[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 123 (Monday, July 30, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H8940-H8950]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2007

  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House 
Resolution 579, I call up the bill (H.R. 2831) to amend title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to clarify that a discriminatory 
compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such 
Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other 
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows

                               H.R. 2831

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
     2007''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
     Rubber Co., No. 05-1074 (May 29, 2007), significantly impairs 
     statutory protections against discrimination in compensation 
     that Congress established and that have been bedrock 
     principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter 
     decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly 
     restricting the time period in which victims of 
     discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory 
     compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the 
     intent of Congress.
       (2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of 
     discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of 
     wage discrimination and is at odds with the robust 
     application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.
       (3) With regard to any charges of discrimination under any 
     law, nothing in this Act is intended to preclude or limit an 
     aggrieved person's right to introduce evidence of unlawful 
     employment practices that have occurred outside the time for 
     filing a charge of discrimination.

     SEC. 3. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF RACE, 
                   COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN.

       Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
     2000e-5(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful 
     employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in 
     compensation in

[[Page H8941]]

     violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation 
     decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual 
     becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or 
     other practice, or when an individual is affected by 
     application of a discriminatory compensation decision or 
     other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other 
     compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such 
     a decision or other practice.
       ``(B) In any action under this title with respect to 
     discrimination in compensation, the Commission, the Attorney 
     General, or an aggrieved person, may for purposes of filing 
     requirements, challenge similar or related instances of 
     unlawful employment practices with respect to discrimination 
     in compensation occurring after an aggrieved person filed a 
     charge without filing another charge with the Commission.
       ``(C) In addition to any relief authorized by 1977a of the 
     Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), liability may accrue and 
     an aggrieved person may obtain relief as provided in section 
     (g)(1), including recovery of back pay for up to two years 
     preceding the filing of the charge, where the unlawful 
     employment practices that have occurred during the charge 
     filing period are similar or related to unlawful employment 
     practices with regard to discrimination in compensation that 
     occurred outside the time for filing a charge.''.

     SEC. 4. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF AGE.

       Section 7(d) of the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 (29 
     U.S.C. 626(d)) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and
       (B) by striking ``(d)'' and inserting ``(d)(1)'';
       (2) in the third sentence, by striking ``Upon'' and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(2) Upon''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice 
     occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in 
     violation of this Act, when a discriminatory compensation 
     decision or other practice is adopted, when a person becomes 
     subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
     practice, or when a person is affected by application of a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, 
     including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
     paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or 
     other practice.
       ``(B) In any action under this Act with respect to 
     discrimination in compensation, the Secretary or an aggrieved 
     person, may for purposes of filing requirements, challenge 
     similar or related instances of unlawful employment practices 
     with respect to discrimination in compensation occurring 
     after an aggrieved person filed a charge without filing 
     another charge with the Secretary.''.

     SEC. 5. APPLICATION TO OTHER LAWS.

       (a) Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.--The amendment 
     made by section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in 
     compensation brought under title I and section 503 of the 
     Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et 
     seq., 12203), pursuant to section 107(a) of such Act (42 
     U.S.C. 12117(a)), which adopts the powers, remedies, and 
     procedures set forth in section 706 of the Civil Rights Act 
     of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5).
       (b) Rehabilitation Act of 1973.--The amendments made by 
     section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in 
     compensation brought under sections 501 and 504 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791, 794), pursuant 
     to--
       (1) sections 501(g) and 504(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 
     791(g), 794(d)), respectively, which adopt the standards 
     applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
     of 1990 for determining whether a violation has occurred in a 
     complaint alleging employment discrimination; and
       (2) paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 505(a) of such Act 
     (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) (as amended by subsection (c)).
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Rehabilitation act of 1973.--Section 505(a) of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after ``(42 U.S.C. 
     2000e-5 (f) through (k))'' the following: ``(and the 
     application of section 706(e)(3) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(3)) to 
     claims of discrimination in compensation)''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``1964'' the 
     following: ``(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in subsections 
     (e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5), 
     applied to claims of discrimination in compensation)''.
       (2) Civil rights act of 1964.--Section 717 of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) is amended by adding 
     at the end the following
       ``(f) Section 706(e)(3) shall apply to complaints of 
     discrimination in compensation under this section.''.
       (3) Age discrimination act of 1967.--Section 15(f) of the 
     Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 
     633a(f)) is amended by striking ``of section'' and inserting 
     ``of sections 7(d)(3) and''.

     SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, take effect 
     as if enacted on May 28, 2007 and apply to all claims of 
     discrimination in compensation under title VII of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), the Age 
     Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et 
     seq.), title I and section 503 of the Americans with 
     Disabilities Act of 1990, and sections 501 and 504 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that are pending on or after that 
     date.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Johnson of Georgia). Pursuant to House 
Resolution 579, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in 
the bill is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows

                               H.R. 2831

       [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     part printed in italic]
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

        This Act may be cited as the ``Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
     Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

        Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
     Rubber Co., No. 05-1074 (May 29, 2007), significantly impairs 
     statutory protections against discrimination in compensation 
     that Congress established and that have been bedrock 
     principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter 
     decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly 
     restricting the time period in which victims of 
     discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory 
     compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the 
     intent of Congress.
       (2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of 
     discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of 
     wage discrimination and is at odds with the robust 
     application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.
       (3) With regard to any charges of discrimination under any 
     law, nothing in this Act is intended to preclude or limit an 
     aggrieved person's right to introduce evidence of unlawful 
     employment practices that have occurred outside the time for 
     filing a charge of discrimination.
       (4) This Act is not intended to change current law 
     treatment of when pension distributions are considered paid.

     SEC. 3. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF RACE, 
                   COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN.

        Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
     2000e-5(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful 
     employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in 
     compensation in violation of this title, when a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is 
     adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or 
     when an individual is affected by application of a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, 
     including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
     paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or 
     other practice.
       ``(B) In addition to any relief authorized by section 1977a 
     of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), liability may 
     accrue and an aggrieved person may obtain relief as provided 
     in subsection (g)(1), including recovery of back pay for up 
     to two years preceding the filing of the charge, where the 
     unlawful employment practices that have occurred during the 
     charge filing period are similar or related to unlawful 
     employment practices with regard to discrimination in 
     compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a 
     charge.''.

     SEC. 4. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF AGE.

        Section 7(d) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
     of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(d)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively;
       (2) by striking ``(d)'' and inserting ``(d)(1)'';
       (3) in the third sentence, by striking ``Upon'' and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(2) Upon''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice 
     occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in 
     violation of this Act, when a discriminatory compensation 
     decision or other practice is adopted, when a person becomes 
     subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
     practice, or when a person is affected by application of a 
     discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, 
     including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
     paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or 
     other practice.''.

     SEC. 5. APPLICATION TO OTHER LAWS.

       (a) Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.--The amendment 
     made by section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in 
     compensation brought under title I and section 503 of the 
     Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et 
     seq., 12203), pursuant to section 107(a) of such Act (42 
     U.S.C. 12117(a)), which adopts the powers, remedies, and 
     procedures set forth in section 706 of the Civil Rights Act 
     of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5).
       (b) Rehabilitation Act of 1973.--The amendments made by 
     section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in 
     compensation brought under sections 501 and 504 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791, 794), pursuant 
     to--
       (1) sections 501(g) and 504(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 
     791(g), 794(d)), respectively, which adopt the standards 
     applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
     of 1990 for determining whether a violation has occurred in a 
     complaint alleging employment discrimination; and
       (2) paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 505(a) of such Act 
     (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) (as amended by subsection (c)).

[[Page H8942]]

       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Rehabilitation act of 1973.--Section 505(a) of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after ``(42 U.S.C. 
     2000e-5 (f) through (k))'' the following: ``(and the 
     application of section 706(e)(3) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(3)) to 
     claims of discrimination in compensation)''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``1964'' the 
     following: ``(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in subsections 
     (e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5), 
     applied to claims of discrimination in compensation)''.
       (2) Civil rights act of 1964.--Section 717 of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) is amended by adding 
     at the end the following:
       ``(f) Section 706(e)(3) shall apply to complaints of 
     discrimination in compensation under this section.''.
       (3) Age discrimination act of 1967.--Section 15(f) of the 
     Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 
     633a(f)) is amended by striking ``of section'' and inserting 
     ``of sections 7(d)(3) and''.

     SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

        This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, take effect 
     as if enacted on May 28, 2007 and apply to all claims of 
     discrimination in compensation under title VII of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), the Age 
     Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et 
     seq.), title I and section 503 of the Americans with 
     Disabilities Act of 1990, and sections 501 and 504 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that are pending on or after that 
     date.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. George 
Miller) and the gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon) each will 
control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. George 
Miller).
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 6 
minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, discrimination is anathema to everything this country 
stands for. It is anathema to the promise that is America. Regrettably, 
the recent Supreme Court's recent Ledbetter v. Goodyear decision 
threatens to turn back the clock on the progress we have made since the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 more than 40 years ago.
  The Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter severely restricts the 
right of employees to challenge pay discrimination. It ignores the 
realities of the workplace, prior precedent, and the clear intent of 
Congress.
  Justice Ginsburg's dissent in this narrowly divided 5-4 decision 
called on Congress to reverse this decision, and that is what we are 
here to do today.
  Lilly Ledbetter, the plaintiff in this case, worked for Goodyear for 
over 19 years. When she retired as a supervisor in 1998, she discovered 
that her salary was 20 percent lower than that of the lowest-paid male 
supervisor. Not only was Ms. Ledbetter earnings nearly $400 a month 
less than her male colleagues, she also retired, obviously, with a 
substantially smaller pension.
  A jury found that Goodyear discriminated against Ms. Ledbetter, and 
she was awarded $3.8 million in back pay and damages. This amount was 
reduced to the $360,000 damage cap in title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.
  Despite the jury's finding, the Supreme Court decided that while 
Goodyear discriminated against Ms. Ledbetter, and it is important that 
the Members understand that that is what the jury's determination was, 
they decided that her claim was made too late. Not that she was wrong, 
not that Goodyear was right. Her claim simply came too late.
  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires an employee to file an 
EEOC charge within 180 days of unlawful employment practices. Ms. 
Ledbetter filed within 180 days, as required, of receiving the 
discriminatory pay from Goodyear. In fact, she filed as soon as she 
found out that she was receiving discriminatory pay. She found out 
thanks to an anonymous note left in her mailbox.
  But a slim majority of the Supreme Court found that, because Ms. 
Ledbetter did not file within 180 days of the discriminatory decision 
to write those discriminatory paychecks that she received for many, 
many years, her time had run out. She could not recover anything from 
Goodyear.
  The majority's decision is absurd and entirely shuns the reason in 
order to satisfy this ideological agenda.
  H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, is narrowly tailored and 
designed to restore the law on pay discrimination as it was before the 
Supreme Court's decision, the law as it was for some 35 years, the law 
as it was reaffirmed in circuit court after circuit court, as it was 
affirmed by the Congress of the United States.
  This bill restores the law so that the 180-day statute of limitations 
clock runs when a discriminatory pay decision or practice is adopted, 
when a person becomes subject to the pay decision or practice, or when 
a person is affected by the pay decision or practice, including 
whenever she receives a discriminatory paycheck. In other words, every 
discriminatory paycheck is a violation of the act. That is as the law 
was for these many, many years. That is what we seek to do.
  The bill makes it clear that a victim of pay discrimination is 
entitled to a full 2 years of back pay. That is as the law currently 
is. You are entitled to recover up to 2 years' back pay under title 
VII.

                              {time}  2200

  The bill ensures that these simple reforms extend to the Age 
Discrimination and Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
and the Rehabilitation Act. H.R. 2831 restores the law to what it was 
for years before this recent Supreme Court decision in the Ledbetter 
case.
  Circuit court after circuit courts have held that the receipt of a 
discriminatory paycheck is a new violation of the law. Lilly Ledbetter 
received her last discriminatory paycheck. She was then informed about 
it, and she filed within 180 days. That's what the law was, that's what 
she did, and then this Supreme Court decided somehow that she wasn't 
within her rights and that her claim came too late.
  The EEOC, in its own compliance manual, states that ``discriminatory 
paychecks can be challenged so long as one is issued within the filing 
period, regardless of when the decision to issue them was made.'' 
Again, the law before the Supreme Court. In fact, the Congressional 
Budget Office reports that this would not establish a new cause of 
action for pay discrimination, it will not significantly effect the 
number of filings in the EEOC, and it will not significantly increase 
the cost of EEOC in other Federal courts.
  Understand this: Unless Congress acts and employers who have made 
discriminatory pay decisions before 180 days ago, they will be allowed 
to lawfully continue discriminating against the people that they 
employ. If they can hide the discriminatory act for 180 days, they can 
then continue to discriminate far into the future if they got past the 
180 days. That is why this is so important.
  The law now tells employers it's okay to discriminate; if you can get 
away with it for 180 days, you're home free. All we're asking here is 
to restore the law as it was, which was that each paycheck was a 
discriminatory act, and under the law you had 180 days to file a claim. 
That's what this bill says. That's what the law said before. If you 
file that claim and you're successful, you can receive up to 2 years 
back pay to make up for that. That's what the law was. That's what we 
seek to do in this legislation.
  This is the only decent thing to do. People say, well, she should 
have known or she should have asked around or she should have done 
this, should have done a lot of things. Except we know that also in 
many instances employers, in fact, have policies where they prohibit 
employees from asking another employee about their level of pay, about 
their compensation.
  So the fact of the matter is this legislation is absolutely necessary 
to end these discriminatory practices on pay, be it against a woman, an 
African American, Hispanic, a person over 60. Whatever the conditions 
are, it should not be allowed to stand. We should return to the law as 
it was these many years.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this ill-considered and over-
reaching legislation.
  Proponents of this bill claim it simply reverses a May 29, 2007, U.S. 
Supreme Court decision and further clarifies congressional opposition 
to wage discrimination against employees in the workplace. In reality, 
however, it will set into motion unintended consequences that its 
supporters simply are not willing to acknowledge.
  At the outset, let me make it clear that opposition to discrimination 
of

[[Page H8943]]

any type, be it gender discrimination, racial discrimination, or any 
other type of discrimination inside or outside the workplace is not 
confined to one party or the other. Every Member of this Chamber stands 
in strong opposition to the unfair treatment of any worker, but at the 
same time we must stand firmly behind a process that ensures justice 
for all parties, and that includes protecting against the potential for 
abuse and over-litigation. That, I believe, is where the two parties 
diverge on the bill before us. We aren't taking sides for or against 
discrimination in the workplace; rather, we're staking out different 
positions on fair and equitable justice and the rule of law.
  For more than 40 years, title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has 
made it illegal for employers to determine an employee's pay scale 
based on his or her gender. And this is a principle upon which all of 
us, Democrats and Republicans alike, can agree. As such, current law 
provides that any individual wishing to challenge an employment 
practice as discriminatory must first file a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission within the applicable statute of 
limitations, which is either 180 or 300 days, depending on his or her 
state of employment after the alleged workplace discrimination 
occurred.
  The statute of limitations was clearly established in the law to 
encourage the timely filing of claims, which helps prevent the filing 
of stale claims and protects against abuse of the legal system.
  Consider these worst case scenarios, for example. Without a statute 
of limitations in place, an employee could sue for discrimination 
resulting from an alleged discriminatory act that might have occurred 
5, 10, 20, 40, or even more years earlier. And without a statute of 
limitations in place, it is entirely conceivable that a worker or 
retiree could seek damages against a company run by employees and 
executives that had nothing to do with the initial act of alleged 
discrimination that occurred dozens of years ago.
  H.R. 2831 would essentially dismantle the statute of limitations and 
replace it with a new system under which every paycheck received by the 
employee allegedly discriminated against starts the clock on an 
entirely new statute. While fair-minded and principled, this dramatic 
change in civil rights law would have incredibly far-reaching impact, 
one that supporters of the bill have yet to take the time to thoroughly 
and appropriately consider. And B, under H.R. 2831, the worst case 
scenarios I just described would become commonplace. And let's not kid 
ourselves; our Nation's trial lawyers would seize upon them.
  Because H.R. 2831 would dismantle the critical statute of 
limitations, the Bush administration last week threatened to veto, 
should the bill ever arrive at his desk. Specifically, the 
administration noted that the legislation ``would serve to impede 
justice and undermine the important goal of having allegations of 
discrimination expeditiously resolved.''
  Furthermore, the effect of elimination of any statute of limitations 
in this area would be contrary to the centuries' old notion about 
limitations, period, for all lawsuits.
  At this time, Mr. Speaker, I would like to enter the Statement of 
Administration Policy into the Record
         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                    Washington, DC, July 27, 2007.

Statement of Administration Policy H.R. 2831--Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
           Act of 2007 (Rep. Miller (D) CA and 31 Cosponsors)

       The Administration supports our Nation's anti-
     discrimination laws and is committed to the timely resolution 
     of discrimination claims. For this and other reasons, the 
     Administration strongly opposes the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
     2007. H.R. 2831 would allow employees to bring a claim of pay 
     or other employment-related discrimination years or even 
     decades after the alleged discrimination occurred. H.R. 2831 
     constitutes a major change in, and expanded application of, 
     employment discrimination law. The change would serve to 
     impede justice and undermine the important goal of having 
     allegations of discrimination expeditiously resolved. 
     Furthermore, the effective elimination of any statute of 
     limitations in this area would be contrary to the centuries-
     old notion of a limitations period for all lawsuits. If H.R. 
     2831 were presented to the President. his senior advisors 
     would recommend that he veto the bill.
       Meaningful statutes of limitations in these sorts of fact-
     intensive cases are crucial to the fair administration of 
     justice. The prompt assertion of employment discrimination 
     permits employers to defend against--and allows employees to 
     prove--claims that arise from employment decisions instead of 
     having to litigate claims that are long past. In such cases, 
     evidence often will have been lost, memories will have faded, 
     and witnesses will have moved on. Moreover, effective 
     statutes of limitations benefit employees by encouraging the 
     prompt discovery, assertion, and resolution of employment 
     discrimination claims so that workplace discrimination can be 
     remedied without delay.
       H.R. 2831 purports to undo the Supreme Court's decision of 
     May 29, 2007, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. by 
     permitting pay discrimination claims to be brought within 180 
     days not of a discriminatory pay decision, which is the rule 
     under current law, but rather within 180 days of receiving 
     any paycheck affected by such a decision, no matter how far 
     in the past the underlying act of discrimination allegedly 
     occurred. As a result, this legislation effectively 
     eliminates any time requirement for filing a claim involving 
     compensation discrimination. Allegations from thirty years 
     ago or more could be resurrected and filed in federal courts.
       Moreover, the bill far exceeds the stated purpose of 
     undoing the Court's decision in Ledbetter by extending the 
     expanded statute of limitations to any ``other practice'' 
     that remotely affects an individual's wages, benefits, or 
     other compensation in the future. This could effectively 
     waive the statute of limitations for a wide variety of claims 
     (such as promotion and arguably even termination decisions) 
     traditionally regarded as actionable only when they occur.
       This legislation does not appear to be based on evidence 
     that the current statute of limitations principles have 
     caused any systemic prejudice to the interests of employees, 
     but it is reasonable to expect the bill's vastly expanded 
     statute of limitations would exacerbate the existing heavy 
     burden on the courts by encouraging the filing of stale 
     claims.

  Mr. Speaker, as the President's veto threat makes clear, H.R. 2831 is 
not a matter of tinkering around the edges as its supporters would have 
the American people believe. Rather, it is a fundamental overhaul of 
long-standing civil rights laws. The last major change to these laws 
occurred more than 15 years ago and after several years of debate. Yet, 
here we are, barely 2 months removed from a Supreme Court decision 
ready to grab headlines before we return home for the month of August 
by advancing a highly flawed bill without any regard to the long-term 
ramifications it could have should it ever make its way into law.
  H.R. 2831 represents bad policy, and even worse processing, and for 
these reasons I will oppose it. I urge my colleagues to do likewise.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to 
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), a member of the committee.
  (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I rise in strong 
support of this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, our friend, the ranking member of the full committee, 
just said that this bill repeals the statute of limitations. This is 
completely wrong. The bill does not repeal the statute of limitations 
for these claims; it restores the statute of limitations that has been 
in existence for nearly four decades under this law, an interpretation 
of the statute of limitations that virtually unanimously, in the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, has been held to be the law.
  What is this standard? It says that if a person works in a workplace, 
as most workplaces are, where knowing what your coworker makes is 
discouraged or even prohibited, that if you're the victim of 
discrimination because of your race or your gender or your religion or 
your nationality, then you have the right to pursue that claim each 
time a new paycheck is issued that manifests and evidences that 
discrimination. This is not a novel theory. This has been the law for 
nearly 40 years. And this bill restores that law.
  Second, our friends on the other side talk about these cataclysmic 
events that are going to occur if the law is restored, people filing 
suits 70 years after discrimination took place. What an odd plaintiff 
that would be, Mr. Speaker, someone who has been victimized for 60 or 
50 or 40 years by discrimination, but because they want to game the 
legal system, sit and wait it out? I've never

[[Page H8944]]

met that plaintiff, Mr. Speaker, and I don't think anybody really has.
  If all of these cataclysmic events were going to happen, why haven't 
they happened for the last 40 years? Why haven't people sued 40 or 50 
years after discrimination took place? It's because that's not what 
this statute of limitations permits, and that's not human nature.
  My friend makes reference, Mr. Speaker, to the worst case scenario. 
My friends, Lilly Ledbetter lived the worst case scenario. She worked 
for nearly 20 years for Goodyear. She was very good at her job. She got 
awards for being an excellent employee. Very late in her career she 
found out that she was making 20 percent less than the men doing the 
same job because she was a woman, so she went to the EEOC. She pursued 
her claim in Federal court. Goodyear stood up and said, oh, no; she was 
discriminated against not because she's a woman, but because she wasn't 
as good at her job as the men. And a jury of her peers heard that 
defense, heard that evidence, and ruled in her favor.
  Up the ladder the case went to the United States Supreme Court, and 
the Court said, she may have been discriminated against, she may have 
been wronged, but she just didn't do anything about it soon enough; 
never mind that she followed the rules that had been in effect for 
nearly 40 years.
  This is a restoration of the statute of limitations, not a new 
statute of limitations or an abrogation of it. And more importantly, it 
is a restoration of justice for people like Lilly Ledbetter who deserve 
better than this Supreme Court ruling and deserve the passage of this 
bill.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes.''
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlelady from Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn).
  Mrs. BLACKBURN. I thank the gentleman from California for the time.
  Mr. Speaker, today I'm rising to oppose this bill.
  We are all for fair pay; we are all for equal pay for equal work, and 
we are all against discrimination. But, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2831 does 
much more than just simply overturn a Supreme Court case in order to 
provide relief to one plaintiff, Lilly Ledbetter. It constitutes a 
major change in and extended application of employment discrimination 
law.
  In my opinion, what this change would do would serve to impede 
justice and undermine the important goal of having allegations of 
discrimination expeditiously resolved. The bill essentially limits the 
1964 Civil Rights Act statute of limitations regarding almost every 
claim of discrimination available under Federal law and potentially 
broadens the scope and application of the civil rights laws to entirely 
new fact patterns, practices and claims.
  It also would allow an employee or any individual who can arguably 
claim to be affected by an allegedly discriminatory decision relating 
to compensation wages, benefits, or any other practice to sue for 
discrimination that may have occurred years or even decades in the 
past. The anticipated increase in legal and recordkeeping costs created 
by this legislation would, indeed, be staggering.
  Congress should not be in the business of removing incentives for 
prompt resolution of discrimination claims. And that is what this would 
do; it would remove the incentive to find a prompt and timely 
resolution to discrimination claims.
  I thank the gentleman from California, and I encourage my colleagues 
to vote against the bill.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I recognize the 
gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).
  Ms. DeLAURO. Lilly Ledbetter was shortchanged; shortchanged by her 
employer, by consistent pay discrimination lasting years; shortchanged 
again by the Supreme Court with its decision limiting a woman's ability 
to sue their employers for pay discrimination under title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.
  As Justice Ginsburg suggested in her dissent, Congress now has an 
obligation to correct the Court's decision. That's why we are here, to 
make it clear the title VII statute of limitations runs from the date a 
discriminatory wage is actually paid, not simply some earliest possible 
date which has come and gone long ago.
  I commend Congressman Miller for acting with urgency to correct the 
injustice. It is time to value the work that women do in our society, 
respecting the work that women do, and to value it.

                              {time}  2215

  ``The plant manager at Goodyear said, The plant did not need women, 
women did not help it, and women caused problems.''
  The President's threat to veto this legislation suggests he is happy 
to limit women's access to equal pay. Let's turn this around, fix the 
decision and make sure that women who face discrimination, like Lilly 
Ledbetter faced, have a right to fight against it.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Keller), the subcommittee ranking member.
  Mr. KELLER of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, the practical effect of this legislation is to do away 
with the statute of limitations in employment disputes. On May 29, 
2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Ms. Ledbetter's claim 
was barred by the statute of limitations.
  There is a strong public policy reason for having a statute of 
limitations in the employment context. Witness' memories fade, 
documents are lost, and employees die. We want these disputes to be 
resolved while witness' memories are fresh, documents are available, 
and the employees are alive.
  The Ledbetter case is a perfect example. Ms. Ledbetter alleged sexual 
harassment misconduct by a single Goodyear supervisor, yet she waited 
19 years after the former supervisor passed away from cancer to file a 
lawsuit.
  On June 12, 2007, Ms. Ledbetter testified before our Education and 
Labor Committee. She stated, ``My story began in 1979 when Goodyear 
hired me to work as a supervisor in their tire production plant in 
Gadsden, Alabama. I worked there for 19 years. One of my supervisors 
asked me to go down to a local hotel with him and promised if I did, I 
would get good evaluations. He said if I didn't, I would get put at the 
bottom of the list. I didn't say anything at first because I wanted to 
try to work it out and fit in without making waves.''
  At our hearing, I spoke with Ms. Ledbetter at length. She seemed like 
a nice lady to me. The conversation she described about the motel made 
you angry about it and sympathetic to her. I wondered what that 
supervisor would have said 19 years ago. Would he admit it? Would he 
deny it but not be very credible? Or would he have said that it 
couldn't have happened because he was in Canada at the time and here is 
my proof of that?
  Well, it turns out that the U.S. Supreme Court was thinking the same 
type of thoughts I was about this matter. Their opinion makes their 
concerns crystal clear.
  On page 12 of its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: ``The 
passage of time may seriously diminish the ability of the parties and 
the factfinder to reconstruct what actually happened. This case 
illustrates the problems created by tardy lawsuits. Ledbetter's claims 
of sex discrimination turned principally on the misconduct of a single 
Goodyear supervisor, who, Ledbetter testified, retaliated against her 
when she rejected his sexual advancements during the early 1980s. Yet, 
by the time of trial, this supervisor had died and therefore could not 
testify. A timely charge might have permitted his evidence to be 
weighed contemporaneously.''
  Supporters of the legislation say that the time period of 300 days in 
most jurisdictions, 180 days in some, is not enough because an employer 
might hide the fact that the female employee's salary was less than the 
amount paid to men for the same work.
  There are two responses to that. First, the judicial doctrine of 
equitable tolling would be available to those type of plaintiffs.
  Second, the plaintiffs could file a claim under the Equal Pay Act. 
This Federal law forbids paying women less than men for the same work. 
It has a longer statute of limitations and an easier burden of proof. 
Ms. Ledbetter filed a Equal Pay Act claim, but it was thrown out on the 
merits by the trial judge who found that Goodyear paid

[[Page H8945]]

Ledbetter less because of her performance, not sex. Significantly, 
Ledbetter abandoned this Equal Pay Act claim.
  Mr. Speaker, there is an old saying, hard cases make bad law. That 
applies here. Do we throw out the statute of limitations in employment 
cases because a nice lady waited 19 years to file a lawsuit? Common 
sense tells you the answer is no.
  The same public policy reasons for a statute of limitations are still 
there. We want witness' memories that are fresh, documents that are 
available and employees who are still alive to tell what actually 
happened.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.'
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey), a member of the 
committee.
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, this legislation overturns the Supreme 
Court's 5-4 decision, which offered a very restricted and decidedly 
unrealistic reading of just when a discriminatory action regarding 
compensation actually occurs. In doing so, this legislation restores 
the common and long-standing understanding of employees, employers and 
the circuit courts alike, that when it comes to discriminatory pay, the 
protection of title VII extends not only to pay decisions and 
practices, but to each and every paycheck as well.
  Let me say a word about the plaintiff in this case, Lilly Ledbetter. 
Lilly will not reap the benefits of our legislation, and, as a result, 
will continue to feel the effect of the court's discriminatory decision 
to pay her less than her male colleagues for the rest of her life.
  Lilly Ledbetter went to work at Goodyear Tires every day for 19 
years. She was one of the few female supervisors at the plant. That was 
quite an accomplishment in and of itself. But what she didn't realize 
was that for all those years, she was paid less than her male 
colleagues, 20 percent less by the time she retired, because of 
discrimination based on her gender.
  A jury found that she was discriminated against. They gave her over 
$3.8 million in back pay and damages. But the Supreme Court said to 
her, Ms. Ledbetter, you didn't file your claim within 180 days of the 
decision to discriminate, and, even though each and every one of your 
paychecks reflects the discriminatory decision, and you didn't have 
proof of the discrimination until long after the decision was made, you 
are out of luck. Lilly Ledbetter, we don't care that your monthly 
pension and your Social Security benefits also reflect that 
discrimination.
  Now, the President says that he is planning to veto this legislation, 
and we shouldn't be surprised. But as a tribute to Lilly Ledbetter and 
other women who work hard to support their families, to get ahead, who 
face discrimination every day of their lives, vote for H.R. 2831.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson), the subcommittee ranking 
member.
  Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding. I appreciate your leadership for the people of the United 
States.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 2831. This 
legislation is being improperly classified as a narrow bill with 
limited ramifications, that simply overturns a Supreme Court decision 
made on May 29, 2007. In actuality, it is one of the most overreaching 
pieces of wage discrimination legislation that has ever been 
considered. If enacted, this legislation would make it impossible for 
businesses to defend themselves against actions that occurred years in 
the past.
  We all oppose discrimination. Action against those who discriminate 
in the workplace should be taken quickly. Current laws ensure that 
disputes over discrimination are addressed expeditiously and with 
certainty. This bill would eliminate the 1964 Civil Rights Act statute 
of limitations governing the time within which a party must make a pay 
discrimination claim, currently 180 days or 300 days, depending on the 
State of employment.
  As an inactive attorney and a person who practiced for 25 years and 
the proud father of an attorney, who appreciates the legal profession, 
I believe a statute of limitation serves many purposes. It encourages 
the timely filing of claims, helps prevent the filing of stale claims, 
and, most importantly, protects against abuse of the legal system.
  Cases should be brought to court as soon as possible after an 
incident occurs to guarantee memories are fresh and witnesses are 
available to testify. In the absence of a statute of limitation, a 
worker or retiree could sue for pay discrimination resulting from an 
alleged discriminatory act that might have occurred 5, 10, 20 or even 
30 years earlier. This same worker or retiree could seek damages 
against a company run by employees and administrators that had nothing 
to do with the initial act of alleged discrimination that occurred 
dozens of years ago.
  I am grateful for the leadership of the Education and Labor Committee 
ranking member Buck McKeon on this issue. I urge my colleagues to 
oppose this flawed legislation
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Ms. Hirono), a member of the committee.
  (Ms. HIRONO asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. HIRONO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2831, the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, and I would like to thank 
Chairman George Miller of the Education and Labor Committee for his 
commitment and dedication to bringing this bill to the floor.
  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to protect 
individuals from discrimination they face in the workplace. This bill 
amends title VII to ensure employees have a realistic remedy to pay 
discrimination. The bill reinstates the paycheck accrual rule, a law 
widely interpreted by eight Federal circuit courts to mean that the 180 
day time limit for filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission begins each time a discriminatory 
paycheck is received.
  I would like to stress that this bill does not amend the rule that an 
aggrieved person may only recover back pay for the 2 years preceding 
the filing of the charge, so there will be no incentive to wait 5, 10, 
15 or 20 years, as our opponents claim, to bring such a lawsuit. 
Moreover, employers prior to the Ledbetter decision were not inundated 
with stale pay discrimination claims, and this law will in fact not 
promote the filings of such claims.
  The Ledbetter decision was a shocking decision for many of us, 
because we know what it is like to face pay discrimination in the 
workplace. It is not as though employers announce that they are going 
to engage in pay discrimination. Employees are not encouraged to 
discuss what they are making, so it is very difficult to find out that 
this kind of discriminatory action is even taking place.
  Supreme Court Associate Ruth Bader Ginsburg strongly disagreed with 
the majority decision stating, ``In our view, the court does not 
comprehend, or is indifferent to, the insidious way in which women can 
be victims of pay discrimination.'' She urged the Congress to act by 
passing this kind of legislation.
  I urge my colleagues to vote strongly in favor of this bill.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy now to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Illinois (Mrs. Biggert), a member of the committee.
  Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, like all of my colleagues here on the floor and in the 
House of Representatives, I fully support efforts to end all forms of 
discrimination. I admire Ms. Ledbetter's bravery for standing up for 
her right to work in an environment free from discrimination.
  I know what it is like. I sat in law school class and was told by my 
professor that I was taking up the place of someone who belonged there, 
a man. As a woman who has felt discrimination, I understand her 
frustration and I am pleased that Congress is discussing this important 
issue.
  If this bill were an anti-discrimination bill, I would be happy to 
vote for it and would encourage others to support it. But this bill is 
not about discrimination. It is about the statute of limitations.
  The statute of limitations is an institution in American 
jurisprudence that pertains to all cases and all causes of

[[Page H8946]]

action. For instance, for torts the statutes of limitations is 2 years; 
for contracts, it is 6 years; for employment determination or 
discrimination, it is 6 months. We can't legislate change in the 
statute of limitations just because we don't like a particular Supreme 
Court ruling.

                              {time}  2230

  The statute of limitation requires plaintiffs to bring a claim or a 
cause of action within a reasonable time. And that is so witnesses 
don't disappear or die off, memories don't fade, and supervisors don't 
move on and documents are not discarded or destroyed.
  That is why I cannot support the legislation before us today. H.R. 
2831 would dismantle the statute of limitation for filing a charge with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. If enacted, this 
legislation would allow an employee to bring a claim against an 
employer years, even decades, after the alleged act of discrimination.
  In addition, this legislation would discourage the prompt 
investigation and resolution of discrimination. I think everyone would 
agree that if there is discrimination at an individual's place of work, 
it should be investigated and addressed as soon as possible to ensure 
fairness and prevent further discrimination.
  Unfortunately, because no hearings were held on this legislation, I 
think the majority is rushing it through the House with little 
discussion on the bill itself. We can only speculate as to what all of 
the ramifications of this bill might be. I know that the gentleman is 
probably going to say there was a hearing, but it wasn't directly on 
this bill. So I would encourage my colleagues to oppose this well-
intentioned but misguided statute of limitation legislation.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for moving so quickly 
to fix this bill because we really can't wait. Fixing this bill, and 
thank you for taking us back to 1964, because that is about what 
happens here. The bill as it was intended, and this is not a 
hypertechnical statute of limitations bill. In fact, interestingly, the 
statute of limitations is not involved at all. It is the same 180 days 
as it always was.
  The bill before us reinstates the law as it was consistently applied 
and interpreted by the courts, including the United States Supreme 
Court before, during and after I administered this law as the Chair of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and administered this very 
section. Once before the Supreme Court misread this, and Congress 
rushed to change it. And here we are back to a Supreme Court really 
reaching very hard away from what we had already fixed in the 1991 
Civil Rights Act.
  I want to remind my colleagues that the first pay cases under this 
act were not brought by women at all. They were brought by black men 
who were working in Southern factories in a segregated part of those 
factories, paid less than white men. Imagine if we said, Look, you 
fellas, go and see if you can find out what the white men, who won't 
even let you work in the same part of the factory, are earning. Of 
course we didn't. And of course nobody can require that of women or 
African Americans, who are just as affected by what we do today as 
women are.
  Imagine, the most secretive information a person has, besides your 
medical information, is how much money you earn. How many in this 
Congress, before your earnings were a matter of public record, knew how 
much the person sitting beside you earned? And particularly, if you are 
a minority, a woman or a minority, you are not going to go up, and if 
you are, you are not going to find out.
  We have got to fix this. The American people have demanded it. We 
have to fix it for women. And remind you, we have to fix this for black 
people, for people of color who bring the majority of pay cases in our 
country today.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon) 
has 14\1/2\ minutes, and the gentleman from California (Mr. George 
Miller) has 13\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. Foxx), a member of the committee.
  Ms. FOXX. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague from California 
for yielding me this time.
  Along with everyone else here, I feel it is important to say that I 
am very much opposed to discrimination. It makes me ill to even think 
about discrimination that has occurred in this country in the past. But 
I am also very much opposed to this legislation. We don't need to be 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
  When I first went to the North Carolina Senate, I was troubled by the 
way a lot of things were done there. And someone said to me, If you 
think that people operate here on logic, you are sadly wrong. They 
operate on emotion.
  We have heard some very emotional comments made about this 
legislation and why it should be passed. Those of us who are opposing 
it are opposing it on very logical reasons.
  This bill makes dramatic changes to civil rights law and would have 
an incredibly far-reaching impact, one which supporters of the bill 
have yet to take the time to thoroughly and appropriately consider. The 
underlying bill constitutes a major change in and expanded application 
of employment discrimination law.
  Traditionally, civil rights laws have had adequate time for 
thoughtful review and consideration. However, this bill was brought 
before the Education and Labor Committee about 24 hours prior to markup 
and rushed to the floor under a closed rule. It is critical that 
legislation of this complexity and with the potential for such 
significant impact be carefully considered and not rushed through only 
weeks after its introduction.
  Many other things have been thoughtfully and rightfully said on our 
side, but I want to say that we need to talk about an area that is most 
likely to be dramatically impacted is that of our Nation's retirement 
system. This legislation contains a pension annuity check rule where 
charges could be brought many years after the discrimination occurs, 
and it could have long-standing impact on benefits. It could wind up 
discriminating against a lot more people than we are trying to help as 
a result of this legislation.
  It is going too fast. We need to slow it down and do it right. We 
want to not have discrimination, but this is not the way to do it
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, this bill would restore to employment 
discrimination victims the realistic chance at justice that the Supreme 
Court recently took away from them. What is important to understand 
about the Court's decision is that everyone agreed that Lilly Ledbetter 
was the victim of intentional discrimination for 19 years. The Court 
said something truly astonishing, that the only discriminatory act was 
the initial decision to pay Lilly Ledbetter less than her male 
coworkers. Once the employer had successfully concealed that fact from 
her for 180 days, she was out of luck and Goodyear could openly go on 
paying her less just because she was a woman forever. The initial 
decision to discriminate was illegal, but the continuing decision to 
continue paying her less was perfectly okay. This upset 40 years of 
settled law, 40 years in which the companies of this country went under 
the rule that this bill would restore.
  The Court's decision is an open invitation to employers to violate 
the law with virtual impunity. Once again, Congress must correct the 
Supreme Court and instruct it that when we said discrimination in 
employment was illegal, we meant it, and we meant for the courts to 
enforce it. And anyone who says that discrimination in employment 
should be illegal but should not be enforceable if the employer can 
hide the discrimination for 6 months is really saying let the 
discrimination go on forever. Let the women and the racial minorities 
and other people who are discriminated against be discriminated against 
forever.
  Shame on the Supreme Court, and shame on those who would make 
employment discrimination victims helpless by opposing this bill. I 
urge adoption of this bill.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from

[[Page H8947]]

Texas (Ms. Granger), a member of our elected leadership.
  Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the 
Democrats Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. At first glance, I simply 
disagree with the name of the bill. The Democrat's Fair Pay Act is not 
fair at all, not for employers, employees or our legal system.
  Every American is entitled to an honest day's pay and we have laws on 
the book to ensure that is the case. But this bill goes well beyond its 
scope by effectively eliminating the statute of limitation in workplace 
discrimination cases.
  This imposes a huge burden on businesses and opens them up to 
litigation years after alleged cases of discrimination. While it is 
inexcusable for anyone to face discrimination for pay or otherwise, to 
overturn the Supreme Court decision would allow for a flood of decades-
old claims to resurface. The laws we have in place allow adequate time 
to file a charge against your employer and offers a set of guidelines 
to help individuals file a claim.
  The burden this would place on small business owners and any company 
to track down a claim that occurred 20 years ago, for example, would 
cripple the system we have in place. The statutes of limitations are in 
place to help the employee-employer relationship so when something 
improper happens, the issue can be dealt with in a timely manner. 
Merely eliminating these guidelines would allow for someone to reopen a 
claim after 5, 10 or even after they have retired. Those involved may 
no longer work at the company or even be alive, for that matter.
  If this passes, it will also eliminate the statute of limitations for 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the American with 
Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.
  The Civil Rights Act and the employment discrimination laws currently 
on the books provide adequate protections for our employees. We should 
work to ensure that existing laws are enforced to protect employees 
against discrimination rather than passing overly broad laws that 
subject employers to open-ended liability
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time.
  I rise in support of H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. 
This important legislation overturns the recent Supreme Court decision, 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire, a decision which undermines title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  The Ledbetter decision forces victims of discriminatory pay decisions 
to live with discriminatory paychecks for the duration of their career 
if they fail to file a claim within 180 days of the discrimination, 
possibly even if they had no knowledge of the discrimination within the 
180 days. In other words, after 180 days, an unsuspecting female, 
minority, elderly, or disabled worker would simply be out of luck.
  This would even be the case if the employer admitted to the 
discrimination and continued to discriminate after the 180-day 
limitation had passed.
  Mr. Speaker, we hear comments that there would be no statute of 
limitations. That is not true. Under the bill, there is still a statute 
of limitations; 180 days still applies. The plaintiff has to show that 
a discriminatory paycheck was issued within the last 180 days. And if 
the employer would simply stop discriminating and went a whole 180 days 
without discriminating, then the statute of limitations would apply and 
it would be too late to bring a case.
  Under the Supreme Court decision, that unjust outcome under the case 
is not in keeping with title VII's remedial purpose or the spirit of 
the civil rights cases.
  Now, Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, ``Congress never intended 
to immunize forever discriminatory pay differentials unchallenged 
within 180 days of their adoption.'' I agree with Justice Ginsburg. And 
she also noted that Congress should correct this injustice. This bill 
corrects the injustice by appropriately expressing Congress's intent 
that title VII will hold employers accountable for unlawful employment 
discrimination.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Minnesota (Mrs. Bachmann).
  Mrs. BACHMANN. Mr. Speaker, in this debate tonight I think we can all 
stipulate that discrimination in the workforce is wrong. It is wrong if 
it is against employees, and it is wrong if it is against employers. 
This bill may very well be seen as discrimination against honest 
American employers, job creators, because it has a seemingly unending 
period to file a lawsuit.
  With that, women may very well experience real discrimination in that 
they may find that future employers are reluctant to hire them in the 
first place for fear of a lawsuit 5, 10, 20, maybe even 40 years down 
the road. Let's face it, memories fade, people die, they move away, and 
it becomes difficult, if not downright impossible, for a job creator to 
defend themselves.
  It is a very impractical bill that we are looking at and could likely 
result in even more paperwork and higher cost for employers, and 
ultimately less wages for all American employees.
  Congress needs to stop discriminating against American companies that 
are just trying to provide decent jobs to great employees. Instead, I 
think Congress should focus on enhancing American competitiveness and 
American prosperity.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).

                              {time}  2245

  Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, I met Lilly Ledbetter during the 
House Judiciary Committee hearing last month. At that time, she 
explained how she was repeatedly harassed during her 20-year career at 
Goodyear. Lilly Ledbetter described for us in Judiciary how she had no 
proof of pay discrimination until someone anonymously slipped payroll 
records into her mailbox. Now, as much as our colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle would like to wish it to be otherwise, until a few 
months ago, it was established law that each paycheck constitutes a 
discriminatory act under the law.
  When they were confirmed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
promised to follow precedent. They promised to practice judicial 
restraint. Instead, they rewrote the law and pushed an activist, 
conservative agenda. They denied Lilly Ledbetter justice.
  In the real world, discrimination is subtle and takes years to become 
evident. However, Justice Alito ruled that victims have only 180 days 
after a discriminatory decision has been made to file suit, even if 
that employee would have no way of knowing about it. This standard is 
impossible to meet. The opponents of this bill expect employees to be 
clairvoyant.
  Many companies intentionally prohibit their employees from comparing 
salaries and pay raises, and this decision will allow employers to 
shield discriminatory practices.
  The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act rights this wrong. It clarifies that an 
employee is discriminated against each and every time she receives an 
unfair paycheck, and I'm surprised at my colleagues, particularly my 
female brethren on the other side of the aisle, who are standing in 
front of this House and asking the House to continue and repeat the 
practice of discrimination against women who have been unfairly treated 
for years and years.
  I urge my colleagues to support fair pay in the workplace, and I 
thank Chairman Miller for his leadership on this issue.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I'm happy now to yield to the gentleman from 
New Mexico (Mr. Pearce) 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this legislation today. Many have 
stated it well, that discrimination is not the subject here tonight. It 
is the end of the statute of limitations which is at issue.
  I would like to just make a point that often we're accused in 
Congress of appealing to the special interests, and I can't tell what 
the motivation is on this particular piece of legislation. It could 
have been narrowly scripted to where it applied only to the person that 
was being affected, to where the question of whether or not it applies 
to the full statute of limitations really would not even be a question.

[[Page H8948]]

  I can tell you that on Thursday of last week we sat in the Resources 
Committee, and we heard testimony that talks about the Hard Rock Mining 
bill that is coming up to regulate Hard Rock Mining. There is a 
provision written by a former Clinton solicitor who is now working for 
a special interest group. That provision in that legislation we read 
says, ``Notwithstanding the decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in High Country Citizens' Alliance v. 
Clarke,'' and then it goes on to say that all the decisions in court 
are going to be set aside, and we're going to allow this group to go 
back to court once more.
  Keep in mind that the district court found against the group, then 
the appellate court found against the group, and finally, the Supreme 
Court said we will not hear the case. So all three levels of judicial 
review had been listened to and turned down, and yet this Congress, 
this majority, says we're going to set it aside. That was last week 
Thursday.
  Last week Friday, we had the Imams case, the John Does. You will 
recall that how innocent people who report suspicious behavior would be 
taken to court. Three-quarters of this House voted against that, and 
yet the House's leadership found it necessary to strip the provision 
out in conference. That provision was stripped out, and that provision 
was added then only under great pressure from this country.
  And now we're at this case. It would have been possible and could 
have been possible to narrowly craft this legislation to where the 
question did not come up. I feel that it is the special interests of 
the trial lawyers who in each case would have had open venue, open 
access to many millions of Americans which was at stake, and I feel 
that's what's like at stake here.
  It is not good for American business. It is not good for American 
competitiveness. I'm deeply opposed to this legislation, and I thank 
the gentleman for yielding
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve my time.
  Mr. McKEON. How much time do we have?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon) 
has 6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from California (Mr. George 
Miller) has 7 minutes remaining.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I'm happy to yield at this time to the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Kline) 3 minutes, ranking member on the 
subcommittee.
  Mr. KLINE of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose H.R. 2831. I think it's been 
really an interesting debate this evening. We've heard views on both 
sides, and clearly, we simply disagree on some fundamental aspects of 
this, and I want to address that as well during my 3 minutes.
  Speaker after speaker on this side of the aisle has stood up and said 
that this legislation effectively eliminates the statute of limitations 
for a broad range of discrimination claims. I believe that's correct.
  The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Keller) stood up here and recounted 
for us the activities of the Supreme Court, and he quoted from the 
justices the language that pertained, and it seemed clear to me that 
there was a fairness issue here. And while our hearts were all touched 
by the testimony of Lilly Ledbetter and by the circumstances of her 
case, it was clear to the court and to Mr. Keller and to me that it's 
simply unreasonable to allow year after year after year to go by after 
a discriminatory act occurs before you make the claim, when in some 
cases people will have left, perhaps have died and moved on.
  This is a huge boon to the trial lawyers of America. It's going to 
bring forward endless litigation, case after case going on day after 
day. What businesses will have to do in terms of recordkeeping is 
staggering in its scale.
  This imperils pensions. One of our colleagues brought up that issue. 
It is not at all clear, despite some findings language in the bill, 
that our pensions will be protected in this legislation. Potentially, 
you can have pensions who simply don't have the funds to pay the earned 
benefits. This is bad policy, Mr. Speaker, and it's made in haste.
  Mr. Speaker, it is very clear that this legislation amounts to a 
significant change in our civil rights laws. It's very clear to me, and 
unfortunately, many of the questions of concern raised by the Ledbetter 
case have yet to be answered. In the normal legislative process, such 
questions would have been raised in committee hearings, subcommittee 
and full committee. Concerns would have been debated in good faith.
  Unfortunately, this was not the process that brought this bill to the 
floor. The Committee on Education and Labor had no legislative 
hearings. The bill was not before us the one time we had some witnesses 
before us to talk about this at all. The time elapsed from the bill's 
introduction to committee markup was little more than 24 business 
hours, and we learned on Friday that we were going to be debating this 
bill on the floor today. Surely, a huge change like this to our civil 
rights laws deserves more of our time, attention and effort than the 
majority has seen fit to provide.
  Once again, the majority has chosen haste and speed over quality in 
making public policy. My concerns and unanswered questions can only 
lead me to say that the Ledbetter bill makes for bad policy, creating a 
flawed legislative process.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against this legislation.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. If I can inquire of the Chair as to 
the allocation of time?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. George 
Miller) has 7 minutes. The gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon) has 
3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. As I understand, I have the right to 
close.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman has the right to close.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. We're reserving 3 minutes; is that 
right?
  Mr. McKEON. It was my understanding we were going to finish up 
tomorrow.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. So we're reserving 3 minutes each. 
You've got a half minute. You and I will close, and we will each have 3 
minutes for tomorrow.
  Mr. McKEON. So you want me to take 30 seconds?
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Yes.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Speaker, as Mr. Kline just said, I think we have had a good 
debate here tonight.
  As we did have that hearing on Ms. Ledbetter's case, the bill wasn't 
before us, but we did hear her story. And all of us I think felt bad 
for her for the things that happened to her 20, 30 years ago.
  But what was also said, as we're sent here to represent all of our 
constituents, we can't totally let emotion guide our decisions. We have 
to make good law, sound law, and I think we're worried about losing the 
statute of limitations. I think that's something we really need to 
protect against.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 
minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, let us understand something here. They can say it until 
the cows come home, but the fact of the matter is, this legislation 
restores the law to what it was before. Up until the Supreme Court made 
its ruling, each discriminatory check that was issued was a violation 
of the law, and you had 180 days from the issuance of that check when 
you discovered it to file a claim. This legislation would restore that 
law as it was.
  If you file that claim, if you were successful in proving your claim, 
you could receive up to 2 years back pay. That was the law up until the 
Supreme Court decision. That would be the law if we passed this 
legislation.
  Now, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have said that if 
we pass this law, the courts will be inundated with lawsuits. The 
people will wait 5, 10, 15, 20 to file a lawsuit, that there will be 
cases where the witnesses die and memories fade and long times will 
expire and we won't be able to have justice. It will be a huge cost on 
the business community. It will change our competitive stature in the 
world. It will limit economic growth. All of that from little Lilly 
Ledbetter.

[[Page H8949]]

  What's the problem with that? If all of that was true, why haven't my 
colleagues come to the floor of the House in the 12 years they 
controlled the House of Representatives and the United States Senate 
and asked to change the law? Why hasn't the President of the United 
States, who's been in office for 6\1/2\ years, asked to change the law?
  Why hasn't that happened? Because none of the things you talked about 
happened under the previous law. It didn't change our competitiveness. 
They weren't involved in thousands of cases. People didn't wait 40 or 
50 years to get 2 years back pay. No, none of those things happened.
  But they want to scare people into believing if we go back to the law 
as it was before the Lilly Ledbetter case and the Supreme Court 
overturned all of these years of laws and justice and fairness and 
anti-discrimination provisions, that somehow all of these terrible 
things would happen, but they didn't happen, and that's been the law 
all of these years.
  So, tomorrow we will get an opportunity to vote to restore the 
protections of every American citizen against pay discrimination, to 
restore justice to the workplace, to restore the right of an individual 
to be paid the same as those who are doing the same job for the same 
reasons and the same purposes. That's what we seek. That's all Lilly 
Ledbetter sought, but she couldn't get justice at the Supreme Court. 
No, she couldn't get it even though a jury found that that could be the 
situation.
  So we're going to have to restore this for the people of this 
country, and again, we'll simply be restoring the law. You can tell the 
doomsday scenarios all day long. You can predict all of the things that 
are going to happen, but none of them have happened in the last 35 
years. None of them have happened in the last 35 years.
  So at least you ought to properly represent what the law was and what 
the law will be, and with that, I look forward to the conclusion of the 
debate tomorrow
  Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, I met Lily Ledbetter during a 
House Judiciary Committee hearing last month. At that time, she 
explained how she was repeatedly harassed during her 20-year career at 
Goodyear. She told me how she had no proof of pay discrimination until 
someone anonymously slipped payroll records into her mailbox. Until a 
few months ago, it was established law that each paycheck constitutes a 
discriminatory act under the law.
  When they were confirmed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
promised to follow precedent--they promised to practice judicial 
restraint. Instead, they rewrote the law and pushed an activist, 
conservative agenda. They denied Lily Ledbetter justice.
  In the real world, discrimination is subtle and takes years to become 
evident. However, Justice Alito ruled that victims have only 180 days 
after a discriminatory decision has been made to file suit--even if 
that employee would have no way of knowing about it! This standard is 
impossible to meet.
  Many companies intentionally prohibit their employees from comparing 
salaries and pay raises, and this decision will allow employers to 
shield discriminatory practices.
  The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act rights this wrong. It clarifies that an 
employee is discriminated against each and every time she receives an 
unfair paycheck.
  I urge my colleagues to support fair pay in the workplace, and I 
thank Chairman Miller for his leadership on this issue.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of pay equity.
  The rationale for the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 should be 
obvious. All people, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, and 
religious or sexual orientation, should receive equal pay for equal 
work.
  Unfortunately, that is not the case today in America. African-
Americans make only 77 cents for every dollar made by men, black 
families make about 60 cents of every dollar made by whites, and gays, 
lesbians and other minorities regularly face discrimination in the 
workplace.
  The Supreme Court's recent decision makes it incredibly difficult for 
employees to challenge acts of discrimination. The decision limits to 
six months the period in which victims can challenge their employers 
and be compensated for discrimination.
  Such a time limit was insufficient for Lily Ledbetter, whose pay 
slowly slipped in comparison to the pay of her male coworkers over a 
period of nineteen years. It would also be insufficient for millions of 
other workers, who often learn of pay discrimination only after the 
fact. The majority of companies do not release information on 
comparable salaries, making it, difficult if not impossible for 
employees to determine if wage discrimination is taking place.
  In a typicaly shortsighted move, Bush has threatened to veto this 
bill on the grounds of preventing frivolous lawsuits. The word 
``frivolous'' can be used to describe many things, but it most 
certainly cannot be used to describe a bill that brings the people of 
this country a step closer to the equality that they deserve. For 
someone who claims he wants to spread the principles of equality and 
democracy to the people of the Middle East, it is unfathomable that he 
would fail to uphold these ideals for the people of this country.
  As representatives of a country that was founded on the idea of 
equality for all, there is no excuse for denying citizens the 
opportunity to contest acts of discrimination. I urge my colleagues to 
support this important legislation.
  Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong 
support of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 (H.R. 2831), which is an 
important step in ensuring the fair and equal pay deserved by women in 
our workforce.
  Women have made tremendous strides forward in America's workforce. 
Earlier this year I was proud to see the election of the first female 
Speaker of the House. Today, women serve as executives at some of 
America's largest corporations and in distinguishing professions such 
as medicine and law. However, 43 years after the Civil Rights Act was 
enacted by Congress, women such as Lilly Ledbetter continue to struggle 
to receive payment equal to their male counterparts. These women, who 
perform the same jobs with the same responsibilities, on average earn 
only 77 cents for every dollar that their male counterparts earn. They 
have had to overcome one obstacle after another on their way to earning 
equal pay and equal respect for their work.
  On May 29th, 2007, the United States Supreme Court threw yet another 
obstacle into the path of women in the workforce with the decision of 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear. According to this decision, if an employee fails 
to file a claim within 180 days of their employer's decision to pay 
them less, rather than when she receives a discriminatory paycheck, she 
will be barred forever from challenging the discriminatory paychecks 
that follow and forced to live with the discriminatory pay for the rest 
of her career. If this is allowed to stand, it will be a severe setback 
to women everywhere.
  I am proud to be a cosponsor of H.R. 2831, which would restore 
protections guaranteed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for 
victims of pay discrimination who are entitled to justice and fair pay. 
Contrary to what opponents of this legislation have said, this bill 
does not eliminate the statute of limitations on claims. What it does 
is ensure that the clock on the statute of limitations begins once a 
discriminatory paycheck is received rather than from the point a 
decision was made to discriminate against an employee. Every 
discriminatory paycheck will be a new violation of this law and restart 
the clock for filing a claim. Until the Ledbetter decision, this was 
the accepted understanding of Title VII and this bill will restore the 
law prior to Ledbetter.
  Mr. Speaker, we must continue the fight for pay parity begun by 
Congress over 40 years ago. I would like to thank Chairman George 
Miller for his leadership on this important issue in the House 
Education and Labor Committee. This piece of legislation, as well as 
the Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 1338) introduced by my good friend 
Representative Rosa DeLauro of which I am also a cosponsor, are needed 
to ensure women continue to receive equal treatment. I urge all my 
colleagues to stand up for women workers and vote in favor of this 
bill.
  Mr. LOEBSACK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today, in strong support of the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. This bill will rectify the 5-4 
Supreme Court decision in the case of Lilly Ledbetter and preserve 
worker's rights everywhere.
  Lilly Ledbetter was a female production supervisor at a Goodyear 
plant in Gadsden, Alabama. She worked for 19 years and retired in 1998. 
Six months prior to her retirement she filed a charge with the EEOC 
alleging various claims of sex discrimination.
  Despite receiving awards for top performance, Ms. Ledbetter received 
several unfair, negative evaluations and her pay dropped well below 
that of her male counterparts. Ledbetter's supervisor even admitted 
that one year her pay fell below the minimum threshold for her 
position.
  Ms. Ledbetter's case went to trial, and an Alabama court found in her 
favor, but Goodyear appealed and the case eventually went to the 
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court tossed aside prior law 
and ruled against Ms. Ledbetter.
  This case has far reaching effects on all worker's civil rights. If 
an employee does not file a charge within 180 days of a discriminatory 
pay decision, the employer's pay decision is immunized. The employee 
must live with discriminatory pay for the rest of her tenure,

[[Page H8950]]

and the employer reaps the financial benefits of unlawfully underpaying 
the employee.
  There are numerous problems with this line of reasoning. Employees 
often don't know about a discriminatory decision until it is too late. 
Pay disparities are difficult to discern. Many employers prohibit 
employees from discussing their salaries, and workplace norms warn 
against asking coworkers about their salaries. Additionally, a minor 
pay disparity adopted for discriminatory reasons in the beginning of a 
career may go unnoticed until, years later, after subsequent percentile 
adjustments, it is too large to ignore.
  This bill overturns the Ledbetter v. Goodyear decision and restores 
the longstanding interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
and states that each paycheck that results from a discriminatory 
decision is itself a discriminatory act that resets the clock on the 
180-day period within which a worker must file.
  This bill acknowledges the realities of the workplace and provides 
necessary protections to hardworking men and women. I urge my 
colleagues to support its passage.
  Mr. BACA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my strong support for 
H.R. 2831, The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007.
  I want to thank my friend, Congressman George Miller, for sponsoring 
this bill and for his tireless efforts on behalf of working American 
families everywhere.
  This past May, the Supreme Court handed down a decision with 
disastrous consequences for many Americans. With their ruling on the 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear case, the Court severely limited the right of 
workers to sue their employers for discrimination in pay.
  If allowed to stand, this decision will strip many of the rights of 
employees who have been discriminated against on the basis of sex, 
race, color, or religion.
  Today's bill rectifies the Supreme Court's misguided decision.
  By restoring the longstanding interpretation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act--Congress is ensuring that every American has the 
basic workplace protection they deserve.
  Currently--women earn 76 cents to every dollar a man earns. This is 
unacceptable. Discrimination in the workplace must no longer be 
tolerated. We must ensure equal pay for equal work.
  It is our duty to protect the rights of every American--no matter 
their skin color, gender, or income level.
  I urge my colleagues to protect the rights of working Americans and 
to vote in favor of H.R. 2831.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007.
  The Supreme Court ruled in a narrow 5-4 decision that Lilly Ledbetter 
was not entitled to any remedy after demonstrating she had been paid as 
much as 40 percent less than male workers doing the same job for 19 
years. The decision was founded on a narrow misreading of the intent of 
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court erroneously ruled 
that Ms. Ledbetter could only rely on paychecks she received in the 
final 180 days of her career at Goodyear to prove discrimination.
  Mr. Speaker, the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the law prompted 
me to introduce my own legislation to correct this injustice. I was 
joined by Congresswoman Carolyn Kilpatrick and Congresswoman Debbie 
Wasserman Schultz as original authors of H.R. 2660, the ``2007 Civil 
Rights Pay Fairness Act''. I want to thank them both for working with 
me on this issue, and I commend our Chairman George Miller for moving 
expeditiously to right this wrong. Chairman Miller's bill brings about 
a different remedy in H.R. 2831, but it is no less forceful, and I am 
proud to also be a cosponsor.
  Both bills clarify the intent of Congress by amending the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to make clear that courts must consider a pattern of 
pay decisions that recur and are cumulative. H.R. 2660 and H.R. 2831 
are bills that ensure that victims of workplace discrimination receive 
effective remedies. The decision of the Court in this case was a sharp 
departure from precedent and would greatly limit the ability of pay 
discrimination victims to vindicate their rights.
  Congress must make clear that a pay discrimination claim accrues when 
a pay decision is made, when an employee is subject to that decision, 
or at any time they are injured by it. As a former prosecutor and 
County Executive, I fought against this kind of injustice and I am 
pleased this House is ready today to stand up and correct the error of 
the Supreme Court in the Ledbetter case.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 to correct the Supreme Court's 
misinterpretation of Title VII regarding when a pay discrimination 
claim is timely filed.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the 
principle of equal pay for equal work and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act of 2007, H.R. 2831.
  On May 29, 2007, the Supreme Court issued a disturbing and 
retrobressive ruling. In a 5-4 ruling the Court issued its decision in 
a sex discrimination case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear, that fundamentally 
changed protections that American workers have enjoyed for more than 40 
years when they were codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  As a member of the House Committee on Education and Labor, I 
participated in a hearing on the flawed ruling in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear. During that hearing the Committee heard testimony from Lilly 
Ledbetter describing the pay discrimination that resulted in her 
earning twenty percent less than the lowest paid man in the same 
position at Goodyear.
  Applying the law as it was written and intended, the trial court 
awarded Lilly Ledbetter backpay and compensatory damages because of 
Goodyear's illegal sex discrimination. On appeal it went all the way to 
the Supreme Court, where Justice Samuel Alito led the 5-4 majority in 
dismissing the case. According to Justice Alito, when Lilly Ledbetter 
failed to file a discrimination case within the statutorily provided 
180 days from the initial decision to pay her less than her male 
colleague, she was barred from filing a complaint and no relief was 
available. Despite documenting the sex based evaluation system Goodyear 
managers used, Lilly Ledbetter was denied justice and the rights 
afforded to her under the Civil Rights Act.
  In a strongly worded dissent Judge Ginsburg noted the fallacy of the 
Majority's argument regarding the timeliness of Lilly Ledbetter's 
filing. She reminded the Court that a previous ruling that held each 
``paycheck perpetuating a past discrimination . . . are actionable not 
simply because they are `related' to a decision made outside the 
charge-filing period . . . but because they discriminate anew each time 
they are issued.''
  Judge Ginsburg explicitly called on Congress to intervene and uphold 
the protections provided by the letter and the spirit of the law, 
saying ``the ball is in Congress' court.''
  Today, we answer Judge Ginsburg's call and reverse this disturbing 
Supreme Court decision. Today, we make clear that Congress is committed 
to protecting the rights of American workers and to ensuring that they 
have adequate remedies if they are discriminated against in the 
workplace.
  The passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 clarifies 
that when it comes to discriminatory pay, the protections of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act extend not 
only to these discriminatory pay decisions and practices but to every 
paycheck that results from those pay decisions and practices. Any 
reasonable citizen who believes that we need protect the rights of 
workers for fair treatment at the workplace and fair pay would surely 
find the Supreme Court decision unreasonable. We must act once to 
reestablish fairness. I urge my colleagues to support this important 
legislation.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the 
balance of my unexpired time, and I reserve the 3 minutes for tomorrow.

                              {time}  2300

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 
579, further proceedings on the bill will be postponed.

                          ____________________