PATRIOT Act reauthorization conference report last year. Now it is becoming clear why they stuck that provision in there. This was a plan they had for some time. That law reversed a longstanding procedure that allowed the chief federal judge in the Federal district where they wanted to appoint a temporary replacement while the permanent nominee undergoes Senate confirmation. The Feinstein bill simply restores the pre-PATRIOT Act procedure. As for the White House scandal, the American people are not getting the truth from the Bush administration. The full story about this scandal—

In the State of Nevada, as an example, Daniel Bogden, a highly respected career prosecutor, was forced to step down. His chosen vocation in life was to be a Federal prosecutor. He worked as an assistant U.S. attorney for a significant period of time before chosen to be the U.S. attorney by a Republican, John Ensign, by the President who sent his name to us. We were initially told that Bogden and others were fired for “performance-related reasons.” But that explanation proved to be totally bogus. In fact, Dan Bogden’s personnel file is glowing. We still don’t know why Dan Bogden was fired. What we do know is under the new PATRIOT Act provision, Mr. Bogden could be replaced by someone with no ties to Nevada, and with no input from the Senate. The damage done to Bogden personally is irreparable. He can’t work now as assistant U.S. attorney. That is part of the process. That is too bad. He is a fine man whose reputation has been besmirched.

Meanwhile, we learned of a scheme hatched in the White House to replace all U.S. attorneys. At least one U.S. attorney has stated he was forced to resign because he refused to bend to political pressure regarding ongoing investigations. Those who were fired under circumstances that raise the same question. In the State of Arkansas, the U.S. attorney was fired and replaced by one of Karl Rove’s underlings. The Attorney General and his deputies told Congress these firings were not politically motivated. But according to newly released e-mails, White House political operatives such as Mr. Rove were involved in the decision-making. Kyl Sampson, who eventually became Chief of Staff to Attorney General Mukasey, sent an e-mail that distinguished between those U.S. attorneys who were “loyal Bushies” and those who were not. Dan Bogden and other U.S. attorneys who were fired last December were not “loyal Bushies.”

What I am worried about—and it hasn’t come out yet—is what about those who were loyal Bushies? Were these people prosecuting people because of the political involvement of the White House? Perhaps a “loyal Bushie” meant letting partisan consideration poison law enforcement decisions. Do prosecutors who are “loyal Bushies” go easy on Republican corruption? Do they bring cases against Democrats without legal justification? The actions of the Bush administration call into question every decision by Federal prosecutors in corrupt investigations across the country. I applaud the efforts of Senator Feinstein, who wrote this legislation and spoke about it early on. I also applaud the efforts of Senators Schumer and Leahy, as well as colleagues on the other side of the aisle who are committed to getting the truth in this matter. I strongly urge the Senate to pass this piece of legislation. Simply put, we need to begin to keep politics out of the Federal criminal justice system.

There will be no rolloca votes today. We will, however, have three votes beginning at 11:30 a.m. tomorrow morning. These votes will be with respect to amendments to the U.S. attorneys bill and then passage of the bill. Following the recess for the party conferences on Tuesday, the Senate will begin to consider the concurrent budget resolution, which was reported by the Senate Committee to the Senate floor last Thursday.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The Acting President pro tempore. Under the previous order, leadership time is reserved.

The Acting President pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of S. 214. The clerk will report the bill by title. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 214) to amend chapter 35 of title 28, United States Code, to preserve the independence of the United States Attorneys.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment, as follows:

(1) the qualification of a United States attorney for such district appointed by the President under section 541 of that title; or
(2) the expiration of 120 days after appointment by the Attorney General under this section.

(3) If an appointment expires under subsection (c)(2), the district court for such district may appoint a United States attorney to serve until the vacancy is filled. The order of appointment by the court shall be filed with the clerk of the court.

SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY.

(a) In General.—The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

(b) Application.—

(1) in general.—Any person serving as a United States attorney on the day before the date of enactment of this Act who was appointed under section 546 of title 28, United States Code, may serve until the earlier of—

(A) the qualification of a United States attorney for such district appointed by the President under section 541 of that title; or

(B) 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

(2) expired appointments.—If an appointment expires under paragraph (1), the district court for that district may appoint a United States attorney for that district under section 546(d) of title 28, United States Code, as added by this Act.

The Acting President pro tempore. Under the previous order, the committee-reported amendment is agreed to and the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The Acting President pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be waived.

The Acting President pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of S. 214, the bill that deals with this issue. This is a bill that simply reinstates the Senate’s role in the confirmation process of U.S. attorneys. It is a bill I introduced with Senator Leahy on January 9, 2007, days after I first learned in early December that officials from the White House called a handful of U.S. attorneys from around the country and forced them to resign their positions without cause.
At that time, I had very little information and was unaware of exactly what had occurred and why. As I looked into it, I learned that in March of 2006, the PATRIOT Act was reauthorized and a change was made in the law. It was made in conference without Democratic representation and, of the best of my knowledge, it was made without the knowledge of any Senator, Republican or Democrat. It is my understanding this was a request from the Justice Department that was presented to the White House. It was put into the bill. It then gave the President the authority essentially to appoint a U.S. attorney without confirmation for the remainder of his term.

The bill, S. 214, that is before the Senate today simply returns the law the way it was before this action took place in March of 2006.

Today, just a little more than 2 months after learning about this situation, additional information has come to light. But rather than alleviating the concerns and answering questions, we are now faced with new and more serious allegations. In fact, one of the looming overhangs is whether the Attorney General and others in the Bush administration have misled the Congress and the public. If true, this is very serious.

There are also allegations that the firings, which took place in March of 2006, were not justified. I have learned about this situation, additional information has come to light. That, but rather than alleviating the concerns and answering questions, we are now faced with new and more serious allegations. In fact, the lingering overhang is whether the Attorney General and others in the Bush administration have misled the Congress and the public. If true, this is very serious.

We now know that at least eight U.S. attorneys were forced from office, and that despite shifting rationales for why, it has become clear that politics has, in fact, played some role.

Last week, we learned that the White House was unhappy with some of the U.S. attorneys’ handling of public corruption cases. If true this, too, is very serious.

This information also shed new light on who was being targeted for firing and why. It is this last point—why, it has become clear that politics was involved in this process. And that, in turn, has raised serious questions.

Today as the Senate begins the debate on the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act, I would like to discuss some of what we have learned in greater detail and some of the reasons this bill is so necessary.

I believe it is important to look at how interim U.S. attorneys have been appointed over the years. There appears to be an assumption by the Bush administration that the Attorney General essentially has exclusive authority to appoint interim U.S. attorneys. But, in fact, history paints a much different picture.

When first looking into this issue, I found that the statutes had given the courts the authority to appoint an interim U.S. attorney and that this dated back as far as the Civil War. Specifically, the authority was first vested with the circuit courts in March of 1863. Then, in 1898, a House of Representatives report explained that while Congress believed it was important to have the courts appoint an interim U.S. attorney, there was a problem relying on circuit courts “since the circuit justice is not always timely found in the field and his time was wasted in ascertaining his whereabouts.” Therefore, at that time, the interim appointment authority was switched to the district courts; that is, in 1898 it was switched to the district courts.

But the statute that was implemented in 1946 required the district courts to be in charge of appointing interim U.S. attorneys, and they did so with virtually no problems.

This structure was left undisturbed until 1986 when the statute was changed. The district courts were in charge of appointing interim U.S. attorneys. But, even then it was restricted and the Attorney General had a 120-day time limit. After that time, if a nominee was not confirmed, the district courts would appoint an interim U.S. attorney. The administration rejected this position in 1986 and that led to this process.

The adoption of this language was a significant change as the statute was used to make changes to the criminal law and thus there was no recorded debate on the floor. There was no debate on the floor of the House or the Senate and both chambers passed the bill by voice vote.

Then, 20 years later, in March of 2006—again without much debate and again as a part of a larger package—a statutory change was inserted into the PATRIOT Act reauthorization. This time, the Executive’s power was expanded even further, giving the Attorney General the authority to appoint an interim U.S. attorney. The Attorney General was asked about the changes and he responded:

Nothing could be further from the truth.

He further stated in response to your comment, Mr. President, that the Department tried to avoid Senate confirmation to reward political allies:

We in no way politicized these decisions.

Two days later, the Attorney General reiterated this position when he came before the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 18 of this year and said:

I would never, ever make a change in the United States attorney position for political reasons.

That is a categorical and definitive nonsensical statement. However, the Department had to backtrack when it became evident that the former U.S. attorney from your State, Mr. President, Arkansas, Bud Cummins, was simply replaced in order to make room for Tim Griffin, who had served as Karl Rove’s special assistant and had been in charge of opposition research against Democratic candidates for the Republican National Committee.

Less than a month later, the Deputy Attorney General confirmed this fact before the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 7, 2007. At that time, he said:

The fact is there was a change made in Arkansas that was not connected, as we said, to the performance of the incumbent, but more related to the opportunity to provide a fresh start with a new person in that position.

Deputy Attorney General McNulty, however, went on to say that all the others who were fired were fired for “performance-related reasons.” But this, too, was not the final explanation. The Department next tried to justify the firings by arguing that the U.S. attorneys were let go because there were allegations of misconduct.

Unfortunately, not 1 year after securing this new authority, abuses have come to light. Almost immediately after I first spoke about what I had learned in January, the Attorney General called me to tell me that I had my facts wrong. However, he also sent up a request to confirm that “less than 10” U.S. attorneys had been asked to resign on December 7, 2006.

Despite this, the Attorney General adamantly denied politics had any role in the process. In fact, in an interview with a Associated Press reporter on January 16, 2007, the Attorney General was asked about the charges of political motivation and he responded:

Nothing could be further from the truth.

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These explanations are as slippery as they are misleading. Rather, what documents and e-mails demonstrate is that none of these reasons was the deciding factor that led some U.S. attorneys to be targeted for firing. Instead, it appears these individuals lost their jobs because a number of Department of Justice officials and possibly—without knowing but possibly—White House officials did not judge them to be sufficiently loyal or did not like the cases they were prosecuting or simply wanted to put in new, politically connected, young lawyers. It appears this way because contained in the documents that were released last week is an outline of the Department of Justice’s plan for how to determine who should be let go and who should stay.

The first step of that plan was to create a new rating system to evaluate all
93 U.S. attorneys. This was to be separate from the independent performance reports, called EARS reports. Those reports routinely occurred and objectively examined each U.S. Attorney's Office by evaluating their prosecution caseloads, their management, their willingness to report performance priorities, and their ability to work cooperatively with the FBI, with the DEA, and with other client agencies.

This rating system was developed back in February of 2005, and one of the primary factors to be considered was loyalty to the administration.

One e-mail describing the ratings stated:

Recommended retaining strong U.S. attorneys who have produced, managed well, and exhibited loyalty to the President and Attorney General. Recommended removing weak U.S. attorneys who have been ineffectual managers and prosecutors, chafe against administration initiatives.

Under this system, two of the eight fired U.S. attorneys received strong evaluations and recommended retaining while three received recommended removing.

One of the U.S. attorneys who received a recommended removing rating was Carol Lam from the Southern District of California. She received this low rating despite her many accomplishments and despite her positive performance evaluations. I am familiar with Carol Lam's career because she served in San Diego. In that position, she has taken on some of the biggest cases and really made a positive impact on the community she has served. But that is not just my opinion. Leaders throughout San Diego have sung her praises. Let me give a few examples.

Dan Dzwilewski, head of the FBI office in San Diego:

Carol has an excellent reputation and has done an excellent job given her limited resources.

Then, when asked whether she had given proper attention to gun cases, he said:

What do you expect her to do? Let corruption exist?

Adele Fasano, the San Diego Director of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, said:

We have enjoyed a strong, collaborative relationship with the U.S. Attorney's Office to combat smuggling activity through the ports of entry.

City attorney for San Diego, Michael Aguirre, said:

Carol Lam was truly an example of a dedicated public servant and a law enforcement executive who leads by example.

The departure of Ms. Lam will be a great loss... Ms. Lam is the consummate law enforcement executive who leads by example.

And Alan Poleszak, Acting Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Agency:

The on-going prosecution of the Javier Arellano Felix drug trafficking organization is both historic and noteworthy... Ms. Lam's commitment to federal law enforcement in this judicial district, county, and city, will be missed.

We should take note of the fact that the Arellano Felix organization is one of the largest and most dangerous Mexican drug cartels known. They operate out of Tijuana. They have killed hundreds of people. They have murdered Mexican DAs, they have murdered Mexican judges, and they are a blight. This U.S. attorney took them on. I will tell my colleagues more about that. She worked hard and she took on the tough fights. She has had success after success. Let me give some examples.

In September of 2005, the president of the San Diego chapter of Hell's Angels pled guilty to conspiracy to commit racketeering. Guy Russell Castiglione admitted he conspired to kill members of a rival motorcycle gang, the Mongols, to sell methamphetamine. In December 2005, Daymond Buchanan, member of Hell's Angels, was sentenced to 92 months in Federal prison for participating in a pattern of racketeering as well as inflicting serious bodily injury upon one victim. At that time, Ms. Lam announced:

With the president, sergeant at arms, secretary, treasurer, and six other members of the Hell's Angels convicted of racketeering offenses, the San Diego chapter of the Hell's Angels has been effectively shut down for the foreseeable future.

If that isn't enough, in September of 2006, Jose Ernesto Beltran-Quinonez, a Mexican national, pled guilty to making false statements about weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Quinonez was sentenced to 3 years in Federal prison for making up a story about Chinese terrorists sneaking into the United States with a nuclear warhead. The hoax prompted a massive investigation, Federal warnings, discussions at one of President Bush's security briefings, and a nationwide hunt for the group of Chinese supposedly plotting the attack.

In December 2006 Mel Kay, of Golden State Fence Company, and Michael McLaughlin pled guilty to felony charges of hiring illegal immigrants and agreed to pay fines of $200,000 and $100,000 respectively. The company, which built much of the fence near Otay Mesa, agreed separately to pay $5 million on a misdemeanor count, one of the largest fines ever imposed on a company for an immigration violation.

Was Carol Lam the best person in the world? No. She was sent packing without an explanation. Those were not her only cases.

She gained a national reputation for her work on public corruption cases. I think it is important to note that public corruption is the FBI's second highest priority after terrorism-related investigations. Now, I didn't know this, but the Judiciary Committee held an oversight hearing of the FBI on December 6, 2006, where the Director, Robert Mueller, came before us and he mentioned what their priorities were, and he said: 'Terrorism first, and then public corruption second, and crime was way down on the list.'

As a matter of fact, I found it rather startling, and I questioned him about that. He said, with some emphasis, those are our priorities, and we believe if we don't do public corruption, nobody else will. So the FBI has as its second highest priority public corruption. The FBI is going to be out there putting together cases. Who prosecutes these cases? U.S. attorneys. The FBI's second highest priority, and Carol Lam rose to this challenge.

In March of 2004, her office convicted Steven Mark Lash, the former chief financial officer of FPA Medical Management, for his role in defrauding shareholders and lenders of FPA. The collapse of the company left more than 1,600 doctors being owed more than $60 million and patients reporting they were unable to obtain medical care because this company had ceased paying providers.

In January of 2005, Mark Anthony Kolowich, owner of World Express Rx, pled guilty to conspiracy to sell counterfeit pharmaceuticals, conspiracy to commit mail fraud and smuggle pharmaceuticals, and conspiracy to launder money. Mr. Kolowich had run an Internet pharmacy Web site where customers could order prescription drugs without a valid prescription. The judge called him the kingpin and architect of an illicit pharmaceutical ring that caused many others to smuggle drugs across the United States-Mexico border at San Ysidro.

Another case. In July 2005, Mrs. Lam brought a case against San Diego councilman Ralph Inzunza and Las Vegas lobbyist Lance Malone. They were convicted on multiple counts of extortion, wire fraud conspiracy and wire fraud and were accused of trading money for efforts to repeal a law.

Then, in her most well-known case, in December of 2005, Mrs. Lam secured a guilty plea from former Representative Randy "Duke" Cunningham for taking more than $2 million in bribes in a criminal conspiracy case involving at least three defense contractors after he accepted cash and gifts and then tried to influence the Defense Department on behalf of donors. He also pled guilty to a separate tax evasion violation for failing to disclose income in 2004.

Now, here is where it gets interesting. Finally, 2 days before she left office, that would be around February 13, Carol Lam announced indictments of Kyle "Dusty" Fogg, a former top officer of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and Brent Wilkes, a defense contractor accused of bribing Duke Cunningham and the prime beneficiary of secret CIA contracts. It is this latest incident, involving the ongoing investigations stemming from the Cunningham case, that has raised the most significant concerns about Carol Lam's removal.

When I first came to the floor in January, I mentioned rumors were circulating around California that Carol Lam was pushed out because of her efforts to investigate the Cunningham case. In the subsequent investigations, I have tried to be very careful about talking about these allegations because they are so serious and because, at the time, they were based on mere speculation.

Despite recent materials coming to light, I want to continue to be very careful in talking about these allegations. At the same time, I must say that today there are even more questions to be answered regarding what role in the Cunningham case played in the administration's decisions about which U.S. attorneys to fire. We have now learned that six of the eight fired U.S. attorneys were involved in public corruption cases.

The Washington Post noted this. I think, very well, as I will point out here on this chart.

David Iglesiases, New Mexico—oversaw probes of State Democrats and alleges two Republican lawmakers pressured him about the case. He was respected by the Judiciary agencies and staff, complied with Department priorities.

Daniel Bogden, Nevada—overall evaluation was very positive. Notable cases, opened a probe related to Nevada Governor Jim Gibbons, former Member of Congress.

Paul Charlton, Arizona—opened preliminary probes of Representatives Jim Kolbe and Rick Renzi before November election. Well respected, established role public corruption cases played in the administration's decisions about whether U.S. attorneys to fire. We have now learned that six of the eight fired U.S. attorneys were involved in public corruption cases.

To: Williams.

Per-your inquiry yesterday after JSC, this is the e-mail I sent to Dabney last month at Harriet's request. Let me call you at your convenience to discuss the following:

Tim Griffin for E.D. Ark.; and
The real problem we have right now with Carol Lam is that leaders of the Department that leads me to conclude that we should have somebody ready to be nominated on 11/18, the day her 4-year term expires.

I believe that irrespective of the intent behind the decision to fire Carol Lam and the other U.S. attorneys working on public corruption cases, such a removal sends a message to all the public prosecutors: whether intended or not, that creates a chilling effect. Because of this, there should have been very careful consideration given to what steps should have been taken to ensure it was clear there was good reason to remove the prosecutor, that the office itself had a comprehensive plan in place to ensure no cases or investigations would be harmed or slowed in any way and that ongoing public corruption cases had absolutely nothing to do with the removal of the U.S. attorney.

However, in the case of Carol Lam and in the case of five other U.S. attorneys, the administration failed to meet even these bare minimum standards. I strongly believe that removal of a United States attorney who is involved in an ongoing public corruption case should occur only—if there is a very good reason, and not simply “we could do better.”

Because of the public corruption cases and allegations that individuals were removed to put in politically connected young lawyers, another issue that must be examined is the appearance of politics impacting how U.S. attorneys are treated and what that means for the prosecution of justice.

As was reported in the McClatchy newspapers, former Federal prosecutors and defense lawyers have said:

Allegations of political interference could undermine the reputation of U.S. attorneys and impartial enforcers of the law. And, yes, I really agree with that. One former Federal prosecutor said:

One of the things the Department has stood for was being apolitical. I strongly believe that any involvement in an appointment process, but this is just nuts.

He is right. Yes, appointees are selected and nominated by the party in power. But once an individual U.S. attorney takes that oath of office, he or she must be independent, objective, and must be free to pursue justice wherever the facts lead.

Bruce Fein, the former Associate Deputy Attorney General for the
Reagan administration, said in an interview last week:

[We expect the rule of law to be administered even-handedly. That’s what ties our country together and gives legitimacy to decisions made to the government itself. When it’s obvious that the prosecution function is being manipulated for political purposes, that undermines the entire rule of law.

In defending its actions, administration officials and others have tried to argue that both Presidents Reagan and Clinton fired all 93 U.S. attorneys when they came into office, and that is no different than what occurred in December. Right?

Wrong. The implication of this argument has been that it is not unheard of to fire U.S. attorneys in this manner, and that, at some level, it is commonplace. Right?

Wrong, it is not commonplace. In fact, the Department of Justice and the White House knew that this was not commonplace and that comparing its actions to Reagan and Clinton was an inaccurate analogy. A memo, written by Kyl Sampson on January 1, 2006, to the Counsel to the President, clearly stated:

During the Reagan and Clinton Administrations, the White House and DOJ did not seek to remove and replace U.S. Attorneys they had appointed, whose four-year terms had expired, but instead permitted such U.S. Attorneys to serve indefinitely under the holdover provision.

That is a memo from the Attorney General’s Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson, again, on January 1, 2006. So they knew. They knew that just to say President Reagan and President Clinton each formed a new team when they became President couldn’t be used as precedent because it was not an accurate precedent.

Despite this, the administration and its defenders have continued to argue that firing U.S. attorneys was “entirely appropriate” and that it was justified because executive branch appointees “serve at the pleasure of the President.” In fact, this had never been done before. In fact, as far as we have been able to find out so far, and they are still researching it—but the Congressional Research Service has told us that in the past 25 years, only two U.S. attorneys who served less than a full term have been fired.

Interestingly, this talking point about “serving at the pleasure of the President!” is repeated throughout the documents that have been released as to what the administration should say when asked about the firing of U.S. attorneys. Specifically, it was listed in several versions of a memo that outlined the steps to be taken to execute the plan. This, again, is a memo from the Chief of Staff to the Attorney General:

“Step 3: Prepare to withstand political upheaval.” We should expect that there will be “direct and indirect appeals of the Administration’s determination to seek these resignations. The contents of such appeals must respond identically . . . U.S. attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President.”

So those to whom somebody appeals must reinforce this argument: U.S. attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President. That little statement is meant to cover, I am sorry to say, a multitude of sins.

Of course, the most literal sense, it is true: executive branch employees serve at the pleasure of the President. However, blind adherence and single-minded pursuit of this principle ignores that it is equally true that our Nation’s courts, independent, they must be objective, and they must pursue justice wherever the facts lead.

And it ignores that our country is based on the principle of checks and balances. Of course, in this instance this means that we must return Senate confirmation as a certainty to the law, and this is exactly what we do in S. 214—we simply return the law to what it was before that unknown addition of the PATRIOT Act reauthorization without the knowledge of Senators.

Since January when this issue was first raised, the Department of Justice has represented that it did not intend to avoid Senate confirmation. For example, before the Judiciary Committee on January 18, 2007, the Attorney General testified that DOJ was “fully committed to try and find administratively appointed, Senate confirmed U.S. Attorneys for every position.”

However, in e-mails and memos written by his staff, a strategy was outlined that involved removing U.S. attorneys from Senate confirmation. For example, on September 13, 2006, 3 months before the firing call on December 7, the Attorney General’s Chief of Staff sent an e-mail to Monica Goodling, liaison between the Department of Justice and the White House, suggesting that the Department use the new authority slipped into the PATRIOT Act reauthorization to facilitate firing U.S. attorneys and replacing them with new ones. The e-mail said:

I strongly recommend that as a matter of administration, we utilize the new statutory provisions that authorize the AG to make [U.S. attorney] appointments.

Then, the inference is, by avoiding Senate confirmation, the e-mail goes on:

[We can give far less deference to home State Senators and thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it far faster and more cheaply at less political costs to the White House.

This is only one example of discussions among White House and DOJ officials about the benefits of avoiding the Senate, especially when the White House was involved in these decisions? Was the plan orchestrated by the White House? Who made these determinations about who to fire and who was involved in the loyalty evaluation? What other U.S. attorneys were targeted for dismissal? We know there were several but their names have been redacted from the documents we have received. We need to know who are they, why were they on the list, and why did they come off the list?

What were the real reasons used to determine who would be fired, since the evaluations don’t line up with the EARS reports? What role, if any, did open public corruption cases play in determining who would be fired? What was the Attorney General’s role in the process? What did he know and when did he know it? How can he say he didn’t know what was going on with the firing of the U.S. attorneys, even though the White House did, and even though there are e-mails showing that he was consulted?

Was the change to the law in March of 2006 done in order to facilitate the wholesale replacement of all or a large number of U.S. attorneys without Senate confirmation? We know that somebody suggested all 93 U.S. attorneys should be replaced, at one point. My question is, was this done to facilitate that?

These are just some of the questions I hope our committee will delve into as the investigation continues.

Finally, in an e-mail that discussed avoiding the Senate confirmation process, the Attorney General’s Chief of Staff wrote:

There is some risk that we’ll lose the attorneys who were targeted for dismissal (interim U.S. attorneys indefinitely), but if we don’t exercise it then what’s the point of having it?
Think about that: There is some risk that we will lose the authority to appoint U.S. attorneys indefinitely, but if we don’t ever exercise it, then what is the point of having it?

I believe the time has come for the administration to lose that authority. All through this job, this question, and questions about legislation have demonstrated at the very least one real thing: the law must be returned to what it was prior to the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, and the bipartisan bill before the Senate would do just that. Through negotiations with Senator SPECTER we are now considering legislation that would give the Attorney General authority to appoint an interim U.S. attorney but only for 120 days. If after that time the President has not sent up a nominee to the Senate and had that nominee confirmed, then the authority to appoint an interim U.S. attorney will fall to the district court.

Given all we have learned in the past few months, I believe this is the least we can do to restore the public’s faith in an independent system of justice. This bill will also help prevent any future abuse or appearance of politicization of U.S. attorney positions.

The legislation also makes it clear that the 120-day limitation applies to all the interim U.S. attorneys who are currently in place, including those who are the result of the Department’s actions in December. These changes are in line with the way the law used to be and would simply be restoring the proper checks and balances that are needed in our system of government.

I urge my colleagues to oppose all amendments and pass a clean bill.

I have noted the distinguished ranking member of the committee is on the Senate floor. Before I yield, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be considered as original text for the purpose of further amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WEHRL). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I join with the Senator from California in urging the adoption of the present legislation.

I am a cosponsor of the legislation. I immediately agreed to join Senator FEINSTEIN on this matter when she called to my attention the situation in the Southern District of California in San Diego, which had resulted from the provisions that was added in the PATRIOT Act re-authorization. That provision had been added in the PATRIOT Act conference report and had been available for inspection from December 8, 2005, when the conference report was filed in the House, and March 2, 2006, when the provision was adopted in the Senate. Though that conference report was available for some 85 days, it was not noted until we saw its application.

Then, when the Senator from California called it to my attention, I immediately said there is a problem here and we ought to correct it, and she introduced the bill. I immediately cosponsored it.

There is no doubt there are major problems which we have to confront on the requested resignations of eight U.S. attorneys.

The President has traditionally had the authority to replace U.S. attorneys. That has generally been interpreted, to me, that the President may replace U.S. attorneys without giving any reason. But I think implicit in the application of replacement of attorneys is you cannot replace them for a bad reason, you cannot replace because they are seeking to ferret out corrupt politicians, or if they are refusing to yield, or not bringing a case the administration thinks ought to be brought. So they are all very serious. When President Clinton took office in 1993, the President replaced some 93 U.S. attorneys, as a matter of fact—of course, without giving any specific reason—and no one drew any objection to that. We have all asked in respect to the eight U.S. attorneys who have been asked to resign and caused the current issues as to whether they are being replaced for bad reasons.

The situation with the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of California, Ms. Carol Lam, raised some issues as to whether she was being asked to resign because she was pursuing corruption charges which resulted in the conviction of former Congressman Duke Cunningham and an 8-year jail sentence.

It has been reported, for example, that U.S. Attorney Lam sent a notice to the Department of Justice saying she could not seek further indictments or criminal investigations of a defense contractor who was linked to former Congressman Duke Cunningham. It was later reported that on the very next day, D. Kyle Sampson, the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Gonzales, sent an e-mail message to William Kelley in the White House Counsel’s Office saying Ms. Lam should be removed as quickly as possible. Now the communication from Mr. Sampson further reportedly asked Mr. Kelley to call Mr. Sampson to discuss: The real problem we have right now with [U.S. attorney] Carol Lam, that leads me to conclude she should have someone ready to be nominated on 11/18, the day her 4-year term expires.

Well, the sequence of events raises a question as to whether Ms. Lam was asked to resign because she was hot on the trail of criminal conduct relating to the Cunningham case. We do not know. But that is a question which ought to be inquired into.

It is my view, as I review all of these matters, that there are disturbing questions as to whether the eight U.S. attorneys who were asked to resign were doing their job or whether they were not.

There was a very lengthy article in the New York Times yesterday—starts on the first page and continues in the interior of the paper for a substantial part of another page—where there are issues raised as to whether New Mexico’s U.S. Attorney, David C. Iglesias was asked to resign because he was pursuing corruption cases or if the U.S. attorney was appropriately not initiating a prosecution. That is a discretionary judgment.

A prosecuting attorney vested with broad discretion can abuse that discretion, and there is case law to that effect. A prosecuting attorney’s discretion is not unlimited. There is comment published in Volume 64 of the Yale Law Journal which goes into that issue in some detail.

The question on my mind is whether we ought to use the occasion of this
legislation and the attendant controversy about the replacement or asking for the resignation of U.S. attorneys to legislate. Congress has the authority to circumscribe, to some extent, the President’s authority to remove prosecuting attorneys. The independent counsel statute, for example, provides that the Congress has provided that the independent counsel may be removed by the Attorney General for cause. That is a legitimate exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority under article I and does not impinge upon the President’s constitutional authority under article II.

With respect to independent commissions, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Commissioners may be removed, but it has to have a higher level of showing of impropriety—something in the nature of malfeasance or its equivalent. In taking a look at what might be done, there could be a provision that U.S. attorneys may be removed or asked to resign only for cause. But that would impinge upon the President’s traditional authority to remove for no reason at all. I have doubts that that is within that far, but I believe there is a strong case to be made for limiting the authority of the President to remove for a reason which is a bad reason, such as the one I have mentioned.

That kind of legislation would call for a variety of situations which would justify removal: for example, the U.S. attorney could not be removed for pursuing a corruption investigation; the U.S. attorney could not be removed for declining to prosecute in a situation where that was within the justifiable discretion of the U.S. attorney.

This issue has percolated now for some time, and the deeper we get into this issue, the more we think about various aspects which so far have not been examined. My staff and I are looking at the time at such an amendment. I was informed today that a unanimous consent agreement was entered into on Thursday which will preclude further amendments. On this state of the record, any such amendment would be out of order. But we intend to pursue it to see if we can structure an amendment which would make sense. If we do, there is always the option of asking for unanimous consent that an additional amendment be permitted on this bill under a limited time agreement.

I know the majority leader is anxious to move through this legislation and move ahead to other items on the docket. I mention that possibility because it is a work in process, and we may find it structurally possible to provide such an amendment which would address some of the underlying problems confronting us in the present situation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a sequence of events relating to the interim appointment of U.S. attorneys in the PATRIOT Act reauthorization be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE INTERIM APPOINTMENT OF U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION

The interim US Attorney provision was first raised with staff on November 9, 2005. The provision was discussed at a staff level and was included in the draft PATRIOT Conference Report. The Conference Report was agreed to on December 16, 2005 (Senate vote 358) until December 20, 2005. No mention was made of the Interim U.S. Attorney provision in any floor statement during the 24 days the Senate debated the Conference Report in the First Session of the 109th conference report was agreed to on December 8, 2005. The Conference Report contained Sec. 502, which was clearly visible in the table of contents of the Report and titled as “Interim Appointment of US Attorneys”; it was not hot pink, but was in plain view for all Members to consider.

Floor Statements on the Conference Report began in the Senate on November 17, 2005. Motion to table the initial defeat of the Interim US Attorney provision in the First Session of the 109th conference report as a separate section and was included in the draft PATRIOT Conference Report in some form on the Floor on January 31, 2006. Debate ran until March 2, 2006 when the Senate adopted the Conference Report (Senate vote 29). No mention was made of the Interim U.S. Attorney provision in any floor statement during the 24 days the Senate debated the Conference Report in the First Session of the 109th.

In all, the Senate discussed the PATRIOT Conference Report in some form on the Floor for a total of 23 days. An amendment was made of the Interim U.S. Attorney provision even though it was not snuck into a managers’ package or included as a technical fix, but was instead clearly labeled and provided its own separate section. Between December 8, 2005, when the Conference Report was filed in the House, and March 2, 2006 when the Report was adopted in the Senate, the Conference Report was open to review for 85 days. During that entire time, the provision was available for all to see.

My staff searched the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the 85 day period in which the Conference Report was under consideration. There was no objection made to Section 502 or the Interim U.S. Attorney provision in either the House or the Senate during that period. The provision was in no way “slipped” into the PATRIOT Act Reauthorization.

Indeed, subsequent to the adoption of the PATRIOT Conference Report, the Congress adopted a legislative package to make additional modifications to the PATRIOT Act. No one requested any modification or elimination of the Interim US Attorney provision from the Conference Report in that legislation.

Mr. SPECKER. Mr. President, I note the presence of my distinguished colleague, Senator LEAHY, and yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Pennsylvania.

First, I thank the Senators who began this debate. I have been told a number of family matters changed the ability of some to be here.

Over the last several months, the Judiciary Committee has used hearings, investigation, and oversight to uncover and abuse of power that threatens the independence of U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country and the trust of all Americans in the independence of our Federal law enforcement officials. We have probed the mass firings of U.S. attorneys. We are trying to get to the truth in order to prevent these kinds of abuses from happening again.

So today, the Senate finally begins debate on S. 214; that is, the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007. The bill was initially introduced by Senator FEINSTEIN and me on January 9. On January 18 during a hearing on oversight of the Department of Justice, we witnessed Attorney General about these firings. We then followed up with two hearings devoted to the matter on February 6 and March 6. I placed the bill on the agenda for the Judiciary Committee’s first business meeting on January 25 but action on the measure was delayed until our meeting on February 8. At the time we debated the bill, considered and rejected amendments, and the committee on a bipartisan basis voted 13 to 6 to report favorably the Feinstein-Specter-Leahy substitute.

We have sought Senate consideration of this bill for more than a month now, but Republican objections have prevented that debate and vote. But through the majority leader’s persistence, he was ultimately able to obtain consent to proceed to this measure today. I thank all Senators for finally allowing it to go forward.

My friend from California, Senator FEINSTEIN, gave our bill a straightforward title: “The Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007.” We need to close the loophole exploited by the Department of Justice and the White House that facilitated this abuse.

The bill we have before us was initially fought by the Department of Justice when it was in committee. It appears that even after these scandals, there are people there who want to continue to have this loophole that has been so badly misused. But likely because of the public outcry against the administration’s attempt to maintain that loophole and the ability to do what no one intended them to do, we
had a meeting in my office on March 8 in which the Attorney General finally said the administration would no longer oppose this bill. So I trust that tomorrow when the Senate votes on this legislation, we will pass it and take a step toward restoring the independence of Federal law enforcement in this country.

Even if we pass the bill, the Judiciary Committee will continue to investigate the firings. We will summon those who have not been willing to answer questions about the firings, including President and his top political operatives at the Department of Justice, and officials at the White House who have previously misled Congress and the American people about the mass firings and the reasons behind them.

The most fundamental problem is that this administration has apparently insisted on corrupting Federal law enforcement by injecting crassly partisan objectives into the selection and evaluation and firing and replacement of top Federal law enforcement officers around our country—our U.S. attorneys.

When you corrupt it at that level, at the prosecutor level, you affect everybody—all the police, all the investigators, all the agents who report to the U.S. Attorney’s Office—because if they think the investigations they carry out have to reflect the White House politics, then they cannot do their job. Ultimately, it hurts not just the people in law enforcement, it hurts every man and woman in the United States of America.

We have heard the Attorney General and even the President use what William Schneider has called the “past exonerative” tense in conceding “mistakes were made.” The “past exonerative” tense. I remember conjugating my verbs back in school. We learn about verbs, adjectives, adverbs, everything else. I guess it took this administration to bring up the “past exonerative” tense. Sister Mary Gonzaga probably would have wondered what I was saying had I come up with that when I was in school.

Now let’s take a look at their use of this “past exonerative” tense. Attorney General Gonzales has yet to specify what mistakes he made. So what mistakes did he make? Was it a mistake to allow the White House, through the President’s top political operative and his White House counsel, to force the firing of a number of high-performing, Bush-appointed U.S. attorneys? Or when he says “mistakes were made,” did he mean it was a mistake for the President and his top political operatives to tell the Attorney General and others in the Department about concerns that U.S. attorneys are not pushing fast enough or hard enough to indict “loyal Bushies” who have committed crimes? Was that the past mistake the President and the Attorney General meant? Or when the Attorney General and the President say “past mistakes were made,” did they mean it was a mistake to generate, with White House political operatives, a hit list for firing hard-working U.S. attorneys and to ensure that what they call—and President Bush repeatedly says—“loyal Bushies” are retained? Or when they say “mistakes were made,” did they mean it was a mistake to name more “loyal Bushies” to replace those U.S. attorneys who have shown the kind of independence we need to show in exercising their law enforcement authority and who have acted without fear or favor based on political party?

Because when a crime is committed, you do not ask whether the victim was a Republican or a Democrat. You ask if a crime was committed. If a crime was committed, you expect the prosecutor to prosecute. You do not expect them to be fired if they step on the toes of either political party.

This is an administration that seeks to justify its unilateralism by an expansive application of what it calls a “unitary executive theory”—everything comes from the President down to the U.S. attorneys. With all that authority and all that control, when they get caught with their hand in the cookie jar all of a sudden no one knows anything, no one can remember anything, no one did anything, and no one particulary. We need the good graces, we didn’t know this happened until we picked up the papers.” Obviously, they did not know it happened when they were testifying up here under oath the first time around to tell us what happened.

Instead, “mistakes were made.” Is the only “mistake” they are now willing to concede their failure to cover up the White House influence over the Justice Department? Is the only mistake they will admit that they got caught in a series of misleading statements to Congress, the media, and the American people? I still wonder if those in the administration or the Attorney General understand the seriousness of this problem.

Of course, mistakes were made. That is why we are here. It is our oversight duty to discover who made those mistakes and how and why they made them. I have said many times, one of the strengths of the Senate is that authority by removing U.S. attorneys for improper reasons. In the same way any employer has the power to hire, we know people cannot be fired because they are Catholic or because of their race or because they are whistle-blowers. The power of employment is not without limit. It can be abused. When it is abused in connection with political influence over Federal law enforcement, the American people and those of us who are entrusted with the power to represent them have a right to be concerned. We need the facts. We do not need more spin. We do not need another cover story. We do not need another “We will come up to the Hill. We will brief you on this. Let’s have a quiet little briefing. We will tell you what is going on.” And then we pick up the paper 2 days later and find out what they left out.

Oh, I want a briefing, all right. I want a briefing where they stand before us and raise their right hand and swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help them God. Then we will ask them questions; both Democrats and Republicans will. And the American people will be able to determine who is telling the truth.

I made no secret during our confirmation proceedings of my concern whether Mr. Gonzales could serve as an independent Attorney General on behalf of the American people and leave behind his role as counselor to President Bush.

As the Nation’s chief Federal law enforcement officer, he must carry out his responsibilities and exercise his awesome authority on behalf of the American people. He has to enforce the law. He has to honor the rule of law. He
must act with the independence necessary to investigate and prosecute wrongdoing without fear or favor. The political interests of the President cannot be his guiding light. When he said as recently as January 18 at our hearing that the President's staff is his “principal,” when he says in an interview he wears two hats—as a member of the President's staff and as head of the Justice Department—then he has forgotten what the Attorney General is. The President has a lawyer called the President has counsel. It is not the Attorney General. This is not the Attorney General of the President. This is the Attorney General of the United States of America. His clients are the American people and his principles must be devoid of partisan politics. He is not there as the President’s loyal counsel. He is there as the Attorney General of the United States of America, for every single one of us. His mission is not to provide legislative excuses or defenses for unlawful actions of the administration, such as the warrantless wiretapping of Americans or the use of torture and the issuing of signing statements to excuse following the law. He is not the one who should be excused if outrageous misconduct. He should enforce the law. He should ensure that Federal law enforcement is above politics. What kind of signal do we send to our Federal law enforcement agencies if we suggest to them that they can proceed without checking the political credentials of the people they are investigating?

The President can pick anybody he wants to serve on his White House staff—and he does. But when it comes to the U.S. Department of Justice and to the U.S. attorneys in our home States, Senators have a say and a stake in ensuring fairness and independence to prevent the Federal law enforcement function from untoward political influence. That is why the law and the practice has always been these appointments require Senate confirmation. The advice and consent check on the appointment power is a critical function of the Senate. That is what this administration insisted be eliminated. They wanted to do away with that check and balance. They wanted to do away with the confirmation process. So they had inserted in the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act a provision almost on the last minute of the consideration of the Attorney General to name an interim U.S. attorney. That is what our bill intends to restore.

We have seen again the effects of letting politics infiltrate the Department and undermine its independence and the independence of its law enforcement function. As we have learned more about these events over the last few months, I was reminded of a dark time some 30 years ago when President Nixon forced the firing of the decorated and well-respected Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Not since what came to be known as the “Saturday Night Massacre” have we witnessed anything of that magnitude. The calls to the U.S. attorneys across the country last December, by which they were forced to resign, were extraordinary.

Unlike during the Watergate scandal, there is no Elliott Richardson or William Ruckelshaus seeking to defend the independence of the Federal prosecutors. Instead, we have a cabal of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys in the White House, all apparently collaborating in efforts to unseat a number of outstanding U.S. attorneys. Then when it becomes public and when the first time in 6 years the House and Senate actually dare ask questions about what is going on, the administration, amazed they have been questioned about their actions, starts a series of shifting explanations and excuses. Lack of accountability or acknowledgment of the seriousness of this matter makes it all the more troubling.

The Attorney General's initial response at our January 18 hearing when we asked about these matters was to brush aside any suggestion that politics and the appearance of ongoing corruption investigations were factors in the firing of U.S. attorneys. He then had to know that contrary to what he told us then, these factors did play a role in this troubling project.

Today and tomorrow we can take a step forward by fixing the statutory excuse (section 2119) to these untoward actions. I commend Senator Feinstein for leading this effort. I commend Senator Specter for joining her. We have all cosponsored this substitute to restore the statutory checks that have existed for the last 20 years. It is time to take that first step toward restoring independence by rolling back this change in law that has contributed to this abuse.

There have been no good answers to our questions about why the administration removed U.S. attorneys without having anyone lined up to replace them or why home State Democratic Senators were not consulted in advance. There is no explanation for why there are now 22 out of the 93 districts with acting or interim U.S. attorneys instead of Senate-confirmed U.S. attorneys.

I look at this in light of my own experience. I am very proud of the fact I was the only lawyer on the United States Attorney's personal office that has my name on it. That is a plaque from my prosecutor's office presented to me by the police when I left office, and it also has my shield, my badge as a prosecutor. I used to inculcate in the police and those prosecutors who worked for me: You don't take sides. Nobody is a Democrat or a Republican when crimes are committed. We don't take sides. If you keep emphasizing this and proving it by the way you carry out your office, then police will in turn work better, courts work better, the grand juries work better, because they know you are not playing politics. The American public, whoever is within the area the prosecutor represents, feels safer because they know you are not playing favorites. I lived my life that way as a prosecutor and I know many Republicans and Democratic Senators in this Chamber who are former prosecutors did the same.

I am worried that even successfully restoring the law is not going to undo the damage done to the American people's confidence in Federal law enforcement. For that, we need to get to the truth and real accountability. But then I think all of us in both parties now, and no matter who holds the White House 2 years from now, must renew a commitment to insulate Federal law enforcement officers from the corrupting influence of partisan politics and the corrosive influence of White House intrusion into law enforcement activities.

Mr. President, I will have more to say on this later. I see my friend from Arizona who has been a prosecutor. The only thing in my career that more about these events over the last couple of hours about the firing of seven U.S. attorneys and a lot of speculation about why that occurred. I suggest it is important to find out the facts and then we can quit speculating and we will know what those facts were.

I wish to change the subject a little bit to what we are going to do about it. Actually, the Judiciary Committee passed a bill which will be amended tomorrow, I hope, and then we will vote on that bill tomorrow. It relates to what was conceived to be at least part of the problem here. The problem was that in the PATRIOT Act, a provision of law relating to appointment of U.S. attorneys was amended to allow the Attorney General to put into office what is called an interim U.S. attorney who would never have to come before the Senate for confirmation. Early on, there was speculation that the reason these seven U.S. attorneys were asked to resign was so the administration could put someone else in their place without going through the regular confirmation process of a nominee by the President. Except for the U.S. attorney in Arkansas, however, there appears to be no evidence that was the case.

In the case of Arizona, for example, it is clear it was not the case. There was one case in which it was to be appointed an interim U.S. attorney. In fact, Senator McCain and I have recommended an individual to the President for his consideration to be nominated to fill the
vacancy that now exists. Nonetheless, there was concern this statute shouldn’t remain on the books, that it shouldn’t be that the Attorney General can appoint an interim U.S. attorney who never has to come to the Senate for confirmation.

I think there is a general consensus that that statute should be changed and that the President should nominate people and the Senate should have an opportunity to act on the nomination.

An interesting thing has occurred, however. The legislation which has been proposed doesn’t achieve the objective. It doesn’t even begin to achieve the objective. So I drafted an amendment which I will be offering tomorrow that actually achieves the objectives. It says: The President has to nominate to fill the vacancy and the Congress has to act on the nomination, and it provides a very strong incentive for the President to comply with the law; it does nothing—Congress’s requirement to act on any of his U.S. attorney nominations for the entire remainder of his term is vitiated. So if he wants strong and quick action by Congress on his nominees, he has to appoint and actually nominate somebody within the 120 days required by my amendment.

Now, that achieves both objectives we are trying to achieve here: that the President will actually nominate and the Congress will actually act on the nomination. The underlying bill, unfortunately, does not achieve that objective. It reverts to the old law which does not require the President to nominate, and if he doesn’t, it has U.S. district court judges nominating U.S. attorneys, something they don’t want to do and they haven’t been very good at, and, in any event, confuses their article 3 responsibilities with the article 2 responsibilities of U.S. attorneys. It is not a good idea, and it doesn’t solve the problem that people perceive existed.

My amendment also eliminates the current statute relating to interim nominees so the President could no longer appoint interim nominees who would have to be confirmed by the Senate, or at least acted upon by the Senate. So I believe my amendment goes directly to the concern that our Democratic colleagues have had regarding S. 214, I would hope that the practical solution to the problem everybody has agreed exists, and that Members on both sides, in a very clear-eyed way, could consider which of the solutions represents the best option of solving the problem.

My colleague Senator Sessions has proposed a solution which, in the event my amendment were not adopted, I would support as well, because it at least improves somewhat on the underlying bill. But the reality is we shouldn’t have Federal district judges making these nominations, and if our goal is to have the President make the nomination and enable the Senate to act on the nomination, the only amendment that does that is my amendment.

I ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to remember we are not always going to have a Republican President and a Democratic Senate. We are going to have a Democratic President some day and a Democratic Senate or a Republican Senator or a Republican President and a Republican Senate. All the permutations will exist and politics should play no role in it. We should want the President to nominate to fill the vacancy and we should want the Congress to have a chance to act on that nomination. That is what my amendment provides.

The committee-passed bill, the number is S. 214, restores the interim U.S. attorney appointment statute that existed between 1986 and 2006. As I said, that system, which delegates to Federal judges the authority to appoint interim attorneys, has several flaws. First, as I said, S. 214 does not ensure that an interim U.S. attorney is appointed and, if he doesn’t, it has U.S. attorneys who are accountable to him. If he is not bringing important prosecutions or enforcing particular statutes, he and his superiors need to be held accountable. But if that U.S. attorney were appointed by a district judge, there is no one to complain to. Judges, after all, have lifetime tenure. It is only by ensuring that U.S. attorneys are appointed by the President, not a district judge, that the laws are faithfully executed. It is the President’s job to enforce the law. To do that effectively, he needs to have in place U.S. attorneys who are accountable to him. If he is not bringing important prosecutions or enforcing particular laws, he and his superiors need to be held accountable. But if that U.S. attorney were appointed by a district judge, there is no one to complain to. Judges, after all, have lifetime tenure. It is only by ensuring that U.S. attorneys are appointed by the President that we can ensure there is ultimate accountability in the system.

This is, after all, the way in which the Constitution envisioned that accountability for enforcing the laws would be charged—by charging the President with the duty to enforce the law.

The second flaw in the underlying bill is that the Senate has no say in the selection of an interim attorney. One of the major complaints about the administration’s handling of the interim U.S. attorney appointment authority is that it did not consult with home State Senators; that, in fact, some individuals sought to use the authority to avoid consulting with Senators.

It is right that the Senate take action in an effort to protect its prerogatives, but letting judges pick U.S. attorneys does not protect the Senate’s interest. One of the concerns is that the Senate have no say in the selection of a U.S. attorney who is picked by a judge. There is no confirmation of the judge’s selection as there is when the President nominates someone. This system, which S. 214 puts back in place, is a solution that doesn’t solve the problem that we have set out to address.

There is a third problem with this underlying bill. There will be those who don’t want the authority. In the past, when district judges have had the authority to appoint interim U.S. attorneys, some have simply refused to do so. Incidentally, the statutory language is “may,” not “shall.” If the district judges, then the very concern that the Democratic Senators have had that an interim U.S. attorney is appointed and serves is exactly what happens. So judges don’t want the authority, and there have been at least three such occasions during the current Bush administration when a district judge has refused to appoint an interim U.S. attorney and, in fact, they have had good reason. It is at least a potential conflict of interest for the district judge, who presides over criminal cases, to also select a U.S. attorney who prosecutes those cases. It is for this reason that some judges have refused to intervene in this area and select U.S. attorneys.

If the bill is enacted with the committee-reported bill, we once again foist this authority on the judges. Why are we doing this—restoring power to the district judges that those judges don’t want and have refused to use in the first place? Why are we forcing them to take actions that judges themselves, for good reason, see as a potential conflict of interest?

There is a fourth reason why this is not a good idea. Unfortunately, some district judges have not acquitted themselves very well when they have exercised the power to appoint U.S. attorneys. A Federal district judge may have the measure of the legal abilities of the lawyers who practice in his district, but he has no way to gauge their managerial skills, which is an important quality in a successful U.S. attorney. A district judge doesn’t even have access to a candidate’s personnel file and would not know of potentially disqualifying information or conflicts of interest in that file.

Allow me to describe two cases under the old system where the appointment of a U.S. attorney by a district judge led to a situation that can only be described as an embarrassment.

In the Southern District of West Virginia, in 1987, the U.S. attorney for the District of West Virginia was confirmed to be a Federal judge. When the term of the interim U.S. attorney expired, the chief district judge appointed another individual as U.S. attorney. This individual was not a Justice Department employee and had not undergone an FBI background investigation. The court’s appointee came into office and started asking about ongoing grand jury investigations, including investigations involving the mayor of Charleston and the State’s Governor. Not only were they major

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and Governor under investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office at the time, both were later indicted and convicted of various Federal crimes.

The first assistant U.S. attorney, who knew that the district court’s U.S. attorney had undergone a background investigation, believed that these inquiries about pending investigations of local politicians were inappropriate and reported them to the Executive Office for United States Attorneys—Washington, DC. The Justice Department eventually had to remove the investigative files involving the Governor from that U.S. Attorney’s Office for safekeeping. The Justice Department also had to direct the court’s appointee to recuse herself from some criminal matters until a background check could be completed. This situation wasn’t resolved until another U.S. attorney was confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. President, at the very time that some Democrats are suggesting that it just doesn’t matter, this is not evidence, but it just might be that one or more of these U.S. attorneys was removed because they were hot on the trail of some Republican officeholder, they were involved in a political investigation, the recusal of a person, and that was the reason they were removed—again, there is no evidence, but that is the suggestion—why would you want to substitute for that situation a statute that goes back to the way it used to be, where the judge can appoint, and allows another employee or officer of the United States to serve instead of the one that was removed, again, with no evidence at all, as I have demonstrated. We can do better. There is nothing partisan about what I suggest. It would work equally for Republican and Democratic Presidents and Republican and Democratic Senators. To that end, I will offer an amendment that I will offer that precludes this from occurring.

Let me point out another very serious problem that I don’t think the authors of the bill are focused upon because it reinstates the exact language that existed before the statute was amended in 2006: the Attorney General could make consecutive 120-day appointments of interim U.S. attorneys. Has this ever been done? There is at least one case where the Attorney General appointed a U.S. attorney to four consecutive 120-day interim terms. Well, that is a year and a half, by my recollection. The incident occurred in the Eastern District of Oklahoma during the years 2000 and 2001. As a result, that district had an interim U.S. attorney who had been appointed by the Attorney General for over a year. Similarly, if an interim U.S. attorney was appointed by the Attorney General. After the 120-day term ran out, the Attorney General appointed that individual to another interim term. After that term ran out, the Attorney General appointed him to a third interim term.

This practice is what the language of the 1986 law allowed. It is the same language that is in the bill that is before us now. It is obvious that much of the impetus for the present legislation is a desire to rein in the Attorney General’s authority to appoint interim U.S. attorneys without Senate confirmation. Yet I submit that such power hasn’t exactly been “reined in,” and the Senate’s prerogatives are not protected, by a system that allows the Attorney General to make consecutive appointments of non-Senate-confirmed U.S. attorneys, which is precisely what the bill before us would allow. That system would mean that U.S. attorneys are subject to U.S. Senate confirmation, which is one of our two goals.

Finally, I note that S. 214’s system of judge-made interim appointments is duplicative of the designation of acting U.S. attorneys under the Vacancies Act. We are effectively creating two different and redundant systems for appointing “temporary” U.S. attorneys. That makes no sense and creates obvious potential problems. For example, this system would make it possible for an individual to be consecutively designated as an acting U.S. attorney and serve in that post for 210 days. He could be appointed as interim U.S. attorney and serve another 120 days. So he can be reappointed and reappointed again, if the Attorney General wanted to do so. This is nearly a whole year that someone could serve as U.S. attorney without ever being confirmed or acted upon by the Senate, without the nomination ever being sent to us.

Mr. President, we can all agree there is a problem. The solution, which was quickly devised, is not a solution at all, as I have demonstrated. We can do better. There is nothing partisan about what I suggest. It would work equally for Republican and Democratic Presidents and Republican and Democratic Senators. To that end, I will offer an amendment that I will offer that precludes these things from occurring.

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Mr. President, especially those who are upset about recent events should support a complete repeal of the interim authority. It is only a complete repeal that will ensure that U.S. attorneys are subject to Senate confirmation. And finally, S. 214 is an amendment that will effectively bar the President from appointing U.S. attorneys under the Vacancies Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et seq., and potentially allows an individual to be appointed to the acting U.S. attorney position without Senate confirmation. In order to encourage the President to abide by these time limits, the amendment would provide that if the President fails to appoint a U.S. attorney candidate within 120 days of a vacancy, it would then require the President to consider the nomination of an interim U.S. attorney candidate in any district within the time limit. The 120-day limit on Senate consideration is vitiated for all U.S. attorney nominations for I have heard that of that President’s term in office. In effect, in order to enjoy the benefits of prompt Senate confirmation on nominees, the President would be required to nominate promptly.

Finally, my amendment: (2) Would completely repeal the interim U.S. attorney statute, 28 U.S.C. § 546. The interim authority is unnecessary in light of the Vacancies Act and has caused a host of problems. To repeal this authority, my amendment would effectively bar the President (or a judge) from appointing an interim U.S. attorney without Senate confirmation. Any temporary gap in the office of U.S. attorney would be addressed by the Vacancies Act, which applies to all Senate-confirmed executive appointments and allows another employee or officer (prosumptively the First Assistant) to carry out the function. To cool the passions and look to the long term, I hope that you will do so—and that you will support my amendment.

Sincerely,

JON KYL

AMENDMENT NO. 459

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I call up my amendment which, I understand, is at the desk.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

Mr. PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be dispensed with.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To ensure that United States attorneys are promptly nominated by the President, and are appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

On page 2, strike line 19 and all that follows and insert the following:

SEC. 2. PROMPT NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION OF INTERIM U.S. ATTORNEYS.

Section 5H1 of title 28, United States Code is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

(1) Not later than 120 days after the date on which a vacancy occurs in the office of United States attorney for a judicial district, the President shall submit an appointment for that office to the Senate of the United States.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), not later than 120 days after the date of the submission of an appointment under paragraph (1), the Senate shall vote on that appointment.

(3) If the President fails to comply with paragraph (1) with regard to the submission of any appointment for the office of United States attorney, paragraph (2) of this subsection shall have no application with regard to any appointment to the office of United States attorney during the remainder of the President’s term of office.

SEC. 3. REPEAL OF INTERIM APPOINTMENT AUTHORITY.

Section 5H2 of title 28, United States Code, is repealed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized for the purpose of offering the following amendment, Mr. KYL.

Sincerely,

JON KYL

AMENDMENT NO. 459

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I call up my amendment which, I understand, is at the desk.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

Mr. PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate Caucus on the PATRIOT Act to which I am a member has reported the following:

EXHIBIT 1

U.S. SENATE


Re: Interim U.S. Attorneys.

Dear Colleague: There is a consensus that the changes made to the interim U.S. attorney statute, 28 U.S.C. § 546, by the Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, L. 109-177, were a mistake. It is my hope that we will not compound that mistake with another legislative fix—this time involving Federal district judges in the appointment of U.S. attorneys.

During Monday’s debate and Tuesday’s vote, a number of Senators expressed concern about the appointment process, and both a Democrat and a Republican will serve as President. The solution to this problem would be one that we are ready to live with under all combinations of these circumstances. It should be a solution that ensures that the President timely nominates U.S. attorneys, and that those U.S. attorneys are subject to confirmation by the Senate.

S. 214, the committee-reported U.S. attorneys bill, does not meet these goals. My proposed amendment does. S. 214 restores the interim U.S. attorney appointment authority that existed between 1996 and 2006. That statute, which delegates to Federal judges the authority to appoint interim U.S. attorneys, has served well. It is preferable to the current law. It does not require that the President will nominate a U.S. attorney. Second, the Senate has no say in the selection of a U.S. attorney who is appointed by a district judge.

Moreover, judges do not want this authority. Some have simply refused to appoint interim U.S. attorneys, finding it a distasteful conflict of interest for the district judge who presides over criminal cases to also select the Acting U.S. attorney who would prosecute those cases. And finally, some district judges have simply refused to appoint interim U.S. attorneys. A Federal district judge may have the measure of the legal abilities of the lawyers who practice in his district, but he is in no position to judge an individual’s professional judgment skill—an important quality in a successful U.S. attorney. A district judge does not even have the authority to appoint U.S. attorneys. A Federal district judge may have the measure of the legal abilities of the lawyers who practice in his district, but he is in no position to judge an individual’s professional judgment skill—an important quality in a successful U.S. attorney.

That is pretty basic to our system. We have had a different procedure for appointing interim attorneys for many years. It has been discussed over time as being unwise, but nothing ever happened until the PATRIOT Act reauthorized it. Then, when we finally opened the process up, the interim appointments, I think we didn’t do it well. We fixed the problem but left a big loophole that does need to be worked on. On balance, the KYL amendment is able to return us back to the old system, and I support it.

I also note there has been a lot of talk about politics and the Department of Justice. I served as a U.S. attorney for 12 years. I served as an assistant U.S. attorney for 2½ years. I came to know and love and respect that office. It is a very great and important office. That is why I am pleased to go on record as being against the United States of America and to stand before that jury and that judge and all the parties who are there and the court says: Is the United States ready? And your Honor—Is the United States of America ready? Your Honor—to speak for the United States of America, to represent the United States of America in court is a high honor and a tremendous responsibility.

My impression, my entire experience was that when faced with difficult choices, I called the people in Washington and sought their advice or help or insight into how to handle a difficult matter, they were very respectful of my decisionmaking process.
They would provide support and advice, and they usually deferred to the decision of the prosecutor.

They have strict regulations that require cases to be reviewed at various levels in the Department before an indictment is filed, and because the U.S. attorney is not a free agent. They are not entitled to indict anyone they choose without any review within the Department of Justice, any oversight at all. A lot of us thought sometimes there was too much of that, but it was main that chaotic headache you had to go through with some cases.

The U.S. attorney is appointed by the President. Presidents who take office routinely replace U.S. attorneys who were there and appoint people they believe are able and who will execute their approaches, their policies of law enforcement and litigation. That is what a Presidential election entails.

When we elect a President, we understand they are going to appoint U.S. attorneys who will be responsible for their effort, and if they refuse to prosecute immigration cases, for whatever reason they might decide, and the United States public knows about this, what recourse do they have? They can vote him out of office. In some cases, the President points somebody who won't enforce the law, gun prosecutions, or any other kind of prosecutions. That is an accountability of sorts. But to have a judge who has a lifetime appointment make these recommendations and have no accountability to the public is not healthy. I believe it undermines accountability.

I guess I had the occasion to be fired. They have been talking about a lot of people being fired. When President Bush took over from President Reagan—I had been appointed a U.S. attorney by President Reagan—even though I had been a Republican and was supported by a Republican President, they tended to appoint people who will appoint him so he could replace all the U.S. attorneys. This was a perfectly logical decision for him to have made.

As a matter of fact, I remember it being discussed, although not acted on, at the midterm of President Reagan's Administration whether U.S. attorneys should be asked to resign after 4 years and bring in new blood. They chose not to do that.

When President Bush took office, many U.S. attorneys did not stay on. Over a period of weeks and months, they submitted their resignations, and he appointed new U.S. attorneys, many excellent U.S. attorneys. I asked that I be allowed to stay on, and after some time, they said: You can stay on. So I stayed for 12 years. There were a handful of U.S. attorneys who stayed during that period—I mean literally half a dozen or fewer who stayed 12 years.

I say that to say these appointments are appointments of the President. The U.S. attorneys have to be responsible, if Presidential elections mean anything at all, in executing the policies the President sets forth with regard to criminal cases or civil cases, for that matter. That is what he does.

We have this sense in which an appointment of a U.S. attorney is both political and nonpolitical. Let me tell you how it works. This is the practice that U.S. attorneys are recommended to the President or known to the President to have certain abilities. People make recommendations. If it is a Republican President, they tend to appoint Republican U.S. attorneys. If it is a Democratic President, they tend to appoint Democratic U.S. attorneys. Local Congressmen and Senators—particularly Senators, since we are in the confirmation process—make these recommendations to the President. He listens to them and gives great weight to the recommendations.

So most of the people who are appointed have some sort of political heritage or background, but when you take that oath, when a person becomes a U.S. attorney and they are asked to evaluate the merits of an existing case before them as to whether a person should be charged, as to what kind of plea bargaining enters into in the course of a prosecution, they should follow the law, they should follow their personal integrity and do the right thing regardless of any politics, regardless of whether that defendant or the person involved in a civil lawsuit is a Republican, a Democrat, rich or poor, whatever. They have taken an oath to enforce the laws fairly against everybody. I took it seriously. It was an important oath to me. I don't think I have ever done which I am more proud than serving as a U.S. attorney. I believe I fulfilled that oath as God gave me the ability to do so, and I made some tough calls. I handled cases against people I knew—friends. I felt it was my duty, and I did my duty to the best of my ability. I am convinced that most U.S. attorneys do the same.

The appointment process has a political component, as everyone in this body knows, because I submit to my colleagues who is listening, there has not been a U.S. attorney appointed who doesn't have some sort of Senate recommendation to it. In fact, they have to get our approval to move the nomination through the Senate. That is a political process. So some of these e-mails which are being talked about I think are not so unusual at that level, where they are talking about appointments. Are we appointing people who are loyal to President Clinton or are we appointing people who are loyal to the administration of President Bush, who wants his administration to succeed and wants his priorities to succeed? That is how appointments are made. But once you take that position, nobody in the Department of Justice, for corrupt or ill intent, should ever try to influence a legitimate, proper decision of a grand jury or a U.S. attorney with any influence. That is what is a tradition which most of the public may not know but is deeply understood throughout the Department of Justice.

Years ago, assistant U.S. attorneys would resign when Presidents were not reelected. The whole office would resign. As a matter of fact, when I came on in 1980, several offices still had that tradition, and in several offices, when the new U.S. attorney walked in, there was a rumor there was the feeling that was the right thing to do—to turn it over and let the new President and new U.S. attorney hire whom he or she wanted to run the office.

What has ended, I think correctly. Now in every U.S. Attorney's Office, there is a deep cadre of experienced career prosecutors. The U.S. Attorney's Office is much larger today. They have grown in size, and they have a deep cadre of professional assistants, many of whom are appointed by different political parties of different Presidents, different Attorneys General, and selected by different U.S. attorneys.

Everybody, if they are doing their job correctly—and I am convinced that the President does do—make decisions on cases based on the merits. If someone in the office tries to upset that or if some U.S. attorney tries to squash or cover up a case that should be prosecuted or a vote of the jury tries to pressure someone and there is not a legitimate basis for it, there are Federal agents involved in these prosecutions, assistant U.S. attorneys, people talk about these things, and it comes to the surface. Really, it is very difficult for anybody to not do what is right. I am not saying it can't be done, but I am just emphasizing that U.S. attorneys have a responsibility to do what is right. Their assistants are raised in that concept, they are trained in that concept, and if some political shenanigans are attempted, those assistants will usually push back and can appeal to the Department of Justice in Washington or state their claims. That is just the way it is.

What about this deal of President Bush firing 8 of U.S. attorneys? Let me say it this way: The President was in midterm. He had been reelected. Apparently, there was a discussion as to whether U.S. attorneys should be kept or replaced. Somebody said: Why don't we replace them all? He said: No, that is not a good idea. We ought to evaluate them and see which ones we want to keep and which ones we want to replace. There is nothing wrong with that. In fact, in my view Presidents and Attorneys General have a greater responsibility than they have exercised to ensure that U.S. attorneys are carrying out aggressively the policies they set forth. It is mainly a question of policy.

They made that decision. They battled it down and came out with eight U.S. attorneys whom they wanted to replace out of 93 U.S. attorneys. That is not a holocaust of U.S. attorneys.

Years ago, President Reagan fired a number of U.S. attorneys. When Presi- dent Clinton was elected President, he sent out a notice that everybody would resign almost immediately. In the past,
President Carter, President Reagan, and President Bush gave people 6 months or more notice to get their affairs in order and trundle on off in a nice fashion, give you an opportunity to find another job. But President Clinton sent out a notice immediately: You are dismissed; you are not to hold office any longer, and then they backed off and said: OK, take your time; we respect you more than that. We will let you take some time before you are out of here, but you are out of here. I have seen that twice. Then President Bush took over from President Reagan and when President Clinton took over from President Bush.

I wish to talk about this question of how you fill a vacancy in the U.S. Department of Justice, a U.S. attorney position. I always thought it odd that the court makes that appointment under certain circumstances. Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, in a Judiciary Committee hearing on February 8, 2007, said:

Allowing the district court to appoint U.S. attorneys would deprive the Attorney General of the authority to appoint his chief law enforcement officials in the field when a vacancy occurs and it is not to another branch of Government. The President is elected to do this. He is the chief law enforcement officer. He sets the prosecutorial policy, not the court.

McNulty further testified:

Some district courts recognize the conflicts inherent in the appointment of an interim United States attorney who would then have matters before that court—not to mention the oddity of one branch of government appointing the officers of another branch of government—and they have simply refused to exercise the appointment authority.

Some judges felt so strongly that this is an unhealthy way of doing business, that they should appoint the prosecutor who is going to be appearing before them trying to convict someone who are supposed to be a neutral arbiter of the facts and the law, that they wouldn’t make the appointment.

McNulty pointed out:

Other district courts ignored the inherent conflict and sought to appoint as interim United States attorneys wholly unacceptable candidates who lacked the required clearances or appropriate qualifications.

You have to have a secret clearance to be a U.S. attorney. This is very serious business, who gets appointed U.S. attorney in these matters. Let’s say there was a U.S. attorney who had a meeting with the judge—and I have had these judges who like to tell you what the policy should be. They like to tell you, you are prosecuting too many drug cases; you are prosecuting too many gun cases. We are the judges; we think you, prosecutor, you work for us, basically you are prosecuting too many immigration cases. You need to do other kinds of things more fitting for the Executive Court, Mr. Prosecutor.

Well, who is the prosecutor working for? Is he working for that judge or is he working, in effect, to set forth the policy of the person duly elected President of the United States and thereby empowered to appoint him and thereby to set those policies? So you have to tell the judge, you know, I like you, Judge, and I appreciate all that. I know you, but that is not our policy. We begin when we have one case.

We think there is too much violence in America, and drugs and gangs are out there killing people and doing all these things, and our policy is to prosecute drug cases.

What about immigration cases? Nobody else will prosecute an immigration case. One U.S. attorney had a larceny record because she did not prosecute those cases to the level of other similar districts and was criticized for it by a lot of people. Let’s say there was a vacancy, and under S. 214 the Senate majority now refused to confirm a Bush appointment to that district and the judge appoints somebody who agrees with him who wouldn’t prosecute immigration cases or gun cases or drug cases, and they could be in there permanently.

This idea that the Executive Branch, or President, can abuse the system is as true and possible as the idea that a judge abuses the system. If the President does it, at least we in this Congress have a vote, and the American people have a right to vote on a President. So there is accountability at least in this system that is not in the Judicial branch of government.

Paul McNulty, the Deputy Attorney General, said this:

The Department of Justice is aware of no other agency where Federal judges, members of a separate branch of government, appoint the interim staff of an agency.

I would ask my colleagues here to name one where the Federal judges fill a vacancy somewhere in the Government. In addition to the constitutional separation of powers that is of concern with this approach, McNulty said:

At a minimum, it gives rise to an appearance of potential conflict that undermines the performance or perceived performance of both the executive and judicial branches.

Tough cases come up before courts and they are litigated before judges with great intensity. There is a lawyer for the defendant and there is a lawyer for the Government, the prosecutor, and imagine now that the judge has appointed the prosecutor. It creates some unease, I submit, and it is not a little bitty matter.

I am talking about a matter that will linger for 100 years. I am not talking about the immediate media flack we are having now, that we are digging into and seeing whether everybody can figure out exactly what happened, and get a complete story of how the eight U.S. attorneys were asked to move on. We will get into that. That will all happen. I don’t know exactly what happened there, but I am saying that, as a principled approach, the appointment of executive branch officers should be maintained, so far as possible, by the executive branch.

I will say one more thing. I do support the Kyl amendment. I think that is a principled approach. I think the PATRIOT Act language we passed was not carefully thought through and did leave a loophole that could allow the President to avoid confirmation procedures that I think is not healthy. I believe the Kyl amendment, consistent with the separation of powers, will confront and deal with that problem. I will say this, regardless of how my colleagues might vote on that, I do believe we should consider an amendment I have offered.

AMENDMENT NO. 460

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I call up my amendment at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is set aside, and the clerk will report the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SESSIONS] proposes an amendment numbered 460.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: to require appropriate qualifications for interim United States attorneys)

On page 2, line 23, strike the quotation marks and the second period and insert the following:

"(c)1 A district court appointing a United States attorney under subsection (d) shall not appoint a candidate—

1. Unless that candidate is an employee of the Department of Justice or is a Federal law enforcement officer (as that term is defined in section 115 of title 18); or

2. If the court learns that candidate is under investigation or has been sanctioned by the Department of Justice or another Federal agency.

(2) Not less than 7 days before making an appointment under subsection (d), a district court shall provide the interim United States attorney general of identity of the candidate for that appointment.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, if the Kyl amendment is not approved, my amendment would require interim U.S. attorney appointments made by a district court have appropriate and proper background checks. That is, whoever the judge appoints would have background checks and security clearances in order to maintain efficient operation of the office during this transition period.

The Feinstein bill that reverts to the appointment of the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia, who was not a Department of Justice employee, did not have a background investigation, and was appointed by a district judge, started demanding to find out everything that was going on in the files related to a prosecution of prominent public officials. The First Assistant U.S. attorney there, a career
person, was taken aback by this. The judge appointed interim U.S. Attorney didn’t have security clearance to see the files, yet he had been appointed by the judge. So they had to remove the files from the office. Not everybody can go in and get a background check and did not have the necessary security clearances. The Department of Justice strongly objected. It goes against the policy of the Department of Justice and the efficiency and effectiveness of the nominee. The Department of Justice has an existing law, and the Federal judge executed the oath of office for this appointee and copies of the Attorney General’s order were sent out to the district court. Ten days after the Department of Justice received a fax indicating that the chief district judge had decided to appoint the earlier unacceptable candidate as U.S. attorney. They had two of them appointed. So I think we can fix that problem, but sooner or later we are going to have unpleasant mess, if you want to know the truth, and we can do better about that.

I see Senator KENNEDY is here, so I won’t go on at length about this, except to say that, unfortunately, a court struck down the new regime also approved the Texas redistricting law that was later struck down by the Supreme Court. It also approved the Georgia photo identification law for voting that was subsequently struck down by a Federal Court as a poll tax. Approval of the Georgia photo identification law was driven by the same partisan motivation that produced the current U.S. attorney scandal.

Georgia’s Republican-dominated State legislature said it was enacting the law to respond to allegations of voter fraud. But evidence of fraud to support the law simply did not exist. The ID law was passed anyway, with full awareness that it would disproportionately prevent minorities from voting. When the law was submitted to the Civil Rights Division for approval under the Voting Rights Act, the career staff of attorneys and analysts recommended an objection by the Department, which would have prevented the law from going into effect, but the recommendation was rejected by the political appointees who set out to remake the Department of Justice. The Federal Court struck down the law as the equivalent of a poll tax, because the State offered to sell ID’s for $20 to prospective voters who did not have them. Tellingly, the State did not establish offices selling ID’s in many of the State’s most heavily minority districts.

The Georgia photo identification law was driven by the same partisan motivation that produced the current U.S. attorney scandal.

The Eisenhower administration half a century ago to eliminate partisanship and cronyism in the Department’s hiring. Under Attorney General Ashcroft, however, the process was placed entirely in the hands of political appointees who set out to remade the ranks of career attorneys by hiring new attorneys based on partisan and ideological qualifications. Predictably, the result has been partisan and ideological law enforcement.

The civil rights division virtually stopped enforcing the Voting Rights Act on behalf of African Americans. It even sued African-American officials in Mississippi for voting against White voters. Contrary to the recommendations of career attorneys, the new regime also approved the Texas redistricting law that was later struck down by the Supreme Court. It also approved the Georgia photo identification law for voting that was subsequently struck down by a Federal Court as a poll tax. Approval of the Georgia photo identification law was driven by the same partisan motivation that produced the current U.S. attorney scandal.

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After the law was blocked, the State reenacted it without the $20 fee, in a blatant effort to gain partisan advantage by manipulating the law. Once again, the political appointees in the Civil Rights Division approved it. Fortunately, a court struck down the new law, finding that it placed an undue burden on the voting rights of minority and elderly voters.

The story does not end there. Shortly after political officials rejected the career attorneys’ recommendation to block the law, they transferred Robert Berman—the leader of the career team that reviewed the Georgia law and a 28-year veteran of the Civil Rights Division—out of his job as a Deputy Chief of the Voting Section and into a dead-end training job.

When the Attorney General testified before the Judiciary Committee last July, I asked whether this transfer was retaliation for the career attorney’s role in recommending that the Department object to the Georgia photo ID law. I still haven’t received an answer. When Wan Kim, the head of the Civil Rights Division, testified before the Committee in November, I asked him if Mr. Berman was transferred in retaliation for the complaints that have been put aside for their failure to toe the partisan line in the Department of Justice. Incredibly, Bradley Schlozman, the independent political appointee who oversaw approval of the Georgia ID law and the retaliation against the career staff, was rewarded with an appointment as interim U.S. attorney for the Western District of Missouri. He has served in that capacity for a year without Senate confirmation. Mr. Schlozman’s appointment is symptomatic of the problem that the bill before us will solve—the appointment as U.S. attorneys of unqualified partisan appointees who may try to win Senate confirmation, but who can serve for extended periods of time any way.

The continuing revelations about the 8 fired U.S. attorneys show how the administration of justice in the Bush administration. As explanation after explanation has unraveled, it has become increasingly clear that the purge of U.S. attorneys had its genesis in the White House and its roots in a desire to remove U.S. attorneys who were not sufficiently committed to the political agenda of the administration.
The initial explanation that 7 of the 8 were fired for poor performance was a smokescreen manufactured out of thin air. Their performance assessments were largely outstanding. Evidence is mounting that the administration was concerned that Carol Lam was too successful in her investigation and prosecution of Republicans in the Duke Cunningham scandal. John McKay was on the list because of his refusal to open an unwarranted investigation into voter fraud after a close 2004 election. Democrats and the_mulig party was the subject of Republican complaints about his unwillingness to pursue voter fraud investigations of Democrats, and he was pressured by Republicans in Congress to indict Democrats before last November’s election to help the Republican candidate in a tight congressional race.

Recently released e-mails show that part of this scheme was to use the little-noticed change in the law inserted in the authorizations of the Patriot Act last year which permitted the Attorney General to appoint interim U.S. attorneys to serve indefinitely without Senate confirmation. The bill before us eliminates that provision and reinstates the limit on service by interim U.S. attorneys appointed by the Attorney General. This change will force the administration to send nominees to the Senate to fill vacant slots, or have them filled by a court instead.

The fact is, with the new Attorney General, a new team is in place. We are no longer bound by the attitudes of the old. They have replaced the Attorney General, William H. Moody. In 1904, when Republican President Theodore Roosevelt wrote a letter to his Attorney General, William H. Moody. In this letter, President Theodore Roosevelt opposed the political firing of Federal prosecutors. This is what he said:

"Of all the officers of the Government, those of the Department of Justice should be kept most free from any suspicion of improper action on partisan or factional grounds...so that there will be gradually a growth, even though a slow growth, in the knowledge that the Federal courts and the representatives of the Federal Department of Justice insist on meting out even-handed justice to all.

Those words were spoken over 100 years ago. They ring true today. Our democracy is based on the rule of law. It is based on meting out even-handed justice, as President Theodore Roosevelt said.

The forced firing of eight U.S. attorneys, nearly all of whom had been judged qualified and favorably reviewed, calls into question the credibility and integrity of Federal prosecutors. It calls into question our Nation’s commitment to even-handed justice.

I have heard my colleagues on the floor say and in committee say: This is much ado about nothing because whenever a new President comes along, they replace all of the U.S. attorneys; that is clearly political. They are replacing those serving as U.S. attorneys with people of their own choosing after they have replaced the Attorney General. There is truth to that.

The fact is, with the new Attorney General, a new team is in place. We have 93 U.S. attorneys. As President George W. Bush took office a little over 2 years ago, he replaced all of those U.S. attorneys appointed by President Clinton with his own. No one called for an investigation. No one screamed
One of them. I am a member of that committee. We plan to vote on these subpoenas this Thursday.

The White House is reluctant to have senior officials testify. That is understandable. But when the shoe was on the other foot—a Democratic President and a Republican Congress, Administration officials testified all the time. Under President Clinton, 47 White House officials testified before congressional committees during their service.

We need to know all of it and nothing but the truth—about the firing of the eight U.S. attorneys.

There is a second question we have to ask which is equally important: How many other U.S. attorneys were approached by the White House and asked to play ball and did play ball? Of the Nation’s 93 U.S. attorneys, how many of them kept their jobs as a result of political cooperation?

We gained some insight into this question from a new study by two professors, John Cragan of Illinois State University and Donald Shields at the University of Missouri. They compiled a database of Federal indictments and convictions by U.S. attorneys against elected officials and political candidates since President Bush took office in 2001. Here is what their study found: U.S. attorneys across the Nation have investigated 298 Democrats and just 67 Republicans—nearly 5 times as many Democratic officials as Republicans. These statistics are troubling, and we have to look into them. The firings of the U.S. attorneys and documents that have been turned over to Congress into question the legitimacy of all prosecutions brought by the U.S. attorney in cases involving partisan interests.

This is regrettable. There is no place for politics when it comes to prosecution, especially when it comes to public corruption and voting rights cases. If there is belief that people in the White House in either party are pushing for prosecutions to seek a political advantage, we have seriously undermined the integrity and credibility of our system of justice.

As President Teddy Roosevelt warned: Even the appearance of political interference in the process of justice is damaging to public faith in Government. Last night, as I left a Chicago restaurant, a young man and his wife were sitting at a table. He asked me to come over. He introduced himself and said he was an assistant U.S. attorney in Chicago. That is a hard job to get. It is not a political job at all. In fact, you have to be really talented to be qualified to serve in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois.

He said to me: Senator, I would like to ask you to do your best to get to the bottom of this. We think we are doing a professional job. This suggestion that some U.S. attorneys were fired for political reasons really casts a shadow on the legitimacy of all prosecutions.

I think he would. The point is, this war has made the U.S. safer.

Those were the words of Stephen Hadley, unfortunately, they are wrong. The National Intelligence Estimate released last spring warns that the war in Iraq has helped create a whole new generation of terrorists around this world.

The latest report from the Defense Department confirms that terrorist groups are now trapped in a civil war. For the longest time, we danced around using the words “civil war.” But even that term does not adequately express the complexity of the deadly situation we find ourselves in today.

Before our military was diverted to fight this war of choice in Iraq, they had driven the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and splintered the leadership of al-Qaeda. We knew who was behind the 9/11 attacks and we determined to get him and others who worked for him. We were on track to demolish the terrorists who brought such grief to our Nation on 9/11.

What is the story today? According to Mr. Hadley in his comments yesterday on television, the war has made us “safer.” The fact is, today al-Qaeda is regrouping and the Taliban is still fighting with all of its might to control for Afghanistan.

Our military—especially the Army—is stretched to the breaking point.
There is not one Active or Reserve Army combat unit outside of Iraq and Afghanistan today that is rated ‘combat ready’—not one. If we were called on to respond to another military emergency in the world with our great military, they would be hard pressed to respond, because they need to respond to a domestic crisis or to train for an overseas mission. A recent audit by the Department of Defense inspector general found the Pentagon has failed to properly equip the soldiers it already has in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many soldiers have found themselves short on guns and ammunition, body armor, communications equipment, armored vehicles, and electronic jammers to disable IEDs.

Two hours ago, I was at Walter Reed Hospital. I make visits there and try to meet with soldiers and talk to them about how they are doing. I go to the rehab unit where amputees are trying to learn to walk. Some have lost one leg, some two. Some have lost an arm. They are struggling to get their lives back together. These are real heroes for America, and they are profiles in courage, as they struggle every single day to try to put their lives back together again.

I sat down with a group of these soldiers, all of whom had lost a leg, in this rehab room. I went around, and I said: What happened to you? Each one of them said the same thing: Well, it was an IED that hit my humvee. It was an IED that hit my humvee. It was an IED that hit my humvee.

I thought to myself: When this war started, in my first visit to Walter Reed, I met a member of the Ohio National Guard who lost his left leg. He could not wait to get back to his unit. I doubted if he ever would. I asked him what happened? He said: Well, this homemade bomb, this IED, hit my humvee. That was 4 years ago, and we still have soldiers coming into our hospitals with similar injuries without the protection they need.

The President’s response to this terrible situation is to order 30,000 more troops into battle.

We ordered for this war for the rest of our lives. But the people who have paid the highest price, by far, are the men and women of the military and their families. Many soldiers and marines, sailors and airmen in Iraq are on their second, even their third or fourth tour of duty. We are pushing them to the absolute limit. They have endured great danger. Their families have endured great hardships.

As of this morning, it is sad but must be reported that 3,210 American soldiers have lost their lives in the State of Illinois, have given everything. They have given their lives in Iraq.

This is a hallowed rollocall. These are the names of every Illinois service-member killed in Iraq since the start of this war. As we begin the fifth year of this war, I ask unanimous consent to honor these great men and women by having printed immediately after my remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD this list of those Illinois brave soldiers and marines, airmen and sailors who have given their lives in Iraq.

The ACTING President pro tempore.

Without objection, it is so ordered:

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. DURBIN. In addition to these fallen heroes, thousands of our troops have come home with serious injuries, disabilities—blindness, amputations, and the signature injury of this war, traumatic brain injury. We have been outraged in recent weeks to read about the shabby way some of these wounded veterans have been treated.

I went to Walter Reed Hospital and I asked to finally see this infamous Building 18, which is about a block away from Walter Reed Hospital. It is a rundown, old motel that our military took over. Under Secretary Rumsfeld, they had this passion to privatize—taking the money from the people who were responsible for maintaining this building and removing them and bringing in a private contractor. That is when the worst happened. The men and women who were involved in the private contracts clearly did not do the job.

As a result, the Washington Post ran this well-publicized series about mold and mice droppings and evidence of bugs and the general rundown condition of Building 18—an outpatient facility for our soldiers at Walter Reed Hospital.

Every day, we learn—as I have learned back in Illinois—of wounded soldiers who have been denied proper medical care, housed in substandard and even deplorable living conditions, and forced to fight a massive bureaucracy and endure long waits for decisions about disability compensation. Meanwhile, their families suffer and many of the wounded soldiers go without medical care.

Sadly, these problems are not unique to Walter Reed, nor are they new to many of the top Pentagon officials.

Mark Benjamin is a reporter who has written some of the groundbreaking stories about 11th hour care crisis. He wrote an article in 2003, 4 years ago, about wounded National Guard soldiers being housed in sweltering cinder-block buildings at Fort Stewart in Georgia.

The Pentagon pledged then, in 2003, that no wounded soldier would be subjected to that shabby treatment again. That was 4 years ago. Yet 2 years later, in 2005, Jeff Romig, a physician’s assistant from Danville, IL, and a captain in the Army National Guard, found himself living in similar conditions at a military base in Indiana after he ruptured his Achilles tendon during training.

Captain Romig had a cast on up to his hip following surgery, but he had to walk a half a mile on crutches every day to eat lunch. When it rained, mud washed into the cinder-block barracks and coated the cement floors where he was required to live. His foot became infected. He has had five surgeries on it. He still has a hole in the back of his foot and his foot drops. He needs a brace to walk properly.

When he was released from active duty with the Army told Captain Romig that the VA would pay for the brace. But then the Veterans’ Administration refused. They told Captain Romig he was not entitled to VA health care until he received a disability rating, which takes 2 years. In the meantime, he would have to pay the bills himself or go without the brace and any other VA health care.

Now, who is Captain Romig? He happens to be a soldier who has served 23 years in the military—12 in the regular Army and 11 in the National Guard. He was one of the lucky ones, though. Through his employer he had private health coverage. They paid for the brace and his medical care when the VA and our Government failed him.

In an e-mail he sent me recently, he said:

Who is going to help pay the bills for a soldier’s family if he or she is disabled? The insurance companies won’t wait two years to receive their payment and the VA made it perfectly clear to me that if I didn’t pay my bill, they would send me to [a collection agency] they don’t want to wait two years for payment, either. So why should a soldier be expected to wait two years for care and financial assistance?

There is another story I would like to share. It is about SGT Garrett Anderson of Champaign, IL. He and his wife Sam share a similar worry. He is 30 years old. She is 29. They have a 6-month-old daughter. On Wednesday, they will celebrate their second wedding anniversary.

Three months after they were married, he went to Iraq with the Illinois National Guard. Four months after that, an IED exploded next to his amputee ward could not have treated him better. I have heard the same thing. There are many outstanding individuals at Walter Reed who should not be lumped into the critical articles about Building 18. These are men and women, medical professionals, who are literally working miracles every day on these soldiers. So criticizing the situation at Walter Reed should not bring down the rest as well.

The blast tore off Sergeant Anderson’s right arm below the elbow, shattered his jaw, severed part of his tongue, took away much of his hearing, and punctured his body with shrapnel. He worries about other wounded veterans. In an e-mail he sent me recently, he said:

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But after the treatment at Walter Reed for Sergeant Anderson, the months of outpatient care that followed were filled with “massive paperwork and red tape.” After 3 years in the Army and 4 in the National Guard, Garrett Anderson finally retired from the military last June.

Last week, 9 months later, he received his disability rating from the VA. You will recall the injuries I told you he sustained. His disability rating, after 6 years, is 90 percent. His wife Sam said the VA ruled that some of her husband’s shrapnel wounds were not service related because Walter Reed had not taken the time to document each and every one of them.

The Andersons are appealing the rating. They are hoping for a 100 percent disability rating, which would make Sergeant Anderson eligible for better health coverage and other benefits. Do you know how long that appeal will take? Two years—2 more years for Sergeant Anderson to wait to determine whether the VA is going to rate him at 100 percent disabled.

In the meantime, he is looking for a civilian doctor to experience treating amputees, and doing without the speech therapy and PTSD counseling he needs.

He is also going to college. His wife is trying to finish law school. They are both speaking out to try to change the system. Here is what his wife Sam says:

Each obstacle renewes our desire to fix the system so that future soldiers can serve proudly and take comfort knowing that their country will take care of them just as they took care of their country.

I applaud Defense Secretary Gates for the decisive steps he has taken to fix the problems at Walter Reed and to determine how widespread they are. But firing a few people—even a few generals—is not enough. The stories about wounded soldiers being mistreated raise serious questions about our past and about the long-term health needs of our soldiers—post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, amputations. Ten years ago, the VA could never have anticipated all these challenges. Today they face them.

Every year since the war in Iraq began, the President has failed to request adequate funding for the VA. The President’s budget for next year would enable the VA to serve 54,000 Iraqi and Afghanistan veterans—54,000. It sounds like a large number. It is. But it is 50,000 patients short of the VA’s expected demand.

The President’s budget provides for half of what is needed. Unbelievably, it would cut funding for defense health facilities such as Walter Reed by 13 percent. I think about that $12 billion in cash—$12 billion in U.S. taxpayer dollars—that was flown into Iraq and cannot be accounted for, sent to Mad Bremer and his Coalition Provisional Authority. How far would that money go to help the VA?

Here is another great statistic. In late January, the Army Times reported that in the last few years, the number of soldiers approved for permanent disability retirement decreased by more than two-thirds—from 642 in 2001 to 209 in 2005. Think about that: a two-thirds reduction in permanent disability ratings in the midst of a war? It does not make sense.

With the horrific wounds our troops are suffering—and thanks to the outstanding care they receive in the field—surviving those wounds, a permanent disability rating is a measure of their service. Declining disability ratings are part of the pattern of failing to plan properly for this war.

I know Dr. David Chu, who is an economist and mathematician by training, and he holds one of the top positions at the Pentagon. He is the Under Secretary for Defense for Personnel and Readiness. He is one of the two top Pentagon officials responsible for making sure that returning vets receive proper post-deployment care and fair compensation.

In January 2005, Dr. Chu told the Wall Street Journal that America was spending too much on benefits for soldiers and veterans. He said:

The amounts have gone to the point where they are hurtful. They are taking away from the Nation’s ability to defend itself.

He said:

The truth is, health care and disability benefits for wounded soldiers now threaten our national security; they are an essential part of the cost of war and part of our national security. Somehow the Pentagon has to come to realize this.

I want to tell my colleagues one more story and then turn the floor over to my colleague from Arkansas. This is about an Illinois soldier, Army 1LT Terry Peterson of Warrenville, IL. I first met Lieutenant Peterson in January 2006 when he was recuperating at Walter Reed. I helped him to come to the President’s State of the Union Address last year as my guest. He was 23 years old. He is a graduate of the Citadel. From the time he was a little boy, he wanted to be a soldier.

On December 8, 2005, 3 weeks after he arrived in Iraq, an IED ripped apart a humvee in which he was riding in Baghdad. The blast killed one soldier in the humvee and nearly killed Lieutenant Peterson. It shattered his right foot, ripped three knuckles off his right hand, and severed an artery in his left arm. He has had 20 surgeries so far. If he is lucky, he will only need two more surgeries. He has five screws in his foot, and he deals with pain all the time. He can’t stand for more than 30 minutes, and it will take a miracle for him to ever be able to run again.

Lieutenant Peterson received outpatient care at Walter Reed for 9 months. Someone from home was always with him—usually his mother, his girlfriend, or his sister—trying to cut through the redtape, trying to make sure he received the very best care. His mom spent $8,000 flying back and forth between Illinois and Washington to be with her son. Lieutenant Peterson spent $10,000 out of pocket to rent hotel rooms near Walter Reed for 6 months because there was no room for him in the infamous Building 18. He has yet to be reimbursed for that expenditure. The truth is the system still needs to turn in more paperwork.

Terry Peterson suffers from PTSD. He didn’t see a psychiatrist until months after his injury, and then only because his father insisted. When he went back for a follow-up appointment a month later, they told him his records had been lost.

Today Lieutenant Peterson is back at Fort Stewart in Georgia waiting to finish his surgeries and get his disability rating to leave the Army. He says:

It took me a long time to stop making excuses for the system.

Some days he says he feels like he was abandoned by the Army. But he is determined to try to fix this system so other soldiers won’t go through the same thing.

Before the State of the Union Address, some 15 months ago, Terry and I met with some reporters. Terry said: I don’t know if I ought to say this, but I am a conservative and a Republican. He said:

What I’m really looking forward to is just hearing that the President is behind us.

He said he didn’t want the sacrifices that he and other soldiers had made to be for nothing.

As we enter the fifth year of this war, America needs to demonstrate to all our troops and families that we are behind them, and that takes more than words. It requires that we stand with our soldiers on the battlefield and when they come home wounded, for as long as they need our help.

I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM CASUALTIES
LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

Marine Corporal Brian Kennedy, 25, of Glenview, IL.
Marine Captain Ryan Anthony Beaupre, 30, of St. Anne, IL.
Marine Private Jonathan L. Gifford, 30, of Decatur, IL.
Marine Corporal Evan James, 20, La Harpe, IL.
Army Specialist Brandon Rowe, 20, of Roscoe, IL.
Army Reserve Specialist Rachael Lacy, 22, of Kleebweker, 19, of Juka, IL.
Marine First Sergeant Edward Smith, 38, of Chicago, IL.
Army Staff Sergeant Lincoln Hollinsaid, 27, of Malden, IL.
Marine Lance Corporal Jakub Henry Kowalik, 19, of Schaumburg, IL.
Marine Lance Corporal Nicholas Brian Kleiboeker, 19, of Iuka, IL.
Marine 1st Lieutenant Timothy Louis Ryan, 30, of North Aurora, IL.
Army Staff Sergeant Andrew R. Pokorny, 30, of Naperville, IL.
Army Private First Class Shawn Pahake, 25, of Manhattan, IL.
Army Specialist Cory A. Hubbell, 20, of Urbana, IL.
Army Private Matthew Bush, 20, East Alton, IL.
Marine Sgt. David M. Caruso, 25, of
Marine Lance Cpl. Branden P. Ramey, 22, of
Army Sgt. Jack T. Hennessy, 21, of
Marine 2nd Lieutenant Ryan Leduc, 28, of
Army Spc. Charles L. Neeley, 19, of Mattoon,
Marine Lance Cpl. Jonathan W. Collins, 19, of
Army Pfc. Collier E. Barcus, 21, of McHenry,
Army National Guard Spc. Jeremy L. Ridlen,
Army Capt. John E. Tipton, 32, of Collins-
Army Staff Sgt. Oscar D. Vargas-Medina,
Army Spc. Shawn C. Edwards, 20, of
Army National Guard Spc. Landis W. Garris-
Army Staff Sgt. Oscar D. Vargas-Medina,
Marine Capt. John E. Tipton, 32, of Collins-
Army National Guard Sgt. Landis W. Garris-
Army Staff Sgt. Daniel G. Gresham, 23, of
Army Spc. Jacob C. Palmatter, 29, of Spring-
Army 2nd Lt. Richard B. Gienau, 29, of Peo-
Army Spc. Adriana N. Salem, 21, of Elk
Army Sgt. Kenneth L. Ridgely, 30, of Olney,
Army Pfc. Wyatt D. Eisenhauer, 26, of
Army Spc. Brian M. Romines, 20, of Simpson,
Army Petty Officer 1st Class Thomas C. Hull,
Army Staff Sgt. Gary R. Harper Jr., 29, of
Army Spc. James T. Grijalva, 26, of Burbank,
Army Spc. Miguel Carraquillo, 25, of River
Army 1st Lt. David L. Giaimo, 24, of Wauk-
Army Spc. Jeffrey A. Williams, 20, of
Army Staff Sgt. Gary R. Harper Jr., 29, of
Army Staff Sgt. Gary R. Harper Jr., 29, of
Army Spc. Terry J. Grishaw, 26, of Burbank,
Army 1st Lt. Debra A. Banaszak, 35, of Bloomington,
Army Staff Sgt. Kyle B. Wehry, 28, of Gales-
Army Spc. Joshua A. Terando, 27, of Morris,
Army Spc. William R. Newgard, 20, of Arlington
Army Staff Sgt. Kyle B. Wehry, 28, of Gales-
Statesville, IL.
Coeur, IL.
Coeur, IL.
Coeur, IL.
Coeur, IL.
Coeur, IL.
Coeur, IL.
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The second of these two steps I refer to is—I said this on the Senate floor the other day, and I still believe it—the Attorney General should resign. In an e-mail dated August 18, 2006, to the Attorney General’s Chief of Staff, it says that we have a “Senorator problem” in Arkansas. Well, guess who the Senator problem is. You are looking at him. I was by that time making calls, checking around. I had heard these rumors that the Justice Department was going to fire Bud Cummins and was going to replace him with Tim Griffin, and we will get to that specific case in a moment. But the bottom line is that—I know I was the problem, but the bottom line is that today the Attorney General, Attorney General Gonzales, has a bigger problem than the junior Senator from Arkansas. He has a credibility problem. He has a trust problem. He has a growing national scandal problem. I think it is best for the Justice Department, for the administration, probably for all the U.S. attorneys and all the things that Justice does all around the country and, quite frankly, it is probably best for him as a person to go ahead and step down and move on.

The Attorney General is different from any other Cabinet-level officer. He is mentioned in the Constitution. This is a role that our Founding Fathers envisioned, I believe, to be about the pursuit of justice. The Attorney General must be held to a higher standard. We should look to him—and we understand that the Attorney General is by nature a political appointment. That is the way the Founding Fathers set it up. But we also look to him to have integrity for that department and to not play politics with the office. He is a political appointee but not to play politics with that office.

One of the things that concerns me the most, the things that I have been reading in these e-mails that have come out in the last several days between the White House and the Justice Department. Again, many of us have read these e-mails or read parts of them. They talk about the “Bushies.” They actually use that term in an e-mail. They talk about the ‘Bushies’ in the summer and in the early fall about some of the things I was hearing in Arkansas and that I had concerns because, by all accounts, from everything I understood, Bud Cummins, the then-U.S. attorney in the Eastern District of Arkansas, in Little Rock, had done a good job. Everybody I talked to in the legal community—the judges, people who are familiar with what that office does—thought Bud Cummins had been very professional and thought he had done his job. They thought he had done exactly what he was supposed to do.

I began hearing rumors over the summer that they were going to replace Bud Cummins with Tim Griffin. At that moment in time, I didn’t know Tim Griffin. I am not sure I had ever met him. I don’t think I had ever met him. I barely even knew who he was. I went to the Arkansas community in Congressman Bozeman’s office mention him, but I really had almost no knowledge or no recollection of who he was at all. That is all beside the point. I had never met him. I had been the attorney general in Arkansas. I had been a practicing lawyer in Little Rock for a decade or more before I was attorney general, and I had never run across this guy in the legal community. It turns out nobody else had either because he wasn’t politically powerful. He may have been there for 1 year or maybe 15 years or something like that.

The bottom line is he didn’t have any stature in the legal community. People didn’t know who he was. They didn’t know anything about him. So that was my concern. I didn’t know who he was. I knew he had a very political background. The first question I would ask him at the door? And that is something I would want to talk to him about and I think the Senate Judiciary Committee would want to talk to him about. But the bottom line is from the very beginning that I think it can nominate whomever he wants to nominate. That is his business. I think it would be smart to check with Senators before he makes a nomination, but it is his business. He can nominate whomever he wants.

From the very beginning, what I was asking for is that they nominate Tim Griffin and send him through the normal confirmation process. I think the people of the Eastern District of Arkansas were owed a fair process. We owe it to them to do our best and to have the very best U.S. attorney there. It may be very qualified, but again, because he was an unknown and because he had no real presence in the Arkansas legal community, I thought certainly he was the type of guy who should go through the confirmation process.

So that is really what I have been saying from the very beginning, and this bill, S. 214, does that. It restores the additional balance. I think that is a good balance. I think it is something we need to go back to immediately.

Now, I mentioned Bud Cummins and Tim Griffin. Listen. In my mind this issue is much larger than those two people, and it is much larger than Democrats and Republicans. This issue is really fundamental to the Constitution; that is, should the Senate have the ability to confirm, give the advice and consent, on U.S. attorneys. I say the answer to that is, yes. I think that is something we as Senators should fight for. I think we need to do this to the best of our ability. We need to be fair. We need to move them through the process.

By and large, when one looks at the history of U.S. attorneys being confirmed, we haven’t had big knockdown, drag-outs over U.S. attorneys. But given the fact that U.S. attorneys go through Senate confirmation, it kind of allows the administration, on whom they nominate. I think that is a very important point.

Here again, with S. 214, we are trying to restore that balance that had worked so well.

One last thing. In the e-mails you see, in my view, a real abuse of power. Over and over we see e-mails between the Justice Department and the White House, and among themselves, where they say they need to do this, and they need to have this appointment power, and if they don’t use it, why in the world should they have it. There again, I think that approach to Government
is dangerous. It is shortsighted, and it seems to me someone who would make that type of statement is more interested in the power of the office rather than doing what is right. If there is one agency in the Federal Government about doing what is right, it ought to be the Department of Justice.

With all that said, I urge my colleagues to please support S. 214. It is good legislation. It restores the natural balance of what has worked so well for a long time around here. Once we can restore balance, I think the people all over this country will feel better about their local U.S. attorney.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas, Mrs. LINCOLN, is recognized.

Mrs. LINCOLN. Madam President, I come to the floor this evening as a co-sponsor of Senator FEINSTEIN’s legislation, supporting the interim appointment of U.S. attorneys. I am here this evening to vigorously restate my support for this bill and urge my colleagues to support its passage. I signed on to this legislation in January following the interim appointment of Tim Griffin, former U.S. Attorney Bud Cummins. I take this opportunity to compliment Senator Pryor, who has done a tremendous job in working with Senator FEINSTEIN and others on this legislation. His background as attorney general in our State, along with his real ability within the Senate to work through these issues to bring a calm and respectful response to the concerns that exist here has been a tremendous asset to this body in being able to bring the bill forward. I thank him and compliment him so much for his service. I am very proud to serve alongside him here in the Senate.

When the Congress reauthorized the PATRIOT Act last year, we granted the administration the authority to appoint U.S. attorney vacancies on an interim basis. Remember, this was for emergency circumstances. The administration asked for this authority based upon the idea that if a national security issue arose requiring a new U.S. attorney, the Attorney General could step up and provide a replacement in a time of crisis without the delay of the confirmation process. For those of us who come from places such as Arkansas, close to Oklahoma, the Oklahoma City bombing comes to mind where a Federal building may be destroyed, and all of a sudden you need to make sure the proper authorities in place. We are in place to be able to continue to serve the public there. So we have certain references of where emergencies might occur. But in these instances we have seen reviewed, I don’t think anybody else could substantiate a real emergency.

One of the first questions I asked the Justice Department, when they asked to do an interim appointment so quickly, was: Was there an emergency in this situation? I had not heard about one.

In a January Senate Judiciary hearing, Attorney General Gonzales stated this emergency provision would not be used for political purposes or to circumvent the confirmation process. Yet how else could it be explained?

Furthermore, the Attorney General pledged he would work with home State Senators to provide replacement U.S. attorneys to the Attorney General’s comments, but we now know the actions of his Justice Department in recent months do not match the rhetoric he delivered.

Specific information revealed last week shows the Justice Department deliberately and deftly planned to circumvent the rules for appointing U.S. attorneys by politicizing the emergency provision we authorized.

In one e-mail exchange between White House staff and officials at the Department of Justice, the administration specifically plotted to “gum this to death” and otherwise to “run out the clock” in an effort to avoid the confirmation process to replace former U.S. Attorney Bud Cummins in Arkansas.

These actions are a disservice to the Justice Department, to this administration, and to all Americans. They demonstrate a willful lack of transparency and regard for the system of checks and balances our forefathers instituted. They foresaw the need to make sure the three coequal branches of Government would remain separate, that there would be a balance and a check to make sure these different branches of our Government were operating as they should.

I recognize the U.S. attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President and they are political appointees. Lord, we have heard that ad nauseam in this debate, that these U.S. attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President. But that does not mean they can politicize the law. It does not mean they serve the President and they serve in these positions for political purposes. They serve in these positions as stewards of the laws of this land. They serve in these positions as public servants to defend the rule of law in this country. However, they have a duty and a responsibility, as well, to implement the laws of our Nation without political favor or bias.

That is why the confirmation process is so very important, to ensure that nominees are qualified and are committed to the rule of law. We know they are going to be nominees of the President and that perhaps they certainly are acquaintances or those whom the President or administration would know, but they still have to be qualified and they still have to be able to implement the rule of law. It is an uncomfortable balance that has served our Nation well, and any attempt to undermine it represents a breakdown in our system.

The e-mails released last week show either a blatant attempt to deceive the Senate or, at the very least, serious mismanagement under the Attorney General. This controversy has caused a serious breach between the Justice Department, Congress, and, most importantly, the American people. It is shortsighted, and it is dangerous. It is shortsighted, and it is a breach I am not sure can be repaired if Mr. Gonzales remains Attorney General.

That is why I am here this evening to preserve the Senate’s role in the confirmation process and to restore our confidence in the way our forefathers envisioned it.

I compliment Senators FEINSTEIN, LEAHY, and SPECTER for their leadership on this issue. This bill represents a compromise on this issue, and the bipartisan leadership they have shown should serve as an example to this entire body.

I also thank the numerous U.S. attorneys and their staffs all across this great Nation for the critical work they do. We must protect our way enforcing the laws of our Nation. Far too often, they do not receive the credit they deserve.

It is unfortunate the Senate is having to set aside time to debate this legislation. What has happened to so many pressing priorities that must be addressed as this year progresses. Yet we have to look at what has gone wrong and what we can prevent it from happening again.

How has this breach of trust affected our overall system? Most importantly, we have to look at what it has done to the sentiments of the American people—those who want desperately to trust us, to trust those of us in the legislative branch, to trust those in the executive branch, and to trust those in the judicial branch to do our jobs, to be there for them as part of the American democracy and what it is we stand for in this country, so they can trust that the laws we create will be implemented without political bias, and that we would work together as branches of Government.

When we look at, unfortunately, what has happened, the mismanagement that has occurred time and time again, from this administration particularly—whether it was the civilian mismanagement we saw early on in Iraq, or the mismanagement of FEMA in Katrina, and the response the Government has to the people of the gulf region. We look at these areas where the mismanagement that has occurred has eroded the faith of the American people in this incredible democracy we are all so proud of.

Our democracy relies on independent and unbiased law enforcement. It is our duty to ensure that these problems are corrected. I encourage my colleagues to support Senator FEINSTEIN’s bill, S. 214.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Madam President, I thank the Senator from
be false. We also know they have said things that boggle the imagination. Perhaps they are true, but it seems unlikely.

The big question within this shameless cloud of admitted falsehood, inevitable falsehood and probable falsehood is this: What truth hides behind the bodyguard of lies? Is it this: U.S. attorneys who prosecuted public corruption cases against Republicans or those who did not bring public corruption cases against Democrats were terminated in the Bush administration?

I have conceded in their e-mail traffic that what made them fail the Department of Justice test that they be "loyal Bushies"? Is that what made Carol Lam a "real problem" for the Department of Justice on the day Republican corruption indictments were announced?

Like dead flesh that must be excised before a wound can heal, like rotten wood that must be scraped away before rebuilding can begin, the cloud of falsehood which must be purged from the Department of Justice must be dispelled. It must first, again, become a department of truth or else it can never again be our American Department of Justice. We cannot tolerate a Department of Justice telling the truth.

Given that money is fungible, when taxpayers either pay for or subsidize allowable gifts as well. Thus, Federal taxpayers put away $200 million in donations each year. In addition, the Smithsonian receives over 70 percent of its money just in the last year. In addition, the Smithsonian receives over 70 percent of its support from the Federal taxpayers, of the Hope Diamond here. The Smithsonian seems, on one hand, to have recognized the need to tell the truth.

A sudden firing awaits you if you cross us.

That is a very bad message to send in the context of this traditional balance. Intimidation by purge is a tactic far better suited for a Soviet ministry of justice than for the U.S. Department of Justice—that is, if everything they have said is true, which brings us now to the Department of Justice telling the truth.

Let me start by saying, as I have said to the Attorney General directly, unless you are first a department of truth, you will never be a Department of Justice. Without truth, there can be no justice. We know already—because they have admitted it—the Department of Justice came before the Senate days ago and told us things that were not true.

We also know they have said things that are inconsistent. They have not had a single statement that is consistent and which statement is not true, but they have said things that cannot both be true. At least one must inevitably out. Let's start by looking at the cold, hard, numerical statistics on public corruption matters under this administration, again with expert help, if necessary, and certainly with full regard for the confidentiality of such investigations, and let's see what the facts are. We also know they have said things that cannot both be true. At least one must inevitably
pennies. The Washington Post, in a story in this morning's paper, cites a Smithsonian memo sent to employees urging them to save energy by turning off decorative and accent lighting.

Unfortunately, while the rank-and-file Smithsonian workforce was told to count the pennies and turn off the lights, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, Mr. Lawrence Small, was throwing hundreds of thousands of dollars out the window. Money was thrown into the Smithsonian's first-class limousine service in 4 days, including a $170.79 dinner for two at the Belaggio, at nearly $500 a night, and enjoyed a $3,464.50 first-class airline ticket for a round trip to Las Vegas in 2002. The reason ostensibly was to attend the opening of a portrait and a press conference. The accountant hired by the inspector general found example after example of Mr. Small and his wife traveling with expenses that far exceeded what Federal employees are allowed to spend. I will highlight just two trips for my colleagues, but I want you to know there are many more about which I could speak.

Mr. Small and his wife decided to take a trip to Las Vegas in 2002. The reason ostensibly was to attend the opening of a portrait and a press conference. The accountant hired by the inspector general found example after example of Mr. Small and his wife traveling with expenses that far exceeded what Federal employees are allowed to spend. I will highlight just two trips for my colleagues, but I want you to know there are many more about which I could speak.

The other argument I hear is that Mr. Small should not be held accountable for the misuse of funds because the board members would have known if they turned that off, as he has turned that castle into a palace.

In addition to spending on his house and first-class travel, Mr. Small has been accused of throwing hundreds of thousands of dollars out the window. Money was thrown away by the Smithsonian's collection and every other area of its operations. Mr. Small's expenditures and actions are extremely troubling. In my State of Iowa, we call this the legislature passing a "legalization act," and it raises very real concerns in my mind of whether the board is running the Smithsonian and its secretary or whether the Secretary is running the board.

The actions of the Smithsonian Board of Regents call to mind my work with some problems with the American Red Cross. This is another organization on which I have conducted oversight. I am pleased that the Senate recently passed legislation that I sponsored that reforms the governance of the American Red Cross. The Red Cross is a great American institution that also needed to modernize its governance, and I worked closely and successfully with the Red Cross leadership and was pleased that they recognized the need for fundamental change.

I hope the Smithsonian Institution will look at the Red Cross's experience for guidance.

While the board has much to account for, that does not excuse where the responsibility lies—with the Secretary of the Smithsonian, Mr. Small. While the board should have been more vigilant in its work and overseeing its public trust, make no mistake, it is Mr. Small who ordered the champagne and handed the bill to the Smithsonian.

So let's put to rest this argument that I have heard from some that Mr. Small should not be held accountable for the misuse of funds because the board knew about it. I think that excuse is way beyond the pale. We have a right to expect the Secretary of the Smithsonian to have the common sense to know if he wants Dom Perignon, he needs to pay for it out of his own pocket.

The other argument I hear is that Mr. Small should be excused of his taxpayer-supported lifestyle because he has raised money. First, let's remember that 70 percent of the money that the Red Cross receives comes from the Federal Government. Second, I think it is insulting that Mr. Small's supporters are trying to give him credit for every dollar raised at the Smithsonian. There are dozens of people being paid top dollar at the Smithsonian, including the museum directors, to help raise money as well. They are all helping to pull that very big weight.

Finally, Mr. Small's supporters act as if I have not been trying to improve board governance at the Smithsonian. The Smithsonian is our Nation's great museum. Many patriotic Americans want to show their support and give to this institution regardless of whether there are problems. Congress must ensure that the Smithsonian is a great institution and not a personal playground for the Secretary.
of who is in charge, if they have the confidence that the money is going to be spent wisely. For example, the Smithsonian received $123 million in donations in 1999, and that was more than double the amount the year before in 1998. This included, by the way, $60 million given even Undeck the new Air and Space Museum near the Dulles Airport, as well as $10 million from Ralph Lauren to preserve the Star-Spangled Banner. All of this fundraising was done before Mr. Small arrived.

Thanks to the growing economy and new tax laws that I have helped champion that encourage greater charitable giving, it should be expected that charitable giving will be up at the Smithsonian. In fact, charitable giving is up across the country.

The supporters of Mr. Small who want to point to fundraising to wash away the thousands of dollars spent painting Mr. Small’s own house remind me of the rooster who crowed and thinks he caused the Sun to rise.

The Smithsonian is the people’s museum, and it contains America’s treasures. The American people have a right to have someone as a Secretary of the Smithsonian who enjoys their confidence. I believe the Secretary of the Smithsonian has lost the confidence of the American people with his actions, actions that have been contrary to the public trust that he has been given. It is precisely in this regard that I would suggest the Board of Regents to take a hard look at itself and the actions from the board. More immediately, however, I would suggest the Board of Regents needs to consider whether the Secretary of the Smithsonian should continue in his position, a position that he should continue in only if he has the trust and confidence of the American people and their representatives.

I think the board itself has learned a lot more about the fact that the Board of Regents looks closely at the facts and listens to what the people are saying, it will have to consider very hard whether the time has come to turn off the lights in the Office of the Secretary of the Smithsonian.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mrs. McCASKILL. Mr. President, first, I have had the opportunity to listen to my colleague from the great State of Iowa, and I want to tell Senator Bond that I couldn’t agree with him more in the speech he just gave concerning the leadership of the Smithsonian museum. I find it is not dissimilar to some of the problems we found from time to time with college presidents of public universities, that somehow we got off the beaten path in terms of taxpayer funding. I certainly commend him for the work he is doing in that area.

I rise this afternoon, however, to talk a little bit about something that is so close to the heart of our democracy, and that is the rule of law. As a very young lawyer out of law school, I was very blessed to have the opportunity to begin my legal career as an assistant prosecuting attorney in the courtrooms of Jackson County, in Kansas City, MO. I learned so much in those first few years that I toiled as an assistant prosecutor. I had a felony docket, and I was learning from great prosecutors. I think back on the quality of legal work that was going on in those courtrooms on behalf of the public by the prosecuting attorneys who worked there for very little money.

I was mentored on the rules of evidence and on courtroom strategy, but, most importantly, I was mentored on the rules as they relate to the ethics of a prosecutor. Where is that line and how do you draw it? How does a prosecutor make the decision as to whether this is justice in terms of a sentence or this is not justice, and it must be put in the hands of a jury when you are trying to decide plea bargains. Charging decisions: how do you decide when that real rooster is a (s)ony or whether you let it go with a misdemeanor, or perhaps not charge at all?

Those lessons were so fundamental to the work that was done. It was from that experience that I began to realize what was core and central to the rule of law in the United States of America. It is fundamental to our democracy. It is the engine that runs our democracy. It is the envy of the rest of the world.

As I have traveled from time to time in other parts of the United States, I have seen this firsthand. I will never forget a time when I was in a foreign country and we got pulled over by a police officer. We asked the native who was helping us around the country that day: What is this? He said we have to pay him. I remember thinking to myself how fortunate we are in America that there isn’t an ingrained system of bribery on the streets of our cities because we have this rule of law.

What is so offensive about the e-mail traffic that has been discovered at the Department of Justice surrounding the firing of eight prosecutors in the Federal criminal justice system has been their reference to loyalty—“loyal Bushies”—loyalty to the President and, by implication, to his party.

Prosecutors I have known, and I am lucky that I have known hundreds, have loyalty to only one thing, and that is to the law. Good American prosecutors are slaves to the facts of the case, and loyal only to the law of this great country. They have great power, prosecutors in our country. The decisions they make, as they apply those facts to our law, can achieve justice. Those same decisions can also ruin lives.

What is happening right now in the United States as it relates to these eight U.S. attorneys, frankly, isn’t that important in the grand scheme of things to those eight U.S. attorneys, or those eight prosecutors. Am I sorry that they have been caught up in what appears to be a political scandal as it relates to their firing? Am I sorry that they have been maligned, and it was said that they were underperforming when, in reality, this was about being a “loyal Bushie”?

By the way, I am quoting the e-mail when I say “loyal Bushie.” That is the only reason I would use that term on the floor of the Senate, quoting that document. What really is happening is very important to all the other prosecutors across the United States of America, particularly those prosecutors in the Federal system because, frankly, what the Justice Department is implying is if you still have your job as U.S. attorneys, you are loyal to the President of the United States and that is why you kept your job; not that you were loyal to the law. The Attorney General’s action implies they kept their jobs because they were loyal to the President. It is not OK to judge a prosecutor through a prism of political loyalty. The facts show that these decisions included discussions of the prosecutor’s loyalty to the President, and because of that fact, and that fact alone, the Attorney General owes them and the rest of America much more than an apology. He owes them his resignation.

TRIBUTE TO FORMER SENATOR TOM EAGLETON

Also, as a young prosecutor, I was very fortunate to have a man who was my mentor until, very sadly, the end of his life just a few days ago. He was a great politician, and there is no place he would prefer to be called that than on the floor of the Senate.

There is a hole in the heart of Missouri with the death of Senator Tom Eagleton. He was a giant among leaders and leaves a legacy that should guide public servants and Senators for generations to come.

In 1956, at the age of 27, he also became a prosecutor. He was elected the prosecutor of St. Louis city, a circuit attorney. In a brief 12-year span, he became elected prosecutor of St. Louis, went on to be elected to the attorney general’s position and then on to Lieutenant Governor and on to U.S. Senate—a whirling dervish of energy, intellect, and ambition.

In 1968, when Missourians sent our “boy wonder” to Washington, we knew he would achieve greatness, and he certainly didn’t disappoint us. Within his first term, he had already begun to turn the tide on the environmental damage that had ensued within the
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half century after the industrial revolu-
tion by helping craft the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972. He was a strong advocate for chil-
dren with disabilities and created the National Institute on Aging.

While much of what Senator Eagleton
did might not make a true impact on America and the world, no ac-
tion may have been as great as his
handwritten amendment that stopped the bombing in Cambodia. This coura-
geous act changed the course of history
by stopping the war through the Vietnam
War. His complete grasp of the com-
plexities of foreign policy continued
during his service.

As he talked to me in February of
2005 and tried to convince me to run for
the Senate, he said to me: Claire, this
war in Iraq is a disaster and, believe me,
it is going to get much worse before
it gets better.

Even in the later years of his life, he
was a virtual fountain of information
about the Vietnam War and the war in Asia. Despite the fact that Senator Eagleton
was a scholar at Amherst College in
Massachusetts and Oxford and a cum
laude graduate from Harvard Law
School and prominent attorney and
politician, he was very modest about his
influence. He said: "I have had a wonderful, understanding
teacher. She has endured all of my foibles and I
love her for it. I have been an absentee father.
Politics is an all-absorbing, all-con-
suming profession. It takes a total, exclusive
commitment. I think there should be a consistent and con-
stant infusion of new blood and fresh brain
power into the legislative process. Eighteen
years for me was enough.

After leaving the Senate, I never missed
being there—except for the debate on the
nomination of Dukakis and the horrible, disas-
trous Iraq War. That war will go down in
American history as one of our greatest blunders. It will be remembered, in part, as a
failure to our Constitution when Attorney
General John Ashcroft attempted to put a
democratic face on torture. Vice President
Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld also will go down in his-
story for their total lack of planning for post-
war Iraq.

I think, frankly, people stay too long in
Congress. The world changes so rapidly that
I think there should be a consistent and con-
stant infusion of new blood and fresh brain
power into the legislative process. Eighteen
years for me was enough.

I set forth my own critique of my Senate
service. I could and should have done more.
I had the energy. I had the desire. In ana-
lyzing myself, I blame the self-imposed mov-
ing attention span. Ted Kennedy has spent 30
plus years on National Health Insurance. I
could not do that. I was too impatient. I
was too quick to attack, too quick to get it in.

War in a few years, I would move on. That is a
major fault for any legislator.
NISEI LINGUISTS

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, as we mark our fourth anniversary of our involvement in Iraq, I wish to highlight the history of the Japanese in America, the events leading to the War, the creation of the MIS, and the Nisei involvement in the War.

For the soldiers of the Military Intelligence Service, and their brethren in the 320th Infantry Division and the 422nd Regimental Combat Team, their service was much more than an obligation to the land of their birth; it was an opportunity to prove themselves as loyal American citizens. As many friends, neighbors, and relatives were transported to concentration camps in various locations around the United States, Nisei soldiers enlisted and served with great distinction.

According to Chief of Military History Dr. Jeffrey Clarke, Nisei Linguists also reminds us that:

the entire experience provides valuable lessons to U.S. Army officers both present and future. In fact, the Global War on Terrorism underlines the need for similar capabilities and programs as the Army girds itself for the sustained struggle ahead.

As chairman of the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, I am privileged to co-host an event marking the publication of Nisei Linguists on Tuesday, March 20th. Among those in attendance will be Dr. McNaughton, Dr. Clarke, and a number of World War II Nisei veterans, including those who served in the MIS.

Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

AGENTS RAMON NEVAREZ, JR., AND DAVID TOURSCHER

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to remind the Senate that not only are brave men and women serving their countries overseas, but they are serving here at home, too. That service can end in tragedy, even on our own soil.

Such an incident occurred last Thursday, March 15, 2007, near Cotton City, NM. I wish to report that on that day, two Border Patrol agents assigned to the Lordsburg, NM, border patrol station were killed in the line of duty in a vehicular accident. I extend my heartfelt condolences to the families of Agent Ramon Nevarez, Jr., and Agent David Tourscher for their loss.

Agent Nevarez is survived by his wife, Ronnie, his mother Juana, his sister Viridiana, and his brother Ryan. Agent Tourscher is survived by his father Gary and his mother Jeanne.

Border security is one of our first lines of defense in the United States. An important part of that security is the men and women who are willing to serve on the front lines of our borders as Border Patrol agents. Agent Nevarez and Agent Tourscher were two such brave men, and I know the Senate joins me in thanking their families for the service of those two men.

BURLINGTON COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, this spring, the new community health center in Burlington, IA, officially opened for business. Having secured funding for the center and attended the groundbreaking ceremony last June, I know how important this health care facility is to Burlington and the surrounding communities. At long last, Des Moines County has a permanent, unified medical and dental clinic something that has been sorely needed for many years.

This is a truly unique community health center. It is housed on the grounds of Southeastern Community College. And there is an agreement between the CHC board and the community college to allow nursing and health aide students to do some of their training in the center. This gives the center an edge in recruiting staff, and it gives students hands-on training opportunities right there on campus. Clearly, this is a win-win-win arrangement for the center, for the community college, and for the entire Burlington community.

I salute Ron Kemp and others who had the vision to create this new community health center, and the persistence to transform their vision into bricks and mortar. The facility is welcoming, modern, and well equipped. And the staff members are truly an inspiration. They have a special passion for their work, and take pride in the fact that they are providing first-rate health care to underserved communities.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., used to say that ‘Life’s most persistent and urgent question is: What are you doing for others?’ The staff members at the community health centers of southeast Iowa have answered that question in powerful ways. They have committed themselves to providing high-quality health care to all comers, regardless of ability to pay. All are welcomed equally. All are served with professionalism and excellence.

As Chair of the Health and Human Services Appropriations Subcommittee, I am 100 percent committed to securing appropriate funding.