[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 124 (Tuesday, July 31, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H9219-H9222]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2007

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 
579, proceedings will now resume on the bill (H.R. 2831) to amend title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to clarify that a discriminatory 
compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such 
Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other 
purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. When proceedings were postponed on Monday, 
July 30, 2007, 6 minutes remained in debate.
  The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. McKeon) each control 3 minutes.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, in order to speak in favor of this 
restoration of the law, I am pleased to acknowledge the majority leader 
of the House for 1 minute.
  Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman.
  Madam Speaker, when the Supreme Court wrongly decides a case, as they 
do from time to time, particularly when congressional intent is at 
issue, the United States Congress can and should act to remedy it. That 
is precisely what this carefully crafted measured legislation, the 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, is designed to do.
  I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), and I thank the 
ranking member as well for the work that they do on this committee.
  Make no mistake. The Court's 5-4 decision on May 29 in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear was wrongly decided. The merits of Lilly Ledbetter's wage 
discrimination claim seemed beyond doubt. A Federal jury agreed that 
she was discriminated against. The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission agreed with Ms. Ledbetter's claims, although the Bush 
administration switched its position once the case got to the Supreme 
Court.
  Most importantly, Lilly Ledbetter was paid less than all of her male 
counterparts, all of her male counterparts, even those who had less 
seniority. This clearly was not a case where her performance was 
suspect. Goodyear gave her a top performance award in 1996.
  The fact is, the Court majority took an extremely cramped view of the 
title VII of the Civil Rights Act, holding that Ms. Ledbetter and 
claimants like her must file their pay discrimination claims within 180 
days of the original discriminatory act. In other words, even if the 
discriminatory acts continued, every week, every biweek, every month, 
that they would have to look back to the original first check.
  There are at least three serious problems with the Court's flawed 
analysis. First, the unlawful discrimination against Ms. Ledbetter did 
not begin and end with Goodyear's original decision to pay her less 
than they paid her male counterparts.
  In fact, every paycheck that Lilly Ledbetter received after 
Goodyear's decision to pay her less was a continuing manifestation of 
Goodyear's illegal discrimination. As Justice Ginsburg said

[[Page H9220]]

in dissent, each subsequent paycheck was ``infected'' by the original 
decision to unlawfully discriminate.
  Secondly, the Court dismissed the realities of the workplace far too 
casually. Detecting pay discrimination is not easy, and sometimes it 
may take years to uncover.
  Now, each of us in this body knows what the other Member of the body 
makes, but that is not true in almost every workplace in America. Why? 
Because people generally do not talk openly with their coworkers about 
their salaries, raises and bonuses. In fact, many employers strive to 
keep such information confidential.
  Just consider, Ms. Ledbetter apparently did not become aware that she 
had been discriminated against until she received an anonymous letter 
alerting her to the discrimination.
  Third, the Court majority ignored its own holdings that Congress 
intended title VII, the majority ignored its own holdings that Congress 
intended title VII to have a broad, remedial purpose, to make persons 
whole for injuries suffered on accounts of unlawful employment 
discrimination.
  Finally, let me say that those who claim that this bill somehow 
eliminates the statue of limitations are incorrect. Under this bill, as 
we thought the law was for 30 years, an employee must still file a 
charge within the statutory filing period after receiving a 
discriminatory paycheck.
  This bill is fair, it is just, and it comports with the intent of 
this Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill, to make sure that what 
Congress intended is, in fact, what the law remains.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Madam Speaker, I would urge our colleagues in both the Republican and 
Democratic Parties to vote ``yes'' in favor of this bill.
  The opponents have raised two arguments. I believe both of them are 
wrong.
  The first is that the bill repeals or eliminates the statute of 
limitations. This is not correct. What is, in fact, correct, is that 
once 180 days have passed from the final act of discrimination, the 
final tainted paycheck, then the plaintiff's claim would be barred.
  The second argument that has been raised by the opponents of the bill 
is that there would be a flood of litigation and a flood of claims that 
would vex employers across the country.
  This is not so. We are restoring the law as it has existed for more 
than three decades. During those three decades, there was no such flood 
or plague of litigation.
  This conclusion is borne out by the Congressional Budget Office, 
which, in analyzing the costs of this bill, concluded that there would 
be no appreciable increase in the number of claims filed with the EEOC.
  So, for these reasons and others, the arguments raised against the 
bill are invalid. Members should vote ``yes'' in favor of the bill.

                              {time}  1315

  Mr. McKEON. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time.
  We have had a good debate last night and this morning, and the other 
side has tried to make this an emotional debate about discrimination, 
but that is not debate. We all, both Democrat and Republican, oppose 
discrimination.
  Madam Speaker, in Congress bad process usually makes for bad product. 
Let there be no mistake, the process that brought H.R. 2831 to the 
floor today was incredibly sloppy. Likewise, the product itself could 
not be sloppier. The title of this bill should be, ``The End of the 
Statute of Limitations.''
  This bill was hastily patched together by the Education and Labor 
Committee Democrats at the behest of the House majority leadership with 
the hope of grabbing a few headlines just a month after the Supreme 
Court's decision to uphold the 1964 Civil Rights Act statute of 
limitations.
  Neither House Republicans nor many key outside stakeholders were 
consulted as the bill was drafted, and the bill was not considered at a 
single legislative hearing. Then, again, at the behest of the House 
Democrat leadership, the Rules Committee granted a completely closed 
rule, locking out nearly 400 Members from amending or even considering 
amendments for this legislation.
  Had this bill truly been a narrow fix, as its supporters would have 
the American people believe, this sloppy process may not have been such 
a problem. However, this is a major fundamental change to civil rights 
law and no less than four separate statutes.
  The last change to civil rights law of this magnitude, the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act, took 2 years of negotiation, debate, and bipartisan accord 
to accomplish. By comparison, this bill took just 2 months. It cheapens 
our legislative process and, indeed, it cheapens the work that has gone 
into decades of serious considerate civil rights lawmaking. The 
legislative product itself, as my Republican colleagues and I have 
discussed, is no less flawed. It guts the statute of limitations 
contained in current law and, in so doing, would allow an employee to 
bring a claim against an employer decades after the alleged initial act 
of discrimination occurred. And trial lawyers, you can be sure, are 
salivating at this prospect.
  Madam Speaker, this is a bad bill that is the result of an equally 
bad process. The President has threatened to veto it should it arrive 
at his desk, and rightfully so. But we should never let it get to that 
point. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this bill.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Madam Speaker, this is a narrow bill that supports a very broad 
principle. The broad principle is that discrimination has no place in 
the lives of Americans.
  This House has people working in it whose families came here who 
could not speak English but now their sons and daughters write the law. 
This House has people in it whose ancestors were brought here as slaves 
but now who write the law of the land. And this House has one person in 
it whose grandmother could not vote but who now is the woman who is 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. When we eliminate 
discrimination, great things happen in America. When we restore 
discrimination, America moves backwards.
  This country is bigger and stronger than the worst thoughts of any 
bigot. Discrimination has no place in our law, no place in our hearts, 
and no place because of technicalities. Vote ``yes'' in favor of 
restoring this strong tool against discrimination.
  Mr. HARE. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and commend my Chairman, Mr. Miller for his 
efforts to bring this legislation forward. The Supreme Court's decision 
in Ledbetter versus Goodyear was a setback for fundamental equal 
rights. As a Member of the Education and Labor Committee I am pleased 
that the House is standing up today for America's workers by 
essentially invalidating this misguided ruling.
  Mrs. Ledbetter's pay discrimination case was dismissed--not because 
she was not being discriminated against--but because the Supreme Court 
believed she filed her claim too late.
  Under this decision, employees in Ledbetter's position are forced to 
live with discriminatory paychecks for the rest of their careers. 
Moreover, the Court's decision ignores the realities of the workplace--
where employees generally do not know enough about what their co-
workers earn or how decisions regarding pay are' made to file a 
complaint precisely when discrimination first occurs.
  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act would clarify that every paycheck 
resulting from a discriminatory pay decision constitutes a violation of 
the Civil Rights Act.
  When the Supreme Court sanctions discrimination through 
technicalities or misinterpretation, it is the job of Congress to 
clarify the intent of the law. We start this process today by passing 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. I urge all my colleagues to vote for 
H.R. 2831.
  Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2831, the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. I regret that this legislation is 
even necessary in the 21st Century, but even today, we see instances of 
pay discrimination time and time again.
  The reason we are bringing this legislation to the Floor today is 
because unfortunately, activist judges on the U.S. Supreme Court have 
changed the rules to make it much, much harder for an employee 
suffering pay discrimination to bring his or her case to court.
  Prior to that case, an employee had 180 days from her previous 
paycheck to file a lawsuit for pay discrimination. However, five 
members of the Supreme Court, led by Justice Samuel Alito, changed 
those rules. Now, an employee has 180 days from the time of the 
decision to file a lawsuit.

[[Page H9221]]

  However, oftentimes it is extremely difficult to know when pay 
discrimination is occurring. In the Supreme Court case under which the 
new rules were decided, Lilly Ledbetter filed her lawsuit because she 
was being paid far less than the lowest paid male employee holding the 
same position as hers. And she only found out about this because an 
anonymous person slipped her a note that showed her that fact.
  There was no way that Ms. Ledbetter could have known about her pay 
discrimination if she had not received this anonymous note. However, 
the five Supreme Court Justices decided that she could not sue because 
it had been more than 180 days since her employers had decided to pay 
her less than the men.
  This legislation is not only beneficial to employees, it is good for 
employers as well. With the current strict time limits, employees have 
more of an incentive to file lawsuits if they suspect discrimination, 
simply because if they delay their suit, they will give up their right 
to sue. It does not make sense to encourage people to sue before they 
have all the facts. We should ensure that we have a statute of 
limitations that makes sense.
  I have fought against pay discrimination since my first day in 
Congress. Discrimination of any kind should never be allowed, and I 
intend to keep fighting against it.
  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is commonsense legislation that 
should be enacted into law as we work to end discrimination at all 
levels.
  Madam Speaker, I strongly support H.R. 2831, and I would encourage 
all of my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2831, the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. Colleagues, I wish that I did not 
have to stand here today; I wish that we did not have to have this 
debate. However, in reversing decades of precedent and placing new 
limits on the ability of victims of pay discrimination to pursue their 
claims, the Supreme Court's May 29 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
makes our debate here today critically necessary to ensuring a better 
America for all of our citizens.
  Some on the other side of the aisle have complained that this 
legislation will dismantle the statute of limitations established by 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. They maintain that this legislation will 
allow an employee to sue for pay discrimination resulting from an 
alleged discriminatory act that might have occurred 5, 10, 20, or even 
30 or more years earlier and that under H.R. 2831 a worker or retiree 
could seek damages against a company run by employees and executives 
that had nothing to do with the initial act of alleged discrimination 
that occurred dozens of years ago.
  These arguments represent nothing more than an attempt to muddy the 
waters. The reality is that Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does nothing 
to disturb the current law's 180-day charge-filing period and employees 
continue to be subject to these time limits. Instead, the bill merely 
clarifies the conduct that triggers the running of the 180-day clock. 
Under the legislation, if an employee wants to challenge discriminatory 
pay, he or she must file within 180 days of the discriminatory conduct, 
such as the payment of a discriminatory wage. If the employee waits 
longer than 180 days after the discriminatory conduct, the 180-day 
clock will run out and a charge will become untimely.
  The fact of the matter is that pay discriminatory is often difficult 
to discover and takes place over many years. Many employers have 
policies explicitly forbidding employees from talking to one another 
about their pay. Workplace norms also discourage employees from asking 
each other about their pay. Additionally, discriminatory pay tends to 
have a cumulative effect--what may seem like a minor discrepancy at 
first builds up over time. By the time the discrimination is noticed, 
it would be too late to file a charge under the Supreme Court's ruling. 
These facts were undoubtedly the reason why a jury of her peers 
originally awarded Lilly Ledbetter more than $3.5 million; finding 
``more likely than not'' that sex discrimination during her 19-year 
career led to her being paid substantially less than her male 
counterparts.
  By passing this legislation here today, Congress will be heeding 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's call to stand up and ensure that no 
American's income should be determined by race, sex, creed, color, or 
sexuality.
  Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Madam Speaker, as cosponsor of this 
legislation, I rise in strong support and urge my colleagues to join me 
in supporting the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
  This legislation corrects and clarifies a serious misinterpretation 
by the Supreme Court when it ruled earlier this year in the case of 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear.
  In that 5-4 decision, the majority ruled that Lilly Ledbetter, the 
lone female supervisor at a tire plant in Gadsden, AL, did not file her 
lawsuit against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. in the timely manner 
specified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  The court determined a victim of pay discrimination must file a 
charge within 180 days of the employer's decision to pay someone less 
for an unlawfully discriminatory reason, such as race, sex, religion, 
etc.
  Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, the widely accepted rule in 
employment discrimination law was that every discriminatory paycheck 
was a new violation that restarts the 180-day clock.
  H.R. 2831 restores the law prior to the Supreme Court's Ledbetter 
decision, by clarifying that the clock for filing a discrimination 
charge starts when a discriminatory pay decision or practice is 
adopted, when a person becomes subject to the pay decision or practice, 
or when a person is affected by the pay decision or practice, including 
whenever she receives a discriminatory paycheck.
  The Supreme Court must not be able to roll back workers' rights in 
one ruling. Congress must pass this legislation to ensure workers are 
protected and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 2831.
  Mr. BISHOP of New York. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support 
of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, HR 2831. Although women have made great 
strides towards income equality in the workplace, a gap still exists. 
According to the Census Bureau, women continue to make 77 cents to 
every dollar that their male counterparts earn. No one knows this fact 
better than Lilly Ledbetter. She worked hard at a Goodyear tire plant 
for 19 years. Initially, Ms. Ledbetter was paid the same as her male 
colleagues but over time her salary did not continue to rise at the 
same rate as male colleagues. However, like many employees, she was 
unaware of the discrepancy for years. By the time she discovered it, 
the Supreme Court said she was too late to receive justice, a finding 
that overturns 30 years of established case law.
  The Supreme Court held, that the plaintiff must file suit within 180 
days of the initial so called discrimination. This may seem like a 
reasonable amount of time, but for wage discrimination cases, this is 
often not feasible. Many employers forbid workers from discussing their 
salaries and employees are often not even aware that they have been 
discriminated against until after they leave their job. This finding 
stands in stark contrast with 30 years of case law, which has found 
that the 180 day ``clock'' starts anew with each discriminatory 
paycheck. This bill codifies by starting the clock for filing a 
discrimination charge starts when a discriminatory pay decision or 
practice is adopted, when a person becomes subject to the pay decision 
or practice, or when employees affected by the pay decision or 
practice, including whenever receive a discriminatory paycheck.
  During her testimony in June at an Education and Labor Committee 
hearing, Lilly Ledbetter said:

       What happened to me is not only an insult to my dignity, 
     but it had real consequences for my ability to care for my 
     family. Every paycheck I received, I got less than what I was 
     entitled to under the law.

  Sadly, Ms. Ledbetter's case is not unique, in fact from 2001-2006, 
some 40,000 wage discrimination cases were filed from workers, much 
like Lilly Ledbetter. This bill will finally give workers the ``what 
they are entitled to under the law''.
  I thank Chairman Miller and my colleagues for bringing this 
legislation to the floor so quickly.
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 
2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007.
  The recent Supreme Court ruling in the Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire 
case turns the clock back on decades of progress. As a result of this 
ruling it is now even more difficult for employees to exercise their 
rights for equal pay and equal treatment as determined under the law.
  This decision was based on a questionable technicality, not on the 
fact that Ms. Ledbetter was paid 20 percent less than even the least 
qualified of her male counterparts. Ms. Ledbetter did nothing wrong 
throughout the process. She toiled for 19 years and deserved equal pay 
and treatment by her employers.
  For centuries, women, minorities, and many others have fought for 
equal rights and consideration under the law. Congress is being forced 
to invoke its constitutional powers to restore balance and justice for 
the sake of equality. Today we send a strong message that 
discrimination and injustice on the basis of gender is intolerable.
  Simply said Madam Speaker, H.R. 2831 is not about turning back the 
clock on civil rights law; this legislation protects these hard-fought 
and hard-earned guarantees. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, women 
who work full time, earn, on average, only 77 cents for every dollar 
men earn. The figures are even worse for women of color. Clearly, 
discrimination is not a relic of the past.
  I know that many, many Members of Congress recognize the importance 
of this legislation. I ask all of my colleagues to vote yes. I

[[Page H9222]]

hope that the President will stand for equality and justice by signing 
this important bill.
  Mr. ANDREWS. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 579, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

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