[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 124 (Tuesday, July 31, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H9219-H9222]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2007
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution
579, proceedings will now resume on the bill (H.R. 2831) to amend title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to clarify that a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such
Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other
purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. When proceedings were postponed on Monday,
July 30, 2007, 6 minutes remained in debate.
The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. McKeon) each control 3 minutes.
Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, in order to speak in favor of this
restoration of the law, I am pleased to acknowledge the majority leader
of the House for 1 minute.
Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman.
Madam Speaker, when the Supreme Court wrongly decides a case, as they
do from time to time, particularly when congressional intent is at
issue, the United States Congress can and should act to remedy it. That
is precisely what this carefully crafted measured legislation, the
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, is designed to do.
I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), and I thank the
ranking member as well for the work that they do on this committee.
Make no mistake. The Court's 5-4 decision on May 29 in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear was wrongly decided. The merits of Lilly Ledbetter's wage
discrimination claim seemed beyond doubt. A Federal jury agreed that
she was discriminated against. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission agreed with Ms. Ledbetter's claims, although the Bush
administration switched its position once the case got to the Supreme
Court.
Most importantly, Lilly Ledbetter was paid less than all of her male
counterparts, all of her male counterparts, even those who had less
seniority. This clearly was not a case where her performance was
suspect. Goodyear gave her a top performance award in 1996.
The fact is, the Court majority took an extremely cramped view of the
title VII of the Civil Rights Act, holding that Ms. Ledbetter and
claimants like her must file their pay discrimination claims within 180
days of the original discriminatory act. In other words, even if the
discriminatory acts continued, every week, every biweek, every month,
that they would have to look back to the original first check.
There are at least three serious problems with the Court's flawed
analysis. First, the unlawful discrimination against Ms. Ledbetter did
not begin and end with Goodyear's original decision to pay her less
than they paid her male counterparts.
In fact, every paycheck that Lilly Ledbetter received after
Goodyear's decision to pay her less was a continuing manifestation of
Goodyear's illegal discrimination. As Justice Ginsburg said
[[Page H9220]]
in dissent, each subsequent paycheck was ``infected'' by the original
decision to unlawfully discriminate.
Secondly, the Court dismissed the realities of the workplace far too
casually. Detecting pay discrimination is not easy, and sometimes it
may take years to uncover.
Now, each of us in this body knows what the other Member of the body
makes, but that is not true in almost every workplace in America. Why?
Because people generally do not talk openly with their coworkers about
their salaries, raises and bonuses. In fact, many employers strive to
keep such information confidential.
Just consider, Ms. Ledbetter apparently did not become aware that she
had been discriminated against until she received an anonymous letter
alerting her to the discrimination.
Third, the Court majority ignored its own holdings that Congress
intended title VII, the majority ignored its own holdings that Congress
intended title VII to have a broad, remedial purpose, to make persons
whole for injuries suffered on accounts of unlawful employment
discrimination.
Finally, let me say that those who claim that this bill somehow
eliminates the statue of limitations are incorrect. Under this bill, as
we thought the law was for 30 years, an employee must still file a
charge within the statutory filing period after receiving a
discriminatory paycheck.
This bill is fair, it is just, and it comports with the intent of
this Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill, to make sure that what
Congress intended is, in fact, what the law remains.
Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
Madam Speaker, I would urge our colleagues in both the Republican and
Democratic Parties to vote ``yes'' in favor of this bill.
The opponents have raised two arguments. I believe both of them are
wrong.
The first is that the bill repeals or eliminates the statute of
limitations. This is not correct. What is, in fact, correct, is that
once 180 days have passed from the final act of discrimination, the
final tainted paycheck, then the plaintiff's claim would be barred.
The second argument that has been raised by the opponents of the bill
is that there would be a flood of litigation and a flood of claims that
would vex employers across the country.
This is not so. We are restoring the law as it has existed for more
than three decades. During those three decades, there was no such flood
or plague of litigation.
This conclusion is borne out by the Congressional Budget Office,
which, in analyzing the costs of this bill, concluded that there would
be no appreciable increase in the number of claims filed with the EEOC.
So, for these reasons and others, the arguments raised against the
bill are invalid. Members should vote ``yes'' in favor of the bill.
{time} 1315
Mr. McKEON. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time.
We have had a good debate last night and this morning, and the other
side has tried to make this an emotional debate about discrimination,
but that is not debate. We all, both Democrat and Republican, oppose
discrimination.
Madam Speaker, in Congress bad process usually makes for bad product.
Let there be no mistake, the process that brought H.R. 2831 to the
floor today was incredibly sloppy. Likewise, the product itself could
not be sloppier. The title of this bill should be, ``The End of the
Statute of Limitations.''
This bill was hastily patched together by the Education and Labor
Committee Democrats at the behest of the House majority leadership with
the hope of grabbing a few headlines just a month after the Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the 1964 Civil Rights Act statute of
limitations.
Neither House Republicans nor many key outside stakeholders were
consulted as the bill was drafted, and the bill was not considered at a
single legislative hearing. Then, again, at the behest of the House
Democrat leadership, the Rules Committee granted a completely closed
rule, locking out nearly 400 Members from amending or even considering
amendments for this legislation.
Had this bill truly been a narrow fix, as its supporters would have
the American people believe, this sloppy process may not have been such
a problem. However, this is a major fundamental change to civil rights
law and no less than four separate statutes.
The last change to civil rights law of this magnitude, the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, took 2 years of negotiation, debate, and bipartisan accord
to accomplish. By comparison, this bill took just 2 months. It cheapens
our legislative process and, indeed, it cheapens the work that has gone
into decades of serious considerate civil rights lawmaking. The
legislative product itself, as my Republican colleagues and I have
discussed, is no less flawed. It guts the statute of limitations
contained in current law and, in so doing, would allow an employee to
bring a claim against an employer decades after the alleged initial act
of discrimination occurred. And trial lawyers, you can be sure, are
salivating at this prospect.
Madam Speaker, this is a bad bill that is the result of an equally
bad process. The President has threatened to veto it should it arrive
at his desk, and rightfully so. But we should never let it get to that
point. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this bill.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, this is a narrow bill that supports a very broad
principle. The broad principle is that discrimination has no place in
the lives of Americans.
This House has people working in it whose families came here who
could not speak English but now their sons and daughters write the law.
This House has people in it whose ancestors were brought here as slaves
but now who write the law of the land. And this House has one person in
it whose grandmother could not vote but who now is the woman who is
Speaker of the House of Representatives. When we eliminate
discrimination, great things happen in America. When we restore
discrimination, America moves backwards.
This country is bigger and stronger than the worst thoughts of any
bigot. Discrimination has no place in our law, no place in our hearts,
and no place because of technicalities. Vote ``yes'' in favor of
restoring this strong tool against discrimination.
Mr. HARE. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and commend my Chairman, Mr. Miller for his
efforts to bring this legislation forward. The Supreme Court's decision
in Ledbetter versus Goodyear was a setback for fundamental equal
rights. As a Member of the Education and Labor Committee I am pleased
that the House is standing up today for America's workers by
essentially invalidating this misguided ruling.
Mrs. Ledbetter's pay discrimination case was dismissed--not because
she was not being discriminated against--but because the Supreme Court
believed she filed her claim too late.
Under this decision, employees in Ledbetter's position are forced to
live with discriminatory paychecks for the rest of their careers.
Moreover, the Court's decision ignores the realities of the workplace--
where employees generally do not know enough about what their co-
workers earn or how decisions regarding pay are' made to file a
complaint precisely when discrimination first occurs.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act would clarify that every paycheck
resulting from a discriminatory pay decision constitutes a violation of
the Civil Rights Act.
When the Supreme Court sanctions discrimination through
technicalities or misinterpretation, it is the job of Congress to
clarify the intent of the law. We start this process today by passing
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. I urge all my colleagues to vote for
H.R. 2831.
Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2831, the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. I regret that this legislation is
even necessary in the 21st Century, but even today, we see instances of
pay discrimination time and time again.
The reason we are bringing this legislation to the Floor today is
because unfortunately, activist judges on the U.S. Supreme Court have
changed the rules to make it much, much harder for an employee
suffering pay discrimination to bring his or her case to court.
Prior to that case, an employee had 180 days from her previous
paycheck to file a lawsuit for pay discrimination. However, five
members of the Supreme Court, led by Justice Samuel Alito, changed
those rules. Now, an employee has 180 days from the time of the
decision to file a lawsuit.
[[Page H9221]]
However, oftentimes it is extremely difficult to know when pay
discrimination is occurring. In the Supreme Court case under which the
new rules were decided, Lilly Ledbetter filed her lawsuit because she
was being paid far less than the lowest paid male employee holding the
same position as hers. And she only found out about this because an
anonymous person slipped her a note that showed her that fact.
There was no way that Ms. Ledbetter could have known about her pay
discrimination if she had not received this anonymous note. However,
the five Supreme Court Justices decided that she could not sue because
it had been more than 180 days since her employers had decided to pay
her less than the men.
This legislation is not only beneficial to employees, it is good for
employers as well. With the current strict time limits, employees have
more of an incentive to file lawsuits if they suspect discrimination,
simply because if they delay their suit, they will give up their right
to sue. It does not make sense to encourage people to sue before they
have all the facts. We should ensure that we have a statute of
limitations that makes sense.
I have fought against pay discrimination since my first day in
Congress. Discrimination of any kind should never be allowed, and I
intend to keep fighting against it.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is commonsense legislation that
should be enacted into law as we work to end discrimination at all
levels.
Madam Speaker, I strongly support H.R. 2831, and I would encourage
all of my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. CONYERS. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2831, the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. Colleagues, I wish that I did not
have to stand here today; I wish that we did not have to have this
debate. However, in reversing decades of precedent and placing new
limits on the ability of victims of pay discrimination to pursue their
claims, the Supreme Court's May 29 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
makes our debate here today critically necessary to ensuring a better
America for all of our citizens.
Some on the other side of the aisle have complained that this
legislation will dismantle the statute of limitations established by
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. They maintain that this legislation will
allow an employee to sue for pay discrimination resulting from an
alleged discriminatory act that might have occurred 5, 10, 20, or even
30 or more years earlier and that under H.R. 2831 a worker or retiree
could seek damages against a company run by employees and executives
that had nothing to do with the initial act of alleged discrimination
that occurred dozens of years ago.
These arguments represent nothing more than an attempt to muddy the
waters. The reality is that Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does nothing
to disturb the current law's 180-day charge-filing period and employees
continue to be subject to these time limits. Instead, the bill merely
clarifies the conduct that triggers the running of the 180-day clock.
Under the legislation, if an employee wants to challenge discriminatory
pay, he or she must file within 180 days of the discriminatory conduct,
such as the payment of a discriminatory wage. If the employee waits
longer than 180 days after the discriminatory conduct, the 180-day
clock will run out and a charge will become untimely.
The fact of the matter is that pay discriminatory is often difficult
to discover and takes place over many years. Many employers have
policies explicitly forbidding employees from talking to one another
about their pay. Workplace norms also discourage employees from asking
each other about their pay. Additionally, discriminatory pay tends to
have a cumulative effect--what may seem like a minor discrepancy at
first builds up over time. By the time the discrimination is noticed,
it would be too late to file a charge under the Supreme Court's ruling.
These facts were undoubtedly the reason why a jury of her peers
originally awarded Lilly Ledbetter more than $3.5 million; finding
``more likely than not'' that sex discrimination during her 19-year
career led to her being paid substantially less than her male
counterparts.
By passing this legislation here today, Congress will be heeding
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's call to stand up and ensure that no
American's income should be determined by race, sex, creed, color, or
sexuality.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Madam Speaker, as cosponsor of this
legislation, I rise in strong support and urge my colleagues to join me
in supporting the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
This legislation corrects and clarifies a serious misinterpretation
by the Supreme Court when it ruled earlier this year in the case of
Ledbetter v. Goodyear.
In that 5-4 decision, the majority ruled that Lilly Ledbetter, the
lone female supervisor at a tire plant in Gadsden, AL, did not file her
lawsuit against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. in the timely manner
specified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court determined a victim of pay discrimination must file a
charge within 180 days of the employer's decision to pay someone less
for an unlawfully discriminatory reason, such as race, sex, religion,
etc.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, the widely accepted rule in
employment discrimination law was that every discriminatory paycheck
was a new violation that restarts the 180-day clock.
H.R. 2831 restores the law prior to the Supreme Court's Ledbetter
decision, by clarifying that the clock for filing a discrimination
charge starts when a discriminatory pay decision or practice is
adopted, when a person becomes subject to the pay decision or practice,
or when a person is affected by the pay decision or practice, including
whenever she receives a discriminatory paycheck.
The Supreme Court must not be able to roll back workers' rights in
one ruling. Congress must pass this legislation to ensure workers are
protected and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 2831.
Mr. BISHOP of New York. Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support
of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, HR 2831. Although women have made great
strides towards income equality in the workplace, a gap still exists.
According to the Census Bureau, women continue to make 77 cents to
every dollar that their male counterparts earn. No one knows this fact
better than Lilly Ledbetter. She worked hard at a Goodyear tire plant
for 19 years. Initially, Ms. Ledbetter was paid the same as her male
colleagues but over time her salary did not continue to rise at the
same rate as male colleagues. However, like many employees, she was
unaware of the discrepancy for years. By the time she discovered it,
the Supreme Court said she was too late to receive justice, a finding
that overturns 30 years of established case law.
The Supreme Court held, that the plaintiff must file suit within 180
days of the initial so called discrimination. This may seem like a
reasonable amount of time, but for wage discrimination cases, this is
often not feasible. Many employers forbid workers from discussing their
salaries and employees are often not even aware that they have been
discriminated against until after they leave their job. This finding
stands in stark contrast with 30 years of case law, which has found
that the 180 day ``clock'' starts anew with each discriminatory
paycheck. This bill codifies by starting the clock for filing a
discrimination charge starts when a discriminatory pay decision or
practice is adopted, when a person becomes subject to the pay decision
or practice, or when employees affected by the pay decision or
practice, including whenever receive a discriminatory paycheck.
During her testimony in June at an Education and Labor Committee
hearing, Lilly Ledbetter said:
What happened to me is not only an insult to my dignity,
but it had real consequences for my ability to care for my
family. Every paycheck I received, I got less than what I was
entitled to under the law.
Sadly, Ms. Ledbetter's case is not unique, in fact from 2001-2006,
some 40,000 wage discrimination cases were filed from workers, much
like Lilly Ledbetter. This bill will finally give workers the ``what
they are entitled to under the law''.
I thank Chairman Miller and my colleagues for bringing this
legislation to the floor so quickly.
Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R.
2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007.
The recent Supreme Court ruling in the Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
case turns the clock back on decades of progress. As a result of this
ruling it is now even more difficult for employees to exercise their
rights for equal pay and equal treatment as determined under the law.
This decision was based on a questionable technicality, not on the
fact that Ms. Ledbetter was paid 20 percent less than even the least
qualified of her male counterparts. Ms. Ledbetter did nothing wrong
throughout the process. She toiled for 19 years and deserved equal pay
and treatment by her employers.
For centuries, women, minorities, and many others have fought for
equal rights and consideration under the law. Congress is being forced
to invoke its constitutional powers to restore balance and justice for
the sake of equality. Today we send a strong message that
discrimination and injustice on the basis of gender is intolerable.
Simply said Madam Speaker, H.R. 2831 is not about turning back the
clock on civil rights law; this legislation protects these hard-fought
and hard-earned guarantees. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, women
who work full time, earn, on average, only 77 cents for every dollar
men earn. The figures are even worse for women of color. Clearly,
discrimination is not a relic of the past.
I know that many, many Members of Congress recognize the importance
of this legislation. I ask all of my colleagues to vote yes. I
[[Page H9222]]
hope that the President will stand for equality and justice by signing
this important bill.
Mr. ANDREWS. I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 579, the previous question is ordered on
the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
____________________