[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 110 (Wednesday, July 11, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9058-S9066]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           NEW IRAQ STRATEGY

  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, let me start by thanking the Senator 
from Colorado for his courtesy to me this evening as well as my friend 
from Tennessee.
  I rise today to join my distinguished colleagues from both sides of 
the aisle in discussing a bipartisan way forward on what is the 
greatest challenge facing our country; that is, the war in Iraq. I 
commend the two leaders of this effort, Senator Salazar and Senator 
Alexander, for their leadership in crafting a well-grounded strategy 
based on the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.
  I have repeatedly expressed my strong opposition to the President's 
strategy of sending tens of thousands of additional troops to Iraq. 
Despite that opposition and the opposition of many others, the 
administration pushed forward with its plan, arguing that the surge 
would give the Iraqi Government the time and space necessary to make 
the political compromises that are necessary to end the continued 
sectarian violence. Unfortunately, my initial concerns about the surge 
strategy have proven to be well-founded.
  First, there has been a terrible loss of life among our troops over 
the past few months. In fact, 331 American soldiers were killed from 
April to June--the highest 3-month level of the war. One such soldier 
was SGT Joel House, a brave and patriotic Mainer whose funeral I 
attended in Lee, ME, just last week. Our troops have sacrificed so 
much.
  Second, the fact is that the Iraqi Government has utterly failed to 
pursue the political reforms necessary to quell the sectarian violence. 
Our troops have done their part, but the fact is virtually all the 
experts agree that a solution to the sectarian violence is found in 
political reforms, not in military action. When you combine the 
increased sacrifice of our troops and the unwillingness or inability of 
the Iraqi leaders to act, it is not surprising that more and more 
Americans are questioning the President's strategy in Iraq.
  It is clear our country needs a new direction in Iraq. We need a new 
strategy that will redefine our mission and set the stage for a 
significant but gradual withdrawal of our troops over the next year. We 
do not have to search far and wide for this new policy. It is right 
before us. It has already been mapped out in the unanimous 
recommendations of the bipartisan Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. The 
Iraq Study Group's recommendations chart the path forward and remain 
just as viable today as they were when they were first released in 
December.
  The Baker-Hamilton report sets forth three core principles for 
salvaging a measure of stability for Iraq and the surrounding region.
  First, the report says the United States must shift the primary 
mission of its military forces in Iraq from combat to training, with 
the goal of removing all combat brigades not necessary for training, 
force protection, and counterterrorism activities against al-Qaida and 
other foreign jihadists by March of 2008. Shifting the mission of our 
troops to a new and more defined and narrower set of goals will 
ultimately encourage the Iraqi military to step up to the plate while 
lowering U.S. casualty rates, relieving our servicemembers of heavy 
deployment schedules, and improving the long-term readiness of our 
military.
  Second, the Iraq Study Group Report states that U.S. support for the 
Iraqi Government should be conditioned on Iraq making progress in 
meeting specific benchmarks.
  In May, Senator Warner and I authored legislation to require the 
President to provide two reports to Congress--one which will be 
released tomorrow and the other on September 15--on whether the Iraqis 
are meeting 18 benchmarks essential to achieving political 
reconciliation. Although we have not yet seen the report that is 
scheduled to be released tomorrow, from everything I have heard, the 
Iraqi Government is extremely unlikely to have met any of the 
benchmarks we have laid out. The Warner-Collins proposal also included 
a provision to condition the release of reconstruction funds to 
progress made by the Iraqi Government. Surely, if the Iraqis are not 
passing the political reforms that are necessary, the United States 
should not continue to provide reconstruction funds. This requirement 
which is in the law now is also consistent with the Iraq Study Group's 
recommendations.
  Third, the Iraq Study Group says the United States must launch a new 
diplomatic effort in the region to ensure Iraq's long-term stability, 
or to help ensure its stability. Iraq cannot be addressed effectively 
in isolation from other major regional issues and interests. Both the 
international community and Iraq's immediate neighbors are clearly not 
doing enough to foster its stability, and it is long past time for that 
to change. Senator Salazar and Senator Alexander have incorporated 
these recommendations into legislation I have cosponsored and into the 
amendment we will be offering to the Defense authorization bill. 
How significant it is that this amendment enjoys widespread, bipartisan 
support because it is long past time for a new bipartisan approach to 
the war in Iraq.

  Iraqi leaders must reach political agreements in order to achieve 
reconciliation, and their failure to do so is unfair to our American 
troops who are making such grave sacrifices. The responsibility for 
Baghdad's internal security and for halting the sectarian violence must 
rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi security 
forces. At the same time, it is important we continue the mission of 
fighting al-Qaida and the counterterrorism mission. But an open-ended 
commitment of American forces in Iraq simply does not provide the Iraqi 
Government with the incentives it needs to adopt the political reforms 
that give Iraq the best chance of quelling the sectarian violence. 
Ultimately,

[[Page S9059]]

resolving the sectarian violence requires a solution in which the Sunni 
minority is more fully integrated into the power structures and oil 
revenues are more equitably distributed among Iraq's citizens.
  This war and the way it has been prosecuted has cost our Nation so 
much over the past 4 years. It has cost us the lives of our men and 
women in uniform, and it has cost us billions of dollars. While our 
Nation's Armed Forces have sacrificed gravely, they continue to answer 
the call of duty. They inspire us, but they have more than done their 
part. Many of our Nation's soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen have 
been to Iraq more than once. This, of course, has been so hard on them, 
and it has also been difficult for the families they leave behind.
  We especially need to thank our National Guard members and our 
reservists. Far too much has been asked of these citizen soldiers, 
their families, and employers. Whether they are from Maine or Michigan 
or Minnesota or Mississippi, these citizen soldiers have put their 
lives on the line and their jobs and families aside to answer the call 
of duty. But we as a nation are asking too much of them given the 
failures of the administration's policies in Iraq.
  We must chart a new course. Now is the time to demonstrate to these 
servicemembers and their families and to the American people at large 
that we in Congress can move past politics, partisan politics on the 
critical issues facing our country as we seek a new direction in Iraq. 
We must demonstrate that we can build a bipartisan approach to bringing 
a responsible conclusion to this war, and that is exactly what the 
Salazar-Alexander amendment would do. It is based on well-thought-out, 
careful, balanced, bipartisan, and unanimous recommendations of the 
Iraq Study Group, and I hope my fellow Senators will join us in 
supporting this measure.
  Madam President, again, my thanks to the chief sponsors of this 
amendment for accommodating my schedule.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Madam President, let me first of all say thank you to 
Senator Collins for her work and for her seeking a solution to Iraq and 
joining with the other cosponsors of this legislation. As is so often 
the case, Susan Collins is part of a group of people in the Senate who 
try to find a solution to the problems our Nation faces. So I 
appreciate her comments, and I appreciate her being a cosponsor of this 
legislation as well.
  I rise tonight in this period of morning business to speak in support 
of amendment No. 2063, which is the amendment to implement the 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. I wish to say first of all 
that this is probably the most bipartisan amendment we have seen to 
deal with Iraq. I thank Senator Alexander for his help and his 
leadership in terms of getting this legislation drafted. It is 
legislation we have been working on for a long period of time with 
members of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, with Secretary Baker and Lee 
Hamilton, and we will refer to them later on.
  I wish to say a particular thanks to my colleagues who have joined 
with us in this effort, including Senator Pryor of Arkansas, Senator 
Casey, Senator Lincoln, Senator Nelson of Florida, Senator Landrieu, 
and Senator McCaskill, all of whom on this side of the aisle have shown 
great leadership in trying to find a new way forward in Iraq.
  I also thank my Republican colleagues, including Senator Lamar 
Alexander, who has worked tirelessly on this effort for the last 
several months, as well as Senator Bennett, Senator Gregg, Senator 
Collins, Senator Sununu, and Senator Domenici for being a part of this 
effort, wherein 13 Members of the Senate have come together and have 
said that if we deal with what is the most difficult national issue we 
face today--and that is the war in Iraq and foreign policy in the 
Middle East--and how it is that we move forward to try to put together 
the Humpty Dumpty that has been created in that part of the world, we 
are going to have to do it in a bipartisan way. It is going to require 
Democrats and Republicans understanding that we need a new way forward 
in Iraq.
  Despite all of the debate and rhetoric we have heard on the floor of 
the Senate and around the country on the issue of Iraq, the truth is 
that there was only one group that has taken a substantive, in-depth, 
coherent look at the problem in Iraq and throughout the Middle East and 
has created a roadmap on how to salvage stability in Iraq and try to do 
our best to create peace in the Middle East. That is the Iraq Study 
Group, chaired by Lee Hamilton and Jim Baker, along with distinguished 
Americans who served on that Commission for the last year. Their report 
came out in December, not long ago. It was the only comprehensive way 
forward that has been laid out in a bipartisan way since we began this 
effort in Iraq now many years ago.
  Madam President, before I speak more about my amendment, I want to 
say thank you to Senator Levin and Senator Warner, and others on the 
Armed Services Committee, who worked so hard in bringing the Defense 
authorization bill to the floor. I admire Senator Levin and the members 
of the committee and the thoughtful leadership they bring to us on 
national security issues. I have been proud to support Senator Levin in 
his call for a change in the policy in Iraq. He recognized long ago 
that we need to chart a new course in our Iraq war policy. Now is the 
time. This is the place. This is the week, and next week, when we will 
hopefully craft that policy. I share Senator Levin's goal, which is 
peace and stability in the Middle East and the safe return home of our 
troops who are now in harm's way.
  As we debate this issue, I hope we will keep in mind the sacrifices 
our soldiers and airmen and sailors and marines are making on the 
ground today in Iraq. We must be ever mindful that on these fundamental 
issues of war and peace there ought to be an American way forward. That 
American way forward should not be a Democratic, a Republican, or an 
Independent way forward; it ought to be an American way forward because 
we have over 150,000 of our men and women in uniform in harm's way 
tonight as we debate this issue on the Senate floor.
  It is a personal issue. When we think about what has happened to the 
men and women who have died in this war in Iraq, we should all think 
about the weight we have on our shoulders because it is a significant 
weight, but it pales in comparison to the weight and the sacrifice we 
ask our men and women in uniform to bear every day in the fields of 
Iraq and Afghanistan. So it is to them, who are serving, that we owe 
the best policy we can develop in the Senate.
  In Iraq, 3,601 Americans have been killed since the beginning of the 
war. All of us who have gone to Walter Reed and other hospitals and 
visited with the brave men and women who have come home without arms 
and legs, those who have suffered from brain injuries and other kinds 
of injuries that will stay with them for the rest of their lives--there 
are almost 27,000 of them who have suffered those kinds of wounds in 
Iraq. From my State of Colorado, we have 51 people who have been killed 
in Iraq since the beginning of the war. We have another 443 who have 
been wounded. Just from Fort Carson alone, which is the home of many of 
our soldiers who served in Iraq, we have had 215 casualties from Fort 
Carson in El Paso County.
  It is to these men and women that we have a solemn obligation to make 
sure we develop the kind of policy they deserve to have as they fight 
on behalf of a mission for the United States of America. They deserve a 
policy that changes their role in Iraq from combat to a much more 
limited role, focused on training and on equipping the Iraqi forces. 
They deserve a policy that includes a major and new diplomatic 
offensive led by the United States but aimed at gathering all of Iraq's 
neighbors around the table. They deserve a policy that underscores the 
need for a comprehensive diplomatic approach, which is critical to 
creating the conditions necessary for a troop withdrawal so that we can 
bring our troops home safely and back to their families. They deserve a 
policy that conditions U.S. political, economic, and military support 
on Iraq's progress in meeting specific benchmarks. The Government of 
Iraq simply must take on a greater responsibility for the fate of their 
country. It is foremost their responsibility.
  These are the broad principles which I believe should guide us as we 
consider

[[Page S9060]]

the various amendments to the bill. I hope we can come together across 
party lines--Democrats and Republicans--to support a change in strategy 
in Iraq.
  I have been pleased to join with colleagues from both sides of the 
aisle in crafting an amendment that I believe will result in that 
constructive change. Our amendment is simple. It implements the 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. I believe the work of that 
group is a model for how we can come together in good faith. The Iraq 
Study Group was comprised of our finest and most experienced public 
servants in America, equally drawn from both political parties. They 
worked together for months to reach consensus on a comprehensive set of 
recommendations as required by the U.S. Congress in legislation that 
funded and created the Iraq Study Group. I appeal to my colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle to take a fresh look at the group's report and 
consider how we can use it as part of the solution in creating a 
successful policy in Iraq.
  We will have much more to say about our amendment at a later point in 
the debate. But as we consider Iraq's policy, I hope we can agree that 
we must change course. I hope we can agree that the brave men and women 
serving in Iraq deserve our best effort to reach common ground. I hope 
we can agree on a path forward that will create a better future for 
Iraq, for the Middle East, and a better and more peaceful future for 
the United States of America.
  Madam President, to recap, our bipartisan amendment, which now has 13 
cosponsors, would essentially do three things.
  First, it would require a mission change for our country in Iraq. 
This would be our national policy and our national law if our proposed 
legislation becomes law and is signed by the President. That change, as 
set forth in the Iraq Study Group Report and in our legislation, would 
remove our troops from a combat mission over to a training mission and 
a mission that is specifically defined to chase al-Qaida. That more 
limited mission is an appropriate one for us here, and that limited 
mission is one that I believe has the bipartisan support of most 
Members of the Senate.
  Secondly, this legislation also conditions, for the first time, the 
efforts of the United States of America and Iraq on the progress that 
is made by the Iraqi Government in terms of meeting the benchmarks 
identified in our legislation. It conditions, for the first time, the 
Iraqi Government stepping up to the plate and doing what they should be 
doing, which is providing the functional government that brings about 
security for their own people. It ought not to be the responsibility of 
the U.S. Government to be in the middle of policing a civil war in 
Iraq.

  Third, the legislation sets forth a comprehensive, diplomatic 
approach to deal with the issues not only in Iraq but also in the 
region. The fact is, as those of us who have been in that region over 
the last several years know, there are places in that region--countries 
that have been sitting on their hands and have not been helping bring 
about stability in Iraq. We also know Iran and Syria and other 
countries have been playing a negative role in terms of achieving the 
goal of stability in Iraq. At the end of the day, it will take an 
international effort and a regional peace plan to bring about the 
stability we all want not only for Iraq but for the Middle East.
  In conclusion, I will say this about the Iraq Study Group and their 
recommendations. Some Members of the Senate have characterized this 
amendment as not doing much. Some Members of the Senate will probably 
come to the floor at some point in the debate and say this legislation 
is too prescriptive; it tells the President too much what to do. Well, 
we will handle those particular criticisms.
  The one I wish to deal with briefly is this sense that we have gotten 
from some Members of the Senate that the Iraq Study Group 
recommendations happened a long time ago and they are no longer 
relevant today. I know of no one who spent as much time studying these 
issues of Iraq and the challenges we face there than former Congressman 
Lee Hamilton, the Chairman of the Commission. This is what Lee Hamilton 
had to say with respect to this legislation:

       The recommendations of the Iraq Study Group are as timely 
     and urgent today as they were in December.

  Madam President, I hope that my colleagues open their hearts and 
their minds to the direction set forth in the Iraq Study Group Report 
and that they join the bipartisan effort with the Presiding Officer and 
the Senator from Tennessee and other colleagues who are cosponsors of 
this amendment to this legislation.
  I know my colleague from Tennessee, Senator Alexander, is on the 
floor. I yield to him.
  (Mr. SALAZAR assumed the Chair.)
  Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer, Mr. 
Salazar, the Senator from Colorado, for his impressive leadership in 
helping our Senate and our Congress and our President and our country 
find a consensus about where we go from here in Iraq. That is, as he 
said, truly our most urgent and difficult issue. It is on the minds of 
every single Senator every day. It is the first thing on my mind. It 
deserves to be. Adding up the lives, the dollars--$10 billion a month, 
3,600 lives, and many wounded--it is a difficult situation.
  Mr. President, the occupant of the chair has said this himself. It 
struck me that we should spend less time in what we think of as the 
world's greatest deliberative body lecturing Baghdad about coming up 
with a political consensus and more time working together ourselves to 
come up with a political consensus about what to do in Iraq. After all, 
they are an infant democracy and we are the oldest democracy; we ought 
to be able to do more than make speeches and have partisan votes. Of 
course, we respect each other's positions, but at some point, there is 
consensus about where we go from here.
  We owe it to our troops fighting there, when they look at Washington, 
not to see us shouting at one another but saying, yes, we can agree on 
why you are there, where we are going to be in a while, what our goals 
are, and say to the rest of the Middle East that we know what we are 
doing in Iraq, give them a chance to flourish and say we in the U.S. 
have free debate, but we are capable of coming to a conclusion, 
especially on our most urgent issue. That is why this report is so 
important.
  When I saw this report in December, what attracted me about it was, 
first, the members of this group--Larry Eagleburger, Secretary of State 
for Bush 1; Vernon Jordan, National Urban League, a close friend of 
President Clinton's; Ed Meese, President Reagan's Attorney General; 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor; Leon Panetta, President Clinton's Chief of 
Staff; William Perry, Secretary of Defense for Clinton; Chuck Robb, 
former U.S. Senator; Alan Simpson, the former Republican whip; and, at 
one point, Roberts Gates, who is now the Secretary of Defense in this 
administration. They unanimously agreed, after 9 months, about what to 
do in Iraq. In 9 months, they unanimously agreed.
  I thought that perhaps President Bush, in January, in the State of 
the Union Address, would invite them to sit in the gallery, as 
Presidents often do, and point to them and say: There they are, nine of 
our most distinguished Americans who have been working for 9 months 
trying to understand where to go on our most difficult issue.
  They say there is no magic formula. They say it is grave and 
deteriorating. They say the consequences of the cost, but they have a 
recommendation and it is a sensible recommendation, and the President 
might have said it is not my recommendation, it is theirs, but I accept 
their recommendation and I invite you to do the same.
  I think the President would have received a good deal of bipartisan 
support in this body had he done that. The President and our country 
need that. A President's job is to see an urgent need, to develop a 
strategy to meet it, and to persuade at least half the people he is 
right. Even if President Bush is right about the current strategy, he 
hasn't persuaded a broad enough number of Americans that he is right or 
a broad enough number in this body that he is right in order to sustain 
his policy in Iraq.
  A part of Presidential leadership is recognizing that adjustments 
have to be made to take into account the views

[[Page S9061]]

of others and then, having done that, to go forward. That is 
Presidential leadership. It is not Presidential weakness. It is what I 
wish President Bush had done in January, and I said so then, and I said 
so in March on the floor of the Senate. I have learned sometimes you 
have to say things two or three times around here before anybody hears.
  Senator Salazar heard it. We talked about it and the outgrowth is 
this legislation that Senator Salazar worked so well on to develop, and 
so expertly, which Secretary Baker and Congressman Hamilton have told 
me accurately represents the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton 
group.
  Exactly what does Baker-Hamilton do? One, it establishes a long-term 
presence for the United States in Iraq but a limited one. Two, it says 
as soon as security conditions on the ground permit--and it estimates 
that would be a year--we would move our combat forces out of the combat 
business and into the support, training, and equipment business in 
Iraq. And third, it steps up regional and diplomatic efforts to cause 
others in the region to help Iraq succeed.
  That is it. Those three things. There are 79 recommendations in this 
book. I am not sure all of us would agree with all of them. But that is 
not the point. There is a new direction for the United States in Iraq 
in this book, and if we were to adopt it and the President were to 
agree with it, what our legislation says is the President should 
formulate a comprehensive plan to implement the recommendations of the 
Iraq Study Group. That in plain English to me means the President would 
take all these recommendations, call together his advisers, come up 
with a plan, and do his best to implement it.
  Would he be able to implement every provision? I doubt it. Would he 
say this was recommended in December and I didn't get the law until 
September, so I am going to adjust some timetables? I would expect so. 
Would he have some improvements to make and some suggestions to make? I 
would guess he would. But he would come up with a comprehensive plan, 
and then he would proceed with it. Then, of course, we would have our 
constitutional duty to review it. We don't have to approve it under our 
recommendation, we just review it and we appropriate money and we have 
other things we could do. But what we could say to our troops, the 
world, and the country is that we have found a common way forward in 
Iraq. We know what we are doing, and we are doing it together. And that 
is the job of our Government.
  The Senator from Colorado dealt with a couple of objections that have 
been made. Let me deal with three or four very quickly. We will have 
other time to do that. I see the Senator from Arkansas is here. I am 
looking forward to what he has to say.
  One objection that was made was this may be dated. It was December. 
One Senator said this was a snapshot taken some time ago and times have 
changed. I don't see this as a snapshot. I see the war in Iraq as more 
like a movie. You go into it after 15 minutes or you go into it 30 
minutes after it started and it is the same movie. You see the same 
characters. It is the same story. A few adjustments might have to be 
made, but it is the same story. And as Lee Hamilton said, the 
recommendations are as relevant today as they were in December. And I 
would say that February would have been a better time than March to 
adopt the recommendations. April would have been better than March. 
Today is better than last month, and last month would be better than 
today. The sooner they are adopted, the better.
  A second point. One Senator said this doesn't have many teeth in it. 
I used to work in the White House for a wise man named Bryce Harlow 40 
years ago. I was an impatient young man. I said: Mr. Harlow, we need to 
do more of this or more of that. I forget the issue.
  He said: Lamar, in the White House, just a little tilt here makes a 
great big difference out there.
  That was a very wise statement. If the President of the United States 
and the Congress of this country were to agree this month on a new 
course in Iraq that defined a limited long-term role, shifted the 
mission from combat to training, support, and equipment over a period 
of months, subject to unexpected developments on the ground, and 
stepped up our diplomatic and political efforts, that is a major shift 
in strategy.

  Next, I have heard from the other side that it has too many teeth, 
too prescriptive on the President. That is not the way I read it. 
Sometimes that comes from this side. The White House has some worries 
about that as well. But that is not the way I read our amendment. It is 
the sense of the Congress that the President and the Congress should 
agree that the way forward in Iraq is to implement this and the 
President should formulate a comprehensive plan to do so.
  I assume the way the President does that is he gets the law in 
September, and he sits down with his advisers. I suppose the first 
person he would sit down with is General Petraeus whose advice we are 
all looking forward to. He would ask his advice about the surge, ask 
the Joint Chiefs what they think, ask a lot of people, and then within 
a few weeks, send us his plan. That is what we ask him to do.
  It is not so prescriptive either about the changes in troops on the 
ground because it says in another section, section 1552, that while we 
intend to move our troops out of the combat business into support, 
equipping, and training business--and the goal is within about a year 
to do that--that it is subject to unexpected developments on the 
ground.
  Here is what the report itself actually said:

       By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected 
     developments in the security situation on the ground, all 
     combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be 
     out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could 
     be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in 
     rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, 
     equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. 
     Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after 
     the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, 
     we would maintain a considerable military presence in the 
     region, with our still significant force in Iraq and with our 
     powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, 
     Bahrain, and Qatar.

  In other words, when we move out of the combat business into these 
other areas, we still have troops there, we still are able to go after 
al-Qaida, we still can protect the troops who are there, and we are 
sending a message to the rest of the Middle East: Stay out, give Iraq a 
chance to flourish.
  The other thing I have heard, and I say this in conclusion--I thank 
you, Mr. President, for your time--is that all people hear in the 
debate in the Senate is discord. I hear another message. It is not as 
loud as the discord, it is not as loud as the partisan votes, but I 
hear a lot of consensus. It may surprise some people to hear me say 
that. I hear a lot of consensus and the seeds of that consensus are in 
the Iraq Study Group report.
  For example, the administration has already begun to act on some of 
the recommendations in the Iraq Study Group report by increasing the 
number of troops embedded in Iraqi forces, using milestones to chart 
progress, by meeting with Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria. 
The President's National Security Adviser has pointed to the Iraq Study 
Group report as valuable. The President himself has spoken well of it.
  Across the aisle on the Democratic side, where there is a great 
desire by many Members for a fixed timetable, which is not a part of 
the Iraq Study Group, the Democratic proposals still have been guided 
by this document. For example, working on milestones for improvement in 
Iraq, limiting the role of the United States to one of training and 
equipping and counterterrorism operations and stating as a goal the 
drawdown of combat forces by a year from now. That is all part of over 
there. I hear more consensus than I do discord.
  I guess my message to my colleagues is much the same as the Senator 
from Colorado said. We have a responsibility to vote and state our 
convictions, but we also have a job to do, and our job to do is to look 
for a way to come to some consensus about where we are going from here 
in Iraq and agree on it so when our troops look back, they know we 
support them, we really support them because we know what they are 
doing. And when the Middle East looks it up, they know to stay out. And 
when the rest of the world looks at this great deliberative body, they 
know occasionally on the foremost issue facing our

[[Page S9062]]

time, we can come to a conclusion, we can join hands with the 
President, even though we may debate with him and say, OK, Mr. 
President, let's have a new strategy, one on which we agree, we 
together, and that we need to do.
  We have an opportunity that is very rare, and it is impressive to 
have seven Democratic Senators and six Republican Senators on this 
subject at this time supporting a comprehensive recommendation. One of 
our former colleagues, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, wrote a book 
about Boss Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. Since I said some respectful 
advice to my colleagues about what I thought our job was, I say to the 
President respectfully: Mr. President, one of Boss Plunkitt's favorite 
maxims was: When you seize your opportunities, you take them. This is 
an opportunity for the President to develop bipartisan support for a 
way forward in Iraq that has a long-term presence there, but limited, 
with a different mission for our combat troops and enhanced political 
and regional support.
  I respectfully suggest that January would have been the best time to 
seize this opportunity, but today is a much better time than September.
  I thank the Chair and I congratulate him for his leadership.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I want to be on the record as thanking you 
for your leadership on this legislation. You shared it with me more 
than a couple of months ago now. I know you worked on it for a number 
of months before that. The Senate and the American people owe Senator 
Ken Salazar of Colorado a real debt of gratitude for drafting this 
legislation and pushing it to the point it has gotten to today.
  I open by reading the first two paragraphs of the executive summary 
of the Iraq Study Group. This was written 6 months ago. It says:

       The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is 
     no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be 
     improved.
       In this report, we make a number of recommendations for 
     actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the 
     region. Our most important recommendations call for new and 
     enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the 
     region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in 
     Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its 
     combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these 
     two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one 
     another. If they are effectively implemented, and if the 
     Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, 
     Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, 
     terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in 
     an important part of the world, and America's credibility, 
     interests, and values will be protected.

That was true when it was written 6 months ago, and it is still very 
relevant today.
  Today, I want to talk about amendment No. 2063 and encourage my 
colleagues to consider voting for it and even cosponsoring it. One of 
the things Senator Salazar did when he drafted this amendment is he 
worked very hard to try to honor the integrity of the findings and the 
recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton group, and he has done that. You 
can look at each paragraph of amendment No. 2063 and see that it 
reflects the essence of what the Iraq Study Group was trying to 
communicate to us.
  In fact, we have had a couple of colleagues come to us in the last 
several days and say: Well, if you will just change this paragraph or 
this sentence or this one word, or if we can just work a little bit on 
this text, then I might be a cosponsor. Well, the problem there is, if 
we change that, then we would be trying to change what the Iraq Study 
Group recommended, and we are not going to do that. The purpose of this 
amendment is to take this bipartisan commission's work and put it into 
legislation.
  Some people ask: Who made up this group? What is so magic about the 
Iraq Study Group? Well, let me tell you, it has two former Secretaries 
of State, it has the former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, it has a former Supreme Court Associate Justice, it has a 
former White House Chief of Staff, it has a former Secretary of 
Defense, and two former United States Senators. This is a group that 
comes together with a lot of intelligence, with a lot of experience, 
and with a lot of knowledge about the region and international affairs 
and history.
  I think the Iraq Study Group is the best effort that America has yet 
put forward on a thoughtful, responsible approach to Iraq. One of the 
things I like about the Iraq study group's recommendations and their 
conclusions is it is not just setting an artificial timetable. I am a 
little bit out of sync with some of my Democratic colleagues on wanting 
to set a timetable on Iraq. I don't think we ought to have a public 
timetable in the law. I know many of my Democratic colleagues disagree 
with me, and a few of my Republican colleagues do as well. But the 
thing I like about the Iraq Study Group legislation, the Salazar-
Alexander amendment, is, it is much more comprehensive than simply a 
timetable. In fact, it is more comprehensive than just military.
  It tries to take a different approach. It really tries to change 
American policy in Iraq. And it is a multifaceted approach on trying to 
deal with the issues in Iraq and the region. So what you are looking at 
with the Iraq Study Group is you are not just looking at a military 
solution. General Petraeus has said if we just have a military solution 
we are going to lose. So the Iraq Study Group anticipates that, and it 
says we need a diplomatic solution, an economic solution, a political 
solution, and a military solution. I think it is the most comprehensive 
approach that anyone has put forward yet on Iraq.
  Again, this is a bipartisan group that has come together, and this 
amendment is bipartisan. We have seven Democrats and six Republicans. 
By this time tomorrow we may have seven and seven, or eight and eight, 
or some combination thereof. We don't know exactly the number of 
cosponsors we will end up with, but certainly we hope we will have a 
solid majority of Senators who will support this amendment when it has 
a chance to come up.
  As Senator Salazar said, and Senator Alexander echoed, part of what 
this bill does is it gets U.S. forces out of the business of combat and 
into the business of training and equipping others. And, really, what 
we are trying to do is stabilize Iraq.
  One thing I think the Iraq Study Group does over and over, for 
several pages in its findings, in its report, on several pages, is it 
talks about diplomacy and regional diplomacy and how important it is to 
have the neighborhood, so to speak, around Iraq--people inside Iraq and 
around the region--to have a part in stabilizing Iraq and making the 
region more stable and stronger.
  I have heard a couple of criticisms, such as my colleagues mentioned 
tonight, and one is that it is too prescriptive, that our legislation 
is too prescriptive. Another is that it doesn't do anything. And those 
are kind of polar opposite criticisms. In fact, there is an old saying 
that when you are settling a lawsuit, if both sides are unhappy, maybe 
you have a good settlement. So I would say in this situation, at least 
one way to look at it is both sides are unhappy.
  We are trying to thread the needle. We are trying to find a 
bipartisan solution on Iraq, a bipartisan consensus in this body. In 
fact, I would say this: With all due respect to my colleagues, and my 
House colleagues, and the President, the last thing in the world we 
should ever have a party-line vote on is Iraq. We have 150,000 troops 
in Iraq. They are getting shot at every day. They are putting their 
lives on the line for this country and for Iraq every single day. There 
are people out there trying to kill them, trying to maim them, trying 
to blow them up--you name it--every day. We should never have a party-
line vote on Iraq. We just shouldn't do it. And this amendment right 
here, this is an effort to try to bring the consensus that we need on 
Iraq.
  Senator Alexander told me a couple of months ago, he said: You know, 
we talk about needing a political consensus in Baghdad. He said: What 
we really need is a political consensus in Washington, DC, on Iraq. And 
I think he is right. The Salazar-Alexander amendment tries to get to 
that consensus.
  I will say this: For the Senators who believe this amendment doesn't 
do anything, I disagree. I think this is a significant step in a new 
direction, in a positive direction for Iraq. In fact, you can look at 
the amendment itself, and it has 13 sections. It is true that 3 of

[[Page S9063]]

the 13 are sense-of-Congress sections--3 out of 13. But that means 10 
of 13 are binding, 10 of 13 actually change U.S. policy and have 
requirements that have teeth. I would encourage my colleagues who 
mistakenly believe this amendment doesn't do anything to actually look 
at the language of the amendment and they will see it is a very 
significant improvement over our current policy in Iraq.
  Some people say it is too prescriptive. In other words, it binds the 
President's hands too much. I disagree. When you look at the language 
that Senator Salazar and members of the Iraq Study Group came up with 
when they drafted this, really what you are talking about is laying out 
some very specific things but also giving the President quite a bit of 
flexibility. And I think that is important. He is the Chief Executive. 
He is the Commander in Chief, and I think Senator Salazar and Senator 
Alexander have found the right balance in drafting this amendment.
  The last thing I will say in closing, going back to the Iraq Study 
Group Report that came out this past December, and back to the 
executive summary--I started with reading the first two paragraphs of 
the executive summary, so let me conclude by reading the last two 
paragraphs of the executive summary in the Iraq Study Group Report:

       It is the unanimous view of the Iraq study group that these 
     recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States 
     in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be 
     implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be 
     separated or carried out in isolation. The dynamics of the 
     region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq.
       The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days 
     ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the 
     region, and the United States of America can emerge stronger.

  Again, I think those words were true 6 months ago, I think they are 
relevant today, and I think we need to give the Iraq Study Group 
recommendations a chance to succeed.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Might I inquire as to the floor? I understand it is 
available to anyone at this time; no time constraints? I would like to 
speak for a few minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has been allocated 10 minutes 
under the previous order.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. I thank the Presiding Officer, and I wish to 
commend the Presiding Officer for his work, as, indeed, my good friend, 
Senator Alexander, and this colleague.
  I must state, with a sense of total modesty, that my contribution 
tonight would be just to express some concerns. I have followed the 
work of your group. Very kindly, the principals on this have invited me 
to join, but I have thus far not done so because I can't find yet the 
answers to some critical issues I have in mind.
  First, I say to my colleagues that I had a little to do with starting 
the group now known as Baker-Hamilton, or the Iraq Study Group. I think 
I worked with my colleague who did the major part of the work, 
Congressman Frank Wolf, and then we engaged a local, highly recognized, 
and well-qualified group in Washington associated with studies to take 
on some of the infrastructure. It was a remarkable recruiting of 
talent, which my colleague recited, and I think they did a very 
credible and fine job.
  It was a major contribution at a time in the fall of 2006 when there 
was a great deal of concern among many of us about the situation in 
Iraq. I had returned in that fall from a trip to Iraq and expressed 
publicly my thoughts that the country was just drifting aimlessly 
sideways, and that remark, together with remarks of others of a similar 
nature, sparked the intensity of the administration's undertaking 
their, I think, very thorough review leading up to the President's 
remarks when he announced a change in strategy on January 10, 2007.
  Now, I have referred to the Iraq Study Group work. I think there were 
7, 8, 9 months that they studied, with hearings and so forth. But when 
they put pen to paper and wrote it, it was a snapshot of the situation 
that faced this Nation and, indeed, our partners, the coalition forces, 
in Iraq. They made certain assumptions at that time which led to the 
strategy they outlined.
  Among those assumptions was that we had reason to believe the Iraqi 
Government, freely elected, in place, was going to become a truly 
representative unity government of all factions. They committed a 
certain number of benchmarks, and it was thought at that time that 
those benchmarks could be met. That, I think is fair to say, was an 
assumption they had.
  Our country, together with our coalition partners, had been in 
training with the Iraqi forces for some 2 years plus at that time, 
building up their own internal army, national guard, and police force. 
So the Iraq Study Group, in my judgment, took a snapshot of the 
situation in the fall of 2006, put it to paper, and it was in the 
President's framework of things that were considered when he derived 
his policy and enunciated it in January.
  I, together with, I think, the colleagues on the Senate floor 
tonight, said to the President, after his announcement on January 10, 
that I was concerned that more of the Iraq Study Group concept was not 
infused into his new strategy. I remember specifically addressing the 
issue of the sectarian violence, now described by some as a civil war 
of some stage, and injecting the American GI, who really had no 
background in the complicated culture of the Muslim religion and the 
Muslim people, into that situation.
  And I am not in any way denigrating that religion or that culture. 
Indeed, it is one of the oldest and, I think, most respected on Earth 
today. But, nevertheless, there are among the Muslim religion a few who 
really are dead set on changing the world--we know all about that--and 
now they are wreaking utter havoc, primarily in Iraq, and to an extent 
now in Afghanistan.
  But that snapshot and those assumptions have not been borne out. We 
do not have any real evidence before us today, or real basis for much 
hope as to what this Iraqi Government might achieve in the foreseeable 
future. The President specifically said on January 10, the Armed Forces 
of Iraq will take the lead. We will be largely in a supporting role. We 
will embed forces, we will train, we will supply, but they are taking 
more of the lead. In fact, they have to a limited extent but not to the 
extent that I believe are the hopes and expectations that were raised 
in the President's January 10 framework of remarks. Certainly the 
Government has not performed as we had hoped and expected. The Armed 
Forces are making a contribution today but not to the degree that was 
anticipated in the fall of 2006.
  I could go on and recite other concerns I have about this report, 
namely, can anyone point to where the Department of Defense sat down 
and studied the strategy in this report and has reached conclusions as 
to whether it would work better than the current strategy? Would it 
bring about a greater strength of government? Would it bring about a 
greater will, simple will among the Iraqi forces, to take on more and 
more responsibility?
  I think, before we recommend to this body and, indeed, if it were to 
pass and become legislation, to the President, that he consider 
implementing a major portion, as this amendment describes, of the 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, someone better bring forth a 
careful military analysis of what might occur given the situation 
today--not the situation in the fall of 2006--of what would happen if 
we made a shift in strategy from the one now employed to this.
  That is essential, if we are asking Senators to support that. Show us 
some analytical study of this strategy and how it would bring about 
greater results than the current strategy being employed.
  There is great credibility attached to this report, primarily because 
of the extraordinary membership--their experience, their achievements 
in the private and public sector. Do we know for a fact that all 
members of that committee are endorsing the concept that now the Senate 
should lift their report as written and prepared some 8 months ago? Are 
there not some among that group who might question today whether the 
assumptions that they had that led to their report are still there to 
support now a shift of strategy? I don't know. I don't see that 
evidence. I

[[Page S9064]]

wish to see something from the members, each one, because I think it 
would be difficult if we shifted to this Iraq Study Group and one or 
more of the members of that group got up in the public and said: What 
we said then is simply not going to work today.
  I think that is important because you are trading on the credibility 
of men and women of clear conscience, extraordinary backgrounds, who 
did, I think, a very fine job as best they could based on facts which 
have largely changed, or facts or assumptions that have not 
materialized.
  We talk about a bipartisan resolution. I think the colleagues tonight 
joined me some weeks ago in putting together a consensus of a 
bipartisan nature, to go forward and to guide this Nation. It was, 
somewhat to my surprise, taken almost verbatim by the appropriators and 
included in the recent appropriations bill--I say recent, it was 6 or 8 
weeks ago--and is now the law.
  Part of that report that I wrote together with colleagues here said 
we ought to have an independent analysis of the Iraqi security forces 
as they exist today and what they might represent 2, 3, 4, 5 months 
into the future. I must say--I say it with a sense of humility--I 
persuaded a former commandant of the Marine Corps, Jim Jones, a man who 
has enormous credibility on both sides of the Congress, House and 
Senate, to head that group. I have met with him. He brought in 
distinguished retired military officers. Tonight, as we are here 
debating, they are in Iraq, preparing a report for this Congress and 
for the President as to their best judgment as to the military 
proficiency, the capability and will to fight of the Iraqi forces today 
and what is the likelihood that will improve in the months to come, 
because so much of all of our strategy, be it the surge strategy or any 
strategy, is dependent on that. As the President has said most 
eloquently: When they stand up, we will stand down.
  I believed we needed an independent study, not to criticize the 
Department of Defense which for months has provided report after report 
of their analysis, but we ought to get a second opinion. That is now 
being prepared and will be brought forth, I think, in large part and 
made public prior to the President making his September 15 analysis.
  That report we put together, which was adopted by the appropriators, 
the bill we had here, required the President to report to the Congress 
on or before July 15. I believed it was very important for colleagues 
to have a current analysis by the President, drawing upon the CENTCOM 
Commander, Admiral Fallon, drawing upon General Petraeus and other 
elements of the administration, to provide the Congress with a set of 
facts so, on the assumption we leave here early in August on a recess, 
we have a current analysis provided by the executive branch.
  That report will be forthcoming. I think it is imminent. I happen to 
know the dates--I think we do--but I am not at liberty to divulge them 
tonight.
  That report will also analyze the benchmarks, which benchmarks we 
recited in that bill which was voted on by this Chamber, or adopted by 
over 50 votes. We had to have a 60-vote margin. We couldn't make the 60 
but we made it over 50. They will talk about each of the benchmarks and 
whether the Iraqi Government has made them and, if they have not, what 
the administration has done to try to encourage the Government to meet 
those benchmarks.
  At this point in time there is a lot of conscientious work going on 
directed at the September timeframe when reports by General Jones and 
his group will come forth, the President will make another report, I am 
hopeful that the intelligence components of our Government will have an 
upgraded National Intelligence Estimate--so much is to be learned, when 
all this information is brought to the attention of the American public 
and to the Congress in the first weeks of September.
  It is my urging that colleagues at this time in the debate on this 
bill, the annual authorization bill, try not to preempt and prejudge 
how this information will be formulated and given to the American 
public early in September.
  I will close with a bit of a personal story. In 1951, 1952, I was 
privileged to serve in the United States Marine Corps. I was with a 
squadron of fighter bombers in old, cold Korea during that winter. I 
was a ground officer, a staff officer. I don't claim any fame 
whatsoever. I was doing my duty. But I watched those aviators as they 
would take off every day. I had occasion, because of my duties, to go 
up to visit the infantry and watch them.

  At the same time, in the fall of 1951-1952, there was sort of a 
conference going on, largely in Panmunjon and elsewhere, to try to 
bring about peace and resolve that conflict. I remember these 
individuals who had to go out in harm's way each day, many of them, and 
said: I am wondering if I am going to be the last soldier, marine, or 
airman to take the last bullet because next time we may wake up and 
they have resolved this problem.
  It dawned on them, but they went on and performed their duties. I say 
there is some parallel to this situation. Were the Senate to adopt this 
piece of work--about which I say to my colleagues, you have worked hard 
on, your hearts are in it--it would send a signal that what the 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are doing today, carrying out 
the orders of the Commander in Chief, it would put in question that 
strategy. Their minds would go through that same thought: Well, if they 
are going to change it, why don't we change it right away? Because I 
don't want to be the last soldier to take the last bullet, if we are 
going to change this strategy and this strategy is not achieving the 
goals that were laid down.
  It has the possibility of bringing about a great concern of those 
young people, so valiantly fighting and giving life and limb to carry 
out the orders of the President.
  I think we have to pause, reflect on what we say and what we do as we 
are working on this bill. It seems to me the President is Commander in 
Chief and has made a decision. He is within, I think, 48 hours going to 
release this report and speak to the Nation. Practically speaking, this 
amendment I presume will not be brought up--I know as a fact--prior to 
his statement. But it seems to me we ought to listen carefully to what 
he has to say and his resolve as to what strategy we should be 
following in the ensuing days and weeks to come. I translate that into 
the minds of these young people fighting this fight and their families 
here at home, so worried, understandably, about the welfare of their 
loved ones.
  I say to my colleagues, have you looked at the intelligence? I have 
taken it upon myself to go out to the various entities of the 
intelligence part of our community and specifically asked them about 
what they think the consequences would be if there were a change to 
this strategy. I am not at liberty to give their responses but I urge 
you to access on your own initiative that information and reflect upon 
it as you move forward and you endeavor to persuade other colleagues to 
join you in this endeavor.
  Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to come tonight to 
express my views to good friends, friends who worked with me and did 
work with me on that piece of legislation which eventually became a 
part of the appropriations bill and is now the law of the land. That is 
the legislation that requires the President in 48 hours to make a 
report to the Nation and to the Congress and to lay down what his 
intentions are for the weeks to come, until he gives his next report on 
September 15.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Pryor). The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. SALAZAR. I ask unanimous consent that we have another up to 15 
minutes in morning business, equally divided between myself and Senator 
Alexander.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I want to respond to some of the concerns 
and comments from my distinguished friend, the great Senator from 
Virginia. He and I had the opportunity to travel to Iraq and to 
Afghanistan about a year or so ago. There is no one on this Senate 
floor that I respect any more than the Senator from Virginia. I 
consider him to be a colleague and a role model in the working 
relationship that he and the chairman of the Armed Services today, 
Senator Levin, have. It is, I think, an example of how we ought

[[Page S9065]]

to do things on the Senate floor more often. The fact that we have a 
Department of Defense authorization bill, which is a very good bill, in 
front of the Senate today is a manifestation and a testament to the 
great work and the bipartisan spirit of Senator Warner and Senator 
Levin. It is with great respect I offer these comments on some of the 
concerns that he raised.
  First, with respect to the Iraq Study Group report being simply a 
snapshot of what was happening in December, I respectfully disagree 
with that assessment of what they did. It was not as if on December 15 
or the day that the Iraq Study Group delivered their recommendations 
that they said this is a picture of what is happening in Iraq today. 
What the Iraq Study Group did is they took a look at the history of 
what had happened in Iraq. They took a look at the regional conflicts 
and at the dynamics that were driving the conflicts in that region and 
they reached a number of different conclusions which were as true in 
December as they are today, and which were as true, frankly, a year 
before December as they are today.
  So it was not a snapshot, it was taking an assessment of the historic 
conflict in the region, some of which has gone on not for 4 or 5 years 
but 10 years, 100 years, 1,000 years, in some cases, in terms of the 
sectarian conflict we see today in Iraq.
  It was out of that history that they came up with what they perceived 
to be the best way forward for the country in terms of how we dealt not 
only with the issue of Iraq but the very integrated issue of the Middle 
East conflict with respect to the whole future of not only Iraq but 
also the neighbors in that region.
  So it was not a snapshot, from my point of view. In our dealings with 
both Congressman Hamilton and Secretary Baker, as we came forward and 
fashioned this legislation, it was their view that this legislation 
was, in fact, the best way forward. It was written in consultation with 
input from Senator Alexander. I reached out to both Congressman 
Hamilton as well as Secretary Baker. This amendment was written with 
their best thoughts in mind on how we could faithfully implement the 
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.
  So I daresay that the characterizations that cochairman of the 
commission, Hamilton, had to say yesterday about the importance and 
current relevancy of this recommendation of the Iraq Study Group are 
still as relevant today as they were in December. In fact, Congressman 
Hamilton said the Baker-Hamilton Commission recommendations today were, 
in fact, as relevant as they were in December and that the urgency of 
the implementation of those recommendations, if I may paraphrase him, 
was even more urgent today than it was back in December as we continue 
to drift sideways, spiral downward frankly, in the conditions in Iraq.
  I do not argue it was a snapshot. It was a recommendation that came 
out after an indepth study by some of the best experts in the world, 
including our military advisers. Secondly, my friend from Virginia also 
says that circumstances have changed in Iraq, that the Iraqi Government 
may not be as functional as any of us would want the Iraq Government to 
be.
  Well, the fact of the matter is that no one has sent the clear 
direction by law to the Iraqi Government that support from America to 
the Iraqi Government and to the Iraqi people is dependent on them 
making progress on the ground. This legislation does that specifically, 
as the Iraq Study Group recommends.
  Thirdly, there were lots of military advisers that were involved in 
providing advice, counsel, and guidance to the Iraq Study Group. It 
included ADM James Ellis, GEN John Keane, GEN Edward Meyer, GEN Joseph 
Ralston, LTG Roger Schultz and hundreds of other people who were 
consulted for their expertise in the formulation of the recommendations 
that went into the Iraq Study Group.
  Finally, I would say that of all the debate we have had on Iraq, the 
fundamental reality still remains the same. There is only the one group 
chartered, in part because of the leadership of the Senator from 
Virginia, that took a comprehensive look at the situation in Iraq and 
the Middle East and came up with a set of recommendations that were 
comprehensive in nature.
  When you look at the bipartisan composition of that commission, they 
spoke on what is in the best interests of America based on the best 
information they were able to acquire from around the world and the 
best military and foreign policy experts we have. So, in my view, the 
Iraq Study Group recommendations are still as relevant today as they 
were in December.
  I would urge my colleagues to join us in this bipartisan effort.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. I thank the Senator from Virginia for coming back to 
the floor from another engagement and offering his comments on our 
proposal. He has made an extraordinary effort to do that at a late hour 
in the evening. I am grateful to him for that.
  I hope he will not mind my saying that I have seen him agonize over 
this war. We have talked about it privately, going many months back 
before many Senators did, about how do we reconcile our national 
interests with the lives of young men and women from Virginia and 
Tennessee, which we have to think about every day.
  He was one of the first to raise questions about our strategy. 
Because he did and because of his background as Navy Secretary and his 
service in World War II and in the Korean War and his senior position 
on Armed Services, everyone paid attention when John Warner spoke.
  We have paid attention to his advice every step of the way. What I 
would like to say, very briefly, in response to my friend from 
Virginia, is this: I would hope that over the next few days as we 
consider this, that he will think a little differently about his own 
contribution to the shift in direction our country needs.
  His first contribution, in addition to his statement, is the Iraq 
Study Group report. He was a little too modest about it. He had a major 
role in getting it started. If he had not, we would not have the kind 
of membership on the Iraq Study Group that we had with Secretary Baker 
and the leaders of so many different administrations.
  Their recommendations need not be put on the bookshelf as a bookend, 
they need to be used.

  Having said that, I can understand how he and the President and 
others might be concerned that if one were to read our proposal too 
prescriptively, they would say: Well, how can we pick up 79 
recommendations and say, Mr. President, do all of those things.
  The way I read our amendment, we do not do that. The way I read our 
amendment we say very simply that the President and the Congress agree 
the way forward in Iraq is to implement this comprehensive set of 
recommendations, and the President himself should formulate a 
comprehensive plan to do so.
  In another part of the amendment, when we get to the part about when 
the troops come home or when the troops' mission moves from a combat 
mission to a support and equipping mission, that is all subject to 
unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground.
  So I would say with respect to my colleague from Virginia, that 
another way--and perhaps I am reading it wrong, but the way I read it, 
another way to read this is to say: Let's take the wisdom of this group 
of 10 people, one of them who has ended up as Secretary of Defense in 
this administration, and say: That gives us a framework. We can adopt 
that together. And then, Mr. President, you take these recommendations 
and you draw up a plan.
  This is not going to be a plan that the Senator from Colorado and I 
drew up. The President is the only one authorized to draw it up. As it 
affects troops, it is subject to security developments on the ground; 
there is no fixed deadline of any kind here.
  I assume that what the President would do, if he were to receive this 
as a law, which might be September by the time it got all the way 
through the conferences, the first person he would sit down with is 
General Petraeus and say: Tell me again about the surge. How are things 
on the ground? What is your recommendation?
  The second thing he might do is sit down with General Jones and say: 
Tell me, General, what have you found out about the position of the 
Iraqi forces?

[[Page S9066]]

  Then I think he would call in the Joint Chiefs and the intelligence 
folks and say: I have to develop a plan. Give me your advice about what 
works and what does not work. Then he would present us the plan within 
90 days. But it is not subject to our approval. It is his plan.
  Now, we can then do what we can do with our constitutional duties 
about it. But the one thing I am afraid we will miss if we do not move 
to adopt the recommendations now of the Iraq Study Group is the 
bipartisan support that was in that group that the Senator from 
Virginia helped to create and the bipartisan support that is on this 
floor for those recommendations. The President doesn't have that now. 
Without that, he cannot sustain a long-term mission in Iraq of any 
kind, I am afraid. I think we have to have one of some kind over a long 
time.
  So I think this goes about as far as it can within this group to say 
to the President: Okay. We can agree with you. But now you draw up the 
plan according to these structures.
  I greatly respect the Senator from Virginia. I will continue to 
listen to him. I am deeply grateful to him for coming back to the floor 
tonight. I thank him for his direction in helping to make possible the 
Iraq Study Group plan, General Jones' study. I know we will have many 
more discussions. But the one thing I do not want the President to lose 
is the opportunity to borrow for our long-term strategy the bipartisan 
support in this document and the bipartisan support on this floor.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have had the privilege of serving in 
this body for 29 years. I have never met a finer gentleman than my 
colleague from Tennessee. I thank you for your gracious reference to 
this humble Senator.
  I simply say that this has been a constructive debate. We have an 
honest difference of opinion. But I would urge that perhaps you check 
into some of the analysis that has been performed in certain segments 
of the Government about the current operations and how the benchmarks, 
so to speak--or maybe I withdraw those words--the points of strategy 
that are in the Iraq Study Group will or will not adopt.
  I would simply say the obvious to my colleagues, that that report of 
the Iraq Study Group is still on the President's desk. I do not think 
he requires the need of the Senate to tell him what is in it. He knows. 
He looked at it, I have been given that assurance, very carefully 
before he devised his January 10 strategy.
  The concern, the greatest concern I have is sort of sending out a 
signal we have throughout, that this strategy would be working better 
than this current strategy. I frankly felt that and expressed that on 
January 10. But I have to accept the fact that he is the Commander in 
Chief. He made the decision. He decided not, at this time, to implement 
the framework of the Baker-Hamilton report but to go ahead with the 
surge.
  I am hesitant to criticize him now. I criticized pretty heavily, if 
you look at the Congressional Record, in January. I urged in several 
speeches that more of this Iraq Study Group concept be incorporated in 
the surge strategy. But having done that, I feel obligated now to 
support the President because he is committed to follow the law of the 
land as originated in this Chamber in a bill which I sponsored, and I 
believe my distinguished colleague from Tennessee did vote for. That 
bill, almost in its entirety, was incorporated into the appropriations 
bill by the conference of the House and the Senate, and it is the law 
of the land.
  I hope the report that will be forthcoming in 48 hours reflects the 
seriousness of how the President approached the mandates of the 
Congress: Report to us on July 15. I have every reason he will do a 
report no later than September 15. At that time, he will have the 
benefit of a surge which is now, as envisioned, fully staffed and 
implemented by our complement of soldiers, together with such other 
Iraqi complements and perhaps some coalition forces, and we will then 
have been shown, did the surge work.
  I, frankly, think the surge, if allowed to continue in the September 
timeframe, will have achieved a measure of what they set out to do. But 
the corollary obligation of the Iraqi Government to accept an improved 
security situation in Baghdad, created by the sacrifice of soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen, and marines in the surge, and the Iraqi fighters 
with them, they will not have taken advantage of what was achieved by 
that enormous sacrifice. That is my great concern. I hope I am wrong.
  But in the time that remains, I am doubtful the concept that greater 
security in the Baghdad region will translate into greater activity and 
accomplishments by the Iraqi Government.
  While there may be some military success, I don't see the signs now 
of the success that was anticipated by the Iraqi Government.
  I close by saying I thank you for the opportunity. I commend you for 
your hard work and what you believe in. That is important in this 
institution, your own personal involvement and will to fight for what 
you believe. But I do urge you to take a look at what the intelligence 
community is looking at, determine the current military analysis. I say 
to my colleague from Colorado, indeed, there were a number of 
witnesses, professional retired witnesses with military experience that 
contributed to this. But again, they were looking at a situation and a 
factual basis that has substantially changed. I say to my colleagues, 
look at the intelligence, get some military analysis, and then think 
through carefully if the President has this on his desk still, it is 
there, do we need to pass a bill in the Senate and send a signal that 
would begin to engender some doubt in what we are doing now as being 
the best course of action and the risks associated with the men and 
women trying to carry forward and respond to the orders of the 
Commander in Chief. That is my fervent plea to you.
  I yield the floor.

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