[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 109 (Tuesday, July 10, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8884-S8885]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about the pending 
business before the Senate, which is the Department of Defense 
authorization bill for fiscal year 2008.
  This is a bill the Senate Armed Services Committee has worked long 
and hard on over a period of several months. I am privileged to be a 
member of the committee and now doubly privileged to be chair of the 
Airland Subcommittee. I am proud of the work of the committee.
  This is a bill that does the best we possibly can to support and 
expand our forces during a time of war. Unfortunately, most of the time 
that will be spent by this Chamber on this bill will not be about the 
solid substance of the Department of Defense authorization bill but 
will be on a series of amendments that will be offered to alter our 
course or force our withdrawal from Iraq.
  In my considered opinion, respectfully, this is a mistake. These 
amendments regarding Iraq, I believe, are untimely, they are unwise, 
and they are unfair.
  They are untimely in the sense that they are premature and should 
await September, when, as ordained by this Congress itself in the 
supplemental appropriations bill, General Petraeus and Ambassador 
Crocker will come back to report to us fully.
  They are unwise, if ever adopted, because they would essentially 
represent a retreat from Iraq, a defeat for the United States and the 
forces of a new Iraq, a free Iraq, and a tremendous victory for Iran 
and al-Qaida, who are our two most significant enemies in the world 
today.
  Offering these amendments at this time, in my opinion, is unfair: 
unfair, most of all, to the 160,000 Americans in uniform over there--
men and women, brave, effective, in my opinion, the new greatest 
generation of American soldiers, committed to this fight, believing we 
can win it, putting their lives on the line every day. They have made 
tremendous progress already in the so-called surge, counteroffensive. 
To snipe at them from here is, in my opinion, unfair.
  That is why I will oppose all the amendments I have heard about thus 
far and why I wish to discuss them today.
  I suppose, in terms of timeliness, if one felt the surge, 
counteroffensive--which began in February, and has just been fully 
staffed a couple of weeks ago--had absolutely failed, then one might 
say: OK, we won't wait until September, as we promised we would do; we 
will try to force a change in policy or a retreat right now. But the 
facts, as I will discuss, will show the surge is showing some success--
in some ways some remarkable success--and does not justify these 
amendments of retreat being offered at this time.
  Six months ago, this Chamber voted unanimously to confirm GEN David 
Petraeus as commander of our forces in Iraq. The fact is--which we all 
acknowledge--before that, the administration had followed a strategy in 
Iraq that simply was not working. It was a strategy focused on keeping 
the U.S. force presence as small as possible, regardless of conditions 
on the ground, and of pushing Iraqi forces into the lead as quickly as 
possible, regardless of their capabilities to do so.
  General Petraeus oversaw--let me step back. General Petraeus was part 
of a process, along with others, that presented a dramatically 
different strategy to the President of the United States, the Commander 
in Chief. He accepted that dramatically different strategy, which was 
to apply classic principles of counterinsurgency that have been 
successful elsewhere, so that instead of our main goal being to get out 
of Iraq, our main goal became to protect the civilian population that 
the terrorists were persistently attacking, bringing chaos throughout 
the country, including particularly in the capital city of Baghdad, and 
making it impossible for a new Iraqi Government to take shape.
  As a result, over the past 5 months, many problems, many crises, many 
challenges in Iraq that had long been described as hopelessly beyond 
solution have begun to improve. In Baghdad, the sectarian violence that 
had paralyzed the city for more than a year began to drop dramatically. 
In Anbar Province, which the chief of Marine Corps intelligence in Iraq 
described 9 months ago as ``lost''--and he was right at that point--a 
city which I was not allowed to visit when I went to Iraq in December 
because it was too dangerous--our surge forces have moved in 
effectively.
  Working together with Sunni tribal leaders and their Sunni followers, 
we have al-Qaida on the run. As a matter of fact, they have effectively 
run from Anbar Province, the province they said they intended to make 
the capital of the new Islamist extremist Republic of Iraq.
  When I was in Iraq a month ago, I was not only allowed to visit 
Ramadi and walk its streets but was tremendously impressed by the peace 
and rebirth that is occurring there.
  As John Burns of the New York Times recently put it, the capital city 
of Anbar, Ramadi, has since ``gone from being the most dangerous place 
in Iraq . . . to being one of the least dangerous places.'' Despite 
these gains in Baghdad and Anbar, critics of the new strategy 
nonetheless insisted that it was not working, pointing to the fact 
that, yes, al-Qaida is on the run, but it is running and causing 
devastation in other parts of Iraq--now in Diyala Province, for 
instance.

  But what happened? General Petraeus, now with the other generals and 
additional personnel brought under his command by the surge 
counteroffensive strategy, was able to leave some troops in Anbar, 
fortified by Iraqi security forces and the Sunni tribal forces, and 
move the surge forces to Diyala, to Bakuba there, where they now have 
al-Qaida on the run.

[[Page S8885]]

  Our forces in the field are, of course, still facing some daunting 
challenges and a brutal, inhumane foe prepared to blow themselves up to 
make a point, to kill others, hating us and others more than they love 
their own lives. But the plain truth is that Iraq in this month, July 
2007, is a very different and better place than Iraq in January or 
February of 2000, and it is because of the so-called surge 
counteroffensive strategy. Those who refuse to recognize that change 
and nonetheless go forward with the same policies of defeat and 
withdrawal that they have been talking about for months have, I would 
say respectfully, closed their eyes, not to mention their heads, to the 
reality of what is actually happening on the ground in Iraq.
  General Petraeus has persistently appealed to us to have some 
patience, to not rush to judgment about the success or failure of a new 
surge strategy. It is only right that we do so. But instead of 
respecting those pleas, withholding our judgment, and remaining true to 
what we ourselves put into the supplemental appropriations bill, which 
was a requirement for an interim report this week and a full report on 
paper about the benchmarks and in person by General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Crocker in September, instead of waiting for that to happen, 
I regret that some of my colleagues have decided to go ahead and submit 
these amendments which, to me, represent the continuation of a longtime 
legislative trench warfare against our presence in Iraq no matter what 
the facts on the ground there are. Rather than giving General Petraeus 
and his troops a fair chance to succeed--and it is not just for them, 
it is for us--I regret that efforts will be made here to undermine our 
strategy, which is now a successful strategy in Iraq, to dictate when, 
where, and against whom our soldiers can fight and when we should get 
out.
  I suppose this would be justified if somebody concluded that the war 
was lost in Iraq. The war is not lost in Iraq. In fact, now American 
and Iraqi security forces are winning. The enemy is on the run in Iraq. 
But here in Congress, in Washington, we seem to be--or some Members 
seem to be on the run--chased, I fear, by public-opinion polls.
  I know the American people are frustrated. I understand that. I know 
what they see every night on the TV, the suicide bombs. I know how much 
they want their loved ones to come home. No one wants that more than we 
do here. But the consequences of doing that would be a disaster for 
Iraq, the Middle East, and for us because the victors would be Iran and 
al-Qaida, our two most dangerous enemies in the world today, and trust 
me, they would follow us back here to this country.
  I said one might pursue a policy of changing course, directing a 
retreat, a withdrawal, accepting defeat if one thought the war was 
lost. The war is not lost. In fact, I will say to my colleagues today 
that this war in Iraq will never be lost by our military on the ground 
in Iraq. The war in Iraq can only be lost with the loss of political 
will here at home and, perhaps, with the loss of political will in 
Iraq. But that story is not finished yet.
  Perhaps there are some who would say the war is not lost but it is 
not worth winning. I think we have to think of the consequences of 
defeat. I know that in the midst of the consequences of defeat are a 
victory for Iran and al-Qaida, chaos in Iraq, slaughter that will 
probably begin to look like genocide, instability in the region, and 
the danger that we will be forced to send our troops back into the 
region in greater numbers to fight a more difficult war.
  I think the amendments on Iraq to be offered on this Department of 
Defense bill are mistaken. What are the alternatives my colleagues are 
going to propose in these amendments? One of the amendments would 
demand a total withdrawal of American troops from Iraq as quickly as 
possible. Its sponsors argue that we can continue to fight al-Qaida in 
Iraq and defend our other key interests in the Middle East by operating 
from bases elsewhere there. With all due respect, this is fantasy.
  As my friend, Senator Lugar, pointed out a short while ago, a 
complete American withdrawal from Iraq is likely to have devastating 
consequences for American national security. Everyone knows Senator 
Lugar is a skeptic about our strategy and events in Iraq. Yet, in his 
words, a complete withdrawal from Iraq would:

       Compound the risks of a wider regional conflict. It would 
     be a severe blow to U.S. credibility that would make nations 
     in the region far less likely to cooperate with us. It would 
     expose Iraqis who have worked with us to retribution, and it 
     would also be a signal that the United States was abandoning 
     efforts to prevent Iraqi territory from being used as a 
     terrorist base.

  So spoke the distinguished Senator from Indiana, Mr. Lugar.
  Another amendment would keep some forces in Iraq, pull most forces 
out by next April 1. Their numbers would be dramatically reduced and 
the mission dramatically redefined.
  Some argue that American soldiers should withdraw from Iraq's cities 
and instead focus on the training of Iraqi forces, targeting 
counterterrorism, and protecting the remaining American troops there. 
Let me say that is a vision I would embrace for the future but not as a 
substitute for the surge counteroffensive strategy we are following now 
but as a consequence of a successful implementation of that strategy, 
for if we in this Chamber and in Congress mandate the withdrawal of our 
troops down to a core group with a new mission before the Iraqi 
security forces are ready to provide security, we are going back to the 
exact strategy some describe as the Rumsfeld strategy which didn't 
work, which was roundly condemned by most people in both parties over a 
period of years.
  I repeat my confidence that the number of American troops will be 
reduced, but it will be reduced best when it is reduced as a result of 
the successful implementation of the surge strategy as carried out 
heroically by American forces.
  I conclude with these words: Our responsibilities in this Chamber 
ultimately do not allow us to be guided by our frustrations or even by 
public-opinion polls when we respectfully believe those public-opinion 
polls do not reflect what is best for our Nation. We were elected to 
lead. We were elected to see beyond the next election, to do what is 
best for the next generation of Americans. We were elected to defend 
our beloved country, its security, and its values. All of that is on 
the line in Iraq today.

  So I appeal to my colleagues, let's not undercut our troops and 
legislate a defeat in Iraq where none is occurring now, where hope is 
strong, where the momentum is, in fact, on our side. If you question 
that, at least show the fairness and respect for General Petraeus, 
Ambassador Crocker, and all the people working for us there to wait 
until September, which is what we said we would do, until we take a 
serious look at these amendments. If we go down the path the amendments 
entice us toward, what awaits us is an emboldened Iran, a strengthened 
al-Qaida, a failed Iraq that will become not just a killing field but 
will destabilize the entire Middle East and also, I fear, imperil our 
security here at home.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Carolina is 
recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I believe I have 15 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is recognized.

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