[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 110 (Wednesday, July 11, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H7635-H7636]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              IRAQ POLICY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Sestak) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SESTAK. Mr. Speaker, even for those convinced the surge in Iraq 
is a mistake, or at a point where our goals cannot realistically be 
attained, the manner in which we implement a decision to leave that 
country is critical to our Nation. How the United States manages its 
transition from a major war to the aftermath of our withdrawal is 
crucial for our strategic security.
  And therefore, a Congress mandating a new security policy through the 
force of law owes a careful explanation to the country why and how it 
is to be done, including dealing with what would occur in the 
aftermath.
  Americans may be tired of this war, but as a group they still expect 
it to be brought to an end that salvages as much as possible from the 
situation and protects our broader interests in the region and the 
world.
  This strategic approach is not just about ``getting the troops 
home.'' Rather, the important concept to pursue is a strategic 
redeployment from Iraq that enhances our security by giving us the 
leverage to begin to unify Iraqis and bring about a regional 
accommodation that works toward that nation's stability.
  However much Americans may desire to reduce forces in Iraq quickly, 
this Nation must still face the aftermath of what will happen in the 
region after redeployment by the force of law. And while some may try 
to characterize this as President Bush's war, it is the whole country's 
war in terms of how its consequences will affect us. For example, a 
careless redeployment due to haste most endangers our 160,000 troops 
and estimated over 100,000 civilian contractors in Iraq.
  Withdrawal is when military forces are at their most vulnerable, 
something our Nation paid heed to when it took the 6 months necessary 
to redeploy less than 10,000 troops safely from Somalia in the 1990s. 
In Iraq, there is one road to Kuwait for thousands of convoys and much 
planning left to do for such a redeployment to occur safely.
  And some ideas for a drawdown will prove less viable than some 
assume. For instance, maintaining residual forces to train Iraqis may 
well not work for the safety of U.S. troops embedded in an Iraqi 
military whose loyalty is suspect at best and fighting motivation 
questionable. Would we then need to retain large combat forces for 
their protection, and if so, how many?
  Let's therefore understand the full limitations of such ideas before 
supporting them without careful strategic thought.
  Such strategic considerations suggest that the precise shape of a 
strategy to redeploy matters a great deal. Responsibility should be 
assigned: To the Iraqis to assume accountability for their country; to 
regional nations to demonstrate accommodations towards

[[Page H7636]]

stability; and to Congress for the consequences of the aftermath which 
it will have dictated.
  A realistic timeline of a year that is needed for a safe redeployment 
of our troops also serves well to protect our regional interests. It 
provides the time needed for a strategy of regional accommodation to 
take effect with Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia, a strategy that rightly 
relies upon their long-term interest in a stable aftermath.
  But in the end, we most importantly must make it clear that we will 
not be made hostage to the permission of our Iraqi friends. This is the 
crux of the strategic approach to enhancing our global strategic 
security: That while Iraqis will have ultimate say over their country, 
we as a Nation need to send a strong message that we are no longer 
willing to support it in a futile pursuit.
  Only by a date that defines the end of our open-ended commitment can 
we force the Iraqis and regional nations to assume responsibility in 
working towards a stable Iraq. We will then, in the eyes of the world, 
leave with the Iraqis and regional nations having clearly helped choose 
the aftermath by their decisions or indecision.
  We cannot afford an inconclusive, open-ended involvement within a 
country where the long-term security benefits do not match what we need 
to reap, and where the trade-off in benefits of not focusing elsewhere 
is harming our strategic security, including a significant negative 
impact on the readiness of our Armed Forces here at home. Nor can we 
afford a nonstrategic approach to the end to our involvement in this 
war, also undermining our future strategic security. Rather than 
leading to a spiral of violence, redeploying from Iraq under a 
strategic timeline of a year will serve as the necessary catalyst for 
the Iraqis to assume responsibility for their country, with regional 
nations then interested in ensuring stability when the United States is 
outside that nation, but remaining with strength in the region.
  The needed accommodation will only come about when the Iraqi 
political leaders are forced to take the difficult political steps 
required to cease the violence in their country, such as building 
cooperation among competing sects and sharing oil revenues among all 
regions in Iraq. And regional nations' incentives, particularly Syria's 
and Iran's, change toward stability when the United States is no longer 
there in the midst of a civil war. And these nations will have to bear 
the consequences of further strife, with refugee flows to their 
countries and the possibility that these relatively allied nations 
could then be joined in a proxy battle to their detriment.
  Ending this war is necessary but insufficient, and Mr. Speaker, how 
we end it and by what means is of even greater importance for the 
troop's safety and our own security.

                          ____________________