[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 62 (Wednesday, April 18, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4678-S4679]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. Bayh):
  S. 1138. A bill to enhance nuclear safeguards and to provide 
assurances of nuclear fuel supply to countries that forgo certain fuel 
cycle activities; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague from 
Indiana, Senator Bayh, to introduce the Nuclear Safeguards and Supply 
Act of 2007.
  The future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the larger 
nonproliferation system it supports is in doubt. The existing 
safeguards regime used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
has succeeded in forestalling nuclear weapons programs in the world's 
advanced industrial states, several of which were weighing the nuclear 
option 40 years ago. Unfortunately, this regime has failed to keep pace 
with the increase in the global availability of nuclear weapons 
technology, especially the technology and equipment for uranium 
enrichment and spent nuclear reactor fuel reprocessing, which can 
produce fissile material for weapons. Now the road to nuclear weapons 
can be traveled by determined countries with only a minimal industrial 
base. While the number of recognized nuclear weapon states has not 
dramatically increased over the years, the dangers of proliferation 
have become all too apparent as demonstrated by the A.Q. Khan network, 
the Iranian, North Korean, and Libyan examples.
  The construction of facilities for the enrichment of uranium and 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in new states, even for ostensibly 
peaceful purposes, poses an unacceptable long-term risk to the national 
security of the United States. The enrichment technology intended to 
produce fuel for reactors can also be used to create highly-enriched 
uranium for a nuclear weapon, and the plutonium that is produced from 
reprocessing spent fuel is also suitable for nuclear weapons and 
susceptible to diversion to terrorists. The spread of enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities will dangerously increase the chances that 
new nations will develop nuclear weapons and that terrorists might 
obtain fissile or radiological materials for crude devices. It is 
therefore incumbent on the United States to lead an international 
effort to halt the expansion of enrichment and reprocessing to new 
countries.
  We know President Bush shares our assessment of this situation. On 
February 11, 2004, he stated, ``The world's leading nuclear exporters 
should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to 
fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment 
and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for 
nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.''
  The threats posed by new nuclear fuel cycle facilities in new states 
are made worse by the fact that the use of nuclear power is likely to 
increase, both in developed and developing countries. As energy costs 
have soared in recent years, many states are reexamining nuclear power 
as a potential source of electricity. Importantly, however, the 
expansion of nuclear power does not require--either technically or 
economically--the construction of enrichment or reprocessing facilities 
in countries that do not currently have them.
  Senator Bayh and I believe the United States should adopt as a basic 
nonproliferation principle that countries who give up their own 
enrichment and reprocessing programs have an assurance, either 
bilateral or multilateral or both, of nuclear reactor fuel at 
reasonable prices. Today, the market provides the basic framework for 
commerce in and access to nuclear fuel, and should not be interrupted 
by government action, but the exchange of nuclear fuel and fuel 
services for enrichment and reprocessing capabilities is not currently 
explicit. This would also require that states agreeing to accept fuel 
services and leasing of fuel, in return for giving up joining the group 
of states possessing reprocessing and enrichment capabilities, would 
also consent to wide access and close monitoring of their nuclear 
energy activities, exceeding the requirements of the IAEA Additional 
Protocol. Related efforts in this area should also move forward in the 
[Nuclear Suppliers Group, where various nations have advocated a 
criteria-based approach to nuclear fuel supply.
  Unfortunately, as the world looks to increase the number of civilian 
nuclear power plants, the IAEA, charged with ensuring that energy 
programs do not stray into weapons efforts through the verification of 
safeguards agreements, operates on a shortsighted budget with old 
equipment. This situation threatens the institution, and to some degree 
the nuclear stability that the IAEA's safeguards verification mandate 
supports. The IAEA is responsible for verifying that states do not 
violate their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT). The IAEA monitors states' nuclear programs through safeguards 
agreements and additional protocols to ensure that nuclear material, 
equipment, and technology are used for declared, peaceful purposes.

  Last November, I visited the IAEA and its Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory (SAL), located just outside Vienna, Austria. Samples 
collected by IAEA inspectors during inspections are brought to the SAL 
to verify that safeguards obligations are being met and that there are 
no undeclared materials and activities. Unfortunately the laboratory's 
aging equipment and dangerous working conditions will hamper the 
important work done there, particularly as more samples arrive there 
and as more states expand their nuclear power infrastructure. Such a 
situation could, in the future, shut down a critical nonproliferation 
facility. The IAEA's nuclear materials analysis capability is 
vulnerable to a single point of failure given the situation at SAL. 
Laboratory staff is also severely limited in the time they can spend 
analyzing evidence in the ``hot'' or nuclear part of SAL because of the 
dilapidated air purification system in one part of the laboratory. 
Equally disturbing, SAL is still using equipment manufactured in the 
1970's. If the IAEA is supposed to be the world's nuclear watchdog, the 
least we can do is to provide the people who work there with 
appropriate and effective tools to do their job.
  Absent refurbishment of SAL, or the construction of a new IAEA 
facility with modem equipment, President Ronald Reagan's charge ``trust 
but verify'' will be abandoned because we have not taken action.
  The SAL helped to discover the inconsistencies in Iran's cover-up of 
its nuclear weapons program. The analysis and questioning by inspectors 
prompted stonewalling by Tehran. The Iranian failure to provide 
information and access led the IAEA Board of Governors to refer the 
matter to the United Nations Security Council. While I wish this might 
have happened more quickly, the fact is that SAL, the network of 
laboratories in other Member States, and the IAEA's inspectors provided 
the evidence necessary to build consensus on Iranian violations.
  The Lugar-Bayh legislation works to create both bilateral and 
multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel supply by specifically 
authorizing the President to pursue such mechanisms. Importantly, our 
legislation takes note of the fact that merely ensuring fuel supply is 
not enough to truly deal with the potential proliferation that could 
arise as a result of many more nuclear reactors being built around the 
world. Proliferation of fuel cycle technologies may continue, 
regardless of the ability of our Nation and others to craft layers of 
assurance in fuel supply. Our bill makes an important point--that fuel 
supply for new nuclear power is as important as the safeguards applied 
to nuclear power.
  The Lugar-Bayh legislation makes it the policy of the United States 
to discourage the development of enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities in additional countries, and to encourage the creation of 
bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel supply,

[[Page S4679]]

and ensure that all supply mechanisms operate in strict accordance with 
the IAEA safeguards system and do not result in any additional unmet 
verification burdens for the system. To ensure that SAL does not cease 
to function, we authorize an additional $10,000,000 for the 
refurbishment or possible replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory. We also authorize the Secretary of State, in cooperation 
with the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of the National 
Laboratories, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of National Intelligence, to pursue a program that will 
improve nuclear safeguards technology development.
  With regard to fuel supply, our bill authorizes the President to 
create, consistent with existing law, bilateral and multilateral 
mechanisms to provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to those 
countries and groups of countries that adhere to policies designed to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that decide to forgo a 
national uranium enrichment program and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing 
facilities. Such mechanisms must confront the challenges of 
international politics, thus the authority contained in the bill is 
designed to provide a flexible framework, rather than a final set of 
requirements, for such mechanisms. The bill embraces both bilateral and 
multilateral fuel supply mechanisms, and calls for a report on the 
establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority.
  The United States cannot fix the IAEA's problems alone, but we must 
lead. An international diplomatic effort is required to raise the funds 
necessary to ensure that the IAEA has the resources and leadership it 
needs to continue its important mission. But the IAEA, its Member 
States and Board of Governors must also act. The Board must review and 
revise SAL staffing policies as they apply to professional staff 
working at SAL to ensure that it attracts and retains key personnel. 
Current policies are self-defeating and force experts out just as they 
are accumulating the level of experience and expertise necessary to 
succeed.
  Not only is the existing IAEA infrastructure in desperate need of 
modernization, but a global nuclear power expansion will require a 
commensurate increase in IAEA capability. We must strengthen the 
organization to ensure that multiplying nuclear power facilities are 
not diverted to weapons work. This can and should be accompanied by 
better support to our own efforts in verification activities and 
technologies, such as through the Key Assets Verification Fund at the 
Department of State and the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to 
IAEA Safeguards or POTAS.
  If the world is at the dawn of a new nuclear power age, then there 
will be more facilities and materials for the IAEA to inspect and 
verify. The IAEA is not prepared for such a future, but there is still 
time to put the necessary investments in place to ensure that it 
continues its important role. The United States and other Member States 
have the ability to plan and make decisions now that will ensure a 
safer nuclear power option in the future. It is incumbent upon the 
United States to assist in the construction of the best possible 
safeguards system to provide for international peace and security. 
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy are only as good as the means to verify 
them.
  The current budget of the IAEA cannot sustain further stress, nor can 
the world afford to allow another state to develop nuclear weapons in 
secret. The IAEA is underfunded to perform its current tasks and would 
be required to do much more should nuclear energy become more 
widespread. The Bush Administration must significantly increase funding 
to the IAEA to improve its ability to exercise its rights and meet its 
obligations. We hope this legislation will begin that process.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Committee on 
Foreign Relations on these important matters. I thank Senator Bayh for 
his partnership in this endeavor.
                                 ______