[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 116 (Thursday, July 19, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9601-S9606]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MRAP
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I want to explain an amendment I hope to
get adopted when we return to the Defense authorization bill and that I
have filed today.
Let me be very frank. This is a very expensive amendment. It is also,
literally, priceless. It makes good on this commitment: So long as a
single American soldier or marine remains in Iraq, we will provide him
or her with the best protection this country can provide.
Let me start with the basics. There are two critical issues facing
our soldiers and marines today: improvised explosive devices, or IEDs,
and explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs. IEDs are planted in roads
and on the side of roads to hit the bottom of vehicles with powerful
explosives. EFPs are shaped charges that come into the side armor of
vehicles at high speeds.
We know that IEDs now cause about 70 percent of all American
fatalities. Since 2003, in any given month, IEDs have caused between 30
and 76 percent of American fatalities. For every death, there are
usually 2 to 10 Americans wounded. Over the past year, we have also
seen a growing threat from EFPs. They are not yet everywhere in Iraq,
but they are spreading and they are very lethal.
The military has a strategy for dealing with both. First, they seek
to disrupt the organizations that produce IEDs and EFPs. They go after
the people and the supplies. Second, they attempt to use tactics and
technology to prevent IEDs and EFPs from being activated when American
personnel are close enough to be harmed. Third, they attempt to survive
a direct hit. It is the third area where we could and should have done
much more to make a difference years ago but where still today we can
and must make a difference.
The military has tested, both at testing centers and in the field,
the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, also called an MRAP. The
MRAP provides dramatically improved protection against IEDs. The
military has said that it is four to five times as good as an up-
armored HMMWV. More important, military commanders tell us that it will
reduce deaths and casualties from IEDs by 67 to 80 percent. The
Brookings Institution found that 1,400 Americans died in Iraq due to
IEDs from March of 2003 through June of 2007. If we had had MRAPs in
the field from the start--and we could and should have--938 to 1,120
Americans would be alive today.
And let me just clarify for my colleagues that this is not new
technology. It has been used successfully in Africa, by nations much
poorer than ours, since the 1970s. I don't want to get bogged down in
history, but this is not rocket science. Every day we delay, another
soldier or marine is killed or injured by an IED. If we just look at
this year, IEDs killed 309 Americans; 207 to 247 would still be alive
today if they had been in MRAPs. We need to make sure that for the
second half of 2007, those MRAPs are there and those lives are saved.
What about the threat from these shaped charges that come in from the
side, the EFP? The Army's Rapid Equipping Force and the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization started working on that
last year. In conjunction with industry, they produced a vehicle
nicknamed ``the Bull'' and officially called the Highly Survivable
Urban Vehicle Ballistic Protection Experiment Program. This vehicle was
tested and shown to defeat EFPs and also tested against the first level
of MRAP requirements. That testing was completed in March of this year.
For some reason, the military has not asked for another vehicle to do
the MRAP level two tests. So we do not actually know how capable this
vehicle might be for all threats, but we know it works against EFPs.
Instead of trying to get ahead of the enemy and get this technology
into the field, the military seems to be sitting on its hands while the
EFP threat has increased. Why wouldn't you field something you know
works?
The perfect vehicle would be a complete MRAP with EFP protection, but
that appears to be many months away, although some MRAP producers tell
me that their vehicles have survived EFP hits in the field. So again,
we do not have the complete picture. We have also been told that Frag-
Kit-6 armor can defeat EFPs, but it is too heavy for MRAPs. So vehicles
must be redesigned and retested. This will take time. I understand that
and support that effort, but Americans are dying today. Again, as with
the MRAP, we have a technology that could keep them alive, and we
should be using it while we work to perfect it.
I do not know if all of my colleagues saw the USA Today article that
appeared on Monday detailing some of the history surrounding the MRAP.
I will summarize a few points but will ask to have the entire article
printed in the Record.
This article details efforts to get MRAPs going back to 2003. It also
details the reasons for delay, and that is what I want to point out to
my colleagues.
First, apparently, the leadership at the Pentagon did not expect this
war to last this long. Well, that is no surprise. We all remember the
``Mission Accomplished'' speech and the promise of roses in the
streets. We remember Vice President Cheney telling us that the
insurgency was in its death throes. We remember Secretary Rumsfeld
telling us that crime in Baghdad was not any worse than that in
Washington, DC. I remember all of that. Sadly, none of those leaders
remember the hearings that Senator Lugar and I held before the war
began that predicted the need for a long-term American presence and
engagement. They don't remember
[[Page S9602]]
some of us, starting before the war, repeatedly urged the President to
level with the American people about the likely duration, cost, and
danger of this war. Perhaps even more tragically, this uncertainty
about future force levels continues to limit the military commitment to
fielding more MRAPs and EFP protected vehicles.
Second, these vehicles were seen as contrary to Secretary Rumsfeld's
vision for the transformed military, a lighter, more agile force. While
it depends on what armored humvee you are talking about, many believed
that MRAPs were heavier and slower than humvees. The stifling effect
Secretary Rumsfeld's views and management style had on military leaders
is well known to everyone who follows military issues. In this
instance, it meant that officers were predisposed against the heavier
vehicle and didn't push the issue when our forces in the field asked
for MRAP technology. Instead, they focused on the first two parts of
the anti-IED strategy I talked about earlier.
Finally, and most disturbing to me, many believed that Congress would
not support funding the MRAP while also fielding better armored
humvees. I do not know of a single wartime funding request that
Congress has denied. There have been some items added to the
supplemental bills that were clearly not urgent or war related, but
nothing directly linked to current operations was refused. Nonetheless,
it appears that the military did not believe that our support for
needed equipment was for real. Even today, I hear that leaders are
concerned that they must cut multiple existing programs to pay for this
growing MRAP requirement. There may be programs that we could all agree
are not as vital for a wartime Army, but I do not want that debate and
concern to slow lifesaving equipment.
I understand that this program will be the third largest procurement
program in the Pentagon. As I said, it is very costly. We can work
together in the future to find the lower priority programs that simply
should not be funded if they are competing with lifesaving programs. We
do not have any more time to delay spending the money needed to buy
these vehicles, however, if we are going to save lives.
Leadership is about making hard choices, and I look forward to
working with my colleagues and the administration to do whatever it
takes. I am even willing to cut programs I support because saving lives
and limbs under fire today must truly be our first priority. So, today,
with this amendment I hope we can make it clear that we will provide
whatever funding is needed, so that military leaders do not fear being
honest about their needs.
In addition to the issues brought out in the article, I have also
heard a regular concern that some in the military do not believe MRAPs
will be needed in the future--that when we leave Iraq, we will leave
most of these vehicles behind. I was happy to see the Secretary of the
Army, Peter Geren, state clearly in his confirmation hearing that he
believes MRAPs will be needed in future conflicts. It is clear to me
that until we show America's enemies that we can handle IEDs, they will
continue to use them throughout the world. We are already seeing an
increased use of IEDs in Afghanistan.
It is also clear to me that those who worry about what the military
will be driving in 5 years are missing the boat here. I understand that
there are great advancements being developed for our future force. But
we have a sacred trust to those on the front lines today, right now.
Right now, we are saying to them: If you survive this war, we will get
you really good protection for the next one. Give me a break. To
paraphrase a former Secretary of Defense, you fight the war you are in,
not the war you might be in down the road. Ideally, you do both, but
your priority has to be protecting the men and women under fire now.
End of story. Can anyone imagine Roosevelt saying, ``Listen, we may not
need some of those boats after Normandy, so maybe we should not build
so many?'' Of course not. War is inherently wasteful and this war is no
exception. I am willing to waste money and equipment if it means we
don't waste lives and limbs. The fact that we may not need all of the
vehicles we buy today in 5 years, is no reason to shortchange the
soldiers and marines who truly need the vehicles today.
I have given my colleagues some of this history so they will
understand why we must stand up for our marines and soldiers on this
issue. We must cut through the ``business as usual'' bureaucracy. I
applaud Secretary Gates for making MRAPs the top priority of the
military, but I am concerned that even now, some of the same problems
continue. After all, Army commanders in Iraq concluded that they need
17,700 MRAPs. That is 15,200 more than currently being bought. We must
act now to put money in the pipeline to order the additional vehicles
and expand production capacity.
Instead, we find out that 2 months later, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council has yet to approve the Army request as a ``validated
joint requirement.'' I don't get it.
The President tells us that the most important thing in this war is
the judgment of our commanders in the field. Now, I may disagree with
the policy being executed, but I would agree that when it comes to
tactical decisions about the best way to implement our policies, this
is the right approach. Apparently, others feel that the commanders
should only be listened to selectively, when it does not cost too much
money.
The commanders in the field have said that they need an additional
15,200 mine resistant vehicles for the Army. They have also said that
they need thousands of vehicles with EFP protection. So, why the delay?
No one from the Pentagon has been able to explain it to me.
Last, some argue that the real problem is production capacity. I
simply don't buy it. We are being told that American industry cannot
handle this or does not care enough about our soldiers and marines to
do it. I don't buy it. These are purely military vehicles. If the
military does not place the orders, industry will not build them, and
they certainly won't create new production capacity. They cannot sell
the extras to your neighbor or mine. So we must put the money up front
and challenge our companies to deliver quickly. We did that on the
supplemental where Congress accepted my amendment adding $1.2 billion.
Because that led to increased production capacity, Secretary Gates has
reprogrammed another $1.2 billion for fiscal year 2007 to take
advantage of that new capacity.
We made it to the Moon by putting money up front and challenging
Americans to do their best to get there. MRAPs and EFP protected
vehicles are basically modified trucks. America knows how to make
trucks and how to make a lot of them. As I said before, this is not
rocket science. If we buy it, they will build it.
What if they cannot? What if industry can only get 15,000 or 20,000
of the 23,000 we need built by the end of fiscal year 2008? Well, I
tell my colleagues, than we will know that we gave them every chance to
succeed. More important, we gave our soldiers and marines their best
chance to survive this war.
And the downside is simply that all of the funds we provide cannot be
spent in 1 year and all of the vehicles cannot be purchased. In that
situation, all we have to do is authorize reprogramming the unspent
funds for the next fiscal year. Compared to taking a chance on saving
our kids, that is an easy downside to accept.
I opened by saying that this was a very expensive amendment, and it
is. Let me be clear. It provides $23.6 billion for Army MRAPs, enough
money to buy the 15,200 the commanders in the field are asking for. The
amount is based on the last cost estimate I was given by the Pentagon
on July 9. The amendment also provides an additional $1 billion that I
have been told is needed for the purchase of 7,774 MRAPs currently
planned for and funded in this bill. The increased funds are needed for
airlift, training, and maintenance costs not originally included in the
program budget.
In addition, the amendment provides $400 million for EFP protection.
Half is to field 200 of the vehicles already tested and half is for the
joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to continue to
work on and field better vehicles. The Bull may not be the perfect
answer, but it gives us a chance to save American lives today. While we
work on the perfect solution, an MRAP with EFP protection, we should
still be giving our soldiers and marines the best we have today. The
military needs
[[Page S9603]]
to see if the Bull can provide full MRAP protection. They also need to
look at other ideas for improving MRAPs, but while they do, we should
take advantage of the proven technology we have at hand.
Last, this amendment asks Secretary Gates to report back to us within
30 days on any legal authorities he needs to produce and field these
protective vehicles faster.
Let me also clarify what we are adding these funds to. The Armed
Services Committee added $4.1 billion to the President's initial
request for a mere $441 million for MRAPs in this bill. At the time,
that was all that was thought to be needed to meet the 7,774
requirement and I applaud the committee for meeting that need. The
situation has changed since the bill came out of committee. We now know
that the Army commanders on the ground want far more. We cannot get
such a large order produced if we continue to delay.
For me, this is very simple. I believe that when our sons and
daughters are getting blown up and we have vehicles proven to
dramatically improve their odds of survival, we must get the vehicles
to them. This amendment allows us to do that. When the Senate returns
to debate on the Defense Authorization Act, I hope all of my colleagues
will support it.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have the article to which
I referred printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From USA Today, July 16, 2007]
Pentagon Balked at Pleas From Officers in Field for Safer Vehicles
(By Peter Eisler, Blake Morrison and Tom Vanden Brook)
Pfc. Aaron Kincaid, 25, had been joking with buddies just
before their Humvee rolled over the bomb. His wife, Rachel,
later learned that the blast blew Kincaid, a father of two
from outside Atlanta, through the Humvee's metal roof.
Army investigators who reviewed the Sept. 23 attack near
Riyadh, Iraq, wrote in their report that only providence
could have saved Kincaid from dying that day: ``There was no
way short of not going on that route at that time (that) this
tragedy could have been diverted.''
A USA TODAY investigation of the Pentagon's efforts to
protect troops in Iraq suggests otherwise.
Years before the war began, Pentagon officials knew of the
effectiveness of another type of vehicle that better shielded
troops from bombs like those that have killed Kincaid and
1,500 other soldiers and Marines. But military officials
repeatedly balked at appeals--from commanders on the
battlefield and from the Pentagon's own staff--to provide the
lifesaving Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, or MRAP,
for patrols and combat missions, USA TODAY found.
In a letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates late last
month, two U.S. senators said the delays cost the lives of an
estimated ``621 to 742 Americans'' who would have survived
explosions had they been in MRAPs rather than Humvees.
The letter, from Sens. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Kit Bond,
R-Mo., assumed the initial calls for MRAPs came in February
2005, when Marines in Iraq asked the Pentagon for almost
1,200 of the vehicles. USA TODAY found that the first appeals
for the MRAP came much earlier.
As early as December 2003, when the Marines requested their
first 27 MRAPs for explosives-disposal teams, Pentagon
analysts sent detailed information about the superiority of
the vehicles to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mails obtained
by USA TODAY show. Later pleas came from Iraq, where
commanders saw that the approach the Joint Chiefs embraced--
adding armor to the sides of Humvees, the standard vehicles
in the war zone--did little to protect against blasts beneath
the vehicles.
Despite the efforts, the general who chaired the Joint
Chiefs until Oct. 1, 2005, says buying MRAPs ``was not on the
radar screen when I was chairman.'' Air Force general Richard
Myers, now retired, says top military officials dealt with a
number of vehicle issues, including armoring Humvees. The
MRAP, however, was ``not one of them.'' Something related to
MRAPs ``might have crossed my desk,'' Myers says, ``but I
don't recall it.''
Why the issue never received more of a hearing from top
officials early in the war remains a mystery, given the
chorus of concern. One Pentagon analyst complained in an
April 29, 2004, e-mail to colleagues, for instance, that it
was ``frustrating to see the pictures of burning Humvees
while knowing that there are other vehicles out there that
would provide more protection.''
The analyst was referring to the MRAP, whose V-shaped hull
puts the crew more than 3 feet off the ground and deflects
explosions. It was designed to withstand the underbelly bombs
that cripple the lower-riding Humvees. Pentagon officials,
civilians and military alike, had been searching for
technologies to guard against improvised explosive devices,
or IEDs. The makeshift bombs are the No. 1 killer of U.S.
forces.
The MRAP was not new to the Pentagon. The technology had
been developed in South Africa and Rhodesia in the 1970s,
making it older than Kincaid and most of the other troops
killed by homemade bombs. The Pentagon had tested MRAPs in
2000, purchased fewer than two dozen and sent some to Iraq.
They were used primarily to protect explosive ordnance
disposal teams, not to transport troops or to chase Iraqi
insurgents.
The goal: Iraqis ``stand up'' so U.S. can ``stand down''
Even as the Pentagon balked at buying MRAPs for U.S.
troops, USA TODAY found that the military pushed to buy them
for a different fighting force: the Iraqi army.
On Dec. 22, 2004--two weeks after President Bush told
families of servicemembers that ``we're doing everything we
possibly can to protect your loved ones''--a U.S. Army
general solicited ideas for an armored vehicle for the
Iraqis. The Army had an ``extreme interest'' in getting
troops better armor, then-brigadier general Roger Nadeau told
a subordinate looking at foreign technology, in an e-mail
obtained by USA TODAY.
In a follow-up message, Nadeau clarified his request:
``What I failed to point out in my first message to you folks
is that the U.S. Govt. is interested not for U.S. use, but
for possible use in fielding assets to the Iraqi military
forces.''
In response, Lt. Col. Clay Brown, based in Australia, sent
information on two types of MRAPs manufactured overseas. ``By
all accounts, these are some of the best in the world,'' he
wrote. ``If I were fitting out the Iraqi Army, this is where
I'd look (wish we had some!)''
The first contract for what would become the Iraqi Light
Armored Vehicle--virtually identical to the MRAPs sought by
U.S. forces then and now, and made in the United States by
BAE Systems--was issued in May 2006. The vehicles, called
Badgers, began arriving in Iraq 90 days later, according to
BAE. In September 2006, the Pentagon said it would provide up
to 600 more to Iraqi forces. As of this spring, 400 had been
delivered.
The rush to equip the Iraqis stood in stark contrast to the
Pentagon's efforts to protect U.S. troops.
In February 2005, two months after Nadeau solicited ideas
for better armor for the Iraqis and was told MRAPs were an
answer, an urgent-need request for the same type of vehicle
came from embattled Marines in Anbar province. The request,
signed by then-brigadier general Dennis Hejlik, said the
Marines ``cannot continue to lose . . . serious and grave
casualties to IEDs . . . at current rates when a commercial
off-the-shelf capability exists to mitigate'' them.
Officials at Marine headquarters in Quantico, Va., shelved
the request for 1,169 vehicles. Fifteen months passed before
a second request reached the Joint Chiefs and was approved.
Those vehicles finally began trickling into Anbar in
February, two years after the original request. Because of
the delay, the Marines are investigating how its urgent-need
requests are handled.
The long delay infuriates some members of Congress. ``Every
day, our troops are being maimed or killed needlessly because
we haven't fielded this soon enough,'' says Rep. Gene Taylor,
D-Miss. ``The costs are in human lives, in kids who will
never have their legs again, people blind, crippled. That's
the real tragedy.''
Not until two months ago did the Pentagon champion the MRAP
for all U.S. forces. Gates made MRAPs the military's top
priority. The plan is to build the vehicles as fast as
possible until conditions warrant a change, according to a
military official who has direct knowledge of the program but
is not authorized to speak on the record. Thousands are in
the pipeline at a cost so far of about $2.4 billion.
Gates said he was influenced by a news report--originally
in USA TODAY--that disclosed Marine units using MRAPs in
Anbar reported no deaths in about 300 roadside bombings in
the past year. His tone was grave. ``For every month we
delay,'' he said, ``scores of young Americans are going to
die.''
One reason officials put off buying MRAPs in significant
quantities: They never expected the war to last this long.
Bush set the tone on May 1, 2003, six weeks after the U.S.
invasion, when he declared on board the aircraft carrier
Abraham Lincoln that ``major combat operations in Iraq have
ended.''
Gen. George Casey, the top commander in Iraq from June 2004
until February this year, repeatedly said that troop levels
in Iraq would be cut just as soon as Iraqi troops took more
responsibility for security. In March 2005, he predicted
``very substantial reductions'' in U.S. troops by early 2006.
He said virtually the same thing a year later.
Casey wasn't the only optimist. In May 2005, Vice President
Cheney declared that the insurgency was ``in its last
throes.''
Given the view that the war would end soon, the Pentagon
had little use for expensive new vehicles such as the MRAP,
at least not in large quantities. The MRAPs ordered for the
Iraqis were intended to speed the day when, to use Bush's
words, Iraqi forces could ``stand up'' and the United States
could ``stand down.''
Nadeau, who wrote the e-mail that led to MRAPs for the
Iraqis, explains why he did so: ``The U.S. government knows
that eventually we're going to get out'' of Iraq. The United
States wants ``to help get (the Iraqis) in a position to take
care of themselves.''
[[Page S9604]]
For U.S. forces, however, the answer was something else:
adding armor to Humvees. Nadeau and others say the choice
made sense because Humvees were already in Iraq and the
improvements--adding steel to the sides, upgrading the
windows and replacing the canvas doors--could be made
quickly, and far more cheaply. Adding armor to a Humvee cost
only $14,000; a Humvee armored at the factory cost $191,000;
today, an MRAP costs between $600,000 and $1 million, though
some foreign models cost only about $200,000 in 2004.
The solution to the IED problem in 2003 had to be
``immediate,'' says retired vice admiral Gordon Holder,
director for logistics for the Joint Chiefs until mid-2004.
``We had to stop the bleeding.'' Holder says MRAPs seemed
impractical for the immediate need: ``We shouldn't take four
years to field something the kids needed yesterday.''
Would it actually have taken four years? That depends upon
how much urgency the Pentagon and Congress attached to
speeding production. Force Protection Inc., the small South
Carolina company that landed the first significant MRAP
contracts, was criticized this month by the Pentagon's
inspector general for failing to deliver its vehicles on
time. But bigger defense contractors were available then--and
have secured MRAP contracts in recent weeks that call for
deliveries in as little as four months.
A bigger obstacle might have been philosophical: The MRAP
didn't fit the Pentagon's long-term vision of how the
military should be equipped.
Then-Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld regarded the Iraq
war ``as a means to change'' the military, ``make it lighter,
make it more responsive, make it more agile,'' Holder says.
The MRAP, heavier and slower than the Humvee, wouldn't have
measured up, he says.
The commander: ``IEDs are my No. 1 threat''
By June 2004, the military had lost almost 200 U.S. troops
to the homemade bombs. Gen. John Abizaid, then head of U.S.
Central Command, told the Joint Chiefs that ``IEDs are my No.
1 threat.'' He called for a ``mini-Manhattan Project''
against IEDs, akin to the task force that developed the
atomic bomb during World War II.
The Pentagon organized a small task force that, two years
later, morphed into a full-fledged agency: the Joint IED
Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO. Its leader, Montgomery Meigs,
is a retired four-star general. Its annual budget totals $4.3
billion. Its mission: to stop IEDs from killing U.S. troops.
In one of its PowerPoint presentations, JIEDDO made its
priorities clear. First, prevent IEDs from being planted by
attacking the insurgency. Then, if a device is planted,
prevent it from exploding. ``When all Else Fails,'' reads
another slide, ``Survive the blast.'' That put solutions such
as the MRAP into the category of last resorts.
JIEDDO did spend its own money for 122 MRAPs, but it
primarily focused on electronic jammers to prevent bombs from
being remotely detonated, unmanned surveillance aircraft to
catch insurgents putting bombs along roads and better
intelligence on who was building and planting bombs.
The agency has claimed some successes. Insurgents in 2007
had to plant six times as many bombs as they did in 2004 to
inflict the same number of U.S. casualties, Meigs said in an
interview.
But the insurgents--Sunnis loyal to the deposed leader
Saddam Hussein, Shiites who hated the U.S. occupiers and
foreigners aligned with al-Qaeda--often managed to stay one
step ahead of JIEDDO. They changed the kind of explosives
they planted and varied the locations of the devices and the
way they detonated them.
When the Pentagon added armor to the sides of Humvees to
guard against bombs planted along roadsides, the insurgents
responded by burying bombs in the roads. The bombs could
blast through the vulnerable underbelly of the Humvees. The
insurgents also moved to larger, more sophisticated bombs,
some packed with as much as 100 pounds of explosives.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, the No. 2
official at the Pentagon, testified on Capitol Hill in June
that ``as the threat has evolved, we have evolved. We work
very, very hard to be responsible to our troops.''
Taylor, the Democratic congressman from Mississippi,
pressed England about why the Pentagon waited until May to
request substantial numbers of MRAPs. ``Are you telling me no
one could see that (need) coming, no one could recognize that
the bottom of the Humvee'' didn't protect troops, and
``that's why the kids inside are losing their legs and their
lives?'' Taylor asked.
``That is too simplistic a description,'' England replied.
``People have not died needlessly, and we have not left our
people without equipment.''
To Pentagon decision-makers, the Humvee seemed able to
handle the threat early in the war--roadside bombs, rather
than those buried in the roads. ``If anybody could have
guessed in 2003 that we would be looking at these kind of
(high-powered, buried) IEDs that we're seeing now in 2007,
then we would have been looking at something much longer''
term as a solution, Holder says. ``But who had the crystal
ball back then?''
Nadeau, now a major general in charge of the Army's Test
and Evaluation Command in Alexandria, Va., also defends the
Pentagon's choices. He says buried IEDs did not become a
serious threat to the armored Humvees until 2006. Critics
might say, ``Why didn't you guys buy 16,000 MRAPs a decade
ago?'' Nadeau says today. ``You know, I didn't need them.''
Six officers interviewed by USA TODAY say the threat to the
Humvees surfaced sooner. Lt. Col. Dallas Eubanks, chief of
operations for the Army's 4th Infantry Division in 2003-04,
says IEDs became more menacing before he left Iraq. ``We were
certainly seeing underground IEDs by early 2004,'' he says.
In mid-2005, two top Marines--Gen. William Nyland,
assistant Marine commandant, and Maj. Gen. William Catto,
head of Marine Corps Systems Command--testified before
Congress that they were seeing an ``evolving'' threat from
underbelly blasts. They said at the time that armored Humvees
remained their best defense.
The congressman: MRAP's ``simple'' advantage
Just after lunch on June 27, 2004, a group of enlisted men
parked a handful of armored vehicles near a cinderblock
building at Marine headquarters in Fallujah, Iraq.
The day had turned sweltering, like every summer afternoon
in central Iraq. But this day was special. A congressional
delegation had arrived, and among the dignitaries was Rep.
Duncan Hunter, then the chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee. Hunter wasn't just a powerful congressman. He was
a Vietnam War veteran, and his son, then a 27-year-old Marine
lieutenant also named Duncan, was stationed at the base.
More important to most of the Marines, the California
Republican had been instrumental in pushing the Pentagon to
get better armor for them. Humvees with cloth doors--canvas,
like the crusher hat that Hunter wore that day--had been
standard issue when the war began. The fabric worked well to
shield the sun; it offered no protection against explosives.
Then, as now, Hunter was impatient with the pace of
procurement in Iraq. That winter, he had dispatched his staff
to steel mills, where they persuaded managers and union
leaders to set aside commercial orders to expedite steel
needed to armor the Humvees. He also worked with the Army and
its contractors to expand production.
In Fallujah, Hunter recognized the Humvees. He couldn't
identify the two vehicles next to them. One was called a
Cougar, the other a Buffalo. Both were MRAPs, made by Force
Protection Inc., and both, he was told, were coveted. They
were used by explosives disposal teams, but combat units
``looked at them and said, `We want those,' '' Hunter
recalls.
Throughout most of Iraq, they still haven't arrived.
Despite requests from the field, Pentagon officials decided
to ration the vehicle. In 2003 and 2004, they bought about
55, and only for explosives-disposal units. But they chose a
different approach for protecting the rest of the troops:
adding armor to Humvees. The choice was problematic. The
Humvee's flat bottom channels an explosion through the center
of the vehicle, toward the occupants.
Memos and e-mails obtained by USA TODAY show a stream of
concerns about the decision to armor the Humvee. Most went up
the chain of command and withered:
December 2003: At the direction of then-deputy Defense
secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who was troubled by the mounting
death toll from IEDs, the Joint Chiefs began to explore
options for giving troops better armor. Detailed information
on the Wer'Wolf, an MRAP made in the African country of
Namibia, was passed from analysts in the Pentagon to Lt. Col.
Steven Ware, an aide collecting information for the Joint
Chiefs.
March 30, 2004: Gen. Larry Ellis, in charge of U.S. Forces
Command in Atlanta, sent a memo to the Army's chief of staff,
Gen. Peter Schoomaker. He complained that ``some Army members
and agencies are still in a peacetime posture.'' U.S.
commanders in Iraq told him that the armored Humvee ``is not
providing the solution the Army hoped to achieve.'' He didn't
recommend MRAPs but rather suggested accelerating production
of a combat vehicle called the Stryker. In response, the
military said new Humvee armor kits would suffice.
April 28-29, 2004: Duncan Lang, a Pentagon analyst who
worked in acquisition and technology, suggested purchasing
the Wer'Wolf, the MRAP put before the Joint Chiefs in
December 2003. In an e-mail to colleagues and supervisors,
Lang said ``a number could be sent to Iraq ``as quickly as,
or even more quickly than, additional armored Humvees.'' He
called it ``frustrating to see the pictures of burning
Humvees while knowing that there are other vehicles out there
that would provide more protection.''
April 30, 2004: Another Pentagon analyst, Air Force Lt.
Col. Bob Harris, forwarded details about MRAP options to a
member of the IED task force. The list included a variety of
MRAPs, among them the Wer'Wolf and Force Protection's Cougar.
``There was no great clarity as to why they didn't pursue
these options,'' Harris says. ``I saw it as my job to
educate.'' Harris is now an acquisition officer at Hanscom
Air Force Base in Massachusetts.
Hunter says the advantages the MRAP had on the Humvee were
clear. ``It's a simple formula,'' Hunter says. ``A vehicle
that's 1 foot off the ground gets 16 times that (blast)
impact that you get in a vehicle that's 4 feet off the
ground,'' like the MRAP.
Although Hunter favored adding armor to Humvees, he now
calls the military's devotion to that approach a costly
mistake. ``It's true that they saved more lives by moving
[[Page S9605]]
first on up-armoring the Humvees,'' he says. ``The flaw is
that they did nothing on MRAPs. The up-armoring of Humvees
didn't have to be an exclusive operation.''
Holder dismisses the idea that the Pentagon could have
moved on a dual track: armoring Humvees while ordering
up MRAPs. He doubts Congress would have funded both at the
time. But that's exactly what Congress is doing now--
buying both vehicles.
``We probably should've had the foresight'' to start buying
MRAPs earlier, says Ware, the Joint Chiefs aide (now retired)
who passed the information to superiors and counterparts in
the Army and Marines. But ``we just couldn't get them there
fast enough.'' Adding armor to the Humvee, Ware says, ``was
better than nothing.''
The lieutenant colonel: ``Hope no one gets wasted''
A PowerPoint presentation, dated Aug. 25, 2004, shows
wounded troops lying in hospital beds. Most are bandaged. One
is bloody. His left eye is barely open, his injured right is
covered by a patch. Each was maimed by an IED. Each, save
one, was in a Humvee.
On another slide: ``Numerous vehicles on the market provide
far superior ballistic protection'' than the Humvee, wrote
then-lieutenant colonel Jim Hampton, the man who prepared the
presentation for the operations staff of the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers in Baghdad.
Safety is a passion for Hampton. He's so concerned with
security that he asks his wife, Kate, to take her pistol when
she goes for walks on their 80 acres in rural Mississippi.
When he got to Iraq in early 2004, he was tasked with looking
at armor options to protect the Corps of Engineers, the
agency sent to help with rebuilding efforts. For weeks, he
studied armor options. His conclusion: The corps should get
MRAPs to protect its people, specifically Wer'Wolves. Hampton
says he asked for 53 Wer'Wolves. The corps got four.
Hampton couldn't have been more opposed to up-armoring the
Humvees and warned his superiors. He even e-mailed his wife
from Iraq. ``Hey Babe,'' his e-mail read. ``Just a little
aggravated with the bureaucracy. It is simply beyond my
comprehension why we're having to go through such (an ordeal)
to order confounded hard vehicles. I sure hope no one gets
wasted before the powers-that-be get off their collective fat
asses.''
Finally, he wrote his congressman, Rep. Chip Pickering, R-
Miss., urging him to investigate deaths involving the Humvee.
``We would never consider sending troops'' in Humvees ``up
against armor or artillery,'' Hampton wrote, ``but this is
tantamount to what we're doing because these vehicles are
being engaged with the very ordnance delivered by artillery
in the form of improvised explosive devices.''
By November 2004, Pentagon analyst Lang had grown
discouraged, an e-mail shows. ``I have found that you can
never put the word out too many times,'' he wrote on Nov. 17.
``I send it on to (the Secretary of Defense's office), Army
and (Marine Corps) contacts I have. Some of it is getting to
the rapid fielding folks and force protection folks that are
looking at Iraq issues. I do not see much action.''
Lang closed the message with a variation on his earlier
plea: ``For the life of me, I cannot figure out why we have
not taken better advantage of the sources of such vehicles,''
he wrote. ``We should be buying 200, not 2, at a time. These
things work, they save lives and they don't cost much, if
any, more than what we are using now.'' At the time, a basic
Wer'Wolf cost about the same as a factory-made armored
Humvee: around $200,000.
In December 2004, at a town hall meeting with troops in
Kuwait, a soldier asked Rumsfeld about the lack of armor on
military vehicles. Rumsfeld explained the situation this way:
``You go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army
you might want or wish to have at a later time.''
The concerns troops voiced at the meeting might have had an
impact. Within a week, the Marine Corps Systems Command in
Quantico posted its first notice seeking information on MRAPs
from potential contractors.
Back in Fallujah, the desire for the Cougar had grown. By
February 2005, the Marines were formally asking for more.
Field commanders sent their first large-scale request for
MRAPs, seeking 1,169 vehicles with specifications that
closely mirrored those of the Cougar. They no longer
envisioned the vehicle as limited to explosives-disposal
teams; they wanted MRAPs for combat troops, too.
Roy McGriff III, then a major, drafted the request signed
by Brig. Gen. Hejlik. ``MRAP vehicles will protect Marines,
reduce casualties, increase mobility and enhance mission
success,'' the request read. ``Without MRAP, personnel loss
rates are likely to continue at their current rate.'' In
spring 2005, he would have a chance to argue his case before
top generals.
The Marine major: ``Unnecessary'' casualties
They convened March 29-30, 2005, at the Marine Corps Air
Station in Miramar, Calif. The occasion: a safety board
meeting, a regular gathering to address safety issues across
the Corps. In attendance: five three-star generals, four two-
stars, seven one-stars and McGriff.
McGriff knew the MRAP's history and the Pentagon's
reluctance to invest in the vehicle. He had learned about the
vehicle from a fellow Marine, Wayne Sinclair. Sinclair, then
a captain, wrote in the July 1996 issue of the Marine Corps
Gazette that ``an affordable answer to the land mine was
developed over 20 years ago. It's time that Marines at the
sharp end shared in . . . this discovery.''
Addressing the generals, McGriff recommended analyzing
every incident involving Marine vehicles the same way
investigators probe aircraft crashes. Look at the vehicle for
flaws, McGriff recalls telling the officers, and examine the
tactics used to defeat it.
Lt. Gen. Wallace Gregson, commander of Marine Corps Forces
in the Pacific, and Lt. Gen. James Mattis, leader of the
Marine Combat Development Command, listened and then
conferred for a moment.
The room grew quiet. ``Then they said, `OK, what do you
want to do?' '' McGriff remembers.
He recited the very plan that the Pentagon, under a new
Defense secretary, would embrace in 2007: ``A phased
transition. Continue to armor Humvees. At the same time, as
quickly and as expeditiously as possible, purchase as many
MRAPs as possible. Phase out Humvees.''
According to McGriff, the room again grew silent. Then,
Mattis finally spoke: ``That's exactly what we're going to
do.'' Mattis' words failed to translate into action. The
urgent-need request McGriff drafted went unfulfilled at
Marine headquarters in Quantico. A June 10, 2005, status
report on the request indicated the Marine Corps was holding
out for a ``future vehicle,'' presumably the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle--more mobile than the MRAP, more protective
than the Humvee, and due in 2012. In practical terms, that
meant no MRAPs immediately.
McGriff foresaw some of the turmoil over vehicles in a
prophetic 2003 paper for the School for Advanced Warfighting
in Quantico.
``Currently, our underprotected vehicles result in
casualties that are politically untenable and militarily
unnecessary,'' his paper read. ``Failure to build a MRAP
vehicle fleet produces a deteriorating cascade of effects
that will substantially increase'' risks for the military
while ``rendering it tactically immobile.'' Mines and IEDs
will force U.S. troops off the roads, he wrote, and keep them
from aggressively attacking insurgents.
The words were strong and the conclusions were damning.
Rhodesia, a nation with nothing near the resources of the
U.S. military, had built MRAPs more than a quarter-century
earlier that remained ``more survivable than any comparable
vehicle produced by the U.S. today,'' McGriff wrote.
Despite his views then, McGriff, now a lieutenant colonel,
says he understands the delays. MRAPs needed to be tested to
ensure they could perform in combat. ``Nothing happens fast
enough when people are fighting and dying,'' he says today.
``But amidst the chaos, you still have to make the right
choices. In the end, I think the Marines got the MRAP
capability as quickly and safely as possible.''
Others disagree.
Marine major Franz Gayl, now retired, was science adviser
to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq. He saw how
Marines were still being killed or maimed in Anbar in the
fall of 2006. If the Marine Corps had decided MRAPs were a
top priority, he says, it could and should have pursued them
with the same urgency the Pentagon is now showing.
``The ramp-up of industry capacity was delayed by over 1\1/
2\ years,'' Gayl says, ``until it became the dire emergency
that it is today.''
Bureaucrats didn't want the MRAP sooner ``because it would
compete against'' armored Humvees and ``many other favored
programs'' for funding, Gayl says. Gayl, who works as a
civilian for the Marines at the Pentagon, has filed for
federal whistleblower protection because he fears retaliation
for speaking out about the failure to get MRAPs sooner.
Defense Secretary Gates: ``Lives are at stake''
After McGriff addressed the generals in March 2005, another
15 months passed. Then the Marines in Iraq reiterated the
request for MRAPs. This time they sent the request directly
to the Joint Chiefs. This time they were successful.
In December 2006, after insurgent bombs had killed almost
1,200 U.S. troops in Iraq, the Joint Chiefs validated
requests from Iraq for 4,060 MRAPs, and the formal MRAP
program was launched.
By March 2007, Marine Corps Commandant James Conway called
the vehicle his ``No. 1 unfilled warfighting requirement.''
In part, that's because he saw it save lives in Anbar
province. Brig. Gen. John Allen, deputy commander of
coalition forces there, says the Marines tracked attacks on
MRAPs since January 2006. The finding: Marines in armored
Humvees are twice as likely to be badly wounded in an IED
attack as those in MRAPs.
Perhaps more convincing: No Marines have been killed in
more than 300 attacks on MRAPs there.
The news, revealed in USA TODAY on April 19, drew the
attention of Defense Secretary Gates, four months into his
job at the Pentagon. He was traveling in Iraq and read about
the MRAP's success in the Pentagon's daily news roundup.
Weeks later, at a news conference, Gates said the Pentagon
would rush MRAPs to Iraq ``as best we can.''
Late last month, top Pentagon officials approved an Army
strategy for buying as many as 17,700 MRAPs, allowing a one-
for-one swap
[[Page S9606]]
for its armored Humvees. About 5,200 MRAPs had been approved
for the other services. Now, Pentagon officials decline to
say exactly how many MRAPs they need.
One official says they'll build MRAPs as fast as possible,
then recalibrate the military's needs as they assess
operations in Iraq, a tacit acknowledgment that they may need
fewer MRAPs as U.S. troops are withdrawn.
During another news conference late last month, Gates
worried that the companies building the MRAP--not only Force
Protection but BAE Systems, General Dynamics, Oshkosh Truck,
Armor Holdings, International Military and Government and
Protected Vehicles--won't be able to get the vehicles to Iraq
fast enough.
``I didn't think that was acceptable,'' Gates said. ``Lives
are at stake.''
the young lieutenant: ``safest vehicle ever''
As the sun egan to bake the Iraqi countryside last month,
Marine 2nd Lt. George Saenz headed back to his base on the
outskirts in Fallujah. He felt oddly joyful.
Saenz had just spent hours leading his platoon through one
of the most excruciating battlefield jobs--inching a convoy
along the crumbling streets of Fallujah, searching for
homemade bombs planted in the asphalt or dirt.
The night before had proved dangerous. Two bombs had blown
up underneath Saenz's convoy, including one beneath his
vehicle.
As Saenz turned through the gray blast walls protecting the
base, he says he couldn't help but think: If I had been
riding a Humvee, I wouldn't be here right now.
Saenz knew why he was alive. His platoon in the 6th Marine
Regiment Combat Team had replaced its Humvees with MRAPs. The
two blasts produced just one injury, a Marine whose
concussion put him on light duty for a week.
``We're probably in the safest vehicle ever designed for
military use,'' Saenz says, recalling his platoon's record:
Three months. Eleven bomb attacks. No one dead.
MRAPs have become legendary in Anbar since Marines began
using them on dangerous missions clearing roadside bombs.
Tank commanders, radio operators and others drop by Saenz's
platoon every day to do what Rep. Hunter had done three years
earlier--inspect the small fleet of MRAPs, knock on the
armor, sometimes crawl inside.
Scores of MRAPs are scheduled to arrive in Anbar this
summer. That means they'll be available for the first time to
the Marines for tasks other than clearing IEDs, says Marine
Col. Mike Rudolph, logistics officer for U.S. forces in
western Iraq. No one has decided how MRAPs will be used, but
``everybody wants one,'' Rudolph says.
To be sure, the vehicle isn't perfect. Saenz's team warns
that MRAPs drive like trucks, plodding and heavy. Some models
are so bulky they have blind spots for troops peering over
the boxy hood and so noisy a driver has to shout at someone 2
feet away.
``They're just so heavy,'' Sgt. Randall Miller says.
``These are virtually designed off a semi-truck platform.''
After substantial testing, the military also has concluded
that MRAPs are vulnerable to explosively formed projectiles,
the newest and most devastating variation of the IED. More
armor has been developed for the MRAPs the Pentagon ordered
this spring.
Miller isn't complaining. On his first tour in Iraq in
2004-05, Miller searched for land mines in a Humvee. His
detection technique was simple: ``Go real slow, cross your
fingers.'' He still drives slowly but feels safer knowing the
MRAP's V-shaped hull will deflect a bomb blast. ``I've seen
our guys get hit and walk away,'' Miller says. ``They're
awesome, awesome vehicles.''
the widow: ``they should've done it'' sooner
Whom or what is to blame for the delay in getting safer
vehicles for the 158,000 U.S. troops in Iraq?
Jim Hampton, now a retired colonel, questions why the
Pentagon and Congress didn't do more to keep the troops safe.
``I have colleagues who say people need to go to jail over
this, and in my mind they do,'' Hampton says.
Hunter, now running for president, blames the Pentagon
bureaucracy, which he says ``doesn't move fast enough to meet
the needs of the war fighter. We have a system in which the
warfighting requirements are requested from the field and the
acquisition people say, `We'll get it on our schedule.' ''
Other members of Congress blame Rumsfeld and his vision of
transforming the military into a leaner, faster fighting
force.
Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., wonders if Rumsfeld's forceful
personality silenced some of the generals. ``Rumsfeld so
intimidated the military that I've lost confidence in them
telling us what they really need'' in Iraq, Murtha says.
``They all knew the Rumsfeld rule: Your career is over if
you say anything contrary'' to his policies, Murtha says.
``It's much better now that Rumsfeld is gone. The military is
being much more honest.''
If the Pentagon ``had just listened to the guys in the
field'' who wanted MRAPs, Murtha says, ``we'd have them in
Iraq right now.''
USA TODAY could not determine what role, if any, Rumsfeld
played in MRAP deliberations. A spokesman for Rumsfeld, now
running a foundation in Washington, said last week that the
former Defense secretary would not comment.
Aaron Kincaid's widow, Rachel, doesn't know who should be
held accountable. She is haunted by whether getting MRAPs to
Iraq earlier might have saved her husband's life. The bomb
that blew apart his Humvee lay along the path he and his unit
took, and no one noticed.
Today, she wonders: Was his death really about the path
that he took, or about the path the Pentagon spent years
avoiding, the path that, in May, finally led them to the
vehicle that might have saved her husband's life?
You think there is always something that could've been done
to prevent it,'' Rachel Kincaid says of her husband's death.
``If that's been around for that many years,'' she says of
the MRAP, ``why hasn't it been used? They should've done it
at the beginning of the war. They should've done it three
years ago, four years ago.''
____________________