[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 106 (Thursday, June 28, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Page S8685]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


            NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DELL LEE DAILEY

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I wish to discuss the confirmation of 
Lieutenant General Dell Lee Dailey as the Coordinator in the State 
Department's Office of Counterterrorism.
  Lieutenant General Dailey has had a distinguished military career. 
There can be no question about that. He is a graduate of West Point and 
has served as a battalion commander, regiment commander, and assistant 
division commander both at posts in the United States and abroad. Most 
recently, he served as director at the Center for Special Operations at 
MacDill Air Force Base. He has received numerous awards for his 
excellence including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, two 
Defense Superior Service Medals, three Army Commendation Medals and six 
Meritorious Service Medals. He has spent his entire life defending this 
nation and I thank him for service.
  The position to which he was confirmed last Friday is that of the 
State Department's Coordinator for the Office of Counterterrorism. 
While I did not object to Lieutenant General Dailey's confirmation, as 
a member of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I would like to register my concerns.
  While the nomination of a military official to a civilian post does 
not by itself cause concerns, this particular position requires an 
ability to develop and implement interagency strategies and to 
encourage the use of and mobilize non-DOD assets. In the context of 
this administration's tendency to employ military options against 
strategic problems, or to assign nonmilitary functions to the 
Department of Defense, it is particularly important that the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism demonstrate a commitment to expanding 
and utilizing the resources of the State Department, USAID and other 
agencies of the U.S. Government.
  I have talked with General Dailey and reviewed his writings, 
including a 2006 article in which he wrote that Special Operations 
forces, ``doing what they do best,'' are ``developing links within the 
population that will provide ongoing intelligence and personal 
relationships that will cement ties with allies around the world.'' 
When it comes to military engagements, Special Operations forces may, 
in fact, have this role. But in most of the countries and regions of 
the world where we are fighting al-Qaida and seeking to deny it safe 
haven, these activities should not fall to the Department of Defense. 
Indeed, ``developing links within the population'' and ``cement[ing] 
ties with allies around the world'' are the jobs of our diplomats. And, 
in far-flung regions of the world, where a U.S. diplomatic presence or 
foreign aid program can help deny terrorist organizations safe haven, 
we should be working to expand those efforts, not deferring to the 
Department of Defense. This is critical for four reasons. First, our 
diplomats and foreign assistance professionals have the background and 
training to conduct these activities. Second, regardless of the skills 
of Special Operations forces, the very fact that uniformed officers are 
at the forefront of local diplomacy can be counterproductive by 
encouraging or reinforcing perceptions that U.S. policy is driven by 
our military. Third, if policy is to guide counterterrorism efforts--
and that is the whole point of the Coordinator position--then 
diplomats, not soldiers, need to be leading the way. And, finally, we 
need our military to do what it does best in the struggle against al-
Qaida and its allies, and that is conduct tactical operations as well 
as work directly with host country militaries and regional peacekeeping 
forces. The overextension of Special Operations or other military 
forces for other missions takes away from these efforts.
  We need only look at Africa, where strategic counterterrorism 
policies are desperately needed, to understand the challenges ahead. In 
Somalia, DOD operations have been conducted in a near policy vacuum. 
Tactical efforts have not, and will not, address the conditions that 
have allowed terrorist organizations safe haven. Yet violence and 
instability continue to fester, at great cost to our national security, 
without adequate diplomatic, humanitarian or foreign assistance 
efforts. Elsewhere on the continent, in regions where extremism can 
take hold and where terrorist organizations might find sympathetic 
populations, neither the State Department nor USAID has sought to 
maintain a presence. Finally, AFRICOM's recent difficulties in finding 
a willing host country illustrate how diplomatic initiatives must 
precede efforts to expand our military footprint. I have supported 
AFRICOM and believe that African nations will recognize what the 
command may have to offer, but we must acknowledge that governments and 
local populations alike remain skeptical of initiatives that seem 
driven by our military.
  It is in this context that I sought from General Dailey an 
understanding of this critical position, one whose primary mission is 
``to forge partnerships with non-state actors, multilateral 
organizations, and foreign governments to advance the counterterrorism 
objectives and national security of the United States.'' At his 
nomination hearing, I asked him the following question:

       What points of collaboration do you see for the relative 
     roles of U.S. military action, military assistance and 
     nonmilitary assistance in the war against international 
     terrorism?

  Lieutenant General Dailey's response was:

       The military has a huge source of non-lethal, non-kinetic 
     resources that Department of State and the other agencies, I 
     think, can rely on to be successful in that portion of the 
     war on terror that gets to the hearts and minds of the 
     people. Civil affairs operations, public diplomacy--right now 
     the Special Operations organizations have about 15 or 20 
     teams that help in public diplomacy that work specifically 
     for the ambassadors in the embassies. That's just a small 
     snapshot of what the military can bring to the table.

  Unfortunately, this response appears to reflect the mindset of 
someone who sees combating terrorism through a military, or at least 
Department of Defense, prism. This answer suggests a lack of 
appreciation for the need to incorporate and balance civil, 
intelligence, and military initiatives when coordinating a U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy. It is not that the answer is wrong; it 
indicates a keen understanding of what the Department of Defense can 
bring to the table. But the Department of Defense does not need more 
champions in the interagency process. What is needed is a champion for 
the role of other agencies and departments, for aggressive diplomacy, 
for expanded foreign assistance efforts, for antipoverty and 
anticorruption programs that complement broader counterterrorism 
strategies, for effective public diplomacy, and for multilateral 
cooperation, including strengthening regional organizations in places 
like Africa and rediscovering the common ground with our allies in 
Europe and elsewhere that we had immediately after September 11.
  I recognize that these challenges present an extremely high bar for 
any nominee. I also recognize that this nomination is colored by the 
failure of this administration to develop and implement effective 
interagency counterterrorism strategies. But it is precisely because of 
the critical importance of this position and the need for the nominee 
to resist this administration's overemphasis on military options that I 
have regarded General Dailey's nomination with such scrutiny. I do not 
register these concerns lightly and now that he has been confirmed, I 
look forward to working with General Dailey on developing coherent and 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategies, coordinating true 
interagency efforts and promoting the use of our diplomatic and other 
nonmilitary resources that are so critical to success in the fight 
against al-Qaida and its affiliates.

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