[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 94 (Tuesday, June 12, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7538-S7539]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE OF CFE STATES PARTIES
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, on May 28, 2007, Russia requested an
Extraordinary Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe--the CFE Treaty--to discuss what
Russia identified as ``exceptional circumstances'' that may lead them
to suspend implementation of the treaty. Russia complains that most of
their former Warsaw Pact allies have now joined NATO, significantly
altering, in Russia's view, the ``balance'' of forces in Europe. This
Extraordinary Conference is now under way in Vienna, Austria. What
happens there will have tremendous implications for the security of
Europe and for U.S.-Russian relations. Both sides must avoid actions
that could lead to the potential unraveling of a treaty that has served
as a cornerstone of European security since the end of the Cold War.
In 1990, the CFE was conceived as a mechanism to reduce post-Cold-War
arsenals of conventional weapons in Europe and has evolved into a
stabilizing influence through its wide range of agreed verification
measures. This treaty should not be relegated to the dustbin of
history. That is not in the interest of all European States, including
Russia, nor of the United States.
The CFE Treaty was originally designed to limit the possibility of a
surprise attack on Europe, when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact still
existed. It imposes numerical limits on
[[Page S7539]]
major conventional military weapons--battle tanks, armored combat
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters--that can
be deployed within Europe. These limits are verifiable through an
extensive regime of inspections, transparency measures, and data
exchanges. To be sure, since the Cold War ended, most countries,
especially in central Europe, have reduced their levels of conventional
weapons well below the limits specified by the treaty. Nonetheless, the
verification measures that continue in place to the present day provide
a level of openness and predictability important to the continued
stability of Europe.
The ``exceptional circumstances'' referred to in Russia's request for
an Extraordinary Conference of the CFE States Parties are of Russia's
own making, and Russia holds the key to their resolution. At the end of
the last decade, the CFE Treaty was updated to reflect post-Cold-War
realities in Europe. The Adapted CFE Treaty was signed in 1999 at
Istanbul, Turkey; however, it has not entered into force. Ratification
of the treaty by the United States and its NATO allies will not occur
until Russia implements two political commitments it made at the time
of the treaty's signing.
In 1999, Russia pledged that it would fully withdraw its forces from
the territories of Georgia and Moldova, which were part of the former
Soviet Union. One of the CFE Treaty's fundamental tenets is that a
nation must give its consent for the stationing or deployment of
foreign military forces on its territory. NATO nations have insisted
that Russia live up to this fundamental principle and abide by its
commitments. In the Senate, we have made clear to administration
officials that we would give advice and consent to ratification of the
Adapted CFE Treaty's provisions only when and if Russia satisfied these
commitments.
Russia has protested that its commitments regarding Georgia and
Moldova were not related to the CFE Treaty. However, both the Georgian
and Moldovan Governments have said repeatedly that they want Russian
forces withdrawn from their territories. This has become a central
issue in the CFE Treaty debate. Russia possesses the ability and the
means to fulfill these commitments, needing only to close a single,
largely abandoned Russian base in Georgia, and to withdraw a few
hundred troops and an ammunition storage depot in Moldova. Russia has
made progress in Georgia, but very little in Moldova since 2004.
The United States is prepared to find ways to work through its
differences with Russia on important security issues in ways that
recognize shared interests. Russia's threatened suspension of the CFE
does not demonstrate a reciprocal view and could lead to the unraveling
of the CFE Treaty itself. Nevertheless, the Extraordinary Conference
can serve as an opportunity to modernize the Cold-War-era CFE Treaty in
a direction that reflects the current security environment in Europe
and one in which all parties can completely fulfill their commitments.
The administration's proposal to multilateralize the current Russian
peacekeeping forces in Moldova, perhaps under the auspices of the NATO-
Russia Council, merits serious consideration. In Georgia, Russia has
already taken significant steps to reduce its troop presence the
remaining steps are far less demanding but just as important. The
Extraordinary Conference should offer a new beginning, rather than the
beginning of the end.
The United States and its NATO Allies believe that the Adapted CFE
Treaty offers the best path toward ensuring a Europe united and at
peace, one in which Russia honors its commitments. If this were to
occur, then, and only then, would the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the United States Senate be likely to begin a careful,
expeditious review leading to U.S. ratification of the Adapted CFE
Treaty.
____________________