[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 125 (Wednesday, August 1, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10593-S10599]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAQ
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, it continues to be my hope that there
will be a consensus reached among Senators as to how to move forward in
Iraq. This is indispensable if there is to be an accommodation between
the President and Congress.
I had hoped to make a floor statement on Iraq during the Senate's
consideration of the DoD authorization bill, but the majority leader
took that bill off the floor after there was only consideration of the
Levin-Reed amendment. That action deprived the Senate of an opportunity
to consider the Warner-Lugar and Salazar-Alexander amendments and
perhaps other amendments which might have secured the requisite 60
votes to structure a new U.S. policy for Iraq.
When a tally is made of the Senators who have voted for or
cosponsored legislation aimed at altering or reevaluating U.S. policy
in Iraq, the total is 62. When Senators are added who have made public
statements critical of the President's policy, the number could
possibly reach or exceed two-thirds of the Senate membership.
A July 2007 vote, had it been successful, would have had no binding
effect since the President already had sufficient funding to continue
until September 30 and would need additional funding only in the next
fiscal year, 2008, beginning October 1.
The time for Congress to have asserted its constitutional power of
the purse to withhold funding was this spring during consideration of
supplemental funding for approximately $120 billion. On April 26, 2007,
following a vote in the House of Representatives of 218-208, the Senate
passed the conference report to H.R. 1591, the fiscal year 2007 Troop
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act on a vote of 51-46. However, because this bill
contained target dates for withdrawal, on May 1, 2007, the President
vetoed the bill.
After the House failed to gather the two-thirds majority required to
override the President's veto, on May 24, 2007, the Congress approved a
bill, H.R. 2206, which did not include targeted dates for withdrawal
and which was subsequently signed into law by President Bush on May 25,
2007, Public Law 110-28.
When the Levin-Reed amendment was considered, it was a forgone
conclusion that there were not anywhere near 60 votes to invoke
cloture, let alone the 67 votes needed to override a veto. With the
removal of the bill from the floor, the Senate was prevented from
considering alternatives to the Levin-Reed proposal, and denied the
opportunity to have a vote or votes to demonstrate dissatisfaction with
the President's policy.
This action deprived the Senate of an opportunity to craft a
compromise around Warner-Lugar or Salazar-Alexander to get the 60 votes
and put the president squarely on notice that funding in September was
unlikely unless the President's policy showed significant progress.
Perhaps the Levin-Reed proponents would have rejected the other
amendments as being insufficiently forceful, but Senators never know
for sure how they will ultimately vote until there is floor debate,
careful analysis, informal discussions on the floor and corridors, and
talk in the cloakroom. Much of the Senate's productive work occurs
during quorum calls when Members hassle and jawbone on the issues.
Since so many Senators demonstratively want a change, it was at least
worth a try in daylight compared to the futile all-nighter.
Of particular interest to me were the provisions of the Warner-Lugar
proposal on having a contingency plan and redefining the mission. For
three decades, Senators Lugar and Warner have served on the Foreign
Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee, respectively, with
both rising to chairman. Their combined tenures in the Senate are more
than 60 years. To say these colleagues bring a significant amount of
thought and authority to this debate is an understatement.
Regrettably, we did not have the opportunity to debate and vote on
their proposal.
The Warner/Lugar amendment is an attempt to ensure that the U.S. is
prepared to implement changes to U.S. policy following the September
report, to be provided by General Petaeus and Ambassador Crocker, on
the progress
[[Page S10594]]
of the President's current strategy in Iraq.
The Warner-Lugar amendment recognizes that conditions in Iraq have
changed considerably since the initial invasion to topple Saddam
Hussein's regime and States that the joint resolution passed by
Congress in 2002 to authorize ``the use of the Armed Forces of the
United States against Iraq'' requires ``review and revision.''
In addition, the amendment calls for enhanced U.S. diplomatic efforts
to work with the Government of Iraq to establish a consistent
diplomatic forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties in the
Middle East. Because of the potential for the Warner-Lugar amendment to
provide a basis for a Senate consensus, I am cosponsoring this
amendment.
As explained on the floor by Senator Lugar on July 13, 2007:
The purpose of the forum would be to improve transparency
of national interests so that neighboring states and other
actors avoid missteps . . . Such a forum could facilitate
more regular contact with Syria and Iran with less drama and
rhetoric. The existence of a predictable and regular forum in
the region would be especially important for dealing with
refugee problems, regulating borders, exploring development
initiatives, and preventing conflict between the Kurds and
Turks.
This type of planning and diplomatic engagement should be occurring
today. I believe a vote confirming this could have led the President to
do that.
Prior to the 2002 U.S. invasion of Iraq, I publicly stated my
concerns about the potential fallout from such an action. On February
13, 2002, I took to the Senate floor to express my belief that there
should be a comprehensive analysis of the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein and what an invasion would amount to in terms of U.S.
casualties:
We need to know, with some greater precision, the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein with respect to weapons of mass
destruction. There also has to be an analysis of what the
costs would be, some appraisal in terms of casualties. Then
there is the issue as to what happens after Saddam Hussein is
toppled.
As I stated on the Senate floor on December 6, 2006:
It has been my view that had we known Saddam Hussein did
not have weapons of mass destruction, we would not have gone
into Iraq.
Eight months after my February 13 statement, on October 7, 2002, I
returned to the floor to express my concerns over the lack of a
comprehensive plan for Iraq:
What happens after Saddam Hussein is toppled has yet to be
answered in real detail.
What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control over
weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of
casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the
consequence in Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was
toppled? What would happen in the region, the impact on the
Arab world, and the impact on Israel?
In previous briefings, I have sought the administration
plan as to what will be done after Saddam Hussein is toppled,
and I think that is an area where a great deal more thought
needs to be given. The situation in Iraq would obviously be
contentious, with disputes between the Sunnis and the
Shi'ites, with the interests of the Kurds in an independent
state, and it means a very long-term commitment by the United
States.
Five years later, we are in the midst of a highly controversial troop
surge in Iraq.
Following the announcement of the President's plan to surge, I met
with President Bush on two occasions. Following these meetings I told
the President directly that I could not support a troop surge. I also
had extensive discussions on the President's plan with the highest
ranking members of his national security team including Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte.
I met with GEN David Petraeus on January 31, 2007, who has been
confirmed as the United States' top commander in Iraq. Following these
meetings, I was not convinced the administration possessed a
comprehensive plan to deal with the situation in Iraq and too many
uncertainties persisted to warrant my support for a surge of U.S.
personnel.
On February 5, 2007, I spoke on the Senate floor regarding the surge:
On this state of the record, I cannot support an additional
allocation of 21,500 troops because it is my judgment that
would not be material or helpful in what is going on at the
present time. This comes against the backdrop of extensive
hearings in the Armed Services Committee and Foreign
Relations Committee, and in the context of the military
having given many estimates with many of those in key command
position saying that no more troops are necessary. This comes
with the Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki saying a variety of
things but at some times saying he doesn't want any more
troops.
At this time, I have not seen a plan that sufficiently addresses a
strategy for victory in Iraq. Various reports indicate military
advisers differ on the impact of an increased troop level in Iraq. It
is not clear what the surge will ultimately accomplish and if it will
be successful. Nonetheless, there are indicators that mandate we create
contingency plans and consider other options. The Iraqi Government has
failed to deliver on prior pledges which makes me hesitant to think
they have the ability to deliver on new ones. According to many
measurements, progress in Iraq has been poor and the situation is
deteriorating. What is clear is that any solution will necessarily
include political compromises by Iraq's various sects as well as an
emphasis on a regional dialogue--something for which the Iraq Study
Group advocated.
Another proposal offered by Senators Salazar and Alexander would have
used the work of the Iraq Study Group, which was led by former
Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton,
as a guide for our policy in Iraq. This legislation garnered bipartisan
support including five Republicans and seven Democrats.
The amendment states that U.S. support should be conditioned on the
Government of Iraq's political will and substantial progress towards
national reconciliation, revision of de baathification laws, equitable
sharing of Iraqi oil revenues, free and fair provincial elections and
mechanisms to ensure the rights of woman and minorities.
Like the Warner-Lugar proposal, this amendment calls for enhanced
diplomatic efforts. Specifically, the measure calls for a new
``Diplomatic Offensive'' to deal with the problems in Iraq and the
region; energize other countries to support reconciliation in Iraq;
engage directly with the Governments of Iran and Syria to obtain their
commitment to constructive policies towards Iraq and the region,
encourage the holding of a conference in Baghdad of neighboring
countries and convey to the Iraqi Government that continued American
support is contingent upon substantial progress toward and assist in
the achievement of the milestones.
Because of the potential for the Salazar-Alexander amendment to
provide a basis for a Senate consensus, I am cosponsoring this
amendment. There is no inconsistency in cosponsoring both Warner-Lugar
and Salazar-Alexander. They complement each other.
Both the Warner-Lugar and Salazar-Alexander proposals address the
issue of diplomacy in the region. I have consistently urged the
administration to work with Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria,
in order to develop cooperative stabilization efforts. To that end, I
have met with President Bashar Assad of Syria. I have met with Iran's
Ambassadors to the United Nations, Seyed Muhammed Hadi Nejad Hosseinian
and Muhammad Javad Zarif, on four occasions in New York and Washington,
DC. Additionally, I was the only Member of Congress to attend the
September 2006 address by former President Khatami at the National
Cathedral.
During my meetings with Iranian officials, I developed a proposal for
an exchange of visits by Members of Congress to Iran and Iranian
parliamentarians to the United States to try to open dialogue between
our two countries. In January 2004, my efforts to foster such a
dialogue were successful. There was a tentative agreement for U.S.
Members of Congress to meet with Iranian parliamentarians in Geneva.
Regrettably, this parliamentary exchange never came to fruition.
In an effort to jumpstart this exchange, on May 3, 2007, I sent a
letter, with support from Senators Biden, Hagel and Dodd and
Representatives Lantos, English, Moran, Gilchrest and Meeks, to the
Speaker of Iran's Parliament suggesting we convene a meeting of U.S.
and Iranian parliamentarians.
I have amplified my strong belief that dialogue with nations such as
Iran and Syria is necessary in an extensive Senate speech on June 16,
2006 and most recently in an essay ``Dialogue
[[Page S10595]]
With Adversaries'' published in the winter edition of The Washington
Quarterly. While we can't be sure that dialogue will succeed, we can be
sure that without dialogue there will be failure.
I am not alone in calling for enhanced dialogue with U.S.
adversaries. Of the many suggestions gleaned from the Baker-Hamilton
commission, one passage crystallizes their conclusion:
Our most important recommendations call for new and
enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the
region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in
Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its
combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these
two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one
another.
However, the President's plan places a disproportionate emphasis on
military force while neglecting the needed diplomacy and political
efforts.
Having served in the Senate for 26 years, holding the chairmanship of
the Intelligence Committee and senior positions on the Appropriations
subcommittees on Defense and Foreign Operations, I am aware of what
challenges nations like Iran and Syria pose to the United States. A
world in which Iran seeks nuclear weapons and supports terrorist groups
such as Hezbollah is not a safe world. A world in which Syria provides
refuge for Hamas and Hezbollah and permits its territory to be used as
a conduit for terrorism is counterproductive to peace and stability. I
expressed my views on the danger the connectivity between Iran, Syria
and Hezbollah poses to peace and security in an August 2, 2006, floor
statement.
Today, however, Americans are not dying from nuclear weapons or from
direct attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah. Many are dying policing a civil
conflict.
President Assad, during our December 2006 meeting in Damascus,
suggested that a conference with regional players and the United States
would be beneficial to addressing the issues confronting Iraq. On
January 22, 2007, I conveyed this proposal and my support for it to
Secretary Rice in a meeting in her office at the State Department. One
month later, on February 27, 2007, during her testimony before the
Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Rice announced such a
proposal:
Before I discuss our specific request for Iraq, I would
like to take this opportunity to announce a new diplomatic
initiative relating to Iraq's future. I am pleased to tell
Members of Congress that there is now being formed a
neighbors' conference to support Iraq. Invitees will include
Iraq's immediate neighbors, as well as representatives
from other regional states, multilateral organizations,
and the UN Permanent Five (the U.S., France, Britain,
Russia and China). I would note that both Syria and Iran
are among Iraq's neighbors invited to attend.
The violence occurring within Iraq has a decided impact on
Iraq's neighbors. Iraq's neighbors have a clear role to play
in helping Iraq to move forward, and this conference will
provide a needed forum in order to do just that.
Very little has happened to effectuate that ``new diplomatic
initiative.'' The Iraq Study Group clearly states:
Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events
within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the
United States should try to engage them constructively.
It would have been my hope that these types of meetings would have
occurred frequently in the intervening months. However, I am pleased
that the President has recently indicated a commitment to ramp up
diplomatic efforts in the region.
Had there been Senate consideration and debate on the Warner-Lugar
and Salazar-Alexander proposals, there would have been an opportunity
for more senators to explicitly put the President on notice that
funding beyond September was in jeopardy without significant
improvement.
I think this time would have also allowed Members to share concerns
about the overall struggle to combat terrorism. While considering U.S.
policy in Iraq, it is important we do not neglect other threats to U.S.
security.
Waziristan is a semi-autonomous tribal region in Pakistan's
mountainous Northwest Frontier province that shares a porous border
with Afghanistan. It is populated primarily by ethnic Pashtuns who do
not recognize the authority of President Musharrafs government in
Islamabad. Many of the Taliban who fled Afghanistan in 2001 found safe
haven in Waziristan with their Pashtun brethren.
Some accounts, including the 9/11 Commission report, indicate
Pakistan's willingness to assist the United States. Following direct
U.S. engagement with Pakistan after the September 11 attacks, the 9/11
Commission report stated that, ``Secretary of State Powell announced at
the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had
agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terrorism.''
However, that was 6 years ago. According to the Congressional
Research Service, CRS, ``Despite clear successes in disrupting al-Qaida
and affiliated networks in Pakistan since 2001, there are increasing
signs that anti-U.S. terrorists are now benefiting from what some
analysts call a Pakistani policy of appeasement in western tribal areas
near the Afghan border.''
GEN Pervez Musharraf took a largely hands-off approach to the region
after signing a truce with tribal leaders in September 2006. The truce
came after 4 years of unsuccessful army operations into the region in
which the government forces suffered heavy casualties and achieved
little. Some accounts indicate this policy has enhanced al-Qaida's
abilities: ``By seeking accommodation with pro-Taliban leaders in these
areas, the Musharraf government appears to have inadvertently allowed
foreign (largely Arab) militants to obtain safe haven from which they
can plot and train for terrorist attacks against U.S. and other Western
targets.''
Assistant Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher confirmed that al-
Qaida thrived under the truce between the tribal leaders and General
Musharraf: ``they were able to operate, meet, plan, recruit, and obtain
financing in more comfort in the tribal areas than previously.''
Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, who
served for 29 years with the CIA and held various positions such as
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East
Affairs at the National Security Council, 1997-2002, stated in his May/
June 2007 essay in Foreign Affairs:
Al Qaeda is a more dangerous enemy today than it has ever
been before and the organization now has a solid base of
operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective
franchise in western Iraq.
Riedel further suggests that:
The United States and its partners, including NATO, also
need to take a firmer position with the Pakistani government
to enlist its help in tracking down al-Qaeda leaders.
President Pervez Musharraf has taken some important steps
against al-Qaeda, especially after its attempts to
assassinate him, and he has promised more than once a full
crackdown on extremism. But mostly he has sought to tame
jihadists--without much success--and his government has
tolerated those who harbor bin Laden and his lieutenants,
Taliban fighters and their Afghan fellow travelers, and
Kashmiri terrorists. Many senior Pakistani politicians say
privately that they believe Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) still has extensive links to bin Laden;
some even claim it harbors him. Apprehending a few al-Qaeda
officers would not be enough, and so a systematic crackdown
on all terrorists--Arab, Afghan, and Kashmiri--is critical.
Hence, Pakistan should no longer be rewarded for its
selective counterterrorism efforts.
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has provided Pakistan
with roughly $9 billion in aid. According to the Congressional Research
Service, CRS:
The outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11,
while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither
neutralized anti-Western militants and reduced religious
extremism in that country, nor have they tributed
sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan.
As Congress considers administration's request for an additional $785
million for fiscal year 2008, it is incumbent upon us to evaluate our
relationship with them and their performance in the war on terror.
Waziristan provides al-Qaida with much of what it lost in Afghanistan
after September 11, 2001: safe haven; territory to train and base
operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and beyond; and a populace
sympathetic to their aims. Failing to recognize and address the
situation in Waziristan risks negating the costly advances made in
Afghanistan over the past 6 years and jeopardizes U.S. security.
As the Senate continues to deliberate, it is my hope that we will
return to the proposals offered by Senators Warner, Lugar, Salazar and
Alexander. These should have been debated in great length as they make
more
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sense in the context of not infringing on the President's authority as
Commander in Chief. Rather, these bipartisan efforts would allow the
President to fulfill a congressional requirement that he ought to be
considering and planning for the next steps.
The Senate is known as the most deliberative body in the world.
Regrettably, the Senate was not permitted the opportunity to
demonstrate this as we did not debate the various options before us.
As I stated on the Senate floor on March 14, 2007, during a similar
debate on whether to continue with the status quo in Iraq or to
legislate a date certain for withdraw:
It is equally undesirable, however, to view the current
situation in Iraq, which looks like an endless tunnel--a
tunnel without a light at the end. We are faced with very
considerable discomfort in this body. I think it is very
important that we debate this matter, that we exchange our
views, that we stimulate discussion that will go beyond this
Chamber and will resound throughout the country, resound
throughout the editorial pages and the television and radio
talk shows, and by our colleagues in the corridors and in the
cloakroom so that we can try to work our way through an
extraordinarily difficult situation where, as I see it, there
is no good answer between the two intractable alternatives to
set a timetable where our opponents simply have to wait us
out or to keep proceeding down a tunnel which, at least at
this juncture, appears to be endless and has no light. We
don't know where the end is, let alone to have a light at the
end of the tunnel.
In a democracy, the voters ultimately decide U.S. policy. As detailed
in Federalist No. 57, elected representatives must be responsive to the
people:
Duty gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords
by which [representatives] will be bound to fidelity and
sympathy with the great mass of the people. Hence, the House
of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the
people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the
mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of
power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment
when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is
to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level
from which they were raised; there forever to remain
unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have
established their title to a renewal of it.
If this is not understood and reflected by elected representatives,
the framers placed elections into the system to remind them. Federalist
No. 57 further states:
The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic
policy of republican government . . . The means relied on in
this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are
numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a
limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a
proper responsibility to the people.
This was the case last November when the electorate spoke loudly
disagreeing with United States policy in Iraq. As I stated on March 14,
2007:
Last November, the American people spoke in a resounding
manner, in a way that could only rationally be interpreted as
rejecting the conduct of the war in Iraq.
I am making this extensive floor statement at this time to put the
administration on notice of my reservations on supporting open-ended
appropriations for the Iraq war in September. This statement further
urges the majority leader to structure the Senate debate in September
to consider the Warner-Lugar amendment, the Salazar-Alexander
amendment, and other possible amendments, as well as the Levin-Reed
amendment, to give the Senate the full range of alternatives to provide
the basis for 60 or more votes to change U.S. policy in Iraq.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, during the recent debate of the Defense
authorization bill, we saw attempt after attempt to declare the new
strategy, General Petraeus' strategy, in Iraq a failure. The other side
of the aisle wanted to declare that the strategy, which had been in
full force only a couple of weeks, had failed and direct the President
to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq, which is today the central front
in the war against terrorists. Indeed, after the other side lost a vote
to withdraw the troops, the majority leader pulled the bill from the
floor, thus leaving important business for our military unfinished.
The Democratic majority's insistence that the General Petraeus'
strategy has failed makes it easy to overlook what the strategy has
accomplished and what the strategy seeks to accomplish.
In that regard, I ask unanimous consent to have an article by Michael
Gordon from New York Times of July 24 printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From nytimes.com, July 24, 2007]
U.S. Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least '09
(By Michael R. Gordon)
Baghdad, July 23.--While Washington is mired in political
debate over the future of Iraq, the American command here has
prepared a detailed plan that foresees a significant American
role for the next two years.
The classified plan, which represents the coordinated
strategy of the top American commander and the American
ambassador, calls for restoring security in local areas,
including Baghdad, by the summer of 2008. ``Sustainable
security'' is to be established on a nationwide basis by the
summer of 2009, according to American officials familiar with
the document.
The detailed document, known as the Joint Campaign Plan, is
an elaboration of the new strategy President Bush signaled in
January when he decided to send five additional American
combat brigades and other units to Iraq. That signaled a
shift from the previous strategy, which emphasized
transferring to Iraqis the responsibility for safeguarding
their security.
That new approach put a premium on protecting the Iraqi
population in Baghdad, on the theory that improved security
would provide Iraqi political leaders with the breathing
space they needed to try political reconciliation.
The latest plan, which covers a two-year period, does not
explicitly address troop levels or withdrawal schedules. It
anticipates a decline in American forces as the ``surge'' in
troops runs its course later this year or in early 2008. But
it nonetheless assumes continued American involvement to
train soldiers, act as partners with Iraqi forces and fight
terrorist groups in Iraq, American officials said.
The goals in the document appear ambitious, given the
immensity of the challenge of dealing with die-hard Sunni
insurgents, renegade Shiite militias, Iraqi leaders who have
made only fitful progress toward political reconciliation, as
well as Iranian and Syrian neighbors who have not hesitated
to interfere in Iraq's affairs. And the White House's interim
assessment of progress, issued on July 12, is mixed.
But at a time when critics at home are defining patience in
terms of weeks, the strategy may run into the expectations of
many lawmakers for an early end to the American mission here.
The plan, developed by Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior
American commander, and Ryan C. Crocker, the American
ambassador, has been briefed to Defense Secretary Robert M.
Gates and Adm. William J. Fallon, the head of the Central
Command. It is expected to be formally issued to officials
here this week.
The plan envisions two phases. The ``near-term'' goal is to
achieve ``localized security'' in Baghdad and other areas no
later than June 2008. It envisions encouraging political
accommodations at the local level, including with former
insurgents, while pressing Iraq's leaders to make headway on
their program of national reconciliation.
The ``intermediate'' goal is to stitch together such local
arrangements to establish a broader sense of security on a
nationwide basis no later than June 2009.
``The coalition, in partnership with the government of
Iraq, employs integrated political, security, economic and
diplomatic means, to help the people of Iraq achieve
sustainable security by the summer of 2009,'' a summary of
the campaign plan states.
Military officials here have been careful not to guarantee
success, and recognized they may need to revise the plan if
some assumptions were not met.
``The idea behind the surge was to bring stability and
security to the Iraqi people, primarily in Baghdad because it
is the political heart of the country, and by so doing give
the Iraqis the time and space needed to come to grips with
the tough issues they face and enable reconciliation to take
place,'' said Col. Peter Mansoor, the executive officer to
General Petraeus.
``If eventually the Iraqi government and the various sects
and groups do not come to some sort of agreement on how to
share power, on how to divide resources and on how to
reconcile and stop the violence, then the assumption on which
the surge strategy was based is invalid, and we would have to
re-look the strategy,'' Colonel Mansoor added.
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will provide an
assessment in September on trends in Iraq and whether the
strategy is viable or needs to be changed.
The previous plan, developed by Gen. George W. Casey Jr.,
who served as General Petraeus's predecessor before being
appointed as chief of staff of the Army, was aimed at
prompting the Iraqis to take more responsibility for security
by reducing American forces.
That approach faltered when the Iraqi security forces
showed themselves unprepared to carry out their expanded
duties, and sectarian killings soared.
In contrast, the new approach reflects the
counterinsurgency precept that protection of the population
is the best way to isolate insurgents, encourage political
accommodations and gain intelligence on numerous
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threats. A core assumption of the plan is that American
troops cannot impose a military solution, but that the United
States can use force to create the conditions in which
political reconciliation is possible.
To develop the plan, General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker assembled a Joint Strategic Assessment Team, which
sought to define the conflict and outline the elements of a
new strategy. It included officers like Col. H. R. McMaster,
the field commander who carried out the successful ``clear,
hold and build'' operation in Tal Afar and who wrote a
critical account of the Joint Chiefs of Staff role during the
Vietnam War; Col. John R. Martin, who teaches at the Army War
College and was a West Point classmate of General Petraeus;
and David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency expert
who has a degree in anthropology.
State Department officials, including Robert Ford, an Arab
expert and the American ambassador to Algeria, were also
involved. So were a British officer and experts outside
government like Stephen D. Biddle, a military expert at the
Council on Foreign Relations.
The team determined that Iraq was in a ``communal struggle
for power,'' in the words of one senior officer who
participated in the effort. Adding to the problem, the new
Iraqi government was struggling to unite its disparate
factions and to develop the capability to deliver basic
services and provide security.
Extremists were fueling the violence, as were nations like
Iran, which they concluded was arming and equipping Shiite
militant groups, and Syria, which was allowing suicide
bombers to cross into Iraq.
Like the Baker-Hamilton commission, which issued its report
last year, the team believed that political, military and
economic efforts were needed, including diplomatic
discussions with Iran, officials said. There were different
views about how aggressive to be in pressing for the removal
of overtly sectarian officials, and several officials said
that theme was toned down somewhat in the final plan.
The plan itself was written by the Joint Campaign Redesign
Team, an allusion to the fact that the plan inherited from
General Casey was being reworked. Much of the redesign has
already been put into effect, including the decision to
move troops out of large bases and to act as partners more
fully with the Iraqi security forces.
The overarching goal, an American official said, is to
advance political accommodation and avoid undercutting the
authority of the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.
While the plan seeks to achieve stability, several officials
said it anticipates that less will be accomplished in terms
of national reconciliation by the end of 2009 than did the
plan developed by General Casey.
The plan also emphasizes encouraging political
accommodation at the local level. The command has established
a team to oversee efforts to reach out to former insurgents
and tribal leaders. It is dubbed the Force Strategic
Engagement Cell, and is overseen by a British general. In the
terminology of the plan, the aim is to identify potentially
``reconcilable'' groups and encourage them to move away from
violence.
However, groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a Sunni Arab
extremist group that American intelligence officials say has
foreign leadership, and cells backed by Iran are seen as
implacable foes.
``You are not out there trying to defeat your enemies
wholesale,'' said one military official who is knowledgable
about the plan. ``You are out there trying to draw them into
a negotiated power-sharing agreement where they decide to
quit fighting you. They don't decide that their conflict is
over. The reasons for conflict remain, but they quit trying
to address it through violence. In the end, we hope that that
alliance of convenience to fight with Al Qaeda becomes a
connection to the central government as well.''
The hope is that sufficient progress might be made at the
local level to encourage accommodation at the national level,
and vice versa. The plan also calls for efforts to encourage
the rule of law, such as the establishment of secure zones in
Baghdad and other cities to promote criminal trials and
process detainee cases.
To help measure progress in tamping down civil strife, Col.
William Rapp, a senior aide to General Petraeus, oversaw an
effort to develop a standardized measure of sectarian
violence. One result was a method that went beyond the
attacks noted in American military reports and which
incorporated Iraqi data.
``We are going to try a dozen different things,'' said one
senior officer. ``Maybe one of them will flatline. One of
them will do this much. One of them will do this much more.
After a while, we believe there is chance you will head into
success. I am not saying that we are absolutely headed for
success.''
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wanted to insert this article in the Record
because it provides an objective description of the Petraeus plan and
how it came to be. The goals of the strategy are ``ambitious,'' as the
article notes, but that is all the more reason to support the plan and
not undermine it in the Senate.
Those who have criticized the surge at this early stage have offered
few options for dealing with the aftermath. One option is to follow the
recommendation of the Baker-Hamilton Commission.
At this point, I request unanimous consent to print in the Record a
column by Steven Biddle that appeared in the July 11 Washington Post.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record as follows:
[From washingtonpost.com, July 11]
Iraq: Go Deep or Get Out
(By Stephen Biddle)
The president's shaky political consensus for the surge in
Iraq is in danger of collapsing after the recent defections
of prominent Senate Republicans such as Richard Lugar (Ind.),
Pete Domenici (N.M.) and George Voinovich (Ohio). But this
growing opposition to the surge has not yet translated into
support for outright withdrawal--few lawmakers are
comfortable with abandoning Iraq or admitting defeat. The
result has been a search for some kind of politically
moderate ``Plan B'' that would split the difference between
surge and withdrawal.
The problem is that these politics do not fit the military
reality of Iraq. Many would like to reduce the U.S.
commitment to something like half of today's troop presence
there. But it is much harder to find a mission for the
remaining 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers that makes any sense
militarily.
Perhaps the most popular centrist option today is drawn
from the Baker-Hamilton commission recommendations of last
December. This would withdraw U.S. combat brigades, shift the
American mission to one of training and supporting the Iraqi
security forces, and cut total U.S. troop levels in the
country by about half. This idea is at the heart of the
proposed legislative effort that Domenici threw his support
behind last week, and support is growing on both sides of the
aisle on Capitol Hill.
The politics make sense, but the compromise leaves us with
an untenable military mission. Without a major U.S. combat
effort to keep the violence down, the American training
effort would face challenges even bigger than those our
troops are confronting today. An ineffective training effort
would leave tens of thousands of American trainers, advisers
and supporting troops exposed to that violence in the
meantime. The net result is likely to be continued U.S.
casualties with little positive effect on Iraq's ongoing
civil war.
The American combat presence in Iraq is insufficient to end
the violence but does cap its intensity. If we draw down that
combat presence, violence will rise accordingly. To be
effective, embedded trainers and advisers must live and
operate with the Iraqi soldiers they mentor--they are not
lecturers sequestered in some safe classroom. The greater the
violence, the riskier their jobs and the heavier their
losses.
That violence reduces their ability to succeed as trainers.
There are many barriers to an effective Iraqi security force.
But the toughest is sectarian factionalism. Iraq is in the
midst of a civil war in which all Iraqis are increasingly
forced to take sides for their own survival. Iraq's security
forces are necessarily drawn from the same populations that
are being pulled apart into factions. No military can be
hermetically sealed off from its society--the more severe the
sectarian violence, the deeper the divisions in Iraqi society
become and the harder it is for Americans to create the kind
of disinterested nationalist security force that could
stabilize Iraq. Under the best conditions, it is unrealistic
to expect a satisfactory Iraqi security force anytime soon,
and the more severe the violence, the worse the prospects.
The result is a vicious cycle. The more we shift out of
combat missions and into training, the harder we make the
trainers' job and the more exposed they become. It is
unrealistic to expect that we can pull back to some safe yet
productive mission of training but not fighting--this would
be neither safe nor productive.
If the surge is unacceptable, the better option is to cut
our losses and withdraw altogether. In fact, the substantive
case for either extreme--surge or outright withdrawal--is
stronger than for any policy between. The surge is a long-
shot gamble. But middle-ground options leave us with the
worst of both worlds: continuing casualties but even less
chance of stability in exchange. Moderation and centrism are
normally the right instincts in American politics, and many
lawmakers in both parties desperately want to find a workable
middle ground on Iraq. But while the politics are right, the
military logic is not.
Mr. KYL. Mr. Biddle provides a need evaluation of the flaws in the
Baker-Hamilton. Among those flaws, as he explains, our combat forces
are restraining the intensity of the violence in Iraq, and removing
them would cause the violence to rise. This rise in violence would put
the safety of Americans who remain to train Iraqis in even greater
jeopardy.
Of course, prematurely withdrawing our troops would have many other
consequences. Indeed, a sobering assessment of the risks of withdrawal
is too often missing from debates about the U.S. mission in Iraq.
[[Page S10598]]
In this regard, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the July
17 Washington Post be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record as follows:
[From the Washington Post, July 17, 2007]
Exit Strategy: Would Iran Take Over Iraq, Would Al-Qaeda? The Debate
About How and When to Leave Centers on What Might Happen After the U.S.
Goes
(By Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks)
If U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraq in the near
future, three developments would be likely to unfold.
Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically
mixed areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would
erupt in civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish
north would solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop
presence there. In short, Iraq would effectively become
three separate nations.
That was the conclusion reached in recent ``war games''
exercises conducted for the U.S. military by retired Marine
Col. Gary Anderson. ``I honestly don't think it will be
apocalyptic,'' said Anderson, who has served in Iraq and now
works for a major defense contractor. But ``it will be
ugly.''
In making the case for a continued U.S. troop presence,
President Bush has offered far more dire forecasts, arguing
that al-Qaeda or Iran--or both--would take over Iraq after a
``precipitous withdrawal'' of U.S. forces. Al-Qaeda, he said
recently, would ``be able to recruit better and raise more
money from which to launch their objectives'' of attacking
the U.S. homeland. War opponents in Congress counter that
Bush's talk about al-Qaeda is overblown fear-mongering and
that nothing could be worse than the present situation.
Increasingly, the Washington debate over when U.S. forces
should leave is centering on what would happen once they do.
The U.S. military, aware of this political battlefield, has
been quietly exploring scenarios of a reduced troop presence,
performing role-playing exercises and studying historical
parallels. Would the Iraqi government find its way, or would
the country divide along sectarian lines? Would al-Qaeda take
over? Would Iran? Would U.S. security improve or deteriorate?
Does the answer depend on when, how and how many U.S. troops
depart?
Some military officers contend that, regardless of whether
Iraq breaks apart or outside actors seek to take over after a
U.S. pullout, ever greater carnage is inevitable. ``The
water-cooler chat I hear most often . . . is that there is
going to be an outbreak of violence when we leave that makes
the [current] instability look like a church picnic,'' said
an officer who has served in Iraq.
However, just as few envisioned the long Iraq war, now in
its fifth year, or the many setbacks along the way, there are
no firm conclusions regarding the consequences of a reduction
in U.S. troops. A senior administration official closely
involved in Iraq policy imagines a vast internecine slaughter
as Iraq descends into chaos but cautions that it is
impossible to know the outcome. ``We've got to be very modest
about our predictive capabilities,'' the official said.
Mistakes of the Past
In April of last year, the Army and Joint Forces Command
sponsored a war game called Unified Quest 2007 at the Army
War College in Pennsylvania. It assumed the partition of an
``Iraq-like'' country, said one player, retired Army Col.
Richard Sinnreich, with U.S. troops moving quickly out of the
capital to redeploy in the far north and south. ``We have
obligations to the Kurds and the Kuwaitis, and they also
offer the most stable and secure locations from which to
continue,'' he said.
``Even then, the end-of-game assessment wasn't very
favorable'' to the United States, he said.
Anderson, the retired Marine, has conducted nearly a dozen
Iraq-related war games for the military over the past two
years, many premised on a U.S. combat pullout by a set date--
leaving only advisers and support units--and concluded that
partition would result. The games also predicted that Iran
would intervene on one side of a Shiite civil war and would
become bogged down in southern Iraq.
T.X. Hammes, another retired Marine colonel, said that an
extended Iranian presence in Iraq could lead to increased
intervention by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states on the
other side. ``If that happens,'' Hammes said, ``I worry that
the Iranians come to the conclusion they have to do something
to undercut . . . the Saudis.'' Their best strategy, he said,
``would be to stimulate insurgency among the Shiites in Saudi
Arabia.''
In a secret war game conducted in December at an office
building near the Pentagon, more than 20 participants from
the military, the CIA, the State Department and the private
sector spent three days examining what might unfold if the
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group were implemented.
One question involved how Syria and Iran might respond to
the U.S. diplomatic outreach proposed by the bipartisan
group, headed by former secretary of state James A. Baker III
and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.). The gamers
concluded that Iran would be difficult to engage because its
divided government is incapable of delivering on its
promises. Role-players representing Syria did engage with the
U.S. diplomats, but linked helping out in Baghdad to a
lessening of U.S. pressure in Lebanon.
The bottom line, one participant said, was ``pretty much
what we are seeing'' since the Bush administration began
intermittent talks with Damascus and Tehran: not much
progress or tangible results.
Amid political arguments in Washington over troop
departures, U.S. military commanders on the ground stress the
importance of developing a careful and thorough withdrawal
plan. Whatever the politicians decide, ``it needs to be well-
thought-out and it cannot be a strategy that is based on
`Well, we need to leave,' '' Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin Mixon, a
top U.S. commander in Iraq, said Friday from his base near
Tikrit.
History is replete with bad withdrawal outcomes. Among the
most horrific was the British departure from Afghanistan in
1842, when 16,500 active troops and civilians left Kabul
thinking they had safe passage to India. Two weeks later,
only one European arrived alive in Jalalabad, near the
Afghan-Indian border.
The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, which began
in May 1988 after a decade of occupation, reveals other
mistakes to avoid. Like the U.S. troops who arrived in Iraq
in 2003, the Soviet force in Afghanistan was overwhelmingly
conventional, heavy with tanks and other armored vehicles.
Once Moscow made public its plans to leave, the political and
security situations unraveled much faster than anticipated.
``The Soviet Army actually had to fight out of certain
areas,'' said Army Maj. Daniel Morgan, a two-tour veteran of
the Iraq war who has been studying the Soviet pullout at Fort
Leavenworth, Kan., with an eye toward gleaning lessons for
Iraq. ``As a matter of fact, they had to airlift out of
Kandahar, the fighting was so bad.''
War supporters and opponents in Washington disagree on the
lessons of the departure most deeply imprinted on the
American psyche: the U.S. exit from Vietnam. ``I saw it once
before, a long time ago,'' Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a
Vietnam veteran and presidential candidate, said last week of
an early Iraq withdrawal. ``I saw a defeated military, and I
saw how long it took a military that was defeated to
recover.''
Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), also a White House
hopeful, finds a different message in the Vietnam retreat.
Saying that Baghdad would become ``Saigon revisited,'' he
warned that ``we will be lifting American personnel off the
roofs of buildings in the Green Zone if we do not change
policy, and pretty drastically.''
The Al-Qaeda Threat
What is perhaps most striking about the military's
simulations is that its post-drawdown scenarios focus on
civil war and regional intervention and upheaval rather than
the establishment of an al-Qaeda sanctuary in Iraq.
For Bush, however, that is the primary risk of withdrawal.
``It would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al-
Qaeda,'' he said in a news conference last week. ``It would
mean that we'd be risking mass killings on a horrific scale.
It would mean we'd allow the terrorists to establish a safe
haven in Iraq to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan.''
If U.S. troops leave too soon, Bush said, they would probably
``have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that
is even more dangerous.''
Withdrawal would also ``confuse and frighten friends and
allies in the region and embolden Syria and especially Iran,
which would then exert its influence throughout the Middle
East,'' the president said.
Bush is not alone in his description of the al-Qaeda threat
should the United States leave Iraq too soon. ``There's not a
doubt in my mind that Osama bin Laden's one goal is to take
over the Kingdom of the Two Mosques [Saudi Arabia] and
reestablish the caliphate'' that ended with the Ottoman
Empire, said a former senior military official now at a
Washington think tank. ``It would be very easy for them to
set up camps and run them in Anbar and Najaf'' provinces in
Iraq.
U.S. intelligence analysts, however, have a somewhat
different view of al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, noting that
the local branch takes its inspiration but not its orders
from bin Laden. Its enemies--the overwhelming majority of
whom are Iraqis--reside in Baghdad and Shiite-majority areas
of Iraq, not in Saudi Arabia or the United States. While
intelligence officials have described the Sunni insurgent
group calling itself al-Qaeda in Iraq as an ``accelerant''
for violence, they have cited domestic sectarian divisions
as the main impediment to peace.
In a report released yesterday, Anthony H. Cordesman of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that
al-Qaeda is ``only one part'' of a spectrum of Sunni
extremist groups and is far from the largest or most active.
Military officials have said in background briefings that al-
Qaeda is responsible for about 15 percent of the attacks,
Cordesman said, although the group is ``highly effective''
and probably does ``the most damage in pushing Iraq towards
civil war.'' But its activities ``must be kept in careful
perspective, and it does not dominate the Sunni insurgency,''
he said.
`Serious Consequences'
Moderate lawmakers such as Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.)
have concluded that a unified Iraqi government is not on the
near horizon and have called for redeployment, change of
mission and a phased drawdown of
[[Page S10599]]
U.S. forces. Far from protecting U.S. interests, Lugar said
in a recent speech, the continuation of Bush's policy poses
``extreme risks for U.S. national security.''
Critics of complete withdrawal often charge that ``those
advocating [it] just don't understand the serious
consequences of doing so,'' said Wayne White, a former deputy
director of Near East division of the State Department's
Intelligence and Research Bureau. ``Unfortunately, most of us
old Middle East hands understand all too well some of the
consequences.''
White is among many Middle East experts who think that the
United States should leave Iraq sooner rather than later, but
differ on when, how and what would happen next. Most agree
that either an al-Qaeda or Iranian takeover would be
unlikely, and say that Washington should step up its regional
diplomacy, putting more pressure on regional actors such as
Saudi Arabia to take responsibility for what is happening in
their back yards.
Many regional experts within and outside the administration
note that while there is a range of truly awful
possibilities, it is impossible to predict what will happen
in Iraq--with or without U.S. troops.
``Say the Shiites drive the Sunnis into Anbar,'' one expert
said of Anderson's war-game scenario. ``Well, what does that
really mean? How many tens of thousands of people are going
to get killed before all the surviving Sunnis are in Anbar?''
He questioned whether that result would prove acceptable to a
pro-withdrawal U.S. public.
White, speaking at a recent symposium on Iraq, addressed
the possibility of unpalatable withdrawal consequences by
paraphrasing Winston Churchill's famous statement about
democracy. ``I posit that withdrawal from Iraq is the worst
possible option, except for all the others.''
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, a premature withdrawal would have severe
consequences, all of which would pose severe risks. Clearly, we should
allow General Petraeus's plan time to succeed.
Finally, Mr. President, as I noted previously, by setting the aside
the Defense authorization bill because he lost a vote to withdraw our
troops, the Majority Leader left important business for our military
undone. Recently, the Senate passed parts of the bill--a pay raise and
``wounded warriors'' provisions--but more needs to be done.
For instance, the Defense authorization bill should be the vehicle
for setting our national security priorities, one of which is how we
should deal with antisatellite weapons the Chinese could use against
us.
I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that an article on China's space
weapons that appeared in the July 23 Wall Street Journal be inserted
into the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2007]
China's Space Weapons
(By Ashley J. Tellis)
On Jan. 11, 2007, a Chinese medium-range ballistic missile
slammed into an aging weather satellite in space. The
resulting collision not only marked Beijing's first
successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test but, in the eyes of
many, also a head-on collision with the Bush administration's
space policies.
As one analyst phrased it, U.S. policy has compelled
China's leaders to conclude ``that only a display of
Beijing's power to launch . . . an arms race would bring
Washington to the table to hear their concerns.'' This view,
which is widespread in the U.S. and elsewhere, misses the
point: China's ASAT demonstration was not a protest against
the Bush administration, but rather part of a maturing
strategy designed to counter the overall military superiority
of the U.S.
Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese strategists have
been cognizant of the fact that the U.S. is the only country
in the world with the capacity--and possibly the intention--
to thwart China's rise to great power status. They also
recognize that Beijing will be weak militarily for some time
to come, yet must be prepared for a possible war with America
over Taiwan or, in the longer term, over what Aaron Friedberg
once called ``the struggle for mastery in Asia.'' How the
weaker can defeat the stronger, therefore, becomes the
central problem facing China's military strategy.
Chinese strategists have struggled to find ways of solving
this conundrum ever since the dramatic demonstration of
American prowess in Operation Desert Storm. And after
carefully analyzing U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf,
Kosovo and Afghanistan, they believe they have uncovered a
significant weakness.
The advanced military might of the U.S. is inordinately
dependent on a complex network of space-based command,
control, communications, and computer-driven intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that enables
American forces to detect different kinds of targets and
exchange militarily relevant information. This network is key
to the success of American combat operations. These assets,
however, are soft and defenseless; while they bestow on the
American military definite asymmetric advantages, they are
also the source of deep vulnerability. Consequently, Chinese
strategists concluded that any effort to defeat the U.S.
should aim not at its fundamental strength--its capacity to
deliver overwhelming conventional firepower precisely from
long distances--but rather at its Achilles' heel, namely, its
satellites and their related ground installations.
Consistent with this calculus, China has pursued, for over
a decade now, a variety of space warfare programs, which
include direct attack and directed-energy weapons, electronic
attack, and computer-network and ground-attack systems. These
efforts are aimed at giving China the capacity to attack U.S.
space systems comprehensively because, in Chinese
calculations, this represents the best way of ``leveling the
playing field'' in the event of a future conflict.
The importance of space denial for China's operational
success implies that its counterspace investments, far from
being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space
regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing
against superior American military power. Because having this
capacity is critical to Chinese security, Beijing will not
entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade
away its space-denial capabilities. This would only further
accentuate the military advantages of its competitors. For
China to do otherwise would be to condemn its armed forces to
inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power.
This is why arms-control advocates are wrong even when they
are right. Any ``weaponization'' of space will indeed be
costly and especially dangerous to the U.S., which relies
heavily on space for military superiority, economic growth
and strategic stability. Space arms-control advocates are
correct when they emphasize that advanced powers stand to
gain disproportionately from any global regime that protects
their space assets. Yet they are wrong when they insist that
such a regime is attainable and, therefore, ought to be
pursued.
Weaker but significant challengers, like China, simply
cannot permit the creation of such a space sanctuary because
of its deleterious consequences for their particular
interests. Consequently, even though a treaty protecting
space assets would be beneficial to Washington, its specific
costs to Beijing--in the context of executing China's
national military strategy--would be remarkably high.
Beijing's attitude toward space arms control will change
only given a few particular developments. China might acquire
the capacity to defeat the U.S. despite America's privileged
access to space. Or China's investments in counterspace
technology might begin to yield diminishing returns because
the U.S. consistently nullifies these capabilities through
superior technology and operational practices. Or China's own
dependence on space for strategic and economic reasons might
intensify to the point where the threat posed by any American
offensive counterspace programs exceed the benefits accruing
to Beijing's own comparable efforts. Or the risk of conflict
between a weaker China and any other superior military power,
such as the U.S., disappears entirely.
Since these conditions will not be realized anytime soon,
Washington should certainly discuss space security with
Beijing, but, for now, it should not expect that negotiation
will yield any successful agreements. Instead, the U.S.
should accelerate investments in solutions that enhance the
security of its space assets, in addition to developing its
own offensive counterspace capabilities. These avenues--as
the Bush administration has correctly recognized--offer the
promise of protecting American interests in space and
averting more serious threats to its global primacy.
Mr. KYL. I asked that this article be printed in the Record because
it is a wake-up call to a new threat we need to take seriously. By
setting aside the Defense authorization bill, we missed an opportunity
to deal with this threat from China.
____________________