Congressional Record, Volume 153 Issue 123 (Monday, July 30, 2007)

[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 123 (Monday, July 30, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H8940-H8950]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2007

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House
Resolution 579, I call up the bill (H.R. 2831) to amend title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to clarify that a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such
Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows

H.R. 2831

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2007''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., No. 05-1074 (May 29, 2007), significantly impairs
statutory protections against discrimination in compensation
that Congress established and that have been bedrock
principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter
decision undermines those statutory protections by unduly
restricting the time period in which victims of
discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory
compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the
intent of Congress.
(2) The limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of
discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of
wage discrimination and is at odds with the robust
application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.
(3) With regard to any charges of discrimination under any
law, nothing in this Act is intended to preclude or limit an
aggrieved person's right to introduce evidence of unlawful
employment practices that have occurred outside the time for
filing a charge of discrimination.

SEC. 3. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF RACE,
COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN.

[[Page H8941]]

violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual
becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice, or when an individual is affected by
application of a discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other
compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such
a decision or other practice.
``(B) In any action under this title with respect to
discrimination in compensation, the Commission, the Attorney
General, or an aggrieved person, may for purposes of filing
requirements, challenge similar or related instances of
unlawful employment practices with respect to discrimination
in compensation occurring after an aggrieved person filed a
charge without filing another charge with the Commission.
``(C) In addition to any relief authorized by 1977a of the
Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), liability may accrue and
an aggrieved person may obtain relief as provided in section
(g)(1), including recovery of back pay for up to two years
preceding the filing of the charge, where the unlawful
employment practices that have occurred during the charge
filing period are similar or related to unlawful employment
practices with regard to discrimination in compensation that
occurred outside the time for filing a charge.''.

SEC. 4. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF AGE.

Section 7(d) of the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 (29
U.S.C. 626(d)) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and
(B) by striking ``(d)'' and inserting ``(d)(1)'';
(2) in the third sentence, by striking ``Upon'' and
inserting the following:
``(2) Upon''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in
violation of this Act, when a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice is adopted, when a person becomes
subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice, or when a person is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or
other practice.
``(B) In any action under this Act with respect to
discrimination in compensation, the Secretary or an aggrieved
person, may for purposes of filing requirements, challenge
similar or related instances of unlawful employment practices
with respect to discrimination in compensation occurring
after an aggrieved person filed a charge without filing
another charge with the Secretary.''.

SEC. 5. APPLICATION TO OTHER LAWS.

(a) Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.--The amendment
made by section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in
compensation brought under title I and section 503 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111 et
seq., 12203), pursuant to section 107(a) of such Act (42
U.S.C. 12117(a)), which adopts the powers, remedies, and
procedures set forth in section 706 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5).
(b) Rehabilitation Act of 1973.--The amendments made by
section 3 shall apply to claims of discrimination in
compensation brought under sections 501 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791, 794), pursuant
to--
(1) sections 501(g) and 504(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C.
791(g), 794(d)), respectively, which adopt the standards
applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 for determining whether a violation has occurred in a
complaint alleging employment discrimination; and
(2) paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 505(a) of such Act
(29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) (as amended by subsection (c)).
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Rehabilitation act of 1973.--Section 505(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after ``(42 U.S.C.
2000e-5 (f) through (k))'' the following: ``(and the
application of section 706(e)(3) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(3)) to
claims of discrimination in compensation)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``1964'' the
following: ``(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in subsections
(e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5),
applied to claims of discrimination in compensation)''.
(2) Civil rights act of 1964.--Section 717 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) is amended by adding
at the end the following
``(f) Section 706(e)(3) shall apply to complaints of
discrimination in compensation under this section.''.
(3) Age discrimination act of 1967.--Section 15(f) of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
633a(f)) is amended by striking ``of section'' and inserting
``of sections 7(d)(3) and''.

SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, take effect
as if enacted on May 28, 2007 and apply to all claims of
discrimination in compensation under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et
seq.), title I and section 503 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, and sections 501 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that are pending on or after that
date.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Johnson of Georgia). Pursuant to House
Resolution 579, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in
the bill is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows

H.R. 2831

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the
part printed in italic]
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

SEC. 3. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF RACE,
COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN.

Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(3)(A) For purposes of this section, an unlawful
employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in
compensation in violation of this title, when a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is
adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or
when an individual is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or
other practice.
``(B) In addition to any relief authorized by section 1977a
of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), liability may
accrue and an aggrieved person may obtain relief as provided
in subsection (g)(1), including recovery of back pay for up
to two years preceding the filing of the charge, where the
unlawful employment practices that have occurred during the
charge filing period are similar or related to unlawful
employment practices with regard to discrimination in
compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a
charge.''.

SEC. 4. DISCRIMINATION IN COMPENSATION BECAUSE OF AGE.

Section 7(d) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(d)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively;
(2) by striking ``(d)'' and inserting ``(d)(1)'';
(3) in the third sentence, by striking ``Upon'' and
inserting the following:
``(2) Upon''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) For purposes of this section, an unlawful practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in
violation of this Act, when a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice is adopted, when a person becomes
subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice, or when a person is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or
other practice.''.

SEC. 5. APPLICATION TO OTHER LAWS.

[[Page H8942]]

(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Rehabilitation act of 1973.--Section 505(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a(a)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after ``(42 U.S.C.
2000e-5 (f) through (k))'' the following: ``(and the
application of section 706(e)(3) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(3)) to
claims of discrimination in compensation)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``1964'' the
following: ``(42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) (and in subsections
(e)(3) of section 706 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5),
applied to claims of discrimination in compensation)''.
(2) Civil rights act of 1964.--Section 717 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(f) Section 706(e)(3) shall apply to complaints of
discrimination in compensation under this section.''.
(3) Age discrimination act of 1967.--Section 15(f) of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
633a(f)) is amended by striking ``of section'' and inserting
``of sections 7(d)(3) and''.

SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. George
Miller) and the gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon) each will
control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. George
Miller).
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 6
minutes.
Mr. Speaker, discrimination is anathema to everything this country
stands for. It is anathema to the promise that is America. Regrettably,
the recent Supreme Court's recent Ledbetter v. Goodyear decision
threatens to turn back the clock on the progress we have made since the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 more than 40 years ago.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter severely restricts the
right of employees to challenge pay discrimination. It ignores the
realities of the workplace, prior precedent, and the clear intent of
Congress.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in this narrowly divided 5-4 decision
called on Congress to reverse this decision, and that is what we are
here to do today.
Lilly Ledbetter, the plaintiff in this case, worked for Goodyear for
over 19 years. When she retired as a supervisor in 1998, she discovered
that her salary was 20 percent lower than that of the lowest-paid male
supervisor. Not only was Ms. Ledbetter earnings nearly $400 a month
less than her male colleagues, she also retired, obviously, with a
substantially smaller pension.
A jury found that Goodyear discriminated against Ms. Ledbetter, and
she was awarded $3.8 million in back pay and damages. This amount was
reduced to the $360,000 damage cap in title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.
Despite the jury's finding, the Supreme Court decided that while
Goodyear discriminated against Ms. Ledbetter, and it is important that
the Members understand that that is what the jury's determination was,
they decided that her claim was made too late. Not that she was wrong,
not that Goodyear was right. Her claim simply came too late.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires an employee to file an
EEOC charge within 180 days of unlawful employment practices. Ms.
Ledbetter filed within 180 days, as required, of receiving the
discriminatory pay from Goodyear. In fact, she filed as soon as she
found out that she was receiving discriminatory pay. She found out
thanks to an anonymous note left in her mailbox.
But a slim majority of the Supreme Court found that, because Ms.
Ledbetter did not file within 180 days of the discriminatory decision
to write those discriminatory paychecks that she received for many,
many years, her time had run out. She could not recover anything from
Goodyear.
The majority's decision is absurd and entirely shuns the reason in
order to satisfy this ideological agenda.
H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, is narrowly tailored and
designed to restore the law on pay discrimination as it was before the
Supreme Court's decision, the law as it was for some 35 years, the law
as it was reaffirmed in circuit court after circuit court, as it was
affirmed by the Congress of the United States.
This bill restores the law so that the 180-day statute of limitations
clock runs when a discriminatory pay decision or practice is adopted,
when a person becomes subject to the pay decision or practice, or when
a person is affected by the pay decision or practice, including
whenever she receives a discriminatory paycheck. In other words, every
discriminatory paycheck is a violation of the act. That is as the law
was for these many, many years. That is what we seek to do.
The bill makes it clear that a victim of pay discrimination is
entitled to a full 2 years of back pay. That is as the law currently
is. You are entitled to recover up to 2 years' back pay under title
VII.

{time} 2200

The bill ensures that these simple reforms extend to the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
and the Rehabilitation Act. H.R. 2831 restores the law to what it was
for years before this recent Supreme Court decision in the Ledbetter
case.
Circuit court after circuit courts have held that the receipt of a
discriminatory paycheck is a new violation of the law. Lilly Ledbetter
received her last discriminatory paycheck. She was then informed about
it, and she filed within 180 days. That's what the law was, that's what
she did, and then this Supreme Court decided somehow that she wasn't
within her rights and that her claim came too late.
The EEOC, in its own compliance manual, states that ``discriminatory
paychecks can be challenged so long as one is issued within the filing
period, regardless of when the decision to issue them was made.''
Again, the law before the Supreme Court. In fact, the Congressional
Budget Office reports that this would not establish a new cause of
action for pay discrimination, it will not significantly effect the
number of filings in the EEOC, and it will not significantly increase
the cost of EEOC in other Federal courts.
Understand this: Unless Congress acts and employers who have made
discriminatory pay decisions before 180 days ago, they will be allowed
to lawfully continue discriminating against the people that they
employ. If they can hide the discriminatory act for 180 days, they can
then continue to discriminate far into the future if they got past the
180 days. That is why this is so important.
The law now tells employers it's okay to discriminate; if you can get
away with it for 180 days, you're home free. All we're asking here is
to restore the law as it was, which was that each paycheck was a
discriminatory act, and under the law you had 180 days to file a claim.
That's what this bill says. That's what the law said before. If you
file that claim and you're successful, you can receive up to 2 years
back pay to make up for that. That's what the law was. That's what we
seek to do in this legislation.
This is the only decent thing to do. People say, well, she should
have known or she should have asked around or she should have done
this, should have done a lot of things. Except we know that also in
many instances employers, in fact, have policies where they prohibit
employees from asking another employee about their level of pay, about
their compensation.
So the fact of the matter is this legislation is absolutely necessary
to end these discriminatory practices on pay, be it against a woman, an
African American, Hispanic, a person over 60. Whatever the conditions
are, it should not be allowed to stand. We should return to the law as
it was these many years.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this ill-considered and over-
reaching legislation.
Proponents of this bill claim it simply reverses a May 29, 2007, U.S.
Supreme Court decision and further clarifies congressional opposition
to wage discrimination against employees in the workplace. In reality,
however, it will set into motion unintended consequences that its
supporters simply are not willing to acknowledge.
At the outset, let me make it clear that opposition to discrimination
of

[[Page H8943]]

any type, be it gender discrimination, racial discrimination, or any
other type of discrimination inside or outside the workplace is not
confined to one party or the other. Every Member of this Chamber stands
in strong opposition to the unfair treatment of any worker, but at the
same time we must stand firmly behind a process that ensures justice
for all parties, and that includes protecting against the potential for
abuse and over-litigation. That, I believe, is where the two parties
diverge on the bill before us. We aren't taking sides for or against
discrimination in the workplace; rather, we're staking out different
positions on fair and equitable justice and the rule of law.
For more than 40 years, title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has
made it illegal for employers to determine an employee's pay scale
based on his or her gender. And this is a principle upon which all of
us, Democrats and Republicans alike, can agree. As such, current law
provides that any individual wishing to challenge an employment
practice as discriminatory must first file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission within the applicable statute of
limitations, which is either 180 or 300 days, depending on his or her
state of employment after the alleged workplace discrimination
occurred.
The statute of limitations was clearly established in the law to
encourage the timely filing of claims, which helps prevent the filing
of stale claims and protects against abuse of the legal system.
Consider these worst case scenarios, for example. Without a statute
of limitations in place, an employee could sue for discrimination
resulting from an alleged discriminatory act that might have occurred
5, 10, 20, 40, or even more years earlier. And without a statute of
limitations in place, it is entirely conceivable that a worker or
retiree could seek damages against a company run by employees and
executives that had nothing to do with the initial act of alleged
discrimination that occurred dozens of years ago.
H.R. 2831 would essentially dismantle the statute of limitations and
replace it with a new system under which every paycheck received by the
employee allegedly discriminated against starts the clock on an
entirely new statute. While fair-minded and principled, this dramatic
change in civil rights law would have incredibly far-reaching impact,
one that supporters of the bill have yet to take the time to thoroughly
and appropriately consider. And B, under H.R. 2831, the worst case
scenarios I just described would become commonplace. And let's not kid
ourselves; our Nation's trial lawyers would seize upon them.
Because H.R. 2831 would dismantle the critical statute of
limitations, the Bush administration last week threatened to veto,
should the bill ever arrive at his desk. Specifically, the
administration noted that the legislation ``would serve to impede
justice and undermine the important goal of having allegations of
discrimination expeditiously resolved.''
Furthermore, the effect of elimination of any statute of limitations
in this area would be contrary to the centuries' old notion about
limitations, period, for all lawsuits.
At this time, Mr. Speaker, I would like to enter the Statement of
Administration Policy into the Record
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management
and Budget,
Washington, DC, July 27, 2007.

Statement of Administration Policy H.R. 2831--Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2007 (Rep. Miller (D) CA and 31 Cosponsors)

The Administration supports our Nation's anti-
discrimination laws and is committed to the timely resolution
of discrimination claims. For this and other reasons, the
Administration strongly opposes the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2007. H.R. 2831 would allow employees to bring a claim of pay
or other employment-related discrimination years or even
decades after the alleged discrimination occurred. H.R. 2831
constitutes a major change in, and expanded application of,
employment discrimination law. The change would serve to
impede justice and undermine the important goal of having
allegations of discrimination expeditiously resolved.
Furthermore, the effective elimination of any statute of
limitations in this area would be contrary to the centuries-
old notion of a limitations period for all lawsuits. If H.R.
2831 were presented to the President. his senior advisors
would recommend that he veto the bill.
Meaningful statutes of limitations in these sorts of fact-
intensive cases are crucial to the fair administration of
justice. The prompt assertion of employment discrimination
permits employers to defend against--and allows employees to
prove--claims that arise from employment decisions instead of
having to litigate claims that are long past. In such cases,
evidence often will have been lost, memories will have faded,
and witnesses will have moved on. Moreover, effective
statutes of limitations benefit employees by encouraging the
prompt discovery, assertion, and resolution of employment
discrimination claims so that workplace discrimination can be
remedied without delay.
H.R. 2831 purports to undo the Supreme Court's decision of
May 29, 2007, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. by
permitting pay discrimination claims to be brought within 180
days not of a discriminatory pay decision, which is the rule
under current law, but rather within 180 days of receiving
any paycheck affected by such a decision, no matter how far
in the past the underlying act of discrimination allegedly
occurred. As a result, this legislation effectively
eliminates any time requirement for filing a claim involving
compensation discrimination. Allegations from thirty years
ago or more could be resurrected and filed in federal courts.
Moreover, the bill far exceeds the stated purpose of
undoing the Court's decision in Ledbetter by extending the
expanded statute of limitations to any ``other practice''
that remotely affects an individual's wages, benefits, or
other compensation in the future. This could effectively
waive the statute of limitations for a wide variety of claims
(such as promotion and arguably even termination decisions)
traditionally regarded as actionable only when they occur.
This legislation does not appear to be based on evidence
that the current statute of limitations principles have
caused any systemic prejudice to the interests of employees,
but it is reasonable to expect the bill's vastly expanded
statute of limitations would exacerbate the existing heavy
burden on the courts by encouraging the filing of stale
claims.

Mr. Speaker, as the President's veto threat makes clear, H.R. 2831 is
not a matter of tinkering around the edges as its supporters would have
the American people believe. Rather, it is a fundamental overhaul of
long-standing civil rights laws. The last major change to these laws
occurred more than 15 years ago and after several years of debate. Yet,
here we are, barely 2 months removed from a Supreme Court decision
ready to grab headlines before we return home for the month of August
by advancing a highly flawed bill without any regard to the long-term
ramifications it could have should it ever make its way into law.
H.R. 2831 represents bad policy, and even worse processing, and for
these reasons I will oppose it. I urge my colleagues to do likewise.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), a member of the committee.
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I rise in strong
support of this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, our friend, the ranking member of the full committee,
just said that this bill repeals the statute of limitations. This is
completely wrong. The bill does not repeal the statute of limitations
for these claims; it restores the statute of limitations that has been
in existence for nearly four decades under this law, an interpretation
of the statute of limitations that virtually unanimously, in the
Circuit Court of Appeals, has been held to be the law.
What is this standard? It says that if a person works in a workplace,
as most workplaces are, where knowing what your coworker makes is
discouraged or even prohibited, that if you're the victim of
discrimination because of your race or your gender or your religion or
your nationality, then you have the right to pursue that claim each
time a new paycheck is issued that manifests and evidences that
discrimination. This is not a novel theory. This has been the law for
nearly 40 years. And this bill restores that law.
Second, our friends on the other side talk about these cataclysmic
events that are going to occur if the law is restored, people filing
suits 70 years after discrimination took place. What an odd plaintiff
that would be, Mr. Speaker, someone who has been victimized for 60 or
50 or 40 years by discrimination, but because they want to game the
legal system, sit and wait it out? I've never

[[Page H8944]]

met that plaintiff, Mr. Speaker, and I don't think anybody really has.
If all of these cataclysmic events were going to happen, why haven't
they happened for the last 40 years? Why haven't people sued 40 or 50
years after discrimination took place? It's because that's not what
this statute of limitations permits, and that's not human nature.
My friend makes reference, Mr. Speaker, to the worst case scenario.
My friends, Lilly Ledbetter lived the worst case scenario. She worked
for nearly 20 years for Goodyear. She was very good at her job. She got
awards for being an excellent employee. Very late in her career she
found out that she was making 20 percent less than the men doing the
same job because she was a woman, so she went to the EEOC. She pursued
her claim in Federal court. Goodyear stood up and said, oh, no; she was
discriminated against not because she's a woman, but because she wasn't
as good at her job as the men. And a jury of her peers heard that
defense, heard that evidence, and ruled in her favor.
Up the ladder the case went to the United States Supreme Court, and
the Court said, she may have been discriminated against, she may have
been wronged, but she just didn't do anything about it soon enough;
never mind that she followed the rules that had been in effect for
nearly 40 years.
This is a restoration of the statute of limitations, not a new
statute of limitations or an abrogation of it. And more importantly, it
is a restoration of justice for people like Lilly Ledbetter who deserve
better than this Supreme Court ruling and deserve the passage of this
bill.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes.''
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the
gentlelady from Tennessee (Mrs. Blackburn).
Mrs. BLACKBURN. I thank the gentleman from California for the time.
Mr. Speaker, today I'm rising to oppose this bill.
We are all for fair pay; we are all for equal pay for equal work, and
we are all against discrimination. But, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2831 does
much more than just simply overturn a Supreme Court case in order to
provide relief to one plaintiff, Lilly Ledbetter. It constitutes a
major change in and extended application of employment discrimination
law.
In my opinion, what this change would do would serve to impede
justice and undermine the important goal of having allegations of
discrimination expeditiously resolved. The bill essentially limits the
1964 Civil Rights Act statute of limitations regarding almost every
claim of discrimination available under Federal law and potentially
broadens the scope and application of the civil rights laws to entirely
new fact patterns, practices and claims.
It also would allow an employee or any individual who can arguably
claim to be affected by an allegedly discriminatory decision relating
to compensation wages, benefits, or any other practice to sue for
discrimination that may have occurred years or even decades in the
past. The anticipated increase in legal and recordkeeping costs created
by this legislation would, indeed, be staggering.
Congress should not be in the business of removing incentives for
prompt resolution of discrimination claims. And that is what this would
do; it would remove the incentive to find a prompt and timely
resolution to discrimination claims.
I thank the gentleman from California, and I encourage my colleagues
to vote against the bill.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I recognize the
gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).
Ms. DeLAURO. Lilly Ledbetter was shortchanged; shortchanged by her
employer, by consistent pay discrimination lasting years; shortchanged
again by the Supreme Court with its decision limiting a woman's ability
to sue their employers for pay discrimination under title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.
As Justice Ginsburg suggested in her dissent, Congress now has an
obligation to correct the Court's decision. That's why we are here, to
make it clear the title VII statute of limitations runs from the date a
discriminatory wage is actually paid, not simply some earliest possible
date which has come and gone long ago.
I commend Congressman Miller for acting with urgency to correct the
injustice. It is time to value the work that women do in our society,
respecting the work that women do, and to value it.

{time} 2215

``The plant manager at Goodyear said, The plant did not need women,
women did not help it, and women caused problems.''
The President's threat to veto this legislation suggests he is happy
to limit women's access to equal pay. Let's turn this around, fix the
decision and make sure that women who face discrimination, like Lilly
Ledbetter faced, have a right to fight against it.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Keller), the subcommittee ranking member.
Mr. KELLER of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
Mr. Speaker, the practical effect of this legislation is to do away
with the statute of limitations in employment disputes. On May 29,
2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Ms. Ledbetter's claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.
There is a strong public policy reason for having a statute of
limitations in the employment context. Witness' memories fade,
documents are lost, and employees die. We want these disputes to be
resolved while witness' memories are fresh, documents are available,
and the employees are alive.
The Ledbetter case is a perfect example. Ms. Ledbetter alleged sexual
harassment misconduct by a single Goodyear supervisor, yet she waited
19 years after the former supervisor passed away from cancer to file a
lawsuit.
On June 12, 2007, Ms. Ledbetter testified before our Education and
Labor Committee. She stated, ``My story began in 1979 when Goodyear
hired me to work as a supervisor in their tire production plant in
Gadsden, Alabama. I worked there for 19 years. One of my supervisors
asked me to go down to a local hotel with him and promised if I did, I
would get good evaluations. He said if I didn't, I would get put at the
bottom of the list. I didn't say anything at first because I wanted to
try to work it out and fit in without making waves.''
At our hearing, I spoke with Ms. Ledbetter at length. She seemed like
a nice lady to me. The conversation she described about the motel made
you angry about it and sympathetic to her. I wondered what that
supervisor would have said 19 years ago. Would he admit it? Would he
deny it but not be very credible? Or would he have said that it
couldn't have happened because he was in Canada at the time and here is
my proof of that?
Well, it turns out that the U.S. Supreme Court was thinking the same
type of thoughts I was about this matter. Their opinion makes their
concerns crystal clear.
On page 12 of its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: ``The
passage of time may seriously diminish the ability of the parties and
the factfinder to reconstruct what actually happened. This case
illustrates the problems created by tardy lawsuits. Ledbetter's claims
of sex discrimination turned principally on the misconduct of a single
Goodyear supervisor, who, Ledbetter testified, retaliated against her
when she rejected his sexual advancements during the early 1980s. Yet,
by the time of trial, this supervisor had died and therefore could not
testify. A timely charge might have permitted his evidence to be
weighed contemporaneously.''
Supporters of the legislation say that the time period of 300 days in
most jurisdictions, 180 days in some, is not enough because an employer
might hide the fact that the female employee's salary was less than the
amount paid to men for the same work.
There are two responses to that. First, the judicial doctrine of
equitable tolling would be available to those type of plaintiffs.
Second, the plaintiffs could file a claim under the Equal Pay Act.
This Federal law forbids paying women less than men for the same work.
It has a longer statute of limitations and an easier burden of proof.
Ms. Ledbetter filed a Equal Pay Act claim, but it was thrown out on the
merits by the trial judge who found that Goodyear paid

[[Page H8945]]

Ledbetter less because of her performance, not sex. Significantly,
Ledbetter abandoned this Equal Pay Act claim.
Mr. Speaker, there is an old saying, hard cases make bad law. That
applies here. Do we throw out the statute of limitations in employment
cases because a nice lady waited 19 years to file a lawsuit? Common
sense tells you the answer is no.
The same public policy reasons for a statute of limitations are still
there. We want witness' memories that are fresh, documents that are
available and employees who are still alive to tell what actually
happened.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.'
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Woolsey), a member of the
committee.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, this legislation overturns the Supreme
Court's 5-4 decision, which offered a very restricted and decidedly
unrealistic reading of just when a discriminatory action regarding
compensation actually occurs. In doing so, this legislation restores
the common and long-standing understanding of employees, employers and
the circuit courts alike, that when it comes to discriminatory pay, the
protection of title VII extends not only to pay decisions and
practices, but to each and every paycheck as well.
Let me say a word about the plaintiff in this case, Lilly Ledbetter.
Lilly will not reap the benefits of our legislation, and, as a result,
will continue to feel the effect of the court's discriminatory decision
to pay her less than her male colleagues for the rest of her life.
Lilly Ledbetter went to work at Goodyear Tires every day for 19
years. She was one of the few female supervisors at the plant. That was
quite an accomplishment in and of itself. But what she didn't realize
was that for all those years, she was paid less than her male
colleagues, 20 percent less by the time she retired, because of
discrimination based on her gender.
A jury found that she was discriminated against. They gave her over
$3.8 million in back pay and damages. But the Supreme Court said to
her, Ms. Ledbetter, you didn't file your claim within 180 days of the
decision to discriminate, and, even though each and every one of your
paychecks reflects the discriminatory decision, and you didn't have
proof of the discrimination until long after the decision was made, you
are out of luck. Lilly Ledbetter, we don't care that your monthly
pension and your Social Security benefits also reflect that
discrimination.
Now, the President says that he is planning to veto this legislation,
and we shouldn't be surprised. But as a tribute to Lilly Ledbetter and
other women who work hard to support their families, to get ahead, who
face discrimination every day of their lives, vote for H.R. 2831.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson), the subcommittee ranking
member.
Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding. I appreciate your leadership for the people of the United
States.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 2831. This
legislation is being improperly classified as a narrow bill with
limited ramifications, that simply overturns a Supreme Court decision
made on May 29, 2007. In actuality, it is one of the most overreaching
pieces of wage discrimination legislation that has ever been
considered. If enacted, this legislation would make it impossible for
businesses to defend themselves against actions that occurred years in
the past.
We all oppose discrimination. Action against those who discriminate
in the workplace should be taken quickly. Current laws ensure that
disputes over discrimination are addressed expeditiously and with
certainty. This bill would eliminate the 1964 Civil Rights Act statute
of limitations governing the time within which a party must make a pay
discrimination claim, currently 180 days or 300 days, depending on the
State of employment.
As an inactive attorney and a person who practiced for 25 years and
the proud father of an attorney, who appreciates the legal profession,
I believe a statute of limitation serves many purposes. It encourages
the timely filing of claims, helps prevent the filing of stale claims,
and, most importantly, protects against abuse of the legal system.
Cases should be brought to court as soon as possible after an
incident occurs to guarantee memories are fresh and witnesses are
available to testify. In the absence of a statute of limitation, a
worker or retiree could sue for pay discrimination resulting from an
alleged discriminatory act that might have occurred 5, 10, 20 or even
30 years earlier. This same worker or retiree could seek damages
against a company run by employees and administrators that had nothing
to do with the initial act of alleged discrimination that occurred
dozens of years ago.
I am grateful for the leadership of the Education and Labor Committee
ranking member Buck McKeon on this issue. I urge my colleagues to
oppose this flawed legislation
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to
the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Ms. Hirono), a member of the committee.
(Ms. HIRONO asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HIRONO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2831, the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, and I would like to thank
Chairman George Miller of the Education and Labor Committee for his
commitment and dedication to bringing this bill to the floor.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to protect
individuals from discrimination they face in the workplace. This bill
amends title VII to ensure employees have a realistic remedy to pay
discrimination. The bill reinstates the paycheck accrual rule, a law
widely interpreted by eight Federal circuit courts to mean that the 180
day time limit for filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission begins each time a discriminatory
paycheck is received.
I would like to stress that this bill does not amend the rule that an
aggrieved person may only recover back pay for the 2 years preceding
the filing of the charge, so there will be no incentive to wait 5, 10,
15 or 20 years, as our opponents claim, to bring such a lawsuit.
Moreover, employers prior to the Ledbetter decision were not inundated
with stale pay discrimination claims, and this law will in fact not
promote the filings of such claims.
The Ledbetter decision was a shocking decision for many of us,
because we know what it is like to face pay discrimination in the
workplace. It is not as though employers announce that they are going
to engage in pay discrimination. Employees are not encouraged to
discuss what they are making, so it is very difficult to find out that
this kind of discriminatory action is even taking place.
Supreme Court Associate Ruth Bader Ginsburg strongly disagreed with
the majority decision stating, ``In our view, the court does not
comprehend, or is indifferent to, the insidious way in which women can
be victims of pay discrimination.'' She urged the Congress to act by
passing this kind of legislation.
I urge my colleagues to vote strongly in favor of this bill.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy now to yield 3 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Illinois (Mrs. Biggert), a member of the committee.
Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, like all of my colleagues here on the floor and in the
House of Representatives, I fully support efforts to end all forms of
discrimination. I admire Ms. Ledbetter's bravery for standing up for
her right to work in an environment free from discrimination.
I know what it is like. I sat in law school class and was told by my
professor that I was taking up the place of someone who belonged there,
a man. As a woman who has felt discrimination, I understand her
frustration and I am pleased that Congress is discussing this important
issue.
If this bill were an anti-discrimination bill, I would be happy to
vote for it and would encourage others to support it. But this bill is
not about discrimination. It is about the statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations is an institution in American
jurisprudence that pertains to all cases and all causes of

[[Page H8946]]

action. For instance, for torts the statutes of limitations is 2 years;
for contracts, it is 6 years; for employment determination or
discrimination, it is 6 months. We can't legislate change in the
statute of limitations just because we don't like a particular Supreme
Court ruling.

{time} 2230

The statute of limitation requires plaintiffs to bring a claim or a
cause of action within a reasonable time. And that is so witnesses
don't disappear or die off, memories don't fade, and supervisors don't
move on and documents are not discarded or destroyed.
That is why I cannot support the legislation before us today. H.R.
2831 would dismantle the statute of limitation for filing a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. If enacted, this
legislation would allow an employee to bring a claim against an
employer years, even decades, after the alleged act of discrimination.
In addition, this legislation would discourage the prompt
investigation and resolution of discrimination. I think everyone would
agree that if there is discrimination at an individual's place of work,
it should be investigated and addressed as soon as possible to ensure
fairness and prevent further discrimination.
Unfortunately, because no hearings were held on this legislation, I
think the majority is rushing it through the House with little
discussion on the bill itself. We can only speculate as to what all of
the ramifications of this bill might be. I know that the gentleman is
probably going to say there was a hearing, but it wasn't directly on
this bill. So I would encourage my colleagues to oppose this well-
intentioned but misguided statute of limitation legislation.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to
the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for moving so quickly
to fix this bill because we really can't wait. Fixing this bill, and
thank you for taking us back to 1964, because that is about what
happens here. The bill as it was intended, and this is not a
hypertechnical statute of limitations bill. In fact, interestingly, the
statute of limitations is not involved at all. It is the same 180 days
as it always was.
The bill before us reinstates the law as it was consistently applied
and interpreted by the courts, including the United States Supreme
Court before, during and after I administered this law as the Chair of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and administered this very
section. Once before the Supreme Court misread this, and Congress
rushed to change it. And here we are back to a Supreme Court really
reaching very hard away from what we had already fixed in the 1991
Civil Rights Act.
I want to remind my colleagues that the first pay cases under this
act were not brought by women at all. They were brought by black men
who were working in Southern factories in a segregated part of those
factories, paid less than white men. Imagine if we said, Look, you
fellas, go and see if you can find out what the white men, who won't
even let you work in the same part of the factory, are earning. Of
course we didn't. And of course nobody can require that of women or
African Americans, who are just as affected by what we do today as
women are.
Imagine, the most secretive information a person has, besides your
medical information, is how much money you earn. How many in this
Congress, before your earnings were a matter of public record, knew how
much the person sitting beside you earned? And particularly, if you are
a minority, a woman or a minority, you are not going to go up, and if
you are, you are not going to find out.
We have got to fix this. The American people have demanded it. We
have to fix it for women. And remind you, we have to fix this for black
people, for people of color who bring the majority of pay cases in our
country today.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon)
has 14\1/2\ minutes, and the gentleman from California (Mr. George
Miller) has 13\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. Foxx), a member of the committee.
Ms. FOXX. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague from California
for yielding me this time.
Along with everyone else here, I feel it is important to say that I
am very much opposed to discrimination. It makes me ill to even think
about discrimination that has occurred in this country in the past. But
I am also very much opposed to this legislation. We don't need to be
throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
When I first went to the North Carolina Senate, I was troubled by the
way a lot of things were done there. And someone said to me, If you
think that people operate here on logic, you are sadly wrong. They
operate on emotion.
We have heard some very emotional comments made about this
legislation and why it should be passed. Those of us who are opposing
it are opposing it on very logical reasons.
This bill makes dramatic changes to civil rights law and would have
an incredibly far-reaching impact, one which supporters of the bill
have yet to take the time to thoroughly and appropriately consider. The
underlying bill constitutes a major change in and expanded application
of employment discrimination law.
Traditionally, civil rights laws have had adequate time for
thoughtful review and consideration. However, this bill was brought
before the Education and Labor Committee about 24 hours prior to markup
and rushed to the floor under a closed rule. It is critical that
legislation of this complexity and with the potential for such
significant impact be carefully considered and not rushed through only
weeks after its introduction.
Many other things have been thoughtfully and rightfully said on our
side, but I want to say that we need to talk about an area that is most
likely to be dramatically impacted is that of our Nation's retirement
system. This legislation contains a pension annuity check rule where
charges could be brought many years after the discrimination occurs,
and it could have long-standing impact on benefits. It could wind up
discriminating against a lot more people than we are trying to help as
a result of this legislation.
It is going too fast. We need to slow it down and do it right. We
want to not have discrimination, but this is not the way to do it
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, this bill would restore to employment
discrimination victims the realistic chance at justice that the Supreme
Court recently took away from them. What is important to understand
about the Court's decision is that everyone agreed that Lilly Ledbetter
was the victim of intentional discrimination for 19 years. The Court
said something truly astonishing, that the only discriminatory act was
the initial decision to pay Lilly Ledbetter less than her male
coworkers. Once the employer had successfully concealed that fact from
her for 180 days, she was out of luck and Goodyear could openly go on
paying her less just because she was a woman forever. The initial
decision to discriminate was illegal, but the continuing decision to
continue paying her less was perfectly okay. This upset 40 years of
settled law, 40 years in which the companies of this country went under
the rule that this bill would restore.
The Court's decision is an open invitation to employers to violate
the law with virtual impunity. Once again, Congress must correct the
Supreme Court and instruct it that when we said discrimination in
employment was illegal, we meant it, and we meant for the courts to
enforce it. And anyone who says that discrimination in employment
should be illegal but should not be enforceable if the employer can
hide the discrimination for 6 months is really saying let the
discrimination go on forever. Let the women and the racial minorities
and other people who are discriminated against be discriminated against
forever.
Shame on the Supreme Court, and shame on those who would make
employment discrimination victims helpless by opposing this bill. I
urge adoption of this bill.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from

[[Page H8947]]

Texas (Ms. Granger), a member of our elected leadership.
Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the
Democrats Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. At first glance, I simply
disagree with the name of the bill. The Democrat's Fair Pay Act is not
fair at all, not for employers, employees or our legal system.
Every American is entitled to an honest day's pay and we have laws on
the book to ensure that is the case. But this bill goes well beyond its
scope by effectively eliminating the statute of limitation in workplace
discrimination cases.
This imposes a huge burden on businesses and opens them up to
litigation years after alleged cases of discrimination. While it is
inexcusable for anyone to face discrimination for pay or otherwise, to
overturn the Supreme Court decision would allow for a flood of decades-
old claims to resurface. The laws we have in place allow adequate time
to file a charge against your employer and offers a set of guidelines
to help individuals file a claim.
The burden this would place on small business owners and any company
to track down a claim that occurred 20 years ago, for example, would
cripple the system we have in place. The statutes of limitations are in
place to help the employee-employer relationship so when something
improper happens, the issue can be dealt with in a timely manner.
Merely eliminating these guidelines would allow for someone to reopen a
claim after 5, 10 or even after they have retired. Those involved may
no longer work at the company or even be alive, for that matter.
If this passes, it will also eliminate the statute of limitations for
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the American with
Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.
The Civil Rights Act and the employment discrimination laws currently
on the books provide adequate protections for our employees. We should
work to ensure that existing laws are enforced to protect employees
against discrimination rather than passing overly broad laws that
subject employers to open-ended liability
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding me this time.
I rise in support of H.R. 2831, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
This important legislation overturns the recent Supreme Court decision,
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire, a decision which undermines title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Ledbetter decision forces victims of discriminatory pay decisions
to live with discriminatory paychecks for the duration of their career
if they fail to file a claim within 180 days of the discrimination,
possibly even if they had no knowledge of the discrimination within the
180 days. In other words, after 180 days, an unsuspecting female,
minority, elderly, or disabled worker would simply be out of luck.
This would even be the case if the employer admitted to the
discrimination and continued to discriminate after the 180-day
limitation had passed.
Mr. Speaker, we hear comments that there would be no statute of
limitations. That is not true. Under the bill, there is still a statute
of limitations; 180 days still applies. The plaintiff has to show that
a discriminatory paycheck was issued within the last 180 days. And if
the employer would simply stop discriminating and went a whole 180 days
without discriminating, then the statute of limitations would apply and
it would be too late to bring a case.
Under the Supreme Court decision, that unjust outcome under the case
is not in keeping with title VII's remedial purpose or the spirit of
the civil rights cases.
Now, Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, ``Congress never intended
to immunize forever discriminatory pay differentials unchallenged
within 180 days of their adoption.'' I agree with Justice Ginsburg. And
she also noted that Congress should correct this injustice. This bill
corrects the injustice by appropriately expressing Congress's intent
that title VII will hold employers accountable for unlawful employment
discrimination.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Minnesota (Mrs. Bachmann).
Mrs. BACHMANN. Mr. Speaker, in this debate tonight I think we can all
stipulate that discrimination in the workforce is wrong. It is wrong if
it is against employees, and it is wrong if it is against employers.
This bill may very well be seen as discrimination against honest
American employers, job creators, because it has a seemingly unending
period to file a lawsuit.
With that, women may very well experience real discrimination in that
they may find that future employers are reluctant to hire them in the
first place for fear of a lawsuit 5, 10, 20, maybe even 40 years down
the road. Let's face it, memories fade, people die, they move away, and
it becomes difficult, if not downright impossible, for a job creator to
defend themselves.
It is a very impractical bill that we are looking at and could likely
result in even more paperwork and higher cost for employers, and
ultimately less wages for all American employees.
Congress needs to stop discriminating against American companies that
are just trying to provide decent jobs to great employees. Instead, I
think Congress should focus on enhancing American competitiveness and
American prosperity.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to
the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).

{time} 2245

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, I met Lilly Ledbetter during the
House Judiciary Committee hearing last month. At that time, she
explained how she was repeatedly harassed during her 20-year career at
Goodyear. Lilly Ledbetter described for us in Judiciary how she had no
proof of pay discrimination until someone anonymously slipped payroll
records into her mailbox. Now, as much as our colleagues on the other
side of the aisle would like to wish it to be otherwise, until a few
months ago, it was established law that each paycheck constitutes a
discriminatory act under the law.
When they were confirmed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
promised to follow precedent. They promised to practice judicial
restraint. Instead, they rewrote the law and pushed an activist,
conservative agenda. They denied Lilly Ledbetter justice.
In the real world, discrimination is subtle and takes years to become
evident. However, Justice Alito ruled that victims have only 180 days
after a discriminatory decision has been made to file suit, even if
that employee would have no way of knowing about it. This standard is
impossible to meet. The opponents of this bill expect employees to be
clairvoyant.
Many companies intentionally prohibit their employees from comparing
salaries and pay raises, and this decision will allow employers to
shield discriminatory practices.
The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act rights this wrong. It clarifies that an
employee is discriminated against each and every time she receives an
unfair paycheck, and I'm surprised at my colleagues, particularly my
female brethren on the other side of the aisle, who are standing in
front of this House and asking the House to continue and repeat the
practice of discrimination against women who have been unfairly treated
for years and years.
I urge my colleagues to support fair pay in the workplace, and I
thank Chairman Miller for his leadership on this issue.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I'm happy now to yield to the gentleman from
New Mexico (Mr. Pearce) 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for
yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this legislation today. Many have
stated it well, that discrimination is not the subject here tonight. It
is the end of the statute of limitations which is at issue.
I would like to just make a point that often we're accused in
Congress of appealing to the special interests, and I can't tell what
the motivation is on this particular piece of legislation. It could
have been narrowly scripted to where it applied only to the person that
was being affected, to where the question of whether or not it applies
to the full statute of limitations really would not even be a question.

[[Page H8948]]

I can tell you that on Thursday of last week we sat in the Resources
Committee, and we heard testimony that talks about the Hard Rock Mining
bill that is coming up to regulate Hard Rock Mining. There is a
provision written by a former Clinton solicitor who is now working for
a special interest group. That provision in that legislation we read
says, ``Notwithstanding the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in High Country Citizens' Alliance v.
Clarke,'' and then it goes on to say that all the decisions in court
are going to be set aside, and we're going to allow this group to go
back to court once more.
Keep in mind that the district court found against the group, then
the appellate court found against the group, and finally, the Supreme
Court said we will not hear the case. So all three levels of judicial
review had been listened to and turned down, and yet this Congress,
this majority, says we're going to set it aside. That was last week
Thursday.
Last week Friday, we had the Imams case, the John Does. You will
recall that how innocent people who report suspicious behavior would be
taken to court. Three-quarters of this House voted against that, and
yet the House's leadership found it necessary to strip the provision
out in conference. That provision was stripped out, and that provision
was added then only under great pressure from this country.
And now we're at this case. It would have been possible and could
have been possible to narrowly craft this legislation to where the
question did not come up. I feel that it is the special interests of
the trial lawyers who in each case would have had open venue, open
access to many millions of Americans which was at stake, and I feel
that's what's like at stake here.
It is not good for American business. It is not good for American
competitiveness. I'm deeply opposed to this legislation, and I thank
the gentleman for yielding
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve my time.
Mr. McKEON. How much time do we have?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon)
has 6\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from California (Mr. George
Miller) has 7 minutes remaining.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I'm happy to yield at this time to the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Kline) 3 minutes, ranking member on the
subcommittee.
Mr. KLINE of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose H.R. 2831. I think it's been
really an interesting debate this evening. We've heard views on both
sides, and clearly, we simply disagree on some fundamental aspects of
this, and I want to address that as well during my 3 minutes.
Speaker after speaker on this side of the aisle has stood up and said
that this legislation effectively eliminates the statute of limitations
for a broad range of discrimination claims. I believe that's correct.
The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Keller) stood up here and recounted
for us the activities of the Supreme Court, and he quoted from the
justices the language that pertained, and it seemed clear to me that
there was a fairness issue here. And while our hearts were all touched
by the testimony of Lilly Ledbetter and by the circumstances of her
case, it was clear to the court and to Mr. Keller and to me that it's
simply unreasonable to allow year after year after year to go by after
a discriminatory act occurs before you make the claim, when in some
cases people will have left, perhaps have died and moved on.
This is a huge boon to the trial lawyers of America. It's going to
bring forward endless litigation, case after case going on day after
day. What businesses will have to do in terms of recordkeeping is
staggering in its scale.
This imperils pensions. One of our colleagues brought up that issue.
It is not at all clear, despite some findings language in the bill,
that our pensions will be protected in this legislation. Potentially,
you can have pensions who simply don't have the funds to pay the earned
benefits. This is bad policy, Mr. Speaker, and it's made in haste.
Mr. Speaker, it is very clear that this legislation amounts to a
significant change in our civil rights laws. It's very clear to me, and
unfortunately, many of the questions of concern raised by the Ledbetter
case have yet to be answered. In the normal legislative process, such
questions would have been raised in committee hearings, subcommittee
and full committee. Concerns would have been debated in good faith.
Unfortunately, this was not the process that brought this bill to the
floor. The Committee on Education and Labor had no legislative
hearings. The bill was not before us the one time we had some witnesses
before us to talk about this at all. The time elapsed from the bill's
introduction to committee markup was little more than 24 business
hours, and we learned on Friday that we were going to be debating this
bill on the floor today. Surely, a huge change like this to our civil
rights laws deserves more of our time, attention and effort than the
majority has seen fit to provide.
Once again, the majority has chosen haste and speed over quality in
making public policy. My concerns and unanswered questions can only
lead me to say that the Ledbetter bill makes for bad policy, creating a
flawed legislative process.
I urge my colleagues to vote against this legislation.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. If I can inquire of the Chair as to
the allocation of time?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. George
Miller) has 7 minutes. The gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon) has
3\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. As I understand, I have the right to
close.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman has the right to close.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. We're reserving 3 minutes; is that
right?
Mr. McKEON. It was my understanding we were going to finish up
tomorrow.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. So we're reserving 3 minutes each.
You've got a half minute. You and I will close, and we will each have 3
minutes for tomorrow.
Mr. McKEON. So you want me to take 30 seconds?
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Yes.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
Mr. Speaker, as Mr. Kline just said, I think we have had a good
debate here tonight.
As we did have that hearing on Ms. Ledbetter's case, the bill wasn't
before us, but we did hear her story. And all of us I think felt bad
for her for the things that happened to her 20, 30 years ago.
But what was also said, as we're sent here to represent all of our
constituents, we can't totally let emotion guide our decisions. We have
to make good law, sound law, and I think we're worried about losing the
statute of limitations. I think that's something we really need to
protect against.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4
minutes.
Mr. Speaker, let us understand something here. They can say it until
the cows come home, but the fact of the matter is, this legislation
restores the law to what it was before. Up until the Supreme Court made
its ruling, each discriminatory check that was issued was a violation
of the law, and you had 180 days from the issuance of that check when
you discovered it to file a claim. This legislation would restore that
law as it was.
If you file that claim, if you were successful in proving your claim,
you could receive up to 2 years back pay. That was the law up until the
Supreme Court decision. That would be the law if we passed this
legislation.
Now, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have said that if
we pass this law, the courts will be inundated with lawsuits. The
people will wait 5, 10, 15, 20 to file a lawsuit, that there will be
cases where the witnesses die and memories fade and long times will
expire and we won't be able to have justice. It will be a huge cost on
the business community. It will change our competitive stature in the
world. It will limit economic growth. All of that from little Lilly
Ledbetter.

[[Page H8949]]

What's the problem with that? If all of that was true, why haven't my
colleagues come to the floor of the House in the 12 years they
controlled the House of Representatives and the United States Senate
and asked to change the law? Why hasn't the President of the United
States, who's been in office for 6\1/2\ years, asked to change the law?
Why hasn't that happened? Because none of the things you talked about
happened under the previous law. It didn't change our competitiveness.
They weren't involved in thousands of cases. People didn't wait 40 or
50 years to get 2 years back pay. No, none of those things happened.
But they want to scare people into believing if we go back to the law
as it was before the Lilly Ledbetter case and the Supreme Court
overturned all of these years of laws and justice and fairness and
anti-discrimination provisions, that somehow all of these terrible
things would happen, but they didn't happen, and that's been the law
all of these years.
So, tomorrow we will get an opportunity to vote to restore the
protections of every American citizen against pay discrimination, to
restore justice to the workplace, to restore the right of an individual
to be paid the same as those who are doing the same job for the same
reasons and the same purposes. That's what we seek. That's all Lilly
Ledbetter sought, but she couldn't get justice at the Supreme Court.
No, she couldn't get it even though a jury found that that could be the
situation.
So we're going to have to restore this for the people of this
country, and again, we'll simply be restoring the law. You can tell the
doomsday scenarios all day long. You can predict all of the things that
are going to happen, but none of them have happened in the last 35
years. None of them have happened in the last 35 years.
So at least you ought to properly represent what the law was and what
the law will be, and with that, I look forward to the conclusion of the
debate tomorrow
Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, I met Lily Ledbetter during a
House Judiciary Committee hearing last month. At that time, she
explained how she was repeatedly harassed during her 20-year career at
Goodyear. She told me how she had no proof of pay discrimination until
someone anonymously slipped payroll records into her mailbox. Until a
few months ago, it was established law that each paycheck constitutes a
discriminatory act under the law.
When they were confirmed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
promised to follow precedent--they promised to practice judicial
restraint. Instead, they rewrote the law and pushed an activist,
conservative agenda. They denied Lily Ledbetter justice.
In the real world, discrimination is subtle and takes years to become
evident. However, Justice Alito ruled that victims have only 180 days
after a discriminatory decision has been made to file suit--even if
that employee would have no way of knowing about it! This standard is
impossible to meet.
Many companies intentionally prohibit their employees from comparing
salaries and pay raises, and this decision will allow employers to
shield discriminatory practices.
The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act rights this wrong. It clarifies that an
employee is discriminated against each and every time she receives an
unfair paycheck.
I urge my colleagues to support fair pay in the workplace, and I
thank Chairman Miller for his leadership on this issue.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of pay equity.
The rationale for the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 should be
obvious. All people, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, and
religious or sexual orientation, should receive equal pay for equal
work.
Unfortunately, that is not the case today in America. African-
Americans make only 77 cents for every dollar made by men, black
families make about 60 cents of every dollar made by whites, and gays,
lesbians and other minorities regularly face discrimination in the
workplace.
The Supreme Court's recent decision makes it incredibly difficult for
employees to challenge acts of discrimination. The decision limits to
six months the period in which victims can challenge their employers
and be compensated for discrimination.
Such a time limit was insufficient for Lily Ledbetter, whose pay
slowly slipped in comparison to the pay of her male coworkers over a
period of nineteen years. It would also be insufficient for millions of
other workers, who often learn of pay discrimination only after the
fact. The majority of companies do not release information on
comparable salaries, making it, difficult if not impossible for
employees to determine if wage discrimination is taking place.
In a typicaly shortsighted move, Bush has threatened to veto this
bill on the grounds of preventing frivolous lawsuits. The word
``frivolous'' can be used to describe many things, but it most
certainly cannot be used to describe a bill that brings the people of
this country a step closer to the equality that they deserve. For
someone who claims he wants to spread the principles of equality and
democracy to the people of the Middle East, it is unfathomable that he
would fail to uphold these ideals for the people of this country.
As representatives of a country that was founded on the idea of
equality for all, there is no excuse for denying citizens the
opportunity to contest acts of discrimination. I urge my colleagues to
support this important legislation.
Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong
support of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 (H.R. 2831), which is an
important step in ensuring the fair and equal pay deserved by women in
our workforce.
Women have made tremendous strides forward in America's workforce.
Earlier this year I was proud to see the election of the first female
Speaker of the House. Today, women serve as executives at some of
America's largest corporations and in distinguishing professions such
as medicine and law. However, 43 years after the Civil Rights Act was
enacted by Congress, women such as Lilly Ledbetter continue to struggle
to receive payment equal to their male counterparts. These women, who
perform the same jobs with the same responsibilities, on average earn
only 77 cents for every dollar that their male counterparts earn. They
have had to overcome one obstacle after another on their way to earning
equal pay and equal respect for their work.
On May 29th, 2007, the United States Supreme Court threw yet another
obstacle into the path of women in the workforce with the decision of
Ledbetter v. Goodyear. According to this decision, if an employee fails
to file a claim within 180 days of their employer's decision to pay
them less, rather than when she receives a discriminatory paycheck, she
will be barred forever from challenging the discriminatory paychecks
that follow and forced to live with the discriminatory pay for the rest
of her career. If this is allowed to stand, it will be a severe setback
to women everywhere.
I am proud to be a cosponsor of H.R. 2831, which would restore
protections guaranteed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for
victims of pay discrimination who are entitled to justice and fair pay.
Contrary to what opponents of this legislation have said, this bill
does not eliminate the statute of limitations on claims. What it does
is ensure that the clock on the statute of limitations begins once a
discriminatory paycheck is received rather than from the point a
decision was made to discriminate against an employee. Every
discriminatory paycheck will be a new violation of this law and restart
the clock for filing a claim. Until the Ledbetter decision, this was
the accepted understanding of Title VII and this bill will restore the
law prior to Ledbetter.
Mr. Speaker, we must continue the fight for pay parity begun by
Congress over 40 years ago. I would like to thank Chairman George
Miller for his leadership on this important issue in the House
Education and Labor Committee. This piece of legislation, as well as
the Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 1338) introduced by my good friend
Representative Rosa DeLauro of which I am also a cosponsor, are needed
to ensure women continue to receive equal treatment. I urge all my
colleagues to stand up for women workers and vote in favor of this
bill.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today, in strong support of the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. This bill will rectify the 5-4
Supreme Court decision in the case of Lilly Ledbetter and preserve
worker's rights everywhere.
Lilly Ledbetter was a female production supervisor at a Goodyear
plant in Gadsden, Alabama. She worked for 19 years and retired in 1998.
Six months prior to her retirement she filed a charge with the EEOC
alleging various claims of sex discrimination.
Despite receiving awards for top performance, Ms. Ledbetter received
several unfair, negative evaluations and her pay dropped well below
that of her male counterparts. Ledbetter's supervisor even admitted
that one year her pay fell below the minimum threshold for her
position.
Ms. Ledbetter's case went to trial, and an Alabama court found in her
favor, but Goodyear appealed and the case eventually went to the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court tossed aside prior law
and ruled against Ms. Ledbetter.
This case has far reaching effects on all worker's civil rights. If
an employee does not file a charge within 180 days of a discriminatory
pay decision, the employer's pay decision is immunized. The employee
must live with discriminatory pay for the rest of her tenure,

[[Page H8950]]

and the employer reaps the financial benefits of unlawfully underpaying
the employee.
There are numerous problems with this line of reasoning. Employees
often don't know about a discriminatory decision until it is too late.
Pay disparities are difficult to discern. Many employers prohibit
employees from discussing their salaries, and workplace norms warn
against asking coworkers about their salaries. Additionally, a minor
pay disparity adopted for discriminatory reasons in the beginning of a
career may go unnoticed until, years later, after subsequent percentile
adjustments, it is too large to ignore.
This bill overturns the Ledbetter v. Goodyear decision and restores
the longstanding interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and states that each paycheck that results from a discriminatory
decision is itself a discriminatory act that resets the clock on the
180-day period within which a worker must file.
This bill acknowledges the realities of the workplace and provides
necessary protections to hardworking men and women. I urge my
colleagues to support its passage.
Mr. BACA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my strong support for
H.R. 2831, The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007.
I want to thank my friend, Congressman George Miller, for sponsoring
this bill and for his tireless efforts on behalf of working American
families everywhere.
This past May, the Supreme Court handed down a decision with
disastrous consequences for many Americans. With their ruling on the
Ledbetter v. Goodyear case, the Court severely limited the right of
workers to sue their employers for discrimination in pay.
If allowed to stand, this decision will strip many of the rights of
employees who have been discriminated against on the basis of sex,
race, color, or religion.
Today's bill rectifies the Supreme Court's misguided decision.
By restoring the longstanding interpretation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act--Congress is ensuring that every American has the
basic workplace protection they deserve.
Currently--women earn 76 cents to every dollar a man earns. This is
unacceptable. Discrimination in the workplace must no longer be
tolerated. We must ensure equal pay for equal work.
It is our duty to protect the rights of every American--no matter
their skin color, gender, or income level.
I urge my colleagues to protect the rights of working Americans and
to vote in favor of H.R. 2831.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007.
The Supreme Court ruled in a narrow 5-4 decision that Lilly Ledbetter
was not entitled to any remedy after demonstrating she had been paid as
much as 40 percent less than male workers doing the same job for 19
years. The decision was founded on a narrow misreading of the intent of
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court erroneously ruled
that Ms. Ledbetter could only rely on paychecks she received in the
final 180 days of her career at Goodyear to prove discrimination.
Mr. Speaker, the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the law prompted
me to introduce my own legislation to correct this injustice. I was
joined by Congresswoman Carolyn Kilpatrick and Congresswoman Debbie
Wasserman Schultz as original authors of H.R. 2660, the ``2007 Civil
Rights Pay Fairness Act''. I want to thank them both for working with
me on this issue, and I commend our Chairman George Miller for moving
expeditiously to right this wrong. Chairman Miller's bill brings about
a different remedy in H.R. 2831, but it is no less forceful, and I am
proud to also be a cosponsor.
Both bills clarify the intent of Congress by amending the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to make clear that courts must consider a pattern of
pay decisions that recur and are cumulative. H.R. 2660 and H.R. 2831
are bills that ensure that victims of workplace discrimination receive
effective remedies. The decision of the Court in this case was a sharp
departure from precedent and would greatly limit the ability of pay
discrimination victims to vindicate their rights.
Congress must make clear that a pay discrimination claim accrues when
a pay decision is made, when an employee is subject to that decision,
or at any time they are injured by it. As a former prosecutor and
County Executive, I fought against this kind of injustice and I am
pleased this House is ready today to stand up and correct the error of
the Supreme Court in the Ledbetter case.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 to correct the Supreme Court's
misinterpretation of Title VII regarding when a pay discrimination
claim is timely filed.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the
principle of equal pay for equal work and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2007, H.R. 2831.
On May 29, 2007, the Supreme Court issued a disturbing and
retrobressive ruling. In a 5-4 ruling the Court issued its decision in
a sex discrimination case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear, that fundamentally
changed protections that American workers have enjoyed for more than 40
years when they were codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
As a member of the House Committee on Education and Labor, I
participated in a hearing on the flawed ruling in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear. During that hearing the Committee heard testimony from Lilly
Ledbetter describing the pay discrimination that resulted in her
earning twenty percent less than the lowest paid man in the same
position at Goodyear.
Applying the law as it was written and intended, the trial court
awarded Lilly Ledbetter backpay and compensatory damages because of
Goodyear's illegal sex discrimination. On appeal it went all the way to
the Supreme Court, where Justice Samuel Alito led the 5-4 majority in
dismissing the case. According to Justice Alito, when Lilly Ledbetter
failed to file a discrimination case within the statutorily provided
180 days from the initial decision to pay her less than her male
colleague, she was barred from filing a complaint and no relief was
available. Despite documenting the sex based evaluation system Goodyear
managers used, Lilly Ledbetter was denied justice and the rights
afforded to her under the Civil Rights Act.
In a strongly worded dissent Judge Ginsburg noted the fallacy of the
Majority's argument regarding the timeliness of Lilly Ledbetter's
filing. She reminded the Court that a previous ruling that held each
``paycheck perpetuating a past discrimination . . . are actionable not
simply because they are `related' to a decision made outside the
charge-filing period . . . but because they discriminate anew each time
they are issued.''
Judge Ginsburg explicitly called on Congress to intervene and uphold
the protections provided by the letter and the spirit of the law,
saying ``the ball is in Congress' court.''
Today, we answer Judge Ginsburg's call and reverse this disturbing
Supreme Court decision. Today, we make clear that Congress is committed
to protecting the rights of American workers and to ensuring that they
have adequate remedies if they are discriminated against in the
workplace.
The passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 clarifies
that when it comes to discriminatory pay, the protections of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act extend not
only to these discriminatory pay decisions and practices but to every
paycheck that results from those pay decisions and practices. Any
reasonable citizen who believes that we need protect the rights of
workers for fair treatment at the workplace and fair pay would surely
find the Supreme Court decision unreasonable. We must act once to
reestablish fairness. I urge my colleagues to support this important
legislation.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the
balance of my unexpired time, and I reserve the 3 minutes for tomorrow.

{time} 2300

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution
579, further proceedings on the bill will be postponed.

____________________