Congressional Record, Volume 153 Issue 109 (Tuesday, July 10, 2007)

[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 109 (Tuesday, July 10, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8890-S8908]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the
Senate will resume consideration of H.R. 1585, which the clerk will
report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 1585) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2008 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other
purposes.

Pending:

Nelson of Nebraska (for Levin) amendment No. 2011, in the
nature of a substitute.
Webb amendment No. 2012 (to amendment No. 2011), to specify
minimum periods between deployment of units and members of
the Armed Forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom.
Nelson of Florida amendment No. 2013 (to amendment No.
2012), to change the enactment date.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, again, I would like to thank my old friend
from Hawaii for his patience so that, as the Republican ranking member
of the committee, I may make a statement about the bill itself and
about the situation in Iraq. I thank him for his courtesy, and I will
try not to take too long a period of time. So I thank my old friend
from Hawaii.
Mr. President, we have reached another moment of importance this week
in debating the fiscal year 2008 Defense authorization bill. We will
help set the course of the Nation's security policy and influence our
participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much of the debate,
as we all know, will be about Iraq, and before I discuss that and my
recent visit, I would note that many provisions in this bill constitute
a good defense policy and will strengthen the ability of our country to
defend itself.
Under the leadership of my good friend from Michigan, the chairman of
the committee, Senator Levin, I think we have crafted an excellent
piece of legislation. I think a testament to his leadership is that the
committee voted unanimously to report the bill, and it fully funds the
President's $648 billion defense budget request. It provides necessary
measures to try to bring under control waste, fraud, and abuse in
defense procurement, and, frankly, it makes Members more accountable
for their spending in the earmark process.

Again, I thank Senator Levin, the subcommittee chairs, and all the
committee members for their work in bringing this issue to the floor.
Very briefly, we have authorized a 3.5-percent, across-the-board pay
raise for all military personnel. We have increased Army and Marine end
strength to 525,400 and 189,000, respectively. The committee also
approved $2.7 billion for items on the Army Chief of Staff's unfunded
requirement list, including $775 million for reactive armor and other
Stryker requirements, $207 million for aviation survivability
equipment, $102 million for combat training centers and funding for
explosive ordnance disposal equipment, night vision devices, and
machine guns.
The bill also authorizes $4.1 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicles, known as MRAP vehicles, for all of the Services'
known requirements.
The committee has come up with the money to support our troops, and I
have no doubt the full Senate will follow step.
Money and policy statements are not all that is required at this
moment in our national history. Courage is required--courage, not the
great courage exhibited by the brave men and women fighting today in
Iraq and Afghanistan, but a smaller measure: the courage necessary to
put our country's interests before every personal or political
consideration.
In this light, I would like to discuss America's involvement in Iraq,
and finally I would like to make several points.
Final reinforcements needed to implement General Petraeus's
counterinsurgency tactics arrived just several weeks ago. Last week I
had the opportunity to visit with troops in theater. From what I saw
and heard while there, I believe our military, in cooperation with the
Iraqi security forces, is making progress in a number of areas. There
are other areas where they are not. I would like to outline some of
their efforts, not to argue that these areas have suddenly become
safe--they have not; I want to emphasize the areas have not become
safe--but to illustrate the progress our military has achieved under
General Petraeus's new strategy.
Last year Anbar Province was believed to be lost to al-Qaida. On the
map we see that U.S. and Iraqi troops cleaned out al-Qaida fighters
from Ramadi and other areas of western Anbar. Tribal sheiks broke with
the terrorists and joined the coalition side. It is a fact that some 16
out of the 24 sheiks in the Sunni area of Anbar Province have now
joined with U.S. forces in their commitment to destroy al-Qaida in
Anbar Province.
Ramadi, months ago, was Iraq's most dangerous city. It is now one of
its safest. At considerable political risk, I point out that I visited,
with Senator Graham, downtown Ramadi where the shopping areas were
open. I did not visit without protection or without security forces
with me. But the fact is, a short time ago it was one of the most
dangerous cities in all of Iraq. Attacks are down from 30 to 35 a day
in February to zero on most days now.
In Fallujah, Iraqi police have established numerous stations and have
divided the city into gated districts. The violence has declined and
local intelligence tips have proliferated. Throughout Anbar Province,
thousands of young men are signing up for the police and Army, and the
locals are taking the fight to al-Qaida. All 18 major tribes in the
province are now onboard with the security plan. A year from now, the
Iraqi Army and police could have total control of security in Ramadi,
allowing American forces to safely draw down.
South of Baghdad, operation Phantom Thunder is intended to stop
insurgents present in the Baghdad belts from originating attacks in the
capital itself. A brigade of the 10th Mountain Division, which I
visited, is operating in Baghdad belts that have been havens for al-
Qaida. All soldiers in the brigade are living forward. That means they
are in outposts away from the headquarters 24-7, living, working, and
fighting alongside Iraqi military. Commanders report that the local
sheiks

[[Page S8891]]

are increasingly siding with the coalition against al-Qaida.
Southeast of Baghdad, the military is targeting al-Qaida in safe
havens they maintain along the Tigris River. In Baghdad itself, the
military, in cooperation with Iraqi security forces, continues to
establish joint security stations and deploy throughout the city. These
efforts have produced some positive results. Sectarian violence has
fallen. Since January, the total number of car bombings and suicide
attacks declined. In May and June, the number of locals coming forward
with intelligence tips has risen.
Make no mistake, violence in Baghdad remains at unacceptably high
levels, suicide bombers and other threats pose formidable challenges,
and other difficulties abound. Nevertheless, there appears to be
overall movement in the right direction.
I have no doubt how difficult suicide bombers are to counter. Ask the
Israelis. They literally had to seal their borders with Gaza and the
West Bank because of the way people who are willing to sacrifice their
own lives in order to take the lives of others are able to get through
and do these horrendous acts that we are exposed to quite often on our
television screens and in our newspapers in America.
In Diyala Province, Iraqi and American troops have surged and are
fighting to deny al-Qaida sanctuary in the city of Baqubah. For the
first time since the war began, Americans showed up in force and did
not quickly withdraw from the area. In response, locals have formed a
new alliance with the coalition to counter al-Qaida.
Why are some of these people now turning against al-Qaida? One reason
is the extreme cruelty that is practiced by al-Qaida on a routine
basis, which has caused many people to reject that kind of extreme
violence and cruelty inflicted on the local people. Diyala, which was
the center of Abu Mus' Ab al-Zarqawi's caliphate, finally has the
chance to turn aside the forces of extremism.
I offer these observations not to present a rosy scenario of the
challenges we continue to face in Iraq. As last weekend's horrific
bombing indicates so graphically, the threats to Iraqi stability have
not gone away, nor are they likely to go away in the near future when
our brave men and women in Iraq will continue to face great challenges.
What I do believe is, while the mission to bring a degree of security
to Iraq and to Baghdad and its environs in particular in order to
establish the necessary preconditions for political and economic
progress--while that mission is still in its early stages, the progress
our military has made should encourage us. It is also clear the overall
strategy that General Petraeus has put into place, a traditional
counterinsurgency tactic that emphasizes protecting a population and
which gets our troops off of the bases and into the areas they are
trying to protect--that this strategy is the correct one.

Some of my colleagues argue that we should return troops to the
forward operating bases and confine their activities to training and
targeted counterterrorism operations. That is precisely what we did for
3\1/2\ years, and the situation in Iraq got worse. Over 3\1/2\ years we
had our troops from operating bases going out--search and destroy as we
used to call it during the Vietnam war--and going back to their bases.
That was a failed strategy from the beginning. I am surprised that any
of my colleagues would advocate a return to the failed Rumsfeld-Casey
strategy.
No one can be certain whether this new strategy, which remains in the
early stages, can bring about greater stability. We can be sure, should
the Senate seek to legislate an end to this strategy as it is just
beginning, then we will fail for certain.
Now that the military effort in Iraq is showing some signs of
progress, the space is opening for political progress. Yet rather than
seizing the opportunity, the government of Prime Minister Maliki is not
functioning as it must. I repeat, the government of Prime Minister
Maliki is not functioning as it must. We see little evidence of
reconciliation and little progress toward meeting the benchmarks laid
out by the President. The Iraqi Government can function. The question
is whether it will.
To encourage political progress, I believe we can find wisdom in
several suggestions put forward recently by Henry Kissinger.
Intensified negotiations by the Iraqi parties could limit violence,
promote reconciliation, and put the political system on a more stable
footing. We should promote dialog between the Iraqi Government and its
Sunni Arab neighbors, specifically Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, in
order to build broader international acceptance for the Iraqi central
government in exchange for that government meeting specific obligations
with respect to the protection and political participation of the Sunni
minority. We should begin a broader effort to establish a basis for aid
and even peacekeeping efforts by the international community, keyed to
political progress in Iraq.
Taking such steps, we must recognize that no lasting political
settlement can grow out of the U.S. withdrawal. On the contrary, a
withdrawal must grow out of a political solution, a solution made
possible by the imposition of security by coalition and Iraqi forces.
Secretary Kissinger is correct when he says ``precipitate withdrawal
would produce a disaster,'' one that ``would not end the war but shift
it to other areas, like Lebanon or Jordan or Saudi Arabia,'' produce
greater violence among Iraqi factions, and embolden radical Islamists
around the world.

The war between Iraqi factions would intensify. The
demonstration of American impotence would embolden radical
Islamism and further radicalize its disciples from Indonesia
and India to the suburbs of European capitals . . .
What America and the world need is not unilateral
withdrawal but a vision by the Bush administration of a
sustainable political end to the conflict.

As I said before, withdrawals must grow out of a political solution,
not the other way around.
The Shias and the Sunnis and the Kurds:

They need the buttress of a diplomatic process that could
provide international support for carrying out any internal
agreements reached or to contain conflict if the internal
parties cannot agree and Iraq breaks up . . .
The American goal should be an international agreement
regarding the international status of Iraq. It would test
whether Iraq's neighbors as well as some more distant
countries are prepared to translate general concepts into
converging policies. It would provide a legal and political
framework to resist violations. These are the meaningful
benchmarks against which to test American withdrawals.

He goes on to point out:

Turkey has repeatedly emphasized it would resist a breakup
by force because of the radicalizing impact a Kurdish State
could have on Turkey's large Kurdish population. But this
would bring Turkey into unwanted conflict with the United
States and open a Pandora's box of other interventions.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan dread Shiite domination of Iraq,
especially if the Baghdad regime threatens to become a
satellite of Iran. The various Gulf Sheikdoms, the largest of
which is Kuwait, find themselves in an even more threatened
position.
Syria's attitudes are likely to be more ambivalent. Its
ties to Iran represent both a claim to status and a looming
vulnerability . . .
Given a wise and determined American diplomacy, even Iran
may be brought to conclude that the risks of continued
turmoil outweigh the temptations before it.

He goes on to talk about a multilateral framework.

A forum for diplomacy already exists in the foreign
ministers' conference that met recently at Sharm el-Sheikh,
Egypt. . . . It is in the United States' interests to turn
the conference into a working enterprise under strong, if
discrete, American leadership.

He goes on to say:

Neither the international system nor American public
opinion will accept as a permanent arrangement, an American
enclave maintained exclusively by American military power in
so volatile a region.

I believe Secretary Kissinger is correct. I believe he is correct
when he bases the premise that precipitate withdrawal would produce a
disaster.
Many of my colleagues would like to believe that should any of the
various amendments forcing withdrawal become law, it would mark the end
of this long effort. They are wrong.
Should the Congress force a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq, it
would mark a new beginning, the start of a new, more dangerous, more
arduous effort to contain the forces unleashed by our disengagement.
Our efforts in Iraq today are critical to the wider struggle against
violent Islamic extremism. Already the terrorists are emboldened,

[[Page S8892]]

excited that America is talking not about winning in Iraq but is rather
debating when we should lose.
Last week, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida's deputy chief, said the
United States is merely delaying our ``inevitable'' defeat in Iraq and
that: ``The Mujahideen of Islam in Iraq of the caliphate and jihad are
advancing with steady steps toward victory.''
If we leave Iraq prematurely, jihadists around the world will
interpret the withdrawal as their great victory against our great
power. The movement thrives in an atmosphere of perceived victory. We
saw this in the surge of men and money flowing to al-Qaida following
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
If they defeat the United States in Iraq, they will believe anything
is possible, history is on their side, and they can bring their
terrible rule to lands the world over.
Recall the plan laid out in a letter from Zawahiri to Abu Mus'ab al-
Zarqawi before his death. That plan is to take shape in four stages:
Establish a caliphate in Iraq, extend the jihad wave to the secular
countries neighboring Iraq, clash with Israel; none of which shall
commence until the completion of stage one: Expel the Americans from
Iraq. The terrorists are in this war to win it. The question is, Are
we?
Withdrawing before there is a stable and legitimate Iraqi authority
would turn Iraq into a failed state and a terrorist sanctuary in the
heart of the Middle East. We have seen a failed state emerge after U.S.
disengagement once before. It cost us terribly. In pre-9/11
Afghanistan, terrorists found sanctuary to train and plan attacks with
impunity. We know that today there are terrorists in Iraq who are
planning attacks against Americans. I do not think we should make this
mistake twice.
Brent Scowcroft, whom we also know was opposed to the invasion of
Iraq in the first place, has said:

The costs of staying are visible. The costs of getting out
are almost never discussed . . . If we get out before Iraq is
stable, the entire Middle East region might start to resemble
Iraq today. Getting out is not a solution.

One of my great heroes and role models and a person whom I have had
the great honor of getting to know recently is Natan Sharansky, a man
of inestimable courage and knowledge. He recently had a piece that ran
Sunday in the Washington Post. The title of his piece is: ``Leave Iraq,
Embrace for a Bigger Bloodbath.''
In his statement, he talks about:

The truth is that in totalitarian regimes, there are no
human rights. Period. The media do not criticize the
government. Parliaments do not check executive power. Courts
do not uphold due process. And human rights groups do not
file reports.

He talks about the moral divide that separates societies in which
people are slaves, from societies in which people are free.
``Some human rights groups undermine the very cause they claim to
champion,'' he says.

Consider one 2005 Amnesty International report on Iraq. It
notes that in the lawless climate of the first months after
Hussein's overthrow, reports of kidnappings, rapes and
killings of women and girls by criminal gangs rose. Iraqi
officers at a police station in Baghdad said in June 2003
that the number of reported rapes was ``substantially higher
than before the war.''
The implication was that human rights may not really be
improving in post-Hussein Iraq. But the organization ignored
the possibility that reports of rape at police stations may
have increased for the simple reason that under Hussein it
was the regime--which includes the police--that was doing the
raping.

He goes on to say:

A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to a
bloodbath that would make the current carnage pale by
comparison.

I am quoting from Natan Sharansky.

Without U.S. troops in place to quell some of the violence,
Iranian-backed Shiite militias would dramatically increase
their attacks on Sunnis; Sunni militias, backed by the Saudis
or others, would retaliate in kind, drawing more and more of
Iraq into a vicious cycle of violence. If Iraq descended into
full-blown civil war, the chaos could trigger similar clashes
throughout the region as Sunni-Shiite tensions spill across
Iraq's borders. The death toll and the displacement civilians
would climb exponentially.

He says:

Perhaps the greatest irony of the political debate over
Iraq is that many of Bush's critics, who accused his
administration of going blindly to war without considering
what would happen once Hussein's regime was toppled, now
blindly support a policy of withdrawing from Iraq without
considering what might follow.
In this respect, the debate over Iraq is beginning to look
a lot like the debate about the Vietnam War in the 1960s and
1970s. Then, too, the argument in the United States focused
primarily on whether U.S. forces should pull out. But many
who supported that withdrawal in the name of human rights did
not foresee the calamity that followed, which included
genocide in Cambodia, tens of thousands slaughtered in
Vietnam by the North Vietnamese and the tragedy of hundreds
of thousands of ``boat people.''

Mr. Sharansky lives in the neighborhood. Mr. Sharansky understands
the meaning of the word ``freedom.'' Mr. Sharansky understands the
meaning of the word ``sacrifice.''
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record the Kissinger and Sharansky articles.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the International Herald Tribune Media Services, July 2, 2007]

A Political Program To Exit Iraq

(By Henry A. Kissinger)

The war in Iraq is approaching a kind of self-imposed
climax. Public disenchantment is palpable. Congress will
surely press for an accelerated, if not total, withdrawal of
American forces. Demands for a political solution are likely
to mount.
But precipitate withdrawal would produce a disaster. It
would not end the war but shift it to other areas, like
Lebanon or Jordan or Saudi Arabia. The war between the Iraqi
factions would intensify. The demonstration of American
impotence would embolden radical Islamism and further
radicalize its disciples from Indonesia and India to the
suburbs of European capitals.
We face a number of paradoxes. Military victory, in the
sense of establishing a government capable of enforcing its
writ throughout Iraq, is not possible in a time frame
tolerated by the American political process. Yet no political
solution is conceivable in isolation from the situation on
the ground.
What America and the world need is not unilateral
withdrawal but a vision by the administration of a
sustainable political end to the conflict. Withdrawals must
grow out of a political solution, not the other way around.
None of Iraq's neighbors, not even Iran, is in a position
to dominate the situation against the opposition of all the
other interested parties. Is it possible to build a
sustainable outcome on such considerations?
The answer must be sought on three levels: the internal,
the regional and the international.
The internal parties--the Shiites, the Sunnis and the
Kurds--have been subjected to insistent American appeals to
achieve national reconciliation. But groups that have been
conducting blood feuds with one another for centuries are,
not surprisingly, struggling in their efforts to compose
their differences by constitutional means. They need the
buttress of a diplomatic process that could provide
international support for carrying out any internal
agreements reached or to contain their conflict if the
internal parties cannot agree and Iraq breaks up.
The American goal should be an international agreement
regarding the international status of Iraq. It would test
whether the neighbors of Iraq as well as some more distant
countries are prepared to translate general concepts into
converging policies. It would provide a legal and political
framework to resist violations. These are the meaningful
benchmarks against which to test American withdrawals.
The reason why such a diplomacy may prove feasible is that
the continuation of Iraq's current crisis presents all of
Iraq's neighbors with mounting problems. The longer the war
in Iraq rages, the more likely will be the breakup of the
country into sectarian units.
Turkey has repeatedly emphasized that it would resist such
a breakup by force because of the radicalizing impact that a
Kurdish state could have on Turkey's large Kurdish
population. But this would bring Turkey into unwanted
conflict with the United States and open a Pandora's box of
other interventions.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan dread Shiite domination of Iraq,
especially if the Baghdad regime threatens to become a
satellite of Iran. The various Gulf sheikhdoms, the largest
of which is Kuwait, find themselves in an even more
threatened position. Syria's attitudes are likely to be more
ambivalent. Its ties to Iran represent both a claim to status
and a looming vulnerability.
Given a wise and determined American diplomacy, even Iran
may be brought to conclude that the risks of continued
turmoil outweigh the temptations before it.
To be sure, Iranian leaders may believe that the wind is at
their backs, that the moment is uniquely favorable to realize
millennial visions of a reincarnated Persian empire or a
reversal of the Shiite-Sunni split under Shiite domination.
On the other hand, if prudent leaders exist--which remains to
be determined--they might come to the conclusion that they
had better treat these advantages as a bargaining chip in a
negotiation

[[Page S8893]]

rather than risk them in a contest over domination of the
region.
No American president will, in the end, acquiesce once the
full consequences of Iranian domination of the region become
apparent. Russia will have its own reasons, principally the
fear of the radicalization of its own Islamic minority, to
begin resisting Iranian and radical Islamist domination of
the Gulf. Combined with the international controversy over
its nuclear weapons program, Iran's challenge could come to
be perceived by its leaders to pose excessive risks.
Whether or whenever Iran reaches these conclusions, two
conditions will have to be met: First, no serious diplomacy
can be based on the premise that the United States is the
supplicant. America and its allies must demonstrate a
determination to vindicate their vital interests that Iran
will find credible. Second, the United States will need to
put forward a diplomatic position that acknowledges the
legitimate security interests of Iran.
Such a negotiation must be initiated within a genuinely
multilateral forum. A dramatic bilateral Iranian-U.S.
negotiation would magnify all the region's insecurities. For
if Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--which have
entrusted their security primarily to the United States--
become convinced that an Iranian-U.S. condominium is looming,
a race for Tehran's favor may bring about the disintegration
of all resolve.
Within a multilateral framework, the United States will be
able to conduct individual conversations with the key
participants, as has happened in the six-party forum on North
Korea.
A forum for such an effort already exists in the foreign
ministers' conference that met recently at Sharm el-Sheikh.
It is in the United States' interest to turn the conference
into a working enterprise under strong, if discreet, American
leadership.
The purpose of such a forum should be to define the
international status of the emerging Iraqi political
structure into a series of reciprocal obligations. Iraq would
continue to evolve as a sovereign state but agree to place
itself under some international restraint in return for
specific guarantees.
In such a scheme, the United States-led multinational force
would be gradually transformed into an agent of that
arrangement, along the lines of the Bosnian settlement in the
Balkans.
All this suggests a three-tiered international effort: an
intensified negotiation among the Iraqi parties; a regional
forum like the Sharm el-Sheikh conference to elaborate an
international transition status for Iraq; and a broader
conference to establish the peacekeeping and verification
dimensions. The rest of the world cannot indefinitely pretend
to be bystanders to a process that could engulf them through
their default.
Neither the international system nor American public
opinion will accept as a permanent arrangement an American
enclave maintained exclusively by American military power in
so volatile a region. The concept outlined here seeks to
establish a new international framework for Iraq. It is an
outcome emerging from a political and military situation on
the ground and not from artificial deadlines.
____

[From the Washington Post, July 8, 2007]

Leave Iraq and Brace for a Bigger Bloodbath

(By Natan Sharansky)

Iraqis call Ali Hassan al-Majeed ``Chemical Ali,'' and few
wept when the notorious former general received five death
sentences last month for ordering the use of nerve agents
against his government's Kurdish citizens in the late 1980s.
His trial came as a reckoning and a reminder--summoning up
the horrors of Saddam Hussein's rule even as it underscored
the way today's heated Iraq debates in Washington have left
the key issue of human rights on the sidelines. People of
goodwill can certainly disagree over how to handle Iraq, but
human rights should be part of any responsible calculus.
Unfortunately, some leaders continue to play down the gross
violations in Iraq under Hussein's republic of fear and
ignore the potential for a human rights catastrophe should
the United States withdraw.
As the hideous violence in Iraq continues, it has become
increasingly common to hear people argue that the world was
better off with Hussein in power and (even more remarkably)
that Iraqis were better off under his fist. In his final
interview as U.N. secretary general, Kofi Annan acknowledged
that Iraq ``had a dictator who was brutal'' but said that
Iraqis under the Baathist dictatorship ``had their streets,
they could go out, their kids could go to school.''
This line of argument began soon after the U.S.-led
invasion in 2003. By early 2004, some prominent political and
intellectual leaders were arguing that women's rights, gay
rights, health care and much else had suffered in post-
Hussein Iraq.
Following in the footsteps of George Bernard Shaw, Walter
Duranty and other Western liberals who served as willing
dupes for Joseph Stalin, some members of the human rights
community are whitewashing totalitarianism. A textbook
example came last year from John Pace, who recently left his
post as U.N. human rights chief in Iraq. ``Under Saddam,'' he
said, according to the Associated Press, ``if you agreed to
forgo your basic freedom of expression and thought, you were
physically more or less OK.''
The truth is that in totalitarian regimes, there are no
human rights. Period. The media do not criticize the
government. Parliaments do not check executive power. Courts
do not uphold due process. And human rights groups don't file
reports.
For most people, life under totalitarianism is slavery with
no possibility of escape. That is why despite the carnage in
Iraq, Iraqis are consistently less pessimistic about the
present and more optimistic about the future of their country
than Americans are. In a face-to-face national poll of 5,019
people conducted this spring by Opinion Research Business, a
British market-research firm, only 27 percent of Iraqis said
they believed ``that their country is actually in a state of
civil war,'' and by nearly 2 to 1 (49 percent to 26 percent),
the Iraqis surveyed said they preferred life under their new
government to life under the old tyranny. That is why, at a
time when many Americans are abandoning the vision of a
democratic Iraq, most Iraqis still cling to the hope of a
better future. They know that under Hussein, there was no
hope.
By consistently ignoring the fundamental moral divide that
separates societies in which people are slaves from societies
in which people are free, some human rights groups undermine
the very cause they claim to champion. Consider one 2005
Amnesty International report on Iraq. It notes that in the
lawless climate of the first months after Hussein's
overthrow, reports of kidnappings, rapes and killings of
women and girls by criminal gangs rose. Iraqi officers at a
police station in Baghdad said in June 2003 that the number
of reported rapes ``was substantially higher than before the
war.''
The implication was that human rights may not really be
improving in post-Hussein Iraq. But the organization ignored
the possibility that reports of rape at police stations may
have increased for the simple reason that under Hussein it
was the regime--which includes the police--that was doing the
raping. When Hussein's son Uday went on his legendary raping
sprees, victims were not about to report the crime.
Of course, Hussein's removal has created a host of
difficult strategic challenges, and numerous human rights
atrocities have been committed since his ouster. But let us
be under no illusion of what life under Hussein was like. He
was a mass murderer who tortured children in front of their
parents, gassed Kurds, slaughtered Shiites, started two wars
with his neighbors and launched Scud missiles into downtown
Riyadh and Tel Aviv. The price for the stability that Hussein
supposedly brought to the region was mass graves, hundreds of
thousands of dead in Iraq, and terrorism and war outside it.
Difficult as the challenges are today--with Iran and Syria
trying to stymie democracy in Iraq, with al-Qaeda turning
Iraq into the central battleground in its holy war of
terrorism against the free world, and with sectarian militias
bent on murder and mayhem--there is still hope that tomorrow
may be better.
No one can know for sure whether President Bush's ``surge''
of U.S. troops in Iraq will succeed. But those who believe
that human rights should play a central role in international
affairs should be doing everything in their power to maximize
the chances that it will. For one of the consequences of
failure could well be catastrophe.
A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to a
bloodbath that would make the current carnage pale by
comparison. Without U.S. troops in place to quell some of the
violence, Iranian-backed Shiite militias would dramatically
increase their attacks on Sunnis; Sunni militias, backed by
the Saudis or others, would retaliate in kind, drawing more
and more of Iraq into a vicious cycle of violence. If Iraq
descended into full-blown civil war, the chaos could trigger
similar clashes throughout the region as Sunni-Shiite
tensions spill across Iraq's borders. The death toll and the
displacement of civilians could climb exponentially.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the political debate over
Iraq is that many of Bush's critics, who accused his
administration of going blindly to war without considering
what would happen once Hussein's regime was toppled, now
blindly support a policy of withdrawing from Iraq without
considering what might follow.
In this respect, the debate over Iraq is beginning to look
a lot like the debate about the Vietnam War in the 1960s and
'70s. Then, too, the argument in the United States focused
primarily on whether U.S. forces should pull out. But many
who supported that withdrawal in the name of human rights did
not foresee the calamity that followed, which included
genocide in Cambodia, tens of thousands slaughtered in
Vietnam by the North Vietnamese and the tragedy of hundreds
of thousands of ``boat people.''
In the final analysis, U.S. leaders will pursue a course in
Iraq that they believe best serves U.S. interests. My hope is
that as they do, they will make the human rights dimension a
central part of any decision. The consequences of not doing
so might prove catastrophic to Iraqis, to regional peace and,
ultimately, to U.S. security.

Mr. McCAIN. Should we leave Iraq before there is a basic level of
stability, we will invite further Iranian influence at a time when
Iranian operatives are already moving weapons, training fighters,
providing resources and helping plan operations to

[[Page S8894]]

kill American soldiers and damage our efforts to bring stability to
Iraq.
Iran will comfortably step into the power vacuum left by a U.S.
withdrawal, and such an aggrandizement of fundamentalist power has
great potential to spark greater Sunni-Shia conflict across the region.
Leaving prematurely would induce Iraq's neighbors, including Saudi
Arabia and Jordan, Egypt and Israel, Turkey and others, to feel their
own security eroding and may well induce them to act in ways that
prompt wider instability. The potential for genocide, wider war,
spiralling oil prices, and the perception of strategic American defeat
is real.
This fight is about Iraq but not about Iraq alone. It is greater than
that and, more important still, about whether America still has the
political courage to fight for victory or whether we will settle for
defeat, with all the terrible things that accompany it. We cannot walk
away gracefully from defeat in this war.
General Petraeus and his commanders believe they have a strategy that
can, over time, lead to success in Iraq. General Petraeus and
Ambassador Ryan Crocker will come to Washington in September to report
on the status of their efforts and those of the Iraqis. They ask two
things of us: the time necessary to see whether their efforts can
succeed and the political courage to support them in their work. I
believe we should give them both.
I know that Senators are tired of this war, tired of the mounting
death toll, tired of the many mistakes we have made in this war and the
great effort it requires to reverse them, tired of the war's
politicization and the degree to which it has become embroiled in
partisan struggles and election strategies. I understand this fatigue.
Yet I maintain that we, as elected leaders with a duty to our people
and the security of their Nation, cannot let fatigue dictate our
policies.
The soldiers I met last week have no illusions about the sacrifices
necessary to achieve their mission. On July 4, I had the great
privilege to be present as 588 troops reenlisted in the military and
another 161 were naturalized as U.S. citizens. Tragically, two of those
who were scheduled to be naturalized as U.S. citizens were killed very
shortly before the ceremony.
Those men and women taking the oaths of enlistment and citizenship in
the center of Saddam's al Faw Palace, they understand the many
hardships made in our name. They have completed tour after tour away
from their families, risking everything, everything for the security of
this country. They do so because they understand the circumstances
that, however great the costs of this war, the costs are immeasurably
greater still if we abandon it prematurely. All they ask is that we
support them in their noble mission.
I wish we had planned to fight this war correctly the first time. But
we can no more turn back the clock to 2003 than we can wish away the
consequences of defeat by imposing some artificial deadline for
withdrawal. Last week in Iraq, I met the bravest men and women our
country has to offer, and not one of them told me it was time to go or
that the cause is lost.
They are frustrated with the Iraqi Government's lack of progress.
They are buffeted by the winds of partisanship in Washington, talking
today of surges and tomorrow of withdrawal, voting to confirm General
Petraeus and then voting for a course that guarantees defeat. But in
the end, they know the war in Iraq is part of a larger struggle, a war
of moderation and stability against the forces of violence and
extremism.
They recognize that if we simply pack up and leave, the war does not
end--it merely gets harder.
Finally, I would like to give a couple of quotes. General Lynch, who
is the third ID commander of the U.S. forces, says:

Pulling out before the mission was accomplished would be a
mess. We find the enemy regaining ground, reestablishing
sanctuaries, building more IEDs and the violence would
escalate.

GEN Anthony Zinni, one of my particular heroes, who opposed the war
in Iraq, said:

. . . that we cannot simply pull out of Iraq, as much as we
may want to. The consequences of a destabilized and chaotic
Iraq, sitting in the center of a critical region of the
world, could have catastrophic implications. . . .There is no
short-term solution. It will take years to stabilize Iraq.
How many? I believe at least five to seven.

In the Baker Hamilton report, there is a lot of selective quoting.
But I would like to point out that they said:

Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for
catastrophe in the role and the commitments of the United
States in initiating events that have led to the current
situation, we believe it would be wrong for the United States
to abandon the country through a precipitous withdrawal of
troops and support. A premature American departure from Iraq
would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence and
further deterioration of conditions, leading to a number of
adverse consequences outlined above. The near-term results
would be a significant power vacuum, greater human suffering,
regional destabilization, and a threat to the global economy.
Al-Qaeda would depict our withdrawal as a historic victory.
If we leave and Iraq descends into chaos, the long-range
consequences could eventually require the United States to
return.

That is page 30 of the Iraq Study Group report.
Finally, I understand, I believe very well, how difficult this issue
is for many of our Members. I know the sorrow and the frustration that
they and their constituents feel. If I knew a great option as to how we
could preserve our Nation's security and withdraw and stop the
unfortunate casualties that are incurred by these brave young people, I
would embrace it tomorrow.
Part of this debate is going to be proposals that people have made
about how we can best leave. I intend to engage in vigorous discussion
and debate. I would like to again begin this debate by pointing out I
respect the views of my colleagues on this issue.
I understand their frustration. I intend to be respectful of their
views, and I hope we can have a debate and discussion on this issue, as
we consider various amendments, that will better inform the American
people of both points of view. I hope over time somehow we can find a
way to come together in this body and in this Nation because this war
has divided this Nation in the most terrible way.
I saw it once before. I saw it once before, a long time ago, and I
saw a defeated military, and I saw how long it took a military that was
defeated to recover. I saw a divided nation beset by assassinations and
riots and a breakdown in a civil society. That is why we need, in my
view, to try to come together--and I do not know how we do that--
beginning with respecting each other's views so we can come together
and hopefully end the tragedy of Iraq and at the same time ensure
America's security.
I will be saying a lot more on this issue as we continue the debate.
I say again, I respect the views of my colleagues. Then, finally, I
again pay my compliments to the distinguished chairman of the
committee, who put together, as is his wont, a bipartisan package that
will ensure our Nation's security in the future, as exemplified again
by a unanimous vote of the committee in reporting out the Defense
authorization bill.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Klobuchar). The Senator from Michigan is
recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, let me first thank Senator McCain for his
great generosity in terms of his comments about the committee and the
operations of our committee. As he well knows, our committee has had a
great tradition of bipartisanship. He has made a major contribution,
always, to that tradition. As ranking member, he has more than
continued that tradition. He has made a major contribution to it and to
the bill that is before us and to the bipartisan flavor of that bill.
While there obviously are and will be differences--which are
understandable and appropriate--as he well points out, this is a bill
that had unanimous support in the committee. We, in the next week or
so, will be hearing differences on issues, including Iraq, and that is
totally what we are all about: to express our feelings in a civil way
and in a strong way.
But I add my thanks to him for his contribution for so many decades
going back. When he speaks about the situation we are in in Iraq, he
speaks with not only great feeling but also with great experience, and
I think every Member of this body treasures our relationship with
Senator McCain and the

[[Page S8895]]

experience he brings to this debate. He has the commitment, I hope, of
everybody in this body that the debate, as we proceed relative to Iraq
or any other issues in this week and next, will proceed in a very civil
way.
This issue requires all of the wisdom we can muster, all of the
experiences of the various Members, and he has my assurance, and I
think he would have the assurance of every Member of this body, that
the tone he sets and wants us to maintain will indeed be maintained by
this Senate. I am confident of that, and thank him again for his
remarks and for his great contribution to this bill.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Congressional
Budget Office cost estimate of the Senate version of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which was not available
when the report on that bill, S. 1547, was filed, be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

S. 1547--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008

Summary: S. 1547 would authorize appropriations totaling
$629 billion for fiscal year 2008 for the military functions
of the Department of Defense (DoD), for activities of the
Department of Energy (DOE), and for other purposes. That
total includes $128 billion for military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In addition, S. 1547 would prescribe
personnel strengths for each active-duty and selected reserve
component of the U.S. armed forces. CBO estimates that
appropriation of the authorized amounts would result in
additional outlays of $621 billion over the 2008-2012 period.
Including outlays from funds previously appropriated,
spending for defense programs authorized by the bill would
total about $599 billion in 2008, CBO estimates. The bill
also contains provisions that would both increase and
decrease costs of discretionary defense programs in future
years. Most of those provisions would affect force structure,
compensation, and benefits. In total, such provisions would
raise costs by $9 billion in 2008 (this amount is included in
the above total of $629 billion specifically authorized for
that year) and by $4 billion to $6 billion annually over the
2009-2012 period.
The bill contains provisions that would both increase and
decrease direct spending from changes to TRICARE For Life,
the foreign currency fluctuation account, combat-related
special compensation, and other programs. We estimate that
those provisions combined would decrease direct spending by
$309 million in 2008, $714 million over the 2008-2012 period,
and $2.1 billion over the 2008-2017 period. Those totals
include estimated net receipts from asset sales of a little
under $0.6 billion over the 2008-2017 period. (Under current
scorekeeping rules and conventions, asset sale receipts are
recorded as a credit against direct spending as long as such
sales would not result in a net financial cost to the
government--as determined on a present value basis.) In
addition, enacting the bill would have a negligible effect on
revenues.
Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
excludes from the application of that act any legislative
provisions that enforce the constitutional rights of
individuals. CBO has determined that section 1022 would fall
within that exclusion because it would amend the authority of
the President to employ the armed services to protect
individuals' civil rights. Therefore, CBO has not reviewed
that section of the bill for mandates.
Other provisions of S. 1547 contain both intergovernmental
and private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA but CBO
estimates that the annual cost of those mandates would not
exceed the thresholds established in UMRA ($66 million for
intergovernmental mandates in 2007 and $131 million for
private-sector mandates in 2007, adjusted annually for
inflation).
The bill also contains several provisions that would
benefit state and local governments. Some of those provisions
would authorize aid for certain local schools with dependents
of defense personnel and convey certain parcels of land to
state and local governments. Any costs to those governments
would be incurred voluntarily as a condition of receiving
federal assistance.
Estimated cost to the federal government: The estimated
budgetary impact of S. 1547 is summarized in Table 1. Most of
the costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050
(national defense).
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that S.
1547 will be enacted near the start of fiscal year 2008 and
that the authorized amount will be appropriated for that
year. The estimated outlays from authorizations of regular
appropriations are based on historical spending patterns.

TABLE 1.--BUDGETARY IMPACT OF S. 1547, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 a
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars
-----------------------------------------------------------------
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Spending Under Current Law for Programs
Authorized by S. 1547:
Budget Authority b........................ 617,085 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays......................... 551,703 219,217 79,329 27,802 10,589 4,277
Proposed Changes:
Authorization of Regular Appropriations
for 2008:
Authorization Level................... 0 501,033 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays..................... 0 320,660 116,444 39,156 12,588 4,993
Authorization of Appropriations for 2008
for Military Operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan:
Authorization Level................... 0 128,226 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays..................... 0 59,054 45,470 15,961 4,751 1,648
Spending Under S. 1547:
Authorization Level b..................... 617,085 629,259 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays......................... 551,703 598,931 241,243 82,919 27,928 10,918

CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING (INCLUDING ASSET SALES) c

Estimated Budget Authority.................... 0 -112 -138 84 26 54
Estimated Outlays............................. 0 -309 -287 -72 -62 14
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Enactment of S. 1547 would have an insignificant effect on federal revenues.
b The 2007 level is the amount appropriated for programs authorized by the bill. That figure includes $99.3
billion that was recently provided in Public Law 110-28, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007. The 2007 level shown here is slightly lower than
the comparable figure presented in CBO's cost estimate for H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008, as passed by the House, because H.R. 1585 would authorize appropriations for some
existing programs that would not be authorized by S. 1547.
c In addition to the direct spending effects shown here, enacting S. 1547 would have additional effects on
direct spending after 2012 (see Table 4). The estimated changes in direct spending (including asset sales)
would reduce outlays by $2.1 billion over the 2008-2017 period.
Note--For 2008, the authorization levels under ``Proposed Changes'' include amounts specifically authorized by
the bill. As discussed in footnote 1 of the ``Summary'' to this estimate, the $629 billion that would be
authorized by the bill does not include $11 billion in TRICARE For Life accrual payments that will be made
under current law. (For additional information on those payments, see the discussion under ``Previous CBO
Estimates.'') The bill also implicitly authorizes some activities in 2009 through 2012; those authorizations
are not included above (but are shown in Table 3) because funding for those activities would be covered by
specific authorizations in future years.

Spending subject to appropriation: The bill would
specifically authorize appropriations totaling $629 billion
in 2008 (see Table 2). Nearly all of that amount falls within
budget function 050 (national defense), while a small
portion--$62 million for the Armed Forces Retirement Home--
falls within budget function 600 (income security).
Of the $629 billion in funding for 2008 authorized by the
bill for the costs of defense programs, $128 billion of that
amount would be for DoD costs associated with continuing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The bill also contains provisions that would both increase
and decrease various costs, mostly for changes in end
strength, military compensation, and health benefits, that
would be covered by the fiscal year 2008 authorization and by
authorizations in future years. Table 3 contains estimates of
those amounts.
Multiyear procurement. Multiyear procurement is a special
contracting method authorized in title 10, United States
Code, section 2306b that permits the government to enter into
contracts covering acquisitions for more than one year but
not more than five years, even though the total funds
required for every year are not appropriated at the time the
contracts are awarded. As part of such a contract, the
government commits to purchase all items specified at the
time the contract is signed, including those to be produced
and paid for in subsequent years. Because multiyear
procurement allows a contractor to plan for more efficient
production, such a contract can reduce the cost of an
acquisition compared with the cost of buying the items
through a series of annual procurement contracts.
Such contracts frequently include provisions that require
DoD to pay for unrecovered fixed costs in the event that the
contract is canceled before completion. DoD does not budget
for, obtain, or obligate funds sufficient to pay for those
contractual commitments at the time they are incurred.
Authorizing DoD to initiate a multiyear procurement program
with such unfunded cancellation liabilities provides contract
authority--a form of budget authority--because it allows the
department to incur that liability in advance of
appropriations. CBO believes that the full cost of such
liabilities

[[Page S8896]]

should be recorded in the budget at the time they are
incurred. The failure to request funding for cancellation
liabilities may distort the resource allocation process by
understating the cost of decisions made for the budget year
and may require future Congresses to find the resources to
pay for decisions made today.

TABLE 2.--SPECIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS IN S. 1547
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
Category ------------------------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorization of Regular Appropriations:
Department of Defense:
Military Personnel:
Authorization Level a........................ 109,352 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 103,409 5,411 175 25 0
Operation and Maintenance:
Authorization Level.......................... 166,618 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 127,463 31,030 4,824 1,723 727
Procurement:
Authorization Level.......................... 110,731 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 32,226 41,476 22,272 7,451 3,126
Research and Development:
Authorization Level.......................... 74,208 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 41,037 26,828 4,553 1,051 297
Military Construction and Family Housing:
Authorization Level.......................... 21,784 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 3,037 7,332 6,759 2,488 919
Revolving Funds:
Authorization Level.......................... 2,395 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 1,760 476 86 50 24
General Transfer Authority:
Authorization Level.......................... 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 1,000 -200 -400 -200 -100
Subtotal, Department of Defense:
Authorization Level a.................... 485,088 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................ 309,932 112,353 38,269 12,588 4,993
Atomic Energy Defense Activities b:
Authorization Level.............................. 15,883 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................ 10,676 4,082 887 0 0
Armed Forces Retirement Home:
Authorization Level.............................. 62 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................ 52 9 0 0 0
Subtotal, Authorization of Regular
Appropriations:
Authorization Level...................... 501,033 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................ 320,660 116,444 39,156 12,588 4,993
Authorization of Appropriations for Military Operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Military Personnel:
Authorization Level.............................. 12,922 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................ 12,190 689 17 2 0
Operation and Maintenance:
Authorization Level.............................. 78,117 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................ 36,478 30,588 7,581 1,940 904
Procurement:
Authorization Level.............................. 32,803 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................ 8,069 12,685 7,908 2,714 725
Research and Development:
Authorization Level.............................. 1,950 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................ 1,117 683 111 23 6
Military Construction:
Authorization Level.......................... 753 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 8 309 286 98 38
Revolving Funds:
Authorization Level.......................... 1,681 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays............................ 947 569 128 27 10
Special Transfer Authority:
Authorization Level.............................. 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays................................ 245 -53 -70 -53 -35
Subtotal, Iraq and Afghanistan:
Authorization Level...................... 128,226 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................ 59,054 45,470 15,961 4,751 1,648
Total Specified Authorizations:
Authorization Level a................................ 629,259 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays.................................... 379,714 161,914 55,117 17,339 6,641
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a As discussed in footnote 1 of the ``Summary'' to this estimate, this figure does not include the effect of an
estimated $11 billion in TRICARE For Life accrual payments that will be made under current law. For additional
information, see the discussion under ``Previous CBO Estimates.''
b These authorizations are primarily for atomic energy activities within the Department of Energy.

TABLE 3.--ESTIMATED AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SELECTED PROVISIONS IN S. 1547
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars
Category ------------------------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FORCE STRUCTURE

Army and Marine Corps Active-Duty End Strengths.......... 6,683 4,821 4,257 3,292 2,930
Navy and Air Force Active-Duty End Strengths............. -583 -935 -966 -1,000 -1,033
Reserve Component End Strengths.......................... 306 71 50 52 53
Reserve Technicians...................................... -7 -15 -15 -16 -16
Grade Structure.......................................... 97 182 248 257 265

COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS (DOD)

Pay Raise................................................ 311 425 439 454 469
Expiring Bonuses and Allowances.......................... 2,127 916 370 185 180
Hardship Duty Pay........................................ 79 56 33 23 23
Leave Carryover.......................................... 4 21 22 23 23
Accession Bonus for Health Professional Scholarship...... 15 15 15 15 15
Special Pays for Medical Officers........................ 8 9 10 10 10
Dental Officer Special Pay............................... 8 8 8 8 8
Loan Repayment for Reserves.............................. 1 2 3 4 5

DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

Discount Drug Pricing.................................... -300 -330 -360 -390 -430

OTHER

Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund........... 300 725 1,150 1,600 1,625
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes.--For every item in this table, the 2008 levels are included in Table 2 as amounts specifically authorized
to be appropriated by the bill. Amounts shown in this table for 2009 through 2012 are not included in Table 1,
because authorizations for those amounts would be covered by specific authorizations in future years.
Figures shown here may not add to numbers in the text because of rounding.

[[Page S8897]]

This bill would authorize the Department of Defense to
enter into multiyear procurement contracts for three
programs: enhancements to the Abrams tank, upgrades to the
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and new Virginia class submarines.
Section 111 would authorize the Army to enter a multiyear
contract for up to five years to acquire a number of
improvements to M1A1 Abrams tanks over a five-year period. If
granted this authority, the Army plans to enter a contract
for the 2008-2012 period to modify 577 tanks at a total cost
of $1,595 million; it has requested $639 million in 2008 to
upgrade 241 tanks. The Army estimates that a multiyear
procurement contract for those tank modifications would cost
$178 million less than a series of annual procurement
contracts for those systems.
Section 112 would authorize the Army to enter a multiyear
contract to acquire a number of improvements to the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle. According to budget documents provided by
the Army, the service would use this authority to enter a
contract for the 2008-2011 period to modify 965 vehicles at a
total cost of $2,310 million; it has requested $1,151 million
in 2008 to upgrade 525 vehicles. The Army estimates that a
multiyear procurement contract for those modifications would
cost $131 million less than a series of annual procurement
contracts for those systems.
Section 131 would authorize the Navy to enter a multiyear
contract for Virginia-class submarines beginning in fiscal
year 2009. The Navy plans to enter a contract for the 2009-
2013 period to purchase seven submarines at a total cost of
$19.1 billion; it has requested $703 million in 2008 to buy
certain components in economic quantities and to order items
that have lengthy production times. The Navy estimates that a
multiyear procurement contract would cost $2.9 billion less
than a series of annual procurement contracts for those
vessels.
Force structure. The bill would affect force structure by
setting end-strength levels for the various military services
and by increasing the number of personnel in higher pay
grades.
Military end strength. Title IV would authorize end-
strength levels in 2008 for active-duty personnel and
personnel in the selected reserves of about 1,370,000 and
850,000, respectively. Of those selected reservists, about
76,000 would serve on active duty in support of the reserves.
In total, active-duty end strength would increase by about
4,000 and selected-reserve end strength would decrease by
about 5,000 when compared to levels authorized for 2007.
Section 401 would authorize increases to the active-duty
end strengths of the Army and Marine Corps relative to the
personnel levels authorized for 2007. CBO estimates that
those increases--13,000 additional personnel for the Army and
9,000 for the Marine Corps--would increase costs to DoD by
about $7 billion in 2008 and about $22 billion over the 2008-
2012 period. Those costs include the pay and benefits of the
additional personnel, as well as costs for operation and
maintenance, procurement, and construction.
Section 401 also would decrease the Navy's active-duty end
strength by 12,300 and the Air Force's active-duty end
strength by 5,600. CBO estimates that, combined, those
decreases in end strength would cut costs for salaries and
other expenses by about $580 million in the first year and
about $1 billion annually in subsequent years.
Sections 411 and 412 would authorize the end strengths for
the reserve components, including those full-time reservists
who serve on active duty in support of the reserves. Under
this bill, the selected reserve would experience a net
decrease in end strength of 4,900, with the Navy Reserve and
Air Force Reserve losing personnel while the Army Reserve and
National Guard would see an increase. However, the cost
savings from that net decrease would be more than offset by
the cost of an increase of 1,900 in the number of reservists
who serve on active duty in support of the reserves. CBO
estimates that the net result of implementing those
provisions would be an increase in costs for salaries and
other expenses for selected reservists of $306 million in
2008 and about $50 million a year thereafter as compared to
the authorized end-strength levels for 2007. Costs would be
higher in 2008 and 2009 than in later years as a result of
the need to procure new equipment for the additional Army
National Guard personnel.
In addition, sections 413 and 414 would authorize the
minimum end-strength level for military technicians, who are
federal civilian personnel required to maintain membership in
a selected reserve component as a condition of their
employment. Under this bill, the required number of
technicians would decrease by 128 relative to the levels
currently authorized. CBO estimates the savings in civilian
salaries and expenses that would result from fewer military
technicians would be about $7 million in 2008 and about $15
million annually thereafter, as compared to the minimum end-
strength levels for technicians in 2007.
The bill also would authorize an end strength of 10,000
servicemembers in 2008 for the Coast Guard Reserve. Because
this authorization is the same as that under current law, CBO
does not estimate any additional costs for this provision.
Grade structure. Sections 501, 502, and 521 would increase
the number of servicemembers in certain grades. Sections 501
and 502 would increase the number of officers authorized to
serve as majors in the Army and as lieutenant commanders,
commanders, and captains in the Navy. Section 521 would allow
the services to increase the percentage of personnel serving
in the pay-grade of E-9 from 1 percent of the enlisted force
to 1.25 percent. Those changes would not increase the overall
end strength, but would result in more promotions to those
ranks. CBO estimates that the additional pay and benefits
associated with promoting personnel to those higher grades
would be about $100 million in 2008 and $1 billion over the
2008-2012 period.
Compensation and benefits. S. 1547 contains several
provisions that would affect military compensation and
benefits for uniformed personnel. The bill would specifically
authorize regular appropriations of $109 billion and
additional appropriations for operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan of $13 billion for costs of military pay and
allowances in 2008.
Pay raise. Section 601 would raise basic pay for all
individuals in the uniformed services by 3.5 percent,
effective January 1, 2008. CBO estimates the total cost of a
3.5 percent raise in 2008 would be about $2.2 billion.
Because the pay raise would be above that projected under
current law (under current law a 3 percent across-the-board
increase would go into effect on January 1, 2008), CBO
estimates that the incremental cost associated with the
larger pay raise would be about $311 million in 2008 and $2.1
billion over the 2008-2012 period.
Bonuses and allowances. Sections 611 through 614 would
extend DoD's authority to pay certain bonuses and allowances
to military personnel. Under current law, most of these
authorities are scheduled to expire in December 2007. The
bill would extend these authorities for another year. Based
on data provided by DoD, CBO estimates that: Authorities to
make special payments and give bonuses to certain health care
professionals would cost $26 million in 2008 and $15 million
in 2009; special payments for aviators and personnel
qualified to operate and maintain naval nuclear propulsion
plants would cost $104 million in 2008 and $72 million in
2009; retention and accession bonuses for officers and
enlisted members with critical skills would cost $95 million
in 2008 and $42 million in 2009; payment of reenlistment
bonuses for active-duty and reserve personnel would cost $1.2
billion in 2008 and $451 million in 2009; and enlistment
bonuses for active-duty and reserve personnel would cost $638
million in 2008 and $330 million in 2009.
Most of these changes would result in additional, smaller
costs in subsequent years because many payments are made in
installments. In total, extending authority for the expiring
bonus and allowances would cost about $2.1 billion in 2008
and $3.8 billion over five years.
Hardship duty pay. Section 617 would increase the maximum
allowable amount of hardship duty pay from $750 per month to
$1,500 per month. The Army reports that it would use this
additional authority as part of its ``Warrior Pay'' program,
which would provide extra incentives to military personnel
who make frequent deployments to combat zones. Based on
information from the Army, CBO estimates the total cost of
implementing this section would be $79 million in 2008 and
$214 million over the 2008-2012 period. Costs would be lower
in later years because CBO expects overseas deployments will
decrease.
Leave carryover. Section 591 would allow servicemembers to
carry up to 90 days of leave from one year to the next and
also would allow members to sell accumulated leave in excess
of 120 days back to the government. Under current law,
members may carryover a maximum of 60 days of leave at the
end of each fiscal year, unless they have recently
participated in a contingency operation, in which case they
can carry over up to 120 days of leave. Section 591 would
increase the maximum carryover allowed to 90 days for members
who have not participated in a contingency operation.
When members reenlist or separate, they are currently
allowed to sell up to 60 days of leave back to the
government. However, increasing the amount of leave carried
over from year to year would increase the average amount of
leave sold back to the government, even within the 60-day
buyback limit. According to data from DoD, in 2006, almost
150,000 personnel were each paid for an average of 19 days of
leave at a total cost of about $250 million. Based on an
analysis of current leave balances provided by the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service, CBO estimates that increasing
leave carryover to 90 days would increase the average amount
of leave sold back to the government by about 7 percent. This
would increase the annual cost of payments for unused leave
by about $17 million beginning in fiscal year 2009.
In addition, section 591 would allow members to sell
accumulated leave in excess of 120 days back to the
government. Based on data from DoD, CBO estimates that, each
year, about 2,000 servicemembers will have leave in excess of
120 days--about 131 days of leave, on average, for that
group. The cost to DoD to buy back those extra days would be
about $155 per person per day, so that the cost would be
about $4 million in 2008 and $21 million over the 2008-2012
period. When combined with the increase in leave carryover,
CBO estimates the total cost of implementing section 591
would be $4 million in 2008 and $93 million over the 2008-
2012 period.
Accession bonus for health professions scholarship. Section
624 would allow DoD to

[[Page S8898]]

award accession bonuses of up to $20,000 to students who
enroll in the Health Professions Scholarship and Financial
Assistance Programs. Those programs pay the tuition and
stipends of medical students who agree to serve in the armed
forces upon completion of their studies. Because the armed
forces are having difficulty recruiting medical
professionals, CBO believes that DoD would use the maximum
amount of this authority if funding were made available.
Based on data from DoD, CBO estimates about 750 students
would enroll in the program and receive this bonus each year,
and that the total cost of implementing section 624 would be
$15 million in 2008 and $74 million over the 2008-2012
period.
Special pay for medical officers. Section 615 would
increase the maximum allowable amounts for both incentive
special pay and the multiyear retention bonus for medical
officers from $50,000 to $75,000 for each year the officer
agrees to remain in the armed forces. There are currently
only three medical specialties that are paid at, or near,
the current maximum amounts: neurologists, radiologists,
and anesthesiologists. The total number of personnel in
those specialties is currently about 630, although to
qualify for incentive special pay medical officers must
first complete their initial service agreements with DoD,
and to qualify for the retention bonus an officer must
have at least eight years of service. Based on DoD data,
CBO estimates that about 50 percent of those 630 people
would be eligible for the increased incentive special pay
and about 15 percent would receive the higher retention
bonus. CBO estimates the total cost of implementing this
section would be $8 million in 2008 and $48 million over
the 2008-2012 period.
Dental officer special pay. Section 616 would increase
additional special pay for dental officers with less than 10
years of service by $6,000 per year. Currently, those
personnel receive either $4,000 or $6,000 per year depending
on their seniority. This section would increase those amounts
to $10,000 and $12,000. Based on data from DoD, CBO estimates
about 1,350 dentists would receive the increase in additional
special pay if this section were enacted, for a cost of $8
million in 2008 and $41 million over the 2008-2012 period.
Loan repayment for reserves. Section 672 would expand DoD's
education loan repayment program to include officers in the
selected reserve. Enlisted reservists are currently eligible
to receive benefits under this program. Assuming that officer
enrollment in this program would be proportionate to that of
enlisted members with college degrees, CBO estimates that DoD
would initiate loan repayment for about 620 reserve officers
each year if this authority were enacted. CBO estimates the
average amount of the loan repayments would total about
$7,000 per person and would be paid over six years in annual
increments of about $1,200, so that the total cost of this
section would be $1 million in 2008 and $14 million over the
2008-2012 period.
Discount drug pricing. Under current law, DoD is one of
several federal agencies that receives from pharmaceutical
makers a significantly reduced price for drugs on the Federal
Supply Schedule (FSS). Through this program, DoD is able to
procure at a discount the drugs that it provides to
beneficiaries through its hospital pharmacies and mail-order
program. However, under DoD's TRICARE programs, beneficiaries
can also fill prescriptions at retail pharmacies. Many drug
manufacturers have refused to provide discounted prices to
DoD for medications provided to beneficiaries in that manner.
Section 701 would require drug manufacturers to provide FSS
pricing on purchases covered by TRICARE at retail pharmacies.
Based on information from DoD about prescriptions filled at
retail pharmacies by active-duty dependents and retirees and
their dependents under age 65, CBO estimates that
implementing this section could result in savings of about
$300 million in 2008 and about $1.8 billion over the 2008-
2012 period. This estimate is based on the difference between
what DoD currently pays drug manufacturers for prescriptions
filled at retail pharmacies and the FSS prices for those
drugs. The estimate takes into account price inflation,
projected increases in drug usage, and a growing active-duty
population, resulting in increased savings in future years.
(See the discussion in the ``Direct Spending'' section for
CBO's evaluation of this provision on the mandatory TRICARE
For Life program.)
Defense acquisition workforce development fund. Section 844
would establish the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development
Fund to dedicate funding for recruiting, training, and
retaining acquisition personnel in excess of the levels DoD
is currently using for those purposes. Military services and
defense agencies would be required to deposit into the fund
in each fiscal year a percentage of the funds expended in
that year on contracts for services, other than services
related to research and development or construction. That
percentage would increase in even steps from 0.5 percent of
such expenditures in 2008 to 2 percent in 2011 and
thereafter.
Based on information from the Federal Procurement Data
System, CBO estimates that DoD will expend approximately $75
billion to $80 billion each year on contracts for services
covered under this provision. The required deposit would be
in addition to the amounts necessary to pay for the
performance of the services contracts. CBO estimates that
implementing section 844 would increase personnel and
training costs by about $5.5 billion over the 2008-2012
period. Most of the deposits to the fund would be related to
expenditures of future appropriations. Those discretionary
costs would total $300 million in 2008 and $5.4 billion over
the 2008-2012 period. The remainder of the deposits, which
would be related to the expenditure of funds that were
appropriated in fiscal year 2007 and in prior years, would
constitute direct spending. Those costs are described later
in this estimate.
Direct spending: The bill contains provisions that would
increase and decrease direct spending from changes to TRICARE
For Life, the foreign currency fluctuation account, combat-
related special compensation, and other programs. S. 1547
also would increase receipts from asset sales, as discussed
in the following section. We estimate that those provisions
combined would decrease direct spending by $309 million in
2008, $714 million over the 2008-2012 period, and $2,088
million over the 2008-2017 period (see Table 4).

TABLE 4.--DIRECT SPENDING, ASSET SALES, REVENUES
[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2008- Total 2008-
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2012 2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING (EXCLUDING ASSET SALES)

Discount Drug Pricing:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ -360 -390 -420 -460 -500 -540 -580 -630 -680 -740 -2,130 -5,300
Estimated Outlays................................. -360 -390 -420 -460 -500 -540 -580 -630 -680 -740 -2,130 -5,300
Transfers to Foreign Currency Account:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ 200 300 500 500 500 0 0 0 0 0 2,000 2,000
Estimated Outlays................................. 100 200 400 450 500 250 100 0 0 0 1,650 2,000
Combat-Related Special Compensation:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ 7 70 98 65 67 69 72 74 76 79 308 678
Estimated Outlays................................. 7 70 98 65 67 69 72 74 76 79 308 678
Aviation War Risk Insurance:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ -80 -160 -120 -60 -10 30 200 240 210 150 -430 400
Estimated Outlays................................. -80 -160 -120 -60 -10 30 200 240 210 150 -430 400
Multiyear Contracts for Renewable Electricity:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ 80 80 80 80 80 80 0 0 0 0 400 480
Estimated Outlays................................. 8 16 24 32 40 48 48 48 48 48 120 360
Early Reserve Retirement:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ * 2 6 11 16 20 28 35 43 52 35 213
Estimated Outlays................................. * 2 6 11 16 20 28 35 43 52 35 213
Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ 90 30 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 140
Estimated Outlays................................. 65 45 20 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 140
Spending of Reimbursements from Palau:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ * * * * * * * * * * 1 3
Estimated Outlays................................. * * * * * * * * * * 1 2
Extension of FEGLI for Reservists:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ 1 * * * * * * * * * 1 1
Estimated Outlays................................. 1 * * * * * * * * * 1 1
Subtotal:
Estimated Budget Authority.................... -62 -68 164 136 153 -341 -280 -281 -351 -459 325 -1,385
Estimated Outlays............................. -259 -217 8 48 113 -123 -132 -233 -303 -411 -305 -1,506

ASSET SALES

National Defense Stockpile:
Estimated Budget Authority........................ -50 -70 -80 -110 -99 -70 -60 -43 -0 -0 -409 -582
Estimated Outlays................................. -50 -70 -80 -110 -99 -70 -60 -43 -0 -0 -409 -582
Total Changes:
Estimated Budget Authority.................... -112 -138 84 26 54 -411 -340 -324 -351 -459 -84 -1,967

[[Page S8899]]

Estimated Outlays............................. -309 -287 -72 -62 14 -193 -192 -276 -303 -411 -714 -2,088
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes.--FEGLI = Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance.
* = less than $500,000.
Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

Discount drug pricing. Under current law, DoD is one of
several federal agencies that receives from pharmaceutical
makers a significantly reduced price for drugs on the Federal
Supply Schedule (FSS). Through this program, DoD is able to
procure at a discount the drugs that it provides to
beneficiaries through its hospital pharmacies and mail-order
program. However, under DoD's TRICARE programs, including the
TRICARE For Life program for retirees and their dependents
age 65 and over, beneficiaries can also fill prescriptions at
retail pharmacies. Many drug manufacturers have refused to
provide discounted prices to DoD for medications provided to
beneficiaries in that manner.
Section 701 would require drug manufacturers to provide FSS
pricing on purchases covered by TRICARE at retail pharmacies.
Based on information from DoD about prescriptions filled at
retail pharmacies by retirees and their dependents age 65 and
over, CBO estimates that implementing this section could
reduce direct spending by about $360 million in 2008, $2.1
billion over the 2008-2012 period, and $5.3 billion over the
2008-2017 period. This estimate is based on the difference
between what DoD currently pays drug manufacturers for
prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies and the FSS prices
for those drugs. The estimate takes into account price
inflation and projected increases in drug usage, resulting in
increased savings in future years. (See the above discussion
under ``Spending Subject to Appropriation'' for CBO's
evaluation of this provision on the discretionary TRICARE
program for active-duty dependents and those retirees and
their dependents under age 65.)
Transfers to the foreign currency account. Section 1007
would enhance DoD's ability to use expired appropriations to
cover the costs of certain contracts and projects which are
financed using foreign currencies. CBO estimates that section
1007 would increase direct spending outlays by $100 million
in 2008, $1.7 billion over the 2008-2012 period, and $2
billion over the 2008-2017 period.
Under current law, most appropriations are available for
obligation for a specified number of years and, after that
time, they expire and cease to be available for new
obligations. Once expired, however, those balances can be
used during the following five years to record, adjust, or
liquidate existing obligations. At the end of that five-year
period, any remaining balances are cancelled. Appropriations
for military personnel and for operation and maintenance
generally are available for obligation for one year, except
as discussed below.
Current law also contains another use for certain DoD funds
that have expired. Title 10 of the U.S. Code, section 2779,
allows DoD to transfer expired appropriations from its
military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts
into its Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCF,D)
account, provided that the transfer occurs within two years
of when the applicable appropriation expired, and that the
account balance does not exceed $970 million at the time the
transfer is made. Funds in the account can then be
transferred back to the military personnel and operation and
maintenance accounts and be obligated to cover ``losses''
that occur when actual exchange rates are less favorable than
the exchange rates that DoD used in formulating its budget.
If those transfers--to cover such losses--prove to exceed
DoD's requirements, the department can once again transfer
funds back to the FCF,D account within a corresponding two-
year period. In addition, if actual exchange rates prove more
favorable than DoD's forecast, the department can transfer
those ``gains'' into the FCF,D account.
Section 1007 would extend--from two years to five years--
the time period that DoD could transfer expired balances from
the military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts
to the FCF,D account. This would result in a reappropriation
of funds by allowing existing appropriations that are
currently expired--or that will otherwise expire under
current law--to become newly available for obligation.
Under section 1007, DoD would have access to a larger pool
of balances that could be transferred into the FCF,D account
because under the existing two-year limit, DoD's program
managers are reluctant to allow such transfers when those
balances may ultimately be needed to adjust or liquidate
obligations in later years. Under section 1007, once the life
of the balances approach the end of the applicable five-year
period, managers would likely allow almost all such balances
to be transferred because those funds would otherwise be
cancelled.
During the 2002-2006 period, transfers of expired balances
ranged from $0.6 billion to $1.9 billion annually. Based on
DoD's past use of expired balances to cover currency losses,
on the expanded pool of balances that would be available to
cover currency losses, and considering the inherent
uncertainty in forecasting exchange rates, CBO estimates that
enacting this section would result in reappropriations of
about $200 million in 2008 and about $2 billion over the
2008-2012 period. Outlays would total about $100 million in
2008, $1.7 billion over the 2008-2012 period, and roughly $2
billion over the 2008-2017 period.
Under current law almost all applicable balances from
appropriations provided in 2007 and prior years will be
cancelled after 2012. Therefore, CBO estimates that no
balances would be reappropriated in 2013 or in later years.
However, when the Congress provides DoD with appropriations
for 2008 and future years, DoD would ultimately spend a
higher percentage of those funds if section 1007 is enacted
into law. That added spending is not reflected in Table 4
because those outlays would be subject to future
appropriation actions.
Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC). Currently,
disabled servicemembers who are allowed to retire with less
than 20 years of service see their retirement annuity offset
or reduced by any amount of disability compensation that they
receive from VA. Retirees who have served 20 or more years in
the service and whose VA-rated disability is related to
combat, hazardous duty, or military training are eligible to
receive CRSC. This compensation replaces part or all of the
portion of their retirement annuity that is offset by VA
disability compensation. Section 653 would allow disability
retirees with less than 20 years of service to receive CRSC.
Based on information from DoD, CBO estimates that enacting
this provision would increase direct spending by $7 million
in 2008, $308 million over the 2008-2012 period, and $678
million over the 2008-2017 period.
Aviation war-risk insurance. Under current law, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) offers a commercial aviation
insurance program that, for a premium, insures air carriers
and certain manufacturers against liabilities arising from
losses caused by terrorist events. The FAA also offers a non-
premium insurance program to air carriers that participate in
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The FAA's authority to
operate both of those programs is scheduled to expire on
March 30, 2008. Section 353 would extend those programs
through December 31, 2013. CBO estimates that extending the
CRAF program through 2013 would have no significant budgetary
impact; however, extending the FAA's authority to offer
commercial aviation insurance through 2013 would reduce net
direct spending by $80 million in 2008 and $430 million over
the 2008-2012 period, but would increase net direct spending
by $400 million over the 2008-2017 period.
Those long-term net costs result because CBO assumes that
the FAA would continue to offer commercial aviation insurance
at rates that would not fully offset the government's cost of
providing that coverage. Based on information from the FAA
about current rates, CBO estimates that increased offsetting
receipts from premiums (which are credited against direct
spending) would total $1.1 billion over the 2008-2014 period.
CBO also estimates, however, that payments for expected
losses under section 353 would cost $1.5 billion over the
next 10 years, with residual spending after 2017.
CBO cannot predict how much insured damage terrorists might
cause to air carriers and manufacturers in any specific year.
Instead, our estimate of the cost of commercial aviation
insurance under section 353 represents an expected value of
payments from the program--a weighted average that reflects
the probabilities of various outcomes, from zero damages up
to very large damages caused by possible future terrorist
attacks. The expected value can be thought of as the amount
of an insurance premium that would be necessary to just
offset the risk of providing this insurance; indeed, our
estimate of the expected cost of implementing section 353 is
based on actual premiums for terrorism insurance that have
been paid by non-U.S. air carriers that must purchase such
insurance from the private sector. Our estimate also
recognizes that some costs faced by private insurance firms
are not borne by the federal government. While this cost
estimate reflects CBO's best judgment on the basis of
available information, such future costs are a function of
inherently unpredictable future terrorist attacks. Actual
costs could fall anywhere within an extremely broad range.
Multiyear contracts for renewable energy. Section 826 would
allow DoD to enter contracts for a term of up to 10 years to
purchase electricity from renewable sources such as wind or
solar power generators. Based on information from DoD, CBO
expects that the department would commit to

[[Page S8900]]

purchasing a guaranteed amount of electricity as part of
those contracts, to encourage producers to invest in
renewable energy generation equipment and to enable them to
acquire financing at favorable interest rates.
When the government enters a contract with a guaranteed
purchase amount, it incurs a legal obligation for the full
cost of those purchases. However, when DoD has used other
multiyear contracting authorities in the past, it has
typically obtained budget authority and recorded obligations
only for the payments that were due in the first year of the
contract, even though its actual contractual obligation
exceeded that amount. That method of implementing multiyear
procurement authority provides DoD with contract authority--a
form of budget authority--because it allows the department to
incur an obligation in excess of available appropriations.
Budget authority for the full cost of such contracts should
be recorded at the time it is signed and outlays should be
recorded over the term of the contracts as payments are made
for the electricity consumed.
Under current law, DoD is required to obtain 7.5 percent of
its electricity from renewable energy sources by 2013. It
currently gets about 4 percent of its electricity from such
sources. If section 826 were enacted, CBO estimates that DoD
would use multiyear contracts to purchase half the additional
renewable electricity it needs--nearly 500,000 megawatt hours
per year--to meet that requirement. The cost of renewable
energy would vary based on the mix of wind, solar, and
biomass power generators that were used; CBO estimates that
DoD would pay roughly $100 per megawatt hour of renewable
electricity. CBO assumes that over a six-year period, DoD
would initiate a series of 10-year contracts for even
increments of additional electricity at a cost of $80 million
per year until it was acquiring 500,000 megawatt hours of
electricity from renewable sources by 2013. Under such
contracts, direct spending would increase by $8 million in
2008, $120 million over the 2008-2012 period, and $360
million over the 2008-2017 period. The first group of
multiyear contracts that would be initiated in 2008 would
expire after 2017. At that time, the department would need to
enter new contracts for renewable electricity to continue to
satisfy the requirement in current law. CBO estimates that in
total, such contracts would increase direct spending by about
$50 million each year after 2017.
Early reserve retirement. Under current law, members of the
reserve components may not receive retirement annuities for
their service until they reach 60 years of age. Section 655
would allow retired reservists to receive such annuities
earlier if they were called to active duty as a reservist and
served for at least 90 days. Under this proposal, for every
90 days a reservist is activated after passage of S. 1547,
they would be eligible to begin receiving their retirement
annuities 90 days earlier than they otherwise would.
Relatively few reservists would be able to take advantage of
this provision in the near future. As most reservists stop
active participation in the reserves well before their 60th
birthday, few reservists nearing retirement over the next
decade will have served on active duty during that decade.
Therefore, the full annual costs of this provision would
occur more than 10 years after enactment and are not
reflected in this estimate. Based upon information from DoD,
CBO estimates that enacting this provision would have an
insignificant effect on direct spending in 2008, and would
increase direct spending by about $35 million over the 2008-
2012 period and $213 million over the 2008-2017 period.
Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. Section 844
would establish the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development
Fund to dedicate funding for recruiting, training, and
retaining acquisition personnel in excess of the levels DoD
is currently using for those purposes. Deposits to the fund
would be based on a percentage of expenditures on contracts
for services in a given year. CBO estimates that over the
2008-2010 period more than $23 billion will be expended on
such contracts from funds that have already been
appropriated.
Most contracts for services are paid from appropriations
for operation and maintenance, which generally are available
for obligation for only one year. For the following five
years, those funds--now expired--are available only to
record, adjust, or liquidate existing obligations to the
account. At the end of that five-year period, any remaining
balances are cancelled. (Over $1 billion in unexpended
balances of operation and maintenance funds are cancelled
each year.) Expired, unobligated balances are available to
pay for an increase in the cost of contracts for which funds
were obligated during the period of availability. CBO expects
that the department would treat the requirement to make
deposits into the Fund as an increase in the cost of the
contracts on which such deposits are based, thus allowing it
to use expired, unobligated balances to make the required
deposits for expenditures of funds that were appropriated
prior to enactment of this bill. Thus, this section would
make those expired balances available for expenditure,
resulting in a reappropriation of those funds. CBO estimates
that those reappropriations would increase direct spending by
$65 million in 2008 and $140 million over the 2008-2011
period. (This section would also require DoD to make deposits
based on the expenditure of funds that have yet to be
appropriated. Those deposits are discretionary costs and are
discussed above in the section on ``Spending Subject to
Appropriation.'')
Spending of reimbursements from Palau. Section 1213 would
allow DoD to spend reimbursements from the government of
Palau. Under current law, Palau reimburses the United States
for the cost of providing military civic action teams and
those receipts--about $250,000 annually--are deposited into
the U.S. Treasury. CBO estimates that enacting section 1213
would cost less than $500,000 in every year, and would cost a
total of $1 million over the 2008-2012 period and $2 million
over the 2008-2017 period.
Extension of Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI)
for reservists. Civilian employees of the federal government
are entitled to purchase life insurance under the FEGLI
program. Under current law, that insurance coverage may be
continued for up to 12 months for reservists who are called
to active military service. Section 1103 would extend FEGLI
coverage for up to 24 months of active military service. This
extension of coverage would initially increase net outlays
from the Employees Life Insurance Fund because private
insurers would most likely increase the premiums they charge
the federal government. However, in later years, the
Employees Life Insurance Fund would offset those additional
costs by increasing the amount participating employees are
required to contribute to the fund. CBO estimates that the
net cost of implementing this section would be $1 million in
2008 and $1 million over the 2008-2017 period.
Housing leases in Korea. DoD has authority under title 10
of the U.S. Code, section 2828, to lease 2,800 family housing
units in Korea, at a maximum cost of $35,000 per unit per
year. Under current law, that cost limit is adjusted for the
change in the consumer price index since 2003, and for the
change in the foreign currency exchange rate since 1988.
Section 2812 would increase the unadjusted cost limit to
$35,050 per unit.
The department has requested that the cost limit on the
authority in current law be increased so that it can acquire
family housing through build-to-lease contracts. In a build-
to-lease agreement, the government contracts with a developer
to build a specified number of housing units in a specified
location for use by military personnel. According to DoD, the
military services often agree to a fixed lease term--
currently limited to a maximum of 15 years in Korea--with
renewal options for additional periods of time. Those renewal
options can extend the duration of the lease term to 30 years
or more. Based on the government's commitment to lease the
housing, the developer borrows money to pay for construction
of the units, using the promised payments from the government
to demonstrate to lenders a reliable source of income for
debt service.
CBO believes that acquiring military housing through a
build-to-lease contract is a governmental activity that uses
a private-sector intermediary to serve as an instrument of
the federal government by borrowing funds to finance the
construction of housing on the government's behalf. Those
build-to-lease agreements should be considered acquisitions
rather than leases for several reasons. First, the housing
would be constructed at the request of the government to fill
an enduring need for housing for DoD personnel. Second,
because the government would agree to lease the housing for
up to 15 years, and may extend the lease term for additional
years under renewal options, the government would likely
consume most of the useful economic life of the housing.
Third, the need for at least 15 years of government
commitment to obtain financing indicates that there may not
be a private-sector market for the new housing. Finally, the
government would be the dominant or only source of income for
such projects. Lease payments are made directly by the
government to the housing developer. If the lease is
terminated before the end of the fixed term, or before the
end of any exercised lease options, the government is liable
for early termination costs, which, under DoD's current
practice, are not funded in the budget when the lease is
signed. The federal government also agrees to pay rent on all
the units it leases, regardless of whether they are occupied
by DoD personnel or are vacant.
The acquisition cost of the housing that would be acquired
using the authority is determined by calculating the present
value of 15 years of lease payments less the portion of those
payments needed for operating and maintenance costs. That
amount should be recorded as budget authority in the year the
lease is signed, and outlays should be recorded over the
construction period. Instead, DoD treats such arrangements as
operating leases, by recording each year's lease payments on
an annual basis. (The department may not record any
obligations in the year it enters a contract for the housing
because such housing takes more than one year to build and
the first payment would not be due until construction
was completed.) By using the authority to incur an
obligation in advance of appropriations, current law
provides contract authority, which is a form of direct
spending.
According to DoD, the lease payment under the current cost
limit calculation do not provide enough income for housing
developers in Korea to recover their construction costs
during the initial 15-year term of the lease. Because it
increases the cost limit by only $50 per unit, CBO believes
that section 2812 is unlikely to facilitate additional build-
to-lease contracts in Korea, and thus would have no effect.
If such contracts were feasible under the increased limit,
DoD could acquire housing worth $575 million, CBO estimates.

[[Page S8901]]

Other provisions. The following provisions would have an
insignificant budgetary impact on direct spending:
Section 504 would clarify the maximum age of service for
certain general and flag officers.
Section 534 would set to 38 the maximum years of service
for reserve officers in the grade of lieutenant general or
vice admiral, aligning such limit with that for the active
duty force.
Section 652 would allow guardians or caretakers of
dependent children to be designated beneficiaries under the
Survivor Benefit Plan.
Section 682 would change the treatment of overseas
residence relating to certain immigration benefits for
military spouses and children.
Section 825 would extend by five years the authority for
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to
provide services to nongovernmental organizations and enter
into unconventional cooperative agreements with private
contractors for research relating to the development of
advanced weapons systems. This provision also would extend
the authority for DARPA to collect and spend reimbursements
for any services rendered.
Section 934 would authorize DoD to operate a Western
Hemisphere Center for Excellence in Human Rights. This
provision would allow the center to accept and spend
donations to help defray operating costs.
Section 1024 would make permanent the authority of the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to accept gifts
on behalf of members of the Armed Forces and of civilian
employees of DoD who are injured in the line of duty.
Section 1030 would prohibit DoD from selling parts for the
F-14 fighter aircraft, except to museums or to other
organizations in the United States that work to preserve F-14
fighter aircraft for historical purposes. (DoD can spend the
proceeds from any such sales without future appropriation
action.)
Asset sales--National Defense Stockpile: Enacting the bill
would lead to increased receipts from the sale of material in
the National Defense Stockpile. Those additional sales would
reduce direct spending by $409 million over the 2008-2012
period and by $582 million over the 2008-2015 period.
Section 1413 would increase by $129 million the target
contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65; later revised by Public
Laws 108-136 and 109-163) for continual sales of chromium and
beryllium from the National Defense Stockpile. CBO estimates
that the additional sales would begin in 2010 and that there
would be sufficient quantities of those materials in the
stockpile to complete those additional sales by 2012. Thus,
CBO estimates that this section would increase receipts from
stockpile sales by $129 million over the 2010-2012 period.
Section 1413 also would increase by $453 million the target
contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; later revised by Public
Laws 106-398, 107-107, 108-375, 109-163, and 109-364) for
continual sales of tungsten from the National Defense
Stockpile, and it would extend sales through fiscal year
2015. CBO estimates that there would be sufficient quantities
of tungsten in the stockpile to achieve additional receipts
of $50 million in 2008, $280 million over the 2008-2012
period, and $453 million over the 2008-2015 period.
In addition to the increased targets, section 1413
initially would limit the sales of ferromanganese from the
National Defense Stockpile to no more than 50,000 tons in
2008. Additional sales of up to 50,000 tons of ferromangenese
would be allowed if the market demand was sufficient. Based
on recent sales, CBO estimates that the provision would not
reduce sales because market demand would be sufficient to
allow for the continued sales of ferromangenese at planned
levels.
Section 1413 also would allow for additional sales of 500
tons of chrome metal (up from planned levels of 500 tons) if
the market demand was sufficient. CBO estimates that this
provision would have no significant budgetary effect because
recent sales suggest that those additional sales would not
occur.
Revenues: Sections 934 and 1024 would allow DoD to accept
and spend gifts. Such donations are classified as revenues.
CBO expects, however, that enactment of those sections would
not have a significant effect on revenues.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: Section 4 of
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act excludes from the
application of that act any legislative provisions that
enforce the constitutional rights of individuals. CBO has
determined that section 1022 would fall within that exclusion
because it would amend the authority of the President to
employ the armed services to protect individuals' civil
rights. Therefore, CBO has not reviewed that section of the
bill for mandates.
Other provisions of S. 1547 contain both intergovernmental
and private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA but CBO
estimates that the annual cost of those mandates would not
exceed the thresholds established in UMRA ($66 million for
intergovernmental mandates in 2007 and $131 million for
private-sector mandates in 2007, adjusted annually for
inflation).
Increasing the end strength of the armed services: Sections
401 and 412 would increase the costs of complying with
existing intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA by increasing the number of servicemembers
and reservists on active duty. Those additional
servicemembers would be eligible for protection under the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) including the right to
maintain a single state of residence for purposes of state
and local personal income taxes and the right to request a
deferral in the payment of certain state and local taxes and
fees. SCRA also requires creditors to reduce the interest
rate on servicemembers' obligations to 6 percent when such
obligations predate active-duty service and allows courts to
temporarily stay certain civil proceedings, such as
evictions, foreclosures, and repossessions. Extending these
existing protections would constitute intergovernmental and
private-sector mandates and could result in additional lost
revenues to government and private-sector entities.
The number of active-duty servicemembers covered by SCRA
would increase by less than 1 percent in fiscal year 2008.
CBO expects that relatively few of these servicemembers would
take advantage of the deferrals in certain state and local
tax payments; the lost revenues to those governments would be
insignificant.
CBO does not have sufficient information to estimate
precisely the increase in costs of existing private-sector
mandates. Servicemembers' utilization of the various
provisions of the SCRA depends on a number of uncertain
factors, including how often and how long they are deployed.
Nonetheless, because the increase in the number of active-
duty servicemembers covered by SCRA would be less than 1
percent, CBO expects that the increased costs to the private
sector caused by those new servicemembers utilizing SCRA
would be small.
Prohibiting the sale by Department of Defense of parts for
F-14 fighter aircraft: Section 1030 contains a private-sector
mandate as defined by UMRA because it would prohibit the sale
of any parts of the F-14 aircraft by the Department of
Defense. It also would prohibit the United States government
from issuing an export license for sale of F-14 aircraft
parts. Those prohibitions would be a mandate upon U.S.
persons or entities that purchased F-14 parts legally from
the Department of Defense with the intention to resell the
aircraft parts.
The cost of the mandate to the private sector, if any,
would be the amount certain United States persons and
entities have already paid to purchase the F-14 parts from
the Department of Defense added to the foregone profit
attributable to the prohibition of resale of the F-14 parts.
From April 2006 to December 2006, F-14 parts were sold for a
total of $38,000. As a result, CBO estimates that the cost,
if any, to comply with that mandate would be minimal.
Providing benefits to state and local governments: This
bill contains several provisions that would benefit state and
local governments. Some of those provisions would authorize
aid for certain local schools with dependents of defense
personnel and convey certain parcels of land to state and
local governments. Any costs to those governments would be
incurred voluntarily as a condition of receiving federal
assistance.
Previous CBO estimates: On April 12, 2007, CBO transmitted
a cost estimate for H.R. 1441, the Stop Arming Iran Act, as
ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
March 27, 2007. Section 1030 of S. 1547 is similar to H.R.
1441 and the estimated costs are the same for both
provisions.
On May 14, 2007, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R.
1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, as reported by the House Committee on Armed Services.
On June 12, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 1585,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,
as passed by the House. Differences in the estimated costs of
S. 1547 and the House-reported and House-passed versions of
H.R. 1585 reflect differences in the legislation, as well as
different treatments of TRICARE For Life accrual payments, as
discussed below.
S. 1547 and H.R. 1585 as passed by the House, would
authorize different levels of appropriations but they
nevertheless envision a similar overall level of funding--
roughly $640 billion--for 2008. Specifically, S. 1547 would
authorize appropriations totaling $629 billion, while the
House-passed version of H.R. 1585 would authorize about $12
billion more than that figure, or $641 billion. The $12
billion difference, however, does not reflect a vastly
different level of recommended funding. Rather, it primarily
reflects different treatments of $11 billion in TRICARE For
Life accrual payments that are part of DoD's budget; S. 1547
does not contain an authorization of appropriations for those
payments, while H.R. 1585 implicitly does.
Those accrual payments, which are categorized as military
personnel spending, will be made under current law regardless
of whether or not they are authorized on an annual basis.
Furthermore, the payments will be charged to the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees and will count against their
discretionary allocations as set forth in the most recent
budget resolution.
Despite envisioning similar levels of overall defense
funding, there is a notable difference in the authorizations
in S. 1547 and H.R. 1585 as passed by the House. S. 1547
would authorize $128 billion for DoD's costs of military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or about $13 billion less
than the amount in the House-passed act (which is about equal
to the President's request.) In authorizing the lower amount,
the Senate Committee on Armed Services states that it

[[Page S8902]]

reallocated requested war-related authorizations--which the
committee believes are not directly related to operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan--into authorizations for DoD's ``base
budget accounts.'' As a result, the authorizations in S. 1547
for DoD's base budget are about $13 billion higher than in
the House-passed version of H.R. 1585 (after making
adjustments for the TRICARE For Life accrual payments
discussed above.)
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Defense Outlays: Kent
Christensen; Military and Civilian Personnel: Matthew Schmit;
Military Construction and Multiyear Procurement: David
Newman; Military Retirement and Education: Mike Waters;
Health Programs: Michelle S. Patterson; Aviation War-Risk
Insurance: Megan Carroll; Stockpile Sales: Raymond J. Hall;
Operation and Maintenance: Jason Wheelock; Foreign Affairs:
Sam Papenfuss; Impact on State, Local, and Tribal
Governments: Neil Hood; Impact on the Private Sector:
Victoria Liu.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that following
the remarks of the Senator from Hawaii, on this side of the aisle, the
order then be Senator Biden and Senator Boxer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.
Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I thank Chairman Levin and Ranking Member
McCain for their leadership and working in a bipartisan fashion to
unanimously pass the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 out of committee. I also thank my ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Readiness, Senator Ensign, and the members of that
committee for their work in bringing this about.
This bill exemplifies what can be achieved through the spirit of
bipartisan cooperation to address a number of important defense
priorities. As our distinguished chairman has already highlighted, this
bill includes a 3.5 percent across-the-board pay raise for all
uniformed personnel, adds $4 billion to the President's budget for mine
resistant vehicles to protect our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. It
also authorizes fiscal year 2008 end strengths for the Army and Marine
Corps, of 525,400 and 189,000 respectively, an increase of 13,000 for
the Army and 9,000 for the Marine Corps, and it supports the
transformation of our Armed Forces to meet the threats of the 21st
century.
As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, both Ranking Member Ensign
and I worked with our colleagues to continue the subcommittee's strong
commitment to increasing the readiness of the Armed Forces. In this
legislation, we are providing support to projects and programs that are
important to the readiness of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines,
both active and reserve components. In this regard, $188.4 billion is
authorized to meet the services' operation and maintenance requirements
to support the combat operations, improve the readiness of deploying
and nondeployed forces, and to support the Army and Marine Corps plans
to increase their fiscal year 2008 end strengths.
I believe all of us in the Senate are concerned that our military
forces have what they need to be trained and ready, but I am
particularly concerned about the readiness of our ground forces. This
legislation before us today fully funds the Army and Marine Corps
request for depot level maintenance. I am encouraged that neither the
Army nor Marine Corps identified a shortage of funds for depot
maintenance. While the Chief of Naval Operations did bring to this
committee's attention a funding shortfall for Navy aircraft depot
maintenance, we approved an increase of $77 million. In addition, we
included $4.8 billion for the procurement of ammunition of all types to
support the services' war fighting, training, and war reserve
requirements.
With regard to the Department of Defense's management and acquisition
policy, I am particularly pleased this bill includes a provision
requiring, for the first time, that the Department of Defense have a
chief management officer. The Comptroller General has told the members
of this committee on numerous occasions that the Department needs to do
this to ensure that the Department's many high-risk areas get the top-
level management attention they deserve.
Other important acquisition reform provisions included in this bill
are as follows: a provision that would provide the resources that DOD
needs to address the shortcomings in its acquisition workforce; a
series of provisions that would tighten DOD management of contract
services; a provision that would ensure that our commanders on the
battlefield have the authority they need to establish rules for armed
contractors in an area of combat operations; a provision establishing
guidelines for DOD to use in determining whether savings are
``substantial'' for the purpose of justifying multiyear contracts; and
a provision that would require that each of the Assistant Secretaries
for Acquisition in the military departments be assisted by a three-star
military deputy who has significant acquisition experience. I believe
these provisions, taken together, will lead to substantial improvements
in the DOD acquisition process.
I am particularly pleased this year's authorization bill includes a
provision to establish a Director of Corrosion Control Policy and
Oversight, and funding for corrosion prevention and control programs.
Corrosion is a costly problem. In fact, it is one of the largest costs
in the life cycle of weapons systems. In addition, corrosion reduces
military readiness, as the need to repair or replace corrosion damage
increases the downtime of critical military assets. Consequently, I
firmly believe that cohesive corrosion control programs are integral to
maintaining military readiness. This critical maintenance activity
increases the life of multimillion dollar weapons systems and ensures
their availability during times of crisis. Effective corrosion control
should be made a key component of the Department of Defense's resetting
strategy and funds should be allocated accordingly.
This legislation also includes my legislation to establish a National
Language Council to develop a long-term and comprehensive language
strategy and oversee the implementation of that strategy. This will
ensure that the administration's current efforts to promote foreign
language competency will develop into an organized and concerted effort
to improve the Nation's foreign language capabilities.
We also make a valuable and important investment in our
infrastructure by providing an additional $461 million above the budget
request to repair, replace, and modernize our aging defense facilities
and improve the quality of life and the productivity of our military.
Furthermore, we make a true commitment to provide quality health care
for all beneficiaries, including authorizing $24.6 billion for the
Defense Health Program, authorizing the use of Federal pricing for
drugs dispensed through the TRICARE retail program. In addition, we
reject the administration's proposal to give DOD broad authority to
increase TRICARE program cost-sharing amounts for military retirees and
their dependents.
As chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee and a member of the
Armed Services Committee, I am able to look at the issue of seamless
transition from military to civilian life from two different
perspectives and, at the appropriate time, I will be offering an
amendment to the underlying bill to improve care specifically for
veterans. My friend and colleague Chairman Levin and I have worked
together on these issues. We held a joint hearing on April 12 and have
developed a thoughtful set of provisions to deal with the VA's response
to traumatic brain injuries, also known as TBI and also known as
invisible wounds. The amendment I will be offering includes provisions
recently approved by the Committee on Veterans' Affairs at our markup
on June 27. In fact, this amendment is a direct product of the
committee's work to address seamless transition issues and is the
corresponding piece to S. 1606, the Dignified Treatment for Wounded
Warriors Act.

At the heart of my amendment are the improvements to TBI care.
Ranking Member Craig and I worked on these traumatic brain injury
provisions and they have garnered the support of many organizations,
including the American Academy of Neurology, the Brain Injury
Association of America, and the Disabled American Veterans. The VA was
caught flat-footed by the large number of devastating TBI cases
resulting from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. My amendment
would go a long way toward resolving the difficulties faced by soldiers
afflicted with TBI by providing comprehensive TBI

[[Page S8903]]

legislation. It would require individual rehabilitation plans for
veterans with traumatic brain injury and authorizes the use of non-VA
facilities for the best TBI treatment available. The amendment also
requires much more research and education for severe TBI. We have even
developed a pilot program for assisted living services for veterans
with TBI.
My amendment would also extend the period of automatic eligibility
for VA health care from 2 to 5 years for servicemembers returning from
combat. It would ensure access to care for conditions that may not be
apparent when a servicemember first leaves active duty and would
contribute to a seamless transition from military to civilian life. In
addition, this amendment requires a preliminary mental health
evaluation be conducted within 30 days of a servicemember's request. VA
must be prodded to ensure timely access to mental health care. I thank
Senator Obama for working with me on this important provision.
Finally, our ongoing global operations have utilized the reserve
components on an unprecedented scale. When these citizen soldiers
redeploy, it is essential that VA include them in their outreach
efforts. To recognize the importance of the National Guard and Reserve
and to acknowledge their contributions to the Nation's efforts, my
amendment redefines the VA's definition by specifically including them
in the outreach program.
The Senate Armed Services Committee has taken bold and necessary
steps in this legislation that will provide the necessary funds and
management reforms required to support our service men and women while
allowing the military to continue to meet our Nation's future defense
needs.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, Senator Biden was to be recognized next.
I don't see him on the floor at this moment, so I will note the absence
of a quorum for a few moments, and if he does not arrive, then I will
give my remarks on the Webb amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. BOXER. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. BOXER. Parliamentary inquiry: I understand I am supposed to
speak after Senator Biden, but he told me before he left the floor that
if he weren't here, I could reverse the order. I wonder if Senator
Levin would give me permission to do that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I thank my good friend from California,
and I have no objection at all.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, this is a very important week for this
country as we bring the issue of Iraq back to the Senate floor and
listen to the American people, who are very clear. They want this war
to end. They want the troops to come home. They know our service men
and women have given everything there is to give, and more. They know
the policies we have followed in Iraq since day one have backfired.
They are looking to us.
If I might say where we are in this debate in this Senate, in my
opinion, is between talk and action. It is very easy to talk and say:
Oh, we need a change. We must have a change. It is important that we
have a change, and call press conferences and say we need a change. It
is time for change. But let's see how people vote. Will they vote for a
sense of the Senate that has absolutely no force of law, which says it
is the sense of the Senate we should change course, or will they vote
to start redeploying our troops out of the middle of a civil war, out
of chaos?
My colleagues know I represent the largest State in the Union, and we
are taking a major hit. We have lost hundreds and hundreds of soldiers.
We see thousands injured from our State. We see a National Guard that
doesn't have the equipment it has to have. Some reports are the
equipment is down 50 percent. What does that mean? It means if, God
forbid, there is an earthquake, a fire, all the things we have to deal
with in my beautiful State, who is going to protect the people? How
much longer can we afford the bloodshed? The dollars--we are now told
$12 billion a month is being spent in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Presiding Officer and I share a lot of common interests. One of
them is, for example, to make sure our kids can go to afterschool care,
because that is the time they get in trouble. That is a high-risk time.
Do my colleagues know what it would cost to fund afterschool care to
the level that it is supposed to be, according to No Child Left Behind?
It would cost $3 billion a year. We are funding it at $1 billion.
Millions of kids are on the street. We spend $12 billion in Iraq and
Afghanistan in 1 month, but we cannot find a couple of billion in a
year for our children. We can't find the money to insure our children,
to protect their health. Oh, no. We don't have the money for that. The
President is going to veto this bill and veto that bill. He can't help
the farmers. We can't do this, we can't do that, but $12 billion in
Iraq and Afghanistan--no problem. No problem to save his reputation, to
save him from having to prove to the world he was wrong. Well, it is
one thing to have an argument with someone and have pride and say: You
know, I am not going to admit I made a mistake. It is another thing
when people are dying because of your mistake--every day.
Now, in November of 2006, the American people voted against the Iraq
war. They elected Democrats. They want this war to end. They want this
mission to end. They don't want our troops in the middle of a civil
war, getting killed and getting maimed, getting post-traumatic stress,
getting brain injuries that are the signature injury of this war.
We will be dealing with the problems of this war for decades to come.
Anyone who lived through Vietnam knows that if you go on the streets
today and look at who the homeless are, you know who they are. A third
of them are veterans, most of them from Vietnam who never got over the
experience. That is why Senator Lieberman and I have worked together to
try and get the people who are coming back the mental health care they
need. Senator Lieberman and I do not agree on this war. We are polar
opposites on this war. But let me tell my colleagues, we are working
together to get these troops the mental health care they need. Their
marriages are breaking up. They can't sleep at night. They are having
trouble with their employers. We have so many problems, and the
American people expect us to fix it.
I see my friend Senator Biden is on the floor, and I will tell him I
will speak for about another 10 minutes.
Now that my friend is on the floor, Senator Biden is the Senator who
has looked ahead, who has said there is a light at the end of the
tunnel. He has put forward a plan, and he put it forward a long time
ago, for a diplomatic solution here, because there is no military
solution. How many more explosive devices are going to blow up in the
faces of our troops before we start bringing them home? How many more
Iraqis are going to die--women, children? How many more faces are we
going to look at on the front page before we get the guts to do the
right thing?
The President doesn't listen. He didn't listen after the election.
Oh, he said he did. He said he had a new strategy. What was it? The
surge. The surge is not a new strategy. It is a military tactic, and it
isn't working. Here is what the President said after he sent in more
than 20,000 additional troops. He said:

Over time, we can expect to see . . . fewer brazen acts of
terror, and growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad's
residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis
will gain confidence in their leaders, and the Government
will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in
other critical areas.

Wrong. The President was wrong again. The Washington Post reported on
Sunday:

The Iraqi government is unlikely to meet any of the
political and security goals or time lines President bush set
for it in January. . . .

And today the AP, Associated Press, reports:

Iraq fails to meet all reform goals.

Not even one goal was met, and our people are dying. They cannot meet

[[Page S8904]]

one goal. The violence continues unabated.
Since the President made his speech on January 10, after the
election, when he said there was going to be a new strategy, 590 U.S.
service men and women have been killed, 107 of whom did not live to see
their 21st birthday. What kind of change is that this President
brought?
The average number of daily attacks by insurgents and militias has
not dropped below 150 per day. In Baghdad alone, there has been an
average of 50 insurgent attacks a day. Over the weekend, more than 150
Iraqis were killed in one single bombing. These bombings are not
isolated events. In June alone, there were 39 bombings in Iraq that
resulted in multiple fatalities. The number of suicide attacks more
than doubled in Iraq since the surge began--from 26 in January to 58 in
April. What kind of new strategy is that? If that is a new strategy, it
is worse than the other one. The average number of Iraqi civilians
killed has risen to more than 100 per day.
The administration is failing on the security front; they are failing
on the political front. They don't listen to Senator Biden, chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee. They don't listen to Senator Lugar,
the ranking member. They are all saying you have to have a political
solution.
The administration is failing on the reconstruction front. Iraqis
living in Baghdad still receive an average of 5.6 hours of electricity
a day. The President can't even keep the lights on, let alone succeed
in this surge.
Yesterday, Tony Snow said:

The President wants to withdraw troops based on the facts
on the ground, not on the matter of politics.

Well, I say to Tony Snow, elections have consequences, and you lost
in 2006. The issue was Iraq and the policies on the ground are not
working; they are failing. So whether you listen to politics or what is
happening on the ground, the answer is the same.
On February 1, Tony Snow described the surge in this way:

We are talking about significant economic development
efforts; we're talking about significant political
reconciliation. These are the kinds of things we expect to
see.

Well, they have not seen them. We know the President is going to
address the American people. I say to the President, tell the truth to
the American people. Lay out what you expected, and then lay out the
reality, and start getting the troops home. We have not seen
improvements. Now our military is at the breaking point. Listen to
retired generals. They don't have to toe the line. They tell the truth.
Nearly 90 percent of Army National Guard units in the U.S. are rated
``not ready''--largely as a result of shortfalls in equipment that
jeopardize their capability to respond to crises at home and abroad. In
my State, our equipment is down 50 percent. So who will be responsible
when we have a disaster, I say to the President? Who is going to be
responsible? The same people who have brought us Iraq are going to
bring us a crisis in our States. We already saw what happened in
Katrina from incompetence. Let's match incompetence and lack of
equipment and see what happens then.
What about Iraqi forces? On January 11, Secretary Gates said:

We are going to know pretty early on whether the Iraqis are
meeting their military commitments. . . .

He said we would know early on. The answer is they are not meeting
their military commitments. After this weekend's violence, senior Iraqi
officials called on Iraqi civilians to arm themselves and fight
insurgents. That is from their Government. They are not telling the
people this Government will protect you; that the Americans have
trained 300,000 of us and we are ready to protect you. No. The answer
is to arm yourselves so that when insurgents break down your door, you
can kill them before they kill you. What a situation.
The Iraqi Vice President said:

The people have no choice but to take up their own defense.

We need to chart a new course on Iraq today. As Senator Lugar said:

Persisting indefinitely with the surge strategy will delay
policy adjustments that have a better chance of protecting
our vital interests over the long term.

But the administration doesn't seem willing to chart a new course. As
stated on the front page of today's Washington Post, ``GOP Dissent
Spurs Change in Message But Not Course.'' That is another way of, I
think, confusing the subject. Get up and give a great speech and then
you vote against anything that has any teeth in it. You vote for
something that says it is the sense of the Senate that things are not
going well, rather than it is time to change this mission and get our
troops out of the middle of a civil war, and make sure what we are
doing is training the Iraqi soldiers, and that is fine, and going after
al-Qaida, which is fine, protecting our forces, and that is fine, but
get most of them out of there.
A change in message will not prevent the deaths of more Americans and
will not salvage the President's failed policy. Over the next 2 weeks,
we will have the opportunity to debate several amendments that will
mandate a change of course on Iraq. I urge my colleagues, as strongly
as I can, as someone who has stood up here time and time again and said
we are making mistakes, to finally admit it--but not just admit it, do
something about it. That is what we have to do. We have to change the
reality of what is happening.

As the experts have told us over and over again, what are we doing
here? We are in the middle of a civil war; we are neglecting the war on
terror. We say we are fighting the terrorists there and we will stop
them from coming here. That is what Tony Blair said, but it didn't stop
anything. This is a recruitment tool for al-Qaida. Iraq is a
recruitment tool for al-Qaida. Peter Bergman said that a long time ago
when we went into Iraq. He is an expert on the Middle East. I don't
want to recruit al-Qaida; I want to go after them. I voted to go after
them after 9/11. I didn't vote to change course and go in another
direction for regime change based on faulty information, faulty
intelligence.
This week and next week, we will find out who talks in the Senate and
who is willing to take action in the Senate. I hope the American people
will look at the amendments we are voting on and, at the bottom line,
understand which ones are just talk and which ones will actually result
in redeployment of the troops out of a civil war--who walks the walk
versus who talks the talk. Action means a deadline. Action means you
change the mission. Action means you start bringing the troops home.
Action doesn't mean a change in message, but a change of course.
Reshuffling the chairs on the deck of the Titanic is not what we should
be doing. We need to change course.
I have spoken with mothers and fathers who have lost sons and
daughters. They have begged me in the most tearful way to spare other
families what they are going through. If this war was working, that
would be one thing. But there is no military solution here. We need to
listen to what our chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is
saying about a political solution, about separating the warring
parties, about bringing in the nations of the region, and doing it
now--before another soldier is blown up or breaks up with his wife
because of the stress, or before another child has no dad or mom. The
time is now.
I am so glad we are going to be doing the Defense authorization bill
and have our opportunity to actually put our ideas into action. I will
be supporting every single amendment that will result in a change of
course, accountability, starting to bring the troops home.
I thank the Chair and I thank the Senator from Delaware for allowing
me to go before he goes.
I yield the floor at this time.
[Applause in the Gallery.]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant-at-Arms will restore order in the
gallery. The expression of approval or disapproval is not permitted.
The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I certainly appreciate the passion of
the Senator from California and her concern for the men and women
serving in the military and those who have sacrificed a great deal
already. The fact is, according to Lee Hamilton and Henry Kissinger,
General Zinni, and according to literally almost every--not all--
respected national security expert in this country, it is acknowledged
that we will have a lot more casualties.

[[Page S8905]]

The Senator's concern is emotional and well-founded and very moving.
I am also moved by the fact that Henry Kissinger and Lee Hamilton say
Congress should drop fixed deadlines for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
As Commander in Chief, the President needs flexibility on troop
withdrawals. He will accept no bill that has a timeline or a fixed date
for withdrawal. Lee Hamilton says:

The American people have the war in Iraq figured out. They
know American troops cannot settle Iraq's sectarian conflict,
and they want to withdraw responsibly. They do not want a
messy or sudden withdrawal to prompt wider sectarian strife
and an escalating humanitarian disaster.

To some degree, I have seen this movie before. I remember when the
debate was going on on the floor of the Senate on our withdrawal from
Cambodia on December 15, 1970. Mr. Gravel, now one of the candidates
for President of the United States, said:

We come back to the argument of protecting American forces.
It is simple. Take the forces out and we do not have any
problem. It is simple. Do not get into Cambodia. Do not get
involved. Then we do not get into anything.

Yes, there was an argument on the floor of the Senate about
withdrawal. There was an argument that prohibited the United States
from being involved in Cambodia. Three million people were
slaughtered--one of the great acts of genocide in modern history. Yes,
we cared about American casualties after Vietnam and we withdrew. The
North Vietnamese attacked and millions of people got on boats,
thousands were killed in reeducation camps, and thousands were
executed. I have seen this movie before. I have seen this movie before
from the liberal left in America, who share no responsibility for what
happened in Cambodia when we said, no, as I quote Senator Gravel:

Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. McCAIN. I would like to finish my comments, and then I will be
glad to yield to the Senator from California.
Continuing to quote Senator Gravel:

What would happen if Cambodia fell tomorrow? It may well
fall. . . . Obviously, it would become communistic. We would
have some gnashing of teeth, but life would go on. We would
have our traffic jams and everything else.

There were no traffic jams in Phnom Penh, Madam President, not a one.
In fact, all of the people were killed or told to walk out of the city.

Life would go on. Basically, that would increase the
casualties of Americans in South Vietnam. That would be the
difference, except the American people are going to get up
and say, ``We do not want Americans getting killed at that
rate.''
. . . it means we are going to put more money in, and if
there is a danger that Cambodia will be overrun 6 months from
now, we would have to escalate to the next higher step, and
they will devise some way of getting American troops in
there. Or they would go the mercenary route until they
butcher enough of those people.

Interesting.

This, to my mind, is wrong, and adds nothing to our
security. Supposing South Vietnam fell, and became totally
Communist tomorrow, and then Cambodia fell and became totally
Communist; would that appreciably change the life of my
colleague from Kansas? Would that change his life?

The debate goes on and on. It is very worthwhile reviewing the debate
that went on about Cambodia and Vietnam, not to mention, as I mentioned
earlier, the impact of losing a war on America, our military, and
others.
The Senator from California and I am sure the Senator from Delaware
will speak very movingly about the strain on the families of the men
and women and the strain on our troops.
By the way, we do in this authorization bill before us increase the
size of the Marine Corps and the Army, and we need to increase it even
more because of the challenges around the world--something that some of
us have sought to achieve for a long period of time.
But the fact is, when you lose a war, the consequences of failure are
far, far more severe on the military than the strain that is put on the
military when they are fighting. It is a fact. It is a fact of military
history. It is a fact of the war that we lost in Vietnam, which took us
well over a decade to restore any kind of efficiency in our military.
I will be glad to yield to the Senator from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, I thank the Senator for yielding. The
Senator made the point that the liberal left wants us out of Iraq. I
want to make sure the Senator is aware that the latest polls show 70
percent of the American people want us to have a strategy to leave. And
my question is, A, is the Senator aware of that? And, B, the followup
to that question is, has the Senator read the various proposals, the
Levin-Reed proposal, which I strongly support? There is no precipitous
withdrawal.
I think the Senator is setting up a straw man, if you will, here. The
fact is, those of us who want to leave want to do it in the right way--
--
Mr. McCAIN. I ask for the regular order.
Mrs. BOXER. And we also change the mission to continue training the
troops, and so on. I want to make sure the Senator is aware of that
point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I thank the Senator from California for
that thoughtful question. The fact is, I do read the polls, and if the
Senator from California had paid attention to my opening statement, she
would have known that I made it very clear that I understand the
frustration and sorrow of the American people. I also know a lot of us
are not driven by polls. A lot of us are driven by principle, and a lot
of us do what we think is right no matter what the polls say.
So I appreciate the concern of the Senator from California about
whether I read the polls. I appreciate that greatly. But I do know also
that when you send a signal, and I appreciate the Senator's concern--I
was talking about the liberal left addressing the war in Cambodia, is
what I was speaking of. The record is clear, and I will be glad to
provide other quotes of a similar nature. But I do also know that those
of us who study history, those of us who spend time in Iraq, those of
us who spend time with various leaders, such as General Zinni, such as
General Scowcroft, such as Secretary of State Baker, such as many
others, we all know what the consequences of a date for withdrawal will
be. And it isn't my opinion alone. It is shared by a broad variety of
national security experts in this field.
I also point out that it does have an effect on the troops in the
field when they see effort after effort after effort to withdraw, to
force them to be withdrawn and, obviously, a failure of their mission.
I welcome this debate, as I said earlier. I think it is important to
inform the American people. I think it is important to have a
respectful exchange of views. And I will continue to respect the views
of the Senator from California, but I will tell her that I have seen
this movie before, and I have seen what happens when we have a defeated
military and we have people who assure us that a withdrawal is without
consequences.
I believe, as Henry Kissinger as recently as a few days ago said:

. . . precipitate withdrawal [from Iraq] would produce a
disaster. It would not end the war but shift it to other
areas, like Lebanon or Jordan or Saudi Arabia. The war
between the Iraqi functions would intensify. The
demonstration of American impotence would embolden radical
Islamism and further radicalize its disciples from Indonesia
and India to the suburbs of European capitals.

Natan Sharansky says the same thing. A person who knows about
oppression, who knows about freedom, who served as a beacon to me and a
hero in my entire life says:

A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to a
bloodbath that would make the current carnage pale by
comparison.

All of these are statements by people for whom I have the greatest
respect. I hope we will heed some of their admonitions.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Boxer). The Senator from Delaware is
recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I was interested in the last exchange.
Let me just say that one of my heroes is the Senator from Arizona. I
mean this sincerely. We use the phrase around here ``my friend.'' I
consider him my friend. I believe if neither he nor I were Senators and
I picked up a phone and

[[Page S8906]]

called him and said: I need you to show up at such-and-such a place, I
can't tell you why, he would be there. I do not pretend to be his best
friend in the world, but I admire him.
But I think I should point out a couple of things. No. 1, the Senator
from California is not poll-driven. As I remember it, when the whole of
the country was clamoring to go to war, the Senator from California
stood up and voted against going to war. If I am not mistaken, it was
viewed as political suicide at that time. I know the Senator from
California, and I know she needs no defense, but I know her. If I know
anybody who is not poll-driven, it is the Senator from California, No.
1.
No. 2, Henry Kissinger, Lee Hamilton, and Baker--all these people
mentioned--they all say get out. None of them think the policy of this
President makes any sense. So let's start off where they are. Henry
Kissinger has endorsed the Biden plan and the Boxer plan and all the
rest who have done it. They need a political solution.
I remind everybody that the Baker-Hamilton report set a date of March
2008 as a goal to get the majority of our troops out, if not all of
them out. They talked about drawing down our troops. The President
rejected that policy.
I don't know a serious person--there probably are--I don't know of
any in the international community, I don't know of anybody in the
foreign policy establishment in the United States of America, from
Colin Powell, a former Secretary of State, to former Secretaries of
State and Secretaries of Defense in Republican administrations, who
thinks this policy makes any sense.
Madam President, I say to my colleagues, to quote Gravel--I was here
in 1972 while my friend John McCain, God love him, was in a prisoner-
of-war camp. I was a 29-year-old Senator. Nobody agreed with Gravel.
Give me a break. Quoting Gravel as the voice of the left--he was the
voice of his voice. God love him, as my mother would say, and he still
is the voice of his voice. Who agrees with Gravel? Maybe somebody does.
But to quote him as if it was the Democratic position on Cambodia--go
count the votes, how many votes Gravel got. That is not representative
of even the left. This is a man who, God love him, nominated himself
for Vice President. Come on. Come on.
And who is calling for a precipitous withdrawal? If I am not
mistaken, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee is
not voting for a precipitous withdrawal. This is what we call, in the
law business, which I have been practicing 34 years, a red herring.
The question is, Do we continue to send our kids into the middle of a
meat grinder based on a policy that is fundamentally flawed? I don't
think there are a dozen Republicans on that side of the aisle who agree
with the President's strategy, nor do I believe, if the President had
followed the recommendation of the Senator from Delaware and then the
Senator from Arizona back before there was a civil war to put enough
troops in to solidify the situation on the ground, we might not be
here. The rationale he offered and I offered, if I am not mistaken,
was: Mr. President, you don't have a strategy. Secretary of Defense,
these are not a bunch of dead-enders, they are not a bunch of thugs.
They are thugs, but you have a big problem, Mr. President.
If I am not mistaken, I heard the Senator from Arizona make those
speeches 4 years ago. I heard him, along with me, call for more troops
back then in order to get out sooner. We predicted there would be a
civil war if we didn't gain control. Surprise, surprise, surprise. We
have a civil war.
Look, I understand the political dilemmas in which we find ourselves:
We have a President of our own party we have a problem with. I have
been there. It never kept me from speaking up. If my colleagues recall,
my friend from California, who is presiding, remembers, to use the
trite expression, I beat President Clinton up and about the head, as
they say in the neighborhood where I come from, to use force in Bosnia,
to end a genocide. The President didn't agree with me. I was told: Calm
down, don't put him in that spot. I am accustomed to taking on
Presidents in my own party, and I know it is hard. It is hard. But I
tell you what, name me any one of the people who were quoted here who
thinks the policy we are pursuing now makes any sense.
Ever since the Democrats took control of the Congress back in
January, we have been working to build pressure on the administration
and, quite bluntly, on our Republican colleagues to change course in
Iraq because I have reached a point where I think the President is
impervious to information. There is a great expression, I believe it
was Oliver Wendell Holmes referring to prejudice--and the President is
not prejudiced, but I make the point. He said prejudice is like the
pupil of the eye: the more light you shine upon it, the more tightly it
closes. This administration is like the pupil of the eye: the more hard
facts you give them to prove their policy is a failure, the tighter it
closes and the less inclined to change they are. More and more
Republicans--more and more Republicans--have stopped backing the
President and started looking for ways to work with us to bring our
soldiers home in a responsible way so we don't merely trade a dictator
for chaos.

Let me say something I am going to be reminded of, I am sure, again
and again and again. Having been here for 34 years, I know you should
not make statements I am about to make lightly, but I am reminded of it
by the comments made about Cambodia. On this, we have a sell-by date.
You know when you buy milk, it says sell by a certain date or it turns
sour? There is a sell-by date here, folks, for us to change policy.
Because if we do not change policy in a radical way in this calendar
year, I believe we will be left with one of two alternatives.
We have a chance now to change policy and maybe salvage--maybe
salvage--a circumstance in Iraq, whereas we gradually leave, and we
will not have traded a dictator for chaos and the possibility of a
regional war. That is alternative one. I think that alternative two is
Saigon revisited. We will be lifting American personnel off the roofs
of buildings in the green zone if we do not change policy and pretty
drastically.
There is not a single person in here that knows anything about the
military who can tell me they think there is any possibility of us
sustaining 160,000 forces in Iraq this time next year. What my friend
from Arizona did not say--and he knows a great deal about this--is that
leading generals in the military say straightforward that we are
breaking--let me emphasize that--breaking the U.S. military--breaking
the U.S. military. Let me put it another way. We have more
professionally trained academy graduates, such as my friend from
Arizona, leaving the military after 5 years than we have had any time
in the last 30-plus years. The cream of the crop are being broken by
this failed--this failed policy in Iraq.
What is worse is not that it is a failed policy, but it is impervious
to recommendations made by the most informed people in both political
parties inside and outside Government. What did the President do with
the Baker-Hamilton Commission? Picked it up, gave it real lip service,
and flipped it on the shelf. Who was on that commission? Two former
Secretaries of State, who were Republicans; the present Secretary of
Defense; some of the leading conservative voices in America on military
matters; along with mainstream Democratic leaders. What did they do?
What did they do? They blew it off. Now they are revisiting it. Now
press reports are that maybe we have to have a plan B.
Look, it matters profoundly how we end this war. It matters to our
soldiers, it matters to the Iraqis, and it matters to America's future
security. As I said before, I don't want my son, a captain in the Army,
going to Iraq, but he will go, if called. But I also don't want my
grandson going. How we leave will determine whether my grandson goes.
So far this President has offered absolutely no political solution to
Iraq. None.
What does he say? He says surge troops. Why? To give the Iraqis
breathing room. Why? So the Iraqis will get together and form a unity
government that can be trusted by all the Iraqi people to govern the
nation, allowing us to leave.
Not in the lifetime of anyone on this floor, including these talented
young pages, will there be a unity government in Baghdad that has the
confidence of all the Iraqi people, able to

[[Page S8907]]

maintain security, provide opportunity, and have a stable unity
government. It will not happen.
I had a proposal over a year ago--and I have been roundly criticized
for it, except for the Presiding Officer and a few others--wherein I
laid out--and not because I am so smart; I happen to be chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee because I have lasted longer than others--
but I laid out a comprehensive proposal. What does everybody say in
this body? Everybody says, in and out of Government, that there is no
military solution to Iraq, only a political solution. Name me a single
person who has offered a political solution, except the Senator from
California, myself, and the Senator from Kansas, Mr. Brownback. Name me
anyone. What is the political solution? What is the political solution
my friend is offering? What is it?
The political solution is that somehow the Iraqis will have an
epiphany--and I know Muslims don't have epiphanies; that is a Christian
thing--they will have an epiphany and all of a sudden they are going to
get together, realizing what is at stake, and form this unity
government that can deliver.
I met with al-Maliki last year. I have been to Iraq and Afghanistan
eight times. I am heading over there again shortly. I sat with al-
Maliki, and when I came back, the President asked my views. He was kind
enough to ask what I thought. I said, I don't think al-Maliki has it in
his bone marrow, in his heart or his brain to desire to reconcile with
the Sunnis. Even if he did, he doesn't have the capacity.
What have we rested everything on here? We are about to have a report
that was going to be filed this June 15, pointing out the Iraqis
haven't met a single benchmark. Isn't that strange? What did we do?
Every opportunity we had to help them along, we walked away from. I
remember after they voted on their Constitution. I was there for the
official vote, I stuck my finger in the ink that does not come off your
finger. I went to the polling places. The Iraqis voted overwhelmingly
for a constitution. Know what it says? I wish somebody would read it
once in a while. It says, I believe it is article 1, we are a
decentralized federal system. Then in articles 15, 16, 17, and 18, if I
am not mistaken--this is from memory--it lays out how any 1 of the 18
governates, political subdivisions, basically, in Iraq can become a
region, vote for their own constitution, and have their own local
security. It also implies there will be an allocation of the oil
resources through a constitutional amendment.
I remember immediately after that vote, coming back from my third or
fourth trip, then meeting with the administration and saying: What are
you going to do? And being told: Oh, it is too premature to push any of
that. I said: Whoa, let me get this straight. How are you going to
bring these folks together unless you help them implement the
Constitution? No, no, too tough now--too tough.
This administration has not made, when given a choice, a single
correct decision on Iraq. Hear me. That is a bold statement. I cannot
think of a single decision when they have been faced with a choice that
they have made the right choice. I cannot think of one. Way back, when
the President asked me why I was calling for Rumsfeld's resignation,
and the Vice President was in the room, in the Oval Office, I said:
With all due respect, Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, if, Mr. Vice
President, you were not a constitutional officer, I would call for your
resignation too. He looked at me and said: Why? I said: Because, Mr.
President, name me one piece of advice either Rumsfeld or Cheney have
given you in Iraq that has turned out to be right. Name me one. One.
One. It is not about retribution, Mr. President, it is about
competence. If all the advice you have been given is bad, don't you
think it is a good idea to look for new advice--new advisers?

Look, I believe there is a comprehensive strategy to end this war
responsibly and it has three parts. First, is a roadmap to bring most
of our troops out and home by early next year. Two, is a detailed plan
for what we leave behind, a political solution. Three, is the
commitment that so long as there is a single American--a single
American soldier--in Iraq, we should do everything in our power to
protect them.
Let me go through this very briefly. First, bringing our troops home.
Instead of escalating the war with no end in sight, we have to start to
bring our troops home now and withdraw most by next year. This was the
Baker-Hamilton recommendation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I wish to remind the Senator that we had an
order to recess after him speaking for 10 minutes. What is the pleasure
of the Senator?
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10
more minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and then
we will recess for the lunch hour.
Mr. BIDEN. If we don't start bringing home combat forces within the
next few months, get them out of the midst of a civil war, we will have
so soured the American people on the ability to do even the things that
need be done that this President and the next President will be left
with absolutely no option--absolutely no option--but to withdraw
totally from that area and let the chips fall where they may.
You know, that is exactly what we started to propose, the Senator
from California and others, Senator Levin, in the Biden-Hagel-Snowe-
Levin resolution opposing the surge back in January and of the Biden-
Levin provision in the Iraqi supplemental bill, the very thing the
President vetoed. The common denominator in all these efforts has been
to transition our troops to a more limited mission so we can start to
bring them home and set the groundwork for being able to leave behind a
political solution.
That is exactly what Senator Levin is doing today. He is taking the
Biden-Levin amendment, now called the Levin-Reed amendment, and he is
going back at it. I compliment him for it because we have to keep
pushing in order to change the minds of our Republican friends by
keeping pressure on them to start to vote for the troops and not the
President.

=========================== NOTE ===========================

On Page S8907, July 10, 2007 the following appears: now called
the Levin-Reid amendment,

The online version has been corrected to: now called the Levin-
Reed amendment,

========================= END NOTE =========================

The second thing is getting our troops out of Iraq is necessary, but
it is not sufficient. We also need a plan for what we are going to
leave behind so we don't trade a dictator for chaos. What happens
matters and how it happens. About everyone agrees there is no purely
military solution. A political solution. Our plan is getting more
bipartisan support--the so-called Biden-Brownback-Boxer-Hutchison-
Nelson-Smith amendment--and that is we recognize the fundamental
problem in Iraq is the self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence.
I would respectfully suggest that history shows these cycles of
sectarian violence end in only one of four ways. One, a bloodletting
that leaves one side victorious and both sides exhausted. In the case
of Iraq, that would take years, and I believe it would generate a
Sunni-Shia revival of hatred from the Mediterranean to the Himalayas.
Second, is an open-ended foreign occupation for a generation or more.
That is not in America's DNA. It is not what we do. We are not the
Ottoman Empire.
Third, a return to a strong man, one who is not on the horizon. Even
if there were, wouldn't it be the ultimate tragic irony that the United
States replaced Saddam Hussein with another dictator?
The fourth way they have ended is a political agreement to form a
decentralized federal government that separates the warring factions,
gives them breathing room in their own regions. That is what we did a
decade ago in Bosnia. We have had over 24,000 NATO troops there for 10
years and not one has been killed. The sectarian violence has stopped,
the genocide is over, and they are trying to become part of Europe. The
plan we put forward has five pieces. I will not take the time to go
into it now, but one is in order to maintain a unified Iraq we have to
decentralize it, with a limited central government that has common
concerns of guarding the border and distributing oil revenues.

Second, we have to secure support from the Sunnis by giving them a
guaranteed piece of the oil revenues because they have nothing in that
triangle.
Third, we have to increase, not diminish, aid to rebuild that
country, and we should look to the gulf states who have an overwhelming
interest and overflow of dollars to do that.

[[Page S8908]]

Fourth, since we have lost all credibility in the region, this has to
be a consequence, this idea--it has to have an international imprimatur
on it. It must come out of the Security Council. They must call an
international conference. It must involve the stamp of the United
Nations and a regional conference, where the international community
pursues this--and they are ready to do it. I will not take the time to
go into why.
Last, we have to begin to draw down. We have to have military plans
to draw down our combat forces by 2008, leaving behind a small force to
take on terrorists and train Iraqis, assuming there is a political
settlement. If there is no political settlement, mark my words, the
public will insist they all come home. If they come home it means
everything comes home. The idea that we are going to be able to leave
an embassy there with thousands of people without 10,000 or more
American soldiers to guard it is a joke. If we fail to make federalism
work, if there is no political accommodation at the center, violent
resistance will increase, the sectarian cycle of revenge will continue
to spiral out of control, and we will not have this country break into
three neat pieces. You will watch it fragment into multiple pieces,
creating incredible difficulties for the entire region.
The Bush administration, though, has another vision. Their vision for
Iraq, their entire premise, as I said, is based on a fundamentally
flawed premise that they can build a competent, popular, supported
government based upon a consensus among the three parties, and it
reside in Baghdad. That is the central flaw in their strategy. It
cannot be sustained. The hard truth is that absent a foreign occupation
or a dictator, Iraq cannot be run from the center. The sooner we
understand that, as Secretary Kissinger does and all the people quoted
today--the sooner we understand that, the faster we will get this thing
resolved and the fewer American casualties there will be.
The last part of this strategy is, so long as we have a single
soldier in Iraq, it is our most sacred responsibility to give him or
her the best protection this country can provide. Two months ago I
called upon the President and Secretary Gates to make building of Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, so-called MRAPs, the Nation's top
priority. Roadside bombs are responsible for 70 percent of the 25,000-
plus injuries and 70 percent of the roughly 3,600 deaths. It is hard to
keep count, unfortunately; 70 percent. Yet if we transition our troops
from those flat-bottomed, up-armored HMMWVs to these V-shaped-bottom
MRAPs, the facts show that somewhere between 66 percent and 80 percent
of the casualties will be avoided.
An article on the front page of USA Today last Friday pointed out a
military person saying if we built these when we were supposed to,
there would be, I think, 731 fewer deaths.
These are our sons, our daughters, not somebody else's--all of ours.
These are the people. These are the kite strings upon which our whole
national ambition is lifted aloft. What are we doing? What are we
doing? We are spending $10 billion a month in Iraq, and I get push-back
for wanting to spend $20 billion to build these vehicles? I find it
obscene.
I fought to front load money in the emergency spending bill for these
vehicles. As a result we will get 2,500 more of these vehicles to Iraq
by the end of the year than we otherwise would have. That is why I
voted for the bill.
But I also insisted that the administration tell us by June 15
whether it would need even more of these vehicles so that we make sure
the money is there to get them built.
Last week the Army concluded that it would need seven times the
number of mine-resistant vehicles it had originally requested--some
17,700, up from 2,500. When you factor in all the service requests, the
total need for mine-resistant vehicles jumps from the 7,774 vehicles
now planned to nearly 23,000 vehicles.
But the Joint Chiefs have not yet made the Army request a ``clear and
urgent'' requirement.
And there is no plan to budget for and build these vehicles over the
next 6 months, as well as proven technology that protects against so-
called explosively formed projectiles--EFP--that strike from the side.
We need a commitment from the administration--now--to build every
last one of these vehicles as soon as possible.
We can't wait till next year or the year after. Our men and women on
the front lines need them now.
I will offer an amendment to the Defense bill to make it clear--with
absolutely no ambiguity--that Congress will provide every dollar needed
and every authority necessary to build these vehicles as quickly as
possible.
Every day we delay is another life lost.
The war in Iraq must end. That is what the American people want. And
that is where America's interests lie.
I conclude by saying that in Congress we have a tremendous
responsibility to turn the will of the American people into a practical
reality. It is long past time we meet this responsibility head on, and
it is long past time our Republican colleagues join us in what I
believe they know to be right--forcing this President to radically
change course in Iraq.
I yield the floor.

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