[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 106 (Thursday, June 28, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Page S8685]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DELL LEE DAILEY
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I wish to discuss the confirmation of
Lieutenant General Dell Lee Dailey as the Coordinator in the State
Department's Office of Counterterrorism.
Lieutenant General Dailey has had a distinguished military career.
There can be no question about that. He is a graduate of West Point and
has served as a battalion commander, regiment commander, and assistant
division commander both at posts in the United States and abroad. Most
recently, he served as director at the Center for Special Operations at
MacDill Air Force Base. He has received numerous awards for his
excellence including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, two
Defense Superior Service Medals, three Army Commendation Medals and six
Meritorious Service Medals. He has spent his entire life defending this
nation and I thank him for service.
The position to which he was confirmed last Friday is that of the
State Department's Coordinator for the Office of Counterterrorism.
While I did not object to Lieutenant General Dailey's confirmation, as
a member of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Select
Committee on Intelligence, I would like to register my concerns.
While the nomination of a military official to a civilian post does
not by itself cause concerns, this particular position requires an
ability to develop and implement interagency strategies and to
encourage the use of and mobilize non-DOD assets. In the context of
this administration's tendency to employ military options against
strategic problems, or to assign nonmilitary functions to the
Department of Defense, it is particularly important that the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism demonstrate a commitment to expanding
and utilizing the resources of the State Department, USAID and other
agencies of the U.S. Government.
I have talked with General Dailey and reviewed his writings,
including a 2006 article in which he wrote that Special Operations
forces, ``doing what they do best,'' are ``developing links within the
population that will provide ongoing intelligence and personal
relationships that will cement ties with allies around the world.''
When it comes to military engagements, Special Operations forces may,
in fact, have this role. But in most of the countries and regions of
the world where we are fighting al-Qaida and seeking to deny it safe
haven, these activities should not fall to the Department of Defense.
Indeed, ``developing links within the population'' and ``cement[ing]
ties with allies around the world'' are the jobs of our diplomats. And,
in far-flung regions of the world, where a U.S. diplomatic presence or
foreign aid program can help deny terrorist organizations safe haven,
we should be working to expand those efforts, not deferring to the
Department of Defense. This is critical for four reasons. First, our
diplomats and foreign assistance professionals have the background and
training to conduct these activities. Second, regardless of the skills
of Special Operations forces, the very fact that uniformed officers are
at the forefront of local diplomacy can be counterproductive by
encouraging or reinforcing perceptions that U.S. policy is driven by
our military. Third, if policy is to guide counterterrorism efforts--
and that is the whole point of the Coordinator position--then
diplomats, not soldiers, need to be leading the way. And, finally, we
need our military to do what it does best in the struggle against al-
Qaida and its allies, and that is conduct tactical operations as well
as work directly with host country militaries and regional peacekeeping
forces. The overextension of Special Operations or other military
forces for other missions takes away from these efforts.
We need only look at Africa, where strategic counterterrorism
policies are desperately needed, to understand the challenges ahead. In
Somalia, DOD operations have been conducted in a near policy vacuum.
Tactical efforts have not, and will not, address the conditions that
have allowed terrorist organizations safe haven. Yet violence and
instability continue to fester, at great cost to our national security,
without adequate diplomatic, humanitarian or foreign assistance
efforts. Elsewhere on the continent, in regions where extremism can
take hold and where terrorist organizations might find sympathetic
populations, neither the State Department nor USAID has sought to
maintain a presence. Finally, AFRICOM's recent difficulties in finding
a willing host country illustrate how diplomatic initiatives must
precede efforts to expand our military footprint. I have supported
AFRICOM and believe that African nations will recognize what the
command may have to offer, but we must acknowledge that governments and
local populations alike remain skeptical of initiatives that seem
driven by our military.
It is in this context that I sought from General Dailey an
understanding of this critical position, one whose primary mission is
``to forge partnerships with non-state actors, multilateral
organizations, and foreign governments to advance the counterterrorism
objectives and national security of the United States.'' At his
nomination hearing, I asked him the following question:
What points of collaboration do you see for the relative
roles of U.S. military action, military assistance and
nonmilitary assistance in the war against international
terrorism?
Lieutenant General Dailey's response was:
The military has a huge source of non-lethal, non-kinetic
resources that Department of State and the other agencies, I
think, can rely on to be successful in that portion of the
war on terror that gets to the hearts and minds of the
people. Civil affairs operations, public diplomacy--right now
the Special Operations organizations have about 15 or 20
teams that help in public diplomacy that work specifically
for the ambassadors in the embassies. That's just a small
snapshot of what the military can bring to the table.
Unfortunately, this response appears to reflect the mindset of
someone who sees combating terrorism through a military, or at least
Department of Defense, prism. This answer suggests a lack of
appreciation for the need to incorporate and balance civil,
intelligence, and military initiatives when coordinating a U.S.
counterterrorism strategy. It is not that the answer is wrong; it
indicates a keen understanding of what the Department of Defense can
bring to the table. But the Department of Defense does not need more
champions in the interagency process. What is needed is a champion for
the role of other agencies and departments, for aggressive diplomacy,
for expanded foreign assistance efforts, for antipoverty and
anticorruption programs that complement broader counterterrorism
strategies, for effective public diplomacy, and for multilateral
cooperation, including strengthening regional organizations in places
like Africa and rediscovering the common ground with our allies in
Europe and elsewhere that we had immediately after September 11.
I recognize that these challenges present an extremely high bar for
any nominee. I also recognize that this nomination is colored by the
failure of this administration to develop and implement effective
interagency counterterrorism strategies. But it is precisely because of
the critical importance of this position and the need for the nominee
to resist this administration's overemphasis on military options that I
have regarded General Dailey's nomination with such scrutiny. I do not
register these concerns lightly and now that he has been confirmed, I
look forward to working with General Dailey on developing coherent and
comprehensive counterterrorism strategies, coordinating true
interagency efforts and promoting the use of our diplomatic and other
nonmilitary resources that are so critical to success in the fight
against al-Qaida and its affiliates.
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