[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 103 (Monday, June 25, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8371-S8375]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
A COURSE CHANGE IN IRAQ: CONNECTING IRAQ STRATEGY TO VITAL INTERESTS
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to offer observations on the
continuing involvement of the United States in Iraq. In my judgment,
our course in Iraq has lost contact with our vital national security
interests in the Middle East and beyond. Our continuing absorption with
military activities in Iraq is limiting our diplomatic assertiveness
there and elsewhere in the world. The prospects that the current
``surge'' strategy will succeed in the way originally envisioned by the
President are very limited within the short period framed by our own
domestic political debate. And the strident, polarized nature of that
debate increases the risk that our involvement in Iraq will end in a
poorly planned withdrawal that undercuts our vital interests in the
Middle East. Unless we recalibrate our strategy in Iraq to fit our
domestic political conditions and the broader needs of United States
national security, we risk foreign policy failures that could greatly
diminish our influence in the region and the world.
The current debate on Iraq in Washington has not been conducive to a
thoughtful revision of our Iraq policy. Our debate is being driven by
partisan political calculations and understandable fatigue with bad
news--including deaths and injuries to Americans. We have been debating
and voting on whether to fund American troops in Iraq and whether to
place conditions on such funding. We have contemplated in great detail
whether Iraqi success in achieving certain benchmarks should determine
whether funding is approved or whether a withdrawal should commence. I
would observe that none of this debate addresses our vital interests
any more than they are addressed by an unquestioned devotion to an ill-
defined strategy of ``staying the course'' in Iraq.
I speak to my fellow Senators, when I say that the President is not
the only American leader who will have to make adjustments to his or
her thinking. Each of us should take a step back from the sloganeering
rhetoric and political opportunism that has sometimes characterized
this debate. The task of securing U.S. interests in the Middle East
will be extremely difficult if Iraq policy is formulated on a partisan
basis, with the protagonists on both sides ignoring the complexities at
the core of our situation.
Commentators frequently suggest that the United States has no good
options in Iraq. That may be true from a certain perspective. But I
believe that we do have viable options that could strengthen our
position in the Middle East, and reduce the prospect of terrorism,
regional war, and other calamities. But seizing these opportunities
will require the President to downsize the United States military's
role in Iraq and place much more emphasis on diplomatic and economic
options. It will also require Members of Congress to be receptive to
overtures by the President to construct a new policy outside the binary
choice of surge versus withdrawal. We don't owe the President our
unquestioning agreement, but we do owe him and the American people our
constructive engagement.
In my judgment, the costs and risks of continuing down the current
path outweigh the potential benefits that might be achieved. Persisting
indefinitely with the surge strategy will delay policy adjustments that
have a better chance of protecting our vital interests over the long
term.
I do not come to this conclusion lightly, particularly given that
General Petraeus will deliver a formal report in September on his
efforts to improve security. The interim information we have received
from General Petraeus and other officials has been helpful and
appreciated. I do not doubt the assessments of military commanders that
there has been some progress in security. More security improvements in
the coming months may be achieved. We should attempt to preserve
initiatives that have shown promise; such as engaging Sunni groups that
are disaffected with the extreme tactics and agenda of al-Qaida in
Iraq. But three factors--the political fragmentation in Iraq, the
growing stress on our military, and the constraints of our own domestic
political process--are converging to make it almost impossible for the
United States to engineer a stable, multi-sectarian government in Iraq
in a reasonable time frame.
First, it is very doubtful that the leaders of Iraqi factions are
capable of implementing a political settlement in the short run. I see
no convincing evidence that Iraqis will make the compromises necessary
to solidify a functioning government and society, even if we reduce
violence to a point that allows for some political and economic
normalcy.
In recent months, we have seen votes in the Iraqi parliament calling
for a withdrawal of American forces and condemning security walls in
Baghdad that were a reasonable response to neighborhood violence. The
Iraqi parliament struggles even to achieve a quorum, because many
prominent leaders decline to attend. We have seen overt feuds between
members of the Iraqi Government, including Prime Minister Maliki and
Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who did not speak to each other for
the entire month of April. The Shia-led government is going out of its
way to bottle up money budgeted for Sunni provinces. Without strident
intervention by our embassy, food rations are not being delivered to
Sunni towns. Iraqi leaders have resisted de-Baathification reform, the
conclusion of an oil law, and effective measures to prevent oil
smuggling and other corrupt practices.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari has told me that various aspects of an
oil law and revenue distribution could be passed by September. But he
emphasized that Iraqis are attempting to make policy in a difficult
environment by broad consensus--not by majority vote. He believes other
policy advancements will take considerable time, but that consensus is
the safest and most appropriate approach in a fledgling democracy.
This may be true, but Americans want results in months. Meanwhile,
various Iraqi factions are willing to wait years to achieve vital
objectives. Even if the results of military operations improve in the
coming months, there is little reason to assume that this will diminish
Sunni ambitions to reclaim political preeminence or Shia plans to
dominate Iraq after decades of Saddam's harsh rule. Few Iraqi leaders
are willing to make sacrifices or expose themselves to risks on behalf
of the type of unified Iraq that the Bush administration had
envisioned. In contrast, there are many Iraqi leaders who are deeply
invested in a sectarian or
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tribal agenda. More often than not, these agendas involve not just the
protection of fellow Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, but the expansion of
territorial dominance and economic privileges.
Even if United States negotiators found a way to forge a political
settlement among selected representatives of the major sectarian
factions, these leaders have not shown the ability to control their
members at the local level. After an intense year-and-a-half of
bloodletting, many subfactions are thoroughly invested in the violence.
We have the worst of both worlds in Iraq--factional leaders who don't
believe in our pluralist vision for their country and smaller
subfactions who are pursuing violence on their own regardless of any
accommodations by more moderate fellow sectarians. As David Brooks
recently observed in the New York Times, the fragmentation in Iraq has
become so prevalent that Iraq may not even be able to carry out a
traditional civil war among cohesive factions.
Few Iraqis have demonstrated that they want to be Iraqis. We may
bemoan this, but it is not a surprising phenomenon. The behavior of
most Iraqis is governed by calculations related to their history, their
personal safety, their basic economic existence, and their tribal or
sectarian loyalties. These are primal forces that have constrained the
vision of most ordinary Iraqis to the limits of their neighborhoods and
villages.
In this context, the possibility that the United States can set
meaningful benchmarks that would provide an indication of impending
success or failure is remote. Perhaps some benchmarks or agreements
will be initially achieved, but most can be undermined or reversed by a
contrary edict of the Iraqi Government, a decision by a faction to
ignore agreements, or the next terrorist attack or wave of sectarian
killings. American manpower cannot keep the lid on indefinitely. The
anticipation that our training operations could produce an effective
Iraqi army loyal to a cohesive central government is still just a
hopeful plan for the future.
I suspect that for some Americans, benchmarks are a means of
justifying a withdrawal by demonstrating that Iraq is irredeemable. For
others, benchmarks represent an attempt to validate our military
presence by showing progress against a low fixed standard. But in
neither case are benchmark tests addressing our broader national
security interests.
Equally unproven is the theory voiced by some supporters of a
withdrawal that removing American troops from Iraq would stimulate a
grand compromise between Iraqi factions. Some Iraqi leaders may react
this way. But most assume that we will soon begin to withdraw troops,
and they are preparing to carry on or accelerate the fight in the
absence of American forces. Iraqi militias have shown an ability to
adapt to conditions on the ground, expanding or contracting their
operations as security imperatives warrant.
American strategy must adjust to the reality that sectarian
factionalism will not abate anytime soon and probably cannot be
controlled from the top.
The second factor working against our ability to engineer a stable
government in Iraq is the fatigue of our military. The window during
which we can continue to employ American troops in Iraqi neighborhoods
without damaging our military strength or our ability to respond to
other national security priorities is closing. Some observers may argue
that we cannot put a price on securing Iraq and that our military
readiness is not threatened. But this is a naive assessment of our
national security resources.
American Armed Forces are incredibly resilient, but Iraq is taking a
toll on recruitment and readiness. In April, the Defense Department
announced it would lengthen tours of duty for soldiers serving in Iraq
and Afghanistan from 12 to 15 months. Many soldiers are now on their
way to a third combat tour.
Last month, for the 27th consecutive year, in a ceremony witnessed by
tens of thousands of Hoosiers, I swore in new military recruits on Pit
Road at the Indianapolis Motor Speedway. Over the course of the
weekend, I visited with the recruits, with the recruiters, and with
military officials. I heard personal stories of the 70-hour work weeks
put in by recruiters to meet recruiting goals. I was impressed with
each of the 66 young men and women I swore in. They are joining a
military at war, and each of them is showing tremendous courage and
commitment to our country.
The swearing-in ceremony was preceded by a briefing from Army
officials here in Washington who assured me that we are fielding the
best equipped, best trained, and most capable force we have ever had.
Yet, they also reported that the Army has exhausted its bench. Instead
of resting and training for 3 to 12 months, brigades coming out of the
field must now be ready almost immediately for redeployment.
Basic recruiting targets are being met, but statistics point to
significant declines in the percentage of recruits who have high school
diplomas and who score above average on the Army's aptitude test.
Meanwhile, the Army has dramatically increased the use of waivers for
recruits who have committed felonies, and it has relaxed weight and age
standards.
The Army is asking for $2 billion more this year for recruitment
incentives, advertising, and related activities. It needs $13 to $14
billion a year to reset the force to acceptable readiness ratings, and
they will need that amount for up to 3 years after the end of the
current operations. The Army needs $52 billion more this year to fill
equipment shortages and modernize. These figures do not include the
billions of dollars required to implement the planned 65,000 soldier
increase in the size of the active force.
Filling expanding ranks will be increasingly difficult given trends
in attitudes toward military service. This has been measured by the
Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies Program, which produced a
``Propensity Update'' last September after extensive research. The
study found that only 1 in 10 youths has a propensity to serve--the
lowest percentage in the history of such surveys. Sixty-one percent of
youth respondents report that they will ``definitely not serve.'' This
represents a 7 percent increase in less than a year. These numbers are
directly attributable to policies in Iraq. When combined with the
Army's estimate that only 3 of 10 youths today meet basic physical,
behavioral, and academic requirements for military service, the
consequences of continuing to stretch the military are dire.
The United States military remains the strongest fighting force in
the world, but we have to be mindful that it is not indestructible.
Before the next conflict, we have much to do to repair this invaluable
instrument. This repair cannot begin until we move to a more
sustainable Iraq policy.
The third factor inhibiting our ability to establish a stable,
multisectarian government in Iraq is the timetable imposed by our own
domestic political process. The President and some of his advisors may
be tempted to pursue the surge strategy to the end of his
administration, but such a course contains extreme risks for United
States national security. It would require the President to fight a
political rear-guard holding action for more than a year and a half
against congressional attempts to limit, modify, or end military
operations in Iraq. The resulting contentiousness would make
cooperation on national security issues nearly impossible. It would
greatly increase the chances for a poorly planned withdrawal from Iraq
or possibly the broader Middle East region that could damage U.S.
interests for decades.
The President and his team must come to grips with the shortened
political timeline in this country for military operations in Iraq.
Some will argue that political timelines should always be subordinated
to military necessity, but that is unrealistic in a democracy. Many
political observers contend that voter `` dissatisfaction in 2006 with
administration policies in Iraq was the major factor in producing new
Democratic Party majorities in both Houses of Congress. Domestic
politics routinely intrude on diplomatic and military decisions. The
key is to manage these intrusions so that we avoid actions that are not
in our national interest.
We do not know whether the next President will be a Democrat or a
Republican. But it is certain that domestic pressure for withdrawal
will continue to be intense. A course change
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should happen now, while there is still some possibility of
constructing a sustainable bipartisan strategy in Iraq. If the
President waits until Presidential election campaign is in full swing,
the intensity of confrontation on Iraq is likely to limit United States
options.
I am not implying that debate on Iraq is bad. I am suggesting what
most Senate observers understand intuitively: Little nuance or
bipartisanship will be possible if the Iraq debate plays out during a
contentious national election that will determine control of the White
House and Congress.
In short, our political time line will not support a rational course
adjustment in Iraq, unless such an adjustment is initiated very soon.
In January, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard from former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who recalled a half century of U.S.
involvement in the Middle East. He argued that this history was not
accidental. We have been heavily involved in the region because we have
enduring vital interests at stake. We may make tactical decisions about
the deployment or withdrawal of forces in Iraq, but we must plan for a
strong strategic position in the region for years to come.
This is not just a maxim from diplomatic textbooks. The vitality of
the U.S. economy and the economies of much of the world depend on the
oil that comes from the Persian Gulf. The safety of the United States
depends on how we react to nuclear proliferation in the region and how
we combat terrorist cells and ideologies that reside there.
The risk for decision-makers is that after a long struggle in Iraq,
accompanied by a contentious political process at home, we begin to see
Iraq as a set piece--as an end in itself, distinct from the broader
interests that we meant to protect. We risk becoming fixated on
artificial notions of achieving victory or avoiding defeat, when these
ill-defined concepts have little relevance to our operations in Iraq.
What is important is not the precise configuration of the Iraqi
Government or the achievement of specific benchmarks, but rather how
Iraq impacts our geostrategic situation in the Middle East and beyond.
The President's troop surge is an early episode in a much broader
Middle East realignment that began with our invasion of Iraq and may
not end for years. Nations throughout the Middle East are scrambling to
find their footing as regional power balances shift in unpredictable
ways.
Although the Bush administration has scaled back its definition of
success in Iraq, we are continuing to pour our treasure and manpower
into the narrow and uncertain pursuit of creating a stable,
democratic, pluralist society in Iraq. This pursuit has been the focal
point of the administration's Middle East policy. Unfortunately, this
objective is not one on which our future in the region can rest,
especially when far more important goals related to Middle East
security are languishing. I am not suggesting that what happens in Iraq
is not important, but the Bush administration must avoid becoming so
quixotic in its attempt to achieve its optimum forecasts for Iraq that
it misses other opportunities to protect our vital interests in the
Middle East.
To determine our future course, we should separate our emotions and
frustrations about Iraq from a sober assessment of our fundamental
national security goals. In my judgment, we should be concerned with
four primary objectives:
First, we have an interest in preventing Iraq or any piece of its
territory from being used as a safe haven or training ground for
terrorists or as a repository or assembly point for weapons of mass
destruction.
Second, we have an interest in preventing the disorder and sectarian
violence in Iraq from upsetting wider regional stability. The
consequences of turmoil that draws neighboring states into a regional
war could be grave. Such turmoil could topple friendly governments,
expand destabilizing refugee flows, close the Persian Gulf to shipping
traffic, or destroy key oil production or transportation facilities,
thus diminishing the flow of oil from the region with disastrous
results for the world economy.
Third, we have an interest in preventing Iranian domination of the
region. The fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni government opened up
opportunities for Iran to seek much greater influence in Iraq and in
the broader Middle East. An aggressive Iran would pose serious
challenges for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab governments.
Iran is pressing a broad agenda in the Middle East with uncertain
consequences for weapons proliferation, terrorism, the security of
Israel, and other U.S. interests. Any course we adopt should consider
how it would impact the regional influence of Iran.
Fourth, we have an interest in limiting the loss of U.S. credibility
in the region and throughout the world as a result of our Iraq mission.
Some loss of confidence in the United States has already occurred, but
our subsequent actions in Iraq may determine how we are viewed for a
generation.
In my judgment, the current surge strategy is not an effective means
of protecting these interests. Its prospects for success are too
dependent on the actions of others who do not share our agenda. It
relies on military power to achieve goals that it cannot achieve. It
distances allies that we will need for any regional diplomatic effort.
Its failure, without a careful transition to a back-up policy would
intensify our loss of credibility. It uses tremendous amounts of
resources that cannot be employed in other ways to secure our
objectives. And it lacks domestic support that is necessary to sustain
a policy of this type.
A total withdrawal from Iraq also fails to meet our security
interests. Such a withdrawal would compound the risks of a wider
regional conflict stimulated by Sunni-Shia tensions. It would also be a
severe blow to U.S. credibility that would make nations in the region
far less likely to cooperate with us on shared interests. It would
increase the potential for armed conflict between Turkey and Kurdish
forces in Iraq. It would expose Iraqis who have worked with us to
retribution, increase the chances of destabilizing refugee flows, and
undercut many economic and development projects currently underway in
Iraq. It would also be a signal that the United States was abandoning
efforts to prevent Iraqi territory from being used as a terrorist base.
Moreover, advocates of an immediate withdrawal have tended to
underestimate the requirements and complexities of such an operation.
Gen. Barry McCaffrey testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing on January 18, 2007, that an immediate withdrawal aimed at
getting out of Iraq as fast as possible would take 6 months. A
carefully planned withdrawal that sought to preserve as much American
equipment as possible, protect Iraqis who have worked with us, continue
anti-terrorist operations during the withdrawal period, and minimize
negative regional consequences would take months longer.
Our security interests call for a downsizing and re-deployment of
U.S. military forces to more sustainable positions in Iraq or the
Middle East. Numerous locations for temporary or permanent military
bases have been suggested, including Kuwait or other nearby states, the
Kurdish territories, or defensible locations in Iraq outside of urban
areas. All of these options come with problems and limitations. But
some level of American military presence in Iraq would improve the odds
that we could respond to terrorist threats, protect oil flows, and help
deter a regional war. It would also reassure friendly governments that
the United States is committed to Middle East security. A re-deployment
would allow us to continue training Iraqi troops and delivering
economic assistance, but it would end the U.S. attempt to interpose
ourselves between Iraqi sectarian factions.
Six months ago, the Iraq Study Group endorsed a gradual downsizing of
American forces in Iraq and the evolution of their mission to a support
role for the Iraqi army. I do not necessarily agree with every
recommendation of the Iraq Study Group, and its analysis requires some
updating given the passage of time. But the report provides a useful
starting point for the development of a ``Plan B'' and a template for
bipartisan cooperation on our Iraq strategy.
We should understand that if the re-deployment of a downsized force
is to be safe and effective, our military planners and diplomats must
have as much
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time as possible to develop and implement the details. We will need the
cooperation of the Iraqi Government and key states in the region, which
will not come automatically. The logistics of a shift in policy toward
a residual force will test military planners, who have been consumed
with the surge. In 2003, we witnessed the costs that came with
insufficient planning for the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. It is
absolutely essential that we not repeat the same mistake. The longer we
delay the planning for a re-deployment, the less likely it is to be
successful.
The United States has violated some basic national security precepts
during our military engagement in Iraq. We have overestimated what the
military can achieve, we have set goals that are unrealistic, and we
have inadequately factored in the broader regional consequences of our
actions. Perhaps most critically, our focus on Iraq has diverted us
from opportunities to change the world in directions that strengthen
our national security.
Our struggles in Iraq have placed U.S. foreign policy on a defensive
footing and drawn resources from other national security endeavors,
including Afghanistan. With few exceptions, our diplomatic initiatives
are encumbered by negative global and regional attitudes toward our
combat presence in Iraq.
In this era, the United States cannot afford to be on a defensive
footing indefinitely. It is essential that as we attempt to reposition
ourselves from our current military posture in Iraq, we launch a
multifaceted diplomatic offensive that pushes adversarial states and
terrorist groups to adjust to us. The best counter to perceptions that
we have lost credibility in Iraq would be a sustained and ambitious set
of initiatives that repairs alliances and demonstrates our staying
power in the Middle East.
The Iraq Study Group report recommended such a diplomatic offensive,
stating ``all key issues in the Middle East--the Arab-Israeli conflict,
Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism
and terrorism--are inextricably linked.'' The report stressed that
diplomacy aimed at solving key regional issues would ``help marginalize
extremists and terrorists, promote U.S. values and interests, and
improve America's global image.''
A diplomatic offensive is likely to be easier in the context of a
tactical draw down of U.S. troops in Iraq. A drawdown would increase
the chances of stimulating greater economic and diplomatic assistance
for Iraq from multilateral organizations and European allies, who have
sought to limit their association with an unpopular war.
A first step is working with like-minded nations to establish a
consistent diplomatic forum related to Iraq that is open to all parties
in the Middle East. The purpose of the forum would be to improve
transparency of national interests so that neighboring states and other
actors avoid miscalculations. I believe it would be in the self-
interest of every nation in the region to attend such meetings, as well
as the United States, EU representatives, or other interested parties.
Such a forum could facilitate more regular contact with Syria and Iran
with less drama and rhetoric that has accompanied some meetings. The
existence of a predictable and regular forum in the region would be
especially important for dealing with refugee problems, regulating
borders, exploring development initiatives, and preventing conflict
between the Kurds and Turks. Just as the Six-Party talks have improved
communications in northeast Asia beyond the issue of North Korea's
nuclear program, stabilizing Iraq could be the occasion for a
diplomatic forum that contributes to other Middle East priorities.
Eventually, part of the massive U.S. embassy under construction in
Baghdad might be a suitable location for the forum. It is likely that
the embassy compound will exceed the evolving needs of the United
States. If this is true, we should carefully consider how best to use
this asset, which might be suitable for diplomatic, educational, or
governmental activities in Iraq.
We should be mindful that the United States does not lack diplomatic
assets. Most regional governments are extremely wary of U.S.
abandonment of the Middle East. Moderate states are concerned by Iran's
aggressiveness and by the possibility of sectarian conflict beyond
Iraq's borders. They recognize that the United States is an
indispensable counterweight to Iran and a source of stability. The
United States should continue to organize regional players--Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States, and others--behind a
program of containing Iran's disruptive agenda in the region.
Such a re-alignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq and bringing
security to other areas of conflict, including Lebanon and the
Palestinian territories. The United States should make clear to our
Arab friends that they have a role in promoting reconciliation within
Iraq, preventing oil price spikes, splitting Syria from Iran, and
demonstrating a more united front against terrorism.
A diplomatic offensive centered on Iraq and surrounding countries
would help lift American interests in the Middle East. But credibility
and sustainability of our actions depend on addressing the two
elephants in the room of U.S. Middle East policy--the Arab-Israeli
conflict and U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil. These are the two
problems that our adversaries, especially Iran, least want us to
address. They are the conditions that most constrain our freedom of
action and perpetuate vulnerabilities. The implementation of an
effective program to remedy these conditions could be as valuable to
our long-term security as the achievement of a stable, pro-Western
government in Iraq.
The Arab-Israeli conflict will not be easily solved. Recent combat
between the Hamas and Fatah Palestinian factions that led to Hamas's
military preeminence in the Gaza Strip complicates efforts to put the
peace process back on track. But even if a settlement is not an
immediate possibility, we have to demonstrate clearly that the United
States is committed to helping facilitate a negotiated outcome.
Progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict would not end the sectarian
conflict in Iraq, but it could restore credibility lost by the United
States in the region. It also would undercut terrorist propaganda, slow
Iranian influence, and open new possibilities related to Syria.
Clearly, the United States does not have the influence to solve the
Arab-Israeli conflict unilaterally. In contrast, our dependence on
Persian Gulf oil is largely within our capacity to fix. Do not
underestimate the impact on Iran and other nations of a concerted U.S.
campaign to reduce our oil consumption. A credible well-publicized
campaign to definitively change the oil import equation would
reverberate throughout the Middle East. It would be the equivalent of
opening a new front in Middle Eastern policy that does not depend on
the good will of any other country.
Many options exist for rapid progress in reducing our Persian Gulf
oil dependence, but I would emphasize two. First, President Bush or his
successor could establish the national goal of making competitively
priced biofuels available to every motorist in America. Such an
accomplishment would transform our transportation sector and cut our
oil import bill. It would require multiple elements, including ensuring
that virtually every new car sold in America is a flexible fuel vehicle
capable of running on an 85 percent ethanol fuel known as E-85; that at
least a quarter of American filling stations have E-85 pumps; and that
ethanol production from various sources is expanded to as much as 100
billion gallons a year within the next 15 to 20 years. Such a campaign
could achieve the replacement of 6.5 million barrels of oil per day by
volume--the rough equivalent of one-third of the oil used in America
and one-half of our current oil imports. None of these goals are easy,
but they are achievable if presidential advocacy and the weight of the
Federal Government are devoted to their realization. Brazil already has
achieved the large-scale deployment of ethanol as a national
transportation fuel, and its success is a source of public pride in
that country.
Second, the President could commit to a radical increase in the miles
per gallon of America's auto fleet. The Federal Government has numerous
tools to make this happen, from direct Federal support for research, to
Government fleet purchasing, to market regulations and incentives.
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Incredibly, cars in America today get less mileage per gallon than
they did 20 years ago. Meanwhile, hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and fully
electric cars are at or nearly at commercialization, yet there is not
enough incentive for consumers to buy them or producers to make them on
the mass scale necessary. For fiscal year 2008, the administration
requested just $176 million for new vehicle technology research--an
amount that was less than what was requested 5 years ago.
Given that other developed nations have made great strides in
improving fuel economy, this is fertile ground for rapid improvement.
In fact, achievements on this front largely would be a matter of
generating and sustaining political will that has, thus far, been
disappointing.
The issue before us is whether we will refocus our policy in Iraq on
realistic assessments of what can be achieved, and on a sober review of
our vital interests in the Middle East. Given the requirements of
military planners, the stress of our combat forces, and our own
domestic political timeline, we are running out of time to implement a
thoughtful plan B that attempts to protect our substantial interests in
the region, while downsizing our military presence in Iraq.
We need to recast the geo-strategic reference points of our Iraq
policy. We need to be preparing for how we will array U.S. forces in
the region to target terrorist enclaves, deter adventurism by Iran,
provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, and generally
reassure friendly governments that the United States is committed to
Middle East security. Simultaneously, we must be aggressive and
creative in pursuing a regional dialogue that is not limited to our
friends. We cannot allow fatigue and frustration with our Iraq policy
to lead to the abandonment of the tools and relationships we need to
defend our vital interests in the Middle East.
If we are to seize opportunities to preserve these interests, the
administration and Congress must suspend what has become almost knee-
jerk political combat over Iraq. Those who offer constructive criticism
of the surge strategy are not defeatists, any more than those who warn
against a precipitous withdrawal are militarists. We need to move Iraq
policy beyond the politics of the moment and reestablish a broad
consensus on the role of the United States in the Middle East. If we do
that, the United States has the diplomatic influence and economic and
military power to strengthen mutually beneficial policies that could
enhance security and prosperity throughout the region. I pray that the
President and the Congress will move swiftly and surely to achieve that
goal.
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