[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 123 (Monday, July 30, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H8930-H8935]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                INTEGRATED DEEPWATER PROGRAM REFORM ACT

  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 2722) to restructure the Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater 
Program, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows

                               H.R. 2722

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

        This Act may be cited as the ``Integrated Deepwater 
     Program Reform Act''.

     SEC. 2. IMPLEMENTATION OF COAST GUARD INTEGRATED DEEPWATER 
                   ACQUISITION PROGRAM.

        (a) Use of Private Sector Entity as a Lead Systems 
     Integrator.--
       (1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     subsection, the Secretary may not use a private sector entity 
     as a lead systems integrator for procurements under, or in 
     support of, the Deepwater Program beginning on the earlier of 
     October 1, 2011, or the date on which the Secretary certifies 
     in writing to the Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate that the Coast Guard has available and can retain 
     sufficient contracting personnel and expertise within the 
     Coast Guard, through an arrangement with other Federal 
     agencies, or through contracts or other arrangements with 
     private sector entities, to perform the functions and 
     responsibilities of the lead system integrator in an 
     efficient and cost-effective manner.
       (2) Completion of existing delivery orders and task 
     orders.--The Secretary may use a private sector entity as a 
     lead systems integrator to complete any delivery order or 
     task order under the Deepwater Program that was issued to the 
     lead systems integrator on or before the date of enactment of 
     this Act.
       (3) Assistance of other federal agencies.--In any case in 
     which the Secretary is the systems integrator under the 
     Deepwater Program, the Secretary may obtain any type of 
     assistance the Secretary considers appropriate, with any 
     systems integration functions, from any Federal agency with 
     experience in systems integration involving maritime vessels 
     and aircraft.
       (4) Assistance of private sector entities.--In any case in 
     which the Secretary is the systems integrator under the 
     Deepwater Program, the Secretary may, subject to the 
     availability of appropriations, obtain by grant, contract, or 
     cooperative agreement any type of assistance the Secretary 
     considers appropriate, with any systems integration 
     functions, from any private sector entity with experience in 
     systems integration involving maritime vessels and aircraft.
       (b) Competition.--
       (1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     subsection, the Secretary shall use full and open competition 
     for each class of asset acquisitions under the Deepwater 
     Program for which an outside contractor is used, if the asset 
     is procured directly by the Coast Guard or by the Integrated 
     Coast Guard System acting under a contract with the Coast 
     Guard.
       (2) Exception.--The Secretary may use a procurement method 
     that is less than full and open competition to procure an 
     asset under the Deepwater Program, if--
       (A) the Secretary determines that such method is in the 
     best interests of the Federal Government; and
       (B) by not later than 30 days before the date of the award 
     of a contract for the procurement, the Secretary submits to 
     the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report explaining 
     why such procurement is in the best interests of the Federal 
     Government.
       (3) Limitation on application.--Paragraph (1) shall not 
     apply to a contract, subcontract, or task order that was 
     issued before the date of enactment of this Act, if there is 
     no change in the quantity of assets or the specific type of 
     assets procured.
       (c) Required Contract Terms.--The Secretary shall include 
     in each contract, subcontract, and task order issued under 
     the Deepwater Program after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act the following provisions, as applicable:
       (1) Technical reviews.--A requirement that the Secretary 
     shall conduct a technical review of all proposed designs, 
     design changes, and engineering changes, and a requirement 
     that the contractor must specifically address all engineering 
     concerns identified in the technical reviews, before any 
     funds may be obligated.
       (2) Responsibility for technical requirements.--A 
     requirement that the Secretary shall maintain the authority 
     to establish, approve, and maintain technical requirements.
       (3) Cost estimate of major changes.--A requirement that an 
     independent cost estimate must be prepared and approved by 
     the Secretary before the execution of any change order 
     costing more than 5 percent of the unit cost approved in the 
     Deepwater Program baseline in effect as of May 2007.
       (4) Performance measurement.--A requirement that any 
     measurement of contractor and subcontractor performance must 
     be based on the status of all work performed, including the 
     extent to which the work performed met all cost, schedule, 
     and mission performance requirements outlined in the 
     Deepwater Program contract.
       (5) Early operational assessment.--For the acquisition of 
     any cutter class for which an Early Operational Assessment 
     has not been developed--
       (A) a requirement that the Secretary of the Department in 
     which the Coast Guard is operating shall cause an Early 
     Operational Assessment to be conducted by the Department of 
     the Navy after the development of the preliminary design of 
     the cutter and before the conduct of the critical design 
     review of the cutter; and
       (B) a requirement that the Coast Guard shall develop a plan 
     to address the findings presented in the Early Operational 
     Assessment.
       (6) Transient electromagnetic pulse emanation.--For the 
     acquisition or upgrade of air, surface, or shore assets for 
     which compliance with transient electromagnetic pulse 
     emanation (TEMPEST) is a requirement, a provision specifying 
     that the standard for determining such compliance shall be 
     the air, surface, or shore asset standard then used by the 
     Department of the Navy.
       (7) Offshore patrol cutter underway requirement.--For any 
     contract issued to acquire an Offshore Patrol Cutter, 
     provisions specifying the service life, fatigue life, days 
     underway in general Atlantic and North Pacific Sea 
     conditions, maximum range, and maximum speed the cutter shall 
     be built to achieve.
       (8) Inspector general access.--A requirement that the 
     Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector 
     General shall have access to all records maintained by all 
     contractors working on the Deepwater Program, and shall have 
     the right to privately interview any contractor personnel.
       (d) Life Cycle Cost Estimate.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall develop an 
     authoritative life cycle cost estimate for the Deepwater 
     Program.
       (2) Contents.--The life cycle cost estimate shall include 
     asset acquisition and logistics support decisions and planned 
     operational tempo and locations as of the date of enactment 
     of this Act.
       (3) Submittal.--The Secretary shall--
       (A) submit the life cycle cost estimate to the Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate within 4 months after the date 
     of enactment of this Act; and

[[Page H8931]]

       (B) submit updates of the life cycle cost estimate to such 
     Committees annually.
       (e) Contract Officers.--The Secretary shall assign a 
     separate contract officer for each class of cutter and 
     aircraft acquired or rehabilitated under the Deepwater 
     Program, including the National Security Cutter, the Offshore 
     Patrol Cutter, the Fast Response Cutter A, the Fast Response 
     Cutter B, maritime patrol aircraft, the aircraft HC-130J, the 
     helicopter HH-65, the helicopter HH-60, and the vertical 
     unmanned aerial vehicle.
       (f) Technology Risk Report.--The Secretary shall submit to 
     the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report 
     identifying the technology risks and level of maturity for 
     major technologies used on each class of asset acquisitions 
     under the Deepwater Program, including the Fast Response 
     Cutter A (FRC-A), the Fast Response Cutter B (FRC-B), the 
     Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), and the Vertical Unmanned 
     Aerial Vehicle (VUAV), not later than 90 days before the date 
     of award of a contract for such an acquisition.
       (g) Submission of Assessment Results and Plans to 
     Congress.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall submit to 
     the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation of the Senate--
       (1) the results of each Early Operational Assessment 
     conducted pursuant to subsection (c)(5)(A) and the plan 
     approved by the Commandant pursuant to subsection (c)(5)(B) 
     for addressing the findings of such assessment, within 30 
     days after the Commandant approves the plan; and
       (2) a report describing how the recommendations of each 
     Early Operational Assessment conducted pursuant to subsection 
     (c)(5)(A) on the first in class of a new cutter class have 
     been addressed in the design on which construction is to 
     begin, within 30 days before initiation of construction.

     SEC. 3. CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICER.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 3 of title 14, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 55. Chief Acquisition Officer

       ``(a) Establishment of Agency Chief Acquisition Officer.--
     The Commandant shall appoint or designate a career reserved 
     employee as Chief Acquisition Officer for the Coast Guard, 
     who shall--
       ``(1) have acquisition management as that official's 
     primary duty; and
       ``(2) report directly to the Commandant to advise and 
     assist the Commandant to ensure that the mission of the Coast 
     Guard is achieved through the management of the Coast Guard's 
     acquisition activities.
       ``(b) Authority and Functions of the Chief Acquisition 
     Officer.--The functions of the Chief Acquisition Officer 
     shall include--
       ``(1) monitoring the performance of acquisition activities 
     and acquisition programs of the Coast Guard, evaluating the 
     performance of those programs on the basis of applicable 
     performance measurements, and advising the Commandant 
     regarding the appropriate business strategy to achieve the 
     mission of the Coast Guard;
       ``(2) increasing the use of full and open competition in 
     the acquisition of property and services by the Coast Guard 
     by establishing policies, procedures, and practices that 
     ensure that the Coast Guard receives a sufficient number of 
     sealed bids or competitive proposals from responsible sources 
     to fulfill the Government's requirements (including 
     performance and delivery schedules) at the lowest cost or 
     best value considering the nature of the property or service 
     procured;
       ``(3) ensuring the use of detailed performance 
     specifications in instances in which performance-based 
     contracting is used;
       ``(4) making acquisition decisions consistent with all 
     applicable laws and establishing clear lines of authority, 
     accountability, and responsibility for acquisition 
     decisionmaking within the Coast Guard;
       ``(5) managing the direction of acquisition policy for the 
     Coast Guard, including implementation of the unique 
     acquisition policies, regulations, and standards of the Coast 
     Guard;
       ``(6) developing and maintaining an acquisition career 
     management program in the Coast Guard to ensure that there is 
     an adequate professional workforce; and
       ``(7) as part of the strategic planning and performance 
     evaluation process required under section 306 of title 5 and 
     sections 1105(a)(28), 1115, 1116, and 9703 of title 31--
       ``(A) assessing the requirements established for Coast 
     Guard personnel regarding knowledge and skill in acquisition 
     resources management and the adequacy of such requirements 
     for facilitating the achievement of the performance goals 
     established for acquisition management;
       ``(B) in order to rectify any deficiency in meeting such 
     requirements, developing strategies and specific plans for 
     hiring, training, and professional development; and
       ``(C) reporting to the Commandant on the progress made in 
     improving acquisition management capability.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

``55. Chief Acquisition Officer.''.
       (c) Special Rate Supplements.--
       (1) Requirement to establish.--Not later than 1 year after 
     the date of enactment of this Act and in accordance with part 
     9701.333 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, the 
     Commandant of the Coast Guard shall establish special rate 
     supplements that provide higher pay levels for employees 
     necessary to carry out the amendment made by this section.
       (2) Subject to appropriations.--The requirement under 
     paragraph (1) is subject to the availability of 
     appropriations.

     SEC. 4. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary shall--
       (1) cause each cutter, other than a National Security 
     Cutter, acquired by the Coast Guard and delivered after the 
     date of enactment of this Act to be classed by the American 
     Bureau of Shipping, before acceptance of delivery;
       (2) cause the design and construction of each National 
     Security Cutter, other than National Security Cutter 1 and 2, 
     to be certified by an independent third party with expertise 
     in vessel design and construction certification to be able to 
     meet a 185-underway-day requirement under general Atlantic 
     and North Pacific sea conditions for a period of at least 30 
     years;
       (3) cause all electronics on all aircraft, surface, and 
     shore assets that require TEMPEST certification and that are 
     delivered after the date of enactment of this Act to be 
     tested and certified in accordance with TEMPEST standards and 
     communications security (COMSEC) standards by an independent 
     third party that is authorized by the Federal Government to 
     perform such testing and certification; and
       (4) cause all aircraft and aircraft engines acquired by the 
     Coast Guard and delivered after the date of enactment of this 
     Act to be certified for airworthiness by an independent third 
     party with expertise in aircraft and aircraft engine 
     certification, before acceptance of delivery.
       (b) First in Class of a Major Asset Acquisition.--The 
     Secretary shall cause the first in class of a major asset 
     acquisition of a cutter or an aircraft to be subjected to an 
     assessment of operational capability conducted by the 
     Secretary of the Navy.
       (c) Final Arbiter.--The Secretary shall be the final 
     arbiter of all technical disputes regarding designs and 
     acquisitions of vessels and aircraft for the Coast Guard.

     SEC. 5. NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTERS.

        (a) National Security Cutters 1 and 2.--
       (1) Report on options under consideration.--The Secretary 
     shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate--
       (A) within 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, a report describing in detail the cost increases that 
     have been experienced on National Security Cutters 1 and 2 
     since the date of the issuance of the task orders for 
     construction of those cutters and explaining the causes of 
     these cost increases; and
       (B) within 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, a report on the options that the Coast Guard is 
     considering to strengthen the hulls of National Security 
     Cutter 1 and National Security Cutter 2, including--
       (i) the costs of each of the options under consideration;
       (ii) a schedule for when the hull strengthening repairs are 
     anticipated to be performed; and
       (iii) the impact that the weight likely to be added to each 
     the cutter by each option will have on the cutter's ability 
     to meet both the original performance requirements included 
     in the Deepwater Program contract and the performance 
     requirements created by contract Amendment Modification 00042 
     dated February 7, 2007.
       (2) Design assessment.--Not later than 30 days before the 
     Coast Guard signs any contract, delivery order, or task order 
     to strengthen the hull of either of National Security Cutter 
     1 or 2 to resolve the structural design and performance 
     issues identified in the Department of Homeland Security 
     Inspector General's report OIG-07-23 dated January 2007, the 
     Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate all results of an assessment of the proposed hull 
     strengthening design conducted by the Naval Surface Warfare 
     Center, Carderock Division, including a description in detail 
     of the extent to which the hull strengthening measures to be 
     implemented on those cutters will enable the cutters to meet 
     a 185-underway-day requirement under general Atlantic and 
     North Pacific sea conditions for a period of at least 30 
     years.
       (b) National Security Cutters 3 Through 8.--Not later than 
     30 days before the Coast Guard signs any contract, delivery 
     order, or task order authorizing construction of National 
     Security Cutters 3 through 8, the Secretary shall submit to 
     the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation of the Senate all results of an 
     assessment of the proposed designs to resolve the structural 
     design, safety, and performance issues identified by the 
     Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 
     report OIG-07-23 for the hulls of those cutters conducted by 
     the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, 
     including a description in detail of the extent to which such 
     designs will enable the cutters to meet a 185-underway-day 
     requirement under general Atlantic and North Pacific sea 
     conditions.

     SEC. 6. MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary shall submit the following 
     reports to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
     of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate:
       (1) Within 4 months after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, a justification for why 8 National Security Cutters are 
     required to meet the operational needs of the Coast Guard, 
     including--
       (A) how many days per year each National Security Cutter 
     will be underway at sea;
       (B) where each National Security Cutter will be home 
     ported;

[[Page H8932]]

       (C) the amount of funding that will be required to 
     establish home port operations for each National Security 
     Cutter;
       (D) the extent to which 8 National Security Cutters 
     deployed without vertical unmanned aerial vehicles (VUAV) 
     will meet or exceed the mission capability (including 
     surveillance capacity) of the 12 Hamilton-class high 
     endurance cutters that the National Security Cutters will 
     replace;
       (E) the business case in support of constructing National 
     Security Cutters 3 through 8, including a cost-benefit 
     analysis; and
       (F) an analysis of how many Offshore Patrol Cutters would 
     be required to provide the patrol coverage provided by a 
     National Security Cutter.
       (2) Within 4 months after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, a report on--
       (A) the impact that deployment of a National Security 
     Cutter and other cutter assets without the vertical unmanned 
     aerial vehicle (VUAV) will have on the amount of patrol 
     coverage that will be able to be provided during missions 
     conducted by the National Security Cutter and all other 
     cutters planned to be equipped with a VUAV;
       (B) how the coverage gap will be made up;
       (C) an update on the current status of the development of 
     the VUAV; and
       (D) the timeline detailing the major milestones to be 
     achieved during development of the VUAV and identifying the 
     delivery date for the first and last VUAV.
       (3) Within 30 days after the elevation to flag-level for 
     resolution of any design or other dispute regarding the 
     Deepwater Program contract or an item to be procured under 
     that contract, including a detailed description of the issue 
     and the rationale underlying the decision taken by the flag 
     officer to resolve the issue.
       (4) Within 4 months after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, a report detailing the total number of change orders 
     that have been created by the Coast Guard under the Deepwater 
     Program before the date of enactment of this Act, the total 
     cost of these change orders, and their impact on the 
     Deepwater Program schedule.
       (5) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, a report detailing the technology risks and level of 
     maturity for major technologies used on maritime patrol 
     aircraft, the HC-130J, and the National Security Cutter.
       (6) Not less than 60 days before signing a contract to 
     acquire any vessel or aircraft, a report comparing the cost 
     of purchasing that vessel or aircraft directly from the 
     manufacturer or shipyard with the cost of procuring it 
     through the Integrated Coast Guard System.
       (7) Within 30 days after the Program Executive Officer of 
     the Deepwater Program becomes aware of a likely cost overrun 
     exceeding 5 percent of the overall asset acquisition contract 
     cost or schedule delay exceeding 5 percent of the estimated 
     asset construction period under the Deepwater Program, a 
     report by the Commandant containing a description of the cost 
     overrun or delay, an explanation of the overrun or delay, a 
     description of Coast Guard's response, and a description of 
     significant delays in the procurement schedule likely to be 
     caused by the overrun or delay.
       (8) Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     articulation of a doctrine and description of an anticipated 
     implementation of a plan for management of acquisitions 
     programs, financial management (including earned value 
     management and cost estimating), engineering and logistics 
     management, and contract management, that includes--
       (A) a description of how the Coast Guard will cultivate 
     among uniformed personnel expertise in acquisitions 
     management and financial management;
       (B) a description of the processes that will be followed to 
     draft and ensure technical review of procurement packages, 
     including statements of work, for any class of assets 
     acquired by the Coast Guard;
       (C) a description of how the Coast Guard will conduct an 
     independent cost estimating process, including independently 
     developing cost estimates for major change orders; and
       (D) a description of how Coast Guard will strengthen the 
     management of change orders.
       (9) Within 4 months after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, a report on the development of a new acquisitions office 
     within the Coast Guard describing the specific staffing 
     structure for that directorate, including--
       (A) identification of all managerial positions proposed as 
     part of the office, the functions that each managerial 
     position will fill, and the number of employees each manager 
     will supervise; and
       (B) a formal organizational chart and identification of 
     when managerial positions are to be filled.
       (10) Ninety days prior to the issuance of a Request for 
     Proposals for construction of an Offshore Patrol Cutter, a 
     report detailing the service life, fatigue life, maximum 
     range, maximum speed, and number of days underway under 
     general Atlantic and North Pacific Sea conditions the cutter 
     shall be built to achieve.
       (11) The Secretary shall report annually on the percentage 
     of the total amount of funds expended on procurements under 
     the Deepwater Program that has been paid to each of small 
     businesses and minority-owned businesses.
       (12) Within 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, a report on any Coast Guard mission performance gap due 
     to the removal of Deepwater Program assets from service. The 
     report shall include the following:
       (A) A description of the mission performance gap detailing 
     the geographic regions and Coast Guard capabilities affected.
       (B) An analysis of factors affecting the mission 
     performance gap that are unrelated to the Deepwater Program, 
     including deployment of Coast Guard assets overseas and 
     continuous vessel shortages.
       (C) A description of measures being taken in the near term 
     to fill the mission performance gap, including what those 
     measures are and when they will be implemented.
       (D) A description of measures being taken in the long term 
     to fill the mission performance gap, including what those 
     measures are and when they will be implemented.
       (E) A description of the potential alternatives to fill the 
     mission performance gap, including any acquisition or lease 
     considered and the reasons they were not pursued.
       (b) Report Required on Acceptance of Delivery of Incomplete 
     Asset.--
       (1) In general.--If the Secretary accepts delivery of an 
     asset after the date of enactment of this Act for which a 
     contractually required certification cannot be achieved 
     within 30 days after the date of delivery or with any system 
     that is not fully functional for the mission for which it was 
     intended, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the United States Senate within 30 days 
     after accepting delivery of the asset a report explaining why 
     acceptance of the asset in such a condition is in the best 
     interests of the United States Government.
       (2) Contents.--The report shall--
       (A) specify the systems that are not able to achieve 
     contractually required certifications within 30 days after 
     the date of delivery and the systems that are not fully 
     functional at the time of delivery for the missions for which 
     they were intended;
       (B) identify milestones for the completion of required 
     certifications and to make all systems fully functional; and
       (C) identify when the milestones will be completed, who 
     will complete them, and the cost to complete them.

     SEC. 7. USE OF THE NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, THE NAVAL AIR 
                   SYSTEMS COMMAND, AND THE SPACE AND NAVAL 
                   WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND TO ASSIST THE COAST 
                   GUARD IN EXERCISING TECHNICAL AUTHORITY FOR THE 
                   DEEPWATER PROGRAM AND OTHER COAST GUARD 
                   ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that the Coast Guard's use of 
     the technical, contractual, and program management oversight 
     expertise of the Department of the Navy in ship and aircraft 
     production complements and augments the Coast Guard's organic 
     expertise as it procures assets for the Deepwater Program.
       (b) Inter-Service Technical Assistance.--The Secretary may 
     enter into a memorandum of understanding or a memorandum of 
     agreement with the Secretary of the Navy to provide for the 
     use of the Navy Systems Commands to assist the Coast Guard 
     with the oversight of Coast Guard major acquisition programs. 
     Such memorandum of understanding or memorandum of agreement 
     shall, at a minimum provide for--
       (1) the exchange of technical assistance and support that 
     the Coast Guard Chief Engineer and the Coast Guard Chief 
     Information Officer, as Coast Guard Technical Authorities, 
     may identify;
       (2) the use, as appropriate, of Navy technical expertise; 
     and
       (3) the temporary assignment or exchange of personnel 
     between the Coast Guard and the Navy Systems Commands to 
     facilitate the development of organic capabilities in the 
     Coast Guard.
       (c) Technical Authorities.--The Coast Guard Chief Engineer, 
     Chief Information Officer, and Chief Acquisition Officer 
     shall adopt, to the extent practicable, procedures that are 
     similar to those used by the Navy Senior Acquisition Official 
     to ensure the Coast Guard Technical Authorities, or 
     designated Technical Warrant Holders, approve all technical 
     requirements.
       (d) Coordination.--The Secretary, acting through the 
     Commandant of the Coast Guard, may coordinate with the 
     Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Chief of Naval 
     Operations, to develop processes by which the assistance will 
     be requested from the Navy Systems Commands and provided to 
     the Coast Guard.
       (e) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act and every twelve months thereafter, the 
     Commandant of the Coast Guard shall report to the Committee 
     on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate on the activities undertaken 
     pursuant to such memorandum of understanding or memorandum of 
     agreement.

     SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.

        In this Act:
       (1) Deepwater program.--The term ``Deepwater Program'' 
     means the Integrated Deepwater Systems Program described by 
     the Coast Guard in its report to Congress entitled ``Revised 
     Deepwater Implementation Plan 2005'', dated March 25, 2005. 
     The Deepwater Program primarily involves the procurement of 
     cutter and aviation assets that operate more than 50 miles 
     offshore.
       (2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cummings) and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LaTourette) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.

[[Page H8933]]

  Madam Speaker, the Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act, H.R. 
2722, which I authored in my capacity as the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, is a critical 
piece of legislation that will strengthen the management of the Coast 
Guard's Deepwater procurement program.
  H.R. 2722 passed both the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
on a voice vote and has enjoyed bipartisan support from the members of 
both the subcommittee and the full committee.
  I wish to express my deepest appreciation to Chairman James Oberstar 
for his leadership and support on this measure, and, indeed, for his 
leadership of our committee.
  I also express my appreciation to the ranking member of the full 
committee, Congressman Mica, and the ranking member of the 
subcommittee, Congressman LaTourette, for their leadership and the 
commitment they have shown to the success of our United States Coast 
Guard through their work on the bill before us today.
  Further, I wish to thank Chairman Bennie Thompson for his wise 
counsel on this bill and for working with us to get this bill to the 
floor today.
  Deepwater is a $24 billion, 25-year procurement effort through which 
the Coast Guard will replace or rehabilitate all of its cutters and 
aircraft. Management of the program was awarded in 2002 through a 
performance-based contract to a private sector team comprised of 
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, now known as the Integrated Coast 
Guard Systems or ICGS.
  Unfortunately, some of the procurements conducted under Deepwater 
over the past 5 years have experienced unacceptable failures that have 
delayed the production of needed assets and contributed to a 
significant shortfall in Coast Guard patrol hours.
  Perhaps the most widely publicized failure of the Deepwater program 
is the failure of the effort to lengthen 110-foot patrol boats already 
in the Coast Guard's fleet to 123 feet. The lengthening was intended to 
upgrade these boats and extend their service lives while newer assets 
were being developed.
  Though warned by Navy experts that the proposed designs for the 
lengthening was inadequate, the Coast Guard proceeded with the effort 
anyway. Eight boats, which originally cost some $60 million to produce 
and which had many years of additional service life left, buckled soon 
after they were lengthened and now sit sadly in the Coast Guard yard in 
Baltimore waiting for the scrap heap.
  Unfortunately, the failure of the 123-foot patrol boats is not the 
sole failure of the Deepwater program. The initial design of the Fast 
Response Cutter was also beset by technical failures, though 
fortunately these were identified before any ships were built. While 
this acquisition effort has now been revamped, the GAO reported earlier 
this year that the design failure has delayed the procurement by at 
least 2 years.
  Together, the failed effort to lengthen the 110-foot patrol boats and 
the failure of the first design of the Fast Response Cutter wasted 
another $100 million of hard-earned American taxpayer dollars.
  Similarly, despite the obligation of another $100 million, the 
initial design effort on the Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, which is 
needed to enhance the surveillance capacity of the National Security 
Cutter, also failed. This craft had originally been scheduled for 
delivery in 2007, but the GAO estimates that delivery will now be 
delayed by as much as 6 years, meaning that the first National Security 
Cutters will likely enter service without the vehicles.
  More recently, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the 
Inspector General found that the hull fatigue life on the National 
Security Cutter, the most expensive asset to be procured under the 
Deepwater program, may not meet contractual requirements. The IG warns 
that fixing the hulls of the first two NSCs, which are already well 
into production, will add potentially significant costs to these ships 
and may even affect their operational capabilities.
  Despite this troubling record of failure and waste, during the first 
4 years of the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard ranked the contractor 
performance between ``very good'' and ``excellent'' and awarded the 
ICGS team some $16 million in award fees; in other words, in bonuses.
  Such a situation is ridiculous and intolerable. Having convened now 
three hearings on Deepwater in the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation in the 110th Congress and having chaired an 
investigative hearing on the 120-foot patrol boat program convened in 
the full Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure by Chairman 
Oberstar, we have had the opportunity to closely examine the failures 
in contractor performance and in Coast Guard management that have 
occurred since 2002.

                              {time}  2045

  H.R. 2722 responds directly to these failures by requiring the 
creation of the management systems and the appointment of the personnel 
needed to enable the Coast Guard to manage Deepwater as effectively as 
the service managed the truly amazing rescues of victims during 
Hurricane Katrina.
  Under the leadership of Commandant Thad Allen, the service is already 
moving decisively to correct past mistakes. Admiral Allen has formed a 
new procurement directorate to professionalize acquisition management 
and to put the business practices in place needed to effectively 
oversee contractor performance and to create lines of strict 
accountability.
  The Coast Guard is now also directly managing the procurement of the 
Fast Response Cutter, and it has issued a solicitation that includes 
new measures specifically intended to focus the procurement on 
producing an asset that will meet all performance requirements.
  The Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act, H.R. 2722, would build 
on the important reforms Admiral Allen has already enacted by putting 
in place a comprehensive package of reforms that will strengthen the 
institutional capacity of the Coast Guard to manage not only Deepwater 
but all other procurements for years to come.
  Specifically, H.R. 2722 will require that the Coast Guard be in 
charge of all technical decisions on Deepwater and would require the 
use of full and open competition for the procurement of new assets to 
ensure that the Coast Guard receives the best value for taxpayers' 
resources.
  H.R. 2722 also sets rigorous new standards for the testing and 
certification of all Deepwater assets.
  The bill requires that all new National Security Cutters procured 
from the date of enactment be certified by an independent third party 
to meet all contractual requirements.
  The DHS Inspector General has testified before our subcommittee that 
the four audits of Deepwater he has conducted over the past 2\1/2\ 
years have revealed the dominant influence of expediency and schedule 
over performance quality in the management of this program.
  Unfortunately, the shoddy results of the prioritization of expediency 
and schedule can be seen in the 123-foot patrol boats, which cannot 
float, and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, which did not fly.
  Professional certification of the design and construction of NSCs 3 
through 8 will help ensure that these assets do not have any structural 
shortcomings, as such certification should be accommodated in all 
procurement schedules.
  Further, given the serious concerns that currently exist over hull 
fatigue with NSCs 1 and 2, H.R. 2722 requires that the design used in 
all future NSCs be submitted to an assessment conducted by the Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, before construction on the 
new NSCs begin.
  Carderock identified many of the potential hull fatigue problems with 
NSC 1 and their expertise will help assess whether proposed design 
changes for subsequent NSCs truly correct design problems that could 
shorten the hull fatigue life of those ships.
  H.R. 2722 requires that all other new cutters acquired under 
Deepwater be classified by the American Bureau of Shipping, and it 
requires that all new aircraft and aircraft engines be certified for 
airworthiness by an independent third party.

[[Page H8934]]

  Significantly, H.R. 2722 also requires the appointment of a civilian 
as the head of the acquisitions directorate. Both the DHS Inspector 
General and the GAO have testified before the Subcommittee on Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation regarding the importance of personnel 
continuity in the effective management of acquisitions contracts.
  Appointment of a civilian with a career's worth of experience in 
procurement will bring to the Coast Guard the level of expertise that 
simply is not cultivated among the service's uniformed personnel given 
that the service lacks a career path to train acquisitions 
professionals. Of course, while the appointment of a civilian to head 
Coast Guard acquisitions functions cannot guarantee continuity, the 
appointment of a uniformed servicemember will guarantee turnover on a 
predictable schedule.
  With the implementation of these measures that will prepare the Coast 
Guard to manage Deepwater, H.R. 2722 requires that private sector 
contractors be phased out as the lead systems integrator by October 1, 
2011. This phase-out can occur prior to that date if the Coast Guard 
certifies they have the personnel and systems in place they need to 
perform the lead systems integration function.
  Madam Speaker, I remain completely confident in Admiral Allen's 
leadership of the Coast Guard and in his management of the Deepwater 
program, but I also believe that Congress must act to build within the 
Coast Guard the systems that will enable the service to effectively 
manage procurement efforts, and manage taxpayer resources, long after 
Admiral Allen has retired.
  The men and women of the Coast Guard will rely on the assets procured 
under Deepwater for decades to come to defend our homeland against an 
ever-growing range of threats. This is a procurement effort that simply 
must be managed correctly, and I'm confident that the enactment of H.R. 
2722 will ensure that it is.
  This bill has enjoyed bipartisan support, both in the Subcommittee on 
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation and the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure. I also note that the Congressional 
Budget Office has found that enacting this measure will not affect 
revenues or direct spending in any way and could result in lower 
procurement expenditures and reduce the long-term costs of the 
Deepwater program.
  In closing, I again commend Chairman Jim Oberstar, chairman of the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for his strong support 
and his commitment to excellence. Under his inspired leadership, our 
committee has truly returned oversight and strict accountability to the 
agenda and is working to enact the ground-breaking policies that are 
essential to meeting the transportation challenges of the 21st century.
  I also commend the ranking member of the full committee, Congressman 
Mica, for his leadership and support on this measure; and I commend the 
ranking member of our subcommittee, the distinguished gentleman, Mr. 
LaTourette, for his hard work and his outstanding leadership on the 
subcommittee.
  I urge my colleagues to demonstrate their commitment to our brave 
young men and women in our Coast Guard, our thin blue line at sea, by 
supporting H.R. 2722, as amended.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve my time.
  Mr. LaTOURETTE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  (Mr. LaTOURETTE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. LaTOURETTE. Madam Speaker, H.R. 2722, the Integrated Deepwater 
Program Reform Act, makes significant changes to the Coast Guard's 
Deepwater program and will reform the way that the Coast Guard 
oversees, manages, and carries out the program as the service takes on 
the lead systems integrator responsibilities.
  I want to add my thanks on the floor tonight and appreciate the 
cooperation of Chairman Oberstar and Chairman Cummings to consider both 
at the subcommittee and during the full committee markup amendments 
from our side of the aisle to improve the bill through the markup 
process. The bill that we are considering today is the product of 
several oversight hearings and has been developed under the regular 
order in both the subcommittee and full committee markups. I want to 
thank both chairmen for their efforts to develop this bill in a truly 
bipartisan manner
  Madam Speaker, I appreciate the cooperation of Chairman Oberstar and 
Chairman Cummings to consider amendments from my side of the aisle to 
improve this bill through the markup process. The bill that we are 
considering today is the product of several oversight hearings and has 
been developed under the regular order in both Subcommittee and Full 
Committee markups. I thank both Chairmen for their efforts to develop 
this bill in a bipartisan manner.
  Our Subcommittee has held four hearings to oversee the Deepwater 
program over the past six months, and we have delved into the problems 
that have troubled this critical acquisition program. This bill 
addresses many of the areas that were identified through our oversight 
process. This bill will provide the Coast Guard with the framework to 
turn the program around and to support the successful acquisition of 
enhanced vessels, aircraft, and systems necessary to carry out the 
service's many missions.
  However, I do want to point out that despite problems with some 
Deepwater program--most notably the failed 110 to 123 conversion, the 
program has had successes. Most importantly, the improved 
communications between shore, sea and air assets have already led to 
improved operations.
  I also want to note that not all of the program's problems result 
from contracting issues. The program has never been funded at the level 
the Coast Guard determined it needed to carry out the program in the 
timeframe it described. Unfortunately, it appears those funding 
shortfalls will only get worse in the coming fiscal year. In fiscal 
year 2007, $1.1 billion was appropriated to carry out the Deepwater 
program. For fiscal year 2008, the Administration sought $837 million 
for the program, the House has provided $698 million, and the Senate 
has approved an amount of $770 million. At those levels, acquisitions 
of new ships and aircraft will be further delayed, meaning that ready-
to-be-retired legacy ships and planes will be kept in service longer. 
Those assets will, in turn, incur higher maintenance costs further 
reducing the funds available to acquire new assets.
  The bill before us today improves the organization and administration 
of Deepwater and seeks answers to questions about the implementation of 
the program. However, if Congress and the Administration continue to 
fail to seek and provide funds at the level planned for, then Deepwater 
has no chance of meeting its targets and goals.
  While this bill will not solve the problems that result from funding 
shortfalls for the Deepwater program, the bill will give the Coast 
Guard adequate time to build its in-house staff and capabilities to the 
level necessary to successfully assume the lead systems integrator role 
and to put in place arrangements to acquire additional personnel and 
expertise from the private sector and other Federal agencies. This is a 
necessary programmatic change.
  I support this bill and urge all Members to approve H.R. 2722.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Madam Speaker, today, the House considers H.R. 2722, 
the ``Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act''. This legislation is 
the product of the lessons learned from a series of hearings delving 
into the Coast Guard's Deepwater program.
  I would like to thank Subcommittee Chairman Cummings for his 
diligence in thoroughly examining these problems and for developing a 
comprehensive bill to get this program back on course.
  The Committee has held three hearings in the 110th Congress on the 
Deepwater program--including one that finally adjourned at 11:29 p.m. 
Committee Members have heard the saga about problems with this program 
that include inadequate staffing, patrol boats that have been altered 
in such a way that they are not seaworthy, and construction standards 
that shorten the fatigue life of cutters below their contracted 30-year 
life.
  During these hearings, the Committee heard testimony from the Coast 
Guard, contractors, the Office of Inspector General (``OIG'') of the 
Department of Homeland Security, and the Government Accountability 
Office (``GAO''), and in addition received reports from the Defense 
Acquisition University (``DAU''), the GAO, and the OIG.
  Unfortunately, we learned from the testimony to the Committee that 
the Deepwater program is an example of a total abdication of 
governmental responsibility for overseeing its contractors, the quality 
of their work, and the timeline for completion.
  H.R. 2722 will correct this problem. The bill establishes within the 
Coast Guard the acquisition management systems, and requires 
appointment of necessary personnel, to effectively manage the $24 
billion Deepwater Acquisition Program.

[[Page H8935]]

  As reported by the Committee, H.R. 2722 prohibits the use of a 
private sector entity as a lead system integrator beginning at the 
earlier date of October 1, 2011, or the date on which the Coast Guard 
certifies to the Committee that the service has the trained personnel 
and resources to implement the system integration.
  I understand that the Coast Guard intends to move forward well before 
the 2011 date and I can assure you that this Committee will monitor 
their progress on taking over the Deepwater program.
  H.R. 2722 also requires the use of full and open competition for 
procurements under Deepwater, and sets forth specific provisions to be 
included in future contracts including requirements subjecting designs 
to technical review and development of independent cost estimates. 
Transient electromagnetic pulse emanation (``TEMPEST'') standards, as 
used by the Department of the Navy, must be used for procurements 
requiring TEMPEST certification. The bill further requires that all 
contracts include provisions allowing the OIG to privately interview 
contractor personnel working on Deepwater.
  The bill also requires the appointment of a civilian Chief 
Acquisition Officer within the Coast Guard, who would report directly 
to the Commandant, and specifies a number of authorities reserved to 
the Chief Acquisition Officer.
  H.R. 2722 sets standards for testing and certification of assets 
procured under Deepwater. Each cutter--other than a National Security 
Cutter (NSC)--must be classed by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). 
The design and construction of NSCs, with the exception of NSC 1 and 2, 
must be certified as capable of being underway for at least 185 days a 
year for 30 years and the other performance requirements by an 
independent third-party such as ABS or the Navy. The bill calls for all 
aircraft to be certified by an independent third-party such as the FAA 
or the Navy as well.
  In addition, the bill requires a number of reports to Congress from 
the Coast Guard to enhance the Committee's oversight of this important 
acquisition program.
  I would like to thank Ranking Member Mica and Subcommittee Ranking 
Member LaTourette for working with Subcommittee Chairman Cummings and 
me on this bill.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting passage 
of H.R. 2722, the ``Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act of 2007''.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, I stand in support of 
H.R. 2722 because I recognize the importance of the Integrated 
Deepwater Systems (Deepwater) program to our National security.
  We need to replace our aging ships and aircraft that operate offshore 
to protect our borders. While this program has come under much scrutiny 
for being more expensive than previously thought and taking more time 
to complete, it is still a worthwhile endeavor.
  Everyday, valiant members of the U.S. Coast Guard risk their lives to 
rescue and protect Americans. The continued success of this mission is 
dependent upon Coast Guard assets which are aging by the day. In the 
mid-1990s, the Coast Guard decided to replace all of these assets in a 
single procurement program--the Integrated Deepwater System program, 
typically referred to as Deepwater. The Coast Guard's plan was to set 
forth broad mission requirements and then rely on private contractors 
to determine the mix of assets necessary to carry out those missions. 
Ultimately, the contract went to ``Integrated Coast Guard System'' 
(ICGS), a consortium headed by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.
  Deepwater was intended to replace or modernize the approximately 90 
ships and 200 Coast Guard aircraft used for missions taking place more 
than 50 miles offshore. The primary missions carried out in this 
``deepwater'' zone are drug and migrant interdiction operations, search 
and rescue, homeland security, and fisheries law enforcement. 
Unfortunately, this program has been beset with problems. One part of 
the ICGS's Deepwater plan was to lengthen the Coast Guard's existing 
110 foot patrol boats by 113 feet. Shortly after the first extended 
boat was delivered, cracks were found in its hull. The Coast Guard dry-
docked the boats in December 2006 due to the lack of operational 
capacity in heavy seas. On February 14, 2007, the Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General released a report 
concerning whistleblower allegations made against the 123-foot Coast 
Guard cutter program. The report found that aspects of the C4ISR 
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) equipment installed aboard the 123-
foot cutters do not meet the design standards set forth in the 
Deepwater contract.
  Specifically, the contractor did not install low smoke cabling aboard 
the 123-foot cutter, despite a Deepwater contract requirement. The 
intent of this requirement was to eliminate the polyvinyl chloride 
jacket encasing the cables, which for years produced toxic fumes and 
dense smoke during shipboard fire.
  Additionally, the contractor installed C4ISR topside equipment aboard 
both the 123-foot cutters and prosecutors, which either did not comply 
or was not tested to ensure compliance with specific environmental 
performance requirements outlined in the Deepwater contract. On April 
17, 2007, the Commandant of the Coast Guard announced the 
decommissioning of the entire 123-foot fleet.
  Similarly, there are problems with the National Security Cutter. On 
January 23, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector 
General's Office released a report stating that ``the National Security 
Cutter, as designed and constructed, would not meet the performance 
specifications described in the original Deepwater contract.'' The 
report also states that ``The National Security Cutter's design and 
performance deficiencies are fundamentally the result of the Coast 
Guard's failure to exercise technical oversight over the design and 
construction of its Deepwater assets.''
  Furthermore, the Inspector General's Office found that ``since the 
deepwater contract was signed in June 2002, the combined cost of 
National Security Cutters 1 and 2 has increased from $517 million to 
approximately $775 million.'' The $775 estimate does not include costs 
to correct or mitigate the National Security Cutter's structural design 
deficiencies, additional labor and materials costs resulting from the 
effects of Hurricane Katrina, and the final costs of a $302 million 
Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) that the Coast Guard is 
currently negotiating with the contractor. Finally, the report states 
that the Inspector General's Office ``encountered resistance'' from the 
Coast Guard and the contractor in its efforts to evaluate the 
structural design and performance issues associated with the cutter.
  The IG's findings are very serious and I am deeply concerned about 
the Coast Guard's ability to manage the Deepwater program. Strict 
Congressional oversight on the part of the new Democratic Congress has 
forced the Coast Guard to make several significant changes to this 
much-needed program and continued oversight is needed. The Homeland 
Security Committee has already held one hearing on the Deepwater 
Program this year, and more are planned.
  H.R. 2722 makes improvements to the Deepwater program that will 
refine the process and make it effective for protecting the homeland 
for decades to come. For instance this bill creates a process for the 
Coast Guard to become the lead systems integrator for the program, it 
opens up competition for procurements, requires the Coast Guard to 
provide life-cycle cost estimates, requires the appointment of a Chief 
Acquisitions Officer, establishes testing and certification 
requirements for Deepwater assets, provides design criteria for the 
National Security Cutter, and allows the Department of Homeland 
Security to work with the United States Navy. These changes to the 
program are necessary to make Deepwater an effective homeland security 
program.
  Mr. LaTOURETTE. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time.


                             General Leave

  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H.R. 2722, as amended.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Maryland?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I yield back my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cummings) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 2722, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

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