[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 121 (Thursday, July 26, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10117-S10130]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, before I describe some of the most 
important provisions in this legislation, I want to thank the 9/11 
families who have played a critical role throughout this process. They 
first pushed for the establishment of the 9/11 Commission and then 
continued their fight, now through three major pieces of legislation, 
to see that its recommendations became law.
  I want to thank the majority leader of the Senate for his leadership 
in helping to get this legislation through the Congress, and through a 
long but ultimately very productive conference.
  I want to thank Senator Collins, Chairman Thompson, Senator Collins, 
Congressman King, and all of my colleagues on the conference 
committee--and their staffs--on both sides of the aisle, from all of 
the relevant committees, and in both the House and the Senate for their 
willingness to work

[[Page S10118]]

through some difficult but critical issues to make our country safer.
  All of us have not been able to agree on everything in this 
legislation, but most of us have agreed on most of it and that is why 
we are able to get this comprehensive legislation to the Congress, and 
hopefully, very soon, to the President's desk.
  While this Nation was born in conflict, it was founded and grew in 
compromise--the melding of different threads of policy and personality 
into a national fabric that covers and protects us all.
  This legislation was also born of conflict--the attacks by Islamist 
extremist terrorists against us on 9/11, and our response to these 
terrorists grows stronger as we come together in legislation like this.
  This comprehensive, bipartisan legislation will make our Nation 
stronger, our cities and towns more secure and our families safer. Let 
me cite a few of its most important points:
  Security enhancement in the legislation:
  First, this legislation will help close one of the most obvious, and 
dangerous vulnerabilities in our Nation's defenses--that is the 
millions of cargo containers that flow into our country every year 
without being scanned and which could be the vehicle for bringing 
dangerous nuclear material into our country.
  It requires that within 5 years, 100 percent of maritime cargo be 
scanned before it is loaded on ships in foreign ports bound for the 
United States. But it wisely gives the Secretary of Homeland Security 
the authority to extend this deadline in 2-year increments if certain 
conditions important to our economy are not met. This has been a 
contentious issue--but I believe this legislation strikes the right 
balance between aggressively pushing for better security while ensuring 
that we maintain a sensible approach.
  This legislation also enhances security in nonaviation sectors that 
have received far too little protection in our own country, even while 
terrorists have demonstrated a willingness to attack them abroad--most 
notably in London and in Madrid. It requires that rail and transit 
systems work with DHS to develop comprehensive risk assessments and 
security plans, and authorizes more than $4 billion over 4 years for 
rail, transit, and bus security grants.
  Keeping in mind that the 9/11 hijackers and Richard Reed, the shoe 
bomber, boarded commercial aircraft and traveled here legally, this 
legislation will make it harder for terrorists to enter our country, by 
adding much needed security enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program. 
These include a new electronic travel authorization system so that 
travelers from visa waiver countries can be checked against terrorist 
watch lists and improved reporting of lost and stolen passports.
  This legislation also increases resources and staffing for the Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking Center and requires DHS to create a terrorist 
travel program to develop strategies and ensure coordination among 
relevant agencies involved with combating terrorist travel.
  This legislation will also better secure our aviation system overall. 
It authorizes important funding increases for critical aviation 
security programs, like checkpoint screening, baggage screening and 
cargo screening on passenger aircraft. And it requires screening of all 
cargo carried onto passenger airlines within three years--again, 
closing another glaring vulnerability in our defenses that terrorists 
could exploit.
  One of the critical failures of 9/11 was, of course, the failure to 
share vital information--and improving information sharing was a key 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.
  While we have previously taken important steps to improve the unity 
of effort across intelligence agencies by creating the Director of 
National Intelligence and the National Counter Terrorism Center, this 
legislation moves the ball even further by strengthening the 
Information Sharing Environment, ISE, which was also established in the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. It does so by 
extending the term of the ISE program manager and authorizing him or 
her to issue government-wide standards for information sharing, as 
appropriate, and rewarding government employees for sharing 
information.
  And it will improve the sharing of information between the Federal 
Government and its State and local counterparts by codifying the new 
Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group, creating standards 
for State and local fusion centers, and ensuring that they receive 
Federal support and personnel. These measures will help ensure that 
intelligence to fight terrorism and keep Americans safe is shared more 
effectively among all levels of government.
  In addition to strengthening Federal, State and local governments, as 
part of the compromise that brought this bill to the floor, this 
legislation will also provide legal protections to individuals who 
report suspicious activities. People acting in good faith to avert what 
they believe may be terrorist activity should not be punished for their 
vigilance.
  Every citizen must observe his or her surroundings and be alert to 
suspicious activity without the fear of being sued for their life 
savings. That is why this bill grants immunity from lawsuits to those 
who in good faith report behaviour that they reasonably suspect is 
related to possible terrorist activity. We want to encourage--not 
discourage--citizens, like the video store employee in New Jersey, who 
stepped forward and alerted authorities to evidence which helped 
unravel a planned attack on Fort Dix.
  This legislation will also improve the very controversial process for 
distributing homeland security grants, and just as importantly, it 
authorizes $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2008, increasing to $3.6 billion 
by 2012--$13.78 billion over the next 5 years--so that we can reverse 
the downward trend in funding for these programs that help State and 
local first preventers and responders do their jobs.
  It authorizes for the first time the State Homeland Security Grant 
Program and Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI, to provide funds to 
States and high-risk urban areas to prevent, prepare, respond and 
recover from acts of terrorism. And it does so in a way that, while 
providing the vast majority of resources on the basis of risk, ensures 
that we build up the capabilities of all the states, knowing that 
terrorist plots can develop in any part of the country.
  This legislation wisely authorizes emergency management performance 
grants and provides additional resources for this program--to assist 
States in preparing for all-hazards to ensure that every State has the 
basic capability to prepare for and respond to both man-made and 
natural disasters.
  Following the communications disasters of both 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina, this legislation also creates a dedicated emergency 
communications interoperability grant program to improve emergency 
communications systems at the local, State, and Federal levels. This is 
clearly one of the highest priorities for our Nation's first 
responders--because it is necessary to save their lives so that they 
can save the lives of others--and by dedicating a program to 
interoperable communications we will enhance our Nation's ability to 
achieve it.
  The 9/11 Commission rightly noted that while we must protect our 
homeland, we must do so in a way that also protects the freedom and 
civil liberties it was founded upon.
  This legislation does so by strengthening the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board by establishing it as an independent agency 
within the executive branch, ensuring partisan balance among members, 
requiring improved public disclosure, allowing the board to request 
that the Attorney General issue subpoenas to private parties and 
increasing its budget over the next 4 years by up to $10 million in 
2011.
  It also requires that agencies with intelligence and security roles 
designate their own internal privacy and civil liberties officers, and 
expands the authority of the DHS privacy officer.
  Also, since 85 percent of our Nation's critical infrastructure is 
under the control of the private sector, this legislation establishes a 
voluntary certification program so that those private sector entities 
that want to can receive certification that they have met consensus 
preparedness standards. This provision responds to another concern of 
the 9/11 Commission--which was also

[[Page S10119]]

reinforced during Katrina--that those companies that take preparedness 
seriously--that have plans and exercise them that provide life saving 
protection for their employees--will recover more quickly from a 
catastrophe and help get their local economy moving again.
  This legislation responds directly to another 9/11 Commission 
recommendation--to improve Congress's ability to oversee the 
intelligence community--by requiring disclosure of the total amount 
spent by the intelligence community.
  After the first 2 fiscal years the President may waive this 
requirement, but only after explaining to Congress why the disclosure 
would harm national security.
  Like the 9/11 Commission, this bill also recognizes that we must do 
more to promote democracy abroad by requiring the Secretary of State 
expand strategies for democracy promotion in nondemocratic and 
democratic countries.
  One of the great threats of our time is that nuclear material may be 
smuggled out of former Soviet states and fall into the hands of 
terrorists. This bill clears legislative obstacles that had constrained 
the cooperative threat reduction, CTR, program by repealing or 
modifying various conditions on CTR actions in former Soviet states and 
repealing a legislative prohibition on Department of Energy 
nonproliferation program assistance outside the former Soviet Union.
  I want to thank my colleagues from both parties, from both houses, 
and their staffs who worked so hard and so late into so many nights to 
bring this to the floor. There is a lot in this legislation to make our 
country safer, and this result was only possible because of this hard 
work and dedication.
  Mr. President, we began as a nation born in conflict as we fought for 
our freedom. Now we are a nation borne with confidence as we fight for 
our ideals against an adversary who promotes hate over hope and fear 
over a future that recognizes our shared humanity.
  I urge my colleagues to adopt this conference report and the 
President to act swiftly to sign it to show the world that the spirit 
of this nation founded in freedom heeds the words of Abraham Lincoln 
that this ``government of the people, by the people, for the people, 
shall not perish from the Earth.''
  Lincoln was right. Let us protect our Nation. Let us thwart our 
enemies.
  Mr. President, again, I thank my colleagues for the very strong vote 
in favor of accepting the conference report. It means a lot to those of 
us who worked on it. I obviously also think it was the right thing to 
do. This is comprehensive, bipartisan legislation that will make 
America stronger, our cities and towns more secure, and our families 
safer.
  I want to take a moment to thank some of the people without whom this 
successful result could not have occurred. I want to begin by thanking 
the 9/11 families--the families of those who were lost on 9/11, the 
victims of this brutal Islamist terrorist attack. They took their loss 
and grief and came to Congress to do everything it could to make sure 
that our Government acted in a way so as to protect every other 
American family from having to suffer the loss they suffered. They 
lobbied for the 9/11 Commission. It was created. When the commission 
reported out and the legislation it recommended was brought before the 
Congress in 2004, the 9/11 families hung in there. Without their 
support, it would not have been adopted and then signed by the 
President.
  Now we return for the second phase of the 9/11 Commission report to 
adopt, as we just have, those previously unimplemented sections, 
inadequately implemented sections or, frankly, our own ideas about how 
to better protect the American people from the ongoing threat from al-
Qaida and other Islamist extremist organizations and, at the same time, 
from natural disasters, some catastrophic like Hurricane Katrina. The 
9/11 families deserve our gratitude.
  I also thank Senator Reid because he made this legislation a priority 
item for this session of Congress. I thank Senator Collins, my ranking 
member who, as always, was thoughtful, constructive, wonderful to work 
with, and set a tone where all the members of our committee worked very 
closely together to produce this legislation.
  On the House side, in conference, we met with the chairman of the 
Homeland Security Committee, Congressman Bennie Thompson of 
Mississippi, and his ranking member Congressman Peter King of New 
York--good public servants. We had some differences, but we reasoned 
together and resolved a lot of them.
  I would like to pay tribute to my staff, who have worked long nights 
and many weekends to produce excellent legislation.
  I particularly want to thank my Homeland Security Committee Staff 
Director, Mike Alexander, for his superb leadership. I also want to 
thank the committee's Chief Counsel, Kevin Landy, for helping to 
shepherd the legislation through the process. Thanks also to Eric 
Anderson, Christian Beckner, Caroline Bolton, Janet Burrell, Scott 
Campbell, Troy Cribb, Aaron Firoved, Elyse Greenwald, Beth Grossman, 
Seamus Hughes, Holly Idelson, Kristine Lam, Jim McGee, Sheila Menz, 
Larry Novey, Deborah Parkinson, Leslie Phillips, Alistair Reader, 
Patricia Rojas, Mary Beth Schultz, Adam Sedgewick, Todd Stein, Jason 
Yanussi, and Wes Young--all on my committee staff. And thanks to Purva 
Rawal and Vance Serchuk on my personal office staff.
  I must also thank Senator Collins' staff director, Brandon Milhorn, 
as well as Andy Weis, Rob Strayer, and the Senator's entire staff for 
working with us to move this very important legislation.
  And of course, thank you to our colleagues and thanks to the 9/11 
Commission.
  There were an enormous number of committees involved in this 
legislation, in some ways even more than in the first 9/11 legislation. 
So it took a lot of cooperation, which is the essence of getting 
anything done and, obviously, bipartisan cooperation to bring us to 
this point.
  Again, I thank Chairman Collins, Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, 
and all our colleagues on the conference committee and their staff on 
both sides of the aisle from all the relevant committees in both the 
House and Senate for their willingness to work through some difficult, 
but critical, issues to make our country safe.
  I have a particular debt of gratitude to my own Homeland Security 
staff: staff director Michael Alexander; chief counsel Kevin Landy; and 
Senator Collins' staff, beginning with staff director Brandon Milhorn.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, after the terrible attacks of September 
11, 2001, Congress moved to strengthen America. Congress created the 
Department of Homeland Security, and Senator Lieberman and I led a 
bipartisan effort to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission--reforming our intelligence community, creating a Director 
of National Intelligence, and establishing the National 
Counterterrorism Center. We have also passed legislation to strengthen 
security at America's seaports and chemical facilities and to reform 
FEMA.
  These were great advances in protecting our country. But as the 
recently released National Intelligence Estimate noted, the United 
States faces a ``persistent and evolving terrorist threat.'' Foremost 
among those threats is al-Qaida, which continues to plot attacks 
against us. We also face a growing threat of homegrown terrorism--
violent radicals inspired by al-Qaida's perversion of the Islamic 
faith, but with no operational connection to foreign terrorist 
networks.
  These real and evolving threats mean that we cannot stop improving 
our existing security arrangements, or ignore needs and opportunities 
to adopt new measures. Congress has, in fact, already enacted most of 
the 9/11 Commission recommendations, but our security must continually 
improve to meet the advances of our enemies.
  The conference report that we consider today builds on our prior 
work, offering important enhancements to our homeland security.
  Notably, the conference report will protect concerned citizens from 
civil liability when they make good-faith reports of suspicious 
activity that could threaten our transportation system. This provision, 
based on legislation

[[Page S10120]]

that I coauthored with Senators Lieberman and Kyl, also wisely protects 
security officials who take reasonable steps to respond to reports of 
suspicious activity.
  Vigilant citizens should not have to worry about being dragged into 
court, hiring defense attorneys, and incurring big legal bills, because 
they did their civic duty by reporting a possible threat. The bill's 
protective language reinforces the important message that New York 
transit passengers see every day: ``If you see something, say 
something.'' And with TSA recently reporting possible ``dry run'' 
efforts to pass simulated bomb components through airport security, it 
is more urgent than ever that we remove any deterrents to citizens 
making their concerns known to authorities.

  Another important aspect of the bill is its creation of a sensible 
formula for homeland security grant programs. We know two critical 
things about the prevention of, and response to, terrorist attacks: 
one, the attacks can be planned and executed anywhere and two, State 
and local agencies are likely to be the first and most urgently needed 
responders.
  The compromise reached on minimum levels of grant funding will help 
ensure a strong baseline of capabilities across the Nation, helping to 
prevent the next terrorist attack before it occurs. Terror plots can 
emerge from any location. Planning, training, and logistics for these 
attacks often occur far from the location of the terrorists' final 
target and, in some cases, are preceded by other local criminal 
activities. And, as the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on 
this threat assessed:

       The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist 
     plotting in this environment will challenge current US 
     defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt 
     plots. It will also require greater understanding of how 
     suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic 
     threat information and how best to identify indicators of 
     terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.

  Much of the work to prevent homegrown terror plots--like the thwarted 
attempt to attack Fort Dix, NJ will occur at the State and local level. 
This legislation ensures adequate funding for prevention efforts in all 
our States.
  Effective response, of course, requires that emergency workers and 
officials be able to talk with one another. The Senate Homeland 
Security Committee's investigation into the Hurricane Katrina 
catastrophe revealed many instances of tragic failures to deliver 
timely assistance to victims simply because communications systems were 
damaged or not interoperable. State and local governments recognize the 
problem. That is why DHS receives more requests for funding to upgrade 
and purchase emergency communications equipment and systems under the 
State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security 
Initiative than for any other purpose.

  We should, therefore, take special notice of this bill's provision 
for a dedicated grant program at the Department of Homeland Security to 
enhance emergency communications interoperability. With an 
authorization of $2 billion over 5 years, this critical program will 
fund development of a robust, national emergency communications network 
to assist emergency personnel whether they are responding to a 
terrorist attack, a tornado, a flood, an earthquake, or an ice storm.
  The conference report also contains important provisions that will 
strengthen the intelligence functions at the Department of Homeland 
Security and will improve the sharing of information related to 
homeland security threats among Federal, State, local, and tribal 
officials.
  Senator Lieberman and I helped establish the Information Sharing 
Environment in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. This program is an 
essential element in promoting homeland security information sharing 
across the Federal Government and with our State and local partners. 
The conference report makes important improvements to the Information 
Sharing Environment--extending the tenure of the program manager, 
enhancing his authority to further develop and coordinate information-
sharing efforts governmentwide, and providing additional guidance 
concerning the operation of the ISE.
  The conference report will improve the operations of the intelligence 
components of the Department of Homeland Security. Through the creation 
of an Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis charged with 
strategic oversight of the intelligence components of the Department, 
the bill will improve the coordination of the Department's intelligence 
activities.
  Whether homeland security information or national intelligence is 
collected by Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, the Transportation Security Administration, or the Coast 
Guard, this information must be efficiently and effectively identified, 
processed, analyzed, and disseminated. The conference report charges 
the Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis with responsibilities 
for improving the sharing of information, training Department employees 
to recognize the intelligence value of the information they receive 
every day, and providing important budget guidance to the intelligence 
components of the Department.

  The legislation will also improve the Department's ability to provide 
useful information to State and local officials and provide feedback on 
the value of the information they share with the Department.
  It is important to recognize the tremendous effort and good work that 
has already gone into establishing fusion centers across the country. 
State governments, in particular, are devoting considerable resources 
to establishing fusion centers. I believe this demonstrates the value 
government entities and the private sector place on establishing 
mechanisms to integrate information and intelligence to protect against 
all kinds of threats.
  The legislation establishes a DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion 
Center Initiative whereby DHS will make available federal intelligence 
officers and analysts to assist the work of fusion centers. It also 
directs the Secretary of DHS to establish guidelines for fusion centers 
that seek Federal funding.
  These guidelines are not meant to step on State toes, but to ensure 
that a fusion center has a clear mission statement and goals, 
incorporates performance measures, adheres to a privacy and civil 
liberties policy, ensures that all personnel receive training on 
privacy and civil liberties, has in place appropriate security 
measures, and provides usable intelligence products to its 
stakeholders.
  Most fusion centers are established and operated by States. However, 
if federal funding is going to support these centers, we should ensure 
that they are operated in a responsible manner and in a way that 
ensures efficient information exchange with the Federal Government and 
with other fusion centers.
  The bill also encourages deeper cooperation with State and local 
officials, by authorizing exchange programs that will send Federal 
intelligence analysts to state and local fusion centers, and by 
bringing the expertise of state and local officials to DHS and the 
National Counterterrorism Center.

  Transportation security is another area that will be strengthened 
under the terms of this bill. Last year's SAFE Port Act made 
significant improvements to maritime security. This conference report 
bolsters the security of other transportation modes, including 
aviation, railroads, and mass transit. For example, the bill requires 
electronic screening of information on l00 percent of air cargo loaded 
on passenger planes through a known-shipper program. It also authorizes 
more than $1 billion annual funding for rail and mass transit grants.
  The bill also enhances security in the Visa Waiver Program. It 
restricts expansion of the program until DHS can effectively track 
entries and exits from our country. And it encourages foreign 
governments' cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and 
information-sharing initiatives, including timely reporting of lost and 
stolen passports.
  I finally note two other important sections of the conference report.
  First, the legislation recognizes that security enhancements should 
not come at the expense of our rights to privacy or our civil 
liberties. The legislation enhances the authority of the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight

[[Page S10121]]

Board and mandates important privacy and civil liberties training for 
officials working at fusion centers.
  Second, the conference report will establish an international science 
and technology R&D program with our allies in the global war on terror, 
providing money for joint homeland security ventures and facilitating 
technology transfers.
  All of the provisions I have mentioned are worthy additions within 
the letter or spirit of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. I 
continue, however, to have considerable concerns about other portions 
of the conference report.
  Above all, I am disappointed that the House amendment mandating 
scanning of l00 percent of maritime containers was adopted by the 
conference committee, overturning the risk-based, layered security 
system enacted just last year as part of the SAFE Port Act. Based on 
current technology, this proposal is not practical because of the huge 
volume--11 million containers per year--coming into our seaports. It 
will divert resources from the focus on high-risk cargo and will likely 
cause considerable backlogs at our ports, disrupting trade and posing 
problems for businesses relying on just-in-time inventories.
  My reservations on that point prevented me from signing the 
conference report.
  While the proposed report makes important improvements to our 
national preparedness, I fear that its language on private-sector 
preparedness could short-circuit the progress that DHS and the private 
sector have already made in the recent release of all 17 sector-
specific plans under the National Infrastructure Protection Program. I 
also believe that, at this time, Congress has insufficient data to 
warrant mandating a new private-sector preparedness certification 
program.
  Now that the conference report has reached the floor of the Senate, 
however, I must weigh my concerns with this legislation against the 
benefits that it undoubtedly offers. Because I believe the net benefits 
to our homeland security are substantial, I intend to support final 
passage of the conference report.

  I close by offering my congratulations and appreciation to Senator 
Lieberman for his efforts to advance this legislation.
  I also thank my staff who worked so hard on this legislation: Brandon 
Milhorn, Andy Weis, Rob Strayer, Amy Hall, Jane Alonso, Asha Mathew, 
Kate Alford, Melvin Albritton, John Grant, Amanda Wood, Mark LeDuc, 
Steve Midas, Leah Nash, Patrick Hughes, Jen Tarr, Clark Irwin, Emily 
Meeks, Douglas Campbell, and Neil Cutter.
  Mr. President, I congratulate Senator Lieberman on his outstanding 
leadership on this bill. This was truly a bipartisan effort in a 
Congress that has seen precious few bipartisan bills taken to 
completion. I join him in thanking our staffs on both sides of the 
aisle. They worked extremely hard. This was a very difficult bill 
because it involved many different issues, complex issues, and also 
jurisdictions that overlapped various committees, and that always is 
difficult in the Senate to resolve.
  I do want to touch again on three points. First, this bill builds 
upon legislation that Senator Lieberman and I authored in 2004, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act. This bill implemented 
the vast majority of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. It 
created, for example, the Director of National Intelligence. It 
established the National Counterterrorism Center. It set forth 
standards for information sharing. That legislation has made a real 
difference. In fact, last summer when the plot which was hatched in 
Great Britain against our airliners was thwarted, Secretary Chertoff 
told me he believed the reforms we put into place through the 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 helped connect the dots, and 
information was shared with our allies and helped lead to the detection 
and the thwarting of that plot. So that made a difference.
  Nevertheless, there were some areas where we hadn't finished the job, 
and this bill will help take us further down the road.
  I want to highlight a second point, and this is the provision that is 
in this bill that I think is absolutely critical and will help to 
increase the safety of our country.
  A recently released National Intelligence Estimate noted that the 
United States continues to face a persistent and evolving terrorist 
threat, and foremost among these threats is, of course, al-Qaida which 
continues to plot attacks against us.
  We also face a growing threat of homegrown terrorism, violent 
radicals inspired by al-Qaida but not necessarily linked directly to 
al-Qaida. These real and evolving threats mean we cannot stop improving 
our existing security arrangements or ignore needs and opportunities to 
adopt new measures.
  Most notably, this conference report will protect concerned citizens 
from civil liability when they in good faith report suspicious activity 
to the authorities. This provision, which is based on legislation that 
I coauthored with Senators Lieberman and Kyl, also wisely protects 
security officials who take reasonable steps to respond to reports of 
suspicious activity.
  Vigilant citizens should not have to worry that if in good faith they 
report suspicious activity that may indicate a terrorist threat, the 
result is going to be they are dragged into court, have to hire defense 
attorneys, incur big legal bills, just because they did what we would 
want them to do. The New York subway has signs saying: ``See something, 
say something.'' And with TSA recently reporting possible dry run 
efforts to pass simulated bomb components through airport security, it 
is more urgent than ever that we remove any deterrence to citizens 
making their concerns known to authorities. I think these are very 
important provisions in this bill.
  Finally, let me comment on one provision in this bill that is of 
great disappointment to me. I am very disappointed that the final 
version of this bill mandates scanning of 100 percent of maritime 
containers. That overturns the risk-based, layered security system 
enacted just last year as part of the SAFE Port Act. Based on current 
technology, this proposal is simply not practical because of the huge 
volume, some 11 million containers per year, coming into our seaports. 
It will divert resources from the focus on high-risk cargo, and it will 
likely cause considerable backlogs at our ports, disrupting trade, and 
posing problems for businesses that rely on just-in-time inventories.
  My reservations about these provisions prevented me from signing the 
conference report. But on balance, this is a very good bill. It 
contains a lot of provisions that I think will improve our homeland 
security and, in the end, I am pleased to vote for it, and I am 
delighted with the strong vote for its passage tonight.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. COBURN. Mr. President, first of all, I thank Senator Lieberman 
and Senator Collins for their hard work on this bill. I think we 
shouldn't be so quick to pat ourselves on the back as far as the 9/11 
Commission. The No. 1 thing the 9/11 Commission said is, the money that 
is spent on protecting this country ought to be based on risk. Fifty 
percent of the money in this bill is not based on risk. It is based on 
political calculations, on each one of us getting so much money for our 
State. That is absolutely wrong.
  There are a lot of good provisions in this bill, I don't disagree 
with that point. But when we take $14 billion over the next 5 years for 
grants and say $7 billion of it isn't going to go based on the highest 
risk in this country, it is going to solve the political problems that 
Members of both the House and Senate have in terms of bringing home the 
bacon rather than putting that money where it should be put. What if 
something happens between now and the next 4 years and we could have 
spent the money in the high-risk areas, but we chose not to because we 
ignored it and we spent the money elsewhere taking care of our own 
political needs rather than the needs of our country?
  The second point that ought to be made, and Senator Collins made this 
point, is, it is absolutely impossible for us, over the next 3 years, 
to screen 100 percent of the cargo. Yet that is what we have mandated. 
In fact, we are going to take a very effective high-risk program right 
now, and we are going to stop it and we are going to go to 100 percent 
screening. In the meantime, we are going to screen 50 percent of it, 
and we are not going to look at the high-

[[Page S10122]]

risk cargo. What we are doing with this bill on cargo is making our 
country less safe. It doesn't fit with any common sense, but yet that 
is what we have done because a majority of us want to answer the 
emotional call for 100 percent screening when, in fact, the scientists 
and people trained to protect us tell us that is not the way to go. We 
reversed, and we walked away from what we were told by the experts to 
do.
  What do we know about grants? What we know is that of the $10 billion 
we have already given in grants, 30 percent of it was wasted, and we 
don't know about the other 70 percent because there are only eight 
people in the whole Department of Homeland Security who look at the $10 
billion we have spent. And we are going to spend $14 billion.
  We did get in some post-grant review, but there is no rigorous 
assessment and transparency of how the money is going to be spent. So 
it is going to go out there, and we are never going to know if it did 
the right thing.
  On our track record for the $10 billion we have already spent, 30 
percent of it we know failed, and 30 percent we know didn't go for 
legitimate homeland security items. And we don't have and didn't put 
the resources in this bill, if we are going to spend $14 billion over 
the next 5 years on grants, to make sure that money goes to do what it 
is supposed to do. So we are creating problems and taking money and not 
spending it in the way that is most appropriate, and that is what the 
Homeland Security said.
  The other point the 9/11 Commission said is we ought to reorganize 
how we oversight intelligence. We didn't do any of that recommendation. 
We didn't do any of it. They also commented that we have to have the 
oversight and priorities, that you don't fight turf battles but what 
you do is fight the terrorists. This bill is loaded with turf battles 
where money is spent, ordered, and managed by one department, but the 
checks are cut somewhere else; not because that is the way to do it, 
but because we are protecting some politicians' turf in terms of 
controlling the money. I think that does not reflect well.

  There is another interesting item we have created. We created a 
weapons of mass destruction czar and commission in this bill. That may 
be a good idea. I am not sure I disagree with that. But we also said to 
that czar--this is going to be a White House position--anything you 
tell the President, you cannot tell him in confidence. We gutted 
executive privilege to have an adviser to the President on weapons of 
mass destruction to have the confidence that what he says to the 
President in private, in confidence for the best part of this country, 
will become available to all of us.
  First of all, no President is ever going to fill this position 
because they are not about to have an adviser behind them advising them 
who cannot give a clear, concrete recommendation without it being 
second-guessed by somebody on the outside knowing what they are saying. 
It goes against all common sense.
  Finally, what we have done is we have taken our black box 
intelligence numbers, and we are going to tell the world what they are, 
which is crazy. We are going to tell the world how much money we spend 
on covert activities, and we are going to share that with them. We 
shouldn't be sharing that information. That information should not be 
out there, and yet we have decided to do it to our own disadvantage.
  I know there has been great work put in on this bill both by Chairman 
Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, and I appreciate it.
  One final point that I will mention. We had in our bill some 
oversight in the BBG, the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Here is what 
we know about Farsi Voice of America TV and Arabic TV. What we know is 
most of the time they are not presenting America's viewpoint. They are 
presenting our enemy's viewpoint, and we know this because my office 
has been translating and having translated their broadcasts. We put 
into the bill to have those translations become public as a part of 
BBG, and that got rejected.
  So we are going to continue to have a foreign policy where we are 
paying money to have radio programs go into Iran that are counter to 
what our own policies are, and yet we are not going to have 
accountability in this bill, to hold BBG accountable. It is not there. 
It has been taken away.
  Transparency is a great thing for this country, and when we spend 
money to create an American position in a foreign land, to not have 
transcripts and for them to not want us to have transcripts of what is 
going on, the first thing one has to ask is, Why not? Why shouldn't 
American taxpayers know where they are spending their money and know 
what the message is that they are sending? Unless the message is 
something different than what it should be. And that is the case with 
Radio Farsi and Radio Farda.

  There are several other things I will not spend any more time on but 
that I think the American people ought to ask themselves. Last year, 
$434 billion on credit cards was charged to our grandkids. We have $14 
billion worth of grants in this bill over the next 5 years; $7 billion 
that we don't know if it is going to be spent well. We certainly don't 
know if it is truly going to be spent on homeland security and at a 
priority of what is best and what is based on the highest risk.
  So I am disappointed that we didn't get a lot of things in the bill 
that we should, and I know this is an effort at compromise, but it 
seems to me that certain things that are common sense, such as spending 
money to make sure our message is right, and knowing that it is right; 
making sure we are spending the money where the highest risk is, rather 
than where the greatest political need is, ought to have been 
principles that should have gotten into this bill.
  I voted against this bill not because I don't think we should be 
protecting the homeland, not because I don't think we should be 
following these recommendations but because we have ignored the No. 1 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, which is the money ought to go 
where the risk is. We ignored it. We ignored it. We played the 
political game that makes us all happy, but we didn't fix the problem. 
If we have another event where we should have put the money, then how 
will we answer that? How will we answer that?
  They didn't say some of the money should go to the highest risk. They 
said all the money should go to the highest risk. What we have are 
three grant programs, one of which is very good at risk and two of 
which are not. So we ought to ask ourselves: Have we done the best we 
could have done?
  The effort by Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins was 
extraordinary. We had great debate in our committee on a lot of these 
issues. By the way, they supported me in these things. We didn't get 
them out of conference. The question we are going to be judged on is 
how effective we did this. My hope was and my feeling is we could have 
done better.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Oklahoma. The 
truth is the Senate is a better place because he is here, he is 
persistent, he is demanding, he spends a lot of time actually reading 
bills, and he brings his opinions to the table and to the floor. 
Although we may be in disagreement on some of the particulars, he cares 
enough about all this to not only work through the details but to stay 
here after midnight, after a busy week, to make these points. So I 
thank him for all that.
  I thank him for the contributions he made along the way to the bill 
as a member of our committee. I am going to put some statements in the 
record to respond to some of the points in more detail that Senator 
Coburn made, but I do wish to say that Senator Collins and I worked 
very hard, both in the committee and then particularly in the 
conference committee, to take the State homeland security grants and 
make sure that they were allocated, a much greater percentage of them 
was allocated based on risk.
  We heard the concerns. So the conference report allocates the 
overwhelming share of State funding based on the risk the State faces 
from terrorism. All States initially will be guaranteed a minimum of 
0.375 percent. The number was up to .75 percent earlier on. This will 
be reduced to .35 percent over the course of the 5 years.
  The reason for having any minimum is twofold: One is that, 
unfortunately, the enemy we face--Islamist extremist terrorism--has a 
higher probability of

[[Page S10123]]

attacking, at least by our experience in this country, very visible 
targets, such as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But the truth 
is the whole country is, unfortunately, vulnerable to their attacks. As 
we have seen in other countries, they attack trains, they are prepared 
to blow up themselves with bombs in the middle of shopping areas, in 
crowds, et cetera. So there is some reason to have a minimum amount for 
every State in the country.
  Secondly, homeland security generally--and we particularly get into 
this in one of the other grant programs that I will talk about in a 
minute--deals not only with protecting the States from terrorism but 
from all hazards, including natural disasters. The Department of 
Homeland Security is an all-hazard agency now, including within it, 
most particularly, FEMA, the Coast Guard, and other agencies that are 
involved when you think more in terms of protection from natural 
disasters. So I think we have made some progress there, and that is the 
reason why we have done what we have done.
  There is a separate program, which perhaps is the one Senator Coburn 
was referring to, the urban area security initiative. That is allocated 
entirely based on risk. We also create, for the first time, two 
programs that are intended to be all-hazard programs and to support law 
enforcement and emergency response around the country. The first is an 
Emergency Management Grant Program and the second, which we talked 
about earlier, is the interoperability of communications.
  So I think, on balance, when it comes to terrorism, we have allocated 
much more now than before based on risk. Yet we also, I think quite 
appropriately, provide something for areas all around the country to 
deal with all the other hazards, natural disasters, that can and have 
struck every section of the country.
  There is also a substantial increase in funding that is authorized by 
this bill. Of course, ultimately, it has to be appropriated, but this 
is a new challenge, this terrible challenge of terrorism, against an 
unconventional brutal enemy, which, as someone other than myself has 
said, hates us more than they love their own lives. They hate us more 
than they love their own lives, so that they are prepared to kill 
themselves to express their hatred of us. Of course, these are not 
conventional armies fighting our conventional Army on a field of battle 
or at sea or in the air.

  These are enemies who strike from the shadows and intend to strike at 
unprotected civilians--at innocents. So this requires a substantial 
commitment by our country to raise our defenses. I think it is part of 
the reason, along with the reform of our intelligence apparatus, that 
we have not, thank God, suffered another terrorist attack since 9/11. 
Part of it, of course, is good fortune, or, if you are so inclined, by 
the grace of God. But I do believe what we have invested is an 
important part of it.
  I myself have said more than once that I thought after 9/11, entering 
this new era of both homeland security needs and the need to involve 
our military in seeking out for the purpose of capturing or killing 
these terrorists, then being engaged in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
that we would have done better if we had considered a special tax and 
one in which we asked everybody to pay to meet the additional expenses 
brought on by this war that Islamist terrorists started against us, so 
we would not be facing the increasing long-term debt that Senator 
Coburn is quite right that our children are going to have to pay.
  What I am saying is the money we have authorized to be spent here is 
important. We have the best defense--the best military in the world. 
Part of the reason we do is because we are spending money on it, an 
enormous amount of money. We will continue to have the best homeland 
security and homeland defense if we do the same.
  One of the great contributions Senator Coburn makes is to be very 
persistent at making sure we don't waste taxpayer money, and he has 
made a contribution to this bill. There are many provisions in the bill 
that improve the oversight of the spending of homeland security funds, 
and in my statement I make clear our gratitude to Senator Coburn and 
his staff for all that they did to strengthen the auditing provisions 
of this bill.
  I will say, finally, on the question of congressional oversight of 
intelligence and the declassification of the top line of the national 
intelligence budget, this is a direct recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission. It doesn't make it sacrosanct, but it does give it some 
force. They argued that the specifics of the intelligence 
appropriations should remain classified, as they do in this proposal, 
but that the top line ought to be publicized to combat the secrecy and 
complexity the Commission had commented on earlier. That is what we 
intend to do.
  But we are mindful of the concerns that Senator Coburn and others 
have had. We have spent some time discussing this with members of the 
administration, and this is compromise language. The bill contains this 
provision, which is that the President would be required to disclose 
the total appropriated amount for the national intelligence budget for 
this year and the coming year, after which the President may waive this 
requirement by sending to Congress a notification explaining the 
reasons for this waiver.
  Listen, I think most people, including most people in the media, know 
what the top line budget for intelligence is. But we are now bringing 
it out and giving the President the opportunity to stop the disclosure 
if he determines it is in the national security interest in future 
years, for various reasons, to do that.
  The conference report addresses the oftentimes contentious issue of 
homeland security grants. It may not make everyone happy, but it 
represents a good and fair compromise and will do much to improve the 
process by which these grants are distributed and used.
  The conference report allocates a greater share--indeed the 
overwhelming share--of state funding based on the risk a state faces 
from terrorism, yet still ensures that each state will get money to 
meet its basic needs in preparing for acts of terrorism. All States 
will initially be guaranteed a minimum of 0.375 percent of funds; this 
will be reduced to 0.35 percent over the course of 5 years.
  Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI, grants will be allocated 
entirely based on risk of terrorism. There will be a two-step process 
for selecting UASI cities. In the first stage, DHS will do a risk 
assessment of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the country, and 
each of these areas will be permitted to submit information to the 
Department concerning the risks faced by that area--thus opening up a 
dialogue with cities and bringing light to a process that has largely 
taken place behind the scenes. After doing this initial assessment, the 
FEMA Administrator will then have the discretion--as he does now--to 
select those high-risk urban areas eligible to apply for UASI grants.
  The conference report also reverses the recent disturbing downward 
trend in funding for these essential grant programs. It would authorize 
$1.8 billion for the State Homeland Security Grant Program, SHSGP, and 
UASI program in fiscal year 2008--our principal antiterrorism grants to 
first responders--and increase this over the next 5 years to $2.25 
billion. Also, as a complement to this, the conference report would 
ensure that states have increased funds available for key all-hazards 
grant programs, including the emergency management performance grants 
and dedicated grants for communications interoperability. These 
programs help ensure that all States have basic preparedness 
capabilities for all disasters, whether natural or man-made.
  The conference report would also for the first time specifically 
authorize State and urban area grants, and provide legislative 
guidelines for the programs, including permissible uses.
  Finally, the conference report would provide a whole series of 
oversight measures to ensure that funds were being spent effectively 
and appropriately to achieve preparedness, and not wasted.
  The 9/11 Commission report said:

       To combat the secrecy and complexity we have described, the 
     overall amounts of money being appropriated for national 
     intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer 
     be kept secret. Congress should pass a separate 
     appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad 
     allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been 
     assigned among the varieties of intelligence work.


[[Page S10124]]


  The Commission went on to say that:

       The specifics of the intelligence appropriation would 
     remain classified, as they are today. Opponents of 
     declassification argue that America's enemies could learn 
     about intelligence capabilities by tracking the top-line 
     appropriations figure. Yet the top-line figure by itself 
     provides little insight into U.S. intelligence sources and 
     methods.

  A provision was passed to declassify the top-line of the National 
Intelligence Budget was passed by the Senate as part of the 
Intelligence Reform Act in 2004 but removed in conference.
  In December 2005, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, an independent 
organization led by the 9/11 Commission members, issued a grade of 
``F'' on the implementation of this recommendation, writing that 
``Congress cannot do robust intelligence oversight when funding for 
intelligence programs is buried within the defense budget. 
Declassifying the overall intelligence budget would allow for a 
separate annual intelligence appropriations bill, so that the Congress 
can judge better how intelligence funds are being spent.''
  The final bill contains a compromise that we have worked closely with 
the White House to craft, one which finally addresses this important 9/
11 Commission recommendation to disclose the top line of the National 
Intelligence Budget.
  The compromise agreement will require the President to disclose the 
total appropriated for the National Intelligence Budget for 2 years--
2007 and 2008--after which the President may waive this requirement by 
sending to Congress a notification explaining the reasons for this 
waiver.
  The inclusion of this provision means that this important 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission will now finally be implemented.
  In this bill, we authorize significant additional funds for homeland 
security grants for State and local governments: for State Homeland 
Security Grants, for Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI, grants, for 
Emergency Management Performance Grants, EMPG, for interoperable 
emergency communications, for rail and transit security, in order to 
ensure that our first responders across the Nation are prepared for 
disasters, natural and man-made.
  In authorizing these additional funds, we are cognizant that we need 
to spend these funds wisely, in a way that will make our first 
responders most prepared and our nation most secure. For this reason, 
the conference report includes extensive oversight and accountability 
provisions designed to ensure that all grant funds are used as 
effectively as possible and for their intended purposes.
  At least every 2 years, DHS is required to conduct a programmatic and 
financial review of each State and urban area receiving grants 
administered by the Department to examine whether grant funds are being 
used properly.
  The DHS inspector general is tasked with following up these agency 
reviews by conducting full, in-depth audits of a sample of States and 
urban areas each year, and then report to Congress on his findings, and 
to post the results of the audits on the Internet.
  For the Public Safety Interoperable Communications grants that go 
through the Commerce Department and are administered jointly by the 
Commerce Department and DHS, there are separate provisions requiring 
that the Commerce Department inspector general conduct audits of those 
grants.
  The conference report also builds on provisions in the Post--Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act that we passed last fall by requiring 
that DHS develop and use performance metrics to assess the progress of 
States and urban areas in becoming prepared, and that States and urban 
areas test their performance against these metrics through exercises.
  All states are required to report quarterly on their expenditures and 
annually on their level of preparedness.
  Finally, The FEMA Administrator is also required to provide to 
Congress annually an evaluation of the efficacy of the Department's 
homeland security grants have contributed to State and local 
governments in meeting their target levels of preparedness and have led 
to the overall reduction of risk.
  From the beginning, we have been aware of Senator Coburn's strongly 
held view that there be adequate oversight and auditing of homeland 
security grants, and his support for the provisions to this effect in 
the Senate bill--provisions that were not part of the House bill. 
Senator Collins' and I, and our staffs, have fought for the Senate 
auditing provisions in conference, in the face of a number of 
objections and concerns raised by House staff from various committees. 
And we have been successful in retaining in the conference report what 
we believe are very strong provisions to ensure accountability for 
homeland security grant funds.
  Working with Senator Coburn, we were able to retain what I believe 
are very significant provisions to ensure the appropriate and effective 
use of homeland security dollars.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate today will 
finally pass the Improving America's Security Act of 2007. Over 3 years 
ago, the 9/11 Commission gave us its recommendations, and we are 
finally taking a big step toward implementing them. Let me mention a 
few highlights.
  This comprehensive legislation goes a long way toward helping our 
first responders. First, it establishes a $400 million annual grant 
program dedicated to funding interoperable communications equipment. We 
know that lives were lost on September 11, 2001, because first 
responders could not communicate. The same situation continues to play 
out across our country every day. For years, I have been urging the 
Department of Homeland Security to establish a dedicated funding source 
for interoperable communications equipment. I am pleased that this 
legislation creates a grant program dedicated to improving operability 
and interoperability at local, regional, State, and Federal levels. 
Second, to improve collaboration and help identify solutions to 
communications problems on our international borders, the legislation 
also includes language that I authored that establishes International 
Border Community Interoperable Communications Demonstration Projects on 
the northern and southern borders. These demonstration projects will 
address the interoperable communications needs of police officers, 
firefighters, emergency medical technicians, National Guard, and other 
emergency response providers at our borders and will improve the 
ability of U.S. personnel to work well, for example, with their 
Canadian counterparts.
  Another key accomplishment is that the legislation provides a more 
equitable distribution of homeland security grant funding. For the past 
5 years, the largest homeland security grant programs distributed funds 
using a formula that arbitrarily set aside a large portion of the funds 
to be divided equally among the States, regardless of size, need, or 
risk. This legislation allocates more of the funding based on risk. 
Specifically, the legislation would reduce the funds guaranteed to each 
State from 0.75 percent to 0.375 percent of grant funds in fiscal year 
2008; the minimum would then decline over a period of 5 years to 0.35 
percent in fiscal year 2012 and thereafter. All other funds would be 
distributed to States based on the risk of acts of terrorism and the 
anticipated effectiveness of the proposed use of the grants.
  Also included in the bill is language I authored that will require 
the Department of Homeland Security, before publishing the final rule, 
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative, WHTI, including the cost to the State Department and 
resources required to meet the increased volume of passports requests. 
The WHTI seeks to require individuals from the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico to present a passport or other document proving citizenship 
before entering the United States. While we need to make our borders as 
secure as they can be, we also need to make sure that we are achieving 
that goal in a way that will not cause economic harm to our States. A 
cost-benefit analysis will help ensure we identify and weigh the 
expenses and benefits of the WHTI.
  The legislation also takes important steps to shore up rail, transit, 
bus, air and cargo security in the United States. It establishes a 
grant program for freight and passenger rail security upgrades and 
requires railroads shipping high-hazard materials to create threat 
mitigation plans. It establishes

[[Page S10125]]

a grant fund for system-wide Amtrak security improvements and much 
needed infrastructure upgrades. It authorizes studies to find ways to 
improve passenger and baggage security screening on passenger rail 
service between the U.S. and Canada which should identify what is 
needed to prescreen rail passengers on the northern border. I hope 
these studies will also advance a long standing effort I have 
undertaken to implement a preclearance system at other land crossings 
so that, for example, we can inspect vehicles for hazardous materials 
before they cross bridges and tunnels between U.S. and Canada.
  In addition to improving rail security, the bill establishes grant 
programs for improving intercity bus and bus terminal security and 
public transportation system security. It takes steps to improve the 
safety of transporting radioactive and hazardous materials on our 
railroads and highways. I am also pleased that this legislation 
requires the screening of all cargo carried on passenger airplanes 
within 3 years. It also requires all containers to be scanned for 
radiation at foreign ports before entering U.S. ports. The legislation 
also establishes an appeal process at the Department of Homeland 
Security for passengers that believe they have been wrongly included in 
``no-fly'' or ``selectee'' watch lists.
  While the conference report takes important steps toward implementing 
many 9/11 Commission recommendations, I am disappointed that it fails 
to address one critical recommendation and excludes several provisions 
that were in the Senate-passed bill.
  The 9/11 Commission report stated: ``Of all our recommendations, 
strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult 
and important.'' I am troubled that the conference report does not 
contain critical provisions--included in the Senate-passed bill--that 
were intended to strengthen congressional oversight and promote 
independent and objective intelligence analysis.
  There is a long, painful history of congressional efforts to obtain 
information from the intelligence community that have been slow-walked 
or simply not answered. The bill that passed the Senate required the 
intelligence community to provide Congress timely access to existing 
intelligence information unless the President asserted a constitutional 
privilege. Unfortunately, the conference report excludes that 
provision.
  The Senate-passed bill also provided that no executive branch 
official could require the intelligence community to get permission to 
testify or to submit testimony, legislative recommendations, or 
comments to the Congress. That provision was also stripped from the 
conference report. We should insist that the intelligence community be 
able to provide Congress its assessment of intelligence matters 
uninfluenced by the policy goals of whatever administration is in 
power.
  It is important for whistleblowers to know that they can come 
directly to Congress if they have evidence that someone has made a 
false statement to Congress. And Congress has a right to that 
information--even if it is classified. The Senate-passed bill made it 
clear that intelligence community employees and contractors can report 
classified information directly to appropriate Members of Congress and 
cleared staff if the employee reasonably believed that the information 
provides direct and specific evidence of a false or inaccurate 
statement to Congress. That provision was also removed in conference.
  While I am disappointed that the conference report does not contain 
these provisions, on balance it is a good bill and I am pleased that we 
are passing it today--both for the families and friends of those we 
lost on September 11, 2001, and for the security of our Nation.
  (At the request of Mr. Reid, the following statement was ordered to 
be printed in the Record.)
 Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the legislation 
reported by the conference, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007. I was proud to serve on this very important 
conference, and while I may not agree with every part of the act, I 
believe that on balance it is a very important piece of legislation 
that will serve to make our Nation more secure and help protect 
Americans of all walks of life. Over 5 years after the tragic events of 
9/11 and almost 2 years since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we continue 
to hear from Governors, county executives, mayors, first responders, 
health professionals, and emergency preparedness officials that our 
country as a whole remains unprepared for another manmade or natural 
disaster. We have heard the argument, which I support, that Congress 
needs to do more to support regional and local efforts to protect 
Americans. Overall, I believe this conference report takes a critical 
step forward in making America more secure.
  I am going to focus on the titles of this legislation dealing with 
transportation security, with which I was deeply involved throughout 
this process as chairman of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee, which has jurisdiction over public transportation.
  Title XIV of this bill creates a new grant program to improve the 
security of public transportation and its 14 million daily passengers. 
Safe and secure transit systems are essential to the well-being of our 
citizens and the health of our economy. The Banking Committee examined 
the state of transit security in our very first hearing of the 110th 
Congress, which was my first hearing as chairman. At that hearing, the 
committee heard from some very compelling witnesses, including the 
directors of the London and Madrid transit systems. It is not all that 
common that we invite witnesses who are not U.S. citizens to come and 
participate in congressional hearings. But given the tragedies in 
Madrid and London, we thought it would be worthwhile to have those who 
manage the transit operations in those two cities come and share with 
us information about their experiences. I think their testimony was 
very helpful in demonstrating the importance of this issue and 
galvanizing the attention of the Congress to address this issue in the 
legislation before us.
  We learned in those hearings that transit attacks have unfortunately 
been a major component of terrorist activities over the last several 
decades. It is no secret that worldwide, terrorists have favored public 
transit as a target. In the decade leading up to 2000, 42 percent of 
terrorist attacks worldwide targeted rail systems or buses, according 
to a study done by the Brookings Institution. In 2005 they attacked, as 
I mentioned, London's rail and bus system, killing 52 riders and 
injuring almost 700 more in what has been called London's bloodiest 
peacetime attack. In 2004, they attacked Madrid's metro system, killing 
192 people and leaving 1,500 people injured.
  Transit is frequently targeted because it is tremendously important 
to any nation's economy. Securing our transit systems and our 
transportation networks generally is a difficult challenge under any 
circumstances. We must do all that we can to meet that challenge. 
Beyond the obvious implications of physically protecting our citizens, 
safe transit systems can help to maintain public confidence, 
encouraging transit use, reducing pollution, and preventing our cities 
from being mired in gridlock.
  The first piece of legislation that the Banking Committee marked up 
after I became chairman addressed with transit security. That 
legislation, reported out of the committee as S. 763, was included in 
the Senate version of the 9/11 bill. I am extremely pleased that it is 
included in the conference report which the Senate is considering. 
Similar to the bill that was reported by the Banking Committee, the 
conference report provides $3.5 billion in grants directly to transit 
agencies for security equipment, evacuation drills, and worker 
training--on which several witnesses, particularly from Madrid and 
London, testified would be the most important investment we could make. 
Indeed, the conference report requires worker training for all transit 
systems that receive security grants. The importance of worker training 
can scarcely be overstated. Transit workers are the first line of 
defense against an attack and the first to respond in the event of an 
attack. Mr. O'Toole, the director of London's transit system, said it 
well: ``You have to invest in your staff and rely on them. You have to 
invest in technology, but don't rely on it.''
  The conference report also authorizes funds for the research and 
development of security technologies and authorizes

[[Page S10126]]

funding for the Information Sharing Analysis Center, ISAC, a valuable 
tool that provides transit agencies timely information on active 
threats against their systems. At the Banking Committee hearing we 
heard testimony from the American Public Transportation Association in 
strong support of the ISAC, and I am very pleased that the conference 
report authorizes this important center.
  The conference report follows the Banking Committee's bill in 
allocating grants directly to transit systems on the basis of risk. The 
legislation makes clear that the Department of Homeland Security is 
responsible for making these critical decisions and allocating the 
grants among the Nation's 6,000 public transit agencies. The report 
does leave open the important decision of which agency, the Department 
of Homeland Security or the Department of Transportation, should 
actually distribute these grants and audit recipients' compliance with 
important provisions of transit law, including labor protections. The 
legislation requires the Secretaries of these 2 Departments to make 
this decision on the basis of which Department can distribute grants in 
the most effective and efficient manner. It is my opinion that at this 
moment, and at least for the next few years, the Department of 
Transportation is the agency that can best meet these criteria. DOT 
already has an efficient and effective grant distribution system in 
place that directly reaches our Nation's transit systems. The Federal 
Transit Administration is well aware of the various provisions of 
transit law that the recipients of security grants will be required to 
comply with and will therefore be able to monitor for compliance 
effectively. These transit security grants must go out to agencies 
quickly, as we face an urgent threat. It is my hope that the 
Secretaries will make a decision based on sound policy to best protect 
the American public and not with an eye toward jurisdiction or turf.

  Over the years we have invested heavily in aviation security. In 
fact, we have invested about $7.50 per aviation passenger per trip. 
About 1.8 million people travel using the aviation system daily in this 
country. Fourteen million people use mass transit systems every 
workday. We have invested about $380 million in the security of mass 
transit systems. That is about one penny per passenger per trip.
  I am not suggesting, nor do we require, that there be an equilibrium 
between the security investment in aviation and mass transit systems. I 
am simply suggesting that the Federal government can and should do more 
to secure our transit systems. To that end, the conference report 
provides an authorization of $3.5 billion for transit security. We 
believe with this additional authorization, and we hope an appropriate 
appropriation from the responsible committees, that we will be able to 
provide some additional security for this critically important 
component of our economy.
  Again, I am grateful to the members of the conference committee for 
their support of this effort. I also want to thank my colleague and 
ranking member on the Banking Committee, Senator Shelby, who has been a 
true champion for transit security for many years. This National 
Transit Systems Security Act of 2007 would never have reached this 
stage without Senator Shelby's work. This was truly a bipartisan 
product, and I want to thank Senator Shelby and our colleagues on the 
Banking Committee, including the former chairmen of the Housing and 
Transportation Subcommittee, Senators Reed and Allard, who have also 
made very valuable contributions to this bill over the many years that 
we have been working to improve transit security.
  I also want to make a few comments about other items that are 
included in this conference report. First, as chairman of the Banking 
Committee, I recognize the preparedness requirements that the Federal 
financial regulators have imposed on institutions under their 
jurisdiction and which those institutions have observed. I am pleased 
to have worked with my colleagues Senators Lieberman and Collins on 
title IX to clarify that the private sector preparedness certification 
is voluntary and should not be construed as a requirement to replace 
any preparedness, emergency response, or business continuity standards, 
requirements, or best practices established under any other provision 
of Federal law, or by any sector-specific agency.
  The Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs also exercises 
jurisdiction over the preparedness of American industry to supply our 
Government in times of defense and homeland security emergencies. Key 
to this effort is ensuring that our Nation's critical infrastructure 
operates uninterrupted and unhindered by natural or manmade disasters. 
Title X of this bill will enable the Department of Homeland Security to 
assess our vulnerabilities and hopefully work with other agencies to 
build up defenses for our critical infrastructure. In one specific 
provision, we built off of the Banking Committee's work 4 years ago 
when we reauthorized the Defense Production Act, DPA. In 2003, we 
emphasized the importance of the DPA's authorities in protecting our 
critical infrastructure. Today, under the conference agreement, we will 
require the Homeland Security Department, in coordination with the 
Departments of Commerce, Transportation, Defense, and Energy, to 
explain how it is implementing these 2003 DPA requirements. With the 
DPA's authorities expiring in September 2008, this report may prove 
helpful for our Committee's eventual markup of the reauthorization and 
modernization of the DPA.
  Finally, I want to express my disappointment that the conference 
report includes an immunity provision that was added to the report 
despite not being contained in either the Senate bill or the House bill 
that was sent to conference. I note that this provision was not 
supported by the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has 
jurisdiction over this matter, and I believe it should have been dealt 
with in a very different manner. While I share the belief that our 
citizens are the first line of defense against terrorism and that they 
need to be encouraged to report legitimate suspicious behavior, we need 
to be very careful whenever we grant blanket immunity and even more 
careful when we pass legislation granting this immunity retroactively.
  To conclude, Mr. President, I am pleased to recommend this conference 
report to my colleagues, as I believe that it will serve us well in our 
efforts to make Americans more secure.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I am very happy to rise today in support 
of a conference report that implements the remaining 9/11 Commission 
recommendations.
  Finally, three years after the Commission released its bi-partisan 
report, we are sending President Bush legislation that implements the 
last of those recommendations--recommendations that will improve 
Maryland's as well as our nation's security. This bill increases 
citizens' safety when they travel by air, road, or rail; improves first 
responders' communications capabilities; facilitates intelligence 
sharing at all levels of law enforcement; and protects citizens' 
privacy and liberty.
  This conference report is the first legislation to formally authorize 
the State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security 
Initiative, UASI, which provide funds to states and high-risk urban 
areas--like the D.C. Metropolitan area--to prevent, prepare for, 
respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. This legislation 
authorizes more money than previous years, but most importantly--and I 
want to stress this most importantly, this legislation ensures the vast 
majority of that funding is distributed based on risk.
  In the past, too great a percentage of our first responder grants 
were distributed without regard to risk and vulnerability. As the 9-11 
Commission final report stated:

       [f]ederal homeland security assistance should not remain a 
     program for general revenue sharing.

  By increasing the percentage of grant money distributed based on 
risk, this legislation moves us toward the full implementation of the 
Commission's prescription.
  This legislation also requires the Department of Homeland Security, 
DHS, to consider certain factors when allocating funds based on risk 
including history of threats, risk associated with critical 
infrastructure, coastline, and the need to respond to neighboring 
areas; considerations critical to adequate risk assessment for many of

[[Page S10127]]

Maryland's communities. All of us were both outraged and deeply 
concerned when DHS ranked the Washington D.C. and New York City 
metropolitan areas in a low-risk category for terrorist attack or 
catastrophe, a decision that would have cost those regions millions in 
anti-terror funds and had devastating impacts on their ability to 
respond to attack had the rankings been allowed to stand. By setting 
criteria for risk assessment, this bill guards against future gross 
miscalculations.
  The legislation includes several important provisions improving 
transportation security, but I am particularly glad to see the bill 
requires DHS to develop its capacity to screen all--100 percent--of 
maritime cargo in foreign ports before it is loaded on ships bound for 
the United States within 5 years. Further, the conference substitute 
requires that DHS be able to screen all cargo carried on passenger 
airplanes within the next three years. And, the legislation authorizes 
substantial funds--more than $4 billion over four years--for rail, 
transit, and bus security grants.
  Not only does the legislation provide funding for improving 
communications systems, it also provides guidance. Maryland's first 
responders and administrators have explained to me that a truly 
interoperable communications system and a functioning incident command 
system require more than equipment. Practically, cooperation between 
and among local, state, national, and even international governments 
requires governance structures, protocols, agreements, and training. By 
providing money for staff, exercises, simulations, training, and any 
other activities necessary to achieve, maintain, or enhance emergency 
communications, this legislation addresses critical governance 
concerns.
  But to keep us safe, different government agencies need more than the 
ability to communicate. They need to actually be communicating critical 
information and intelligence to the officials and officers who need it. 
The conference substitute encourages the free transfer of intelligence 
across agencies by authorizing government-wide standards for 
information sharing, and creating standards for state, local, and 
regional intelligence fusion centers and ensures they receive federal 
support and personnel.
  The 9-11 attacks and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated how 
inadequate information sharing and inadequate communications systems 
can compound disasters. Let us hope that with these changes we will 
never again have to witness firefighters rushing into buildings when 
they should have been running out or distraught citizens trapped by 
flood waters while national officials remain unaware of the disaster.
  But this legislation does more than protect our physical safety; it 
contains provisions to safeguard our most cherished liberties. Recent 
revelations regarding FBI abuse of its PATRIOT Act authority to gather 
phone, bank, and credit information on thousands of citizens underscore 
the importance of this legislation's enhanced privacy and civil 
liberties protections. The bill strengthens the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board independence and expands its oversight 
authority. The bill requires agencies with access to citizens' private 
information to designate at least one senior official to serve as a 
source of advice and oversight on privacy and civil liberties matters. 
Finally, under this legislation, federal agencies must report annually 
on their development and use of data mining technologies so this body 
can ensure proper usage of any technologies that raise privacy or civil 
liberties concerns.
  This Conference Substitute also encourages this country to look 
beyond its own borders to promote others' safety and liberty through 
diplomacy. The legislation requires the Secretary of State expand 
strategies for democracy promotion in non-democratic and democratic 
transition countries, and to expand the effectiveness of the State 
Department's annual human rights reports. It further supports democracy 
promotion through international institutions, such as the UN Democracy 
Fund, the Community of Democracies, and the International Center for 
Democratic Transition, specifically through encouraging the 
establishment of an office of multilateral democracy promotion. To 
allow ``maximum effort'' on non-proliferation by the U.S. Government, 
as the 9-11 Commission called for, the bill establishes a Presidential 
Coordinator for the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism.
  We know now how closely our own safety is linked to other nations' 
internal security. These efforts are critical to creating a more stable 
Middle East and a safer world.
  The 9-11 families, several of whom are my constituents, asked us to 
pass this legislation, and I am proud that we have fulfilled this 
obligation to them and to the country.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I am pleased we are considering the 
conference report to H.R. 1, the Improving America's Security Act of 
2007. This legislation is particularly timely given the daily reports 
that the terrorist threat against our Nation is increasing. We must be 
proactive in defending the homeland and take particular care to protect 
the transportation systems which have so often been targeted.
  The conference report we are voting on today contains significant 
provisions to strengthen the security of the Nation's transportation 
system, including our surface, aviation and maritime networks. We also 
take action to improve the interoperability of public safety 
communications.
  For surface transportation security, we have worked with the relevant 
House conferees to reach consensus on provisions that would authorize 
new security assessments, grant programs, and security measures for the 
nation's major surface modes, including passenger and freight 
railroads, trucks, intercity buses, and pipelines. This bill will 
finally authorize adequate funding and a much needed statutory 
framework for the Transportation Security Administration's, TSA, 
surface transportation and rail security efforts.
  The conference report also takes critical steps to address the 
remaining recommendations of the 9/11 Commission on aviation security. 
The commission's report expressed continuing concern over the state of 
air cargo security, the screening of passengers and baggage, access 
controls at airports, and the security of general aviation.
  Under this bill, all cargo going on passenger aircraft must be 
screened within 3 years. Requirements will be put in place to plan and 
fund improvements for the detection of explosives in checked baggage 
and at passenger screening checkpoints. The TSA will also be required 
to ensure a system is in place to coordinate passenger redress matters 
and develop a strategic plan to test and implement an advanced 
passenger prescreening system.
  With respect to giving our Nation's first responders the necessary 
resources to communicate effectively during times of crisis, the bill 
will further bolster our previous efforts to improve interoperable, 
public safety communications by eliminating statutory ambiguities for 
eligibility and by directing specific funds in support of State 
Strategic Technology Reserves that can be tapped in times of crisis by 
State and local personnel, as proposed in S. 4.
  This conference report is an important step toward securing our 
Nation. The Commerce Committee worked for years to craft many of these 
provisions, and they reflect the expertise and dedication of our 
members. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, we have completed action on the conference 
report on H.R. 1, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, and I wish to commend Senators Joseph Lieberman 
and Susan Collins for leading this effort in the Senate. I appreciate 
their hard work and dedication in forging a compromise on this 
important piece of legislation. As a conferee I was pleased to take 
part in reconciling the differences between the Senate and House 
versions of this bill. The work that has gone into this legislation has 
been matched by the tremendous commitment of all of those involved to 
ensure that our country remains secure in the face of natural and man-
made threats. Now that the Senate votes on passage of the conference 
report, I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a few issues 
that are particularly important to me.
  The provision to create a Chief Management Officer, CMO, is a 
necessary

[[Page S10128]]

step in addressing the serious management and integration challenges at 
the Department of Homeland Security. I am disappointed that the 
conference report language does not encompass the entire provision 
passed by the Senate designating the CMO as the principal advisor to 
the Secretary on management issues. The CMO must have the authority of 
a Deputy Secretary to address department-wide management functions. My 
good friend Senator Voinovich, with whom I have worked closely on the 
Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee, as well as Comptroller 
General Walker, and I have long advocated for a CMO at the Deputy 
Secretary level.
  I am pleased to see that strong privacy provisions included in the 
House and Senate bills were retained in this report. The Privacy 
Officer With Enhanced Rights Act, or the POWER Act, a provision 
championed by Congressman Bennie Thompson and I, will strengthen the 
investigative authority of the chief privacy officer at the Department 
of Homeland Security. I am also pleased that the report increases the 
independence of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, so 
that there will be no undue influence exerted on them. Both of these 
provisions go a long way in ensuring that increased security efforts 
will not be at the cost of Americans' right to privacy.
  The conference report also includes an important provision to 
increase reporting requirements for agencies using data mining. I was 
pleased to work with my good friends Senators Russell Feingold and John 
Sununu, on this language. Federal agencies use data mining technology 
to review and analyze millions of public and private records for many 
reasons, including the detection of criminal and terrorist activities. 
This raises privacy concerns since an agency may analyze various 
databases containing personal information without any specific 
suspicion of wrongdoing.
  In 2003, I asked the Government Accountability Office, GAO, to look 
into this issue, and in 2004, GAO reported that 122 Government data 
mining activities involved the use of personal information, 46 of which 
involved sharing personal information between agencies. GAO also found 
36 data mining programs which used personal information from the 
private sector. However, these numbers did not include programs that 
are used for intelligence purposes. In 2005, GAO issued a follow-up 
report which found that agencies are not following all privacy and 
security policies. Given the increasing use of data mining and the 
threats such activities pose to Americans' privacy rights, I believe 
Congress must have a full accounting of agencies' data mining programs. 
That is why I am pleased the conference report retains the Senate 
language.
  Finally, I want to express my disappointment that we were not able to 
address protections for airline screeners in this legislation. It is 
essential that transportation security officers are given adequate 
employee protections, especially the right to collectively bargain like 
their colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security. I hope we will 
be able to address this issue in the future.
  While more still needs to be done, the conference report before us 
now provides much needed reform.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I believe that securing our Nation's public 
transportation systems is one of the most pressing homeland security 
issues facing our Nation. Over 180 public transportation systems 
throughout the world have been primary targets of terrorist attacks. In 
2001, as chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Development 
Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development, I 
held the first hearing on transit security in the wake of September 11. 
The hearing took place early in the 107th Congress so I am saddened 
that it has taken us this long to enact legislation to protect our 
transit systems. I am pleased, however, that tonight we are prepared to 
pass the conference report to implement the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, including the transit security measures that I 
authored.
  While our Nation acted quickly after 9/11 to secure airports and 
airplanes against terrorists, major vulnerabilities remain in surface 
transportation. Transit agencies around the country have identified in 
excess of $6 billion in transit security needs.
  Transit is vital to providing mobility for millions of Americans and 
offers tremendous economic benefits to our Nation. In the United 
States, people use public transportation over 33 million times each 
week day compared to 2 million passengers who fly daily. Paradoxically, 
it is the very openness of the system that makes it vulnerable to 
terrorism. When one considers this and the fact that roughly $7 per 
passenger is invested in aviation security, but less than 1 cent is 
invested in the security of each transit passenger, the need for an 
authorized transit security program is clear. We need to be more 
vigilant to protect public transit from terrorists.
  As a member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, I was proud to author with Senators Dodd and Shelby 
comprehensive legislation to protect our public transportation systems 
and the Americans that they serve. Title XIV of The Improving America's 
Security Act of 2007 authorizes $3.5 billion in grants to transit 
agencies for capital and operational costs. It also establishes an 
essential security training program for public transportation employees 
who are at the front lines of preventing terrorist acts. The act allows 
the Secretaries of Transportation and Homeland Security to determine 
which federal Department will distribute the grant funding. I urge the 
Secretaries and the administration to place responsibility for the 
grant program with the Department of Transportation and make this 
decision promptly. It is my opinion that this will result in the 
effective and efficient administration of the program for local transit 
agencies.
  Taking action to protect our public transportation systems is long 
overdue. I am pleased to support the Improving America's Security Act.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank the Chairman and ranking member 
of the 9/11 bill conference committee for their efforts to bring the 
conference report before the Senate. This was no small task and they, 
along with other conferees and staff, are to be commended.
  Despite these efforts, however, the final conference report includes 
objectionable maritime cargo scanning language that could be 
devastating to both the international and domestic flow of commerce.
  The decision to mandate scanning for 100 percent of cargo containers 
is a risky proposition because it does not follow a risk-based 
approach:
  The title of the final conference report clearly states that its 
purpose is to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. But 
the commission did not advocate for the scanning--or even screening--of 
100 percent of the containers arriving at our shores.
  The 9/11 Commission recommended instead that we mitigate our 
vulnerabilities to terrorism in a logical manner by applying our 
resources based on risk, and specifically cautioned us not to employ a 
blanket approach.
  Our Nation's ports, including the Port of Anchorage, are vital to our 
economies--both regional and national. Ensuring their security must be 
a top priority. But a mandate to scan every cargo container entering 
the U.S. could shut down many of these ports, and the resulting delays 
for both imports and exports would be excessive and costly for 
consumers.
  Moreover, it is likely that foreign nations will disregard any 
caveats we may provide, and according to a European union diplomat,
  The E.U. would consider imposing reciprocal requirements and filing a 
complaint against the United States in the World Trade Organization.
  This fact renders the approach taken by this bill with respect to 
scanning cargo unworkable internationally.
  Here at home, these cargo scanning provisions may be equally, if not 
more, devastating to rural economies. Communities in the lower 48 are 
served by multiple transportation modes distributing basic supplies 
like food and other consumer goods. In Alaska, however, over 90 percent 
of our supplies flow through the Port of Anchorage. Any disruption at 
this port would be a disaster for Alaskans, not to mention to the Port 
of Tacoma, which serves as a

[[Page S10129]]

conduit for cargo transiting to and from Alaska.
  Some contend that we are not doing enough for port security. I 
disagree. Not even one year ago, we passed the Safe Port Act. While 
many of us made these same arguments concerning 100 percent scanning 
during the debate of that bill, we ultimately settled on directing DHS 
to conduct a pilot program to determine whether 100 percent scanning of 
cargo containers is even feasible. The pilot began earlier this year 
and we are only now beginning to get a clearer picture of the 
complexities that scanning entails.
  Mandating 100 percent scanning of cargo containers without the 
benefit of the results of the pilot tests is premature and 
counterproductive.
  Homeland security should not be used as a rhetorical tool. Let us 
first learn from the lessons promised by the Safe Port Act's pilot 
tests before committing ourselves to an irrational, costly, and 
potentially ineffective approach to securing our Nation.
  I thank the following staff of the Senate Commerce Committee for 
their hard work on this bill:

       Pamela Friedman, Mark Delich, Jarrod Thompson, Chris 
     Bertram, Mike Blank, Kim Nahigian, Paul Nagle, Christine 
     Kurth, Dan Neumann, Betsy McDonnell, and David Wonnenberg.

  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I commend Senators Lieberman and Collins 
for their leadership and the members of the Conference Committee for 
their work on this important legislation.
  More than five years after 9/11--despite tens of billions of dollars 
spent--America's ports, rails, airports, borders, nuclear powerplants 
and chemical plants are still not as safe as they could be.
  It has been almost 3 years since the 9/11 Commission issued its final 
recommendations.
  This legislation is a major step toward fully implementing the 
recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission. It changes course 
after years of inadequate action on critical homeland security needs.
  The bill will make America more secure because it: provides funding 
for first responders; makes it harder for potential terrorists to enter 
the United States; helps secure our rail, air, and mass transit 
systems; and improves intelligence and information sharing at all 
levels of law enforcement.
  I am especially proud to highlight a few provisions in the bill that 
I have championed for some time.
  The legislation specifies that States can use Federal grants to 
design, conduct, and evaluate mass evacuation plans and exercises.


                            Mass Evacuation

  As we learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, there is no 
substitute for being prepared.
  Last fall, Rockford, IL, was flooded after heavy storms. Public 
safety workers were able to vacate an entire neighborhood quickly and 
safely because they were prepared.
  They had an evacuation plan. They knew where they would take people. 
They had a mobile command center set up there within hours.
  Most cities and States have evacuation plans. But you need to have 
training drills and exercises to identify where the plan breaks down. 
Evacuation exercises allow you to work out solutions before lives are 
at risk in a real emergency. We may only have one chance to get it 
right.


                            Civil Liberties

  The 9/11 Commission recognized that one of the biggest challenges we 
face in fighting the war on terrorism is protecting civil liberties. 
The Commission said:

       While protecting our homeland, Americans should be mindful 
     of threats to vital personal and civil liberties. This 
     balancing is no easy task, but we must constantly strive to 
     keep it right.

  To help keep this balance right, the Commission wisely recommended 
the creation of a board to ensure that the Government does not violate 
privacy or civil liberties. Three years ago, when Congress passed the 
first 9/11 bill, it included a provision I worked on to create a 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The bill that the Senate 
passed would have created a strong and independent board with subpoena 
power, a full-time Chairman, and a broad statutory mandate, among other 
things.
  Unfortunately, House Republicans were able to water down the bill to 
reduce the independence and authority of the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Board. As a result, the board has not been an effective check 
on this administration, which has shown reckless disregard for the 
constitutional rights of innocent Americans.
  The conference report we consider tonight will fix those 
deficiencies.
  Throughout American history, in times of war, we have sacrificed 
liberty in the name of security. As the 9/11 Commission said, ``The 
choice between security and liberty is a false choice.'' We can be both 
safe and free. I hope the new and improved Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board will help make that a reality.


                               Risk-Based

  Two years ago Congress earned an F from the 9/11 Commission for 
creating a Homeland Security Grant Program that is not sufficiently 
focused on risk.
  This bill puts more emphasis on risk as a factor in distributing 
homeland security grants. Right now, homeland security grants are based 
on a variety of factors--but risk is one of many.


                          Information Sharing

  The 9/11 Commission strongly recommended that we change the culture 
in Government, so that agencies talk to each other and share 
information so everyone can do their jobs.
  In 2001, the FBI had information about the hijackers that was never 
shared with local officials.
  The conference report responds to that challenge. This bill: makes 
the Office of Information Sharing permanent, establishes an interagency 
coordination group on threat assessment, and makes it easier to share 
information between State and local government and across Federal 
agencies.
  I am pleased that conferees made the program manager for the 
Information Sharing Environment (ISE) permanent and authorizes funds 
and staff to carry out the ISE mission.
  The bill also calls for progress reports to Congress on the 
Information Sharing Environment.


                         ``John Doe'' Provision

  I will support the conference report, but I want to make clear that 
it contains one provision that has not been properly written or 
carefully considered. The so-called John Doe provision would give 
blanket immunity to citizens and Government officials who engage in 
racial profiling, as long a court finds they were acting in good faith.
  The proponents of this legislation claim that it is necessary because 
citizens will not report suspicious behavior if they are afraid they 
will be sued for racial profiling.
  With all due respect, this is a solution in search of a problem. 
There is no evidence that people are reluctant to file complaints about 
suspicious behavior and there is no epidemic of nuisance lawsuits 
against people who do so.
  In fact, all the evidence points in the opposite direction--vigilant 
Americans are playing a crucial role in homeland security.
  The reality is that this provision is targeted at one pending 
lawsuit. There is no indication that the courts are incapable of 
handling this or any other racial profiling lawsuit. There are immunity 
rules that the courts have developed over many years and there is no 
evidence that those rules are not working to protect innocent people 
from nuisance lawsuits.
  I cannot judge the merits of this particular lawsuit, but I do know 
this: Congress should not be in the business of passing legislation to 
affect the outcome of individual cases that are pending in court. We 
should not substitute our judgment for that of a jury of American 
citizens, doing their civic duty, who will hear and weigh all of the 
relevant evidence.
  Remember the last time Congress did this? It was the Terri Schiavo 
case. That should be a warning to Congress not to go down this road 
again.
  Its proponents claim that the John Doe provision is necessary so that 
people would not be deterred from reporting suspicious behavior. But 
this legislation will have another chilling effect: It will deter 
victims of racial profiling from seeking justice in the courts.
  This legislation would require a plaintiff to pay attorneys fees to a 
defendant if the defendant who allegedly engaged in racial profiling 
acted in

[[Page S10130]]

good faith. Let's be clear: even if a defendant acted in bad faith, 
many victims of racial profiling will not file a lawsuit because they 
cannot take the risk that they will be forced to pay attorney's fees if 
they lose.
  Despite what its proponents claim, the John Doe provision applies to 
more than just terrorism cases. In fact, it applies to any activity 
related to a threat to a passenger vehicle or its passengers. As a 
result, this provision will probably be invoked by every defendant in 
every future racial profiling case.
  I am especially disappointed that this legislation was inserted into 
the 9/11 conference report without any consideration of the concerns I 
have outlined. This provision was not in the 9/11 bill that the Senate 
passed. In the Senate, it has received no hearings, no debate, and no 
votes.
  The John Doe bill falls under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary 
Committee, of which I am a member. Senator Leahy, the chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee, asked that it not to be included in the 9/11 
conference report so that we could hold hearings on it, but 
unfortunately his request was not granted.
  This reminds me of another controversial bill that was inserted into 
a conference report without any debate in the Senate. It's called the 
REAL ID Act, and it is now opposed by States across our country.
  I will be tracking closely how this legislation is implemented. I 
suspect that, as with REAL ID, the John Doe law will be met with rising 
opposition across this country as more and more Americans learn about 
it.


                                 Close

  The 9/11 Commission gave Congress a critically important job.
  The Commission charged Congress with making structural changes to 
close the gaps in America's homeland security defenses. This 
legislation responds to that challenge, and I support final passage of 
the conference report.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back all 
remaining time, and Senator Coburn, in the spirit of not only the good 
spirit I identify with him but in the spirit of the hour, I gather, is 
prepared to yield back his remaining time as well.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield back the time on this side as 
well.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, again, I thank Senator Collins and 
Senator Coburn. It is a measure of their devotion that they are both 
still here at this hour.

                          ____________________