[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 99 (Tuesday, June 19, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7840-S7842]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, for more than six decades, the bedrock
of American national security has been a strong, reliable, and cutting-
edge nuclear deterrent. Literally thousands of the best scientists and
engineers in the world have dedicated themselves to ending World War
II, winning the Cold War, and protecting the free world.
Each year, the Directors of the three national nuclear weapons
laboratories must certify to the President, and through him to the rest
of the United States, that our nuclear weapons systems are reliable.
That certification process assures Americans, and warns our
adversaries, that the Nation's nuclear stockpile will be able to
continue to perform its basic mission--prevention of a nuclear weapons
exchange.
During these six decades, discussion of the nature and size of our
nuclear deterrent has been literally constant. Each year, hundreds of
scientists, engineers, and global strategists devote innumerable hours
and days to intense discussions of the proper strategy for the Nation
and the proper nuclear stockpile to implement that strategy.
Each year, Presidents have recommendations based upon the work of
specialists inside and outside the Federal Government. Since the end of
physical testing of our nuclear weapons stockpile--a big event; and, in
fact, a major event in American nuclear weapons evolution, the idea we
would no longer test our weapons--America has relied on a concept
called stockpile stewardship to try to keep our nuclear weapons
resources certifiably reliable.
This Nation has already embarked upon, and through three different
Presidents has reaffirmed, a commitment to physical testing-free
testing that has cost billions of dollars. Our strategy has been
simple: the most reliable weapons without physical testing, upgraded as
strategy dictates.
At the same time, the United States has embarked on a major reduction
in the size of our stockpile and in the nuclear stores of other
nations. We have done this through programs this Senator has supported
and authored during the past 20 years. I salute Senator Richard Lugar,
my colleague from Indiana, and former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, for
their groundbreaking work in forging these programs, and I am proud I
have been able to work with them in these critical efforts.
Because of these initiatives--the Nunn-Lugar, Nunn-Lugar-Domenici,
the Nuclear Cities Initiative, the Global Initiative for Proliferation
Prevention, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development
Program, and others--our world is safer.
In total, under Nunn-Lugar, we have deactivated 6,982 warheads, 644
ICBMs, 485 ICBM silos, 100 mobile ICBM launchers, 155 bombers, 906 air-
launched cruise missiles, 436 submarine-launched ballistic missile
launchers, 611 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 30 strategic
missile submarines, and 194 nuclear test tunnels. Indeed, nine more
warheads were deactivated in the last month.
We have offered thousands of Russian nuclear scientists alternative
pay and occupations, in hopes they will be less susceptible to
blandishments from other parties. We are sharing nonproliferation
efforts with other nations beyond the former Soviet Union states.
In more stark terms, under the Washington-Moscow Treaty, ratified by
the Senate and signed by the President, we will have in our nuclear
stockpile, by 2013, fewer weapons than at any time since the era of
President Eisenhower. We will have fewer nuclear weapons than we had,
in other words, before the Cold War began in earnest.
So this two-pronged approach--international cooperation against
proliferation and for elimination of weapons, coupled with the
inception of Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship--has been America's
strong response to the need to reduce the danger of both nuclear
[[Page S7841]]
weapon stockpiles and physical nuclear testing.
Almost a decade ago, in a speech at Harvard University, I outlined
what I called a new nuclear paradigm. That paradigm envisioned, among
other things, a cut in American nuclear weapons to what I then called a
threat-based nuclear stockpile; that is, a stockpile commensurate with
the anticipated international threat to our Nation.
Critical to that concept was, and remains, the principle of
reliability and the continuous battle against degradation of our
present stockpile. No serious expert advocated simply keeping the very
same physical weapons we had 20 or 25 years ago, with no upgrading or
improvements. At some point, the degradation of components in those
weapons would mean the certification necessary from the three weapons
labs Directors to the President could not be honestly made.
In short, without upgrades and continuous nonphysical monitoring, our
nuclear weapons deterrence could be put in serious doubt. Yet at this
very time, the youngest nuclear weapons designs in our arsenal are 20
to 25 years old. Age-related component degradation could impact several
different systems at the same time, calling into question reliability.
For the past several years, this Senate has supported, on a
bipartisan basis, spending the money necessary to protect our stockpile
from degradation. At the same time, we have recognized some of our
systems are too complicated, pose risks to workers, and need
substantial upgrading.
This background brings me to the present Energy and Water Development
Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2008 proposed by the House
Appropriations Committee and scheduled for House floor action this
week.
That bill, if enacted without substantial change, would send American
nuclear deterrence strategy in a new, unknown, direction. Think about
that. More than 20 years of intensive study, by some of the best minds
in the world, could begin to be overturned by enactment of a single
appropriations bill. The new direction wouldn't be enacted as the
result of 3 to 4 years of intensive study and hearings by all of the
relevant committees of Congress. It wouldn't result from a convocation
of the best minds at our disposal. It wouldn't result from the kind of
pain-staking analysis of future risks that any prudent American would
demand from its government. No, that new path would begin by a single
appropriations bill, devised by a small group with the best of
intentions, but far from public view and analysis. In that regard, I
ask unanimous consent that an article from the Washington Post,
``Congress seeks new direction for Nuclear Strategy,'' by Walter
Pincus, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, June 18, 2007]
Congress Seeks New Direction for Nuclear Strategy
(By Walter Pincus)
Congress is moving to change the direction of the Bush
administration's nuclear weapons program by demanding the
development of a comprehensive post-Sept. 11, 2001 nuclear
strategy before it approves funding a new generation of
warheads.
``Currently there exists no convincing rationale for
maintaining the large number of existing Cold War nuclear
weapons, much less producing additional warheads,'' the House
Appropriations Committee said in its report, released last
week, on the fiscal 2008 Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Bill. The full House is expected to vote on
the measure this week.
The Bush administration had sought $88 million for the
Reliable Replacement Warhead program next year so that cost
and engineering studies could be completed and a decision
could be reached on congressional approval to build the first
RRW model, with the first new warheads ready by 2012.
The House already passed the fiscal 2008 Defense
Authorization Bill, which reduced RRW funding and called for
development of a new nuclear weapons strategy before steps
are taken to produce new warheads.
While the Senate has yet to act on the authorization or
appropriations measure, the Senate Armed Services and
Appropriations committees are expected to follow the House's
example by reducing proposed RRW spending and demanding
development of a new nuclear weapons policy.
Rep, Ellen O. Tauscher (D-Calif.), chairman of the House
Armed Services subcommittee that handles strategic weapons,
said in an interview last week that she expects that the
question of future U.S. nuclear weapons policy will be passed
to the next administration, since the Bush White House is
preoccupied with other subjects.
The House appropriations bill eliminates RRW funding and
directs the Energy and Defense departments and the
intelligence agencies to develop a ``comprehensive nuclear
defense strategy based on current and projected global
threats.'' And it slows down funding of the Bush
administration's program to modernize the facilities where
nuclear weapons are built, stored and dismantled.
``These multi-billion dollar initiatives are being proposed
in a policy vacuum without any administration statement on
the national security environment that the future nuclear
deterrent is designed to address,'' the report said. ``[I]t
is premature to proceed with further development of the RRW
or a significant nuclear complex modernization plan.''
The committee pointed out that neither the Pentagon's
Quadrennial Defense Review last year nor the administration's
2001 Nuclear Posture Review ``provided a long term nuclear
weapons strategy or the defined total nuclear stockpile
requirements for the 21st century.''
The House bill more than triples the amount the Bush
administration is asking for dismantlement of old warheads
and adds $30 million to modify a facility at the Nevada
nuclear test site so it can be used for dismantling weapons.
At present, the only facility that does that work is the
Pantex plant near Amarillo, Tex., which also refurbishes
currently deployed weapons.
Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.), chairman of the
Appropriations subcommittee handling the nuclear program, has
indicated he is thinking along the same lines, according to a
senior Democratic staffer familiar with his views. ``The
Tauscher approach makes sense,'' the staff member said.
He noted that senior Bush administration officials had not
publicly supported the RRW program despite a request by Sen.
Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.), a former Appropriations
subcommittee chairman and a proponent of the new warheads.
The Senate subcommittee is expected to provide limited funds
for the program ``so we have a couple of years to gather
information while the next administration lays out future
requirements.''
Mr. DOMENICI. Note an important point in this story. The funding cuts
are proposed now; a new strategic direction will be forged later in
this decade. Such an approach is absolutely backwards. We should forge
the new direction, if one is believed appropriate in a world of
increasing threats to our security, after great study. We should fund
our present strategy, 20 years in the making, now.
The House Bill and the Post story focus on the so-called RRW, the
Reliable Replacement Warhead. The RRW is a proposed new element of
administration policy. The intent of the RRW, to enable increased
reliability and design simplification in weapons of comparable
explosive yield is, in my view, a very appropriate consideration, which
may well result in the ability to maintain still smaller future
stockpiles supported by a still smaller future weapons complex. But, as
other legislators have suggested and as I noted in the last paragraph,
I agree that a study of the complete role of the RRW in the Nation's
nuclear deterrent is appropriate. That study must involve far greater
resources than those involved in the House report language.
Furthermore, Congress will have many opportunities to review and
finalize any decision for actual deployment of the RRW, but the funds
proposed for investment in the RRW now should provide the detailed data
to underpin any future congressional decision to shift portions of our
deterrent to that design.
But far beyond the RRW debate, with or without any RRW, stockpile
stewardship is absolutely vital to our national security. As long as
this Nation requires a nuclear deterrent in our defense or in support
of our allies, we must maintain the skills and infrastructure that
support the viability of that stockpile. That must include both trained
people and the facilities to enable their work to proceed. Th House
bill does harm to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It cuts all
funding for the new CMRR facility, which would replace the present
facility, which will be inoperable after 2010. Without a new facility,
our Nation will not be able to support the pit mission, which is a
single point failure in the complex. Without a viable pit capability,
the U.S. nuclear deterrent is vulnerable. The House bill cuts the
Nuclear Material Safeguard and Security Upgrade, required to meet the
Design Basis Threat around the key nuclear facilities that contain
special nuclear material; it would cut stockpile services, the
foundation of the production capability for our Nation; it would cut
almost in half
[[Page S7842]]
our pit mission, the critical component of our nuclear deterrent
systems; it would cut funding for the repair and elimination of old and
unused facilities that now drain funds from required new facilities; it
would cripple advanced computing, the key to science-based stockpile
stewardship; force the shutdown of LANSCE, the accelerator needed for a
variety of research; and, cut the Z machine, another component of our
nonphysical testing regime.
I urge all my colleagues to attend to this debate as it moves through
the House and to markup in subcommittee next week on the Senate side.
Implementing and funding a new strategic policy after extensive debate
is intelligent; defunding critical parts of our present strategy
without a clear new path in view poses serious risks to our national
security.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time controlled by the minority has
expired.
The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I believe we are in a period of morning
business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself 12 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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