[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 62 (Wednesday, April 18, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4683-S4685]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. SNOWE:
  S. 1144. A bill to provide for an assessment of the achievements by 
the Government of Iraq of benchmarks for

[[Page S4684]]

political settlement and national reconciliation in Iraq; to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise to speak to the monumental and 
consequential matter regarding the future course of the United States 
and our courageous men and women in uniform in Iraq.
  Today, we are at a profoundly challenging moment in time, and at a 
critical crossroads with respect to our direction in this war. I know 
that none of us arrive at this question lightly. In my 28-year tenure 
in Congress, I have witnessed and participated in debates on such vital 
matters as Lebanon, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo. And indisputably, myriad, deeply-held beliefs and arguments 
were expressed on those pivotal matters--some in concert, some 
complementary, some in conflict. Yet, without question, all were rooted 
in mutual concern for--and love of--our great Nation. And there was--
and should not be today--no question about our support for our brave 
and extraordinary troops.
  It is therefore with the utmost respect for our troops that I today 
introduce a bill which allows them the ability to complete the mission 
they have selflessly undertaken, while assuring them that their valor 
shall not be unconditionally expended upon an Iraqi government which 
fails to respond in kind. This amendment requires that government to 
actually achieve previously agreed political and security benchmarks 
while the Baghdad Security Plan--commonly referred to as the 
``surge''--is in effect, or face the redeployment of those U.S. troops 
dedicated to that plan.
  Specifically, this legislation would require that, 120 days after 
enactment--a point in time at which our military commanders have stated 
that they should know whether the surge will succeed--the Commander of 
Multi-National Forces, Iraq would report to Congress as to whether the 
Iraqi government has met each of six political and security-related 
benchmarks which it has already agreed to meet by that time. These six 
benchmarks are:
  Iraqi assumption of control of its military . . .
  Enactment of a Militia Law to disarm and demobilize militias and to 
ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central 
government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq . . .
  Completion of the constitutional review and a referendum held on 
special amendments to the Iraqi Constitution that ensure equitable 
participation in the government of Iraq without regard to religious 
sect or ethnicity . . .
  Completion of provincial election law and preparation for the conduct 
of provincial elections that ensures equitable constitution of 
provincial representative bodies without regard to religious sect or 
ethnicity . . .
  Enactment and implementation of legislation to ensure that the energy 
resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other 
Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner; and
  Enactment and implementation of legislation that equitably reforms 
the de-Ba'athification process in Iraq.
  The Iraqi Government must know that any opportunity gained from our 
increased troop levels in Baghdad is a window that we will soon close 
if it fails to take urgent action and show tangible results in tandem. 
If, at the end of 120 days, the Commander of Multi-National Forces, 
Iraq reports the Iraqi Government has not met the benchmarks, then the 
Commander should plan for the phased redeployment of the troops we 
provided for the Baghdad Security Plan, period.
  That is why, under this amendment, after 120 days, should the 
Commander report that the Iraqi Government has failed to meet the 
benchmarks listed, he will then be required to present a plan for the 
phased redeployment of those combat troops sent to Iraq in support of 
the Baghdad Security Plan and to provide plans detailing the transition 
of the mission of the U.S. forces remaining in Iraq to one of 
logistical support, training, force protection, and targeted counter-
terrorism operations--i.e., those functions set forth in the Iraq Study 
Group Report. As General Petraeus stated in March, ``I have an 
obligation to the young men and women in uniform out here, that if I 
think it's not going to happen, to tell them that it's not going to 
happen, and there needs to be a change.''
  The message must be loud and clear--the Iraqi government must 
understand in no uncertain terms that our presence is neither open-
ended nor unconditional, and I support setting conditions for a phased 
withdrawal. My concern with the supplemental appropriations bill stems 
from the fact that it mandates a specific date for troop withdrawal by 
requiring it to occur within 120 days of passage. This arbitrary 
timeline would telegraph a precise and immediate departure date to our 
enemies that I believe would jeopardize the security of our men and 
women remaining on the ground.
  Moreover, this mandated, 120-day timetable does not place the 
necessary pressure and conditions on the Iraqi government to implement 
national reconciliation and solidify their own security. Rather, we 
should require that the Iraqi government complete work within 120 days 
on the specific, concrete benchmarks they have already agreed to that 
would lead to national reconciliation. If the Iraqis cannot meet these 
benchmarks within this 120-day period, our commanders should begin 
planning for the phased redeployment of the troops we deployed for the 
Baghdad Security Plan.
  My colleagues may recall that I opposed the surge because I did not--
and still do not--believe that additional troops are a substitute for 
political will and capacity. General Petraeus said last month that a 
political resolution is crucial because that is what will determine in 
the long run the success of this effort. I could not agree more. The 
fact is, America and the world require more than Iraq's commitment 
to accomplishing the benchmarks that will lead to a true national 
reconciliation--we must see actual results. The Iraqi Government must 
find the will to ensure that it represents and protects the rights of 
every Iraqi.

  After our four-year commitment, Iraq's Government should not doubt 
that we must observe more than incremental steps toward political 
reconciliation we require demonstrable changes. While limited progress 
has been made on necessary legislative initiatives such as the 
Hydrocarbon Law, it is in fact a sheaf of laws and not just a single 
measure that must pass to ensure that all Iraqis have a share and stake 
in their government. Chief among these are constitutional amendments 
which will permit Iraqis of all ethnicities and confessions to be 
represented at the local level of government. Yet, so far, the review 
committee has yet to even finish drafts of these critical amendments.
  I believe we were all encouraged by the recent Ambassadorial meetings 
in Baghdad and the follow-on ministerial conference called at the Iraqi 
government's request. These talks are vital to securing Iraq's border, 
reversing the flow of refugees, and stemming the foreign interference 
which exacerbates sectarian divisions. But we also look for the Iraqi 
government's leadership in dismantling the militias and strengthening 
the National Army so that it is truly a national institution that can 
provide the security so desperately desired by all Iraqis in every 
province.
  We are now three months into the surge, and our troops have made 
gains in reducing the still horrific levels of violence on Baghdad 
through their heroic efforts. Yet it is deeply concerning to me that--
mirroring the slowness with which the Iraqi government has moved on 
political reforms--their sacrifice remains by and largely unmatched by 
their Iraqi counterparts.
  Two weeks ago, Leon Panetta, a member of the Iraq Study Group, wrote 
the following in a New York Times Op-Ed, ``. . . every military 
commander we talked to felt that the absence of national reconciliation 
was the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq. As one American general 
told us, `if the Iraqi government does not make political progress on 
reforms, all the troops in the world will not provide security.' `` He 
went on to enumerate the progress or, more to the point, the lack of 
progress toward the agreed upon benchmarks and concluded that `unless 
the United States finds new ways to bring strong pressure on the 
Iraqis, things are not likely to pick up any time soon.'''
  In fact, over the past few months, many have come to the realization 
that political action by the Iraqi government is a paramount precursor 
to

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national reconciliation and stability and, without it, the Baghdad 
Security Plan is only a temporary, tactical fix for one specific 
location. And while we are hearing about incremental successes, I agree 
with Thomas Friedman who said recently in an interview, ``there's only 
one metric for the surge working, and that is whether we're seeing a 
negotiation among Iraqis to share power, to stabilize the political 
situation in Iraq, which only they can do . . . telling me that the 
violence is down 10 percent or 8 percent here or 12 percent there, I 
don't really think that's the metric at all.''
  To this day, the public looks to the United States Senate to temper 
the passions of politics and to bridge divides. And if ever there were 
a moment when Americans are imploring us to live up to the moniker of 
``world's greatest deliberative body,'' that moment is upon us.
  If I had a son or daughter or other family member serving in Iraq, I 
would want at least the assurance that someone was speaking up to tell 
the Iraqi government--and frankly our government as well--that my 
family's sacrifice must be matched by action and sacrifice on the part 
of the Iraqi government. I would want to know that the most profound of 
all issues was fully debated by those who are elected to provide 
leadership. For those of us who seek success in Iraq, and believe that 
a strategy predicated on political and diplomatic solutions--not merely 
increased troop levels--presents the strongest opportunity to reach 
that goal, let us coalesce around this bill, which will allow us to 
speak as one voice strong . . . together . . . and united in service to 
a purpose we believe to be right.
                                 ______