Program Year; and

[[Page H10537]]

       ``(II) based upon pro rata determinations pursuant to 
     paragraph (2)(B), does not result in aggregate industry 
     insured losses during such Program Year exceeding 
     $100,000,000,000.

       ``(C) Program trigger.--In the case of a certified act of 
     terrorism occurring after March 31, 2006, no compensation 
     shall be paid, pursuant to subsection (h)(1), by the 
     Secretary under subsection (a), unless the aggregate industry 
     insured losses resulting from such certified act of terrorism 
     exceed $50,000,000, except that if a certified act of 
     terrorism occurs for which resulting aggregate industry 
     insured losses exceed $1,000,000,000, the applicable amount 
     for any subsequent certified act of terrorism shall be the 
     amount specified in section 102(1)(B)(ii).
       ``(D) Limitation on compensation for group life 
     insurance.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
     the Federal share of compensation under the Program paid, 
     pursuant to subsection (h)(1), by the Secretary for insured 
     losses of an insurer resulting from coverage of any single 
     certificate holder under any group life insurance coverages 
     of the insurer may not during any additional Program Year 
     exceed $1,000,000.
       ``(E) Prohibition on duplicative compensation.--The Federal 
     share of compensation for insured losses under the Program 
     shall be reduced by the amount of compensation provided by 
     the Federal Government to any person under any other Federal 
     program for those insured losses.
       ``(2) Cap on annual liability.--
       ``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any 
     other provision of Federal or State law, including any State 
     workers' compensation or other compulsory insurance law, if 
     the aggregate amount of the Federal share of compensation to 
     be paid to all insurers pursuant to paragraph (1) exceeds 
     $100,000,000,000, during any additional Program Year (until 
     such time as the Congress may act otherwise with respect to 
     such losses)--
       ``(i) the Secretary shall not make any payment under this 
     title for any portion of the amount of the aggregate insured 
     losses during such Program Year for which the Federal share 
     exceeds $100,000,000,000; and
       ``(ii) no insurer that has met its insurer deductible shall 
     be liable for the payment of any portion of the aggregate 
     insured losses during such Program Year that exceeds 
     $100,000,000,000.
       ``(B) Insurer share.--For purposes of subparagraph (A), the 
     Secretary shall determine the pro rata share of insured 
     losses to be paid by each insurer that incurs insured losses 
     under the Program.
       ``(C) Claims allocations.--The Secretary shall, by 
     regulation, provide for insurers to allocate claims payments 
     for insured losses under applicable insurance policies in any 
     case described in subparagraph (A). Such regulations shall 
     include provisions for payment, for the purpose of addressing 
     emergency needs of applicable individuals affected by an act 
     of terrorism, of a portion of claims for insured losses 
     promptly upon filing of such claims.
       ``(3) Limitation on insurer financial responsibility.--
       ``(A) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     Federal or State law, including any State workers' 
     compensation or other compulsory insurance law, an insurer's 
     financial responsibility for insured losses from acts of 
     terrorism shall be limited as follows:
       ``(i) Federal compensation not provided.--In any case of an 
     act of terrorism with respect to which there has not been 
     enacted a joint resolution for payment of Federal 
     compensation described in subsection (h)(2), an insurer's 
     financial responsbility for insured losses from such act of 
     terrorism shall be limited to its applicable insurer 
     deductible.
       ``(ii) Federal compensation provided.--In any case of an 
     act of terrorism with respect to which there has been enacted 
     a joint resolution for payment of Federal compensation 
     described in subsection (h)(2), an insurer's financial 
     responsbility for insured losses from such act of terrorism 
     shall be limited to--
       ``(I) its applicable insurer deductible; and
       ``(II) its applicable share of insured losses that exceed 
     its applicable insurer deductible, subject to the 
     requirements of paragraph (2).
       ``(B) Federal reimbursement.--``In the case of any act of 
     terrorism with respect to which there has been enacted a 
     joint resolution for payment of Federal compensation 
     described in subsection (h)(2) and notwithstanding any other 
     provision of Federal or State law, the Secretary shall--
       ``(i) reimburse insurers for any payment of excess insured 
     losses made prior to publication of any notification pursuant 
     to paragraph (4)(A);
       ``(ii) reimburse insurers for any payment of excess insured 
     losses occurring on or after the date of any notification 
     pursuant to paragraph (4)(A), but only to the extent that--

       ``(I) such payment is ordered by a court pursuant to 
     subparagraph (C) of this paragraph or is directed by State 
     law, notwithstanding this paragraph, or by Federal law;
       ``(II) such payment is limited to compensating insurers for 
     their payment of excess insured losses and does not include 
     punitive damages, or litigation or other costs; and
       ``(III) the insurer has made a good-faith effort to defend 
     against any claims for such payment; and

       ``(iii) have the right to intervene in any legal 
     proceedings relating to such claims specified in clause 
     (ii)(III).
       ``(C) Federal court jurisdiction.--
       ``(i) Conditions.--All claims relating to or arising out of 
     an insurer's financial responsibility for insured losses from 
     acts of terrorism under this paragraph shall be within the 
     original and exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts of 
     the United States, in accordance with the procedures 
     established in subparagraph (D), if the Secretary certifies 
     that the following conditions have been met, or that there is 
     a reasonable likelihood that the following conditions may be 
     met:

       ``(I) The aggregate amount of the Federal share of 
     compensation to be paid to all insurers pursuant to paragraph 
     (1) exceeds $100,000,000,000, pursuant to paragraph (2); and
       ``(II) the insurer has paid its applicable insurer 
     deductible and its pro rata share of insured losses 
     determined pursuant to paragraph (2)(B).

       ``(ii) Removal of state court actions.--If the Secretary 
     certifies that conditions set forth in subclauses (I) and 
     (II) of clause (i) have been met, all pending State court 
     actions that relate to or arise out of an insurer's financial 
     responsibility for insured losses from acts of terrorism 
     under this paragraph shall be removed to a district court of 
     the United States in accordance with subparagraph (D).
       ``(D) Venue.--For each certification made by the Secretary 
     pursuant to subparagraph (C)(i), not later than 90 days after 
     the Secretary's determination the Judicial Panel on 
     Multidistrict Litigation shall designate one district court 
     or, if necessary, multiple district courts of the United 
     States that shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction 
     over all actions for any claim relating to or arising out of 
     an insurer's financial responsibility for insured losses from 
     acts of terrorism under this paragraph.
       ``(E) Federal court jurisdiction and venue in cases of no 
     federal compensation.--In the case of any act of terrorism 
     with respect to which there has not been enacted a joint 
     resolution for payment of Federal compensation described in 
     subsection (h)(2)--
       ``(i) all claims relating to or arising out of an insurer's 
     financial responsbility for insured losses from such act of 
     terrorism shall be within the original and exclusive 
     jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States, in 
     accordance with the procedures established in clause (iii);
       ``(ii) all pending State court actions that relate to or 
     arise out of an insurer's financial responsbility for insured 
     losses from such act of terrorism shall be removed to a 
     district court of the United States in accordance with clause 
     (iii); and
       ``(iii) not later than 90 days after the Secretary's 
     certification of such act of terrorism, the Judicial Panel on 
     Multidistrict Litigation shall designate one district court 
     or, if necessary, multiple district courts of the United 
     States that shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction 
     over all actions for any claim relating to or arising out of 
     an insurer's financial responsibility for insured losses from 
     such act of terrorism.
       ``(4) Notices regarding losses and annual liability cap.--
       ``(A) Approaching cap.--If the Secretary determines 
     estimated or actual aggregate Federal compensation to be paid 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) equals or exceeds $80,000,000,000 
     during any Program Year, the Secretary shall promptly provide 
     notification in accordance with subparagraph (D)--
       ``(i) of such estimated or actual aggregate Federal 
     compensation to be paid;
       ``(ii) of the likelihood that such aggregate Federal 
     compensation to be paid for such Program Year will equal or 
     exceed $100,000,000,000; and
       ``(iii) that, pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)(ii), insurers 
     are not required to make payments of excess insured losses.
       ``(B) Event likely to cause losses to exceed cap.--If any 
     act of terrorism occurs that the Secretary determines is 
     likely to cause estimated or actual aggregate Federal 
     compensation to be paid pursuant to paragraph (1) to exceed 
     $100,000,000,000 during any Program Year, the Secretary 
     shall, not later than 10 days after such act, provide 
     notification in accordance with subparagraph (D)--
       ``(i) of such estimated or actual aggregate Federal 
     compensation to be paid; and
       ``(ii) that, pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)(ii), insurers are 
     not required to make payments for excess insured losses.
       ``(C) Exceeding cap.--If the Secretary determines estimated 
     or actual aggregate Federal compensation to be paid pursuant 
     to paragraph (1) equals or exceeds $100,000,000,000 during 
     any Program Year--
       ``(i) the Secretary shall promptly provide notification in 
     accordance with subparagraph (D)--

       ``(I) of such estimated or actual aggregate Federal 
     compensation to be paid; and
       ``(II) that, pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)(ii), insurers are 
     not required to make payments for excess insured losses 
     unless the Congress provides for payments for excess insured 
     losses pursuant to clause (ii) of this subparagraph; and

       ``(ii) the Congress shall determine the procedures for and 
     the source of any payments for such excess insured losses.
       ``(D) Parties notified.--Notification is provided in 
     accordance with this subparagraph only if notification is 
     provided--
       ``(i) to the Congress, in writing; and
       ``(ii) to insurers, by causing such notice to be published 
     in the Federal Register.
       ``(E) Determinations.--The Secretary shall make 
     determinations regarding estimated and actual aggregate 
     Federal compensation to be paid promptly after any act of 
     terrorism as may be necessary to comply with this paragraph.
       ``(F) Mandatory disclosure for insurance contracts.--All 
     policies for property and casualty insurance and group life 
     insurance shall be deemed to contain a provision to the 
     effect that, in the case of any act of terrorism with respect 
     to which there has been enacted a joint resolution for 
     payment of Federal compensation described in subsection 
     (h)(2), no insurer that has met its applicable insurer 
     deductible and its applicable share of insured losses that 
     exceed its applicable insurer deductible but are not 
     compensated pursuant to paragraph (1), shall be obligated to 
     pay for any portion of excess insured loss. Notwithstanding 
     the preceding sentence, insurers shall include a disclosure 
     in their policies detailing the maximum level of Government

[[Page H10538]]

     assistance and the applicable insurer share. ``All policies 
     for property and casualty insurance and group life insurance 
     shall be deemed to contain, and insurers shall be permitted 
     to include in their policies, a provision to the effect that, 
     in the case of insured losses resulting from any act of 
     terrorism with respect to which there has not been enacted a 
     joint resolution for payment of Federal compensation 
     described in subsection (h)(2), no insurer shall be obligated 
     to pay for any portion of any such insured losses that 
     exceeds its applicable insurer deductible.
       ``(5) Final netting.--The Secretary shall have sole 
     discretion to determine the time at which claims relating to 
     any insured loss or act of terrorism shall become final.
       ``(6) Determinations final.--Any determination of the 
     Secretary under this subsection shall be final, unless 
     expressly provided, and shall not be subject to judicial 
     review.
       ``(7) Insurance marketplace aggregate retention amount.--
     For purposes of paragraph (8), the insurance marketplace 
     aggregate retention amount shall be--
       ``(A) for the period beginning on the first day of the 
     Transition Period and ending on the last day of Program Year 
     1, the lesser of--
       ``(i) $10,000,000,000; and
       ``(ii) the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured 
     losses during such period;
       ``(B) for Program Year 2, the lesser of--
       ``(i) $12,500,000,000; and
       ``(ii) the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured 
     losses during such Program Year;
       ``(C) for Program Year 3, the lesser of--
       ``(i) $15,000,000,000; and
       ``(ii) the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured 
     losses during such Program Year;
       ``(D) for Program Year 4, the lesser of--
       ``(i) $25,000,000,000; and
       ``(ii) the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured 
     losses during such Program Year;
       ``(E) for Program Year 5, the lesser of--
       ``(i) $27,500,000,000; and
       ``(ii) the aggregate amount, for all insurers, of insured 
     losses during such Program Year; and
       ``(F) for each additional Program Year--
       ``(i) for property and casualty insurance, the lesser of--

       ``(I) $27,500,000,000; and
       ``(II) the aggregate amount, for all such insurance, of 
     insured losses during such Program Year; and

       ``(ii) for group life insurance, the lesser of--

       ``(I) $5,000,000,000; and
       ``(II) the aggregate amount, for all such insurance, of 
     insured losses during such Program Year.

       ``(8) Recoupment of federal share.--
       ``(A) Mandatory recoupment amount.--For purposes of this 
     paragraph, the mandatory recoupment amount for each of the 
     Program Years referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of 
     paragraph (7) shall be the difference between--
       ``(i) the applicable insurance marketplace aggregate 
     retention amount under paragraph (7) for such Program Year; 
     and
       ``(ii) the aggregate amount, for all applicable insurers 
     (pursuant to subparagraph (E)), of insured losses during such 
     Program Year that are not compensated by the Federal 
     Government because such losses--

       ``(I) are within the insurer deductible for the insurer 
     subject to the losses; or
       ``(II) are within the portion of losses of the insurer that 
     exceed the insurer deductible, but are not compensated 
     pursuant to paragraph (1).

       ``(B) No mandatory recoupment if uncompensated losses 
     exceed applicable insurance marketplace retention.--
     Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), if the aggregate amount of 
     uncompensated insured losses referred to in clause (ii) of 
     such subparagraph for any Program Year referred to in any of 
     subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (7) is greater 
     than the applicable insurance marketplace aggregate retention 
     amount under paragraph (7) for such Program Year, the 
     mandatory recoupment amount shall be $0.
       ``(C) Mandatory establishment of surcharges to recoup 
     mandatory recoupment amount.--The Secretary shall collect, 
     for repayment of the Federal financial assistance provided in 
     connection with all acts of terrorism (or acts of war, in the 
     case of workers' compensation) occurring during any of the 
     Program Years referred to in any of subparagraphs (A) through 
     (F) of paragraph (7), terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums 
     in an amount equal to any mandatory recoupment amount for 
     such Program Year.
       ``(D) Discretionary recoupment of remainder of financial 
     assistance.--To the extent that the amount of Federal 
     financial assistance provided exceeds any mandatory 
     recoupment amount, the Secretary may--
       ``(i) recoup, through terrorism loss risk-spreading 
     premiums, such additional amounts; or
       ``(ii) submit a report to the Congress identifying such 
     amounts that the Secretary believes cannot be recouped, based 
     on--

       ``(I) the ultimate costs to taxpayers of no additional 
     recoupment;
       ``(II) the economic conditions in the commercial 
     marketplace, including the capitalization, profitability, and 
     investment returns of the insurance industry and the current 
     cycle of the insurance markets;

       ``(III) the affordability of commercial insurance for 
     small- and medium-sized businesses; and
       ``(IV) such other factors as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate.

       ``(E) Separate recoupment.--``The Secretary shall provide 
     that--
       ``(i) any recoupment under this paragraph of amounts paid 
     for Federal financial assistance for insured losses for 
     property and casualty insurance shall be applied to property 
     and casualty insurance policies; and
       ``(ii) any recoupment under this paragraph of amounts paid 
     for Federal financial assistance for insured losses for group 
     life insurance shall be applied to group life insurance 
     policies.
       ``(9) Policy surcharge for terrorism loss risk-spreading 
     premiums.--
       ``(A) Policyholder premium.--Subject to paragraph (8)(E), 
     any amount established by the Secretary as a terrorism loss 
     risk-spreading premium shall--
       ``(i) be imposed as a policyholder premium surcharge on 
     property and casualty insurance policies and group life 
     insurance policies in force after the date of such 
     establishment;
       ``(ii) begin with such period of coverage during the year 
     as the Secretary determines appropriate; and
       ``(iii) be based on--

       ``(I) a percentage of the premium amount charged for 
     property and casualty insurance coverage under the policy; 
     and
       ``(II) a percentage of the amount at risk for group life 
     insurance coverage under the policy.

       ``(B) Collection.--The Secretary shall provide for insurers 
     to collect terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums and remit 
     such amounts collected to the Secretary.
       ``(C) Percentage limitation.--A terrorism loss risk-
     spreading premium may not exceed, on an annual basis--
       ``(i) with respect to property and casualty insurance, the 
     amount equal to 3 percent of the premium charged under the 
     policy; and
       ``(ii) with respect to group life insurance, the amount 
     equal to 0.0053 percent of the amount at risk under the 
     policy.
       ``(D) Adjustment for urban and smaller commercial and rural 
     areas and different lines of insurance.--
       ``(i) Adjustments.--In determining the method and manner of 
     imposing terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums, including 
     the amount of such premiums, the Secretary shall take into 
     consideration--

       ``(I) the economic impact on commercial centers of urban 
     areas, including the effect on commercial rents and 
     commercial insurance premiums, particularly rents and 
     premiums charged to small businesses, and the availability of 
     lease space and commercial insurance within urban areas;
       ``(II) the risk factors related to rural areas and smaller 
     commercial centers, including the potential exposure to loss 
     and the likely magnitude of such loss, as well as any 
     resulting cross-subsidization that might result; and
       ``(III) the various exposures to terrorism risk for 
     different lines of insurance.

       ``(ii) Recoupment of adjustments.--Any mandatory recoupment 
     amounts not collected by the Secretary because of adjustments 
     under this subparagraph shall be recouped through additional 
     terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums.
       ``(E) Timing of premiums.--The Secretary may adjust the 
     timing of terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums to provide 
     for equivalent application of the provisions of this title to 
     policies that are not based on a calendar year, or to apply 
     such provisions on a daily, monthly, or quarterly basis, as 
     appropriate.
       ``(f) Captive Insurers and Other Self-Insurance 
     Arrangements.--The Secretary may, in consultation with the 
     NAIC or the appropriate State regulatory authority, apply the 
     provisions of this title, as appropriate, to other classes or 
     types of captive insurers and other self-insurance 
     arrangements by municipalities and other entities (such as 
     workers' compensation self-insurance programs and State 
     workers' compensation reinsurance pools), but only if such 
     application is determined before the occurrence of an act of 
     terrorism in which such an entity incurs an insured loss and 
     all of the provisions of this title are applied comparably to 
     such entities.
       ``(g) Reinsurance to Cover Exposure.--
       ``(1) Obtaining coverage.--This title may not be construed 
     to limit or prevent insurers from obtaining reinsurance 
     coverage for insurer deductibles or insured losses retained 
     by insurers pursuant to this section, nor shall the obtaining 
     of such coverage affect the calculation of such deductibles 
     or retentions.
       ``(2) Limitation on financial assistance.--The amount of 
     financial assistance provided pursuant to this section shall 
     not be reduced by reinsurance paid or payable to an insurer 
     from other sources, except that recoveries from such other 
     sources, taken together with financial assistance for the 
     Transition Period or a Program Year provided pursuant to this 
     section, may not exceed the aggregate amount of the insurer's 
     insured losses for such period. If such recoveries and 
     financial assistance for the Transition Period or a Program 
     Year exceed such aggregate amount of insured losses for that 
     period and there is no agreement between the insurer and any 
     reinsurer to the contrary, an amount in excess of such 
     aggregate insured losses shall be returned to the Secretary.
       ``(h) Priviledged Procedure for Joint Resolution for 
     Payment of Federal Compensation.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall pay the Federal 
     share of compensation under the Program for insured losses 
     resulting from an act of terrorism only if there is enacted a 
     joint resolution for payment of Federal compensation with 
     respect to such act of terrorism.
       ``(2) Joint resolution.--For purposes of this subsection, 
     the term `joint resolution for payment of Federal 
     compensation' means a joint resolution that--
       ``(A) does not have a preamble;
       ``(B) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
     follows: `That the Congress approves of the certification by 
     the Secretary of the Treasury under section 102(1)(A) of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.'; and
       ``(C) the title of which is as follows: `To permit Federal 
     compensation under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002'.

[[Page H10539]]

       ``(3) Introduction and referral.--Upon receipt of a 
     submission under section 102(1)(G), the joint resolution 
     described in this subsection shall be introduced by the 
     majority leader of each House or his designee (by request). 
     In the case in which a House is not in session, such joint 
     resolution shall be so introduced upon convening the first 
     day of session after the date of receipt of the 
     certification. Upon introduction, the joint resolution shall 
     be referred to the appropriate calendar in each House.
       ``(4) Consideration in the house of representatives.--
       ``(A) Proceeding to consideration.--Upon referral to the 
     appropriate calendar, it shall be in order to move to proceed 
     to consider the joint resolution in the House. Such a motion 
     shall be in order only at a time designated by the Speaker in 
     the legislative schedule within two legislative days. The 
     previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
     motion to its adoption without intervening motion. A motion 
     to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of 
     shall not be in order.
       ``(B) Consideration.--The joint resolution shall be 
     considered as read. All points of order against teh joint 
     resolution and against its consideration are waived. The 
     previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint 
     resolution to its passage without intervening motion except 
     one hour of debate equally divided and controlled by a 
     proponent and an opponent and one motion to limit debate on 
     the joint resolution. A motion to reconsider the vote on 
     passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order.
       ``(5) Consideration in the senate.--
       ``(A) Proceeding.--Upon introduction, the joint resolution 
     shall be placed on the Calendar of Business, General Orders. 
     A motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint 
     resolution shall be in order at any time. The motion is 
     privileged and not debatable. A motion to proceed to 
     consideration of the joint resolution may be made even though 
     a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to. 
     An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall 
     it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the 
     motion is agreed to.
       ``(B) Debate.--Debate on the joint resolution, and all 
     debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall 
     be limited to not more than ten hours. The time shall be 
     equally divided between and controlled by, the majority 
     leader and the minority leader or their designees.
       ``(C) Debatable motions and appeals.--Debate on any 
     debatable motion or appeal in relation to the joint 
     resolution shall be limited to not more than one hour from 
     the time allotted for debate, equally divided and controlled 
     by the majority leader and the minirity leader or their 
     designees.
       ``(D) Motion to limit debate.--A motion to further limit 
     debate is not debatable.
       ``(E) Motion to recommit.--Any motion to commit or recommit 
     the joint resolution shall not be in order.
       ``(F) Final passage.--The Chair shall put the question on 
     final passage of the joint resolution no later than 72 hours 
     from the time the measure is introduced.
       ``(6) Amendments prohibited.--No amendment to, or motion to 
     strike a provision from, a joint resolution considered under 
     this subsection shall be in order in either the Senate or the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(7) Consideration by the other house.--In the case of a 
     joint resolution described in this subsection, if before 
     passage by one House of a joint resolution of that House, 
     that House receives such joint resolution from the other 
     House, then--
       ``(A) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if 
     no joint resolution had been received from the other House; 
     but
       ``(B) the vote on final passage shall be on the joint 
     resolution of the other House.
       ``(8) House and senate rulemaking.--This subsection is 
     enacted by the Congress as an exercise of the rulemaking 
     power of the house of Representatives and Senate, 
     respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of 
     each House, respectively, and such procedures supersede other 
     rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such 
     rules; and with full recognition of the consitutional right 
     of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to 
     the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same 
     manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that 
     House.'';
       (2) in section 104(a)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting 
     ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) during the 90-day period beginning upon the 
     certification of any act of terrorism, to issue such 
     regulations as the Secretary considers necessary to carry out 
     this Act without regard to the notice and comment provisions 
     of section 553 of title 5, United States Code.'';
       (3) in section 104, by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(h) Annual Adjustment.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this title, the Secretary shall adjust, for the second 
     additional Program Year and for each additional Program Year 
     thereafter, based upon the percentage change in an 
     appropriate index during the 12-month period preceding such 
     Program Year, each of the following amounts (as such amount 
     may have been previously adjusted):
       ``(A) The dollar amount in section 102(1)(B)(ii) (relating 
     to act of terrorism).
       ``(B) The dollar amount in section 102(11)(J) (relating to 
     aggregate industry insured losses in a previously impacted 
     area).
       ``(C) The dollar amounts in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
     section 103(e)(1) (relating to limitation on Federal share).
       ``(D) The dollar amounts in section 103(e)(1)(C) (relating 
     to Program trigger).
       ``(E) The dollar amount in section 103(e)(1)(D) (relating 
     to limitation on group life insurance compensation).
       ``(F) The dollar amounts in section 103(e)(2) (relating to 
     cap on annual liability).
       ``(G) The dollar amounts in section 103(e)(3)(C) (relating 
     to limitation on insurer financial liability).
       ``(H) The dollar amounts in section 103(e)(4) (relating to 
     notices regarding losses and annual liability cap).
       ``(I) The dollar amounts in section 103(e)(7) (relating to 
     insurance marketplace aggregate retention amount).
       ``(J) The dollar amounts in section 109(b)(1)(C) (relating 
     to membership of Commission on Terrorism Insurance Risk).
       ``(2) Publication.--The Secretary shall make the dollar 
     amounts for each additional Program Year, as adjusted 
     pursuant to this subsection, publicly available in a timely 
     manner.'';
       (4) in section 106(a)(2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (F); 
     and
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
     subparagraphs:
       ``(C) during the period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and 
     Extension Act of 2007 and ending on December 31, 2008, rates 
     and forms for property and casualty insurance, and group life 
     insurance, required by this title and providing coverage 
     except for NBCR terrorism that are filed with any State shall 
     not be subject to prior approval or a waiting period under 
     any law of a State that would otherwise be applicable, except 
     that nothing in this title affects the ability of any State 
     to invalidate a rate as excessive, inadequate, or unfairly 
     discriminatory, and, with respect to forms, where a State has 
     prior approval authority, it shall apply to allow subsequent 
     review of such forms;
       ``(D) during the period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and 
     Extension Act of 2007, and ending on December 31, 2009, forms 
     for property and casualty insurance, and group life 
     insurance, covered by this title and providing coverage for 
     NBCR terrorism that are filed with any State, to the extent 
     of the addition of such coverage for NBCR terrorism and where 
     such coverage was not previously required, shall not be 
     subject to prior approval or waiting period under any law of 
     a State that would otherwise be applicable;
       ``(E) during the period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and 
     Extension Act of 2007, and ending on December 31, 2010, rates 
     for property and casualty insurance, and group life 
     insurance, covered by this title and providing coverage for 
     NBCR terrorism that are filed with any State, to the extent 
     of the addition of such coverage for NBCR terrorism and where 
     such coverage was not previously required, shall not be 
     subject to prior approval or waiting period under any law of 
     a State that would otherwise be applicable, except that 
     nothing in this title affects the ability of any State to 
     invalidate a rate as inadequate or unfairly discriminatory; 
     and'';
       (5) in section 106, by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Rule of Construction Regarding Insurer 
     Coordination.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to 
     prohibit, restrict, or otherwise limit an insurer from 
     entering into an arrangement with another insurer to make 
     available coverage for any portion of insured losses to 
     fulfill the requirements of section 103(c). The Secretary 
     shall develop, in consultation with the NAIC, minimum 
     financial solvency standards and other standards the 
     Secretary determines appropriate with respect to such 
     arrangements. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed 
     to establish any legal partnership.''; and
       (6) in section 108(c)(1), by striking ``paragraph (4), (5), 
     (6), (7), or (8)'' and inserting ``paragraph (5), (6), (7), 
     (8), or (9)''.
       (b) Regulations on Claims Allocations.--The Secretary of 
     the Treasury shall issue the regulations referred to in 
     subparagraph (C) of section 103(e)(2) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002, as amended by subsection (a)(1) of 
     this section, and to carry out subparagraph (B) of such 
     section 103(e)(2), not later than the expiration of the 120-
     day period beginning upon the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (c) Regulations on NBCR Exemptions.--The Secretary of the 
     Treasury shall issue the regulations to carry out paragraph 
     (4) of section 103(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
     2002, as amended by subsection (a)(1) of this section, not 
     later than the expiration of the 180-day period beginning 
     upon the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 4. TERRORISM BUY-DOWN FUND.

       The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 
     note) is amended--
       (1) by inserting after section 106 the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 106A. TERRORISM BUY-DOWN FUND.

       ``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a 
     Terrorism Buy-Down Fund (in this section referred to as the 
     `Fund') that shall make available additional terrorism 
     coverage for the insured losses of insurers, which shall be 
     available for purchase by insurers on a voluntary basis.
       ``(b) Purchase of Deductible, Co-Share, and Trigger Buy-
     Down Coverage.--
       ``(1) In general.--An insurer may purchase deductible, co-
     share, and pre-trigger buy-down coverage (in this section 
     referred to as `buy-down coverage') through the Fund by 
     making an election, in advance, to treat some or all of

[[Page H10540]]

     the premiums it has disclosed pursuant to section 106(b)(3) 
     as fee charges for the Program imposed by the Secretary and 
     remitting such amounts to the Fund.
       ``(2) Limits.--An insurer may not purchase buy-down 
     coverage in an amount greater than the lesser of--
       ``(A) the highest amount specified in section 103(e)(1)(C); 
     and
       ``(B) the insurer's one-in-one-hundred-year risk exposure 
     to acts of terrorism.
       ``(c) Buy-Down Coverage.--The Fund shall provide the buy-
     down coverage to an insurer for losses for acts of terrorism, 
     without application of the insurer deductible and in addition 
     to any otherwise payable Federal share of compensation 
     pursuant to section 103(e).
       ``(d) Build-up.--The buy-down coverage that shall be 
     payable to an insurer for qualifying losses shall be the 
     aggregate of the insurer's buy-down coverage premiums plus 
     interest accrued on such amounts.
       ``(e) Use by Insurers.--
       ``(1) Qualifying losses.--For the purpose of this section, 
     qualifying losses are insured losses by an insurer that are 
     not excess losses and that do not include amounts for which 
     Federal financial assistance pursuant to section 103(e) is 
     received, notwithstanding any limits otherwise applicable 
     regarding section 103(e)(1)(C) (regarding program triggers) 
     or section 102(11) (regarding insurer deductibles).
       ``(2) Use of buy-down coverage.--An insurer may use any 
     buy-down coverage payments received under subsection (f) to 
     satisfy--
       ``(A) the applicable insurer deductibles for the insurer;
       ``(B) the portion of the insurer's losses that exceed the 
     insurer deductible but are not compensated by the Federal 
     share; and
       ``(C) the insurer's obligations to pay for insured losses 
     if the Program trigger under section 103(e)(1)(C) is not 
     satisfied.
       ``(3) Buy-down coverage does not reduce federal co-share.--
     The receipt by an insurer of buy-down coverage under this 
     section for insured losses shall not be considered with 
     respect to calculating the insurer's insured losses with 
     respect to the insurer's deductible and eligibility for 
     Federal financial assistance pursuant to section 103(e).
       ``(4) Insolvency.--An insurer may sell its rights to buy-
     down coverage from the Fund to another insurer as part of or 
     to avoid an insolvency or as part of a merger, sale, or major 
     reorganization.
       ``(f) Payment of Buy-Down Coverage.--The Fund shall pay the 
     qualifying losses of an insurer purchasing buy-down coverage 
     up to the amount described in subsection (d).
       ``(g) Government Borrowing.--The Secretary may borrow the 
     funds from the Fund to offset, in whole or in part, the 
     Federal share of compensation provided to all insurers under 
     the Program, except that--
       ``(1) the Fund shall always immediately provide any buy-
     down coverage payments required under subsection (f); and
       ``(2) any such amounts borrowed must be replenished with 
     appropriate interest.
       ``(h) Risk-Sharing Mechanisms.--The Secretary shall 
     establish voluntary risk-sharing mechanisms for insurers 
     purchasing buy-down coverage from the Fund to pool their 
     reinsurance purchases and otherwise share terrorism risk.
       ``(i) Termination.--Upon termination of the Program under 
     section 108, and subject to the Secretary's continuing 
     authority under section 108(b) to adjust claims in 
     satisfaction under the Program, the Secretary shall provide 
     that the Fund shall become a privately-operated mutual 
     terrorism reinsurance company owned by the insurers that have 
     submitted buy-down coverage premiums in proportion to such 
     premiums minus any buy-down coverage payments received.''; 
     and
       (2) in the table of contents in section 1(b), by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 106 the following new 
     item:

``Sec. 106A. Terrorism Buy-Down Fund.''.

     SEC. 5. ANALYSIS AND STUDY.

       (a) Analysis of Market Conditions.--Section 108 of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is 
     amended by striking subsection (e) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(e) Analysis of Market Conditions for Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     NAIC, representatives of the insurance industry, 
     representatives of the securities industry, and 
     representatives of policyholders, shall perform an analysis 
     regarding the long-term availability and affordability of 
     insurance for terrorism risk in the private marketplace, 
     including coverage for--
       ``(A) property and casualty insurance;
       ``(B) group life insurance;
       ``(C) workers' compensation;
       ``(D) nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological 
     events; and
       ``(E) commercial real estate.
       ``(2) Biennial reports.--The Secretary shall submit 
     biennial reports to the Committee on Financial Services of 
     the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, 
     Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, on its findings 
     pursuant to the analysis conducted under paragraph (1). The 
     first such report shall be submitted not later than the 
     expiration of the 24-month period beginning on the date of 
     the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and 
     Extension Act of 2007.
       ``(3) Testimony.--Upon submission of each biennial report 
     under paragraph (2), the Secretary shall provide oral 
     testimony to the Committee on Financial Services of the House 
     of Representatives and Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
     Urban Affairs of the United States Senate regarding the 
     report and the analysis under this subsection for which the 
     report is submitted.''.
       (b) Commission on Terrorism Risk Insurance.--Title I of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 6701 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 109. COMMISSION ON TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE.

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is hereby established the 
     Commission on Terrorism Risk Insurance (in this section 
     referred to as the `Commission').
       ``(b) Membership.--
       ``(1) The Commission shall consist of 21 members, as 
     follows:
       ``(A) The Secretary of the Treasury or the designee of the 
     Secretary.
       ``(B) One member who is a State insurance commissioner, 
     designated by the NAIC.
       ``(C) 15 members, who shall be appointed by the President, 
     who shall include--
       ``(i) a representative of group life insurers;
       ``(ii) a representative of property and casualty insurers 
     with direct earned premium of $1,000,000,000 or less;
       ``(iii) a representative of property and casualty insurers 
     with direct earned premium of more than $1,000,000,000;
       ``(iv) a representative of multiline insurers;
       ``(v) a representative of independent insurance agents;
       ``(vi) a representative of insurance brokers;
       ``(vii) a policyholder representative;
       ``(viii) a representative of the survivors of the victims 
     of the attacks of September 11, 2001;
       ``(ix) a representative of the reinsurance industry;
       ``(x) a representative of workers' compensation insurers;
       ``(xi) a representative from the commercial mortgage-backed 
     securities industry;
       ``(xii) a representative from a nationally recognized 
     statistical rating organization;
       ``(xiii) a real estate developer;
       ``(xiv) a representative of workers' compensation insurers 
     created by State legislatures, selected in consultation with 
     the American Association of State Compensation Insurance 
     Funds from among its members; and
       ``(xv) a representative from the commercial real estate 
     brokerage industry or the commercial property management 
     industry.
       ``(D) Four members, who shall serve as liaisons to the 
     Congress, who shall include two members jointly selected by 
     the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Financial 
     Services of the House of Representatives and two members 
     jointly selected by the Chairman and Ranking Member of the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
     Senate.
       ``(2) Secretary.--The Program Director of the Terrorism 
     Risk Insurance Act of the Department of the Treasury shall 
     serve as Secretary of the Commission. The Secretary of the 
     Commission shall determine the manner in which the Commission 
     shall operate, including funding and staffing.
       ``(c) Duties.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Commission shall identify and make 
     recommendations regarding--
       ``(A) possible actions to encourage, facilitate, and 
     sustain provision by the private insurance industry in the 
     United States of affordable coverage for losses due to an act 
     or acts of terrorism;
       ``(B) possible actions or mechanisms to sustain or 
     supplement the ability of the insurance industry in the 
     United States to cover losses resulting from acts of 
     terrorism in the event that--
       ``(i) such losses jeopardize the capital and surplus of the 
     insurance industry in the United States as a whole; or
       ``(ii) other consequences from such acts occur, as 
     determined by the Commission, that may significantly affect 
     the ability of the insurance industry in the United States to 
     cover such losses independently; and
       ``(C) possible actions to significantly reduce the Federal 
     role in covering losses resulting from acts of terrorism.
       ``(2) Evaluations.--In identifying and making the 
     recommendations required under paragraph (1), the Commission 
     shall specifically evaluate the utility and viability of 
     proposals aimed at improving the availability of insurance 
     against terrorism risk in the private marketplace.
       ``(3) Initial meeting.--The Commission shall hold its first 
     meeting during the 3-month period that begins 15 months after 
     the date of the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Revision and Extension Act of 2007.
       ``(4) Reports.--
       ``(A) Contents.--The Commission shall submit two reports to 
     the Congress that--
       ``(i) evaluate and make recommendations regarding whether 
     there is a need for a Federal terrorism risk insurance 
     program;
       ``(ii) if so, include a specific, detailed recommendation 
     for the replacement of the Program under this title; and
       ``(iii) include the identifications, evaluations, and 
     recommendations required under paragraphs (1) and (2).
       ``(B) Timing.--The first report required under subparagraph 
     (A) shall be submitted before the expiration of the 60-month 
     period beginning on the date of the enactment of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007. 
     The second such report shall be submitted before the 
     expiration of the 96-month period beginning upon such date of 
     enactment.''; and
       (2) in the table of contents in section 1(b), by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 108 the following new 
     item:

``Sec. 109. Commission on Terrorism Risk Insurance.''.

     SEC. 6. APPLICABILITY.

       The amendments made by this Act shall apply beginning on 
     January 1, 2008. The provisions of

[[Page H10541]]

     the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, as in effect on the 
     day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall apply 
     through the end of December 31, 2007.

  Mr. HINOJOSA. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 2761, the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act, TRIREA, of 2007, 
which will both extend and improve upon the current Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program.
  I am very pleased that the legislation will include domestic 
terrorism as a covered event. I strongly support the inclusion of group 
life insurance as a covered line under the new TRIA legislation, and I 
applaud Chairman Frank for allowing the return of farm owners multiple 
peril as a TRIA-covered line.
  I want to thank Chairman Barney Frank, Chairman Paul Kanjorski, 
Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney and Congressman Michael Capuano for working 
so diligently on this bill and bringing it to the floor today.
  At this point, I ask unanimous consent to submit for the record the 
following letters of support of H.R. 2761: (1) a letter from the 
American Insurance Association; (2) a letter from the Financial 
Services Roundtable; (3) a letter from the Coalition to Insure Against 
Terrorism; and, (4) a letter of support from the Mortgage Bankers 
Association.
  I want to stress one important point that seems to have been lost in 
the discussion of terrorism overall and the debate on the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act and program in particular.
  Mr. Chairman, we are all in this together--not just New York City or 
Washington, DC, or other large cities but cities both large and small. 
We must protect all our constituents in all our cities in the United 
States, and this bill, H.R. 2761 goes a long way towards attaining that 
goal.
  As far as I know, there is no definitive methodology that will 
determine where terrorists might strike next in the United States. So, 
we all need to remain vigilant, even those of us from small cities and 
rural areas. We all need to be prepared, and we all need to help 
prevent terrorist attacks.
  This legislation will help us attain our goals.
  For these reasons and more, I encourage my colleagues to vote in 
favor of H.R. 2761.

                               American Insurance Association,

                               Washington, DC, September 18, 2007.
     Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
     Speaker, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Steny Hoyer,
     Majority Leader, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. John Boehner,
     Minority Leader, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Roy Blunt,
     Minority Whip, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Speaker Pelosi, Minority Leader Boehner, Majority 
     Leader Hoyer, and Minority Whip Blunt: We understand that 
     H.R. 2761 is scheduled for House floor consideration 
     tomorrow. We commend the House for moving forward on this 
     critical legislation.
       Apart from extending the existing program, H.R. 2761 
     confronts the unique insurance challenges posed by terrorist 
     threats of a nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological 
     nature (NBCR). In the last two years, two separate government 
     studies--one by the President's Working Group on Financial 
     Markets (led by Treasury) and another by the Government 
     Accountability Office--have concluded what insurers already 
     knew: that, outside of state mandates, there is virtually no 
     private insurance market capacity for NBCR terrorism risk and 
     there is little potential for such a market to emerge in the 
     near future. H.R. 2761 fills that void by requiring insurers 
     to make available additional NBCR terrorism insurance as part 
     of the Federal backstop where policyholders accept the 
     terrorism coverage offered under current law, and by 
     providing insurers with more limited and certain financial 
     exposure that reflects the distinctive catastrophic nature of 
     NBCR terrorism. For this and other reasons, the American 
     Insurance Association and its more than 350 property casualty 
     insurance company members strongly endorse H.R. 2761 as it 
     was reported out of the House Financial Services Committee.
       We understand that a new provision has been added to 
     address the concerns resulting from the Congressional Budget 
     Office report, which would require additional Congressional 
     action to authorize Federal payment for an act of terrorism. 
     The industry has serious reservations about the commercial 
     workability and certainty of the provision and the potential 
     adverse marketplace impact. As the legislation moves forward 
     in the process, we look forward to working with you and 
     others in Congress to ensure these concerns are resolved in a 
     way that preserves the future viability of the program.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Marc Racicot,
     President.
                                  ____



                            The Financial Services Roundtable,

                               Washington, DC, September 19, 2007.
     Hon. Barney Frank,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Frank: On behalf of the members of the 
     Financial Services Roundtable, I am writing to express my 
     strong support for H.R. 2761, the ``Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Revision and Extension Act of 2007 (TRIREA)'' which will 
     extend the public/private partnership created in 2002 to 
     enhance our nation's economic security.
       The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) has served as a 
     vital economic policy enabling insurers and policy holders to 
     arrive at commercial insurance agreements that provide 
     adequate coverage for the insured while protecting the 
     solvency of the insurer. Without TRIA, the commercial 
     insurance marketplace faces severe disruption.
       H.R. 2761 continues this important partnership, and 
     improves upon it. Notably, the bill extends the program for 
     15 years, enables coverage for megacatastrophes involving 
     nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological events and 
     covers group life--the only type of life insurance held by 
     most Americans.
       I understand that the manager's amendment to the bill makes 
     an essential change to the program making government funds 
     available only after a future congressional action. While 
     generally, we could not support adding contingencies into a 
     bill that is designed to create certainty, I understand the 
     change is necessary to move the bill forward in a timely 
     manner.
       As such, I encourage your support for the rule and H.R. 
     2761 and ask you to oppose any motion to recommit.
       Thank you for your consideration of this important matter. 
     Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call 
     me, or Andy Barbour of my staff.
           Best Regards,
                                                   Steve Bartlett,
     President and CEO.
                                  ____


                       Vote ``Yes'' on H.R. 2761

       The undersigned members of the Coalition to Insure Against 
     Terrorism (CIAT), a broad based coalition of business 
     insurance policyholders representing a significant segment of 
     the nation's GDP, strongly urge you to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 
     2761 Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 
     2007 (TRIREA).
       American Bankers Association; American Bankers Insurance 
     Association; American Council of Engineering Companies; 
     American Gas Association; American Hotel and Lodging 
     Association; American Land Title Association; American Public 
     Gas Association; American Public Power Association; American 
     Resort Development Association; American Society of 
     Association Executives; Associated Builders and Contractors; 
     Associated General Contractors of America; Association of 
     American Railroads; Association of Art Museum Directors; 
     Babson Capital Management LLC; The Bond Market Association; 
     Building Owners and Managers Association International; 
     Boston Properties; and CCIM Institute.
       Campbell Soup Company; Century 21 Department Stores; 
     Chemical Producers and Distributors Association; Citigroup 
     Inc.; Commercial Mortgage Securities Association; Cornerstone 
     Real Estate Advisers, Inc.; CSX Corporation; Edison Electric 
     Institute; Electric Power Supply Association; The Financial 
     Services Roundtable; The Food Marketing Institute; General 
     Aviation Manufacturers Association; Helicopter Association 
     International; Hilton Hotels Corporation; Host Hotels and 
     Resorts; Independent Electrical Contractors; Institute of 
     Real Estate Management; Intercontinental Hotels; and 
     International Council of Shopping Centers.
       International Franchise Association; International Safety 
     Equipment Association; The Long Island Import Export 
     Association; Marriott International; Mortgage Bankers 
     Association; National Apartment Association; National 
     Association of Home Builders; National Association of 
     Industrial and Office Properties; National Association of 
     Manufacturers; National Association of REALTORS'; 
     National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts; 
     National Association of Waterfront Employers; National 
     Association of Wholesaler-Distributors; National Basketball 
     Association; National Collegiate Athletic Association; 
     National Council of Chain Restaurants; National Football 
     League; National Hockey League; and National Multi Housing 
     Council.
       National Petrochemical & Refiners Association; National 
     Restaurant Association; National Retail Federation; National 
     Roofing Contractors Association; National Rural Electric 
     Cooperative Association; The New England Council; Partnership 
     for New York City; Office of the Commissioner of Baseball; 
     Public Utilities Risk Management Association; The Real Estate 
     Board of New York; The Real Estate Roundtable; Society of 
     American Florists; Starwood Hotels and Resorts; Taxicab, 
     Limousine & Paratransit Association; Travel Business 
     Roundtable; Trizec Properties, Inc.; UJA-Federation of New 
     York; Union Pacific Corporation; and U.S. Chamber of 
     Commerce.
                                  ____



                                 Mortgage Bankers Association,

                               Washington, DC, September 17, 2007.
     Hon. Steny H. Hoyer,
     Majority Leader, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
     Hon. John A. Boehner,
     Republican Leader, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Leader Hoyer and Leader Boehner: On behalf of the 
     Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), I am writing to express 
     my strong support for H.R. 2761, the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Revision and Extension Act of 2007 and strongly urge Members 
     of the House of Representatives to support the legislation 
     when it comes to the House floor.

[[Page H10542]]

       H.R. 2761, introduced by Representative Michael Capuano, 
     passed the Committee on Financial Services by a bipartisan 
     vote of 49-20 on August 1, 2007. Significant additions to the 
     prior legislation, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act 
     of 2005 (TRIEA), include:
       Extension of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act for 15 years;
       Coverage of nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological 
     (NBCR) attacks;
       Coverage of domestic source terrorism; and
       Provision for group life insurance.
       The 15-year extension will allow for greater stability in 
     the commercial real estate lending industry where the average 
     loan duration is 10 years. The addition of NBCR coverage will 
     be welcome news to owners and investors in a market where the 
     very limited availability of NBCR terrorism coverage, at any 
     price, has left virtually all properties uninsured against an 
     NBCR event. Given the current concerns about homegrown 
     terrorist acts, particularly since recent events in Europe, 
     the bill extends the program to include acts of domestic 
     terrorism. Finally, the bill includes, for the first time, 
     group life insurance in the program. As a whole, the 
     inclusion of these items in H.R. 2761 eliminates significant 
     terrorism insurance coverage gaps that could inflict great 
     financial damage to American businesses.
       Extending TRIEA is essential to continued American economic 
     growth. An inadequate supply of terrorism insurance would 
     potentially trigger bond downgrades, sharply reducing the 
     availability of loan capital for commercial real estate, 
     increasing borrowing costs and undermine economic growth, 
     including employment in the construction and real estate 
     sectors. In fact, conversations with rating agencies indicate 
     that without such a federal backstop, bond downgrades will 
     likely occur, as was the case in the time period between the 
     September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the enactment of 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.
       The Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act is 
     strong legislation that will greatly benefit the American 
     economy, giving developers and their investors the constancy 
     they need to work on large-scale real estate projects.
       Thank you for the opportunity to share our views on this 
     critical issue. We urge Members of the House of 
     Representatives to support this important legislation.
           Sincerely,
                                                  John M. Robbins,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mrs. McCARTHY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 
2761, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007. 
This legislation extends the TRIA program for 15 years, and it is vital 
to our Nation.
  A longer TRIA means economic certainty and stability in commercial 
real estate. A longer TRIA means better planning, better rates, and 
better returns for investors. A longer TRIA is good for the economy.
  Financing for major construction often takes more than 10 years. If a 
project seeks finance for a project in year one of the new TRIA, 
investors might have the confidence to advance these funds. However, if 
a project is conceived in year two or year three, and if TRIA is 
extended for only 10 years, then investors will know that TRIA will be 
around for only 7 years. The investors may not provide the necessary 
capital, or those investors may change far more interest than they 
would under TRIA.
  What happens if a community cannot rebuild after an act of terror? 
Jobs are lost and with them tax revenue from the local to the state and 
to the federal level. It simply is not rational to believe that somehow 
a limited TRIA will save money in the long run.
  I simply do not believe that the reinsurance industry has the ability 
or the interest in providing terrorism risk insurance. A federal backup 
like TRIA is essential.
  My colleagues need to remember that TRIA is not a handout and it is 
not a benefit. The program pays out only in the event of an act of 
terrorism against the United States; and terrorism is neither a benefit 
nor a handout.
  When one part of America is attacked, the entire country is attacked. 
When one city or region suffers, then the rest of the country pitches 
in to help. We have done that in the past after earthquakes, floods, 
droughts, hurricanes, and acts of terror.
  I hope that none of you have to experience what the people of New 
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut experienced 6 years ago. The next 
attack may occur in Orlando, Chicago, Los Angeles, or even small cities 
across this Nation. The people and the government will respond, as we 
have in the past.
  But, TRIA ensures that taxpayers will not have to bear the entire 
burden of the response. The bill requires insurance companies to do 
what they do best: provide insurance. Without TRIA, the American 
taxpayers will have to bear the entire cost of responding to another 
act of terrorism.
  I fully support the TRIA legislation brought before the House today 
and urge my colleagues to pass the legislation and allow for Senate 
Action.
  Mr. GARRETT of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to voice my 
very reluctant opposition to the underlying bill.
  Over the last 8 months, the Financial Services Committee has had 
several hearings on this important topic, including one that I attended 
in New York City. I thought these hearings were very productive and I 
am pleased that the Committee and this House are focused on an issue 
that is not only very important to the 5th district of New Jersey, but 
to our national economic well-being.
  After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, terrorism risk insurance either 
became unavailable or extremely expensive and many businesses were no 
longer able to purchase insurance that would protect them in any future 
terrorist attack. Financially, terrorist threats pose a risk of serious 
harm not only to the insurance industry, but also to the real estate, 
transportation, construction, energy, and utility sectors. Even beyond 
the horrific human toll, terrorists could inflict real pain by melting 
our infrastructure and economy down.
  Recognizing the detrimental effects an attack could have upon our 
economy, Congress acted quickly and responsibly to debate and pass the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, better known as TRIA. This 
temporary Act helped stabilize the terrorism insurance marketplace and 
restore capacity to that large part of the U.S. economy.
  In 2005, Congress extended the TRIA program with some additional 
reforms and changes for 2 more years. I supported this extension 
because I felt that more time was needed to allow the private markets 
increase their capacity and develop new and creative ways to work out 
the problems that existed.
  Since September 11, insurers and reinsurers have cautiously reentered 
the terrorism insurance market, allocating more capacity year-to-year. 
More commercial policyholders are becoming insured, year-to-year. At 
the same time, the federal role has scaled back correspondingly, with 
higher deductibles, higher co-pays, higher triggers, and fewer lines of 
insurance covered. I view this increased private-sector involvement and 
decreased government involvement, to be a positive development.
  Unfortunately, the bill before us today sets these positive and 
natural developments back. Still more unfortunate is that though this 
is an issue that the Financial Services Committee has historically 
acted on in a bipartisan manner, the Chairman rebuffed in full and 
without, what I believe, proper consideration a number of very 
reasonable proposals that my colleagues on this side of the aisle 
offered--amendments that might have made this bill more palatable and 
perhaps staved off the Presidential veto threat now on the table.
  My primary concern is the proposed length of duration of the 
government program. This bill would extend the life of this program by 
15 years. A short-term, temporary extension allows for periodic 
reassessment of market conditions to see if there is more room for 
private sector participation. It allows for a gradual scaling-back of 
the government program going-forward as we observe how private insurers 
and reinsurers continue to expand the market. A short-term extension 
permits the natural evolution of the market to occur.
  Given that the private sector continues to increase its capacity to 
cover terrorism risk insurance, I believe a short-term extension is 
more appropriate than creating a permanent government program. If we 
establish an essentially permanent program, the private sector will 
lose its incentive to look for innovative and newer solutions.
  And realistically passing a 15-year extension is equivalent to 
passing an essentially permanent program. If we extend the program for 
too long of a time period, I fear we will not revisit this important 
topic and continue to try and make improvements like we did after the 
last time the program expired. As we all know, Congress rarely opens 
already passed legislation to make changes and improvements. We did not 
reopen the Transportation Bill, the Farm Bill and other long-term 
reauthorizations regardless of the problems that arose. And, we will 
not reopen this bill either.
  So, Mr. Chairman, while I would support a temporary extension of this 
important program, I cannot support extending the program by 15 years, 
decreasing the amount of private sector participation, and loading an 
extra burden on the U.S. taxpayer. I ask my colleagues to vote against 
this legislation.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, six years ago, when the Congress considered 
the bill creating the terrorism insurance program, I urged my 
colleagues to reject it. One of the reasons I opposed the bill was my 
concern that, contrary to the claims of the bill's supporters, 
terrorism insurance would not be allowed to sunset. As I said then:
  ``The drafters of H.R. 3210 claim that this creates a `temporary' 
government program. However, Mr. Speaker, what happens in three years 
if industry lobbyists come to Capitol Hill to explain that there is 
still a need for this program because of the continuing threat of 
terrorist attacks. Does anyone seriously believe that Congress will 
refuse to reauthorize this

[[Page H10543]]

`temporary' insurance program or provide some other form of taxpayer 
help to the insurance industry? I would like to remind my colleagues 
that the federal budget is full of expenditures for long-lasting 
programs that were originally intended to be `temporary.' ''
  I am disappointed to be proven correct. I am also skeptical that, 
having renewed the program twice, this time for fifteen years, Congress 
will ever allow it to expire.
  As Congress considers extending this program, I renew my opposition 
to it for substantially the same reasons I stated six years ago. 
However, I do have a suggestion on how to improve the program. Since 
one claimed problem with allowing the private market to provide 
terrorism insurance is the difficulty of quantifying the risk of an 
attack, the taxpayers' liability under the terrorism reinsurance 
program should be reduced for an attack occurring when the country is 
under orange or red alert. After all, because the point of the alert 
system is to let Americans know when there is an increased likelihood 
of an attack it is reasonable to expect insurance companies to demand 
that their clients take extra precautionary measures during periods of 
high alert. Reducing taxpayer subsidies will provide an incentive to 
ensure private parties take every possible precaution to minimize the 
potential damage from possible terrorists attack.
  Since my fundamental objections to the program remain the same as six 
years ago, I am attaching my statement regarding H.R. 3210, which 
created the terrorist insurance program in the 107th Congress:
   Mr. Chairman, no one doubts that the government has a role to play 
in compensating American citizens who are victimized by terrorist 
attacks. However, Congress should not lose sight of fundamental 
economic and constitutional principles when considering how best to 
provide the victims of terrorist attacks just compensation. I am afraid 
that H.R. 3210, the Terrorism Risk Protection Act, violates several of 
those principles and therefore passage of this bill is not in the best 
interests of the American people.
  Under H.R. 3210, taxpayers are responsible for paying 90 percent of 
the costs of a terrorist incident when the total cost of that incident 
exceeds a certain threshold. While insurance companies technically are 
responsible under the bill for paying back monies received from the 
Treasury, the administrator of this program may defer repayment of the 
majority of the subsidy in order to ``avoid the likely insolvency of 
the commercial insurer,'' or avoid ``unreasonable economic disruption 
and market instability.'' This language may cause administrators to 
defer indefinitely the repayment of the loans, thus causing taxpayers 
to permanently bear the loss. This scenario is especially likely when 
one considers that ``avoid . . . likely insolvency, unreasonable 
economic disruption, and market instability'' are highly subjective 
standards, and that any administrator who attempts to enforce a strict 
repayment schedule likely will come under heavy political pressure to 
be more ``flexible'' in collecting debts owed to the taxpayers.
  The drafters of H.R. 3210 claim that this creates a ``temporary'' 
government program. However, Mr. Speaker, what happens in three years 
if industry lobbyists come to Capitol Hill to explain that there is 
still a need for this program because of the continuing threat of 
terrorist attacks. Does anyone seriously believe that Congress will 
refuse to reauthorize this ``temporary'' insurance program or provide 
some other form of taxpayer help to the insurance industry? I would 
like to remind my colleagues that the federal budget is full of 
expenditures for long-lasting programs that were originally intended to 
be ``temporary.''
  H.R. 3210 compounds the danger to taxpayers because of what 
economists call the ``moral hazard'' problem. A moral hazard is created 
when individuals have the costs incurred from a risky action subsidized 
by a third party. In such a case individuals may engage in unnecessary 
risks or fail to take steps to minimize their risks. After all, if a 
third party will bear the costs of negative consequences of risky 
behavior, why should individuals invest their resources in avoiding or 
minimizing risk?
  While no one can plan for terrorist attacks, individuals and 
businesses can take steps to enhance security. For example, I think we 
would all agree that industrial plants in the United States enjoy 
reasonably good security. They are protected not by the local police, 
but by owners putting up barbed wire fences, hiring guards with guns, 
and requiring identification cards to enter. One reason private firms 
put these security measures in place is because insurance companies 
provide them with incentives, in the form of lower premiums, to adopt 
security measures. H.R. 3210 contains no incentives for this private 
activity. The bill does not even recognize the important role insurance 
plays in providing incentives to minimize risks. By removing an 
incentive for private parties to avoid or at least mitigate the damage 
from a future terrorist attack, the government inadvertently increases 
the damage that will be inflicted by future attacks!
  Instead of forcing taxpayers to subsidize the costs of terrorism 
insurance, Congress should consider creating a tax credit or deduction 
for premiums paid for terrorism insurance, as well as a deduction for 
claims and other costs borne by the insurance industry connected with 
offering terrorism insurance. A tax credit approach reduces 
government's control over the insurance market. Furthermore, since a 
tax credit approach encourages people to devote more of their own 
resources to terrorism insurance, the moral hazard problems associated 
with federally funded insurance is avoided.
  The version of H.R. 3210 passed by the Financial Services committee 
took a good first step in this direction by repealing the tax penalty 
which prevents insurance companies from properly reserving funds for 
human-created catastrophes. I am disappointed that this sensible 
provision was removed from the final bill. Instead, H.R. 3210 instructs 
the Treasury Department to study the benefits of allowing insurers to 
establish tax-free reserves to cover losses from terrorist events. The 
perceived need to study the wisdom of cutting taxes while expanding the 
federal government without hesitation demonstrates much that is wrong 
with Washington.
  In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, H.R. 3210 may reduce the risk to 
insurance companies from future losses, but it increases the costs 
incurred by the American taxpayer. More significantly, by ignoring the 
moral hazard problem this bill may have the unintended consequence of 
increasing the losses suffered in any future terrorist attacks. 
Therefore, passage of this bill is not in the long-term interests of 
the American people.
  Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in strong 
support of H.R. 2761, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and 
Extension Act of 2007, which would reauthorize the Federal terrorism 
insurance program (TRIA) for 15 years.
  I am pleased that the years spent working on this issue with 
constituents, the insurance industry, and the financial services 
industries to build a consensus has produced a bill so widely supported 
by Members in the House on both sides of the aisle that has the strong 
support of the business community. I applaud Chairman Frank, the 
members of the House Financial Services Committee, and Representative 
Capuano, the chief sponsor of the bill, for their leadership in 
crafting this critical legislation protecting the safety and security 
of America.
  It is estimated that the September 11th terrorist attacks resulted in 
$40 billion in insured claims, the largest man-made insurance disaster 
on record. After the 9/11 attacks, given the size of potential 
liabilities, there was growing concern that insurance companies and 
reinsurers might not be able to write policies to insure losses due to 
future acts of terrorism. As a result, the TRIA program was enacted in 
2002 in an attempt to prevent an industry-wide catastrophe in the event 
of another domestic terrorist attack. The TRIA program provides a 
federal backstop to the insurance industry by providing compensation 
for a portion of insured losses resulting from acts certified by the 
Government as acts of terrorism. The law was reauthorized with some 
changes in 2005 (P.L. 109-44) and will expire on December 31, 2007.
  Currently, TRIA only covers foreign terrorism; however, this bill 
would extend TRIA coverage to both foreign and domestic terrorism. The 
bill would set the ``trigger'' level--the size of an attack at which 
the Federal Government would provide aid to insurers--at $50 million. 
According to studies from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
the risk of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological terrorism is 
uninsurable absent a Federal Government backstop. In response, this 
legislation would include acts of nuclear, biological, chemical, and 
radiological terrorism in TRIA. The bill would also add group life 
insurance to the types of insurance for which terrorism insurance 
coverage must be made available by insurers. Finally, H.R. 2761 would 
create a 21-member ``blue ribbon'' commission to propose long-term 
solutions to covering terrorism risk. The goal of this legislation is 
to protect America's economy during a time of national crisis and is 
important to the economic security of the business community in 
Hartford and the Capital Region.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of final passage and for the 
President to sign this bill into law. The continued insurance and 
safety of our Nation against terrorist attacks is an urgent and 
bipartisan issue.
  The CHAIRMAN. No further amendment to the bill, as amended, is in 
order except those printed in part B of the report. Each further 
amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a 
Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be 
debatable for the time specified in the report, equally divided and 
controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject

[[Page H10544]]

to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the 
question.


         Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed 
in House Report 110-333.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts:
       Strike section 102(1)(C) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Act of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 3(a)(1) of 
     the bill, and insert the following:

       ``(C) Certification of act of nbcr terrorism.--Where a 
     certified act of terrorism is carried out by means of a 
     nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapon or 
     similar instrumentality, the Secretary shall further certify 
     such act of terrorism as an act of NBCR terrorism. If a 
     certified act of terrorism involves any other weapon or 
     instrumentality, the Secretary, in concurrence with the 
     Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
     the Attorney General of the United States, shall determine 
     whether the act of terrorism meets the definition of NBCR 
     terrorism in this section. If such determination is that the 
     act does meet such definition, the Secretary shall further 
     certify that such act as an act of NBCR terrorism. Nothing in 
     this subparagraph shall prohibit the Secretary from 
     determining that a single act of terrorism resulted in both 
     NBCR and non-NBCR insured losses.''.

       In section 102(11)(I)(ii)(II) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 
     3(a)(1) of the bill, strike ``and'' at the end.

       In section 102(11)(J)(i) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Act of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 3(a)(1) of 
     the bill, add ``and'' at the end.

       In section 102(11)(J) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
     of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 3(a)(1) of the 
     bill, strike the period at the end and insert ``; and''.

       At the end of section 102(11) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 
     3(a)(1) of the bill, add the following:

       ``(K) for the fifth additional Program Year and any 
     Additional Program year thereafter, notwithstanding 
     subparagraph (I)(i), if aggregate industry insured losses 
     resulting from a certified act of NBCR terrorism exceed 
     $1,000,000,000, for any insurer that sustains insured losses 
     resulting from such act of NBCR terrorism, the value of such 
     insurer's direct earned premiums over the calendar year 
     immediately preceding the Program Year, multiplied by a 
     percentage, which--
       ``(i) for the fifth additional Program Year shall be 5 
     percent; and
       ``(ii) for each additional Program Year thereafter, shall 
     be 50 basis points greater than the percentage applicable to 
     the preceding additional Program Year, except that if an act 
     of NBCR terrorism occurs during the fifth additional Program 
     Year or any additional Program Year thereafter that results 
     in aggregate industry insured losses exceeding 
     $1,000,000,000, the percentage for the succeeding additional 
     Program Year shall be 5 percent and the increase under this 
     clause shall apply to additional Program Years thereafter;
     except that for purposes of determining under this 
     subparagraph whether aggregate industry insured losses exceed 
     $1,000,000,000, the Secretary may combine insured losses 
     resulting from two or more certified acts of NBCR terrorism 
     occurring during such Program Year in the same geographic 
     area (with such area determined by the Secretary), in which 
     case such insurer shall be permitted to combine insured 
     losses resulting from such acts of NBCR terrorism for 
     purposes of satisfying its insurer deductible under this 
     subparagraph; and except that the insurer deductible under 
     this subparagraph shall apply only with respect to 
     compensation of insured losses resulting from such certified 
     act, or combined certified acts, and that for purposes of 
     compensation of any other insured losses occurring in the 
     same Program Year, the insurer deductible determined under 
     subparagraph (I)(i) shall apply.''.

       In section 102(13) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
     2002, as proposed to be amended by section 3(a)(1) of the 
     bill, strike ``involves nuclear, biological'' and all that 
     follows and insert ``involves or triggers nuclear, 
     biological, chemical, or radiological reactions, releases, or 
     contaminations, but only if any aggregate industry insured 
     losses that result from such reactions, releases, or 
     contaminations exceed the amount set forth in paragraph 
     (1)(B)(ii).''.

       In section 103(c)(4)(A)(iii)(II)(aa) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 
     3(a)(1) of the bill, strike ``unlawful'' and insert 
     ``fraudulent''.

       In section 103(c)(4)(A)(iii)(II)(bb) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 
     3(a)(1) of the bill, after ``insured person is'' insert 
     ``substantially''.

       In section 103(e)(1)(B)(ii) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
     Act of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 3(a)(1) of 
     the bill, insert ``result from any such reactions, releases, 
     or contaminations and that'' after ``such insured losses 
     that'' .

       In section 103(e)(1)(B)(ii)(I) of the Terrorism Risk 
     Insurance Act of 2002, as proposed to be amended by section 
     3(a)(1) of the bill, strike ``exceeds'' and insert 
     ``exceed''.

       In section 103(h)(1) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
     2002, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as proposed 
     to be amended by section 3(a)(1) of the bill, strike ``an 
     appropriate index'' and all that follows through the colon 
     and insert ``the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers 
     (CPI-U), as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of 
     the Department of Labor, during the 12-month period preceding 
     such program year, each of the dollar amounts set forth in 
     this title (as such amount may have been previously 
     adjusted), including the following amounts:''.

       Strike subparagraph (B) of section 103(h)(1) of the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, as proposed to be 
     amended by section 3(a)(1) of the bill, and insert the 
     following:

       ``(B) The dollar amounts in subparagraphs (J) and (K) of 
     section 102(11) (relating to an insurer deductible threshold 
     based on the amount of aggregate industry insured losses).''.

       In section 3 of the bill, redesignate subsection (c) as 
     subsection (d).

       In section 3 of the bill, after subsection (b) insert the 
     following new subsection:

       (c) Regulations on Certification of an Act of NBCR 
     Terrorism.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall issue the 
     regulations to carry out subparagraph (C) of section 102(1) 
     of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, as amended by 
     subsection (a)(1) of this section, not later than the 
     expiration of the 180-day period beginning upon the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 660, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I recognize myself for 1 
minute.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an agreed-upon set of amendments. As I said, it 
was a bipartisan process, to some extent, in drafting. This makes 
technical revisions and requires Treasury to promulgate rules to 
clarify the nuclear, biological, chemical and radiation certification 
process. It provides that there be indexing, which is, I think, in 
accordance, there are some copayments, et cetera, and these will be 
indexed. It applies the reset mechanism to the deductible for nuclear, 
biological, chemical and radiological, and it makes technical and 
conforming changes. I believe, as I said, this represents a consensus.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim time in opposition, 
although I am not opposed to the manager's amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Alabama is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment has some improvements to the 
bill. I would like to express to the chairman that I appreciate his 
willingness to work to make, I think, some needed and technical changes 
to the bill. I would encourage my colleagues to vote for the manager's 
amendment and, again, express, although the chairman and I have some 
philosophical differences in the overall TRIA legislation and whether 
how temporary it ought to be or how permanent it ought to be or the 
extent of where the Federal subsidies, on this amendment we have no 
disagreement.
  We continue to work well in a bipartisan manner despite our 
philosophical differences.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge Members to support the manager's amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member. 
We were able to work out a number of these things. I would just want to 
return to a couple of broader points. I want to make two points. One, I 
don't think the market will work and neither does any participant in 
the market either as an insurer, or any significant number, or as the 
insured. But even if it could, it does not seem to me that it should. 
If you did this purely in the private market, you would give to the 
vicious attackers of America the power to decide that it would be more

[[Page H10545]]

expensive to do business in some parts of our country than others. You 
could have another video from the despicable Osama Bin Laden in which 
he could threaten that he would take action against this area or that 
area, these facilities or those facilities, and their insurance 
premiums would go up.
  Yes, the private market should govern all those things which it deals 
with, with fire and with other forms of casualty and even with natural 
disasters. But to put in the hands of America's enemies this economic 
power is a grave error. Should the taxpayers pay for it? Yes, because 
it is a matter of national defense. It is a matter of homeland 
security. We are not talking about insuring people against the risk if 
they built a commercial building of liability to injury, of fire, of 
theft, of improper or inadequate construction. We are saying that, no, 
if you are in business in America, you should not have to insure 
against an attack on this country based on hatred of us.
  So that is why I believe that we should do this as a public policy 
matter.
  Mr. Chairman, at this point, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina, a member of the committee who is one of our most 
thoughtful Members to discuss the general principle of the bill.
  Mr. WATT. I am actually walking into the floor at a good time to pick 
up on the point that the Chair of the committee is making.
  This has kind of turned out to be the kind of debate that you hear in 
politics: Democrats believe in government and government can do 
everything; and Republicans believe in the private sector, and the 
private sector can do everything. The truth of the matter is neither 
one of those things is correct. There are some things that government 
can do and there are some things, a lot of things, that the private 
sector can do. One thing I think the private sector cannot do 
effectively is to insure against the kind of things that are really 
governmental responsibilities, protection of ourselves, our national 
defense. When that fails, it becomes a responsibility of government to 
accept and provide a safety net for our business community, or for our 
people.
  It is unfortunate that this debate has deteriorated into that kind of 
dichotomy. You have to either have all of government or all of the 
private sector.
  We think this is an ideal time for the government to be providing 
this kind of insurance protection so that business and the private 
sector and real estate development can continue to operate without fear 
of intervention by foreign powers or terrorists.
  And I rise in support of the amendment

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to reclaim 30 
seconds of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Alabama?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BACHUS. I thank the Chairman.
  Let me say to all Members of this body, we are not saying and neither 
has it been our position that the government does not have a role to 
play in offering a backstop to terrorist insurance. We believe that 
that ought to be a limited goal, and we believe that we ought to 
continue in the path of the prior TRIA extensions, where we continue to 
let the private market fill in.
  We believe, on the other hand, and we not only believe, but this bill 
calls for higher deductibles, higher premiums and higher taxpayer 
participation, and we feel like we are reversing our role
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts will be 
postponed.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Pearce

  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed 
in part B of House Report 110-333.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Pearce:
       In the matter proposed to be added by the amendment made by 
     section 3(a)(1) of the bill, in section 102(11)(J)(ii), 
     strike ``50 basis points'' and insert ``100 basis points''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 660, the gentleman from 
New Mexico (Mr. Pearce) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Mexico.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an amendment to the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007. My amendment takes 
one critical step forward in writing insurer participation back into 
TRIA.
  Five years ago, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, TRIA, was signed 
into law as a temporary program to facilitate transition to a viable 
market for private terrorism insurance. Since enacting TRIA in 2002, 
insurer deductibles have increased incrementally by at least 2.5 
percent each year, from 7 percent in the first year to the current 20 
percent level.
  The bill before us today scales back insurance industry participation 
in the terrorism risk market and reduces the expectation that a private 
market will one day take over. H.R. 2761 would lower the 20 percent 
deductible to 5 percent, increasing by one-half percent each year for 
events above $1 billion. At that rate, it would take 30 years before 
the deductibles would reach today's level, where Treasury assures us 
the market is performing very well.
  While I am supportive of TRIA as a concept and understand the market 
is not yet where it needs to be to take over terrorism insurance, I 
believe strongly that the responsibility for terrorism insurance needs 
to be on the insurers, not on the taxpayers.
  My amendment will rewrite some of the insurance industry 
participation back into TRIA. I have proposed a modest increase in 
deductible each year of 1 percent, an increase of one-half percent from 
where the bill is today. It will ensure that deductibles are back up to 
the current 20 percent level at the end of the 15-year extension.
  I believe my amendment is a step in the right direction towards 
encouraging a private terrorism insurance market, while providing the 
insurance industry with the environment for a stable transition. I hope 
that you will join me in supporting this important amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, our friends on the Republican side pride 
themselves on being tough on terror, and rightfully so. To be honest, 
it is evident when you listen to President Bush and he says things like 
``You're either with us or against us.''
  But also the President said in the wake of 9/11, he said this here in 
this Chamber to the Congress and to the American people, and I quote 
our President, ``Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our 
biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundations of America. 
These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American 
resolve.'' Our President said that to us, Mr. Chairman.
  After looking over the amendment, I realize the gentleman from New 
Mexico was not yet elected to be here and probably didn't get the memo 
about what the President said, because the effect of his amendment 
would allow terrorists to tell us where we can and where we cannot 
build after a catastrophic terrorist attack.
  The bill would reset the deductible from 20 percent to 5 percent 
after a terrorist attack, which is good. The amendment that the 
gentleman proposes would increase the reset deductible to as high as 19 
percent after a terrorist attack, which is almost the same as the 
original 20 percent. Small comfort.
  Undermining the purpose and the intent of the reset mechanism by 
eliminating the incentives created by the reset would price insurers 
out of areas affected by terrorist attacks, prohibiting developers from 
rebuilding.

[[Page H10546]]

  It would seem to me that to support this amendment is so blatantly to 
oppose the American resolve that President Bush claimed in the wake of 
September 11. Should we have left Ground Zero smoldering and not build 
the Freedom Tower? Should we concede defeat to Osama bin Laden? Should 
he dictate where we can and cannot build?
  I say to the gentleman from New Mexico, if we cannot build and 
rebuild in the areas where terrorists attack, that is a major defeat 
for our country and a resounding retreat from the spirit of our Nation.
  I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, the chairman of the 
committee.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I join the gentleman in opposition, and I 
want to address this charge that we heard from one of the Members that 
this is a typical liberal Democratic big-spending program.
  I will include for the Record a strong endorsement of H.R. 2761 from 
the Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism. It is composed of such 
traditional liberal groups as the American Bankers Association, the 
National Apartment Association, the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Retail 
Federation, the National Restaurant Association and the National 
Association of Industrial and Office Property. Virtually every business 
involved in this, the Financial Services Roundtable, led by that 
radical, our former colleague, Mr. Bartlett of Texas, every business 
group from the insuring and insured part says this is not for the 
market.
  I would add also a letter from the National League of Cities strongly 
urging on behalf of the cities of America passage of this bill as it 
was reported out of committee.
  Finally, from the American Insurance Association, a strong argument. 
In particular, it thanks us for including nuclear, biological, chemical 
and radiological.
  Those who said the market can do it, it says two separate government 
studies have concluded what insurers already knew, that outside of 
State mandates, there is virtually no private insurance market capacity 
for NBCR. ``For this and other reasons,'' they like the whole bill, 
``the American Insurance Association and its more than 350 property 
casualty insurance companies strongly endorse H.R. 2761 as it was 
reported out of the committee.'' They have got some concern about the 
reset, and we will talk about that and we agree with them. But here is 
this strong endorsement.
  Yes, it is true that this is something that some liberal Democrats 
support. And here is the signer on behalf of the American Insurance 
Association, Governor Marc Racicot, I believe a former chairman of the 
Republican National Committee. I want to congratulate my Democratic 
colleagues. To have insinuated a liberal Democrat into the chairmanship 
of the Republican National Committee is a degree of flexibility I 
didn't know we have.
  So this notion that this is some liberal invention and that the 
market can do it is repudiated by everyone who knows anything about the 
market. I hope the amendment is defeated and the bill is passed.

                       Vote ``Yes'' on H.R. 2761

       The undersigned members of the Coalition to Insure Against 
     Terrorism (CIAT), a broad based coalition of business 
     insurance policyholders representing a significant segment of 
     the nation's GDP, strongly urge you to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 
     2761 Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 
     2007 (TRIREA).
       American Bankers Association; American Bankers Insurance 
     Association; American Council of Engineering Companies; 
     American Gas Association; American Hotel and Lodging 
     Association; American Land Title Association; American Public 
     Gas Association; American Public Power Association; American 
     Resort Development Association; American Society of 
     Association Executives; Associated Builders and Contractors; 
     Associated General Contractors of America; Association of 
     American Railroads; Association of Art Museum Directors; 
     Babson Capital Management LLC; The Bond Market Association; 
     Building Owners and Managers Association International; 
     Boston Properties; and CCIM Institute.
       Campbell Soup Company; Century 21 Department Stores; 
     Chemical Producers and Distributors Association; Citigroup 
     Inc.; Commercial Mortgage Securities Association; Cornerstone 
     Real Estate Advisers, Inc.; CSX Corporation; Edison Electric 
     Institute; Electric Power Supply Association; The Financial 
     Services Roundtable; The Food Marketing Institute; General 
     Aviation Manufacturers Association; Helicopter Association 
     International; Hilton Hotels Corporation; Host Hotels and 
     Resorts; Independent Electrical Contractors; Institute of 
     Real Estate Management; Intercontinental Hotels; and 
     International Council of Shopping Centers.
       International Franchise Association; International Safety 
     Equipment Association; The Long Island Import Export 
     Association; Marriott International; Mortgage Bankers 
     Association; National Apartment Association; National 
     Association of Home Builders; National Association of 
     Industrial and Office Properties; National Association of 
     Manufacturers; National Association of REALTORS'; 
     National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts; 
     National Association of Waterfront Employers; National 
     Association of Wholesaler-Distributors; National Basketball 
     Association; National Collegiate Athletic Association; 
     National Council of Chain Restaurants; National Football 
     League; National Hockey League; and National Multi Housing 
     Council.
       National Petrochemical & Refiners Association; National 
     Restaurant Association; National Retail Federation; National 
     Roofing Contractors Association; National Rural Electric 
     Cooperative Association; The New England Council; Partnership 
     for New York City; Office of the Commissioner of Baseball; 
     Public Utilities Risk Management Association; The Real Estate 
     Board of New York; The Real Estate Roundtable; Society of 
     American Florists; Starwood Hotels and Resorts; Taxicab, 
     Limousine & Paratransit Association; Travel Business 
     Roundtable; Trizec Properties, Inc.; UJA-Federation of New 
     York; Union Pacific Corporation; and U.S. Chamber of 
     Commerce.
                                  ____



                               American Insurance Association,

                               Washington, DC, September 18, 2007.
     Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
     Speaker, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Steny Hoyer,
     Majority Leader, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. John Boehner,
     Minority Leader, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Roy Blunt,
     Minority Whip, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Speaker Pelosi, Minority Leader Boehner, Majority 
     Leader Hoyer, and Minority Whip Blunt: We understand that 
     H.R. 2761 is scheduled for House floor consideration 
     tomorrow. We commend the House for moving forward on this 
     critical legislation.
       Apart from extending the existing program, H.R. 2761 
     confronts the unique insurance challenges posed by terrorist 
     threats of a nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological 
     nature (NBCR). In the last two years, two separate government 
     studies--one by the President's Working Group on Financial 
     Markets (led by Treasury) and another by the Government 
     Accountability Office--have concluded what insurers already 
     knew: that, outside of state mandates, there is virtually no 
     private insurance market capacity for NBCR terrorism risk and 
     there is little potential for such a market to emerge in the 
     near future. H.R.2761 fills that void by requiring insurers 
     to make available additional NBCR terrorism insurance as part 
     of the Federal backstop where policyholders accept the 
     terrorism coverage offered under current law, and by 
     providing insurers with more limited and certain financial 
     exposure that reflects the distinctive catastrophic nature of 
     NBCR terrorism. For this and other reasons, the American 
     Insurance Association and its more than 350 property casualty 
     insurance company members strongly endorse H.R. 2761 as it 
     was reported out of the House Financial Services Committee.
       We understand that a new provision has been added to 
     address the concerns resulting from the Congressional Budget 
     Office report, which would require additional Congressional 
     action to authorize Federal payment for an act of terrorism. 
     The industry has serious reservations about the commercial 
     workability and certainty of the provision and the potential 
     adverse marketplace impact. As the legislation moves forward 
     in the process, we look forward to working with you and 
     others in Congress to ensure these concerns are resolved in a 
     way that preserves the future viability of the program.
           Sincerely,
                                            Governor Marc Racicot,
     President, American Insurance Association.
                                  ____



                                    National League of Cities,

                               Washington, DC, September 19, 2007.
     Hon. Barney Frank,
     Chairman, House of Representatives, Committee on Financial 
         Services, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Spencer Bachus,
     Ranking Member, House of Representatives, Committee on 
         Financial Services, Rayburn House Office Building, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Frank and Ranking Member Bachus: I am writing 
     on behalf of the 19,000 cities and towns represented by the 
     National League of Cities to express our support for the 
     Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007, 
     H.R. 2761.
       The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) creates an 
     important mechanism under which the Federal government 
     provides a vital federal backstop to potential catastrophic 
     loss caused by terrorism. In addition to safeguarding 
     America's economy and

[[Page H10547]]

     stabilizing the terrorism insurance marketplace, TRIA 
     provides the necessary direct federal insurance assistance to 
     state and local governments in the case of terrorist acts.
       The Act would extend the Terrorism Insurance Program for a 
     sufficient time period to assure local governments that 
     adequate and affordable insurance against losses caused by 
     terrorism is readily available in the marketplace. The 
     legislation also extends coverage to domestic acts of 
     terrorism, which will add an additional level of protection 
     against losses to America's cities and towns.
       For these reasons, NLC supports H.R. 2761. We thank you for 
     your leadership on this important legislation and look 
     forward to working with you to ensure its passage.
           Sincerely yours,
                                                  Donald J. Borut,
                                               Executive Director.

  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Bachus).
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman of the full 
committee for reading that list of those that endorsed it. You will 
notice that some of the absences were the Consumer Federation of 
America, which said that this bill was not good for consumers, i.e. 
taxpayers. The National Taxpayers Association obviously wasn't on that 
list, because it is a great deal for the insurance companies, and we 
all acknowledge that. It merely subsidizes them at the expense of 
taxpayers. The one name missing is taxpayers. They will pay for this 
legislation.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I further yield to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I would say yes, the taxpayers do pay. It 
is a matter of national defense. Where people are building and 
incurring risks, they should pay for it themselves. I accept that 
point. We are talking about how we respond to Osama bin Laden or other 
murderers who would attack this country.
  I think it is appropriate that the country as a whole respond, and 
not allow the terrorists to pick and choose which Americans will have 
to suffer disproportionately.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I find the comments very strange from the 
opponents of the amendment. They say that my amendment will stop 
rebuilding and let Osama bin Laden tell us where to rebuild.
  Currently the rate of insurance deductible is at 20 percent. The 
rebuilding is going on quite well, frankly, and they have sustained 2.5 
percent increases through the past 6 years. What we are simply saying 
is we are going to start at 5 percent and increase 1 percent a year 
over 15 years back up to the 20 percent level. Yet we are being told 
that regardless of what is being built now, something is going to 
change in the equation and the people are going to stop rebuilding if 
we go up and go to this one-half percent increase.
  I find it heartening to know that we are within a half percent of 
stopping the entire economy of the U.S. on a one-half percent 
deductible and giving over our independence to the terrorists based on 
this one-half percent, when the truth is the last 6 years showed us 
that the industry will sustain 2.5 percent increases and continue to 
build exactly where they want to build, and in fact the industry will 
sustain on its own at least up to 20 percent. If we are estimating 
something above that, that would be unchartered territory. But I do 
find the arguments somewhat stunning.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have no further speakers. I would just 
urge all of our colleagues to join with the former chairman of the 
Republican National Committee and Mr. Frank and myself and oppose this 
amendment before the House.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I have no other speakers and would just 
urge Members to support the amendment so that we can convert this 
public program back into a private program over a long course of time.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition 
to this amendment. This amendment effectively guts a provision of this 
bill which is essential for the recovery of localities that are the 
subject of terrorist attacks.
  As we know in New York, insurance companies are reluctant to write 
coverage at all for sites of terrorist attacks because they find the 
risk of another attack too high given the deductible under TRIA. 
Insurance companies aren't willing to pay the higher deductible more 
than once, in other words, for any given site. We in New York face this 
problem today as there is far less coverage available for lower 
Manhattan than is required, but this problem will confront any locality 
that is the subject of an attack.
  The reset mechanism in the bill solves this problem by lowering the 
deductible for any locality that has been the subject of a significant 
attack. It applies nationally and will greatly help with economic 
recovery by helping to provide adequate terrorism insurance.
  We have worked on a bipartisan basis to make sure this reset 
mechanism works for the whole Nation, for industry, for policy holders 
and that it is fiscally responsible.
  This amendment guts the reset mechanism by mandating large and rapid 
increases in the deductible once it resets to a lower number after a 
large terrorist attack.
  Under this amendment, the reset deductible could rise in a short time 
to as high as 19 percent, which is almost the same as the original 
deductible of 20 percent. This defeats the purpose of the reset 
mechanism, which we worked so hard to craft as a balanced and effective 
tool.
  A TRIA bill that does not consider the special problems of sites 
recovering from an attack is not an effective or well designed plan.
  I urge my colleagues to reject this misguided amendment.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. Pearce).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Mexico will be 
postponed.


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will 
now resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were 
postponed, in the following order:
  Amendment No. 1 printed in part B by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts;
  Amendment No. 2 printed in part B by Mr. Pearce of New Mexico.
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for the second electronic 
vote in this series.


         Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts

  The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded 
vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Frank) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 426, 
noes 1, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 881]

                               AYES--426

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Bordallo
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boustany
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Carter
     Castor
     Chabot
     Chandler
     Christensen
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cohen
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel

[[Page H10548]]


     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Faleomavaega
     Fallin
     Farr
     Fattah
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fortuno
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Granger
     Graves
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hall (TX)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hobson
     Hodes
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Inslee
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Jordan
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Klein (FL)
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCollum (MN)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murphy, Tim
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Neugebauer
     Norton
     Nunes
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pence
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Salazar
     Sali
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Sestak
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Souder
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Sullivan
     Sutton
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Walz (MN)
     Wamp
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (OH)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NOES--1

       
     Castle
       

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Allen
     Carney
     Cubin
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Gilchrest
     Jindal
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, Sam
     Meeks (NY)
     Serrano

                              {time}  1407

  Mrs. BACHMANN, Messrs. SIMPSON, EHLERS, BURGESS, BRADY of Texas and 
Mrs. BLACKBURN changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                 Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Pearce

  The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded 
vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. 
Pearce) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 194, 
noes 230, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 882]

                               AYES--194

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bean
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Deal (GA)
     DeFazio
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Donnelly
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fortuno
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marshall
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mitchell
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Taylor
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--230

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Bordallo
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Christensen
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Faleomavaega
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kirk
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Norton
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Sestak
     Shays
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Towns
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh (NY)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters

[[Page H10549]]


     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Allen
     Carney
     Cubin
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Gilchrest
     Hooley
     Jindal
     Johnson (GA)
     Marchant
     McCaul (TX)
     Miller, George
     Serrano
     Tancredo


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised there are 2 
minutes left in this vote.

                              {time}  1414

  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Ross) having assumed the chair, Mr. Israel, Chairman of the Committee 
of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that 
Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2761) to 
extend the Terrorism Insurance Program of the Department of the 
Treasury, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 660, he 
reported the bill, as amended by that resolution, back to the House 
with a further amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  The question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Dreier

  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. DREIER. Absolutely.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

        Mr. Dreier moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 2761, to the 
     Committee on Financial Services with instructions to report 
     the same to the House promptly without the changes made by 
     the amendment printed in part A of the report of the 
     Committee on Rules (Report No. 110-333, 110th Congress) 
     accompanying the resolution, H. Res. 660, 110th Congress.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I offer this motion to recommit to rectify 
what my Rules Committee colleague, the gentleman from Miami (Mr. 
Lincoln Diaz-Balart), eloquently described as an outrage.
  What we have done in this measure is unprecedented, and we are 
undermining the goal that I think most all of us share of trying to 
have a responsible Federal backdrop to deal with the potential 
terrorist attack on our country.
  Mr. Speaker, one of the things that we all know is that certainty is 
absolutely essential when you are dealing with the issue of insurance. 
Now, we know that people can't run a business without insurance, people 
can't hire people without insurance, they can't build without 
insurance. Insurance is absolutely essential. But it is critical that 
certainty be provided and, unfortunately, it is not being provided 
under this measure.
  I would like to quote the letter that was sent from our friend from 
New York (Mr. Ackerman) to Speaker Pelosi when he said, ``It is our 
strong belief, however, that making the entire program contingent on 
Congress passing a second piece of legislation completely undermines 
the intent and desired effect of the legislation. Under this proposal, 
policyholders would not know for certain whether their policies would 
pay out in the event of an attack and insurers could be placed in the 
unthinkable position of either not paying out on their policies or 
facing insolvency. The uncertainty that this proposed solution to the 
PAYGO problem would cause would render the legislation almost 
completely useless.''
  Now, Mr. Speaker, it is very, very important that that certainty be 
provided. Now, I have heard that there is a letter that has come from 
the Speaker to my friend from New York (Mr. Ackerman) that says this 
will be rectified. Well, Mr. Speaker, by passing this motion to 
recommit, we can guarantee that it will be rectified. We can guarantee 
that it will be rectified because we are in fact sending it back to the 
committee.
  Why is it we are doing this promptly rather than forthwith? We know 
there are PAYGO problems that need to be addressed by this committee. 
The problem with what we have done is that in the name of trying to 
protect this poorly crafted PAYGO rule that was put into place at the 
beginning of the 110th Congress, we are waiving PAYGO. That is exactly 
what is happening here, Mr. Speaker.
  So I urge my colleagues, if you in fact want a responsible Terrorism 
Insurance Act package, we need to recommit this bill to the committee 
so that they can come out with an even better work product than the one 
they have today.
  I urge an ``aye'' vote on the motion to recommit.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. First of all, of course it says 
``promptly.'' Members make a choice. The purpose of this is terrorism 
risk insurance expires the end of this year. We are on a reasonable 
timetable but not one that has a lot of water in it.
  Yesterday, on an important bill that goes before the Committee on 
Financial Services, they said ``promptly.'' So the notion is that they 
can make the Committee on Financial Services a revolving door and then 
complain when we can't get the work done when we will have to do it two 
and three times.
  Secondly, Members on the other side, and I don't know where the 
gentleman from California was on this, but in Committee, before the 
PAYGO problem arose, while we got substantial Republican support, 14, 
19 Republicans, including the ranking member, voted ``no.'' So the 
Republicans had taken an opposing position in the majority. The 
administration is in the majority against it.
  And what are they telling us? That a bill that the Republicans on the 
whole are against doesn't do enough for the people who want the bill. 
This is people intervening on behalf of people who don't want their 
intervention.
  It is true that there is some ambiguity that I hope will be resolved; 
but the American Insurance Association, and that is the group that, 
despite the Republican's argument that this can be done by the market, 
says no, the market can't handle it. And, in a letter signed by a 
former chairman of the Republican National Committee, Governor Marc 
Racicot, president of the AIA, they say please go ahead with the bill. 
And they say: We have concerns about this fix. We hope we can go 
forward and work on it as opposed to delaying it further.
  We got a letter today from the Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the Bankers, the League of Cities, being 
aware of the problem and of the first cut at fixing it, that say please 
go forward.
  Now, if the people who were expecting to be the participants in this 
program said, wait a minute, this can't go forward, they would be, I 
think, entitled to be listened to. When people who have on the whole 
been opposed to the whole program and who voted against it before this 
arose now appear to say, oh, my goodness, this poor program, you are 
not doing enough justice, when they want to kill it, I don't think have 
a lot of credibility.
  So, yes, this does need some work. There are a variety of suggestions 
that have been made. We do have a Senate to go forward and we have a 
conference process.
  And I will say to the Republicans, I understand their skepticism 
about a conference process, because when they were in the power, they 
didn't have any. They did a lot of backroom, okay, we will do this.
  We will have a conference. I am chairman of this committee. I can 
promise, and I have talked to the leadership, we will have an open 
conference and there will be debates and discussions.
  I am explaining it because the Republicans, some of them, the newer 
ones don't know what one is. It will be the

[[Page H10550]]

House and the Senate, and we will talk about it. And so we will address 
this particular issue.
  And, again, all of those who are in favor of this program as it was 
drafted, all of them want us to go forward as we continue to make this 
final fix. Most of those who are saying, oh, no, you can't go forward, 
it is not perfect, didn't like it in any case.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DREIER. I thank my friend for yielding. Just to answer the 
question that was raised earlier, I will say to my friend, if we pass 
this motion to recommit, I will vote in favor of the legislation and I 
would recommend that some of the other committee follow the example 
set.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I thank the gentleman, but I take back my 
time. He will vote in favor of the legislation after it is sent back to 
committee, after it is wide open again to an amendment process, after 
members of the committee on his side of the aisle will offer a whole 
lot of new amendments. And so weeks could go by before we are able to 
get floor time again and do it. There are a lot of things on the floor, 
and they are complaining that we didn't pass other things.
  So the gentleman will vote for it in the sweet by-and-by if we send 
it back. There is an alternative: We go through the regular process. 
The Senate votes on this, aware of the CBO. We go to an open 
conference. We debate it, and we bring that to the floor.
  I will yield again to the gentleman.
  Mr. DREIER. I thank my friend for yielding.
  And I will simply say, Mr. Speaker, that the issue here happens to be 
jurisdictional as well. He is talking about conference committees and 
everything. The Rules Committee abdicates this responsibility through 
expedited procedures by going through this process.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I know turf is more important to some 
Members than anything else.
  Mr. DREIER. No, the institution is very important.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. It is rather odd to proclaim yourself an 
institutionalist while violating the rules.
  The fact is that I understand turf makes some people jittery. And I 
will certainly advocate that the Rules Committee be included in the 
conference report.
  Again, the Republicans have forgotten how conferences work. 
Conferences can have more than one committee, so the Rules Committee 
can get representation on the conference.
  Again, everybody who is for this bill in the House and the private 
sector, people on the whole and the cities, the representatives of the 
public affected, want us to go forward and say, in good faith work, 
this out.
  People who have been on the whole opposed to it, not entirely but on 
the whole opposed to it, have found this hook to try and hold it up. I 
don't think they are trying to hold it up to make it better when a 
majority of them wanted to kill it in the first place.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair 
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on 
the question of passage.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 196, 
noes 228, not voting 8, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 883]

                               YEAS--196

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Lampson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--228

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shays
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Wilson (OH)
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Allen
     Carney
     Cubin
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Jindal
     Johnson (GA)
     McHugh
     Miller, George


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there 
are 2 minutes remaining on this vote.

[[Page H10551]]

                              {time}  1445

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 312, 
nays 110, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 884]

                               YEAS--312

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown, Corrine
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carson
     Castor
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, Lincoln
     Davis, Tom
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Emerson
     Engel
     English (PA)
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gerlach
     Giffords
     Gilchrest
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Graves
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hall (TX)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hobson
     Hodes
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Keller
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kirk
     Klein (FL)
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     Kuhl (NY)
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHenry
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murphy, Tim
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Nunes
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickering
     Platts
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schmidt
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sestak
     Shays
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walsh (NY)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Whitfield
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (OH)
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--110

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Blackburn
     Bonner
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Culberson
     Davis, David
     Deal (GA)
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Flake
     Forbes
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Hastings (WA)
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hoekstra
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Kline (MN)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Lewis (CA)
     Linder
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marshall
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCrery
     McKeon
     McMorris Rodgers
     Miller (FL)
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pitts
     Poe
     Price (GA)
     Radanovich
     Rogers (AL)
     Rohrabacher
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Sullivan
     Tancredo
     Walden (OR)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Westmoreland
     Wicker
     Wilson (SC)

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Allen
     Boehner
     Carney
     Cubin
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Delahunt
     Jindal
     Johnson (GA)
     McHugh
     Miller, George


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised that 2 
minutes are remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1454

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________