[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 123 (Monday, July 30, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H8930-H8935]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTEGRATED DEEPWATER PROGRAM REFORM ACT
Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 2722) to restructure the Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater
Program, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows
H.R. 2722
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Integrated Deepwater
Program Reform Act''.
SEC. 2. IMPLEMENTATION OF COAST GUARD INTEGRATED DEEPWATER
ACQUISITION PROGRAM.
(a) Use of Private Sector Entity as a Lead Systems
Integrator.--
(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the Secretary may not use a private sector entity
as a lead systems integrator for procurements under, or in
support of, the Deepwater Program beginning on the earlier of
October 1, 2011, or the date on which the Secretary certifies
in writing to the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate that the Coast Guard has available and can retain
sufficient contracting personnel and expertise within the
Coast Guard, through an arrangement with other Federal
agencies, or through contracts or other arrangements with
private sector entities, to perform the functions and
responsibilities of the lead system integrator in an
efficient and cost-effective manner.
(2) Completion of existing delivery orders and task
orders.--The Secretary may use a private sector entity as a
lead systems integrator to complete any delivery order or
task order under the Deepwater Program that was issued to the
lead systems integrator on or before the date of enactment of
this Act.
(3) Assistance of other federal agencies.--In any case in
which the Secretary is the systems integrator under the
Deepwater Program, the Secretary may obtain any type of
assistance the Secretary considers appropriate, with any
systems integration functions, from any Federal agency with
experience in systems integration involving maritime vessels
and aircraft.
(4) Assistance of private sector entities.--In any case in
which the Secretary is the systems integrator under the
Deepwater Program, the Secretary may, subject to the
availability of appropriations, obtain by grant, contract, or
cooperative agreement any type of assistance the Secretary
considers appropriate, with any systems integration
functions, from any private sector entity with experience in
systems integration involving maritime vessels and aircraft.
(b) Competition.--
(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the Secretary shall use full and open competition
for each class of asset acquisitions under the Deepwater
Program for which an outside contractor is used, if the asset
is procured directly by the Coast Guard or by the Integrated
Coast Guard System acting under a contract with the Coast
Guard.
(2) Exception.--The Secretary may use a procurement method
that is less than full and open competition to procure an
asset under the Deepwater Program, if--
(A) the Secretary determines that such method is in the
best interests of the Federal Government; and
(B) by not later than 30 days before the date of the award
of a contract for the procurement, the Secretary submits to
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report explaining
why such procurement is in the best interests of the Federal
Government.
(3) Limitation on application.--Paragraph (1) shall not
apply to a contract, subcontract, or task order that was
issued before the date of enactment of this Act, if there is
no change in the quantity of assets or the specific type of
assets procured.
(c) Required Contract Terms.--The Secretary shall include
in each contract, subcontract, and task order issued under
the Deepwater Program after the date of the enactment of this
Act the following provisions, as applicable:
(1) Technical reviews.--A requirement that the Secretary
shall conduct a technical review of all proposed designs,
design changes, and engineering changes, and a requirement
that the contractor must specifically address all engineering
concerns identified in the technical reviews, before any
funds may be obligated.
(2) Responsibility for technical requirements.--A
requirement that the Secretary shall maintain the authority
to establish, approve, and maintain technical requirements.
(3) Cost estimate of major changes.--A requirement that an
independent cost estimate must be prepared and approved by
the Secretary before the execution of any change order
costing more than 5 percent of the unit cost approved in the
Deepwater Program baseline in effect as of May 2007.
(4) Performance measurement.--A requirement that any
measurement of contractor and subcontractor performance must
be based on the status of all work performed, including the
extent to which the work performed met all cost, schedule,
and mission performance requirements outlined in the
Deepwater Program contract.
(5) Early operational assessment.--For the acquisition of
any cutter class for which an Early Operational Assessment
has not been developed--
(A) a requirement that the Secretary of the Department in
which the Coast Guard is operating shall cause an Early
Operational Assessment to be conducted by the Department of
the Navy after the development of the preliminary design of
the cutter and before the conduct of the critical design
review of the cutter; and
(B) a requirement that the Coast Guard shall develop a plan
to address the findings presented in the Early Operational
Assessment.
(6) Transient electromagnetic pulse emanation.--For the
acquisition or upgrade of air, surface, or shore assets for
which compliance with transient electromagnetic pulse
emanation (TEMPEST) is a requirement, a provision specifying
that the standard for determining such compliance shall be
the air, surface, or shore asset standard then used by the
Department of the Navy.
(7) Offshore patrol cutter underway requirement.--For any
contract issued to acquire an Offshore Patrol Cutter,
provisions specifying the service life, fatigue life, days
underway in general Atlantic and North Pacific Sea
conditions, maximum range, and maximum speed the cutter shall
be built to achieve.
(8) Inspector general access.--A requirement that the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector
General shall have access to all records maintained by all
contractors working on the Deepwater Program, and shall have
the right to privately interview any contractor personnel.
(d) Life Cycle Cost Estimate.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall develop an
authoritative life cycle cost estimate for the Deepwater
Program.
(2) Contents.--The life cycle cost estimate shall include
asset acquisition and logistics support decisions and planned
operational tempo and locations as of the date of enactment
of this Act.
(3) Submittal.--The Secretary shall--
(A) submit the life cycle cost estimate to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate within 4 months after the date
of enactment of this Act; and
[[Page H8931]]
(B) submit updates of the life cycle cost estimate to such
Committees annually.
(e) Contract Officers.--The Secretary shall assign a
separate contract officer for each class of cutter and
aircraft acquired or rehabilitated under the Deepwater
Program, including the National Security Cutter, the Offshore
Patrol Cutter, the Fast Response Cutter A, the Fast Response
Cutter B, maritime patrol aircraft, the aircraft HC-130J, the
helicopter HH-65, the helicopter HH-60, and the vertical
unmanned aerial vehicle.
(f) Technology Risk Report.--The Secretary shall submit to
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report
identifying the technology risks and level of maturity for
major technologies used on each class of asset acquisitions
under the Deepwater Program, including the Fast Response
Cutter A (FRC-A), the Fast Response Cutter B (FRC-B), the
Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), and the Vertical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (VUAV), not later than 90 days before the date
of award of a contract for such an acquisition.
(g) Submission of Assessment Results and Plans to
Congress.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall submit to
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate--
(1) the results of each Early Operational Assessment
conducted pursuant to subsection (c)(5)(A) and the plan
approved by the Commandant pursuant to subsection (c)(5)(B)
for addressing the findings of such assessment, within 30
days after the Commandant approves the plan; and
(2) a report describing how the recommendations of each
Early Operational Assessment conducted pursuant to subsection
(c)(5)(A) on the first in class of a new cutter class have
been addressed in the design on which construction is to
begin, within 30 days before initiation of construction.
SEC. 3. CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICER.
(a) In General.--Chapter 3 of title 14, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 55. Chief Acquisition Officer
``(a) Establishment of Agency Chief Acquisition Officer.--
The Commandant shall appoint or designate a career reserved
employee as Chief Acquisition Officer for the Coast Guard,
who shall--
``(1) have acquisition management as that official's
primary duty; and
``(2) report directly to the Commandant to advise and
assist the Commandant to ensure that the mission of the Coast
Guard is achieved through the management of the Coast Guard's
acquisition activities.
``(b) Authority and Functions of the Chief Acquisition
Officer.--The functions of the Chief Acquisition Officer
shall include--
``(1) monitoring the performance of acquisition activities
and acquisition programs of the Coast Guard, evaluating the
performance of those programs on the basis of applicable
performance measurements, and advising the Commandant
regarding the appropriate business strategy to achieve the
mission of the Coast Guard;
``(2) increasing the use of full and open competition in
the acquisition of property and services by the Coast Guard
by establishing policies, procedures, and practices that
ensure that the Coast Guard receives a sufficient number of
sealed bids or competitive proposals from responsible sources
to fulfill the Government's requirements (including
performance and delivery schedules) at the lowest cost or
best value considering the nature of the property or service
procured;
``(3) ensuring the use of detailed performance
specifications in instances in which performance-based
contracting is used;
``(4) making acquisition decisions consistent with all
applicable laws and establishing clear lines of authority,
accountability, and responsibility for acquisition
decisionmaking within the Coast Guard;
``(5) managing the direction of acquisition policy for the
Coast Guard, including implementation of the unique
acquisition policies, regulations, and standards of the Coast
Guard;
``(6) developing and maintaining an acquisition career
management program in the Coast Guard to ensure that there is
an adequate professional workforce; and
``(7) as part of the strategic planning and performance
evaluation process required under section 306 of title 5 and
sections 1105(a)(28), 1115, 1116, and 9703 of title 31--
``(A) assessing the requirements established for Coast
Guard personnel regarding knowledge and skill in acquisition
resources management and the adequacy of such requirements
for facilitating the achievement of the performance goals
established for acquisition management;
``(B) in order to rectify any deficiency in meeting such
requirements, developing strategies and specific plans for
hiring, training, and professional development; and
``(C) reporting to the Commandant on the progress made in
improving acquisition management capability.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``55. Chief Acquisition Officer.''.
(c) Special Rate Supplements.--
(1) Requirement to establish.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of enactment of this Act and in accordance with part
9701.333 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard shall establish special rate
supplements that provide higher pay levels for employees
necessary to carry out the amendment made by this section.
(2) Subject to appropriations.--The requirement under
paragraph (1) is subject to the availability of
appropriations.
SEC. 4. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall--
(1) cause each cutter, other than a National Security
Cutter, acquired by the Coast Guard and delivered after the
date of enactment of this Act to be classed by the American
Bureau of Shipping, before acceptance of delivery;
(2) cause the design and construction of each National
Security Cutter, other than National Security Cutter 1 and 2,
to be certified by an independent third party with expertise
in vessel design and construction certification to be able to
meet a 185-underway-day requirement under general Atlantic
and North Pacific sea conditions for a period of at least 30
years;
(3) cause all electronics on all aircraft, surface, and
shore assets that require TEMPEST certification and that are
delivered after the date of enactment of this Act to be
tested and certified in accordance with TEMPEST standards and
communications security (COMSEC) standards by an independent
third party that is authorized by the Federal Government to
perform such testing and certification; and
(4) cause all aircraft and aircraft engines acquired by the
Coast Guard and delivered after the date of enactment of this
Act to be certified for airworthiness by an independent third
party with expertise in aircraft and aircraft engine
certification, before acceptance of delivery.
(b) First in Class of a Major Asset Acquisition.--The
Secretary shall cause the first in class of a major asset
acquisition of a cutter or an aircraft to be subjected to an
assessment of operational capability conducted by the
Secretary of the Navy.
(c) Final Arbiter.--The Secretary shall be the final
arbiter of all technical disputes regarding designs and
acquisitions of vessels and aircraft for the Coast Guard.
SEC. 5. NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTERS.
(a) National Security Cutters 1 and 2.--
(1) Report on options under consideration.--The Secretary
shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate--
(A) within 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, a report describing in detail the cost increases that
have been experienced on National Security Cutters 1 and 2
since the date of the issuance of the task orders for
construction of those cutters and explaining the causes of
these cost increases; and
(B) within 180 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, a report on the options that the Coast Guard is
considering to strengthen the hulls of National Security
Cutter 1 and National Security Cutter 2, including--
(i) the costs of each of the options under consideration;
(ii) a schedule for when the hull strengthening repairs are
anticipated to be performed; and
(iii) the impact that the weight likely to be added to each
the cutter by each option will have on the cutter's ability
to meet both the original performance requirements included
in the Deepwater Program contract and the performance
requirements created by contract Amendment Modification 00042
dated February 7, 2007.
(2) Design assessment.--Not later than 30 days before the
Coast Guard signs any contract, delivery order, or task order
to strengthen the hull of either of National Security Cutter
1 or 2 to resolve the structural design and performance
issues identified in the Department of Homeland Security
Inspector General's report OIG-07-23 dated January 2007, the
Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate all results of an assessment of the proposed hull
strengthening design conducted by the Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Carderock Division, including a description in detail
of the extent to which the hull strengthening measures to be
implemented on those cutters will enable the cutters to meet
a 185-underway-day requirement under general Atlantic and
North Pacific sea conditions for a period of at least 30
years.
(b) National Security Cutters 3 Through 8.--Not later than
30 days before the Coast Guard signs any contract, delivery
order, or task order authorizing construction of National
Security Cutters 3 through 8, the Secretary shall submit to
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate all results of an
assessment of the proposed designs to resolve the structural
design, safety, and performance issues identified by the
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General
report OIG-07-23 for the hulls of those cutters conducted by
the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division,
including a description in detail of the extent to which such
designs will enable the cutters to meet a 185-underway-day
requirement under general Atlantic and North Pacific sea
conditions.
SEC. 6. MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall submit the following
reports to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate:
(1) Within 4 months after the date of enactment of this
Act, a justification for why 8 National Security Cutters are
required to meet the operational needs of the Coast Guard,
including--
(A) how many days per year each National Security Cutter
will be underway at sea;
(B) where each National Security Cutter will be home
ported;
[[Page H8932]]
(C) the amount of funding that will be required to
establish home port operations for each National Security
Cutter;
(D) the extent to which 8 National Security Cutters
deployed without vertical unmanned aerial vehicles (VUAV)
will meet or exceed the mission capability (including
surveillance capacity) of the 12 Hamilton-class high
endurance cutters that the National Security Cutters will
replace;
(E) the business case in support of constructing National
Security Cutters 3 through 8, including a cost-benefit
analysis; and
(F) an analysis of how many Offshore Patrol Cutters would
be required to provide the patrol coverage provided by a
National Security Cutter.
(2) Within 4 months after the date of enactment of this
Act, a report on--
(A) the impact that deployment of a National Security
Cutter and other cutter assets without the vertical unmanned
aerial vehicle (VUAV) will have on the amount of patrol
coverage that will be able to be provided during missions
conducted by the National Security Cutter and all other
cutters planned to be equipped with a VUAV;
(B) how the coverage gap will be made up;
(C) an update on the current status of the development of
the VUAV; and
(D) the timeline detailing the major milestones to be
achieved during development of the VUAV and identifying the
delivery date for the first and last VUAV.
(3) Within 30 days after the elevation to flag-level for
resolution of any design or other dispute regarding the
Deepwater Program contract or an item to be procured under
that contract, including a detailed description of the issue
and the rationale underlying the decision taken by the flag
officer to resolve the issue.
(4) Within 4 months after the date of enactment of this
Act, a report detailing the total number of change orders
that have been created by the Coast Guard under the Deepwater
Program before the date of enactment of this Act, the total
cost of these change orders, and their impact on the
Deepwater Program schedule.
(5) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, a report detailing the technology risks and level of
maturity for major technologies used on maritime patrol
aircraft, the HC-130J, and the National Security Cutter.
(6) Not less than 60 days before signing a contract to
acquire any vessel or aircraft, a report comparing the cost
of purchasing that vessel or aircraft directly from the
manufacturer or shipyard with the cost of procuring it
through the Integrated Coast Guard System.
(7) Within 30 days after the Program Executive Officer of
the Deepwater Program becomes aware of a likely cost overrun
exceeding 5 percent of the overall asset acquisition contract
cost or schedule delay exceeding 5 percent of the estimated
asset construction period under the Deepwater Program, a
report by the Commandant containing a description of the cost
overrun or delay, an explanation of the overrun or delay, a
description of Coast Guard's response, and a description of
significant delays in the procurement schedule likely to be
caused by the overrun or delay.
(8) Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
articulation of a doctrine and description of an anticipated
implementation of a plan for management of acquisitions
programs, financial management (including earned value
management and cost estimating), engineering and logistics
management, and contract management, that includes--
(A) a description of how the Coast Guard will cultivate
among uniformed personnel expertise in acquisitions
management and financial management;
(B) a description of the processes that will be followed to
draft and ensure technical review of procurement packages,
including statements of work, for any class of assets
acquired by the Coast Guard;
(C) a description of how the Coast Guard will conduct an
independent cost estimating process, including independently
developing cost estimates for major change orders; and
(D) a description of how Coast Guard will strengthen the
management of change orders.
(9) Within 4 months after the date of enactment of this
Act, a report on the development of a new acquisitions office
within the Coast Guard describing the specific staffing
structure for that directorate, including--
(A) identification of all managerial positions proposed as
part of the office, the functions that each managerial
position will fill, and the number of employees each manager
will supervise; and
(B) a formal organizational chart and identification of
when managerial positions are to be filled.
(10) Ninety days prior to the issuance of a Request for
Proposals for construction of an Offshore Patrol Cutter, a
report detailing the service life, fatigue life, maximum
range, maximum speed, and number of days underway under
general Atlantic and North Pacific Sea conditions the cutter
shall be built to achieve.
(11) The Secretary shall report annually on the percentage
of the total amount of funds expended on procurements under
the Deepwater Program that has been paid to each of small
businesses and minority-owned businesses.
(12) Within 120 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, a report on any Coast Guard mission performance gap due
to the removal of Deepwater Program assets from service. The
report shall include the following:
(A) A description of the mission performance gap detailing
the geographic regions and Coast Guard capabilities affected.
(B) An analysis of factors affecting the mission
performance gap that are unrelated to the Deepwater Program,
including deployment of Coast Guard assets overseas and
continuous vessel shortages.
(C) A description of measures being taken in the near term
to fill the mission performance gap, including what those
measures are and when they will be implemented.
(D) A description of measures being taken in the long term
to fill the mission performance gap, including what those
measures are and when they will be implemented.
(E) A description of the potential alternatives to fill the
mission performance gap, including any acquisition or lease
considered and the reasons they were not pursued.
(b) Report Required on Acceptance of Delivery of Incomplete
Asset.--
(1) In general.--If the Secretary accepts delivery of an
asset after the date of enactment of this Act for which a
contractually required certification cannot be achieved
within 30 days after the date of delivery or with any system
that is not fully functional for the mission for which it was
intended, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the United States Senate within 30 days
after accepting delivery of the asset a report explaining why
acceptance of the asset in such a condition is in the best
interests of the United States Government.
(2) Contents.--The report shall--
(A) specify the systems that are not able to achieve
contractually required certifications within 30 days after
the date of delivery and the systems that are not fully
functional at the time of delivery for the missions for which
they were intended;
(B) identify milestones for the completion of required
certifications and to make all systems fully functional; and
(C) identify when the milestones will be completed, who
will complete them, and the cost to complete them.
SEC. 7. USE OF THE NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, THE NAVAL AIR
SYSTEMS COMMAND, AND THE SPACE AND NAVAL
WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND TO ASSIST THE COAST
GUARD IN EXERCISING TECHNICAL AUTHORITY FOR THE
DEEPWATER PROGRAM AND OTHER COAST GUARD
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that the Coast Guard's use of
the technical, contractual, and program management oversight
expertise of the Department of the Navy in ship and aircraft
production complements and augments the Coast Guard's organic
expertise as it procures assets for the Deepwater Program.
(b) Inter-Service Technical Assistance.--The Secretary may
enter into a memorandum of understanding or a memorandum of
agreement with the Secretary of the Navy to provide for the
use of the Navy Systems Commands to assist the Coast Guard
with the oversight of Coast Guard major acquisition programs.
Such memorandum of understanding or memorandum of agreement
shall, at a minimum provide for--
(1) the exchange of technical assistance and support that
the Coast Guard Chief Engineer and the Coast Guard Chief
Information Officer, as Coast Guard Technical Authorities,
may identify;
(2) the use, as appropriate, of Navy technical expertise;
and
(3) the temporary assignment or exchange of personnel
between the Coast Guard and the Navy Systems Commands to
facilitate the development of organic capabilities in the
Coast Guard.
(c) Technical Authorities.--The Coast Guard Chief Engineer,
Chief Information Officer, and Chief Acquisition Officer
shall adopt, to the extent practicable, procedures that are
similar to those used by the Navy Senior Acquisition Official
to ensure the Coast Guard Technical Authorities, or
designated Technical Warrant Holders, approve all technical
requirements.
(d) Coordination.--The Secretary, acting through the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, may coordinate with the
Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Chief of Naval
Operations, to develop processes by which the assistance will
be requested from the Navy Systems Commands and provided to
the Coast Guard.
(e) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act and every twelve months thereafter, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard shall report to the Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate on the activities undertaken
pursuant to such memorandum of understanding or memorandum of
agreement.
SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Deepwater program.--The term ``Deepwater Program''
means the Integrated Deepwater Systems Program described by
the Coast Guard in its report to Congress entitled ``Revised
Deepwater Implementation Plan 2005'', dated March 25, 2005.
The Deepwater Program primarily involves the procurement of
cutter and aviation assets that operate more than 50 miles
offshore.
(2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Cummings) and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LaTourette)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
[[Page H8933]]
Madam Speaker, the Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act, H.R.
2722, which I authored in my capacity as the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, is a critical
piece of legislation that will strengthen the management of the Coast
Guard's Deepwater procurement program.
H.R. 2722 passed both the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
on a voice vote and has enjoyed bipartisan support from the members of
both the subcommittee and the full committee.
I wish to express my deepest appreciation to Chairman James Oberstar
for his leadership and support on this measure, and, indeed, for his
leadership of our committee.
I also express my appreciation to the ranking member of the full
committee, Congressman Mica, and the ranking member of the
subcommittee, Congressman LaTourette, for their leadership and the
commitment they have shown to the success of our United States Coast
Guard through their work on the bill before us today.
Further, I wish to thank Chairman Bennie Thompson for his wise
counsel on this bill and for working with us to get this bill to the
floor today.
Deepwater is a $24 billion, 25-year procurement effort through which
the Coast Guard will replace or rehabilitate all of its cutters and
aircraft. Management of the program was awarded in 2002 through a
performance-based contract to a private sector team comprised of
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, now known as the Integrated Coast
Guard Systems or ICGS.
Unfortunately, some of the procurements conducted under Deepwater
over the past 5 years have experienced unacceptable failures that have
delayed the production of needed assets and contributed to a
significant shortfall in Coast Guard patrol hours.
Perhaps the most widely publicized failure of the Deepwater program
is the failure of the effort to lengthen 110-foot patrol boats already
in the Coast Guard's fleet to 123 feet. The lengthening was intended to
upgrade these boats and extend their service lives while newer assets
were being developed.
Though warned by Navy experts that the proposed designs for the
lengthening was inadequate, the Coast Guard proceeded with the effort
anyway. Eight boats, which originally cost some $60 million to produce
and which had many years of additional service life left, buckled soon
after they were lengthened and now sit sadly in the Coast Guard yard in
Baltimore waiting for the scrap heap.
Unfortunately, the failure of the 123-foot patrol boats is not the
sole failure of the Deepwater program. The initial design of the Fast
Response Cutter was also beset by technical failures, though
fortunately these were identified before any ships were built. While
this acquisition effort has now been revamped, the GAO reported earlier
this year that the design failure has delayed the procurement by at
least 2 years.
Together, the failed effort to lengthen the 110-foot patrol boats and
the failure of the first design of the Fast Response Cutter wasted
another $100 million of hard-earned American taxpayer dollars.
Similarly, despite the obligation of another $100 million, the
initial design effort on the Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, which is
needed to enhance the surveillance capacity of the National Security
Cutter, also failed. This craft had originally been scheduled for
delivery in 2007, but the GAO estimates that delivery will now be
delayed by as much as 6 years, meaning that the first National Security
Cutters will likely enter service without the vehicles.
More recently, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the
Inspector General found that the hull fatigue life on the National
Security Cutter, the most expensive asset to be procured under the
Deepwater program, may not meet contractual requirements. The IG warns
that fixing the hulls of the first two NSCs, which are already well
into production, will add potentially significant costs to these ships
and may even affect their operational capabilities.
Despite this troubling record of failure and waste, during the first
4 years of the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard ranked the contractor
performance between ``very good'' and ``excellent'' and awarded the
ICGS team some $16 million in award fees; in other words, in bonuses.
Such a situation is ridiculous and intolerable. Having convened now
three hearings on Deepwater in the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation in the 110th Congress and having chaired an
investigative hearing on the 120-foot patrol boat program convened in
the full Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure by Chairman
Oberstar, we have had the opportunity to closely examine the failures
in contractor performance and in Coast Guard management that have
occurred since 2002.
{time} 2045
H.R. 2722 responds directly to these failures by requiring the
creation of the management systems and the appointment of the personnel
needed to enable the Coast Guard to manage Deepwater as effectively as
the service managed the truly amazing rescues of victims during
Hurricane Katrina.
Under the leadership of Commandant Thad Allen, the service is already
moving decisively to correct past mistakes. Admiral Allen has formed a
new procurement directorate to professionalize acquisition management
and to put the business practices in place needed to effectively
oversee contractor performance and to create lines of strict
accountability.
The Coast Guard is now also directly managing the procurement of the
Fast Response Cutter, and it has issued a solicitation that includes
new measures specifically intended to focus the procurement on
producing an asset that will meet all performance requirements.
The Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act, H.R. 2722, would build
on the important reforms Admiral Allen has already enacted by putting
in place a comprehensive package of reforms that will strengthen the
institutional capacity of the Coast Guard to manage not only Deepwater
but all other procurements for years to come.
Specifically, H.R. 2722 will require that the Coast Guard be in
charge of all technical decisions on Deepwater and would require the
use of full and open competition for the procurement of new assets to
ensure that the Coast Guard receives the best value for taxpayers'
resources.
H.R. 2722 also sets rigorous new standards for the testing and
certification of all Deepwater assets.
The bill requires that all new National Security Cutters procured
from the date of enactment be certified by an independent third party
to meet all contractual requirements.
The DHS Inspector General has testified before our subcommittee that
the four audits of Deepwater he has conducted over the past 2\1/2\
years have revealed the dominant influence of expediency and schedule
over performance quality in the management of this program.
Unfortunately, the shoddy results of the prioritization of expediency
and schedule can be seen in the 123-foot patrol boats, which cannot
float, and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, which did not fly.
Professional certification of the design and construction of NSCs 3
through 8 will help ensure that these assets do not have any structural
shortcomings, as such certification should be accommodated in all
procurement schedules.
Further, given the serious concerns that currently exist over hull
fatigue with NSCs 1 and 2, H.R. 2722 requires that the design used in
all future NSCs be submitted to an assessment conducted by the Naval
Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, before construction on the
new NSCs begin.
Carderock identified many of the potential hull fatigue problems with
NSC 1 and their expertise will help assess whether proposed design
changes for subsequent NSCs truly correct design problems that could
shorten the hull fatigue life of those ships.
H.R. 2722 requires that all other new cutters acquired under
Deepwater be classified by the American Bureau of Shipping, and it
requires that all new aircraft and aircraft engines be certified for
airworthiness by an independent third party.
[[Page H8934]]
Significantly, H.R. 2722 also requires the appointment of a civilian
as the head of the acquisitions directorate. Both the DHS Inspector
General and the GAO have testified before the Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation regarding the importance of personnel
continuity in the effective management of acquisitions contracts.
Appointment of a civilian with a career's worth of experience in
procurement will bring to the Coast Guard the level of expertise that
simply is not cultivated among the service's uniformed personnel given
that the service lacks a career path to train acquisitions
professionals. Of course, while the appointment of a civilian to head
Coast Guard acquisitions functions cannot guarantee continuity, the
appointment of a uniformed servicemember will guarantee turnover on a
predictable schedule.
With the implementation of these measures that will prepare the Coast
Guard to manage Deepwater, H.R. 2722 requires that private sector
contractors be phased out as the lead systems integrator by October 1,
2011. This phase-out can occur prior to that date if the Coast Guard
certifies they have the personnel and systems in place they need to
perform the lead systems integration function.
Madam Speaker, I remain completely confident in Admiral Allen's
leadership of the Coast Guard and in his management of the Deepwater
program, but I also believe that Congress must act to build within the
Coast Guard the systems that will enable the service to effectively
manage procurement efforts, and manage taxpayer resources, long after
Admiral Allen has retired.
The men and women of the Coast Guard will rely on the assets procured
under Deepwater for decades to come to defend our homeland against an
ever-growing range of threats. This is a procurement effort that simply
must be managed correctly, and I'm confident that the enactment of H.R.
2722 will ensure that it is.
This bill has enjoyed bipartisan support, both in the Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation and the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure. I also note that the Congressional
Budget Office has found that enacting this measure will not affect
revenues or direct spending in any way and could result in lower
procurement expenditures and reduce the long-term costs of the
Deepwater program.
In closing, I again commend Chairman Jim Oberstar, chairman of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for his strong support
and his commitment to excellence. Under his inspired leadership, our
committee has truly returned oversight and strict accountability to the
agenda and is working to enact the ground-breaking policies that are
essential to meeting the transportation challenges of the 21st century.
I also commend the ranking member of the full committee, Congressman
Mica, for his leadership and support on this measure; and I commend the
ranking member of our subcommittee, the distinguished gentleman, Mr.
LaTourette, for his hard work and his outstanding leadership on the
subcommittee.
I urge my colleagues to demonstrate their commitment to our brave
young men and women in our Coast Guard, our thin blue line at sea, by
supporting H.R. 2722, as amended.
Madam Speaker, I reserve my time.
Mr. LaTOURETTE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
(Mr. LaTOURETTE asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. LaTOURETTE. Madam Speaker, H.R. 2722, the Integrated Deepwater
Program Reform Act, makes significant changes to the Coast Guard's
Deepwater program and will reform the way that the Coast Guard
oversees, manages, and carries out the program as the service takes on
the lead systems integrator responsibilities.
I want to add my thanks on the floor tonight and appreciate the
cooperation of Chairman Oberstar and Chairman Cummings to consider both
at the subcommittee and during the full committee markup amendments
from our side of the aisle to improve the bill through the markup
process. The bill that we are considering today is the product of
several oversight hearings and has been developed under the regular
order in both the subcommittee and full committee markups. I want to
thank both chairmen for their efforts to develop this bill in a truly
bipartisan manner
Madam Speaker, I appreciate the cooperation of Chairman Oberstar and
Chairman Cummings to consider amendments from my side of the aisle to
improve this bill through the markup process. The bill that we are
considering today is the product of several oversight hearings and has
been developed under the regular order in both Subcommittee and Full
Committee markups. I thank both Chairmen for their efforts to develop
this bill in a bipartisan manner.
Our Subcommittee has held four hearings to oversee the Deepwater
program over the past six months, and we have delved into the problems
that have troubled this critical acquisition program. This bill
addresses many of the areas that were identified through our oversight
process. This bill will provide the Coast Guard with the framework to
turn the program around and to support the successful acquisition of
enhanced vessels, aircraft, and systems necessary to carry out the
service's many missions.
However, I do want to point out that despite problems with some
Deepwater program--most notably the failed 110 to 123 conversion, the
program has had successes. Most importantly, the improved
communications between shore, sea and air assets have already led to
improved operations.
I also want to note that not all of the program's problems result
from contracting issues. The program has never been funded at the level
the Coast Guard determined it needed to carry out the program in the
timeframe it described. Unfortunately, it appears those funding
shortfalls will only get worse in the coming fiscal year. In fiscal
year 2007, $1.1 billion was appropriated to carry out the Deepwater
program. For fiscal year 2008, the Administration sought $837 million
for the program, the House has provided $698 million, and the Senate
has approved an amount of $770 million. At those levels, acquisitions
of new ships and aircraft will be further delayed, meaning that ready-
to-be-retired legacy ships and planes will be kept in service longer.
Those assets will, in turn, incur higher maintenance costs further
reducing the funds available to acquire new assets.
The bill before us today improves the organization and administration
of Deepwater and seeks answers to questions about the implementation of
the program. However, if Congress and the Administration continue to
fail to seek and provide funds at the level planned for, then Deepwater
has no chance of meeting its targets and goals.
While this bill will not solve the problems that result from funding
shortfalls for the Deepwater program, the bill will give the Coast
Guard adequate time to build its in-house staff and capabilities to the
level necessary to successfully assume the lead systems integrator role
and to put in place arrangements to acquire additional personnel and
expertise from the private sector and other Federal agencies. This is a
necessary programmatic change.
I support this bill and urge all Members to approve H.R. 2722.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Madam Speaker, today, the House considers H.R. 2722,
the ``Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act''. This legislation is
the product of the lessons learned from a series of hearings delving
into the Coast Guard's Deepwater program.
I would like to thank Subcommittee Chairman Cummings for his
diligence in thoroughly examining these problems and for developing a
comprehensive bill to get this program back on course.
The Committee has held three hearings in the 110th Congress on the
Deepwater program--including one that finally adjourned at 11:29 p.m.
Committee Members have heard the saga about problems with this program
that include inadequate staffing, patrol boats that have been altered
in such a way that they are not seaworthy, and construction standards
that shorten the fatigue life of cutters below their contracted 30-year
life.
During these hearings, the Committee heard testimony from the Coast
Guard, contractors, the Office of Inspector General (``OIG'') of the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Government Accountability
Office (``GAO''), and in addition received reports from the Defense
Acquisition University (``DAU''), the GAO, and the OIG.
Unfortunately, we learned from the testimony to the Committee that
the Deepwater program is an example of a total abdication of
governmental responsibility for overseeing its contractors, the quality
of their work, and the timeline for completion.
H.R. 2722 will correct this problem. The bill establishes within the
Coast Guard the acquisition management systems, and requires
appointment of necessary personnel, to effectively manage the $24
billion Deepwater Acquisition Program.
[[Page H8935]]
As reported by the Committee, H.R. 2722 prohibits the use of a
private sector entity as a lead system integrator beginning at the
earlier date of October 1, 2011, or the date on which the Coast Guard
certifies to the Committee that the service has the trained personnel
and resources to implement the system integration.
I understand that the Coast Guard intends to move forward well before
the 2011 date and I can assure you that this Committee will monitor
their progress on taking over the Deepwater program.
H.R. 2722 also requires the use of full and open competition for
procurements under Deepwater, and sets forth specific provisions to be
included in future contracts including requirements subjecting designs
to technical review and development of independent cost estimates.
Transient electromagnetic pulse emanation (``TEMPEST'') standards, as
used by the Department of the Navy, must be used for procurements
requiring TEMPEST certification. The bill further requires that all
contracts include provisions allowing the OIG to privately interview
contractor personnel working on Deepwater.
The bill also requires the appointment of a civilian Chief
Acquisition Officer within the Coast Guard, who would report directly
to the Commandant, and specifies a number of authorities reserved to
the Chief Acquisition Officer.
H.R. 2722 sets standards for testing and certification of assets
procured under Deepwater. Each cutter--other than a National Security
Cutter (NSC)--must be classed by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).
The design and construction of NSCs, with the exception of NSC 1 and 2,
must be certified as capable of being underway for at least 185 days a
year for 30 years and the other performance requirements by an
independent third-party such as ABS or the Navy. The bill calls for all
aircraft to be certified by an independent third-party such as the FAA
or the Navy as well.
In addition, the bill requires a number of reports to Congress from
the Coast Guard to enhance the Committee's oversight of this important
acquisition program.
I would like to thank Ranking Member Mica and Subcommittee Ranking
Member LaTourette for working with Subcommittee Chairman Cummings and
me on this bill.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting passage
of H.R. 2722, the ``Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act of 2007''.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, I stand in support of
H.R. 2722 because I recognize the importance of the Integrated
Deepwater Systems (Deepwater) program to our National security.
We need to replace our aging ships and aircraft that operate offshore
to protect our borders. While this program has come under much scrutiny
for being more expensive than previously thought and taking more time
to complete, it is still a worthwhile endeavor.
Everyday, valiant members of the U.S. Coast Guard risk their lives to
rescue and protect Americans. The continued success of this mission is
dependent upon Coast Guard assets which are aging by the day. In the
mid-1990s, the Coast Guard decided to replace all of these assets in a
single procurement program--the Integrated Deepwater System program,
typically referred to as Deepwater. The Coast Guard's plan was to set
forth broad mission requirements and then rely on private contractors
to determine the mix of assets necessary to carry out those missions.
Ultimately, the contract went to ``Integrated Coast Guard System''
(ICGS), a consortium headed by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.
Deepwater was intended to replace or modernize the approximately 90
ships and 200 Coast Guard aircraft used for missions taking place more
than 50 miles offshore. The primary missions carried out in this
``deepwater'' zone are drug and migrant interdiction operations, search
and rescue, homeland security, and fisheries law enforcement.
Unfortunately, this program has been beset with problems. One part of
the ICGS's Deepwater plan was to lengthen the Coast Guard's existing
110 foot patrol boats by 113 feet. Shortly after the first extended
boat was delivered, cracks were found in its hull. The Coast Guard dry-
docked the boats in December 2006 due to the lack of operational
capacity in heavy seas. On February 14, 2007, the Department of
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General released a report
concerning whistleblower allegations made against the 123-foot Coast
Guard cutter program. The report found that aspects of the C4ISR
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) equipment installed aboard the 123-
foot cutters do not meet the design standards set forth in the
Deepwater contract.
Specifically, the contractor did not install low smoke cabling aboard
the 123-foot cutter, despite a Deepwater contract requirement. The
intent of this requirement was to eliminate the polyvinyl chloride
jacket encasing the cables, which for years produced toxic fumes and
dense smoke during shipboard fire.
Additionally, the contractor installed C4ISR topside equipment aboard
both the 123-foot cutters and prosecutors, which either did not comply
or was not tested to ensure compliance with specific environmental
performance requirements outlined in the Deepwater contract. On April
17, 2007, the Commandant of the Coast Guard announced the
decommissioning of the entire 123-foot fleet.
Similarly, there are problems with the National Security Cutter. On
January 23, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector
General's Office released a report stating that ``the National Security
Cutter, as designed and constructed, would not meet the performance
specifications described in the original Deepwater contract.'' The
report also states that ``The National Security Cutter's design and
performance deficiencies are fundamentally the result of the Coast
Guard's failure to exercise technical oversight over the design and
construction of its Deepwater assets.''
Furthermore, the Inspector General's Office found that ``since the
deepwater contract was signed in June 2002, the combined cost of
National Security Cutters 1 and 2 has increased from $517 million to
approximately $775 million.'' The $775 estimate does not include costs
to correct or mitigate the National Security Cutter's structural design
deficiencies, additional labor and materials costs resulting from the
effects of Hurricane Katrina, and the final costs of a $302 million
Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) that the Coast Guard is
currently negotiating with the contractor. Finally, the report states
that the Inspector General's Office ``encountered resistance'' from the
Coast Guard and the contractor in its efforts to evaluate the
structural design and performance issues associated with the cutter.
The IG's findings are very serious and I am deeply concerned about
the Coast Guard's ability to manage the Deepwater program. Strict
Congressional oversight on the part of the new Democratic Congress has
forced the Coast Guard to make several significant changes to this
much-needed program and continued oversight is needed. The Homeland
Security Committee has already held one hearing on the Deepwater
Program this year, and more are planned.
H.R. 2722 makes improvements to the Deepwater program that will
refine the process and make it effective for protecting the homeland
for decades to come. For instance this bill creates a process for the
Coast Guard to become the lead systems integrator for the program, it
opens up competition for procurements, requires the Coast Guard to
provide life-cycle cost estimates, requires the appointment of a Chief
Acquisitions Officer, establishes testing and certification
requirements for Deepwater assets, provides design criteria for the
National Security Cutter, and allows the Department of Homeland
Security to work with the United States Navy. These changes to the
program are necessary to make Deepwater an effective homeland security
program.
Mr. LaTOURETTE. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time.
General Leave
Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
on H.R. 2722, as amended.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Maryland?
There was no objection.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I yield back my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cummings) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 2722, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.
____________________