[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 134 (Tuesday, September 11, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11416-S11417]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  By Mr. HATCH (for himself and Mr. Bennett): S. 2039. A bill to 
require an assessment of the plans for the modernization and 
sustainment of the land-based, Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missile strategic deterrent force, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce the Strategic 
Deterrent Sustainment Act of 2007, which is cosponsored by Senator 
Bennett. Currently, our land-based strategic forces are in the process 
of completing a vital and important modernization program.
  However, I am unaware of any Department of Defense plan to maintain 
our land-based strategic missile industrial base once this 
modernization is completed in the next 2 to 3 years. Therefore, this 
legislation would require the Secretary of Defense to prepare a report 
detailing how our Nation will maintain an industrial base to replace 
the Minuteman III missile with a follow-on land-based strategic 
deterrent after 2030. 2030, is of course, the date in which the 
Minuteman III system is scheduled to be replaced. The Secretary, under 
this legislation, will also be required to outline how our Nation will 
maintain, modernize and sustain the Minuteman III intercontinental 
ballistic missile system until at least 2030.
  To put this in context, in 2002, the administration wisely committed 
the U.S. to a policy of modernizing our land-based intercontinental 
ballistic missile force. Under this policy, the Peacemaker ICBM has 
been retired and that system's warheads are being retrofitted and 
placed into the Minuteman III fleet. In addition to the new warheads, 
500 Minuteman III systems are being completely rebuilt and thoroughly 
modernized.
  Unfortunately, after this work is completed, no other work on land-
based strategic missile systems is planned. As we all know, building an 
intercontinental ballistic missile is extremely complex and a great 
feat of engineering. It requires engineers with years of experience and 
highly trained and professional manufacturing specialists to 
successfully and safely build a missile system. Clearly, if there are 
not any additional systems to build, then these sought after engineers 
and specialists will merely find employment elsewhere. In addition, if 
a replacement system will not be built

[[Page S11417]]

until 2030, it is very likely that much of our Nation's knowledge on 
how to design and build a land-based strategic missile system will be 
lost.
  As an example, one can point to the British who recently decided to 
modernize their nuclear deterrent. Since the British nuclear warhead 
industrial base all but ceased to exist years ago, that nation will now 
have to allocate billions of additional pounds to reconstitute their 
design and production capability.
  What would be the cost of our Nation to maintain our land-based 
strategic missile industrial base? Well I understand, the propulsion 
portion of the industrial base can be maintained for the relatively 
modest sum of under $50 million a year. In fact, such a program already 
exists for our submarine launched ballistic missile systems. Under this 
industrial base sustainment plan, 12 Trident missiles are manufactured 
each year.
  Should a plan to maintain our land-based strategic missile industrial 
base closely follow our submarine launched strategic missile industrial 
plans? Well under this legislation, the Secretary of Defense will have 
the opportunity to make that determination.
  In conclusion, during this period of uncertainty we must keep our 
Nation's defense industrial options open in order to meet the threats 
of the future. The Strategic Deterrent Sustainment Act of 2007 affords 
us that opportunity and I hope that it will receive from my colleagues 
the support it deserves.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2039

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic Deterrent 
     Sustainment Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The strategic forces of the United States remain a 
     cornerstone of United States national security.
       (2) The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review states that it is the 
     current policy of the United States that intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic 
     missiles, and long-range nuclear-armed bombers play a 
     critical role in the defense capabilities of the United 
     States, its allies, and friends.
       (3) The dispersed and alert Minuteman III intercontinental 
     ballistic missile system provides the most responsive, 
     stabilizing, and cost-effective strategic force.
       (4) Section 139 of the John Warner National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364; 
     120 Stat. 2114) requires the Secretary of the Air Force to 
     modernize Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles 
     in the United States inventory so as to maintain a sufficient 
     supply of launch test assets and spares to sustain the 
     deployed force of such missiles through 2030.
       (5) The modernization program for the Minuteman III 
     intercontinental ballistic missile is nearing completion. 
     Once that program is complete, there will be no program to 
     sustain the capability of the United States industrial base 
     to modernize or replace the intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles that constitute the sole land-based strategic 
     deterrent system of the United States.
       (6) As an example, motor production for the Minuteman III 
     Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) is currently scheduled 
     to end in fiscal year 2009. Once the PRP program ends, the 
     capacity of the United States industrial base to respond to 
     matters arising from the aging and obsolescence of Minuteman 
     III intercontinental ballistic missiles will be extremely 
     diminished, decades-worth of critical program knowledge may 
     be lost, and the current design of the Minuteman III 
     intercontinental ballistic missile is likely to no longer be 
     reproducible.

     SEC. 3. REPORT ON CAPABILITIES FOR SUSTAINMENT OF THE 
                   MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than March 1, 2008, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
     defense committees a report on the capability of the United 
     States industrial base to achieve each of the following:
       (1) To maintain, modernize, and sustain the Minuteman III 
     intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system until at 
     least 2030.
       (2) To replace the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
     missile with a follow-on land-based strategic deterrent 
     system after 2030.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A description of any current plans for extending the 
     Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system after 
     the period from 2020 to 2030, including plans for testing 
     sufficient to account for any aging and obsolescence found in 
     the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile during 
     the remaining life of the system, and an assessment of the 
     risks associated with such plans after the shutdown of 
     associated production lines.
       (2) A description of any current plans to maintain the 
     Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system after 
     2030, including an assessment of any risks associated with 
     such plans after the shutdown of associated production lines.
       (3) An explanation why the Minuteman III intercontinental 
     ballistic missile system, the only United States land-based 
     strategic deterrent system, is no longer considered to be of 
     the highest national defense urgency, as indicated by 
     inclusion of the system on the so-called ``DX-Rated Program 
     List'' while the sea-based strategic deterrent system, the 
     Trident II D5 missile system, is still on the so-called ``DX-
     list''.
       (4) An analysis of existing commonalities between the 
     service life extension program for the Trident II D5 missile 
     system and any equivalent planned service life extension 
     program for the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
     missile system, including an analysis of the impact on 
     materials, the supplier base, production facilities, and the 
     production workforce of extending all or part of the service 
     life extension program for the Trident II D5 missile system 
     to a service life extension program for the Minuteman III 
     intercontinental ballistic missile system.
       (5) An assessment of the adequacy of current and 
     anticipated programs, such as missile defense, space launch, 
     and prompt global strike programs, to support the industrial 
     base for the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile 
     system, including an analysis of the impact on materials, the 
     supplier base, production facilities, and the production 
     workforce of extending all or part of any such program to the 
     program for the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
     missile system.
       (c) Comptroller General Review.--Not later than 60 days 
     after submittal under subsection (a) of the report required 
     by that subsection, the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
     report setting forth the Comptroller General's assessment of 
     the matters contained in the report under subsection (a), 
     including an assessment of the consistency of the budget of 
     the President for fiscal year 2009, as submitted to Congress 
     pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, 
     with the matters contained in the report under subsection 
     (a).
       (d) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``congressional defense committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
                                 ______