[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 64 (Friday, April 20, 2007)]
[House]
[Pages H3699-H3714]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SHAREHOLDER VOTE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ACT
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pallone). Pursuant to House Resolution
301 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration
of the bill, H.R. 1257.
{time} 0914
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 1257) to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
provide shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation,
with Mr. Pomeroy (Acting Chairman) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on
Wednesday, April 18, 2007, a request for a recorded vote on amendment
No. 7 printed in the Congressional Record by the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. McHenry) had been postponed.
Are there further amendments to the bill?
{time} 0915
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Price of Georgia
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 9 offered by Mr. Price of Georgia:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SEC. 1. DISCLOSURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION.
Congress finds and declares that the shareholder
disclosures relating to executive compensation required by
the rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
September 8, 2006 (71 Fed. Reg. 53158) provide an adequate
and complete mechanism for shareholder approval of such
compensation.
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. I want to thank the chairman of the committee
for his kindness in allowing appropriate amendments within committee.
Mr. Chairman, I had hoped that this would be an absolutely open rule
on the floor of the House, but it seems that this is as open as we get
in this Congress, and I appreciate the opportunity to present an
amendment or two on this important bill. This is an important debate
that we are having.
If you look at the backdrop for it, it is important to appreciate the
history of what is happening in many of our business sectors in this
Nation. Seventy-five percent of the IPOs in the world are not in the
United States. There is a reason for that. The number of public
companies converting to private increases daily, and there is a reason
for that. The number of U.S. companies looking to move offshore is
increasing, and there is a reason for that.
As it relates to this issue in 2006, the Securities and Exchange
Commission adopted sweeping changes to the rules regarding disclosure
of compensation paid to executive officers and directors of public
companies. This amendment, my amendment, amendment No. 9, simply states
that the disclosures of executive compensation adopted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006 provide a complete and
adequate mechanism for shareholder approval.
SEC rules approved last summer direct companies to publish a table
showing executives' total compensation, designed to bring better
disclosure to shareholders. Companies must also detail stock option
grants. The centerpiece of it was a single pay number, a single pay
number meant to replace a jumble of charts and tables that appear now
in proxy statements sent annually to investors. The single number will
combine salary and bonuses and perks and other compensation awarded in
a given year, with details for each component provided in a summary
composition table.
Publicly traded corporations compete for the trust of investors, and
these votes that have been proposed in the underlying bill can already
be arranged for today if the corporations feel they are warranted as
illustrated by AFLAC's recent nonbinding shareholder vote on executive
compensation.
Now, if investors become displeased with a board of directors, then
they have several choices available to them. They can seek to elect
different board members. They can sell their stock and shift their
investments to other companies whose corporate governance and decisions
are more to their liking, or they can ask the government to expand
regulation.
Regrettably, it is this last option that we are faced with today.
Further, regulation from Congress is rarely the answer, and it
certainly is not now.
I would ask my colleagues to seriously consider this amendment. My
amendment is a vote for transparency. It is a vote for disclosure over
increased government expansion and regulation. A vote against this
amendment will increase the incentives for companies to go from public
to private and to move from onshore to offshore.
I will close by saying this. Most Americans have a general sense that
some CEOs have levels of pension that are greater than warranted by
merit. They know that there must be a correction. They also know well
that Washington should not be the author of that correction.
I urge adoption of my amendment.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, this is an amendment, the purpose of which is to let
people vote against the bill without voting against the bill. What the
amendment says is, we don't need the bill. There are some Members who
are apparently reluctant to vote against the bill. There would be no
reason to vote for this amendment in the normal course of events. What
it says is that we don't need anything else.
Again, the effect of this amendment is exactly, exactly the same as
voting ``no'' on the bill. But some Members have a problem. There are a
lot of examples of excessive compensation in the minds of many. I would
note that this Congress will not be making any judgment about what is
or isn't excessive.
[[Page H3700]]
One amendment was offered by a Republican that would have had us
differentiate based on some definition of ``excessive.'' I hope that is
voted down. I don't think we should be that intrusive. What the
amendment says is, we don't need a bill. Well, if you don't need the
bill, you vote ``no.'' Why would you vote for an amendment that says
you don't need a bill instead of simply voting ``no''?
The answer is, you don't want to be accused of voting ``no'' on the
bill, so you vote for an amendment which has the same effect as killing
the bill but is worded slightly differently.
I do note, and I acknowledge my colleagues on the other side
agreeing, because someone said, oh, the government shouldn't get
involved in this. What this does is celebrate a significant government
involvement in the pay practices of corporations. What it says is that
the rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, dominated
by Republicans, run by a former Republican Member of this House as the
chairman, that those rules are adequate and complete. In other words,
it says, ``Those are a good thing. That's all we need.''
Understand that those rules were a ``mandate,'' to use the word that
has been used here, a significant mandate by the Federal Government
into private corporations. It says to private corporations, we, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, this was done last year, we order
you against your will, because if you want to do it, you could have
done it voluntarily, we order you as the Federal Government to print on
every proxy form the following information in the following form.
I am glad they did that. I am glad that my colleagues implicitly
repudiate this notion that somehow the Federal Government is not
supposed to tell corporations what to do. The SEC did do that. But now
the question is, what do you do with the information?
It is interesting. I was just shown by one of the members of the
staff an article where the corporation, United Health, was asked to
allow a vote, then, by the shareholders on this information which the
SEC has put forward, and they said, well, that would put us at a
competitive disadvantage in America because some companies would do it
and some wouldn't.
This bill simply eliminates the competitive disadvantage. It says
every corporation can do it.
I was asked before, why don't you leave this to the market. That's
what this bill does. The market consists of the people who own the
shares, who buy the shares. This bill empowers them.
Finally, I do want to note that my colleagues are giving a different
set of arguments, my colleagues on the other side, today apparently,
than Wednesday. On Wednesday, there was a lot of patriotism and a lot
of talk about, let's not do what other countries do, let's stick with
America. There were a lot of references to America's success in the
corporate world. The gentleman from Georgia offering this amendment to
kill the bill without a vote to kill the bill, says, America is doing
so well, why jeopardize it?
So I urge Members to study the two alternative approaches. In fact,
the gentleman from Georgia today says America is not doing so good,
we've got to be careful; we're losing IPOs, we're losing things. The
argument that we have been hearing, and he is joined by others in
making it, is that we're losing them primarily to England because of
the corporate practices in England. That's what the committee appointed
by the Secretary of the Treasury said, or inspired by him said. That's
what the McKinsey report said: England does this.
What we are proposing today is exactly the model that has been
followed in England. If you believe what the gentleman from Georgia
said, which is that we are losing financial business, I think that has
been overstated, but we are losing financial business to others, and
the country that we are told we are losing it to does exactly what we
are doing.
The fact is that letting the people who own the company vote on
information that the SEC has required the company to put forward as to
whether or not they approve or disapprove that that's what the people
they hired should be paid is not at all intrusive. It hasn't caused
problems in England. We think it has had a reasonable effect in
moderating corporate excesses. That is why I hope that we will vote
down this amendment.
By the way, if this amendment is voted down, the people who don't
want to vote for the bill don't have to vote for the bill. But they
ought to be willing to vote ``yes'' or ``no'' on the bill and not
defeated by this kind of wording which gives people a chance to vote
``no'' without standing up and doing it.
Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
The other day, Mr. Chairman, when we originally debated the bill, the
chairman of the committee gently admonished one of the other speakers,
one of the gentlemen from California, for selectively quoting a
particular article.
We all do that, though, don't we? He was making the point Wednesday,
when we discussed this bill, about this particular issue, and the
chairman, in sort of a gentle nudge, teased him a little bit, but sort
of called him out and said, you know, read the entire article.
It seems to me that the chairman of the committee may be falling into
that same trap a little bit. Because coming to this floor now and
having a conversation of the range of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and sort of, by implication, giving the imprimatur of
approval on rules that the SEC promulgated is not a great celebration
necessarily of the entire framework of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
It is not as if we have a choice today. We are in the minority. We
don't get to set the debate. It is not as if we get to take the Etch-A-
Sketch of Securities and Exchange law and go and shake it today and
come up and create a new thing.
Now, if the gentleman from Georgia says, well, within the context of
this, there is something that is decent that is happening here that the
SEC has done, then so be it. But that is not an imprimatur of
everything----
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROSKAM. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I apologize, then. I inferred that the
Members on the other side were being supportive of what our former
colleague, Mr. Cox, did. If, in fact, I have incorrectly assumed that
my colleagues were supportive of what the Republican SEC has done,
rather than simply taking account of it, I will withdraw that, and I
will not impute to you approval of what Mr. Cox has done.
Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I would suggest the
chairman should resist the temptation to overcharacterize a particular
argument.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
That was an extraordinary and revealing exchange. I was also going to
point out that Mr. Price was supporting the recent mandatory rulings of
the Republican-run SEC for disclosure, but then deprive the public, the
stockholders, from being able to do anything meaningful once they find
out about scandalous levels of executive compensation or board
compensation.
Everyone talks about the board as the remedy. The board is often a
part of the problem, being paid huge amounts of money for showing up
once or twice a year at meetings.
So, now, I mean, at least this is a little more honest. They don't
even want the stockholders to be able to find out how much the
executive is being paid, out of fear that somehow they might be able to
do something about it, I guess. I mean, this is absolutely
extraordinary.
I heard some other things. They say, if a corporation feels it is
warranted, the gentleman from Georgia says, they can vote on executive
salary. Oh, the board, who got a sweet deal, who are supporting the CEO
who has got a sweet deal, if they feel it is warranted, they will allow
those little peons, the stockholders, to vote on it. This is America.
These are public corporations.
Now, would the gentleman say if someone inherits some stock, or
someone has been a lifelong investor in a company, and there is a coup
by some
[[Page H3701]]
corporate raiders, and they install a board, and they just start
dumping an excessive, as the gentleman said, sometimes greater than
warranted salary on a CEO, that they should not have the power to do
something about it?
He says, well, you know, they can elect other people to the board.
Well, no, because the election to the board process is fixed too. You
get either to vote for the nominees or withhold. But if they get a
single vote, and their buddy sitting next to them is going to vote,
they will get their own stock for themselves. They are elected to the
board. Ninety-nine percent of the people may have withheld, 99.999 may
have withheld. That one person votes for himself. He is still on the
board.
That is the way the rules work now. Apparently you think that is just
fine. You admit that there is excessive salary being paid here,
excessive compensation. No one can look at those numbers and say that
they aren't, the gentleman even admitted, greater than warranted in
some cases.
Well, then, give the stockholders a meaningful remedy. That is all we
are doing here. We are just saying, it is not even mandatory, just that
you can have, once you get the mandatory disclosure put in place by the
Republicans, we Democrats are saying the stockholders should be allowed
to have a referendum on that and not have a runaround by the board or
not have their capability to put a measure before the corporation
denied by the board.
{time} 0930
I have a major stockholder of Bank of America stock in my district,
and he has been constantly frustrated in attempting to move forward
questions about board compensation, about executive compensation, about
governance. And he is a major stockholder, as are the rest of his
family. But he is thwarted. It is a little bit like the old Soviet
Union: They are in charge, they don't have to listen to him. It is not
democratic.
But the gentleman from Georgia says, well, sell your stock. That is a
great remedy. Let the corporate raiders take it over, sell your stock.
Now, come on. Give people recourse. And, you know, the reason that some
investors are going to Europe is because they have more regulation in
Europe and they have less excessive compensation to boards and CEOs,
and they know that their dollars and/or pounds or Euros are being
better cared for within that investment. That is why we are losing
people overseas, not because of disclosure of excessive compensation or
the possibility stockholders might be able to vote on it.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield my time to my good friend from
Georgia, the sponsor of the amendment, Mr. Price.
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding; I appreciate that. And I appreciate my good friend from
Oregon being so transparent in his truth as he made a very interesting
argument for more regulation and the fixing of CEO salaries. Which is
remarkable, Mr. Speaker. The mischaracterization of this amendment is
extremely curious.
The chairman of the committee says this amendment is superfluous, it
is not necessary. Well, it is absolutely vital. And the reason it is
vital is because it is important for us to say that we believe it is
appropriate, the action that has been taken by the Securities and
Exchange Commission as it relates to CEO compensation and the
disclosure requirements. That is important, because it is important for
us as a Congress to say we condone and appreciate the work that the
administration, the executive branch is doing in this area. It is also
important because it draws attention to the issue and says to the
American people, educates them to what is now available to them as
shareholders.
My good friend from Oregon says that this isn't mandatory. Well, it
is mandatory. The bill states it is mandatory. There isn't any way out
of it. It is Congress inserting itself into the functioning in very
specific ways of corporations. And, Mr. Chairman, I don't know about
your constituents, but my constituents know that that is the last place
they want Congress, I promise you that.
My good friend from Oregon states that the vote is fixed, it is not
really a vote. Well, if he truly believes that, then why on Earth would
he support the underlying bill? If the vote is already fixed, why
support the underlying bill? It doesn't make any sense.
So I would also just highlight for Congress and for anyone who is a
shareholder that the opportunity for these kinds of votes already
exists within the structure of corporate governance right now, within
the structure of shareholder rights, as was demonstrated by a good
company from Georgia, AFLAC, who went ahead and already has these
nonbinding shareholder votes. But there is a difference between having
individuals in the private sector, shareholders and individuals outside
of the mandating of government to have it occur and have government
come in with its heavy hand and say, this is exactly what you need to
do because we know best.
Mr. Chairman, in my district I believe that my constituents know
better how to act and how to relate to corporations than Washington.
And I appreciate the gentleman's time.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Price).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the
noes appeared to have it.
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia will
be postponed.
Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Putnam
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 11 offered by Mr. Putnam:
Page 4, line 13, strike ``Any proxy'' and insert ``Subject
to paragraph (3), any proxy''.
Page 5, line 6, strike ``In any proxy'' and insert
``Subject to paragraph (3), in any proxy''.
Page 6, line 13, strike the close quotation marks and
following period and after such line insert the following:
``(3) Deferred compensation exemption.--The shareholder
vote requirements of this subsection shall not apply to an
issuer if the compensation of executives as disclosed
pursuant to the Commission's compensation disclosure rule
indicates that the issuer provides the majority of the
issuer's executive compensation in the form of non-qualified
deferred compensation.''.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Chairman, today's debate on shareholder votes
highlights differing views on executive compensation. It is important
to note that shareholders already have the power to propose votes on
executive compensation. In fact, during the 2007 proxy season, 64
corporations will hold votes on whether to provide shareholders
nonbinding votes on executive pay.
As my friend from Georgia referenced, AFLAC has already voluntarily
agreed to include an advisory vote on executive compensation on its
2007 proxy statement, an example of market forces and shareholder views
at work.
These examples reflect boards' responsiveness to improving corporate
governance and holding executives accountable to fulfill their duty of
increasing shareholder value by growing profits and creating jobs.
However, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle argue that boards
of directors' pay for CEOs is disconnected from their performance. I
would argue that if you believe that, then you should support this
amendment that focuses on performance and encourages greater
accountability.
The amendment I offer today brings attention to what is known as
nonqualified, deferred compensation. It allows the issuers to be exempt
from the nonbinding shareholder vote on executive pay if the issuer
provides the majority of the executive's compensation in the form of
that nonqualified deferred compensation. And the reason for that is
that nonqualified deferred compensation is subject to forfeiture.
Unlike worker or union pension plans, it is contingent compensation. In
other words, it is based on the performance of the company, the CEOs,
and the executives. Those that have poor performance forfeit some of
their compensation.
[[Page H3702]]
My amendment gets to the heart of shareholder frustration, which is
that if a CEO fails to fulfill their fiduciary duties, then they should
be held accountable. Let me give you an example.
Recently, a CEO of a major corporation announced that he would be
leaving his post at the end of the year. The board of directors of that
company decided not to give a large incentive bonus to that CEO because
the company reported a 28 percent decrease in their profit for the last
quarter of the year. While the CEO claimed that he deserved a $7.65
million bonus, the board reached an agreement and the CEO will receive
less than half of what he thought he was entitled to. The board
exercised discretion based on performance, holding executives
accountable.
Mr. Speaker, this amendment aligns management interest with
shareholder interest, enhancing shareholder value and equity in the
company. Nonqualified deferred compensation packages help to drive
financial performance, meet growth targets, and ensure the retention of
good performing executives. Simply put, if the executive does not
perform and the company suffers, then the compensation should reflect
as much.
I would also like to point out that in 2004 both Democrats and
Republicans created rules that determine when it is appropriate to
defer certain types of compensation. It is unnecessary for shareholders
to have a nonbinding vote if there is no constructive receipt of that
compensation. They are voting on something that may or may not actually
be paid out to poorly performing CEOs. We should be encouraging this
type of performance-based compensation, not second-guessing.
I would urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to adopt this
amendment.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
First, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the subdebate between the
gentleman from Illinois and the gentleman from Georgia on the
Republican side.
Just to recap, I said I was glad that the gentleman from Georgia,
apparently on behalf of the Republicans, agreed with what the SEC did.
The gentleman from Illinois took me to task and said, nothing in the
amendment was approving. So I said, okay, I withdraw the notion that it
was approving.
But then the gentleman from Georgia came back and said, it does
approve. So I would urge the two of them to work that out. I would be
glad to either give them the acknowledgment, as the gentleman from
Georgia said, that they support it; or retract that compliment to Mr.
Cox, as the gentleman from Illinois prefers. But I am confused now as
to their difference.
As to the gentleman from Florida's amendment, it does exactly what
our amendment is inaccurately accused of doing, it intrudes the
Congress into the internal pay decisions of the corporation.
We are strictly, scrupulously, completely neutral as to how the
corporations pay their CEOs and others. We simply say that the market
should work, that these shareholders should decide. And the gentleman
said, shareholders have that right now. They do in some places, they do
in some States, they do in some corporations; they do not in others.
There is no uniform, legally enforceable right for shareholders to do
this; and some corporations have refused to do it. United Health
Service recently refused a request from a pension fund to do that.
There is no uniform right.
By the way, it is a matter of State law or Federal law. This notion
that we are intruding on the private corporation, as they said on
Wednesday, makes no sense. Private corporations are the creation of
positive law, and positive law says, here are the rights and here are
the duties, et cetera.
Indeed, the gentleman from Georgia, who, unlike the gentleman from
Illinois, approves of what the SEC did, says Washington shouldn't
decide. But on the other hand, he is for what the SEC did. Has the SEC
decamped to Wichita when I wasn't looking? I would have thought, as
chairman of the committee, if the SEC had moved out of Washington,
someone would have told me. Maybe they're not getting my mail. But how
can you say that Washington should tell corporations what to do and be
so supportive of this SEC intervention?
And on the subject of intervention, what the gentleman from Florida
would do, would have us say is, you have to have a shareholder vote if
you have certain kinds of compensation, but you don't have to have a
shareholder vote if you have other kinds of compensation. And what is
the majority, and is it nonqualified deferred? It would be a far
greater intrusion both substantively and procedurally than what we say.
We say, have a vote, let the shareholders vote. Terribly radical. Let
those people who own the corporation give their opinion on what the CEO
should be paid.
The gentleman from Florida says ``no,'' but here is the deal: Some
corporations hate that. They don't want these pesky shareholders having
a say on how many hundred million dollars a guy ought to get when he
gets fired, so we will say ``yes'' in some cases, ``no'' in others.
The gentleman said we should kind of give them an incentive. Well, I
don't think that is the case. I don't think Congress ought to be
picking and choosing as to what is the right kind of corporate
compensation and what is not the right kind of corporate compensation.
But that is what the amendment does. The amendment does exactly what,
as I said, our bill carefully avoids doing: It puts Congress into the
decision-making process and says, if you do it the way we, Congress,
think is right, you are okay; if you don't do it the way Congress
thinks is right, you have a shareholder vote.
Now, I don't think a shareholder vote is any problem. But for those
who do, if you really do, then you are intruding the Congress into that
process in a way that we have sought to avoid. So I hope that the
amendment is defeated.
Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I think in response to the chairman's observations
about the gentleman from Florida's amendment, I do take the chairman at
face value that what you are trying to do and the way you are looking
at it is trying to create a neutral framework by which these matters
are determined. No question about that. But it seems to me that the
beauty of this amendment is that it really does seem to get at the
heart of the matter that is really prompting this sort of national
conversation.
In other words, I think the gentleman from Florida has come up with a
more surgical way to accomplish the very task that the chairman of the
committee is trying to do. So while the chairman's bill in and of
itself is a bit of a blunt instrument, I think that the gentleman from
Florida's amendment sharpens that blunt instrument and helps to really
cut to the cause and the issue that is before the Congress, and I urge
its passage.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
First, since the gentleman from Georgia wouldn't allow me to correct
his mischaracterization of my position, I guess we are having a little
issue over the meaning of the word ``fix.'' Now, if he means ``fixed''
as in ``setting,'' that is, setting the salary, he is totally wrong. I
never said that, and that is not what this bill would do. It would just
allow a referendum by the owners of the company on the package being
paid to the corporate executive.
Now, if he means ``fixed'' in terms of what he stated on his own, he
said some are greater than warranted and then he talked about
correction; if we are talking about that kind of ``fix,'' he is
absolutely right, and that is what this bill would do. It would allow
the stockholders a vote. He doesn't want to allow them to vote on that
compensation.
{time} 0945
Then how are you going to fix it? That is extraordinary.
Now, Mr. Putnam makes an interesting argument. This poor CEO, whoever
he was who totally underperformed who would receive compensation under
his amendment that would be exempt from a vote, saw his compensation,
having screwed up the corporation and making the board of directors mad
and underperforming, losing money for the stockholders. He
[[Page H3703]]
didn't get that $6.75 million. He only got $3 million. Wow. He was
penalized. Well, maybe the stockholders would rather he was fired and
he got nothing. Three million bucks for screwing up. That is not
exactly a corrective action. I don't know what world you folks live in
over there, but for people in my district, that would be like winning
the lottery big. Three million bucks. And this is for a guy who didn't
do his job properly. And that is the kind of, and that would be exempt
from the stockholders, because that is corrective action. He only got
three million. Don't worry. He only got three million. And only three
million came out of your assets to go to this guy who lowered the value
of your investment and messed up the company, probably fired a bunch of
workers and who knows what else he did that messed things up. So it is
just extraordinary.
So now you are getting in the weeds here. You are actually
determining what sorts of compensation would be voted on and what
wouldn't. You are getting into fixing something, regulating something.
We are just saying we want to allow a referendum. It is kind of the
democratic process that most of us understand around here. If people
are part of a public corporation, they should get a vote on executive
compensation. They should also be allowed to put other measures before
the board in a meaningful way. But the Republicans apparently don't
believe in corporate democracy.
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
I want to commend the gentleman from Florida for his amendment. I do
think that it focuses the attention of this issue where it ought to be.
But I want to address a couple of remarkable misstatements from my
friends on the other side. They have said, the gentleman from Oregon
said that, I don't want to allow a shareholder vote.
Well, I mean, that is absolutely ridiculous. I am all in favor of a
shareholder vote if it is done without the mandate from Washington.
That is the distinction that we have here, Mr. Chairman. We have a
party that is desirous of increasing regulation and increasing the
mandate from government. And we have defenders of a system that allows
individuals to act in concert in the way that they best deem
appropriate. That is the difference. It is a fundamental philosophical
difference.
They believe that mandates from Washington are the solution to this
and virtually every other problem. Well, I simply don't believe that. I
simply don't believe that, and I know that my constituents don't
believe that.
It is also clear from the comments made by my good friend from Oregon
that class warfare is alive and well. And that is also something that I
think does a disservice to this body, and does a disservice to our
Nation, does a disservice to the discussion.
To my good friend, the chairman, he was somewhat astounded by the
fact that the gentleman from Illinois and I could think differently,
and I appreciate that because the lock-step group on the other side is
in full swing. And I understand that. That is all right. But we have an
opportunity to think on this side of the aisle. And we have an
opportunity to reach conclusions. They may be the same conclusions,
they may be different conclusions, but we have an opportunity to think
on this side of the aisle. And for that I am appreciative.
What I am only asking for in this bill and in the amendment that I am
supporting is to provide the opportunity for the American people to
think and to act for themselves without the mandate, without the
dictates from the Federal Government.
So I urge my colleagues to support the amendment of the gentleman
from Florida.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, I have been intrigued by the debate that has been
transpiring here. I wanted to come to the floor to make one simple
point, and that is that I appreciate the efforts on behalf of the
Financial Services Committee and Chairman Frank to start demystifying
the process. There is a lot of talk about supporting of shareholder
rights and what not. But the fact is that we don't have a uniform
system in this country that actually guarantees people the right to
exercise corporate democracy in ways that most people would take for
granted. In terms of the most important stakeholders, the people who
own these corporations, they are too often treated like children that
need to be kept at bay. You don't have to read very many business pages
in the New York Times, just for the last year, to discover areas of
systematic abuse in terms of what anybody would expect to be the
treatment of shareholders. And, unfortunately, that is aided and
abetted by government policy.
I appreciate what is happening with the Financial Services Committee
to take some steps to try and demystify the process. I see this as one
simple step to allow shareholders just an advisory vote on
compensation. I thought it was a pretty good idea. I thought it was
being part of a larger conversation. I think it is a warning shot about
corporate behavior and to State regulators to take seriously the rights
of the people who own these companies. All of us, I think, support
capitalism. But the way that the shareholders are treated must make us
be suspect.
Then on top of this, I hear the amendment from my friend from
Florida. Again, I may be a little biased, getting my information from
the business pages of the newspaper, but the Sunday before last, it was
fascinating looking at the hash that has been made by SEC in terms of
trying to explain what total compensation is. It is almost now beyond
the capacity of individuals to understand because we get in here, make
these distinctions that torture and twist information.
I thought the proposal that is brought forward by Financial Services,
was pretty straightforward. Yet this amendment again would start
parsing that out, distinguishing between different types of
compensation and making it harder for shareholders to have a clear
understanding.
I would respectfully suggest that we vote against this amendment; we
support the underlying bill; and most important, we support the
philosophy from Financial Services to demystify corporate governance,
that we give a little more respect to the rights of shareholders and
our responsibility as people who establish the rules of the game.
I think the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was rushed through after years
of sort of holding it at bay in the aftermath of scandals where
Congress wouldn't act, to the point where Congress was forced to act.
I appreciate what is happening in the Financial Services Committee
where they are looking at this subject in a systematic fashion. I look
forward to subsequent proposals that come forward so that we can give
shareholders the rights that they deserve as the people who are after
all really the owners of our capitalistic system.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Putnam).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the
noes appeared to have it.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will
be postponed.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Price of Georgia
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Price of Georgia:
Page 6, line 13, strike the close quotation marks and
following period and after such line insert the following:
``(3) Conditional implementation.--
``(A) Conditional effective date.--Subject to subparagraph
(C), this subsection shall be effective with respect to any
solicitation of a proxy, consent, or authorization for an
annual or other shareholder meeting occurring on or after the
date that is 90 days after the Commission transmits to
Congress the report required under subparagraph (B).
``(B) Study on recruitment and retention of executives.--
The Commission shall conduct a study to determine the effect
of the separate vote requirements under this subsection on
the ability of issuers to recruit and retain executives, and
not later than 90
[[Page H3704]]
days after the date of enactment of this Act, shall transmit
to Congress a report containing the findings of such study.
``(C) Determination by commission.--This subsection shall
not take effect if the Commission determines, pursuant to the
study required under subparagraph (B), that the requirements
of this subsection would significantly hinder issuers'
recruitment and retention of executives.''.
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I think that this amendment gets
to what the consequences of this underlying bill are. Now, we have
heard some contradictory information from the proponents of this bill.
Some say it doesn't mean anything. Some say it is very important and
that the consequences are remarkable.
I would suggest that, frankly, we don't know what mandating to
companies and to publicly traded companies in this Nation, what this
bill will do. I don't think that we, as Congress, know. I think the
consequences may be remarkable and significant.
I do know that it would be helpful and appropriate for all of us to
have that information, to have the information about what the
unintended consequences of this might be. So this amendment is an
amendment to address that. It would ensure that this legislation will
not compromise fair competition and a level playing field for publicly
traded companies. The amendment would require the SEC, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, to conduct a study to determine whether a
separate nonbinding vote, what the bill mandates, whether or not that
would hinder a publicly traded company's ability to compete for the
best available candidates for its officers and directors.
It would make sense that it would be helpful for us and for the
Nation to know whether or not that would be a consequence. If, in fact,
the SEC finds that the rules would hamper the company's ability to
compete for the best candidates, then the nonbinding shareholder vote
will not be required.
For every publicly traded company, there are thousands of privately
held firms. Large privately held corporations compete with publicly
traded corporations for the same talent pool of CEOs and, presumably,
pay the same compensation levels. Responsibility, our responsibility
dictates that we don't add yet another reason for companies to list on
foreign exchanges or otherwise be discouraged from becoming publicly
traded.
So this is a very simple amendment, provides for a study that would
determine the consequences in terms of whether or not publicly traded
companies would be able to attract the best talent. I urge my
colleagues to support it.
Mr. MILLER of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
I think this amendment makes clear how radical an idea the minority
party thinks democracy is, whether it is in corporations or in
government, and how wary they are of voting, whether in corporations,
by shareholders or in politics.
Usually the minority party is very critical, hostile to the idea that
regulatory agencies should play a role in our democracy, in our
economy. Regulatory agencies play an important role. They work out a
lot of details. They address new problems more quickly than Congress
can in a way that is consistent with what Congress has done before. But
this is not a complicated proposal. This is a straightforward proposal.
There are not details to work out. Either we want to do this or we are
not going to do this and we are not making it up as we go along.
Britain did this in 2001. We have got 6 years' experience under
Britain, the way it has worked in Britain, and it has worked just fine
in Britain.
The minority party has come to the curious position, after more than
200 years of experience in American democracy, of thinking the
Congress, the Members of the House of Representatives and the other
body, elected by the people should be mere advisers, an advisory body
to the President, and that anyone appointed by the President
necessarily must be wiser and more knowledgeable than the folks who are
actually elected by the people.
Mr. Chairman, we were elected by the people. We are speaking for the
people. We are acting on their behalf. This amendment will undermine
democracy in the boardroom in corporate America, and it will undermine
democracy in our government, and I urge we vote against it.
Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, it is interesting, the majority has now slipped into I
think the same arguable bad habit that the chairman accused us of,
because now the SEC has been criticized as Presidential appointees
lacking the wisdom that Congress has.
Let's just discuss this amendment for a minute, because I really do
think it is a good amendment. It gets to the heart of this matter. And
it basically, for purposes of our discussion today, Mr. Chairman, it
accepts, I think, the premise of the chairman. It says, here we go.
Let's go back to the underlying bill and just focus our conversation
for a minute. The underlying bill says, let's put a nonbinding
referendum on the ballot. The chairman has made a number of arguments
in favor of it. But the gentleman from Georgia, essentially says, in
this amendment, okay, let's do that, but first, just hit the pause
button. Just put the pause button on just for a bit and let the
Securities and Exchange Commission, who, over the past day or so of
debate, have risen to the point of almost Superman status, they have
been so widely complimented and called wise and so forth by the other
side of the aisle. Let's ask that commission what their opinion is.
Let's study it. Let's look at it. And if, if, if, they say no problem,
then there is no problem. No harm, no foul.
{time} 1000
The bill is put into place and on we go. But if the Securities and
Exchange Commission says that public companies enter into a competitive
disadvantage because of this, then ought we not consider that?
Shouldn't we then hit the stop button? Because we have heard the other
side get up on the floor today and over the past few days and talk
about the free market and how they are in favor of capitalism, and we
have heard the gentleman from Oregon a couple of minutes ago telling us
that the reason that companies are going to Europe is somehow because
they don't have shareholder rights, and the logic was so dizzying, I
couldn't even follow it.
But accepting everything that the other side says for the sake of
argument is then implicit in accepting this amendment. Because all this
amendment says, and let's be very clear about it, is it simply says hit
the pause button for 90 days. Just wait 90 days. So let's assume for
the sake of argument that this blows through the Senate. Let's assume
for the sake of argument that it is signed into law on June 1. I would
submit to you between June 1 and September 1 we can wait to take the
temperature to find out if this is a good idea or if somehow this
hinders us competitively.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what we are doing here today. This is
important, I think, for the American people to understand the critical
role that Congress plays here in providing transparency and openness
and helping corporate America do what they do best, and that is to
generate and grow our economy.
But I rise in opposition to my friend, the gentleman from Georgia's,
amendment. And I do so because, it is interesting, there seems to be a
double-speak, Mr. Chairman, coming from the other side of the aisle. On
the one hand they say that there is too much government involvement,
and at the same time their amendment would add another layer of
government involvement, a further study that would slow this whole
process down.
I don't understand what is wrong with transparency. Transparency in
our markets is what makes our markets so attractive to investors, to
investors who want to know what is going on within that publicly traded
company.
This amendment would make the effective date of the bill conditional
on the SEC's performance of a study to determine the effect of
shareholder vote requirements on the ability of issuers to recruit and
retain executives. The bill would not take effect if the SEC finds the
vote would ``significantly hinder issuers' recruitment and retention of
executives.''
[[Page H3705]]
In effect, this is a way to kill the bill without voting against the
bill. It would permit the SEC and the business executives to
effectively veto the Congress with a study.
This amendment would make nonbinding shareholder votes on
compensation subject to an SEC study and the SEC's finding.
And I should just remind our friends on the other side that Congress
does not generally make laws that apply only if agencies make certain
findings.
I would also note for the record that this amendment was defeated in
committee by a vote of 27 yeas to 32 nays with 1 present, therefore a
vote against this amendment.
And again I just want to come back to what I talked about before, and
it relates as well to the Putnam amendment, and that is what is wrong
with transparency? What is wrong with those individuals, moms and pops,
moms who are soccer field moms, understanding what their investment is
doing, how their investment dollars are being spent?
If the other side of the aisle wants to continue to align themselves
with the Bob Nardellis and the Ken Lays of the world over Joe and Mary
Six-Pack, so be it. But I would just point out that I think that the
American stockholders would like to know what is happening in corporate
America.
I wonder how many stockholders in GE understood that when Jack Welch
retired as a CEO, what that package actually entailed. GE shareholders
would provide him with a ``lifetime access to company facilities and
services comparable to those which are currently made available to him
by the company,'' that they are unconditional and irrevocable. And
don't forget about the use of an $80,000 per month Manhattan apartment
owned by the company, aka the shareholders. I wonder how many
shareholders know that they are supplying a rent-free apartment for
Jack Welch in Manhattan; courtside seats at the New York Knicks and
U.S. Open; seats at Wimbledon; box seats, and, Mr. Frank, I hope you
will forgive me, at the Red Sox-Yankees baseball games; country club
fees.
Who paid for all this and who continues to pay for all this? The
shareholders, who are the individual citizens, pension funds, 401(k)s.
We the people who invest in these public corporations are the ones who
pay for all this. Is it right that we pay for this and have no ability
to learn about it or no ability to really hold these public
corporations accountable? I don't think so.
The other side of the aisle seems to think that is okay and that is
how corporate America should conduct itself.
I believe that shareholders have the right to know what the full
compensation packages, the total compensation packages, of the
employees running their, the shareholders', companies. And it goes back
to Mr. Putnam's amendment again. What we need to oppose is this
amendment, as well as the Putnam amendment, because it injects the
government too far into the board rooms, creates new hassles for
corporate America, and it disrespects and ignores the owners of
shareholders, the constituency of those executives as well as our
constituents that we represent.
So I oppose this and the Putnam amendment.
Mr. GARRETT of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
Mr. Chairman, I just come to the floor to rise to answer the question
that the gentleman from the other side just raised as far as the
information that the shareholders have the right to know, and I agree
with him completely. The shareholders do have a right to know what is
going on in the corporations that they are investing in.
When you think about it, what should be the ultimate objective of any
of the legislation that we are addressing here today or any of the
amendments that we are addressing here today? And that, I think, is to
make sure that the shareholders, A, have information, and, B, have the
best return on their investment possible, whether we are talking about
senior citizens who are relying upon their investments for their
pensions and their security for their remaining days and they have to
make absolutely certain that these investments are good investments
because this is what they are relying on because they are no longer
working or whether these are young people who are just starting out and
are beginning to put a way a little money for their children for their
education 5, 10, 15, 20 years down the road.
They want to be sure that their investments have a good return as
well. They want to have information as well. Or maybe it is somebody in
their middle years, such as myself, 40, 47 years old. We want to make
sure that the money that we set aside for our retirement is going to be
there and that we are getting a good return. So we want information as
well. So the gentleman on the other side of the aisle is correct when
he says we need to know that information.
Well, that is exactly what this amendment does. This is to provide
more information. And that is exactly what the SEC has already done
with their proposed rules and regulations as far as providing more
information to the American investor as far as the pay packages that
are going to CEOs.
So let's step back again and see what is already out there. The SEC
has initiated proceedings to make sure that the investor, whether it is
a senior citizen, middle-income family, or a young person starting out,
has the information that should be available to them. And I commend the
gentleman from Georgia because he is following on in that tradition of
making sure investors have additional information. Because what do we
not want to do by any legislation that passes through this House? What
we should not want to do is to hurt the investor. What we should not
want to do is to add costs to the system that are unnecessary. What we
should not want to do is hurt that senior citizen by adding a
burdensome process to the system that will actually diminish the value
of his or her current investments.
What we should not want to do is hurt that young family just starting
out putting money aside for their children's education by hurting the
investments that they have already made. The underlying language in
this bill has the potential to do that. This amendment by the gentleman
from Georgia (Mr. Price) will alleviate that problem.
This amendment simply asks to investigate, to study, to find out, to
perform, to provide transparency, if you will, to the system to make
sure that whatever we do here is for the benefit of the investor in the
long run.
I will just close on this: the other day I had my own amendment,
which says that, like the other side of the aisle, we too on this side
of the aisle agree that some of the pay packages that we read about in
the media seem egregiously high or very excessive and what have you and
we have our questions about them as well; but like this amendment and
my amendment that came yesterday, we all want to do the same thing and
make sure that at the end of the day the investor is not hurt by the
actions of the other side of the aisle or by Congress, but are helped.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Let me begin with the gentleman from New Jersey's worrying that the
investor might be hurt by what we would do. I guess the motto of
investor in this case should be ``Stop me before I vote again.''
How are we going to hurt the investor? We are going to say to those
investors, You know the information that is going to be presented to
you because the SEC mandated that companies do it? You get to say
whether you approve or disapprove of that proposal.
That is going to hurt the investor? Are investors so much in need of
protection from themselves that they must be prevented from voting on
this?
This is part of the problem. It is an inversion of capitalism here.
The CEOs don't own the company. The boards don't own the company. The
shareholders own the company. They are the market. And all this bill
does is to empower them.
By the way, when the gentleman from Illinois says we are rushing in,
he has a very different definition of ``rushing in'' than I do. This
takes effect in 2009. We, in fact, were approached by some, the
Business Roundtable. They still don't like the bill.
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
[[Page H3706]]
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman for
yielding.
Given that it has that implementation date, which I think is
appropriate, and given that my amendment asks for a study for a period
of 90 days, is there any reason why the gentleman would oppose the
amendment?
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Yes. And reclaiming my time, I will tell
him what it is. If all this asks for was for the SEC to study it, I
would support the amendment. And section B, ``The commission shall
conduct a study,'' I would be glad to support that. Indeed, the
commission could do that on its own. What I object to is a point has
been made before and it is constitutional, Congress being made to wait
for permission from the regulatory agency to do things.
So, again, and I appreciate the gentleman, but I do want to go back
to the error of the gentleman from Illinois when he said we had to hit
the pause button. This does not take effect until 2009. We are not
rushing into anything. And we delayed the effective date at the request
of the Business Roundtable so there would be no burden in paperwork on
the company.
Between now and 2009, if the SEC wants to do a study, it can do a
study. If you want to mandate that they do it, I would be glad to
mandate that, although the SEC has been somewhat overworked. The
difference is, and the reason I object is, this says that Congress will
not go forward with what most of us on our side, and many on the other
side, think is a good idea until the SEC gives us permission. I do not
think constitutionally we should await permission from the regulatory
agency.
By the way, the gentleman from Illinois, I don't understand. He wants
to find an inconsistency, and when he can't find one, somehow he
manufactures one. I never said the SEC was all wise and all knowing. He
is caricaturing things that weren't even said. What I did was to
acknowledge that the SEC has moved here and the SEC, I do want to
remind my colleagues, is in Washington. All this rhetoric about no
mandates from Washington is wholly inconsistent with the affirmation of
the SEC's having correctly proposed the information.
I would also say to the gentleman from Georgia, I was not struck by
the fact that he and the gentleman from Illinois differ. It has been
clear to me for some time. I have been on the committee. The gentleman
from Georgia and his Republican colleagues often differ, and I will say
in the spirit of the French assembly ``vive la difference.'' I
encourage people to differ with the gentleman from Georgia. I would
hardly chide them for it.
{time} 1015
What I was responding to is the gentleman from Illinois accusing me
of misstating the views of the gentleman from Georgia, and I am glad
the gentleman from Georgia cleared that up.
But back to the main point. We have until 2009. Yes, the SEC has the
right to study this if it wants to. And if this was simply a mandate
that the SEC study it, it would be a different story. But saying that
the bill is contingent on the SEC's finding seems to me
constitutionally unwise. That's why I would not support it as is, but I
would support a modified version.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Chairman, my only point is that the 2009 date, and
that is a fair observation on your part that it's not going to happen
tomorrow, but if this becomes law, it's going to happen no matter what.
So even if the SEC comes up and sends a signal flair and says, hey,
this is going to be a train wreck, this is going to be a real problem;
and we're going to see more and more companies either going private,
unwilling to go public, which is sort of the subtext of a lot of what's
going on, or ultimately going to Europe, my point is that this will not
stop.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Let me take back my time.
Two points. First of all, I do want to respond to this really
terrible argument that this might drive companies to go private. Do
Members realize, Mr. Chairman, how viciously that attacks the CEOs?
That argument says this: A CEO faced with the possibility of people
voting on his or her salary will take that company private. I think
that is a terrible thing to say.
Secondly, if the SEC makes a recommendation, we are here to listen to
it.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Price).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chairman announced that the
ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia will
be postponed.
Announcement by the Acting Chairman
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings
will now resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were
postponed, in the following order:
Amendment No. 13 by Mr. Sessions of Texas.
Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Garrett of New Jersey.
Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Campbell of California.
Amendment No. 7 by Mr. McHenry of North Carolina.
Amendment No. 9 by Mr. Price of Georgia.
Amendment No. 11 by Mr. Putnam of Florida.
Amendment No. 8 by Mr. Price of Georgia.
The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote
after the first vote in this series.
Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Sessions.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Sessions) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 13 offered by Mr. Sessions:
Page 6, line 13, strike the close quotation marks and
following period and after such line insert the following new
paragraph:
``(3) Disclosure of Activities to Influence Vote.--
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) or (2)(B), a shareholder's
vote shall not be counted under such paragraphs if the
shareholder has spent, directly or indirectly, more than a de
minimis amount of money (as determined by the Commission) on
activities to influence a vote of other shareholders unless
such shareholder discloses to the Commission, in accordance
with rules prescribed by the Commission--
``(A) the identity of all persons or entities engaged in
such a campaign;
``(B) the activities engaged in to influence the vote; and
``(C) the amount of money expended on such a campaign.''.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 177,
noes 222, not voting 39, as follows:
[Roll No. 236]
AYES--177
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ellsworth
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jindal
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
[[Page H3707]]
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Neugebauer
Nunes
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (FL)
NOES--222
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Norton
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--39
Alexander
Baldwin
Bishop (UT)
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Cantor
Carson
Christensen
Conyers
Cubin
Culberson
Davis, Jo Ann
Doolittle
Ehlers
Faleomavaega
Fattah
Ferguson
Fortuno
Gerlach
Hayes
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hunter
Jones (NC)
Lampson
Levin
Lowey
Marchant
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Myrick
Platts
Rohrabacher
Simpson
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Wicker
Young (AK)
{time} 1044
Ms. SOLIS, Ms. VELAZQUEZ and Mrs. CAPPS and Messrs. CLEAVER, ALTMIRE,
McNERNEY and DINGELL changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. Rogers of Alabama changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Ms. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, on April 20th I was not able to cast the
first in a series of votes on H.R. 1257. Had I been available, I would
have voted no on Roll No. 236.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Garrett of New Jersey
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey
(Mr. Garrett) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Garrett of New Jersey:
Page 4, line 13, strike ``Any proxy'' and insert ``Subject
to paragraph (3), any proxy''.
Page 5, line 6, strike ``In any proxy'' and insert,
``Subject to paragraph (3), in any proxy''.
Page 6, line 13, strike the close quotation marks and
following period and after such line insert the following:
``(3) Conditions triggering vote.--The shareholder vote
requirements of this subsection shall only apply if the
executive compensation (as disclosed pursuant to the
Commission's compensation disclosure rules) exceeds by 10
percent or more the average compensation for comparable
positions--
``(A) in companies within the issuer's industry; and
``(B) among companies with comparable total market
capitalization,
as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the
Commission.''.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 155,
noes 244, not voting 39, as follows:
[Roll No. 237]
AYES--155
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Blackburn
Blunt
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Schmidt
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (FL)
NOES--244
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boehner
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Christensen
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Filner
Fortenberry
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jindal
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kline (MN)
Kucinich
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mack
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
[[Page H3708]]
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Norton
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rogers (KY)
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Weller
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--39
Alexander
Baldwin
Bishop (UT)
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Buyer
Cantor
Conyers
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Ehlers
Faleomavaega
Fattah
Ferguson
Fortuno
Gerlach
Hayes
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hunter
Jones (NC)
Lampson
Levin
Lowey
McCarthy (NY)
McHenry
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Moore (WI)
Myrick
Peterson (PA)
Platts
Rohrabacher
Simpson
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Wicker
Young (AK)
Announcement by the Acting Chairman
The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 2 minutes
remain in this vote.
{time} 1052
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. McHENRY. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 237 I was inadvertently
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. PETERSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 237 I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Stated against:
Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 237, had I been
present, I would have voted ``no.''
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Campbell of California
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
(Mr. Campbell) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Campbell of California:
Page 4, line 13, strike ``Any proxy'' and insert ``Subject
to paragraph (3), any proxy''.
Page 5, line 6, strike ``In any proxy'' and insert
``Subject to paragraph (3), in any proxy''.
Page 6, line 13, strike the close quotation marks and
following period and after such line insert the following:
``(3) Majority-elected board exemption.--The shareholder
vote requirements of this subsection shall not apply with
respect to any issuer that requires the members of its board
of directors to be elected by a majority of the votes cast in
a shareholder election of such board.''.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 161,
noes 241, not voting 36, as follows:
[Roll No. 238]
AYES--161
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
English (PA)
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Schmidt
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--241
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bono
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Camp (MI)
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Christensen
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jindal
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Norton
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--36
Alexander
Bishop (UT)
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Cantor
Carney
Conyers
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Ehlers
Faleomavaega
Fattah
Ferguson
Fortuno
Gerlach
Hayes
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hunter
Jones (NC)
Lampson
Levin
Lowey
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mollohan
Myrick
Platts
Rohrabacher
Ruppersberger
Simpson
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Wicker
Announcement by the Acting Chairman
The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised there are
2 minutes remaining in this vote.
{time} 1100
Mr. PORTER changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment was rejected.
[[Page H3709]]
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 238, I voted ``no,''
put card in and I guess it did not register. I was present and voted
``no.''
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. McHenry
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. McHenry) on which further proceedings were postponed and
on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. McHENRY:
Page 3; line 18, strike the close quotation marks and
following period and after such line insert the following new
paragraph:
``(3) Disclosure of vote to pension fund beneficiaries.--A
shareholder who is casting the vote permitted under this
subsection on behalf of the beneficiaries of a pension fund
shall be required to disclose to such beneficiaries whether
such vote was cast to approve or disapprove the
compensation.''.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 164,
noes 236, not voting 38, as follows:
[Roll No. 239]
AYES--164
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
English (PA)
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jindal
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ryan (WI)
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Space
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
NOES--236
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bono
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Hulshof
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Norton
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Platts
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--38
Alexander
Baldwin
Bishop (UT)
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Cantor
Christensen
Conyers
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Ehlers
Faleomavaega
Fattah
Ferguson
Fortuno
Gerlach
Hayes
Higgins
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hunter
Jones (NC)
Lampson
Levin
Lowey
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Murtha
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Sali
Simpson
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Wicker
Young (FL)
Announcement by the Acting Chairman
The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised there are
2 minutes remaining in this vote.
{time} 1107
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Price of Georgia
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia
(Mr. Price) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 148,
noes 257, not voting 33, as follows:
[Roll No. 240]
AYES--148
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
English (PA)
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gilchrest
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Hobson
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
Latham
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Sali
Schmidt
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Tancredo
Terry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
[[Page H3710]]
Upton
Walberg
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Westmoreland
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--257
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bono
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Butterfield
Camp (MI)
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Farr
Filner
Fortenberry
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jindal
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murphy, Tim
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Norton
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Platts
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rogers (KY)
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wilson (OH)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--33
Alexander
Bishop (UT)
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Cantor
Christensen
Conyers
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Ehlers
Faleomavaega
Fattah
Ferguson
Fortuno
Gerlach
Hayes
Herger
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hunter
Jones (NC)
Lampson
Levin
Lowey
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Rohrabacher
Simpson
Sullivan
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Wicker
Announcement by the Acting Chairman
The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised there are
2 minutes remaining in this vote.
{time} 1114
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Putnam
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Putnam) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 160,
noes 240, not voting 38, as follows:
[Roll No. 241]
AYES--160
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Emerson
English (PA)
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--240
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bono
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Camp (MI)
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Dicks
Dingell
Donnelly
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Farr
Filner
Fortenberry
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gillmor
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jindal
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murphy, Tim
Murtha
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Norton
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Platts
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rogers (KY)
Ross
Rothman
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--38
Alexander
Bishop (UT)
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Cantor
Christensen
Conyers
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Doggett
Ehlers
Faleomavaega
Fattah
Ferguson
Fortuno
Gerlach
Gonzalez
Hayes
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hunter
Issa
Jones (NC)
Lampson
[[Page H3711]]
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lowey
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Napolitano
Perlmutter
Rohrabacher
Roybal-Allard
Simpson
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Wicker
Announcement by the Acting Chairman
The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised there are
2 minutes remaining in this vote.
{time} 1121
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman on rollcall No. 241, had I been
present, I would have voted no.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Price of Georgia
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia
(Mr. Price) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 162,
noes 242, not voting 34, as follows:
[Roll No. 242]
AYES--162
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
English (PA)
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--242
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bilbray
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Burgess
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Farr
Filner
Fortenberry
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jindal
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Norton
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Platts
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rogers (KY)
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--34
Alexander
Bishop (UT)
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Cantor
Christensen
Cleaver
Conyers
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
DeLauro
Ehlers
Faleomavaega
Fattah
Ferguson
Fortuno
Gerlach
Hayes
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hunter
Jones (NC)
Lampson
Levin
Lowey
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Perlmutter
Rohrabacher
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Westmoreland
Wicker
Announcement by the Acting Chairman
The Acting CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised there are
2 minutes remaining in this vote.
{time} 1127
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1257, the
Shareholder vote on Executive Compensation Act.
Earlier this year, the Ways and Means Committee held a series of
hearings on the state of the U.S. economy. We heard from experts across
a variety of disciplines and a wide spectrum of political perspectives,
and one of the recurring themes we heard from them was that income
inequality is rising, and that this trend is eroding the public's
confidence in the fundamental fairness of our society and our public
policy. Recent data indicate that in 2005, the share of national income
going to the top one percent of earners jumped to 19.3 percent,
representing the highest degree of income concentration since 1929.
Rising executive compensation is, of course, just one component of
this trend, but it is one of the most visible. What are middle-class
families who are struggling with the rising costs of health care and
higher education to think when they read about CEOs that are given tens
and even hundreds of millions of dollars to leave companies whose stock
price has fallen precipitously? These executives are not being rewarded
for their performance, they are apparently being rewarded for
squandering billions of dollars of shareholder value.
Mr. Chairman, corporations are creations of government, and by law,
their boards have a fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders who
are the owners of that corporation. A variety of scandals from Enron to
options backdating have called into question the independence of boards
that are often hand-picked by management, and we have taken steps both
through legislation and the regulatory process to strengthen the
independence of boards of directors.
The measure before us is a relatively modest additional step to
ensure that corporations and their management operate in the interest
of shareholders. All we are saying in this bill is that shareholders
own these corporations, and they should have an annual, non-binding
vote on the corporation's executive compensation disclosures.
The opposition of the minority to this is simply inconsistent. They
call for an ``ownership society'' that would all too often shift ever
greater risk onto individuals, and then oppose giving individual
shareholders a non-binding vote on the compensation of senior
executives who are the guardians of their investment. Corporations do
not exist to serve the interests of management, they exist to serve the
interest of their owners.
[[Page H3712]]
Mr. Chairman, it is not too much to ask that hardworking Americans
who have made an investment in a company be given the opportunity of an
advisory vote on the pay of managers who are essentially their
employees. Again, the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation is a
modest, common-sense reform that will strengthen corporate governance
in our society, and I urge its adoption.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment in
the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
McDermott) having assumed the chair, Mr. Pomeroy, Acting Chairman of
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
1257) amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide
shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation, pursuant
to House Resolution 301, he reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment
reported from the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on
the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Feeney
Mr. FEENEY. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. FEENEY. I am in its current form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Feeney moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 1257, to the
Committee on Financial Services with instructions to report
the same to the House forthwith with the following amendment:
Page 6, line 15, strike the close quotation marks and
following period and after such line insert the following new
paragraph:
``(3) Clarification of non-binding nature of the vote.--A
decision of the board of directors that is contrary to, or
inconsistent with, the shareholder vote provided for in
paragraphs (1) and (2)(B), shall not be construed to affect
the determination of a breach of any duty or obligation owed
by the board to the issuer or its shareholders.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. FEENEY. Mr. Speaker, this motion to recommit clarifies that this
nonbinding vote is in fact nonbinding: no court may consider the
board's refusal to follow the shareholders' advisory vote as a breach
of that board's duties of care or loyalty to the shareholders. It
clarifies that although such a vote is compulsory, the result cannot
be, and it cannot force a board of directors to act in a way that
contravenes its best interest.
Mr. Shays offered an important amendment during the markup process to
clarify that nothing in this bill imposes any new fiduciary duties on
boards that the majority of the committee accepted. However, I am
concerned not only about whether this statute imposes new, additional
obligations on a board; I am concerned that a court might construe a
board's decision to disregard the advice of a shareholders' advisory
vote as prima facie evidence of a board's failure to satisfy its
existing duties.
The chairman has frequently said, ``This bill does not do what this
bill does not do.'' I hope he is right, because in the Financial
Services Committee hearing and markup, in the Rules Committee, and on
the floor, he has stressed that this bill is purely advisory. Rather
than hope, though, I offer this motion to recommit in order to be
certain and to protect the directors in their discretionary exercise of
their duties.
If this provision is redundant, that is fine. We do a lot worse here
than redundancy. As Chairman Frank often advises, the law is filled
with redundancies, and when Members oppose language in language in
bills because they are redundant, they are typically being
disingenuous.
So if this bill really does bar frivolous litigation by activist
shareholders, then the majority should have no trouble accepting this
motion to recommit. However, if it does not preclude private rights of
action, as I fear that it does not, then this motion is critical. If
the majority cannot support an amendment that limits frivolous
litigation, then their motives are suspect.
This motion to recommit protects America's competitive position vis-
a-vis international capital markets. If a court can weigh a vote
intended as noncompulsory when evaluating whether directors have
breached their fiduciary duties, the real beneficiaries of this bill
will be trial lawyers racing to the courthouse. The losers will be
American enterprise, American stockholders, and, ultimately, American
workers.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the
motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, never has the willingness of
the minority to abuse the process for purely political ends been truer
than today.
Mr. Speaker, this bill was voted on in committee in a multi-day
markup. A number of amendments were offered and debated. One amendment
offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays) aimed directly at
this point, and the language was accepted by us and is in the bill, and
it says that nothing in here shall create a new fiduciary duty; and it
was intended to achieve exactly what we are now told this has sought to
achieve. If Members genuinely thought it was inadequate, they had the
rest of the markup to try to amend it. And we are here under an open
rule. If the Members thought that the bill that we had voted on and
which they had every chance to amend needed further amendment, the
democratic procedure, the procedure that shows respect for the process,
would have been to file an amendment. Had this been an amendment, we
could have debated it for more than 5 minutes. We could even have read
it for more than 2. This was delivered to me about 2 minutes before we
started.
I am not one of the more modest Members of the body, I concede. But I
do not credit myself with being on my own, off the top of my head, not
having practiced law ever except for the fact that I am a member of the
bar, I am not able to fully analyze this. It might be something very
useful. And people who are genuinely interested in adding it to the
bill could have offered it in committee; they could have offered it
under the open rule; we could have debated it. We have had a large
number of roll calls; we just had seven roll calls.
Now, we have been told in the past, well, I had to do a recommit, you
wouldn't give me any other chance. Members on the other side had every
opportunity at the committee and in this open rule fully to debate this
and to offer amendments. They chose not to. They chose instead to
legislate by ambush.
Mr. Speaker, I had underestimated the tenderness of the feelings of
the Members opposite. I confess to insensitivity, but I will not
confess to the disrespect for our legislative process that Members--
Mr. FEENEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Of course not. The gentleman asked for a
courtesy. Had the gentleman offered this in committee, I would have
been glad to have a dialogue with him. Had he seriously wanted this
amendment and offered it during the floor, we could have talked about
it. But to wait until the last minute when we can't read it, to refuse
to take advantage of an open rule, to refuse to offer it in committee,
and now ask me to yield to you? Of course not.
Now, I want to emphasize again: this may or may not be good. I will
guarantee the Members here will look at this. We have a way to go on
this bill. It has to go to the Senate. If in fact we need further to
tighten the language,
[[Page H3713]]
and it was the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays' amendment that we
adopted that sought to do this, if the gentleman from Florida is right
and Mr. Shays' was inadequate, if the gentleman from Florida is right
and Mr. Shays' amendment doesn't do the job, we will analyze it
seriously. But I urge Members, do not on a serious legal issue, when we
have had 2 minutes to look at a complex legal principle, vote to put it
into a bill when the Members advocating it deliberately refused to
subject it to an open democratic process.
I hope this is repudiated.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. FEENEY. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on
the question of passage of the bill.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 184,
nays 222, not voting 27, as follows:
[Roll No. 243]
YEAS--184
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Emerson
English (PA)
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jindal
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--222
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--27
Alexander
Bishop (UT)
Brady (PA)
Cantor
Conyers
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Ehlers
Fattah
Ferguson
Gerlach
Hayes
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hunter
Jones (NC)
Lampson
Levin
Lowey
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Perlmutter
Rohrabacher
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Wicker
{time} 1156
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Boucher was allowed to speak out of
order.)
Moment of Silence in Memory of Those Slain at Virginia Tech University
Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, as Members may know, Governor Kaine of
Virginia has asked that today be a national day of mourning for the
students and the faculty members who lost their lives at Virginia Tech
on Monday of this week. In observance of Governor Kaine's request, I
ask that the House join our Nation for a moment of silence at this
time.
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, 5-minute voting will
continue.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. PRICE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 269,
noes 134, not voting 30, as follows:
[Roll No. 244]
AYES--269
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Butterfield
Camp (MI)
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chabot
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Filner
Fortenberry
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Heller
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hobson
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jindal
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
[[Page H3714]]
Kaptur
Keller
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Knollenberg
Kucinich
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murphy, Tim
Murtha
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pastor
Payne
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickering
Platts
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rogers (KY)
Ros-Lehtinen
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Souder
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stupak
Sutton
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Wexler
Whitfield
Wilson (OH)
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
Young (FL)
NOES--134
Aderholt
Akin
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Boustany
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Buchanan
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cardoza
Carter
Castle
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Cuellar
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gingrey
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hensarling
Herger
Hulshof
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kline (MN)
Kuhl (NY)
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Musgrave
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Pitts
Poe
Price (GA)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (MI)
Roskam
Royce
Sali
Schmidt
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Sullivan
Tancredo
Tanner
Terry
Tiahrt
Walberg
Wamp
Westmoreland
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Young (AK)
NOT VOTING--30
Alexander
Bishop (UT)
Brady (PA)
Cantor
Conyers
Cubin
Davis, Jo Ann
Ehlers
Fattah
Ferguson
Gerlach
Gohmert
Hayes
Higgins
Hoekstra
Hunter
Jones (NC)
Lampson
Levin
Lowey
Meek (FL)
Melancon
Millender-McDonald
Mollohan
Pascrell
Perlmutter
Rohrabacher
Thornberry
Walsh (NY)
Wicker
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are reminded there
are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.
{time} 1205
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________