[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 43 (Tuesday, March 13, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3024-S3058]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          IMPROVING AMERICA'S SECURITY ACT OF 2007--Continued

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues, on the pending 
legislation, S. 4, the Senate has now used up all the time postcloture 
so that what stands--if I could put it in a more negative light than I 
should--before the Senate and the vote on final passage of this 
important legislation is disposition of the remaining germane 
amendments and any other matters that can be passed by consent.
  We are working on a managers' amendment which would contain the 
matters about which there is unanimous consent. We are whittling down 
the number of germane amendments that will need to be voted on. I say 
to my colleagues we hope to be able soon to announce when the last few 
votes on amendments and final passage will occur. But they will 
definitely occur this afternoon.
  I thank the Chair, and pending further developments, I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have spoken to the manager of the bill, 
and I am--with his permission and their permission--going to speak. But 
as soon as they are ready to reclaim the floor, to close this down, I 
am prepared to stop at that point, or before.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 383

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I know there is not a lot of time, but the 
amendment that is at the desk, No. 383, that I have--I ask it be called 
up and be considered.
  This is all about rail safety. The Federal Government currently has 
no say on where 90-ton rail tankers, filled with chlorine or other 
hazardous chemicals, are shipped around the Nation. The Naval Research 
Laboratory, at my request, some months ago, issued a report. The 
context of my inquiry with them was: What would happen if one of these 
90-ton chlorine gas tanker cars exploded--for example, where a 
terrorist put C-2 underneath there in a populated area and blew it up?
  What made me think of it was, you may remember almost 2 years ago 
now, out in North Dakota, one of these tankers leaked, and the end 
result was a number of adjoining towns, small towns, had to be 
evacuated because it was so deadly.
  So I asked the question of the Naval Research Center. As you know, 
some of our best scientists in the world are there. I asked: What would 
happen? What would happen if a 90-ton tanker containing chlorine were 
to be blown up in a major metropolitan area?
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the report submitted to 
me be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Advanced simulation technology gives us a practical 
     breakthrough for analyzing and treating urban contaminant 
     accidents, pollutant incidents, and in combating Chemical, 
     Biological, and Radiological (CBR) terrorism. Today the 
     nation is striving to develop plans and corresponding 
     procedures to prepare for these contingencies. The ability to 
     construct accurate, easy-to-understand analyses of dangerous 
     contaminant release incidents is an absolutely crucial 
     component of civil defense planning and execution. When 
     decisions have to be made during an actual crisis, 
     essentially infinite speed is required of the predictions and 
     yet the analyses must be performed with high accuracy. When 
     responding to a CBR crisis, waiting even one minute to 
     perform simplified support computations can be far too long 
     for timely situation assessment. State-of-the-art, 
     engineering-quality three-dimensional predictions that one 
     might be more inclined to believe can take hours or days. The 
     answer to this dilemma is to do the most accurate 
     computations possible well ahead of time and then to capture 
     their salient results in a highly compressed database that 
     can be recalled, manipulated, and displayed instantly during 
     a crisis. Dispersion Nomograph TM technology was 
     invented at NRL to provide this capability.
       This presentation is based on a portable software tool 
     called CT-Analyst TM that uses dispersion 
     nomographs to combine information from sensors and eyewitness 
     reports to find contaminant sources in an urban maze of 
     buildings, to track airborne contaminant plumes accurately 
     across the city, and to plan evacuation routes. In a crisis, 
     real time users don't have to wait for any of these results 
     because personnel defense plans and strategies can be adapted 
     to current situation assessments with no delay for computing. 
     This presentation uses CT-Analyst to show the evolution of a 
     large contaminant plume caused by the rupture of a railroad 
     tank car adjacent to the Blathersburg Mall.
       Detailed, three-dimensional FAST3D-CT simulations (such as 
     shown at left) are compressed by more than a factor of 10,000 
     to produce compact data structures called Dispersion 
     Nomographs TM. These ``nomographs'' allow CT-
     Analyst TM to make accurate, instantaneous 
     predictions including the effects of buildings (as shown at 
     right). This example shows the situation twenty minutes after 
     a contaminant release occurred at the location marked by the 
     blue star with the wind from 295 degrees at 3 m/s. This CT-
     Analyst display shows the instantaneous plume at 20 minutes 
     (light red) superimposed on the footprint of the likely 
     contamination region (light gray). The footprint can 
     eventually become contaminated beyond tolerable limits 
     sometime during the scenario. The plume region displayed 
     surrounds the instantaneous plume--with a safety buffer zone. 
     CT-Analyst is in use at a number of locations (see figure), 
     was extended for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and is being 
     modified as a CBR Emergency Assessment System for 
     installation in Navy bases over seas.
       Also overlaid on the CT-Analyst display are the results of 
     the backtrack function (sensor readings and observations 
     determining a probable source location as shown in blue and 
     purple). CT-Analyst performs multi-sensor fusion operations 
     based on the very limited information about the contaminant 
     density. A number of sensors are active and operating in 
     automatic (triangles) and manual (circles) modes to register 
     the presence or absence of the agent plume at their location. 
     Red indicates a ``hot'' sensor (something considered 
     dangerous) and blue indicates a ``cold'' reading where the 
     contaminant agent density is below the threshold for 
     detection. Please note that the ``Escape'' function has also 
     been activated in this composite display, projecting optimal 
     evacuation routes. These recommended evacuation routes 
     suggest walking paths for rapid egress from the path of the 
     advancing plume and continue out to the edges of the 
     contamination footprint. This entire assessment takes about 
     50 milliseconds on a typical windows laptop computer.
       The figure above shows the contaminant concentration just 
     three minutes after a railroad tank car accident has occurred 
     along the indicated section of track where the right-of-way 
     turns toward the east as shown by the yellow arrow. A large 
     quantity of contaminant has been released in a couple of 
     minutes. The time is late evening and the brisk breeze, from 
     the southeast in this scenario, blows the cloud up toward a 
     quarter of a million people celebrating Fourth of July on the 
     Mall near the Blatherburg Monument.
       The large gray area is the contamination footprint 
     predicted by CT-Analyst TM; this area can become 
     highly contaminated in the first half an hour. It is a good 
     idea to get to outside the footprint and stay outside of it 
     until an ``all clear'' is given. The bands of color downwind 
     of the source, originating at the bright blue stars along the 
     track, indicate the contaminant concentration in the cloud 
     moving with the wind toward the upper left. The table tells 
     how to interpret the colors in easily understood terms. The 
     actual numbers, of course, can only be made specific and 
     quantitative when the absolute size of the source is known. 
     Each color marks approximately a factor of two range of 
     concentration values. People breathing yellow green and 
     ``hotter'' colors are in a very deadly situation. Not all 
     colors appear on each figure because the contaminant 
     concentration drops as the plume (cloud) spreads.
       The diagonal purple lines in this and the following figures 
     mark general suggested evacuation routes. The gaps in these 
     lines show a kind of ``no man's land'' where the plume will 
     go first and in highest concentration. People should walk 
     briskly away from the center of the advancing plume along the 
     general direction of these evacuation paths skirting around 
     buildings and keeping to reasonable walking routes as 
     required. Don't run and don't get in or stay in a car.
       These two figures show the advancing plume at five minutes 
     (left) and ten minutes (right) after the release occurred. 
     Three adjacent blue stars are used to mark the extended 
     region over which this release has occurred from a moving 
     railroad tank car. The yellow arrow indicates the direction 
     of motion along the track and the pink arrow is the 
     prevailing wind direction in each figure. The brisk breeze 
     here is a worst case because slower winds allow much easier 
     evacuation from the affected area and much faster winds 
     dissipate the cloud so quickly that fewer people at any one 
     spot receive critical dosages.
       Almost everywhere in the plume after five minutes has 
     elapsed (colored region)

[[Page S3025]]

      there is a high probability that the contamination will be 
     lethal and almost all of the plume is still lethal at ten 
     minutes. At ten minutes the lethal plume area is spreading at 
     about its maximum rate. If 100,000 people receive critical 
     (lethal) doses in the absence of any defensive action, they 
     are crossing this critical dose threshold at the rate of a 
     hundred people per second. Thus there is an enormous benefit 
     to immediate warning delay and speedy defensive response.
       Based on a number of other simulations not shown here and a 
     consistent analytic theory, a warning issued within 3 minutes 
     is possible with an automated sensor network and near 
     complete situation assessment and response should be possible 
     within five minutes. Though many procedural and communication 
     problems remain to be solved, these times should be adopted 
     as goals because so many lives will depend on making these 
     response times as short as possible. Between five minutes and 
     the current goal of issuing a warning in 15 minutes, 60,000 
     people or more could be critically dosed.
       These two figures show the advancing plume in the previous 
     scenario at 15 minutes (left) and 30 minutes (right) after 
     the release has occurred. By 30 minutes the plume has spread 
     laterally about as much as it will but it is still quite 
     toxic and still expanding downwind off the edge of the 
     nomograph. At 30 minutes the plume extends three to four 
     miles downwind, is about 1.5 miles wide at its widest, and is 
     still dangerously toxic as indicated by the large yellow-
     green region above right. If people are standing or sitting 
     as much as 15 feet apart in all directions at an event on the 
     Mall, there would be well over 100,000 people per square 
     mile. Furthermore, the contaminant plume in this scenario 
     will be dangerous over several square miles. Therefore, in 
     the absence of an early warning and concerted action (rapid 
     evacuation away from the centerline of the plume) over 
     100,000 people could be seriously harmed or even killed in 
     the first half an hour.
       Although this is a dire scenario, the people several miles 
     downwind from the source, in this example a couple miles off 
     the upper left corner of the figures, have plenty of time to 
     walk out of the way of the plume given a warning in five 
     minutes or less. They would have to walk only about \3/4\ of 
     a mile at most to get completely out of the plume and would 
     have 20 to 25 minutes to do this. Walking is recommended in 
     urban areas since the roadways should be kept open for 
     emergency traffic and will gridlock instantly if everyone 
     tries to leave in their cars at the same time.
       The message is clear, walking perpendicular to the wind 
     away from the centerline of the plume is the only effective 
     direction to walk, as indicated automatically by CT-Analyst. 
     There is a wide range of angles, plus or minus 30 degrees, 
     for which this strategy is effective but the effectiveness 
     declines the longer the delay in receiving a warning. For 
     large contaminant sources, simple theory and detailed 
     computer simulations both suggest that 85 to 95% of the 
     people who would otherwise be exposed can avoid exposure, 
     regardless of what the agent is, when the appropriate warning 
     is issued without delay.
       What also becomes apparent is that solid information, as 
     well as prompt warning and action, reduces exposure. Knowing 
     the location of the contaminant source, the wind speed, and 
     its direction can save tens of thousands of lives. Combining 
     an integrated city sensor net with accurate models 
     incorporating the unique building/terrain features is the key 
     to defining the centerline of the plume based on source 
     location and thus determining effective escape routes. A CBR 
     Emergency Assessment System must be instantaneous and capable 
     of incorporating changing wind and sensor data as they become 
     available. Only centralized analysis and prompt communication 
     can define the safe routes away from an invisible cloud.
       These CBR emergency assessment tools have been used to 
     evaluate and compare a number of possible CBR defense 
     strategies. The model on which this graph is based follows 
     hundreds of thousands of people who begin walking 
     (evacuating) in a specified direction relative to the wind 
     once a warning is issued. The computed contaminant density is 
     integrated to determine each persons dose. This ``warning 
     delay'' is varied to measure the reduced effectiveness of 
     evacuation as the warning delay gets too long. Zero (0) 
     degrees is walking downwind, 90 degrees is across the wind 
     (perpendicular) to the plume centerline, and 180 degrees is 
     walking upwind.
       We have shown that plausible accidents or terrorist attacks 
     in an urban environment can put 100,000 people or more at 
     risk in a 15 to 30-minute time span. During this interval 
     several square miles of city can become lethally exposed and 
     people can die at the rate of 100 per second. Clearly there 
     is a very great premium or fast effective response.
       The point is--we already have accurate, fast tools based on 
     tested scientific models for computing the detailed airflow 
     and converting these data sets directly to critical civil 
     defense information. An urban CBR Emergency Assessment System 
     (CBREAS) based on this new technology can instantly combine 
     information from eyewitness reports and CBR sensors to locate 
     hidden sources, can estimate regions about to become 
     contaminated, and can predict effective evacuation paths. 
     This new technology faithfully incorporates the 3D structure 
     of urban building mazes and has reasonable sun, wind, and 
     information-display options. The challenge is to harness 
     these tools effectively in the current political climate. If 
     police, fire department personnel, and emergency first 
     responders use this technology to obtain a minute-by-minute 
     situation assessment and implement an action plan, they can 
     reduce exposures, even of large crowds in the open, by 85 to 
     95% provided that an early warning is issued.
       Sales Pitch: The CT-Analyst contaminant transport system is 
     ACCURATE. Plume envelopes are 80-90% as accurate as state-of-
     the-art 3D computational fluid dynamics. CT-Analyst is VERY 
     FAST with performance 1000 to 10000 times faster than real 
     time. This can make the difference in saving tens of 
     thousands of lives in a real attack. It is also very EASY TO 
     USE. Two hours of training should be adequate. CT-Analyst can 
     also be used for war games, virtual reality training, site 
     defense planning and execution, and sensor network 
     optimization. The CT-Analyst software has stabilized and is 
     very rugged. The software also allows the user to displace 
     plumes by dragging the source across the screen, and can 
     ``backtrack'' to find hidden sources. CT-Analyst will also 
     project optimal evacuation routes.

  Mr. BIDEN. Let me summarize the report.
  The answer was ``over 100,000 people could be seriously harmed or 
even killed in the first half an hour.'' Let me say that again. One of 
these tankers filled with chlorine gas--and there are hundreds, up and 
down the road, going through major metropolitan areas, from Los Angeles 
to New York and everywhere in between--what would happen if a terrorist 
were to explode one of those in a major metropolitan area? The answer 
was: ``over 100,000 people could be seriously harmed or even killed in 
the first half an hour.''
  Said another way: What happens if one of these is blown up in a 
freight yard in Philadelphia, PA, right along the Schuylkill River, 10 
blocks, 15 blocks from City Hall, the University of Pennsylvania, 
Drexel University--a very populated area? Within one-half hour, 100,000 
people could be seriously harmed or even killed.
  How long would it take to evacuate that area? Imagine evacuating 
downtown New York City, Baltimore, Miami, Seattle--you name the city.
  So what is the problem? Well, the problem is--and we have seen in 
recent reports--insurgents in Iraq are using chlorine in their attacks 
on civilians. There is little doubt terrorists who are targeting us 
here at home are paying attention. In these roadside bombs, they are--
thank God they have not gotten it down very well yet--but they are 
injecting chlorine into that carnage they cause because they know the 
consequence of the dissemination of the highly toxic substance in a 
populated area.
  Nevertheless, we continue to allow these 90-ton--that is a standard: 
90-ton--rail tanks containing chlorine and other hazardous chemicals to 
roll unprotected through the hearts of our largest cities in high-
threat areas. We know the rail industry has adamantly opposed any 
attempt to allow local officials, in conjunction with the Department of 
Homeland Security and security people, to reroute these tankers.
  Now, again, look where this tanker is sitting, as shown in this 
picture. Do these buildings look familiar to you? This is an actual 
photograph of a 90-ton chlorine gas tanker car sitting in the direct 
view--if you look over the top of it, you can see the Hart Building, 
you can see the Dirksen Building, and you can see the U.S. Capitol.
  By the way, I know my friend, the Presiding Officer, a former board 
member of Amtrak, a guy who has fought very hard to protect Amtrak--we 
take the train almost every day together back and forth to and from 
Delaware--I say to my colleagues, go on down to the station this 
afternoon and follow us down whenever we finish and get on the train. 
If it is not an Acela, stand in the back car of an Amfleet train. You 
can look out the back window. Watch as we pull out of the station. Tell 
me how many cops you see. Tell me how many cameras you see. Tell me how 
much protection exists there.
  Look at this tanker car, shown in this picture, sitting right out 
there--in the middle of nowhere, in the middle of everywhere.
  So, folks, the idea we do not even have as an option the ability of 
our security people and the mayors and local

[[Page S3026]]

officials to suggest these tankers bypass their cities so, God forbid, 
if something happens, they are not as high a prize of a target--by the 
way, the less sensational damage able to be done, the less likelihood 
it will be picked as a target.
  Because someone could legitimately argue: Biden, you are taking this 
out of the route--and we have other maps showing the routes of the 
various alternative routes that could be used to avoid the major 
cities. Now, they could say: You are going to be going through more 
rural areas. Yes, serious damage could be done in rural areas, but the 
prize for the terrorist is much lower. The likelihood of them 
concluding that instead of coming down from, for example, Newark, NJ, 
all the way down into Augusta--you can, in fact, reroute these on 
Norfolk Southern, which goes through much less populated areas.
  People legitimately say: Aren't you putting those folks at risk? No 
matter where these cars are, we are at risk. But again, where is the 
likely target? Where are terrorists going to risk their lives to be 
able to go in and do damage? They will do it where the most people are.
  So I know the rail industry, as I said, is adamantly opposed to 
amendment No. 306, and is likely opposed to the updated version we will 
vote on today. But in the face of such risks, I do not know how we can 
let their opposition determine whether we go forward.
  This amendment is very limited. It simply states the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, not the rail industry--the rail industry is not the 
bad guy--should determine the most secure routes for the shipments of 
the most dangerous chemicals, and that ownership of the track is not to 
be considered in making this risk-based determination; meaning, if you 
have something going down on a CSX track that is owned by CSX, they 
should be able to use and be diverted to a Norfolk Southern track. I 
could give you examples all across the country, as the Presiding 
Officer knows.
  Again, all I am saying is, let the Department of Homeland Security 
determine whether the most dangerous chemicals are able to be diverted 
around the most populated areas in our country. And do not--do not--in 
fact, use as an impediment the idea the track upon which it is being 
carried is not owned by the company whose car is on that track.
  That is all we are doing, Mr. President. The amendment would apply to 
only .36 percent--less than a third of a percent--of all the shipments 
that occur on our rail system. It only applies to through-shipments; it 
does not apply to the destination city. Some of this stuff goes into 
large populations, where that is the end point. It doesn't say it 
cannot go there, but it does say we should reduce the probability of 
catastrophic damage by allowing them to be rerouted, if that is the 
judgment of the Department of Homeland Security.
  A similar amendment was passed by voice vote in the House Homeland 
Security Committee today. Not one Republican or Democrat spoke in 
opposition to this measure. This amendment will ensure that the Senate 
is on the right side of the issue as well.
  Mr. President, I was asked by my colleague from Connecticut, one of 
the two managers, that he be added as a cosponsor. I ask unanimous 
consent his name be added.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I understand that a man with whom I hardly 
disagree, Senator Inouye, has reservations. I hope he will reconsider 
those reservations. Again, all we are doing is letting the Department 
of Homeland Security, in conjunction with local officials, make the 
judgment whether the risk is so high that it warrants it being 
rerouted. Of all the cargo on all of the tracks in America, we are 
talking about .36 of 1 percent, all that is transported on rail. So we 
are not asking much. The downside of us being mistaken is significant.
  I close by quoting from the rail industry's letter opposing this 
amendment. They say:

       Rerouting would not eliminate the risk, but instead shift 
     it from one population to another.

  That is true, but this amendment says the Department of Homeland 
Security, not the rail industry, should determine how to weigh and 
respond to this known potentially catastrophic risk. What did we just 
debate last week on the floor? The allocation of resources for Homeland 
Security should be going toward the danger lines. There is nothing that 
is risk free--nothing. It is a little like my friend from Delaware and 
I have heard so much every time we come up with rail security 
legislation. We are told we cannot secure every mile of track. That is 
true, we can't, but there is a big difference with a terrorist taking a 
single train off a track somewhere in rural America and a terrorist 
taking a train at 140 miles an hour into the most visited area in 
Washington, DC, Union Station, at a high speed.
  There is a difference between blowing up a tunnel underneath the 
Chesapeake Bay or the Hudson River and blowing up a tunnel in the 
middle of some rural area. Terrorists pick targets for the greatest 
effect. So the idea that we would not reroute--if the Department of 
Homeland Security determined it made sense--a series of chlorine gas 
tankers from a major metropolitan area to a more rural area seems to me 
to be such a silly argument to make.
  The idea is, how do we reduce the risk for the most people of the 
United States of America? Again, I will end where I began. When this 
was called to my attention some years ago, I went to the Naval Research 
Laboratory and I asked them--and I have included this in my statement--
to tell me what would happen--and, again, it doesn't take much for 
terrorists to figure out a way to puncture a hole in the bottom or the 
side of one of these tanks by use of explosives or other devices. The 
answer was that if that were to occur in a highly populated area, 
``over 100,000 could be seriously harmed or even killed in the first 
half hour.''
  Imagine how many people we get to evacuate reasonably so that there 
is essentially no one left in a half hour. If the gun goes off right 
now, how long does it take downtown Manhattan or downtown Washington, 
DC, or Capitol Hill to evacuate people so they are not around? If you 
don't evacuate--to say it another way--within a half hour, a whole lot 
more than 100,000 people will be seriously injured or will die.
  I know the Senator from Connecticut supports this amendment. I don't 
know what the view of our colleague from Maine is. I hope they 
understand how limited this amendment is, how consequential it is. I 
hope my colleagues, when it comes time to vote, will vote in favor of 
this amendment.
  I thank the Chair and I thank the managers. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the amendment offered by the senior 
Senator from Delaware is actually more under the jurisdiction of the 
Commerce Committee than the Homeland Security Committee. Nevertheless, 
in the absence of a member of the Commerce Committee on the Senate 
floor, I want to express my concern about the amendment.
  As I understand it, the effect of the amendment would be to require 
that hazardous materials on rail cars be routed around high-threat 
areas, with some exceptions.
  The problem is that the Commerce Committee title on rail security 
already has a section that addresses hazardous materials by requiring a 
mitigation plan that can include rerouting but only when the homeland 
security advisory system is at a high or severe level of threat or when 
specific intelligence indicates that there is a specific or imminent 
threat.
  I think this amendment, while well-intentioned, creates all sorts of 
practical problems. The Chamber of Commerce, which is rating this as a 
key vote, lists some of those that I want to read from a letter that we 
received from the Chamber today. The letter reads:

       The Biden amendment, which would require mandatory 
     rerouting of shipments of hazardous materials around high 
     threat corridors, would not reduce risk to homeland security. 
     It would only reallocate risk among population centers. In 
     fact, the amendment would actually increase risk by either 
     eliminating routes that provide optimal overall safety and 
     security, or by adding hundreds of miles and additional 
     days to the journeys of shipments of hazardous materials 
     via less direct routes.

  In other words, if we are causing this hazardous material to be on 
its journey far longer because it is not going by

[[Page S3027]]

the more direct route, that could in fact increase the problems or the 
chances of the hazardous material being attacked. The letter goes on to 
point out that the railroads have been working with the Federal 
Government, with chemical manufacturers, and with consumers to explore 
the use of coordinated routing arrangements to reduce mileage and time 
in the transit of highly hazardous materials.
  This amendment seems to be going in the opposite direction. Another 
one of my colleagues has raised the issue of chlorine shipments to 
wastewater treatment plants. Those shipments need to be made. It raises 
a lot of practical questions about how to move this material. Another 
colleague raised the issue to me of whether this would result in more 
trucks on our highways carrying hazardous materials.
  So I think that while I agree with the overall intent of the 
amendment, I am much more comfortable with the approach taken by the 
Commerce Committee--a committee which, unfortunately, I don't serve on, 
so I don't have the level of expertise that its members have in talking 
about this issue. I do expect some members of the Commerce Committee to 
come to the floor and debate this issue.
  I do want my colleagues to know that the distinguished Senator's 
amendment is controversial, that it may have unintended consequences. 
Based on my knowledge of the issue, I hope it will be defeated.
  Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator 
from Maine. She may have misunderstood two aspects of the amendment. 
One, it doesn't mandatorily require rerouting at all. It says the 
Department of Homeland Security can reroute, if they determine it 
should be rerouted.
  No. 2, the freight industry, where they made the judgment on how much 
further in distance it would travel if, in fact, you were to reroute, 
factored in only that it had to be rerouted on their own tracks. So the 
idea being that they would not be able to--this happens all the time, 
where other tracks are used; for example, the Chesapeake using Norfolk 
Southern track.
  No. 3, the Chamber of Commerce is opposed because it costs more 
money. A lot of these things cost more money. Will it cost more money 
to be able to reroute up to one-third of 1 percent of the freight on 
rail? Yes. But I ask the rhetorical question: What will it cost if one 
of these tankers goes off in a populated area? What will the cost then 
be to the very businesses that are most concerned about it?
  Fourth, this doesn't affect destination. If the chlorine gas tanker 
car is going to a water treatment facility, it still goes to that 
facility. Nothing changes. What we could have changed is what we did in 
Delaware, not use chlorine. There are other means by which water can be 
purified. We have done it in our home State. That is what you should 
do. But that doesn't stop this car, or any other car, from going to 
such a facility.
  Let me emphasize again that there is no prohibition on end point 
distribution. If the car is designed to go to a facility in the center 
of a city, it goes to the center of the city. There is nothing you can 
do about that. That is very different than--I am making up these 
numbers for illustration--you may have one of these tankers going in 
once a month versus 50 going through the same city in a month or 100 in 
a month. This is all about percentages. You play the percentages. 
Again, it is true, rerouting may render cities in North Dakota--well, 
they would not be rerouted in North Dakota, but I referenced the small 
towns. There was a chlorine gas tanker car going across the top of the 
Nation and, thank God, what happened was it went off in a rural part of 
the world. You were able to evacuate the three cities and nobody died. 
Had that same thing occurred in the middle of Chicago, you would not be 
able to evacuate the city. We would not have had time.
  So, yes, it is true. Are you going to put a different population at 
risk? Yes, about one-tenth, one-twentieth, one one-hundredth or one 
one-thousandth of the population, depending on where it is rerouted. So 
it is a little bit like saying: Why do we spend so much money worrying 
about the Sears Tower? It is there, it is big, and it is a target. Is 
it possible that a terrorist would go into a building that is two 
stories and blow it up? Yes. Can they fly an aircraft into a rural town 
grain elevator? Yes. But that is not what we are worried about. They 
are not likely to do that. They are likely to fly a plane, plant a 
bomb, do something devastating where the most people are.
  So I find it to be a totally disingenuous argument. This is about the 
bottom line. I measure the bottom line--as I suspect all of us would if 
we thought about it--in human life.
  The bottom line, in terms of the dollars, the impact that would occur 
in a catastrophic circumstance is if there is a town of 1,000 people 
and a town of 6 million people, there is a phenomenal difference 
whether that chlorine gas tanker car gets exploded.
  Let me summarize. It is indicated by the Department of Homeland 
Security again that an explosion of a rail tanker carrying chlorine 
would kill 17,500 individuals, require the hospitalization of another 
100,000--and only then if we evacuate within a half an hour. We can 
evacuate a city of 1,000 people in half an hour. We cannot evacuate a 
city of 4 million people in half an hour. So it matters.
  If this rail tanker goes off in New York City, my friend from New 
York is going to be on the floor again pointing out the catastrophic 
impact. If it goes off in rural Delaware, it will be a tragedy for me 
and my constituency, but there will be a significant magnitude of 
difference.
  So everything we do in terms of allocation of resources goes in this 
place to deal with protecting the most people who can be protected: The 
shipment originates or the point of destination is in the high-threat 
corridor; no practical alternative routes exist. If they don't exist, 
it doesn't get rerouted. Rerouting would not increase the likelihood of 
an attack. It would decrease the likelihood of an attack because people 
attack targets that have the maximum impact. This would not increase 
the total number of cars on the track. It would allow the potential for 
homeland security to reroute them away from the places that would do 
the most damage.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I do expect additional Members on my side 
of the aisle to come and debate this issue.
  I wish to clarify that the language, as I read it, in the Senator's 
amendment, is not discretionary, it is mandatory. It does allow for 
some certain significant exceptions for the Department to make findings 
on, but it clearly says:

       The regulations issued under this section shall--
       (1) except as provided in--

  The subsections part--

     provide that any rail shipment containing high hazard 
     materials be rerouted around any high threat corridor.

  So I don't see it as giving the Department great discretion if that 
determination is made because of the word ``shall,'' which is not 
permissive, it is mandatory. There are some exceptions later which the 
Senator has referred to, such as the origination point or point of 
destination being within the high-threat corridor. But as I read the 
amendment, it pretty clearly calls for rerouting.
  I wanted to clarify that issue. Maybe I misunderstood the Senator 
from Delaware, but I thought he was saying it did not require 
rerouting.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, she is correct, 
but it only requires the Secretary to do it if he or she concludes that 
there is a safer way to reroute the shipment. If the conclusion made by 
the Secretary is that in a high-risk corridor the rerouting would not 
result in an increased safety margin for the shipment, then he or she 
need not reroute it. But it is correct, the presumption is, in a high-
risk corridor we reroute if it is not a point of destination or origin 
but only if the determination by the Secretary is that the shipment, in 
fact, would be safer to be rerouted. It is on page 4 of the amendment. 
It is section 2, subparagraph E, ``Transportation and Storage of High 
Hazard Materials through High Threat Corridor'' areas. It says:

       In General.--The standards for the Secretary to grant 
     exceptions under section

[[Page S3028]]

     (d)(4) shall require a finding by the Secretary that--
       (A) the shipment originates or the point of destination is 
     in the high threat corridor;
       (B) there is no practical alternative route;
       (C) there is an unanticipated, temporary emergency that 
     threatens the lives of persons or property in the high threat 
     corridor;
       (D) there would be no harm to persons or property beyond 
     the owners or operator of the railroad in the event of a 
     successful terrorist attack on shipment; or
       (E) rerouting would increase the likelihood of a terrorist 
     attack on the shipment.

  The bottom line is that it should be left to the discretion of the 
Secretary to decide not to reroute rather than the privately owned 
railroad. I thank the Senator for her clarification.
  I yield the floor.
  Ms. COLLINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I will speak briefly because I know the 
floor leader for the minority side has people coming to speak to 
respond to the amendment. I am not speaking on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator is recognized.


                             U.S. Attorneys

  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise because I heard Attorney General 
Gonzales speak about the growing, disheartening, and alarming scandal 
with the U.S. attorneys. I wish to say, first, that this is a serious 
issue. In every district in America, the U.S. attorney represents the 
enforcer of the Federal law without fear or favor. U.S. attorneys over 
decades have built up a reputation of being not part of politics but, 
rather, enforcing the law, as they say, without fear or favor.
  Over every Justice Department office in every corner of the land is 
the eagle perched on a branch, with her claw holding a bunch of arrows. 
When you see that symbol, it denotes strength, but it denotes fairness 
and impartiality. That fairness, that impartiality has received a 
serious blow--maybe not a mortal blow because of the resilience of our 
country, but a serious blow--over what has happened in the Justice 
Department over the last several months.
  What we have had in the past is misstatement after misstatement about 
what has happened. The story has kept changing, we can't get the truth, 
and that is why we had no choice but to undertake our own 
investigation.
  Let me say that time and time again we have heard falsehoods. We were 
told that all seven of the eight U.S. attorneys were fired for 
performance reasons. It now turns out this was false, as their glowing 
performance evaluations attest.
  We were told by the Attorney General he would ``never, ever make a 
change for political reasons.'' It now turns out all this was false, as 
the evidence makes clear this approach was based purely on politics to 
punish prosecutors who were perceived to be too light on Democrats or 
too tough on Republicans.
  We were told by the Attorney General this was ``an overblown 
personnel matter.'' It now turns out, however, that far from being a 
low-level personnel matter, this was a longstanding plan to exact 
political vendettas or make political payoffs.
  We were told the White House was not involved in the plan to fire 
these U.S. attorneys. It now turns out this was a complete falsehood. 
Harriet Miers was one of the masterminds of this plan, as demonstrated 
by numerous e-mails made public today. She communicated extensively 
with Kyle Sampson about firing of U.S. attorneys. In fact, she 
originally wanted to fire and replace the top prosecutors in all 93 
districts in the country.
  We were told that Karl Rove had no involvement in getting his protege 
appointed U.S. attorney in Arkansas. In fact, there is a letter from 
the Department of Justice:

       The Department is not aware of Karl Rove playing any role 
     in the decision to appoint Mr. Griffin.

  Mr. Griffin was the attorney whom they appointed. It now turns out 
this was a falsehood, as demonstrated by Mr. Sampson's e-mail:

       Getting him--

  Griffin--

     was important to Harriet, Karl, et cetera.

  We were told the change to the PATRIOT Act was an innocent attempt to 
fix a legal loophole, to help the war on terrorism, not a cynical 
strategy to bypass the Senate's role in serving as a check and balance. 
It now turns out this, too, was a falsehood--another one--as 
demonstrated by an e-mail from Mr. Sampson:

       I strongly recommend that as a matter of administration, we 
     utilize the new statutory provisions that authorize the AG to 
     make USA appointments.

  Mr. Sampson specifically argued that by using these provisions, the 
administration ``can give far less deference to home State Senators and 
thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it faster and 
more efficiently at less political cost to the White House.''
  So it has been misstatement after misstatement. To put it delicately, 
prevarication after prevarication, changes in stories, coverups in 
stories. And the only reason, frankly, we are getting to the truth is 
we have the majority, and we have the ability to subpoena and have 
hearings and investigate.
  A few minutes ago, Attorney General Gonzales spoke. I have to say I 
have no animus toward Attorney General Gonzales. In fact, I like the 
man. He seems to me to be a genuinely nice man. He doesn't seem to me 
to be one of these hard popular warriors who populate the 
administration in such large numbers and, frankly, we have seen in 
Justice Department appointees throughout the Justice Department in far 
too great a number. But simply being a nice person, being a ``nice 
guy'' is not enough, particularly when you are not performing your job.
  The Attorney General got up and said:

       I am ultimately responsible, but simply claiming 
     responsibility is not enough.

  He said:

       I was not involved in any memos or discussions of what was 
     going on.

  That is his quote.
  He said:

       Many decisions are delegated.

  Mr. President, did the Attorney General not know that eight U.S. 
attorneys were to be fired? If he didn't know, he shouldn't be Attorney 
General, plain and simple. That is not a minor personnel decision. That 
is a major act that has now shaken the integrity of the U.S. Attorney's 
Offices--not only those in question but all of them--to the core.
  To simply say decisions were delegated, that is a sorry excuse. And 
then, of course, if the Attorney General knew, that one doesn't work 
either.
  The Attorney General has said:

       I will do the best I can to maintain the confidence of the 
     American people.

  Mr. Attorney General, you have already lost that confidence. It has 
not simply been on this issue, although this is the straw that has 
broken the camel's back, and when you sat in a room with Senator Leahy 
and Senator Feinstein and Senator Specter and myself last Thursday and 
seemed to give this crisis, most considered crisis, the back of your 
hand and say it is not terribly important and don't worry, we will fix 
it without caring about it, my total confidence was shaken, and I 
believe the others in the room felt the same.
  This was, as I said, the straw that broke the camel's back. It was 
hardly the only decision. On issue after issue, the Attorney General 
has not stood up for the rule of law, which is his foremost duty. On 
issue after issue, whether it be wiretaps, whether it be national 
security letters, whether it be the unitary theory of the Executive, 
allowing the Executive to do everything with no checks and balances, 
this Secretary has been a rubberstamp for policies that the courts have 
found repeatedly unconstitutional.
  The Attorney General, unfortunately, in my judgment, misconceives his 
role. The Attorney General misconceives his role because he still sees 
himself as counsel to the President, his previous job, where he 
rubberstamped everything the President did. But when you are the 
President's counsel, your job is to serve the President, period. When 
you become Attorney General, you have a higher

[[Page S3029]]

duty. That duty is the rule of law--to preserve it, to protect it, to 
defend it. For whatever reason, the Attorney General doesn't see that 
as his role. His time in office should be over.
  The U.S. attorneys scandal and all the other instances where the 
Attorney General did not protect the rule of law are just too great a 
weight for the office to bear. To simply say ``I am responsible'' and 
not tell people what it is all about makes no sense. We just saw 
Scooter Libby be convicted. Many said he was a fall guy. We are not 
going to have another Scooter Libby, another fall guy. Kyle Sampson did 
many wrong things, and it is very possible he broke the criminal law, 
but, as Harry Truman said, the buck stops at the top. The buck stops 
with the Attorney General. It defies belief that his chief of staff was 
making all these major decisions without his knowledge, particularly 
when it is clear that at least on a few instances he admits he had 
phone calls from the President and from others about this issue.
  I want to say one other thing, because this issue is not going to go 
away. This issue is going to stay with us until we find out everything 
that has happened, for the sake of punishing those who did wrong but 
also, more importantly, to clear the air and restore the good name of 
the U.S. attorneys who were fired incorrectly and of the U.S. 
attorneys--a more numerous group--who were not involved in this issue 
but whose reputations have been called into question. Tomorrow, if 
someone is indicted by a U.S. attorney who had no involvement in this 
scandal and their defense attorney says politics was involved, the 
public may believe it, given what we have seen happen thus far. So it 
is our obligation, it is our moral imperative to get to the bottom of 
this, to clear the air, and to restore the reputation of U.S. 
Attorney's Offices now and into the future, and that is just what we 
will do.
  Madam President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. McCaskill). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


       Amendments Nos. 441, 357, 448, 337, 389, and 299, En Bloc

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, we are making progress in disposing 
of the final amendments pending as we head toward final passage of S. 
4. So at this time, I would like to propound a unanimous consent 
request that there are a number of pending amendments which I 
understand can be considered and agreed to without the necessity of a 
rollcall vote, and two of these amendments will have second-degree 
amendments.
  I now ask unanimous consent that it be in order for the Senate to 
proceed en bloc to the consideration of the following amendments, that 
they be agreed to en bloc, and that the motions to reconsider be laid 
upon the table:
  First, the Kyl amendment, No. 357, with a Feingold second-degree 
amendment, No. 441.
  Second, a Schumer amendment, No. 337, with a modification that is at 
the desk, and with an Ensign second-degree amendment, No. 448.
  Third, a Bond amendment, No. 389, with a modification at the desk.
  Fourth, and finally, a Stevens amendment, No. 299.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, these amendments have been cleared on 
this side of the aisle, and I do not object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 441), to amendment No. 357, was agreed to, as 
follows:

 (Purpose: To require appropriate reports regarding data mining by the 
                          Federal Government)

       On page 1, strike ``(1) Data-mining.--'' and all that 
     follows through ``(c) Reports on Data Mining Activities by 
     Federal Agencies.--'' on page 2, and insert the following:
       (1) Data mining.--The term ``data mining'' means a program 
     involving pattern-based queries, searches, or other analyses 
     of 1 or more electronic databases, where--
       (A) a department or agency of the Federal Government, or a 
     non-Federal entity acting on behalf of the Federal 
     Government, is conducting the queries, searches, or other 
     analyses to discover or locate a predictive pattern or 
     anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on the 
     part of any individual or individuals;
       (B) the queries, searches, or other analyses are not 
     subject-based and do not use personal identifiers of a 
     specific individual, or inputs associated with a specific 
     individual or group of individuals, to retrieve information 
     from the database or databases; and
       (C) the purpose of the queries, searches, or other analyses 
     is not solely--
       (i) the detection of fraud, waste, or abuse in a Government 
     agency or program; or
       (ii) the security of a Government computer system.
       (2) Database.--The term ``database'' does not include 
     telephone directories, news reporting, information publicly 
     available to any member of the public without payment of a 
     fee, or databases of judicial and administrative opinions or 
     other legal research sources.
       (c) Reports on Data Mining Activities by Federal 
     Agencies.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (d) of this section shall have 
     no force or effect.
       (2) Reports.--
       (A) Requirement for report.--The head of each department or 
     agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any 
     activity to use or develop data mining shall submit a report 
     to Congress on all such activities of the department or 
     agency under the jurisdiction of that official. The report 
     shall be produced in coordination with the privacy officer of 
     that department or agency, if applicable, and shall be made 
     available to the public, except for an annex described in 
     subparagraph (C).
       (B) Content of report.--Each report submitted under 
     subparagraph (A) shall include, for each activity to use or 
     develop data mining, the following information:
       (i) A thorough description of the data mining activity, its 
     goals, and, where appropriate, the target dates for the 
     deployment of the data mining activity.
       (ii) A thorough description of the data mining technology 
     that is being used or will be used, including the basis for 
     determining whether a particular pattern or anomaly is 
     indicative of terrorist or criminal activity.
       (iii) A thorough description of the data sources that are 
     being or will be used.
       (iv) An assessment of the efficacy or likely efficacy of 
     the data mining activity in providing accurate information 
     consistent with and valuable to the stated goals and plans 
     for the use or development of the data mining activity.
       (v) An assessment of the impact or likely impact of the 
     implementation of the data mining activity on the privacy and 
     civil liberties of individuals, including a thorough 
     description of the actions that are being taken or will be 
     taken with regard to the property, privacy, or other rights 
     or privileges of any individual or individuals as a result of 
     the implementation of the data mining activity.
       (vi) A list and analysis of the laws and regulations that 
     govern the information being or to be collected, reviewed, 
     gathered, analyzed, or used in conjunction with the data 
     mining activity, to the extent applicable in the context of 
     the data mining activity.
       (vii) A thorough discussion of the policies, procedures, 
     and guidelines that are in place or that are to be developed 
     and applied in the use of such data mining activity in order 
     to--

       (I) protect the privacy and due process rights of 
     individuals, such as redress procedures; and
       (II) ensure that only accurate and complete information is 
     collected, reviewed, gathered, analyzed, or used, and guard 
     against any harmful consequences of potential inaccuracies.

       (C) Annex.--
       (i) In general.--A report under subparagraph (A) shall 
     include in an annex any necessary--

       (I) classified information;
       (II) law enforcement sensitive information;
       (III) proprietary business information; or
       (IV) trade secrets (as that term is defined in section 1839 
     of title 18, United States Code).

       (ii) Availability.--Any annex described in clause (i)--

       (I) shall be available, as appropriate, and consistent with 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), to 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
     the Committee on the Judiciary, the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee 
     on the Judiciary, the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
     Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (II) shall not be made available to the public.

       (D) Time for report.--Each report required under 
     subparagraph (A) shall be--
       (i) submitted not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act; and
       (ii) updated not less frequently than annually thereafter, 
     to include any activity to use or develop data mining engaged 
     in after the date of the prior report submitted under 
     subparagraph (A).
       (d) Reports on Data Mining Activities by Federal 
     Agencies.--

  The amendment (No. 357), as modified, as amended, was agreed to.

[[Page S3030]]

  The amendment (No. 337), as modified, was agreed to, as follows:

       On page 86, after line 20,:
       (c) Exception.--The limitations under subparagraph (A) 
     shall not apply to activities permitted under the full-time 
     counter-
     terrorism staffing pilot, as described in the Fiscal Year 
     2007 Program Guidance of the Department for the Urban Area 
     Security Initiative.
  The amendment (No. 448), to amendment No. 337, was agreed to, as 
follows:

   (Purpose: To establish a Law Enforcement Assistance Force in the 
  Department of Homeland Security to facilitate the contributions of 
        retired law enforcement officers during major disasters)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. 15  __. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE FORCE.

       (a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a Law 
     Enforcement Assistance Force to facilitate the contributions 
     of retired law enforcement officers and agents during major 
     disasters.
       (b) Eligible Participants.--An individual may participate 
     in the Law Enforcement Assistance Force if that individual--
       (1) has experience working as an officer or agent for a 
     public law enforcement agency and left that agency in good 
     standing;
       (2) holds current certifications for firearms, first aid, 
     and such other skills determined necessary by the Secretary;
       (3) submits to the Secretary an application, at such time, 
     in such manner, and accompanied by such information as the 
     Secretary may reasonably require, that authorizes the 
     Secretary to review the law enforcement service record of 
     that individual; and
       (4) meets such other qualifications as the Secretary may 
     require.
       (c) Liability; Supervision.--Each eligible participant 
     shall, upon acceptance of an assignment under this section--
       (A) be detailed to a Federal, State, or local government 
     law enforcement agency; and
       (B) work under the direct supervision of an officer or 
     agent of that agency.
       (d) Mobilization.--
       (1) In general.--In the event of a major disaster, the 
     Secretary, after consultation with appropriate Federal, 
     State, and local government law enforcement agencies, may 
     request eligible participants to volunteer to assist the 
     efforts of those agencies responding to such emergency and 
     assign each willing participant to a specific law enforcement 
     agency.
       (2) Acceptance.--If the eligible participant accepts an 
     assignment under this subsection, that eligible participant 
     shall agree to remain in such assignment for a period equal 
     to not less than the shorter of--
       (A) the period during which the law enforcement agency 
     needs the services of such participant;
       (B) 30 days;
       (C) such other period of time agreed to between the 
     Secretary and the eligible participant.
       (3) Refusal.--An eligible participant may refuse an 
     assignment under this subsection without any adverse 
     consequences.
       (e) Expenses.--
       (1) In general.--Each eligible participant shall be allowed 
     travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, 
     at rates authorized for employees of agencies under 
     subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, 
     while carrying out an assignment under subsection (d).
       (2) Source of funds.--Expenses incurred under paragraph (1) 
     shall be paid from amounts appropriated to the Federal 
     Emergency Management Agency.
       (f) Termination of Assistance.--The availability of 
     eligible participants of the Law Enforcement Assistance Force 
     shall continue for a period equal to the shorter of--
       (1) the period of the major disaster; or
       (2) 1 year.
       (g) Definitions.--In this section--
       (1) the term ``eligible participant'' means an individual 
     participating in the Law Enforcement Assistance Force;
       (2) the term ``Law Enforcement Assistance Force'' means the 
     Law Enforcement Assistance Force established under subsection 
     (a); and
       (3) the term ``major disaster'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
     and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122).
       (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     this section.

  The amendment (No. 337), as modified, as amended, was agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 389), as modified, was agreed to, as follows:

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING A REPORT ON THE 9/11 
                   COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND CONGRESSIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REFORM.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
     United States (referred to in this section as the ``9/11 
     Commission'') conducted a lengthy review of the facts and 
     circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 
     11, 2001, including those relating to the intelligence 
     community, law enforcement agencies, and the role of 
     congressional oversight and resource allocation.
       (2) In its final report, the 9/11 Commission found that--
       (A) congressional oversight of the intelligence activities 
     of the United States is dysfunctional;
       (B) under the rules of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives in effect at the time the report was 
     completed, the committees of Congress charged with oversight 
     of the intelligence activities lacked the power, influence, 
     and sustained capability to meet the daunting challenges 
     faced by the intelligence community of the United States;
       (C) as long as such oversight is governed by such rules of 
     the Senate and the House of Representatives, the people of 
     the United States will not get the security they want and 
     need;
       (D) a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee 
     structure is needed to give the intelligence community of the 
     United States appropriate oversight, support, and leadership; 
     and
       (E) the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its 
     final report will not succeed if congressional oversight of 
     the intelligence community in the United States is not 
     changed.
       (3) The 9/11 Commission recommended structural changes to 
     Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities.
       (4) Congress has enacted some of the recommendations made 
     by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing 
     additional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
       (5) The Senate adopted Senate Resolution 445 in the 108th 
     Congress to address some of the intelligence oversight 
     recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by abolishing term 
     limits for the members of the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, clarifying jurisdiction for intelligence-
     related nominations, and streamlining procedures for the 
     referral of intelligence-related legislation, but other 
     aspects of the 9/11 Commission recommendations regarding 
     intelligence oversight have not been implemented.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate each, or jointly, should--
       (1) undertake a review of the recommendations made in the 
     final report of the 9/11 Commission with respect to 
     intelligence reform and congressional intelligence oversight 
     reform;
       (2) review and consider any other suggestions, options, or 
     recommendations for improving intelligence oversight; and
       (3) not later than December 21, 2007, submit to the Senate 
     a report that includes the recommendations of the Committee, 
     if any, for carrying out such reforms.

  The amendment (No. 299) was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 448

  Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, I speak today about my amendment to 
create the law enforcement assistance force. This amendment is a 
common-sense idea and I hope my colleagues would adopt this amendment.
  My amendment proposes the creation of a law enforcement assistance 
force which is a system for retired law enforcement personnel to apply 
to DHS, and complete the necessary paperwork and training, before a 
disaster occurs. Then, when disaster happens, DHS would have a pool of 
qualified first responders who could be called into action. These 
volunteers would be detailed to a Federal, State, or local law 
enforcement agency to work side by side with law enforcement located in 
affected communities. The amendment also provides that DHS would 
reimburse volunteers for their costs.
  The need for properly trained first responders was never greater than 
it was immediately after Hurricane Katrina. In the wake of this 
disaster, I toured the gulf region and saw the devastation firsthand. A 
situation caused by natural disaster was made worse by the way Federal, 
State and local government responded. I say this not to criticize 
anyone but to propose a way to improve how America will respond in the 
future.
  In the aftermath of any disaster, there is an acute need for trained 
rescue and recovery personnel. These needs are often met by volunteers 
who, having seen their fellow Americans in need, travel across country 
to answer the call for help. In the aftermath of Katrina, there was no 
shortage of volunteers who answered this call. Their willingness to 
help is a testament to the American spirit. Unfortunately, these 
volunteers were not used in a way that was equal to their spirit or the 
needs of the people affected by this storm.
  As the media reported, FEMA diverted many volunteer first responders 
to places outside of the disaster area. Some highly skilled emergency 
response volunteers were sent to Arkansas to prepare paperwork. Others 
were

[[Page S3031]]

diverted to Atlanta to hand out fliers and still others were forced to 
attend ``sensitivity training'' seminars. Meanwhile, in the hardest hit 
areas of the gulf region, people suffered. Many needed basic medical 
care and supplies. The resources of local first responders and 
government officials were strained. The local responders needed 
reinforcements, especially when lawlessness broke out. Responding to a 
disaster is always a difficult job. But like we advise at-risk 
communities to take steps to prepare for potential disasters, the 
Federal Government also has an obligation to prepare in advance as 
well.
  My amendment creates a process to enable FEMA and DHS to put 
qualified first responders in place in the immediate aftermath of 
disaster. It will ensure a better Federal response by providing State 
and local communities with the reinforcements they need. I believe 
there is a willingness on the part of retired law enforcement to 
volunteer their experience and expertise in times of crisis. In fact, 
the idea for this amendment was given to me by a friend of mine, Tom 
Page, who is a retired Las Vegas Metro Police officer. I thank him for 
this suggestion and I urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.


                           amendment no. 389

  Mr. BOND. Madam President, I would like to commend Senators Lieberman 
and Collins for all their hard work on S. 4 and I would especially like 
to thank them for their support of my amendment calling for further 
congressional review and action with regard to the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission.
  The 9/11 Commission identified many shortfalls, some in the 
intelligence community and some in congressional oversight.
  We can never ease the pain and anguish of the 9/11 families resulting 
from the deaths of their loved ones. It is possible, however, to do 
everything within our power to ensure more American families are not 
subjected to a similar nightmare.
  We owe it to the 9/11 families as well as the American people to 
adopt reforms that will improve intelligence collection and 
dissemination, as well as will improve congressional oversight.
  Putting our own house in order may not be popular, but it is the 
right thing to do.
  I look forward to working with the chairman and ranking member, as 
well as the members of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee to continue to improve U.S. intelligence and congressional 
oversight of U.S. intelligence.
  In closing, I would also like to thank Ms. Holly Idelson of Senator 
Lieberman's staff and Mr. Brandon Milhorn of Senator Collins's staff 
for their assistance to me and my staff. Both of these young people 
went out of their way to assist us, and I am grateful to them for their 
courteous demeanor and their professional conduct.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I rise today in support of Senate 
amendment No. 389 offered by my colleague from Missouri, Senator Bond. 
It is appropriate that this amendment be offered to the 9/11 bill as it 
is a first step in implementing one of the few outstanding 
recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission--to reform congressional 
oversight of the intelligence community. I am proud to be a cosponsor 
of this important amendment and thank Senator Bond for his leadership 
on this issue.
  The 9/11 Commission suggested that the rules of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate lack the power, influence and sustained 
capability to effectuate oversight of the intelligence community. As 
such, they recommended that Congress establish one committee in each 
House of Congress with both authorizing and appropriation authority for 
the intelligence community or create a joint committee based on the 
model of the old Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
  Just this year, the House of Representatives amended their rules to 
create a new panel on the Appropriations Committee with members of both 
the Intelligence Committee and the Appropriations Committee. While the 
House provision does not meet the 9/11 Commission recommendation in 
full, the Senate has not acted at all. As every Member of this body 
knows, reforming Congress, especially the Senate, can be difficult and 
will face much resistance. However, the Senate should not be an 
exception to government reform after September 11, 2001. We should lead 
by example. We owe the American public and the families of those lost 
on September 11, 2001 to continue to improve intelligence collection 
and coordination as well as to improve congressional oversight.
  I know many have ideas on reform in the Senate, and we should explore 
those. We need to find the most effective way to conduct vital, and 
often difficult, intelligence oversight. That is why this amendment is 
so important--it asks the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and 
the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to each review 
the 9/11 Commission's recommendation. Members of the Senate with 
expertise in reform and intelligence will review the oversight process 
and develop recommendations on the most valuable reforms.
  In conclusion, I hope all my colleagues will support this amendment 
and work with the committees in the Senate to improve the congressional 
oversight process.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, we certainly know how complicated and 
even vexing the process of reforming the intelligence community is. On 
the one hand, we now have in place a new structure, with an overarching 
office of the Director of National Intelligence, that is responsible 
for addressing many of the institutional and structural impediments 
that led to our intelligence community's underperformance in the last 
years of the 20th century, leaving us more vulnerable to the attacks of 
September 11. The second and recently confirmed Director of the Office 
of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, assumes leadership in a 
structure that is up and running, if still on its shakedown cruise. In 
Mike McConnell we have a leader that will take the DNI to the levels of 
authority and accomplishment we in Congress who created the Office of 
the DNI intended.
  Throughout the IC we have seen many promising developments. Agencies 
are infused with resources and focus, and they are addressing our 
priority and hard targets like no other time during my 30 years in the 
Senate. Mike Hayden at CIA is providing leadership to an organization 
that is truly beginning to reach out of its petrified structures and 
mindset of the past to bravely and creatively take on the intelligence 
challenges of today and tomorrow. As a member of the Intelligence 
Committee, I make every effort to commend and encourage all of these 
positive developments, and I know I am joined by most of my colleagues.
  That is the good news. The bad news is that intelligence reform has 
many unfinished aspects. There are still deep cultural problems with 
the way certain IC organizations, particularly the CIA, work. We still 
have far to go and addressing the challenge of hard targets, like North 
Korea and Iran. All of these challenges will take time and leadership 
to address.
  The 9/11 Commission's report on the intelligence failures leading to 
September 11 also focused how Congress needed to change. The report 
stated:

       Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions the House 
     and Senate intelligence committees lack the power, influence, 
     and sustained capability to meet this challenge.

  The Commission recommended:

       Either Congress should create a joint committee for 
     intelligence . . . or it should create House and Senate 
     committees with combined authorizing and appropriations 
     powers.

  We began to improve congressional oversight with S. Res. 445, passed 
immediately after the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004. We removed term limits, raised the stature of the committee to 
an A Committee, and returned to the use of designated staff. But this 
was tinkering in comparison to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation.
  I recognize this is a difficult question, for all of the reasons of 
congressional resistance and established prerogatives. But I think that 
we should not abandon addressing the very substantive question of the 
current structure that greatly limits intelligence committee control 
over intelligence community appropriations.
  Therefore, I am pleased that amendment No. 389 has been accepted to 
S. 4, and I commend the author of this amendment, the vice chairman of 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Bond. I am pleased 
to

[[Page S3032]]

note that this amendment has the cosponsorship of the chairman of the 
committee, Senator Rockefeller. This amendment requests a joint review 
of this question be conducted by both the Intelligence and the Homeland 
Security Committees, and be presented by year's end. This is not a 
radical proposal, in and of itself, but keeps the Senate focused on an 
unresolved question, a question whose importance to the question of 
congressional oversight of our intelligence community cannot be 
underestimated.
  Intelligence reform is an ongoing process. I happen to believe that, 
when our institutional will flags or is diverted, we should remind 
ourselves of the costs of intelligence failure, and steel ourselves to 
the fact that intelligence will play a larger role in our national 
defense for the foreseeable future. And we should never abandon our 
oversight of intelligence reform, our dedication to supporting the most 
dynamic intelligence community, and our responsibility to conducting 
this oversight in the most effective manner possible.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank the Chair and my friend from 
Maine, and I notify our colleagues that we are working very hard to 
eliminate the remaining objections on components of the managers' 
amendment. We anticipate at least one more rollcall vote on one of the 
pending amendments and then final passage, and hopefully that will 
happen soon.
  Pending that, Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, while we are waiting here to line up a 
vote on this amendment and this bill, I will speak briefly relative to 
my thoughts on how this bill is evolving. Like everyone, I was very 
impressed with the work of the 9/11 Commission. I think they did a 
superb job of pointing out what were, unfortunately, very significant 
problems which we have as a nation relative to our preparedness to 
fight terrorism. I had the good fortune to chair the Homeland Security 
Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee for the last 2 years and 
spent a considerable time before that working on the accounts of the 
FBI. We worked hard, honestly, to try to address some of the issues 
which were raised by the 9/11 Commission and, as a practical matter, 
the great majority of the issues raised by the 9/11 Commission have 
been addressed and are moving forward, hopefully, to a constructive 
resolution.
  This bill, although it has the 9/11 Commission imprimatur on it as 
its name, is more of a clutter--a collection of various ideas, some of 
which the 9/11 Commission agrees with, some of which I suspect they 
never even thought of discussing and, as a practical matter, the bill 
as a whole, in my humble opinion, in its present form would actually 
end up undermining rather than improving our safety as a nation. There 
are a number of reasons for that, but at the moment the most 
significant reason is the unionization language in this bill which 
essentially says the TSA will become a unionized organization.
  When we originally set up the TSA, which was a matter of considerable 
debate on this floor, that issue was at the essence, at the center, of 
the discussion as to why and how we were going to set up the TSA. The 
belief was at the time we set up the TSA and the commitment was at that 
time that we would not create a unionized organization.
  Why was that? It is not that unions do not do good work. Unions do 
extraordinary work. They have been one of the great forces in American 
culture for producing and mainstreaming many Americans, from the 
standpoint of income and social activity, having a group to participate 
with. They have been an extraordinarily positive force. But the belief 
was--and it is an accurate belief arrived at after considerable thought 
and a great deal of debate--that unionizing TSA would be like 
unionizing the military, to give an example.
  The TSA is the front line of our defense relative to protecting 
airplanes that fly in America today. We know air traffic is the No. 1 
source for attack from the al-Qaida interests. We know that they, in 
their handbooks and their training manuals, constantly come back to the 
use of aircraft as a weapon, and unfortunately we saw them use it on 9/
11.
  Having a secure transportation industry, especially in the aircraft 
area, is absolutely critical to our protecting our Nation from acts of 
terrorism. That is why we put in place the TSA. They are the front line 
of securing our air transportation system in this country. They are 
like a military force. Their purpose is to be moved around quickly to 
areas of weakness. Their purpose is to make sure they execute 
efficiently the review of people getting on aircraft to make sure those 
people are appropriately screened.
  You cannot have incompetence. You can't have inefficiency. You can't 
have poorly trained people or people who do not sort of get with the 
program. You must have a very disciplined, focused group of individuals 
managing the security at our airports. That is the goal we were hoping 
to accomplish with the TSA.
  It was fully understood, because I was involved in the debate, that 
when we set up the TSA it would not be unionized because union rules 
inherently create delay and they create stricture and straitjackets and 
make it very difficult to manage different issues that have to be 
managed aggressively and with fluidity by the leadership of the TSA and 
the TSA teams on the ground.
  To create a unionized TSA will take away that flexibility, that 
efficiency. It will take away the ability to assure the people who are 
doing the screening will be the best we can get and they are doing it 
in the most effective way that can be done. In my opinion, putting this 
language in this bill, if it were to pass, would undermine security 
generally.
  There are other issues with this bill which I can assure you, in my 
reading of the 9/11 Commission report, they did not think of in the 
terms this bill is structured: specifically, the formula for the 
distribution of funds. I chaired the Appropriations subcommittee which 
had responsibility for distributing funds relative to terrorist 
activity in this country. We do have this pool of funds which is 
distributed to all the States and all the regions in this country under 
a formula. My opinion is if you want to effectively use that money, it 
should be threat based. That should be the No. 1 priority and the No. 1 
criterion. Is the money going where the threat is highest?
  We know there are certain targets in this country which are high-
threat areas: New York City, the subway system specifically, but a lot 
of parts of New York City; Los Angeles; Washington, DC. These are 
clearly high-priority targets when you are talking about terrorists. 
Terrorists have goals. One of their goals is to destroy our culture and 
kill as many Americans as they can, according to al-Qaida, but another 
is to make a statement internationally. That is why they picked the 
World Trade Center. That was a recognized international symbol.
  I know there are places in New Hampshire that are probably 
susceptible to terrorist attack. I am sure they are. But the fact is, 
it is unlikely, if you are ordering priorities, that most of them are 
going to be very high on a priority list for terror attack--certainly 
one structured by an al-Qaida type organization. They may be from 
domestic terrorism; that is different--domestic terrorism such as hit 
Oklahoma City. But if there were a structured terrorist attack from an 
Islamic fundamentalist group, we can prioritize what is the terrorist 
threat and what is not the terrorist threat.
  The money should go to the threat. Now how does that affect New 
Hampshire? It means New Hampshire would get less money. As the chairman 
of an Appropriations subcommittee, I had responsibility for this area 
up until this year, when I switched over to foreign affairs accounts. I 
strongly promoted the program of putting the money where the threat 
was, to the disadvantage of New Hampshire, because I felt that was the 
way it should be done.
  Now this bill comes along and tries to reorder that in a way that 
essentially says every State, every community will get, for lack of a 
better word,

[[Page S3033]]

``walking around money'' for purposes of buying security, to the 
detriment of the high-threat areas. We only have so much money.
  Once we have secured the high-threat areas and we are fairly 
comfortable, then we can start distributing it maybe more broadly and 
without any accountability for threat. But initially the distribution 
should be based on threat.
  Yes, every State should get some, but it should not be under the 
formula that is in this bill. It should be a much lower absolute 
commitment of dollars and a much higher commitment of dollars in the 
threat area. This is what bothers me about this bill.
  In addition, there is the ability of people to get access to 
classified intelligence briefings and materials. This is playing with 
fire when we start significantly expanding access to this type of 
material. Because it is this material falling into the wrong hands by 
accident, which it might be, or just oversight, because it is in so 
many hands, because it is expanded by this bill and going into so many 
hands, that if it falls into the wrong places, people can trace the 
source, and protecting these sources of where we get intelligence is 
absolutely the most critical thing we have to do. If we have a good 
source of intelligence on how people want to attack us, protecting that 
source is absolutely essential.
  Some of the intelligence material that will be released under this 
bill--with good intentions, but, unfortunately, the Congress tends to 
be a sieve, and no matter how aggressively people try to protect that 
information, it seems to get out--could easily expand the number of 
people available who have access to this information to a point where 
the security of the administration will come into question.
  So these are very serious issues relative to this bill. The most 
serious is the unionization of a nonunion, lean, effective organization 
which would protect our transportation system, especially air traffic; 
the failure to put the money on the target which is threatened; and the 
issue of expanding the availability of very sensitive intelligence 
information in a way that might undermine the sources of that 
information.
  Those are the reservations I have about this bill. That is why I will 
not be able to support the bill when it comes up for final passage 
should it be in its present form.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, we are coming to the moment when we 
adopt the managers' amendment and proceed to final passage. I want to 
respond to some of the things said by my friend from New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator may proceed.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. In response to my friend from New Hampshire, two 
things: One is, S. 4 is a direct response not just to the original 9/11 
Commission in 2004, which was the basis of the Intelligence Reform 
Terrorism Prevention Act of that year, but it is a response directly to 
the appeal the 9/11 Commission issued in December of 2005 that there 
was unfinished business.
  That appeal was not only seconded but echoed and amplified by the 
various organizations representing families who lost loved ones on 9/11 
in the terrorist attack of that day.
  So this legislation before the Senate now, about to go to final 
amendment consideration and adoption, includes improvements in 
information sharing--the critical question of connecting the dots 
before the terrorists can strike us so we can stop them from doing so. 
It creates a new dedicated grant fund to support interoperable 
communications equipment--complicated words which simply mean whether 
in a crisis, a potential terrorist attack, or a natural disaster such 
as Katrina, our firefighters, our police officers, our emergency 
responders can talk to each other as they were not able to do on 
9/11.
  This is a balanced, progressive recommendation to solve once and for 
all by legislation the ongoing dispute about how to distribute homeland 
security grant funding. We have improved the security requirements of 
the so-called visa waiver program. We have strengthened the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Board and done much else. There is a lot constructive 
here. One of the parts of this legislation that I believe still should 
be the least controversial and, frankly, not the most important but an 
act of fairness consistent with our effort to improve homeland 
security, was simply to give the transportation security officers at 
the Transportation Security Agency, who now can join a union but cannot 
collectively bargain, the same right to collectively bargain in very 
limited areas without the right to strike, the same rights that most 
other employees at the Department of Homeland Security, including law 
enforcement personnel, have and continue to have, without impeding 
their carrying out of their law enforcement public safety functions. 
That includes the Border Patrol, obviously at the Capitol that includes 
our Capitol Police, and throughout America it includes firefighters and 
police officers.
  It is unfortunate that is so much the focus of discussion about this 
bill because this bill is a direct response to the appeals of the 9/11 
Commissioners and the 9/11 families to take constructive action to 
respond to the statements that the Commission itself made in 2004 and 
again in 2005: America is safer than it was on 9/11/01 but not yet safe 
enough.
  This bill, which is not controversial and ought to receive 
nonpartisan support, will make the people of America, in an age of 
terrorism, safer yet than they have been before. It is why I strongly 
urge my colleagues across party lines to support final passage of the 
legislation.
  I hope soon to be able to propound a series of unanimous consent 
agreements. I am waiting for final clearance from my ranking member. As 
soon as that happens I will rise to do so.


                           Amendment No. 448

  I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding its adoption, the Ensign 
amendment No. 448 be considered a first-degree amendment, agreed to, 
and that it be inserted at the appropriate place in the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


        Requested Resignations of Seven United States Attorneys

  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to comment 
about the events in the Department of Justice over the course of the 
past 10 days, with respect to the request for the resignations of seven 
United States attorneys and the disclosures that the FBI was improperly 
using national security letters.
  With respect to the matter about the request for resignations of the 
United States attorneys, I believe it is important for the Judiciary 
Committee to proceed with its inquiry to find out exactly what 
happened. There is no doubt--I think it is undisputed--that the 
Attorney General has the authority to replace United States attorneys. 
There is a serious question if they are replaced for improper motives.
  We know when President Clinton was elected, one of his first acts in 
early 1993, when he took office, was to replace all 93 of the United 
States attorneys. I had the occasion recently to discuss this with the 
Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Tom Corbett, who was a U.S. attorney 
at that time for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In 1993, he had 
the position in the United States attorneys organization to make those 
telephone calls. That was handled in due course, and nobody challenged 
the President's authority to replace United States attorneys.
  Now, questions have arisen as to whether United States attorneys were 
replaced improperly--for example, the question has been raised as to 
U.S. Attorney Lam in the Southern District of California, in San Diego, 
and whether she was replaced because of her conviction of former 
Congressman Duke Cunningham, now serving an 8-year sentence, and 
whether she was about to investigate other people who were politically 
powerful.
  Ms. Lam was questioned about that. I asked her whether she considered 
the

[[Page S3034]]

request for her resignation to be inappropriate. She said she was 
surprised by it. I pressed her for her own conclusion. I think we may 
need more by way of inquiry to examine what her performance ratings 
were to see if there was a basis for her being asked to resign.
  We had a situation with Mr. Cummins, who was a U.S. attorney in the 
Eastern District of Arkansas. He received a telephone call, which he 
then relayed to other dismissed United States attorneys, and he did it 
by e-mail very shortly after the telephone call. The question I had for 
Mr. Cummins was, what was said? The e-mail did not contain the language 
of the caller from the Department of Justice. It had Mr. Cummins' 
sense, or feelings, that it was a warning. After little discussion, one 
lawyer to another, he said it may have been friendly advice. Well, that 
perhaps requires a little more analysis, if not a little more inquiry.
  Then we have the situation with the U.S. attorney from New Mexico, 
where, according to the news reports--and we have to find this out from 
the actual witnesses--there had been concerns expressed by people in 
New Mexico as to whether he was doing his job properly. On those 
concerns--at least according to the press--we have to find this out 
from the witnesses. Those calls, according to members of the press, or 
according to what has been reported in the press, were relayed to White 
House officials, and they passed them on to the Department of Justice.
  We have to look at that and ask ourselves the question of whether 
there is impropriety in that. If the Department of Justice is to 
evaluate whether a United States attorney ought to be retained, is it 
relevant as to what people think about him or her? The comments may 
require that we look at whether he was doing the job. Those are matters 
we have yet to determine. So when we have declarations made on the 
Senate floor that are conclusory, condemning the Department of Justice 
for what it has done, I say that is premature.
  When the issue came up about the hearing that was a week ago today, 
in my capacity as ranking member of the committee, I was asked to waive 
the 7-day rule, and I agreed to do so. I agreed to do so because I 
thought it was important to move ahead promptly. When Senator Leahy has 
raised the issue about other witnesses coming in, I think he is correct 
on that. The issue was raised about bringing in former White House 
Counsel Harriet Miers, issues were raised about bringing in people from 
the Department of Justice and other people in the office of the White 
House Counsel. I think that ought to be done. I do not think it is 
necessary to subpoena them. We will see.
  Before subpoenas ought to be issued, or before there even ought to be 
an issue raised about subpoenas, we ought to make a determination as to 
whether people are willing to come in voluntarily. When you talk about 
subpoenas, the first public reaction is: Why do they have to be 
subpoenaed? Why don't they come in voluntarily? Do they have something 
to hide? The next inference or question is: Are they guilty of 
something that they have to be subpoenaed?
  So let us proceed in the regular course of business. I was a district 
attorney for some 8 years and an assistant DA before that, and I have 
been on the Judiciary Committee for 27 years. The regular way to do 
business is to ask people to come in. If they refuse, then you can talk 
about subpoenas and you can get tough if it is necessary to do that.
  I regret I could not be here when Senator Schumer was on the floor 
earlier today. He has made public statements about the Attorney General 
politicizing the office. Well, that may be Senator Schumer's opinion, 
his judgment. But let's get down to specific facts as to what is 
involved in the politicization. We are all working here in a political 
field. I, frankly, have a concern to see Senator Pete Domenici on the 
Web site of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee. I have a little 
concern about some of the statements that have been made by Members of 
this body, rushing to judgment, before we have had these witnesses in.

  There has been a request for witnesses from the administration, from 
the White House. Well, why condemn the parties and condemn the 
Department until we have found out what the facts are? My view, as I 
expressed last Thursday in the Judiciary Committee's executive session, 
has been to tone down the rhetoric. We are now on the heels of the 
issue of the request for resignations of the United States attorneys.
  We have the disclosures that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had 
misused the national security letters. We gave them broader powers in 
the PATRIOT Act. We broadened the powers from cases involving foreign 
powers to national security matters generally. We put in a provision as 
to exigent circumstances, which means an emergency. Until we find, at 
least preliminarily, that the FBI used the exigent category more 
broadly--in some situations, they were to get statements on probable 
cause for the judicial authorization. In giving the FBI these broader 
powers under the--Madam President, the Senate is not in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. SPECTER. We gave the FBI these broader powers under the PATRIOT 
Act because of the importance of fighting terrorism, and that is a 
major problem of the United States today, an enormous problem 
worldwide. We are concerned that where the FBI exercises these greater 
powers there has to be an appropriate regard for civil liberties and 
for constitutional rights. If it weren't for the fact we inserted in 
the reauthorization the authority of the inspector general to make 
these audits, we would not have found out what was going on.
  So then in evaluating what the Department of Justice has done, I 
think it is important to look thoroughly at the issues raised by the 
inspector general. It is a thick volume. We are going to need oversight 
hearings. Senator Leahy, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, already 
announced that. I think we may have to go further and consider changing 
the authority of the FBI under the PATRIOT Act. If they do not use the 
powers within the confines the Congress has prescribed and the 
President authorized, then we may have to limit their power.
  There are serious issues that confront the Department of Justice at 
this time and the Judiciary Committee, in its oversight capacity and 
investigative capacity, has the full authority of power to find out 
what the facts are, and we will speak plainly. I will have no 
hesitation in making a factually based judgment if they have acted 
improperly.
  Let us see the background of the firing of these U.S. attorneys, and 
let us see what the details are on the national security letters and 
what the Department of Justice does to correct the situation.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.


 Amendment No. 291; Amendment No. 293, As Modified; Amendment No. 341; 
 Amendment No. 323; Amendment No. 290, As Further Modified; Amendment 
 No. 368; Amendment No. 392; Amendment No. 332, As Modified; Amendment 
   No. 391; Amendment No. 431; Amendment No. 348; Amendment No. 404; 
    Amendment No. 388, As Modified; Amendment No. 411, As Modified; 
 Amendment No. 456; Amendment No. 414, As Modified; Amendment No. 412, 
              As Modified; Amendment No. 354, As Modified

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I am very happy to indicate to our 
colleagues we have reached agreement on a series of unanimous consent 
requests that will allow us to move to final passage.
  I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and 
the Senate proceed to the consideration of a series of amendments, 
which have been cleared on our side and by Senator Collins on her side. 
The amendments are as follows:
  Sununu amendment No. 291; Grassley amendment No. 293, with a 
modification; Coleman amendment No. 341; Feinstein amendment No. 323; 
Salazar amendment No. 290, with a further modification; Carper 
amendment No. 368; Akaka amendment No. 392; Lieberman amendment No. 
332, with a modification; Lieberman-Collins amendment No. 391; 
Lieberman-Collins amendment No. 431; Wyden-Bond amendment No. 348; Byrd 
amendment No. 404; Pryor amendment No. 388, with a modification; 
Lieberman-McCain amendment No. 411, with a modification; Landrieu 
amendment No. 456;

[[Page S3035]]

Coleman amendment No. 414, with a modification; Inouye-Stevens-
Lieberman amendment No. 412, with a modification; Menendez amendment 
No. 354, with a modification.
  I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be agreed to en bloc; 
that the motions to reconsider be laid on the table, en bloc; that any 
statements thereon be printed in the Record as if read; and that 
consideration of these items appear separately in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments were agreed to, as follows:


                           amendment no. 291

       (Purpose: To ensure that the emergency communications and 
interoperability communications grant program does not exclude Internet 
                Protocol-based interoperable solutions)

       On page 121, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
       ``(k) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed or interpreted to preclude the use of funds 
     under this section by a State for interim or long-term 
     Internet Protocol-based interoperable solutions, 
     notwithstanding compliance with the Project 25 standard.''.


                     amendment no. 293, as modified

       At the end, add the following:

         TITLE_MODERNIZATION OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS

     SEC. _01. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``The American National Red 
     Cross Governance Modernization Act of 2007''.

     SEC. _02. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Substantive changes to the Congressional Charter of The 
     American National Red Cross have not been made since 1947.
       (2) In February 2006, the board of governors of The 
     American National Red Cross (the ``Board of Governors'') 
     commissioned an independent review and analysis of the Board 
     of Governors' role, composition, size, relationship with 
     management, governance relationship with chartered units of 
     The American National Red Cross, and whistleblower and audit 
     functions.
       (3) In an October 2006 report of the Board of Governors, 
     entitled ``American Red Cross Governance for the 21st 
     Century'' (the ``Governance Report''), the Board of Governors 
     recommended changes to the Congressional Charter, bylaws, and 
     other governing documents of The American National Red Cross 
     to modernize and enhance the effectiveness of the Board of 
     Governors and governance structure of The American National 
     Red Cross.
       (4) It is in the national interest to create a more 
     efficient governance structure of The American National Red 
     Cross and to enhance the Board of Governors' ability to 
     support the critical mission of The American National Red 
     Cross in the 21st century.
       (5) It is in the national interest to clarify the role of 
     the Board of Governors as a governance and strategic 
     oversight board and for The American National Red Cross to 
     amend its bylaws, consistent with the recommendations 
     described in the Governance Report, to clarify the role of 
     the Board of Governors and to outline the areas of its 
     responsibility, including--
       (A) reviewing and approving the mission statement for The 
     American National Red Cross;
       (B) approving and overseeing the corporation's strategic 
     plan and maintaining strategic oversight of operational 
     matters;
       (C) selecting, evaluating, and determining the level of 
     compensation of the corporation's chief executive officer;
       (D) evaluating the performance and establishing the 
     compensation of the senior leadership team and providing for 
     management succession;
       (E) overseeing the financial reporting and audit process, 
     internal controls, and legal compliance;
       (F) holding management accountable for performance;
       (G) providing oversight of the financial stability of the 
     corporation;
       (H) ensuring the inclusiveness and diversity of the 
     corporation;
       (I) providing oversight of the protection of the brand of 
     the corporation; and
       (J) assisting with fundraising on behalf of the 
     corporation.
       (6)(A) The selection of members of the Board of Governors 
     is a critical component of effective governance for The 
     American National Red Cross, and, as such, it is in the 
     national interest that The American National Red Cross amend 
     its bylaws to provide a method of selection consistent with 
     that described in the Governance Report.
       (B) The new method of selection should replace the current 
     process by which--
       (i) 30 chartered unit-elected members of the Board of 
     Governors are selected by a non-Board committee which 
     includes 2 members of the Board of Governors and other 
     individuals elected by the chartered units themselves;
       (ii) 12 at-large members of the Board of Governors are 
     nominated by a Board committee and elected by the Board of 
     Governors; and
       (iii) 8 members of the Board of Governors are appointed by 
     the President of the United States.
       (C) The new method of selection described in the Governance 
     Report reflects the single category of members of the Board 
     of Governors that will result from the implementation of this 
     title:
       (i) All Board members (except for the chairman of the Board 
     of Governors) would be nominated by a single committee of the 
     Board of Governors taking into account the criteria outlined 
     in the Governance Report to assure the expertise, skills, and 
     experience of a governing board.
       (ii) The nominated members would be considered for approval 
     by the full Board of Governors and then submitted to The 
     American National Red Cross annual meeting of delegates for 
     election, in keeping with the standard corporate practice 
     whereby shareholders of a corporation elect members of a 
     board of directors at its annual meeting.
       (7) The United States Supreme Court held The American 
     National Red Cross to be an instrumentality of the United 
     States, and it is in the national interest that the 
     Congressional Charter confirm that status and that any 
     changes to the Congressional Charter do not affect the rights 
     and obligations of The American National Red Cross to carry 
     out its purposes.
       (8) Given the role of The American National Red Cross in 
     carrying out its services, programs, and activities, and 
     meeting its various obligations, the effectiveness of The 
     American National Red Cross will be promoted by the creation 
     of an organizational ombudsman who--
       (A) will be a neutral or impartial dispute resolution 
     practitioner whose major function will be to provide 
     confidential and informal assistance to the many internal and 
     external stakeholders of The American National Red Cross;
       (B) will report to the chief executive officer and the 
     audit committee of the Board of Governors; and
       (C) will have access to anyone and any documents in The 
     American National Red Cross.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) charitable organizations are an indispensable part of 
     American society, but these organizations can only fulfill 
     their important roles by maintaining the trust of the 
     American public;
       (2) trust is fostered by effective governance and 
     transparency, which are the principal goals of the 
     recommendations of the Board of Governors in the Governance 
     Report and this title;
       (3) Federal and State action play an important role in 
     ensuring effective governance and transparency by setting 
     standards, rooting out violations, and informing the public; 
     and
       (4) while The American National Red Cross is and will 
     remain a Federally chartered instrumentality of the United 
     States, and it has the rights and obligations consistent with 
     that status, The American National Red Cross nevertheless 
     should maintain appropriate communications with State 
     regulators of charitable organizations and should cooperate 
     with them as appropriate in specific matters as they arise 
     from time to time.

     SEC. _03. ORGANIZATION.

       Section 300101 of title 36, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``a Federally chartered 
     instrumentality of the United States and'' before ``a body 
     corporate and politic''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting at the end the 
     following new sentence: ``The corporation may conduct its 
     business and affairs, and otherwise hold itself out, as the 
     `American Red Cross' in any jurisdiction.''.

     SEC. _04. PURPOSES.

       Section 300102 of title 36, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (4) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following paragraph:
       ``(5) to conduct other activities consistent with the 
     foregoing purposes.''.

     SEC. _05. MEMBERSHIP AND CHAPTERS.

       Section 300103 of title 36, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``, or as otherwise 
     provided,'' before ``in the bylaws'';
       (2) in subsection (b)(1)--
       (A) by striking ``board of governors'' and inserting 
     ``corporation''; and
       (B) by inserting ``policies and'' before ``regulations 
     related''; and
       (3) in subsection (b)(2)--
       (A) by inserting ``policies and'' before ``regulations 
     shall require''; and
       (B) by striking ``national convention'' and inserting 
     ``annual meeting''.

     SEC. _06. BOARD OF GOVERNORS.

       Section 300104 of title 36, United States Code, is amended 
     to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 300104. Board of governors

       ``(a) Board of Governors.--
       ``(1) In general.--The board of governors is the governing 
     body of the corporation with all powers of governing and 
     directing, and of overseeing the management of the business 
     and affairs of, the corporation.
       ``(2) Number.--The board of governors shall fix by 
     resolution, from time to time, the number of members 
     constituting the entire board of governors, provided that--

[[Page S3036]]

       ``(A) as of March 31, 2009, and thereafter, there shall be 
     no fewer than 12 and no more than 25 members; and
       ``(B) as of March 31, 2012, and thereafter, there shall be 
     no fewer than 12 and no more than 20 members constituting the 
     entire board.

     Procedures to implement the preceding sentence shall be 
     provided in the bylaws.
       ``(3) Appointment.--The governors shall be appointed or 
     elected in the following manner:
       ``(A) Chairman.--
       ``(i) In general.--The board of governors, in accordance 
     with procedures provided in the bylaws, shall recommend to 
     the President an individual to serve as chairman of the board 
     of governors. If such recommendation is approved by the 
     President, the President shall appoint such individual to 
     serve as chairman of the board of governors.
       ``(ii) Vacancies.--Vacancies in the office of the chairman, 
     including vacancies resulting from the resignation, death, or 
     removal by the President of the chairman, shall be filled in 
     the same manner described in clause (i).
       ``(iii) Duties.--The chairman shall be a member of the 
     board of governors and, when present, shall preside at 
     meetings of the board of governors and shall have such other 
     duties and responsibilities as may be provided in the bylaws 
     or a resolution of the board of governors.
       ``(B) Other members.--
       ``(i) In general.--Members of the board of governors other 
     than the chairman shall be elected at the annual meeting of 
     the corporation in accordance with such procedures as may be 
     provided in the bylaws.
       ``(ii) Vacancies.--Vacancies in any such elected board 
     position and in any newly created board position may be 
     filled by a vote of the remaining members of the board of 
     governors in accordance with such procedures as may be 
     provided in the bylaws.
       ``(b) Terms of Office.--
       ``(1) In general.--The term of office of each member of the 
     board of governors shall be 3 years, except that--
       ``(A) the board of governors may provide under the bylaws 
     that the terms of office of members of the board of governors 
     elected to the board of governors before March 31, 2012, may 
     be less than 3 years in order to implement the provisions of 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2); and
       ``(B) any member of the board of governors elected by the 
     board to fill a vacancy in a board position arising before 
     the expiration of its term may, as determined by the board, 
     serve for the remainder of that term or until the next annual 
     meeting of the corporation.
       ``(2) Staggered terms.--The terms of office of members of 
     the board of governors (other than the chairman) shall be 
     staggered such that, by March 31, 2012, and thereafter, \1/3\ 
     of the entire board (or as near to \1/3\ as practicable) 
     shall be elected at each successive annual meeting of the 
     corporation with the term of office of each member of the 
     board of governors elected at an annual meeting expiring at 
     the third annual meeting following the annual meeting at 
     which such member was elected.
       ``(3) Term limits.--No person may serve as a member of the 
     board of governors for more than such number of terms of 
     office or years as may be provided in the bylaws.
       ``(c) Committees and Officers.--The board--
       ``(1) may appoint, from its own members, an executive 
     committee to exercise such powers of the board when the board 
     is not in session as may be provided in the bylaws;
       ``(2) may appoint such other committees or advisory 
     councils with such powers as may be provided in the bylaws or 
     a resolution of the board of governors;
       ``(3) shall appoint such officers of the corporation, 
     including a chief executive officer, with such duties, 
     responsibilities, and terms of office as may be provided in 
     the bylaws or a resolution of the board of governors; and
       ``(4) may remove members of the board of governors (other 
     than the chairman), officers, and employees under such 
     procedures as may be provided in the bylaws or a resolution 
     of the board of governors.
       ``(d) Advisory Council.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There shall be an advisory council to 
     the board of governors.
       ``(2) Membership; appointment by president.--
       ``(A) In general.--The advisory council shall be composed 
     of no fewer than 8 and no more than 10 members, each of whom 
     shall be appointed by the President from principal officers 
     of the executive departments and senior officers of the Armed 
     Forces whose positions and interests qualify them to 
     contribute to carrying out the programs and purposes of the 
     corporation.
       ``(B) Members from the armed forces.--At least 1, but not 
     more than 3, of the members of the advisory council shall be 
     selected from the Armed Forces.
       ``(3) Duties.--The advisory council shall advise, report 
     directly to, and meet, at least 1 time per year with the 
     board of governors, and shall have such name, functions and 
     be subject to such procedures as may be provided in the 
     bylaws.
       ``(e) Action Without Meeting.--Any action required or 
     permitted to be taken at any meeting of the board of 
     governors or of any committee thereof may be taken without a 
     meeting if all members of the board or committee, as the case 
     may be, consent thereto in writing, or by electronic 
     transmission and the writing or writings or electronic 
     transmission or transmissions are filed with the minutes of 
     proceedings of the board or committee. Such filing shall be 
     in paper form if the minutes are maintained in paper form and 
     shall be in electronic form if the minutes are maintained in 
     electronic form.
       ``(f) Voting by Proxy.--
       ``(1) In general.--Voting by proxy is not allowed at any 
     meeting of the board, at the annual meeting, or at any 
     meeting of a chapter.
       ``(2) Exception.--The board may allow the election of 
     governors by proxy during any emergency.
       ``(g) Bylaws.--
       ``(1) In general.--The board of governors may--
       ``(A) at any time adopt bylaws; and
       ``(B) at any time adopt bylaws to be effective only in an 
     emergency.
       ``(2) Emergency bylaws.--Any bylaws adopted pursuant to 
     paragraph (1)(B) may provide special procedures necessary for 
     managing the corporation during the emergency. All provisions 
     of the regular bylaws consistent with the emergency bylaws 
     remain effective during the emergency.
       ``(h) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) the term `entire board' means the total number of 
     members of the board of governors that the corporation would 
     have if there were no vacancies; and
       ``(2) the term `emergency' shall have such meaning as may 
     be provided in the bylaws.''.

     SEC. _07. POWERS.

       Paragraph (a)(1) of section 300105 of title 36, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``bylaws'' and inserting 
     ``policies''.

     SEC. _08. ANNUAL MEETING.

       Section 300107 of title 36, United States Code, is amended 
     to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 300107. Annual meeting

       ``(a) In General.--The annual meeting of the corporation is 
     the annual meeting of delegates of the chapters.
       ``(b) Time of Meeting.--The annual meeting shall be held as 
     determined by the board of governors.
       ``(c) Place of Meeting.--The board of governors is 
     authorized to determine that the annual meeting shall not be 
     held at any place, but may instead be held solely by means of 
     remote communication subject to such procedures as are 
     provided in the bylaws.
       ``(d) Voting.--
       ``(1) In general.--In matters requiring a vote at the 
     annual meeting, each chapter is entitled to at least 1 vote, 
     and voting on all matters may be conducted by mail, 
     telephone, telegram, cablegram, electronic mail, or any other 
     means of electronic or telephone transmission, provided that 
     the person voting shall state, or submit information from 
     which it can be determined, that the method of voting chosen 
     was authorized by such person.
       ``(2) Establishment of number of votes.--
       ``(A) In general.--The board of governors shall determine 
     on an equitable basis the number of votes that each chapter 
     is entitled to cast, taking into consideration the size of 
     the membership of the chapters, the populations served by the 
     chapters, and such other factors as may be determined by the 
     board.
       ``(B) Periodic review.--The board of governors shall review 
     the allocation of votes at least every 5 years.''.

     SEC. _09. ENDOWMENT FUND.

       Section 300109 of title 36, United States Code is amended--
       (1) by striking ``nine'' from the first sentence thereof; 
     and
       (2) by striking the second sentence and inserting the 
     following: ``The corporation shall prescribe policies and 
     regulations on terms and tenure of office, accountability, 
     and expenses of the board of trustees.''.

     SEC. _10. ANNUAL REPORT AND AUDIT.

       Subsection (a) of section 300110 of title 36, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Submission of Report.--As soon as practicable after 
     the end of the corporation's fiscal year, which may be 
     changed from time to time by the board of governors, the 
     corporation shall submit a report to the Secretary of Defense 
     on the activities of the corporation during such fiscal year, 
     including a complete, itemized report of all receipts and 
     expenditures.''.

     SEC. _11. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND OFFICE 
                   OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 3001 of title 36, United States 
     Code, is amended by redesignating section 300111 as section 
     300113 and by inserting after section 300110 the following 
     new sections:

     ``Sec. 300111. Authority of the Comptroller General of the 
       United States

       ``The Comptroller General of the United States is 
     authorized to review the corporation's involvement in any 
     Federal program or activity the Government carries out under 
     law.

     ``Sec. 300112. Office of the Ombudsman

       ``(a) Establishment.--The corporation shall establish an 
     Office of the Ombudsman with such duties and responsibilities 
     as may be provided in the bylaws or a resolution of the board 
     of governors.
       ``(b) Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall submit 
     annually to the appropriate Congressional committees a report

[[Page S3037]]

     concerning any trends and systemic matters that the Office of 
     the Ombudsman has identified as confronting the corporation.
       ``(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--For purposes 
     of paragraph (1), the appropriate Congressional committees 
     are the following committees of Congress:
       ``(A) Senate committees.--The appropriate Congressional 
     committees of the Senate are--
       ``(i) the Committee on Finance;
       ``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations;
       ``(iii) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
     Pensions;
       ``(iv) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs; and
       ``(v) the Committee on the Judiciary.
       ``(B) House committees.--The appropriate Congressional 
     committees of the House of Representatives are--
       ``(i) the Committee on Energy and Commerce;
       ``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs;
       ``(iii) the Committee on Homeland Security;
       ``(iv) the Committee on the Judiciary; and
       ``(v) the Committee on Ways and Means.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 
     3001 of title 36, United States Code, is amended by striking 
     the item relating to section 300111 and inserting the 
     following:

``300111. Authority of the Comptroller General of the United States.
``300112. Office of the Ombudsman.
``300113. Reservation of right to amend or repeal.''.

                           amendment no. 341

  (Purpose: To provide for an additional program requirement for the 
             border interoperability demonstration project)

       On page 124, line 16, strike ``and'' after the semicolon.
       On page 124, line 18, strike the period and insert ``; 
     and''.
       On page 124, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:
       (9) identify solutions to facilitate communications between 
     emergency response providers in communities of differing 
     population densities.


                 amendment no. 290, as modified further

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Establishment.--Not later than the end of fiscal year 
     2008, the Secretary shall establish a national homeland 
     security strategy.
       (2) Review.--Four years after the establishment of the 
     national homeland security strategy, and every 4 years 
     thereafter, the Secretary shall conduct a comprehensive 
     examination of the national homeland security strategy.
       (3) Scope.--In establishing or reviewing the national 
     homeland security strategy under this subsection, the 
     Secretary shall conduct a comprehensive examination of 
     interagency cooperation, preparedness of Federal response 
     assets, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of 
     the homeland security program and policies of the United 
     States with a view toward determining and expressing the 
     homeland security strategy of the United States and 
     establishing a homeland security program for the 20 years 
     following that examination.
       (4) Reference.--The establishment or review of the national 
     homeland security strategy under this subsection shall be 
     known as the ``quadrennial homeland security review''.
       (5) Consultation.--Each quadrennial homeland security 
     review under this subsection shall be conducted in 
     consultation with the Attorney General of the United States, 
     the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of 
     the Treasury.
       (b) Contents of Review.--Each quadrennial homeland security 
     review shall--
       (1) delineate a national homeland security strategy 
     consistent with the most recent National Response Plan 
     prepared under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 or 
     any directive meant to replace or augment that directive;
       (2) describe the interagency cooperation, preparedness of 
     Federal response assets, infrastructure, budget plan, and 
     other elements of the homeland security program and policies 
     of the United States associated with the national homeland 
     security strategy required to execute successfully the full 
     range of missions called for in the national homeland 
     security strategy delineated under paragraph (1); and
       (3) identify--
       (A) the budget plan required to provide sufficient 
     resources to successfully execute the full range of missions 
     called for in that national homeland security strategy at a 
     low-to-moderate level of risk; and
       (B) any additional resources required to achieve such a 
     level of risk.
       (c) Level of Risk.--The assessment of the level of risk for 
     purposes of subsection (b)(3) shall be conducted by the 
     Director of National Intelligence.
       (d) Reporting.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall submit a report 
     regarding each quadrennial homeland security review to 
     Congress and shall make the report publicly available on the 
     Internet. Each such report shall be submitted and made 
     available on the Internet not later than September 30 of the 
     year in which the review is conducted.
       (2) Contents of report.--Each report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) the results of the quadrennial homeland security 
     review;
       (B) the threats to the assumed or defined national homeland 
     security interests of the United States that were examined 
     for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in 
     the examination of those threats;
       (C) the status of cooperation among Federal agencies in the 
     effort to promote national homeland security;
       (D) the status of cooperation between the Federal 
     Government and State governments in preparing for emergency 
     response to threats to national homeland security; and
       (E) any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.
       (e) Resource Plan.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
     of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall provide to 
     Congress and make publicly available on the Internet a 
     detailed resource plan specifying the estimated budget and 
     number of staff members that will be required for preparation 
     of the initial quadrennial homeland security review.


                           amendment no. 323

 (Purpose: To provide for the inclusion of executive level training in 
                    certain curriculum for training)

       On page 23, strike lines 11 through 15, and insert the 
     following:
       (a) Curriculum.--The Secretary, acting through the Chief 
     Intelligence Officer, shall--
       (1) develop curriculum for the training of State, local, 
     and tribal government officials relating to the handling, 
     review, and development of intelligence material; and
       (2) ensure that the curriculum includes executive level 
     training.

                           amendment no. 368

  (Purpose: To make funds available for the activities of the Public 
                    Interest Declassification Board)

       At the end of title XI, add the following:

     SEC. 1104. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
                   DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

       Section 21067 of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 
     2007 (division B of Public Law 109-289; 120 Stat. 1311), as 
     amended by Public Law 109-369 (120 Stat. 2642), Public Law 
     109-383 (120 Stat. 2678), and Public Law 110-5, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c) From the amount provided by this section, the 
     National Archives and Records Administration may obligate 
     monies necessary to carry out the activities of the Public 
     Interest Declassification Board.''.

                           amendment no. 392

    (Purpose: To provide for the Secretary to ensure that chemical, 
     biological, radiological, and nuclear detection equipment and 
 technologies are integrated as appropriate with other border security 
      systems and detection technologies, and for other purposes)

       At the end of title XV, add the following:

     SEC. ____. INTEGRATION OF DETECTION EQUIPMENT AND 
                   TECHNOLOGIES.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary shall have responsibility 
     for ensuring that chemical, biological, radiological, and 
     nuclear detection equipment and technologies are integrated 
     as appropriate with other border security systems and 
     detection technologies.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to 
     Congress that contains a plan to develop a departmental 
     technology assessment process to determine and certify the 
     technology readiness levels of chemical, biological, 
     radiological, and nuclear detection technologies before the 
     full deployment of such technologies within the United 
     States.

                     amendment NO. 332, as modified

       On page 54, strike line 5 and all that follows through page 
     57, line 9, and insert the following:
       ``(a) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary, through the 
     Administrator, may award grants to State, local, and tribal 
     governments for the purposes of this title.
       ``(b) Programs Not Affected.--This title shall not be 
     construed to affect any authority to award grants under any 
     of the following Federal programs:
       ``(1) The firefighter assistance programs authorized under 
     section 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control 
     Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229 and 2229a).
       ``(2) The Urban Search and Rescue Grant Program authorized 
     under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
       ``(3) Grants to protect critical infrastructure, including 
     port security grants authorized under section 70107 of title 
     46, United States Code, and the grants authorized in title 
     XIII and XIV of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
       ``(4) The Metropolitan Medical Response System authorized 
     under section 635 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
     Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 723).
       ``(5) Grant programs other than those administered by the 
     Department.
       ``(c) Relationship to Other Laws.--
       ``(1) In general.--The grant programs authorized under this 
     title shall supercede all grant programs authorized under 
     section 1014 of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 3714).
       ``(2) Program integrity.--Each grant program under this 
     title, section 1809 of this

[[Page S3038]]

     Act, or section 662 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
     Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 763) shall include, consistent 
     with the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (31 U.S.C. 
     3321 note), policies and procedures for--
       ``(A) identifying activities funded under any such grant 
     program that are susceptible to significant improper 
     payments; and
       ``(B) reporting the incidence of improper payments to the 
     Department.
       ``(3) Allocation.--Except as provided under paragraph (2) 
     of this subsection, the allocation of grants authorized under 
     this title shall be governed by the terms of this title and 
     not by any other provision of law.
       ``(d) Minimum Performance Requirements.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall--
       ``(A) establish minimum performance requirements for 
     entities that receive homeland security grants;
       ``(B) conduct, in coordination with State, regional, local, 
     and tribal governments receiving grants under this title, 
     section 1809 of this Act, or section 662 of the Post-Katrina 
     Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 763), 
     simulations and exercises to test the minimum performance 
     requirements established under subparagraph (A) for--

       On page 66, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:
       ``(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated for grants under this section--
       ``(1) for fiscal year 2007, such sums as are necessary;
       ``(2) for each of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, 
     $1,278,639,000; and
       ``(3) for fiscal year 2011, and each fiscal year 
     thereafter, such sums as are necessary.

       On page 77, strike line 3 and all that follows through page 
     80, line 7, and insert the following:
       ``(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated for grants under this section--
       ``(1) for fiscal year 2007, such sums as are necessary;
       ``(2) for each of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, 
     $913,180,500; and
       ``(3) for fiscal year 2011, and each fiscal year 
     thereafter, such sums as are necessary.

     ``SEC. 2005. TERRORISM PREVENTION.

       On page 84, strike line 19 and insert the following:

     ``SEC. 2006. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF FUNDS.

       On page 85, line 25, strike ``611(j)(8)'' and insert 
     ``611(j)(9)''.
       On page 86, line 2, strike ``5196(j)(8))'' and insert 
     ``5196(j)(9))''.
       On page 87, strike line 22 and insert the following:

     ``SEC. 2007. ADMINISTRATION AND COORDINATION.

       On page 89, line 7, strike ``under this title'' and insert 
     ``under section 2003 or 2004''.
       On page 91, strike line 16 and insert the following:

     ``SEC. 2008. ACCOUNTABILITY.

       On page 94, lines 13 and 14, strike ``the Homeland Security 
     Grant Program'' and insert ``grants made under this title''.
       On page 97, strike lines 7 and 8 and insert the following:

     ``SEC. 2009. AUDITING.

       ``(a) Audits of Grants.--
       On page 104, strike line 7 and all that follows through 
     page 105, line 9, and insert the following:
       ``(d) Definition.--In this section, the term `Emergency 
     Management Performance Grants Program' means the Emergency 
     Management Performance Grants Program under section 662 of 
     the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 
     U.S.C. 763; Public Law 109-295).

     ``SEC. 2010. SENSE OF THE SENATE.

       ``It is the sense of the Senate that, in order to ensure 
     that the Nation is most effectively able to prevent, prepare 
     for, protect against, respond to, recovery from, and mitigate 
     against all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of 
     terrorism, and other man-made disasters--
       ``(1) the Department should administer a coherent and 
     coordinated system of both terrorism-focused and all-hazards 
     grants, the essential building blocks of which include--
       ``(A) the Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland 
     Security Grant Program established under this title 
     (including funds dedicated to law enforcement terrorism 
     prevention activities);
       ``(B) the Emergency Communications Operability and 
     Interoperable Communications Grants established under section 
     1809; and
       ``(C) the Emergency Management Performance Grants Program 
     authorized under section 662 of the Post-Katrina Emergency 
     Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 763); and
       ``(2) to ensure a continuing and appropriate balance 
     between terrorism-focused and all-hazards preparedness, the 
     amounts appropriated for grants under the Urban Area Security 
     Initiative, State Homeland Security Grant Program, and 
     Emergency Management Performance Grants Program in any fiscal 
     year should be in direct proportion to the amounts authorized 
     for those programs for fiscal year 2008 under the amendments 
     made by titles II and IV, as applicable, of the Improving 
     America's Security Act of 2007.''.

       On page 106, strike lines 1 through 9, and insert the 
     following:
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 note) 
     is amended by striking the items relating to title XVIII and 
     sections 1801 through 1806, as added by the SAFE Port Act 
     (Public Law 109-347; 120 Stat. 1884), and inserting the 
     following:

             ``TITLE XIX--DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

``Sec. 1901. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
``Sec. 1902. Mission of Office.
``Sec. 1903. Hiring authority.
``Sec. 1904. Testing authority.
``Sec. 1905. Relationship to other Department entities and Federal 
              agencies.
``Sec. 1906. Contracting and grant making authorities.

                  ``TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

``Sec. 2001. Definitions.
``Sec. 2002. Homeland Security Grant Program.
``Sec. 2003. Urban Area Security Initiative.
``Sec. 2004. State Homeland Security Grant Program.
``Sec. 2005. Terrorism prevention.
``Sec. 2006. Restrictions on use of funds.
``Sec. 2007. Administration and coordination.
``Sec. 2008. Accountability.
``Sec. 2009. Auditing.
``Sec. 2010. Sense of the Senate.''.

       TITLE III--COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY

       On page 126, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:

       TITLE IV--EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS PROGRAM

     SEC. 401. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS PROGRAM.

       Section 622 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
     Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 763) is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 622. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS PROGRAM.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Population.--The term `population' means population 
     according to the most recent United States census population 
     estimates available at the start of the relevant fiscal year.
       ``(2) State.--The term `State' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 101 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 101).
       ``(b) In General.--There is an Emergency Management 
     Performance Grants Program to make grants to States to assist 
     State, local, and tribal governments in preparing for, 
     responding to, recovering from, and mitigating against all 
     hazards.
       ``(c) Application.--
       ``(1) In general.--Each State may apply for a grant under 
     this section, and shall submit such information in support of 
     an application as the Administrator may reasonably require.
       ``(2) Annual applications.--Applicants for grants under 
     this section shall apply or reapply on an annual basis for 
     grants distributed under the program.
       ``(d) Allocation.--Funds available under the Emergency 
     Management Performance Grants Program shall be allocated as 
     follows:
       ``(1) Baseline amount.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     each State shall receive an amount equal to 0.75 percent of 
     the total funds appropriated for grants under this section.
       ``(B) Territories.--American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the 
     Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each 
     shall receive an amount equal to 0.25 percent of the amounts 
     appropriated for grants under this section.
       ``(2) Per capita allocation.--The funds remaining for 
     grants under this section after allocation of the baseline 
     amounts under paragraph (1) shall be allocated to each State 
     in proportion to its population.
       ``(3) Consistency in allocation.--Notwithstanding 
     paragraphs (1) and (2), in any fiscal year in which the 
     appropriation for grants under this section is equal to or 
     greater than the appropriation for Emergency Management 
     Performance Grants in fiscal year 2007, no State shall 
     receive an amount under this section for that fiscal year 
     less than the amount that State received in fiscal year 2007.
       ``(e) Allowable Uses.--Grants awarded under this section 
     may be used to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and 
     mitigate against all hazards through--
       ``(1) any activity authorized under title VI or section 201 
     of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
     Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq. and 5131);
       ``(2) any activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007 
     Program Guidance of the Department for Emergency Management 
     Performance Grants; and
       ``(3) any other activity approved by the Administrator that 
     will improve the emergency management capacity of State, 
     local, or tribal governments to coordinate, integrate, and 
     enhance preparedness for, response to, recovery from, or 
     mitigation against all-hazards.
       ``(f) Cost Sharing.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (i), 
     the Federal share of the costs of an activity carried out 
     with a grant under this section shall not exceed 50 percent.
       ``(2) In-kind matching.--Each recipient of a grant under 
     this section may meet the matching requirement under 
     paragraph (1) by making in-kind contributions of goods or 
     services that are directly linked with the purpose for which 
     the grant is made.

[[Page S3039]]

       ``(g) Distribution of Funds.--The Administrator shall not 
     delay distribution of grant funds to States under this 
     section solely because of delays in or timing of awards of 
     other grants administered by the Department.
       ``(h) Local and Tribal Governments.--
       ``(1) In general.--In allocating grant funds received under 
     this section, a State shall take into account the needs of 
     local and tribal governments.
       ``(2) Indian tribes.--States shall be responsible for 
     allocating grant funds received under this section to tribal 
     governments in order to help those tribal communities improve 
     their capabilities in preparing for, responding to, 
     recovering from, or mitigating against all hazards. Tribal 
     governments shall be eligible for funding directly from the 
     States, and shall not be required to seek funding from any 
     local government.
       ``(i) Emergency Operations Centers Improvement Program.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Administrator may award grants to 
     States under this section to plan for, equip, upgrade, or 
     construct all-hazards State, local, or regional emergency 
     operations centers.
       ``(2) Requirements.--No grant awards under this section 
     (including for the activities specified under this 
     subsection) shall be used for construction unless such 
     construction occurs under terms and conditions consistent 
     with the requirements under section 611(j)(9) of the Robert 
     T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
     U.S.C. 5196(j)(9).
       ``(3) Cost sharing.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Federal share of the costs of an 
     activity carried out with a grant under this subsection shall 
     not exceed 75 percent.
       ``(B) In kind matching.--Each recipient of a grant for an 
     activity under this section may meet the matching requirement 
     under subparagraph (A) by making in-kind contributions of 
     goods or services that are directly linked with the purpose 
     for which the grant is made.
       ``(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated for grants under this section--
       ``(1) for fiscal year 2007, such sums as are necessary;
       ``(2) for each of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, 
     $913,180,500; and
       ``(3) for fiscal year 2011, and each fiscal year 
     thereafter, such sums as are necessary.''.


                           amendment no. 391

  (Purpose: To improve the guidelines for fusion centers operated by 
State or local governments, to improve the awarding and administration 
          of homeland security grants, and for other purposes)

       On page 37, line 5, strike ``within the scope'' and all 
     that follows through ``(6 U.S.C. 485)'' on line 8 and insert 
     ``and intelligence''.
       On page 37, lines 9 and 10, strike ``local emergency 
     response providers'' and insert ``local government agencies 
     (including emergency response providers)''.
       On page 37, line 25, strike ``and''.
       On page 38, line 3, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
       On page 38, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
       ``(9) incorporate emergency response providers, and, as 
     appropriate, the private sector, into all relevant phases of 
     the intelligence and fusion process through full time 
     representatives or liaison officers.
       On page 63, line 13, before the semicolon, insert the 
     following: ``the inclusion of which will enhance regional 
     efforts to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
     and recover from acts of terrorism''.
       On page 66, strike lines 3 through 8 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(2) State distribution of funds.--
       ``(A) In general.--Each State shall provide the eligible 
     metropolitan area not less than 80 percent of the grant 
     funds. Any funds retained by a State shall be expended on 
     items or services approved by the Administrator that benefit 
     the eligible metropolitan area.
       ``(B) Funds retained.--A State shall provide each relevant 
     eligible metropolitan area with an accounting of the items or 
     services on which any funds retained by the State under 
     subparagraph (A) were expended.
       On page 82, line 4, strike ``or other'' and insert ``and 
     other''.
       On page 83, line 15, before the semicolon, insert the 
     following: ``, including through review of budget requests 
     for those programs''.
       On page 90, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:
       ``(3) Existing planning committees.--Nothing in this 
     subsection may be construed to require that any State or 
     metropolitan area create a planning committee if that State 
     or metropolitan area has established and uses a 
     multijurisdictional planning committee or commission that 
     meets the requirements of this subsection.


                           amendment no. 431

    (Purpose: To clarify the coordination of the accreditation and 
 certification program for the private sector, and for other purposes)

       On page 194, lines 18 and 19, strike ``and each private 
     sector advisory council created under section 102(f)(4)'' and 
     insert ``each private sector advisory council created under 
     section 102(f)(4), and appropriate private sector advisory 
     groups such as sector coordinating councils and information 
     sharing and analysis centers''.
       On page 195, line 12, strike ``the American National 
     Standards Institute and'' and insert ``representatives of 
     organizations that coordinate or facilitate the development 
     of and use of voluntary consensus standards''.
       On page 195, lines 14 through 16, strike ``and each private 
     sector advisory council created under section 102(f)(4)'' and 
     insert ``, each private sector advisory council created under 
     section 102(f)(4), and appropriate private sector advisory 
     groups such as sector coordinating councils and information 
     sharing and analysis centers''.
       On page 196, line 21, strike ``and'' after the semicolon.
       On page 196, strike lines 17-23 and insert the following:
       ``(C) consider the unique nature of various sectors within 
     the private sector, including preparedness, business 
     continuity standards, or best practices, established--
       ``(i) under any other provision of Federal law; or
       ``(ii) by any sector-specific agency, as defined under 
     Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7; and
       ``(D) coordinate the program, as appropriate, with--
       ``(i) other Department private sector related programs; and
       ``(ii) preparedness and business continuity programs in 
     other Federal agencies.
       On page 201, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following:
       ``(e) Compliance by Entities Seeking Certification.--Any 
     entity seeking certification under this section shall comply 
     with all applicable statutes, regulations, directives, 
     policies, and industry codes of practice in meeting 
     certification requirements.
       On page 201, line 10, strike ``(e)'' and insert ``(f)''.
       On page 201, line 13, strike ``(f)'' and insert ``(g)''.
       On page 201, line 18, strike ``(g)'' and insert ``(h)''.
       On page 202, strike lines 20 through 24, and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 706. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this title may be construed to supercede any 
     preparedness or business continuity standards, requirements, 
     or best practices established--
       (1) under any other provision of Federal law; or
       (2) by any sector-specific agency, as defined under 
     Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.


                           amendment no. 348

 (Purpose: To require that a redacted version of the Executive Summary 
   of the Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence 
 Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Joint 
  Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the 
   Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 is made available to the 
                                public)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. ___. AVAILABILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT 
                   ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY 
                   REGARDING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 
                   11, 2001.

       (a) Public Availability.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency shall prepare and make available 
     to the public a version of the Executive Summary of the 
     report entitled the ``Office of Inspector General Report on 
     Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings 
     and Conclusions of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence 
     Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks 
     of September 11, 2001'' issued in June 2005 that is 
     declassified to the maximum extent possible, consistent with 
     national security.
       (b) Report to Congress.--The Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a classified 
     annex to the redacted Executive Summary made available under 
     subsection (a) that explains the reason that any redacted 
     material in the Executive Summary was withheld from the 
     public.


                           amendment no. 404

   (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to notify 
    Congress not later than 30 days before waiving any eligibility 
requirement under the visa waiver program established under section 217 
                of the Immigration and Nationality Act)

       On page 133, line 20, strike ``(C)'' and insert the 
     following:
       (C) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following: 
     ``The Secretary of Homeland Security may not waive any 
     eligibility requirement under this section unless the 
     Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional committees 
     not later than 30 days before the effective date of such 
     waiver.'';
       (D)


                     amendment no. 388, as modified

       On page 105, after line 9, insert the following:

     SEC. 203. EQUIPMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRAINING

       (a) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate 
     that the Department of Homeland Security shall conduct no 
     fewer than 7,500 trainings annually through the Domestic 
     Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program.
       (b) Report.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     report no later than September 30 annually to the Senate 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the 
     House Homeland Security Committee, Senate Appropriations 
     Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and the

[[Page S3040]]

     House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security--
       (1) on the number of trainings conducted that year through 
     the Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance 
     Program; and
       (2) if the number of trainings conducted that year is less 
     than 7,500, an explanation of why fewer trainings were 
     needed.


                     amendment no. 411, as modified

       At the end, add the following new title:

              TITLE XVI--ADVANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES

     SECTION 1601. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Advance Democratic Values, 
     Address Non-democratic Countries, and Enhance Democracy Act 
     of 2007'' or the ``ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007''.

     SEC. 1602. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that in order to support the expansion of 
     freedom and democracy in the world, the foreign policy of the 
     United States should be organized in support of 
     transformational diplomacy that seeks to work through 
     partnerships to build and sustain democratic, well-governed 
     states that will respect human rights and respond to the 
     needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in 
     the international system.

     SEC. 1603. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It should be the policy of the United States--
       (1) to promote freedom and democracy in foreign countries 
     as a fundamental component of the foreign policy of the 
     United States;
       (2) to affirm internationally recognized human rights 
     standards and norms and to condemn offenses against those 
     rights;
       (3) to use instruments of United States influence to 
     support, promote, and strengthen democratic principles, 
     practices, and values, including the right to free, fair, and 
     open elections, secret balloting, and universal suffrage;
       (4) to protect and promote fundamental freedoms and rights, 
     including the freedom of association, of expression, of the 
     press, and of religion, and the right to own private 
     property;
       (5) to protect and promote respect for and adherence to the 
     rule of law;
       (6) to provide appropriate support to nongovernmental 
     organizations working to promote freedom and democracy;
       (7) to provide political, economic, and other support to 
     countries that are willingly undertaking a transition to 
     democracy;
       (8) to commit to the long-term challenge of promoting 
     universal democracy; and
       (9) to strengthen alliances and relationships with other 
     democratic countries in order to better promote and defend 
     shared values and ideals.

     SEC. 1604. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Annual report on advancing freedom and democracy.--The 
     term ``Annual Report on Advancing Freedom and Democracy'' 
     refers to the annual report submitted to Congress by the 
     Department of State pursuant to section 665(c) of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
     107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2151n note), in which the Department 
     reports on actions taken by the United States Government to 
     encourage respect for human rights and democracy.
       (2) Assistant secretary.--The term ``Assistant Secretary'' 
     means the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 
     Rights, and Labor.
       (3) Community of democracies and community.--The terms 
     ``Community of Democracies'' and ``Community'' mean the 
     association of democratic countries committed to the global 
     promotion of democratic principles, practices, and values, 
     which held its First Ministerial Conference in Warsaw, 
     Poland, in June 2000.
       (4) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the 
     Department of State.
       (5) Under secretary.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means 
     the Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global 
     Affairs.

  Subtitle A--Liaison Officers and Fellowship Program to Enhance the 
                         Promotion of Democracy

     SEC. 1611. DEMOCRACY LIAISON OFFICERS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall establish and 
     staff Democracy Liaison Officer positions, under the 
     supervision of the Assistant Secretary, who may be assigned 
     to the following posts:
       (1) United States missions to, or liaison with, regional 
     and multilateral organizations, including the United States 
     missions to the European Union, African Union, Organization 
     of American States and any other appropriate regional 
     organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
     Europe, the United Nations and its relevant specialized 
     agencies, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
       (2) Regional public diplomacy centers of the Department.
       (3) United States combatant commands.
       (4) Other posts as designated by the Secretary of State.
       (b) Responsibilities.--Each Democracy Liaison Officer 
     should--
       (1) provide expertise on effective approaches to promote 
     and build democracy;
       (2) assist in formulating and implementing strategies for 
     transitions to democracy; and
       (3) carry out other responsibilities as the Secretary of 
     State and the Assistant Secretary may assign.
       (c) New Positions.--The Democracy Liaison Officer positions 
     established under subsection (a) should be new positions that 
     are in addition to existing officer positions with 
     responsibility for other human rights and democracy related 
     issues and programs.
       (d) Relationship to Other Authorities.--Nothing in this 
     section may be construed as removing any authority or 
     responsibility of a chief of mission or other employee of a 
     diplomatic mission of the United States provided under any 
     other provision of law, including any authority or 
     responsibility for the development or implementation of 
     strategies to promote democracy.

     SEC. 1612. DEMOCRACY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

       (a) Requirement for Program.--The Secretary of State shall 
     establish a Democracy Fellowship Program to enable Department 
     officers to gain an additional perspective on democracy 
     promotion abroad by working on democracy issues in 
     congressional committees with oversight over the subject 
     matter of this title, including the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and in 
     nongovernmental organizations involved in democracy 
     promotion.
       (b) Selection and Placement.--The Assistant Secretary shall 
     play a central role in the selection of Democracy Fellows and 
     facilitate their placement in appropriate congressional 
     offices and nongovernmental organizations.
       (c) Exception.--A Democracy Fellow may not be assigned to 
     any congressional office until the Secretary of Defense 
     certifies to the Committee on Armed Services and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives that the request of 
     the Commander of the United States Central Command for the 
     Department of State for personnel and foreign service 
     officers has been fulfilled.

     SEC. 1613. TRANSPARENCY OF UNITED STATES BROADCASTING TO 
                   ASSIST IN OVERSIGHT AND ENSURE PROMOTION OF 
                   HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL 
                   BROADCASTS.

       (a) Transcripts.--The Broadcasting Board of Governors shall 
     transcribe into English all original broadcasting content.
       (b) Public Transparency.--The Broadcasting Board of 
     Governors shall post all English transcripts from its 
     broadcasting content on a publicly available website within 
     30 days of the original broadcast.
       (c) Broadcasting Content Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``broadcasting content'' includes programming produced 
     or broadcast by United State international broadcasters, 
     including--
       (1) Voice of America;
       (2) Alhurra;
       (3) Radio Sawa;
       (4) Radio Farda;
       (5) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty;
       (6) Radio Free Asia; and
       (7) The Office of Cuba Broadcasting.

      Subtitle B--Annual Report on Advancing Freedom and Democracy

     SEC. 1621. ANNUAL REPORT.

       (a) Report Title.--Section 665(c) of the Foreign Relations 
     Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22 
     U.S.C. 2151n note) is amended in the first sentence by 
     inserting ``entitled the Advancing Freedom and Democracy 
     Report'' before the period at the end.
       (b) Schedule for Submission.--If a report entitled the 
     Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report pursuant to section 
     665(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
     Year 2003, as amended by subsection (a), is submitted under 
     such section, such report shall be submitted not later than 
     90 days after the date of submission of the report required 
     by section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2151n(d)).
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 665(c) of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
     107-228; 2151n note) is amended by striking ``30 days'' and 
     inserting ``90 days''.

     SEC. 1622. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   REPORTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State 
     should continue to ensure and expand the timely translation 
     of Human Rights and International Religious Freedom reports 
     and the Annual Report on Advancing Freedom and Democracy 
     prepared by personnel of the Department of State into the 
     principal languages of as many countries as possible. 
     Translations are welcomed because information on United 
     States support for universal enjoyment of freedoms and rights 
     serves to encourage individuals around the globe seeking to 
     advance the cause of freedom in their countries.

Subtitle C--Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion and the Internet 
                   Website of the Department of State

     SEC. 1631. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.

       Congress commends the Secretary of State for creating an 
     Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion, and it is the 
     sense of Congress that the Committee should play a 
     significant role in the Department's transformational 
     diplomacy by advising the Secretary of State regarding United 
     States efforts to promote democracy and democratic transition 
     in connection with the formulation and implementation of 
     United States foreign policy and foreign assistance.

[[Page S3041]]

     SEC. 1632. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE INTERNET WEBSITE OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Secretary of State should continue and further 
     expand the Secretary's existing efforts to inform the public 
     in foreign countries of the efforts of the United States to 
     promote democracy and defend human rights through the 
     Internet website of the Department of State;
       (2) the Secretary of State should continue to enhance the 
     democracy promotion materials and resources on that Internet 
     website, as such enhancement can benefit and encourage those 
     around the world who seek freedom; and
       (3) such enhancement should include where possible and 
     practical, translated reports on democracy and human rights 
     prepared by personnel of the Department, narratives and 
     histories highlighting successful nonviolent democratic 
     movements, and other relevant material.

     Subtitle D--Training in Democracy and Human Rights; Promotions

     SEC. 1641. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRAINING IN DEMOCRACY AND 
                   HUMAN RIGHTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Secretary of State should continue to enhance and 
     expand the training provided to foreign service officers and 
     civil service employees on how to strengthen and promote 
     democracy and human rights; and
       (2) the Secretary of State should continue the effective 
     and successful use of case studies and practical workshops 
     addressing potential challenges, and work with non-state 
     actors, including nongovernmental organizations that support 
     democratic principles, practices, and values.

     SEC. 1642. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ADVANCE DEMOCRACY AWARD.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Secretary of State should further strengthen the 
     capacity of the Department to carry out result-based 
     democracy promotion efforts through the establishment of 
     awards and other employee incentives, including the 
     establishment of an annual award known as Outstanding 
     Achievements in Advancing Democracy, or the ADVANCE Democracy 
     Award, that would be awarded to officers or employees of the 
     Department; and
       (2) the Secretary of State should establish the procedures 
     for selecting recipients of such award, including any 
     financial terms, associated with such award.

     SEC. 1643. PROMOTIONS.

       The precepts for selection boards responsible for 
     recommending promotions of foreign service officers, 
     including members of the senior foreign service, should 
     include consideration of a candidate's experience or service 
     in promotion of human rights and democracy.

     SEC. 1644. PROGRAMS BY UNITED STATES MISSIONS IN FOREIGN 
                   COUNTRIES AND ACTIVITIES OF CHIEFS OF MISSION.

       It is the sense of Congress that each chief of mission 
     should provide input on the actions described in the 
     Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report submitted under 
     section 665(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
     Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2151n note), 
     as amended by section 1621, and should intensify democracy 
     and human rights promotion activities.

            Subtitle E--Alliances With Democratic Countries

     SEC. 1651. ALLIANCES WITH DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES.

       (a) Establishment of an Office for the Community of 
     Democracies.--The Secretary of State should, and is 
     authorized to, establish an Office for the Community of 
     Democracies with the mission to further develop and 
     strengthen the institutional structure of the Community of 
     Democracies, develop interministerial projects, enhance the 
     United Nations Democracy Caucus, manage policy development of 
     the United Nations Democracy Fund, and enhance coordination 
     with other regional and multilateral bodies with jurisdiction 
     over democracy issues.
       (b) Sense of Congress on International Center for 
     Democratic Transition.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     International Center for Democratic Transition, an initiative 
     of the Government of Hungary, serves to promote practical 
     projects and the sharing of best practices in the area of 
     democracy promotion and should be supported by, in 
     particular, other European countries with experiences in 
     democratic transitions, the United States, and private 
     individuals.

             Subtitle F--Funding for Promotion of Democracy

     SEC. 1661. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY 
                   FUND.

       It is the sense of Congress that the United States should 
     work with other countries to enhance the goals and work of 
     the United Nations Democracy Fund, an essential tool to 
     promote democracy, and in particular support civil society in 
     their efforts to help consolidate democracy and bring about 
     transformational change.

     SEC. 1662. THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY FUND.

       The purpose of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund should 
     be to support innovative programming, media, and materials 
     designed to uphold democratic principles, support and 
     strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights and 
     the rule of law, and build civil societies in countries 
     around the world.


                           Amendment no. 456

  (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to include 
         levees in the list of critical infrastructure sectors)

       At the appropriate place, insert ``The Secretary shall 
     include levees in the Department's list of critical 
     infrastructure sectors.


                     AMENDMENT NO. 414, as modified

       Insert at the appropriate place:
       (a) Demonstration Project.--Not later than 120 days after 
     the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall--
       (1) establish a demonstration project to conduct 
     demonstrations of security management systems that--
       (A) shall use a management system standards approach; and
       (B) may be integrated into quality, safety, environmental 
     and other internationally adopted management systems; and
       (2) enter into 1 or more agreements with a private sector 
     entity to conduct such demonstrations of security management 
     systems.


                     amendment no. 412, as modified

     (Purpose: To provide for model ports of entry and modify the 
               international registered traveler program)

       On page 2, after the item relating to section 405, insert 
     the following:

       Sec. 406. Model ports-of-entry.
       On page 148, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 406. MODEL PORTS-OF-ENTRY.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
       (1) establish a model ports-of-entry program for the 
     purpose of providing a more efficient and welcoming 
     international arrival process in order to facilitate and 
     promote business and tourist travel to the United States, 
     while also improving security; and
       (2) implement the program initially at the 20 United States 
     international airports with the greatest average annual 
     number of arriving foreign visitors.
       (b) Program Elements.--The program shall include--
       (1) enhanced queue management in the Federal Inspection 
     Services area leading up to primary inspection;
       (2) assistance for foreign travelers once they have been 
     admitted to the United States, in consultation, as 
     appropriate, with relevant governmental and nongovernmental 
     entities; and
       (3) instructional videos, in English and such other 
     languages as the Secretary determines appropriate, in the 
     Federal Inspection Services area that explain the United 
     States inspection process and feature national, regional, or 
     local welcome videos.
       (c) Additional Customs and Border Protection Officers for 
     High Volume Ports.--Subject to the availability of 
     appropriations, before the end of fiscal year 2008 the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall employ not less than an 
     additional 200 Customs and Border Protection officers to 
     address staff shortages at the 20 United States international 
     airports with the highest average number of foreign visitors 
     arriving annually.


                     amendment no. 354, as modified

       Beginning with line 1 on page 1, strike through the end of 
     the amendment and insert the following:
       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. PLAN FOR 100 PERCENT SCANNING OF CARGO CONTAINERS.

       Section 232(c) of the Security and Accountability For Every 
     Port Act (6 U.S.c. 982(c)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Not later'' and inserting the following:
       ``(1) In general.--Not later'';
       (2) by resetting the left margin of the text thereof 2 ems 
     from the left margin; and
       (3) by inserting at the end thereof the following:
       ``(2) Plan for 100 percent scanning of cargo containers.--
       ``(A) In general.--The first report under paragraph (1) 
     shall include an initial plan to scan 100 percent of the 
     cargo containers destined for the United States before such 
     containers arrive in the United States.
       ``(B) Plan contents.--The plan under subparagraph (A) shall 
     include--
       ``(i) specific annual benchmarks for the percentage of 
     cargo containers destined for the United States that are 
     scanned at a foreign port;
       ``(ii) annual increases in the benchmarks described in 
     clause (i) until 100 percent of the cargo containers destined 
     for the United States are scanned before arriving in the 
     United States, unless the Secretary explains in writing to 
     the appropriate congressional committees that inadequate 
     progress has been made in meeting the criteria in section 
     232(b) for expanded scanning to be practical or feasible;
       ``(iii) an analysis of how to effectively incorporate 
     existing programs, including the Container Security 
     Initiative established by section 205 and the Customs-Trade 
     Partnership Against Terrorism established by subtitle B, to 
     reach the benchmarks described in clause (i); and
       ``(iv) an analysis of the scanning equipment, personnel, 
     and technology necessary to reach the goal of 100 percent 
     scanning of cargo containers.
       ``(C) Subsequent reports.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
     after the initial report shall include an assessment of the 
     progress toward implementing the plan under subparagraph 
     (A).''.

[[Page S3042]]

Amendments Nos. 423, 424, 340, 307, 358, 359, 394, 415, and 371 En Bloc

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, on behalf of the Commerce Committee, 
I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and the 
Senate proceed en bloc to the consideration of a series of amendments 
which have been cleared by the chair and ranking member of the Commerce 
Committee, Senators Inouye and Stevens.
  The amendments are as follows: Inouye-Stevens amendment No. 423 with 
a modification; Inouye-Stevens amendment No. 424 with a modification; 
Rockefeller amendment No. 340; Kerry amendment No. 307; Murray 
amendment No. 358 with a modification; Lautenberg amendment No. 359 
with a modification; Cardin amendment No. 394.
  On behalf of the Banking Committee, Senators Dodd and Shelby, I ask 
that the following amendments within their jurisdiction which they have 
cleared also be considered: Dodd amendment No. 415, Kohl amendment No. 
371 with a modification.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be 
agreed to en bloc, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, en 
bloc, that any statements thereon be printed in the Record, and that 
the consideration of these amendments appear separately in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments (Nos. 340, 307, 394, and 415) were agreed to, as 
follows:


                 AMENDMENT NO. 340 TO AMENDMENT NO. 275

(Purpose: To reinstate the State registration fee system for commercial 
   motor vehicles until the Unified Carrier Registration System Plan 
                    Agreement is fully implemented)

         On page 4, strike the item relating to section 1336 and 
     insert the following:

Sec. 1336. Unified carrier registration system plan agreement.
Sec. 1337. Authorization of appropriations.

       On page 298, strike line 8 and insert the following:

     SEC. 1336. UNIFIED CARRIER REGISTRATION SYSTEM PLAN 
                   AGREEMENT.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 4305(a) of the 
     SAFETEA-LU Act (Public Law 109-59)--
       (1) section 14504 of title 49, United States Code, as that 
     section was in effect on December 31, 2006, is re-enacted, 
     effective as of January 1, 2007; and
       (2) no fee shall be collected pursuant to section 14504a of 
     title 49, United States Code, until 30 days after the date, 
     as determined by the Secretary of Transportation, on which--
       (A) the unified carrier registration system plan and 
     agreement required by that section has been fully 
     implemented; and
       (B) the fees have been set by the Secretary under 
     subsection (d)(7)(B) of that section.
       (b) Repeal of Section 14504.--Section 14504 of title 49, 
     United States Code, as re-enacted by this Act, is repealed 
     effective on the date on which fees may be collected under 
     section 14504a of title 49, United States Code, pursuant to 
     subsection (a)(2) of this section.

     SEC. 1337. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.




                 amendmend no. 307 to amendment no. 275

    (Purpose: To modify the criteria that the Secretary of Homeland 
   Security will use to develop a hazardous material tracking pilot 
                      program for motor carriers)

       On page 305, strike lines 8 through 15 and insert the 
     following:
       (v) technology that allows the installation by a motor 
     carrier of concealed electronic devices on commercial motor 
     vehicles that can be activated by law enforcement authorities 
     and alert emergency response resources to locate and recover 
     high hazard materials in the event of loss or theft of such 
     materials and consider the addition of this type of 
     technology to the required communications technology 
     attributes under paragraph (1).



                 AMENDMENT NO. 394 TO AMENDMENT NO. 275

(Purpose: To require Amtrak contracts and leases involving the State of 
    Maryland to be governed by the laws of the District of Columbia)

         On page 299, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

     SEC. 1337. APPLICABILITY OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW TO 
                   CERTAIN AMTRAK CONTRACTS.

       Section 24301 of title 49, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:
       ``(o) Applicability of District of Columbia Law.--Any lease 
     or contract entered into between the National Railroad 
     Passenger Corporation and the State of Maryland, or any 
     department or agency of the State of Maryland, after the date 
     of the enactment of this subsection shall be governed by the 
     laws of the District of Columbia.''.


                 AMENDMENT NO. 415 TO AMENDMENT NO. 275

  (Purpose: To amend title X, with respect to critical infrastructure 
        protection efforts by Federal departments and agencies)

         On page 233, strike lines 8 through 15.
       On page 233, line 16, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(b)''.
       On page 233, line 19, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(c)''.
       On page 234, strike lines 17 through 21 and insert the 
     following:
       (2) Classified information.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary shall submit with each 
     report under this subsection a classified annex containing 
     information required to be submitted under this subsection 
     that cannot be made public.
       (B) Retention of classification.--The classification of 
     information required to be provided to Congress, the 
     Department, or any other department or agency under this 
     section by a sector-specific agency, including the assignment 
     of a level of classification of such information, shall be 
     binding on Congress, the Department, and that other Federal 
     agency.
       On page 235, line 21, strike ``private sector'' and all 
     that follows through page 236, line 4 and insert ``private 
     sector.''.
       On page 236, line 8, insert ``a report'' after ``submit''.
       On page 236, beginning on line 11, strike ``a report'' and 
     insert the following: ``, and to each Committee of the Senate 
     and the House of Representatives having jurisdiction over the 
     critical infrastructure or key resource addressed by the 
     report,''.
       On page 236, strike lines 18 and 19 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(2) Classified information.--
       ``(A) In general.--The report under this subsection may 
     contain a classified annex.
       ``(B) Retention of classification.--The classification of 
     information required to be provided to Congress, the 
     Department, or any other department or agency under this 
     section by a sector-specific agency, including the assignment 
     of a level of classification of such information, shall be 
     binding on Congress, the Department, and that other Federal 
     agency.''.

       On page 236, after line 23, insert the following:

     SEC. 1004. PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS.

       Not later than 6 months after the last day of fiscal year 
     2007, and for each year thereafter, the Secretary, in 
     cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 
     Transportation, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary 
     of Energy shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
     and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Financial Services and the Committee on Homeland Security of 
     the House of Representatives a report that details the 
     actions taken by the Federal Government to ensure, in 
     accordance with subsections (a) and (c) of section 101 of the 
     Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2071), the 
     preparedness of industry--
       (1) to reduce interruption of critical infrastructure 
     operations during a terrorist attack, natural catastrophe, or 
     other similar national emergency; and
       (2) to minimize the impact of such catastrophes, as so 
     described in section 1001(a)(1).

  The amendment (No. 423), as modified, was agreed to, as follows:

                     amendment no. 423 as modified

       On page 203, beginning with line 4, strike through line 5 
     on page 215 and insert the following:

     SEC. 801. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING.

       (a) In General.--Section 114(t)(1)(B) of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) transportation modal and intermodal security plans 
     addressing risks, threats, and vulnerabilities for aviation, 
     bridge, tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, 
     pipeline, rail, mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other 
     public transportation infrastructure assets.''.
       (b) Contents of the National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security.--Section 114(t)(3) of such title is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, based on risk 
     assessments conducted by the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     (including assessments conducted under section 1321 or 1403 
     of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007 or any 
     provision of law amended by such title),'' after ``risk based 
     priorities'';
       (2) in subparagraph (D)--
       (A) by striking ``and local'' and inserting ``, local, and 
     tribal''; and
       (B) by striking ``private sector cooperation and 
     participation'' and inserting ``cooperation and participation 
     by private sector entities'';
       (3) in subparagraph (E)--
       (A) by striking ``response'' and inserting ``prevention, 
     response,''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and threatened and executed acts of 
     terrorism outside the United States to the extent such acts 
     affect United States transportation systems'' before the 
     period at the end;
       (4) in subparagraph (F), by adding at the end the 
     following: ``Transportation security research and development 
     projects shall be based, to the extent practicable, on such 
     prioritization. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be 
     construed to require the termination of any research or 
     development project initiated by the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security before the date of enactment of the Improving 
     America's Security Act of 2007.''; and

[[Page S3043]]

       (5) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(G) Short- and long-term budget recommendations for 
     Federal transportation security programs, which reflect the 
     priorities of the National Strategy for Transportation 
     Security.
       ``(H) Methods for linking the individual transportation 
     modal security plans and the programs contained therein, and 
     a plan for addressing the security needs of intermodal 
     transportation hubs.
       ``(I) Transportation security modal and intermodal plans, 
     including operational recovery plans to expedite, to the 
     maximum extent practicable, the return to operation of an 
     adversely affected transportation system following a major 
     terrorist attack on that system or another catastrophe. These 
     plans shall be coordinated with the resumption of trade 
     protocols required under section 202 of the SAFE Port Act (6 
     U.S.C. 942).''.
       (c) Periodic Progress Reports.--Section 114(t)(4) of such 
     title is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C)--
       (A) in clause (i), by inserting ``, including the 
     transportation modal security plans'' before the period at 
     the end; and
       (B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
       ``(ii) Content.--Each progress report submitted under this 
     subparagraph shall include the following:

       ``(I) Recommendations for improving and implementing the 
     National Strategy for Transportation Security and the 
     transportation modal and intermodal security plans that the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate.
       ``(II) An accounting of all grants for transportation 
     security, including grants for research and development, 
     distributed by the Secretary of Homeland Security in the most 
     recently concluded fiscal year and a description of how such 
     grants accomplished the goals of the National Strategy for 
     Transportation Security.
       ``(III) An accounting of all--

       ``(aa) funds requested in the President's budget submitted 
     pursuant to section 1105 of title 31 for the most recently 
     concluded fiscal year for transportation security, by mode; 
     and
       ``(bb) personnel working on transportation security by 
     mode, including the number of contractors.
       ``(iii) Written explanation of transportation security 
     activities not delineated in the national strategy for 
     transportation security.--At the end of each year, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a written explanation of 
     any activity inconsistent with, or not clearly delineated in, 
     the National Strategy for Transportation Security, including 
     the amount of funds to be expended for the activity and the 
     number of personnel involved.''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``Select''.
       (d) Priority Status.--Section 114(t)(5)(B) of such title is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (iii), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
       (3) by inserting after clause (iii) the following:
       ``(iv) the transportation sector specific plan required 
     under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7; and''.
       (e) Coordination and Plan Distribution.--Section 114(t) of 
     such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(6) Coordination.--In carrying out the responsibilities 
     under this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall 
     consult, as appropriate, with Federal, State, and local 
     agencies, tribal governments, private sector entities 
     (including nonprofit employee labor organizations), 
     institutions of higher learning, and other entities.
       ``(7) Plan distribution.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall make available an unclassified version of the 
     National Strategy for Transportation Security, including its 
     component transportation modal security plans, to Federal, 
     State, regional, local and tribal authorities, transportation 
     system owners or operators, private sector stakeholders 
     (including non-profit employee labor organizations), 
     institutions of higher learning, and other appropriate 
     entities.''.

     SEC. 802. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.

       (a) In General.--Section 114 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(u) Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan.--
       ``(1) Establishment of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the program manager of the 
     information sharing environment established under section 
     1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
     of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the Secretary of Transportation, and 
     public and private stakeholders, shall establish a 
     Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan. In 
     establishing the plan, the Secretary shall gather input on 
     the development of the Plan from private and public 
     stakeholders and the program manager of the information 
     sharing environment established under section 1016 of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
     U.S.C. 485).
       ``(2) Purpose of plan.--The Plan shall promote sharing of 
     transportation security information between the Department of 
     Homeland Security and public and private stakeholders.
       ``(3) Content of plan.--The Plan shall include--
       ``(A) a description of how intelligence analysts within the 
     Department of Homeland Security will coordinate their 
     activities within the Department and with other Federal, 
     State, and local agencies, and tribal governments, including 
     coordination with existing modal information sharing centers 
     and the center established under section 1406 of the 
     Improving America's Security Act of 2007;
       ``(B) the establishment of a point of contact, which may be 
     a single point of contact, for each mode of transportation 
     within the Department of Homeland Security for its sharing of 
     transportation security information with public and private 
     stakeholders, including an explanation and justification to 
     the appropriate congressional committees if the point of 
     contact established pursuant to this subparagraph differs 
     from the agency within the Department that has the primary 
     authority, or has been delegated such authority by the 
     Secretary, to regulate the security of that transportation 
     mode;
       ``(C) a reasonable deadline by which the Plan will be 
     implemented; and
       ``(D) a description of resource needs for fulfilling the 
     Plan.
       ``(4) Coordination with the information sharing 
     environment.--The Plan shall be--
       ``(A) implemented in coordination with the program manager 
     for the information sharing environment established under 
     section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); and
       ``(B) consistent with the establishment of that 
     environment, and any policies, guidelines, procedures, 
     instructions, or standards established by the President or 
     the program manager for the implementation and management of 
     that environment.
       ``(5) Reports to congress.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     containing the Plan.
       ``(B) Annual report.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
     of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report 
     on updates to and the implementation of the Plan.
       ``(6) Survey.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct a biennial 
     survey of the satisfaction of the recipients of 
     transportation intelligence reports disseminated under the 
     Plan, and include the results of the survey as part of the 
     annual report to be submitted under paragraph (5)(B).
       ``(B) Information sought.--The survey conducted under 
     subparagraph (A) shall seek information about the quality, 
     speed, regularity, and classification of the transportation 
     security information products disseminated from the 
     Department of Homeland Security to public and private 
     stakeholders.
       ``(7) Security clearances.--The Secretary shall, to the 
     greatest extent practicable, take steps to expedite the 
     security clearances needed for public and private 
     stakeholders to receive and obtain access to classified 
     information distributed under this section as appropriate.
       ``(8) Classification of material.--The Secretary, to the 
     greatest extent practicable, shall provide public and private 
     stakeholders with specific and actionable information in an 
     unclassified format.
       ``(9) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     `appropriate congressional committees' has the meaning given 
     that term in subsection (t), but shall also include the 
     Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development.
       ``(B) Plan.--The term `Plan' means the Transportation 
     Security Information Sharing Plan established under paragraph 
     (1).
       ``(C) Public and private stakeholders.--The term `public 
     and private stakeholders' means Federal, State, and local 
     agencies, tribal governments, and appropriate private 
     entities.
       ``(D) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security.
       ``(E) Transportation security information.--The term 
     `transportation security information' means information 
     relating to the risks to transportation modes, including 
     aviation, bridge and tunnel, mass transit, passenger and 
     freight rail, ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, and over-
     the-road bus transportation.''.
       (b) Congressional Oversight of Security Assurance for 
     Public and Private Stakeholders.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary shall provide a semiannual report to the Committee 
     on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee 
     on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee 
     on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development of the Senate and 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives that--
       (A) identifies the job titles and descriptions of the 
     persons with whom such information is to be shared under the 
     transportation security information sharing plan established 
     under section 114(u) of title 49, United States Code, as 
     added by this Act,

[[Page S3044]]

     and explains the reason for sharing the information with such 
     persons;
       (B) describes the measures the Secretary has taken, under 
     section 114(u)(7) of that title, or otherwise, to ensure 
     proper treatment and security for any classified information 
     to be shared with the public and private stakeholders under 
     the plan; and
       (C) explains the reason for the denial of transportation 
     security information to any stakeholder who had previously 
     received such information.
       (2) No report required if no changes in stakeholders.--The 
     Secretary is not required to provide a semiannual report 
     under paragraph (1) if no stakeholders have been added to or 
     removed from the group of persons with whom transportation 
     security information is shared under the plan since the end 
     of the period covered by the last preceding semiannual 
     report.

  The amendment (No. 424), as modified, was agreed to as follows:

                     amendment no. 424, as modified

       On page 4, strike the item relating to section 1366 and 
     insert the following:

Sec. 1366. In-line baggage system deployment.

       On page 5, after the item relating to section 1376, insert 
     the following:

Sec. 1377. Law enforcement biometric credential.
Sec. 1378. Employee retention internship program.

       On page 5, after the item relating to section 1384, insert 
     the following:

Sec. 1385. Requiring reports to be submitted to certain committees.

       On page 254, line 11, strike ``Administration,'' and insert 
     ``Administration and other agencies within the Department,''.
       On page 254, line 12, insert ``Federal'' after 
     ``appropriate''.
       On page 267, line 11, strike ``through the'' and insert 
     ``in consultation with''.
       On page 267, line 19, strike ``and, through the Secretary 
     of Transportation, to Amtrak,'' and insert ``and to Amtrak''
       On page 269, strike lines 20 through 23 and insert the 
     following:
       (d) Conditions.--Grants awarded by the Secretary to Amtrak 
     under subsection (a) shall be disbursed to Amtrak through the 
     Secretary of Transportation. The Secretary of Transportation 
     may not disburse such funds unless Amtrak meets the 
     conditions set forth in section 1322(b) of this title.
       On page 269, line 19, after the period insert ``Not later 
     than 240 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary shall provide a report to the Committees on 
     Commerce, Science and Transportation and Homeland Security 
     and Governmental Affairs in the Senate and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security in the House on the feasibility and 
     appropriateness of requiring a non-federal match for the 
     grants authorized in subsection (a).''.
       On page 281, beginning in line 24, strike ``terrorists.'' 
     and insert ``terrorists, including observation and 
     analysis.''.
       On page 286, line 7, strike the closing quotation marks and 
     the second period.
       On page 286, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
       ``(f) Process for Reporting Problems.--
       ``(1) Establishment of reporting process.--The Secretary 
     shall establish, and provide information to the public 
     regarding, a process by which any person may submit a report 
     to the Secretary regarding railroad security problems, 
     deficiencies, or vulnerabilities.
       ``(2) Confidentiality.--The Secretary shall keep 
     confidential the identity of a person who submits a report 
     under paragraph (1) and any such report shall be treated as a 
     record containing protected information to the extent that it 
     does not consist of publicly available information.
       ``(3) Acknowledgment of receipt.--If a report submitted 
     under paragraph (1) identifies the person making the report, 
     the Secretary shall respond promptly to such person and 
     acknowledge receipt of the report.
       ``(4) Steps to address problems.--The Secretary shall 
     review and consider the information provided in any report 
     submitted under paragraph (1) and shall take appropriate 
     steps under this title to address any problems or 
     deficiencies identified.
       ``(5) Retaliation prohibited.--No employer may discharge 
     any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee 
     with respect to the compensation to, or terms, conditions, or 
     privileges of the employment of, such employee because the 
     employee (or a person acting pursuant to a request of the 
     employee) made a report under paragraph (1).''.
       On page 330, beginning in line 7, strike ``paragraph (2);'' 
     and insert ``subsection (g);''.
       On page 332, strike lines 21 and 22 and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 1366. IN-LINE BAGGAGE SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT.

       On page 337, line 5, strike ``fully implement'' and insert 
     ``begin full implementation of''.
       On page 338, strike lines 1 through 4 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an 
     Office of Appeals and Redress to implement, coordinate, and 
     execute the process established by the Secretary pursuant to 
     subsection (a). The Office shall include representatives from 
     the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and 
     Border Protection, and other agencies or offices as 
     appropriate.
       On page 338, line 19, strike ``and''.
       On page 339, line 3, strike ``positives.' ''. and insert 
     ``positives; and''.
       On page 339, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
       ``(C) require air carriers and foreign air carriers take 
     action to properly and automatically identify passengers 
     determined, under the process established under subsection 
     (a), to have been wrongly identified.''.
       On page 339, line 21, strike ``utilizing appropriate 
     records in'' and insert ``as well as''.
       On page 342, line 9, strike ``47135(m));'' and insert 
     ``47134(m));''
       On page 342, line 21, strike ``47135(m)).'' and insert 
     ``47134(m)).''
       On page 343, beginning in line 9, strike ``to the 
     Transportation Security Administration before entering United 
     States airspace; and'' and insert ``at the same time as, and 
     in conjunction with, advance notification requirements for 
     Customs and Border Protection before entering United States 
     airspace; and''.
       On page 344, beginning with line 14, strike through line 12 
     on page 345 and insert the following:

     SEC. 1376. NATIONAL EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINE TEAM TRAINING 
                   CENTER.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Increased training capacity.--Within 180 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall begin to increase the capacity of the 
     Department of Homeland Security's National Explosives 
     Detection Canine Team Program at Lackland Air Force Base to 
     accommodate the training of up to 200 canine teams annually 
     by the end of calendar year 2008.
       (2) Expansion detailed requirements.--The expansion shall 
     include upgrading existing facilities, procurement of 
     additional canines, and increasing staffing and oversight 
     commensurate with the increased training and deployment 
     capabilities required by paragraph (1).
       (3) Ultimate expansion.--The Secretary shall continue to 
     increase the training capacity and all other necessary 
     program expansions so that by December 31, 2009, the number 
     of canine teams sufficient to meet the Secretary's homeland 
     security mission, as determined by the Secretary on an annual 
     basis, may be trained at this facility.
       (b) Alternative Training Centers.--Based on feasibility and 
     to meet the ongoing demand for quality explosives detection 
     canines teams, the Secretary shall explore the options of 
     creating the following:
       (1) A standardized Transportation Security Administration 
     approved canine program that private sector entities could 
     use to provide training for additional explosives detection 
     canine teams. For any such program, the Secretary--
       (A) may coordinate with key stakeholders, including 
     international, Federal, State, local, private sector and 
     academic entities, to develop best practice guidelines for 
     such a standardized program;
       (B) shall require specific training criteria to which 
     private sector entities must adhere as a condition of 
     participating in the program; and
       (C) shall review the status of these private sector 
     programs on at least an annual basis.
       (2) Expansion of explosives detection canine team training 
     to at least 2 additional national training centers, to be 
     modeled after the Center of Excellence established at 
     Lackland Air Force Base.
       (c) Deployment.--The Secretary--
       (1) shall use the additional explosives detection canine 
     teams as part of the Department's layers of enhanced mobile 
     security across the Nation's transportation network and to 
     support other homeland security programs, as deemed 
     appropriate by the Secretary; and
       (2) may make available explosives detection canine teams to 
     all modes of transportation, for areas of high risk or to 
     address specific threats, on an as-needed basis and as 
     otherwise deemed appropriate by the Secretary.

     SEC. 1377. LAW ENFORCEMENT BIOMETRIC CREDENTIAL.

       (a) In General.--Paragraph (6) of section 44903(h) of title 
     49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(6) Use of biometric technology for armed law enforcement 
     travel.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
       ``(i) consult with the Attorney General concerning 
     implementation of this paragraph;
       ``(ii) issue any necessary rulemaking to implement this 
     paragraph; and
       ``(iii) establishing a national registered armed law 
     enforcement program for law enforcement officers needing to 
     be armed when traveling by air.
       ``(B) Program requirements.--The program shall--
       ``(i) establish a credential or a system that incorporates 
     biometric technology and other applicable technologies;
       ``(ii) provide a flexible solution for law enforcement 
     officers who need to be armed when traveling by air on a 
     regular basis and for those who need to be armed during 
     temporary travel assignments;
       ``(iii) be coordinated with other uniform credentialing 
     initiatives including the Homeland Security Presidential 
     Directive 12;

[[Page S3045]]

       ``(iv) be applicable for all Federal, State, local, tribal 
     and territorial government law enforcement agencies; and
       ``(v) establish a process by which the travel credential or 
     system may be used to verify the identity, using biometric 
     technology, of a Federal, State, local, tribal, or 
     territorial law enforcement officer seeking to carry a weapon 
     on board an aircraft, without unnecessarily disclosing to the 
     public that the individual is a law enforcement officer.
       ``(C) Procedures.--In establishing the program, the 
     Secretary shall develop procedures--
       ``(i) to ensure that only Federal, State, local, tribal, 
     and territorial government law enforcement officers with a 
     specific need to be armed when traveling by air are issued a 
     law enforcement travel credential;
       ``(ii) to preserve the anonymity of the armed law 
     enforcement officer without calling undue attention to the 
     individual's identity;
       ``(iii) to resolve failures to enroll, false matches, and 
     false non-matches relating to use of the law enforcement 
     travel credential or system; and
       ``(iv) to invalidate any law enforcement travel credential 
     or system that is lost, stolen, or no longer authorized for 
     use.
       (b) Report.--Within 180 days after implementing the 
     national registered armed law enforcement program required by 
     section 44903(h)(6) of title 49, United States Code, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit a report to the 
     Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. If 
     the Secretary has not implemented the program within 180 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
     issue a report to the Committee within 180 days explaining 
     the reasons for the failure to implement the program within 
     the time required by that section, and a further report 
     within each successive 180-day period until the program is 
     implemented explaining the reasons for such further delays in 
     implementation until the program is implemented. The 
     Secretary shall submit each report required by this 
     subsection in classified format.

     SEC. 1378. EMPLOYEE RETENTION INTERNSHIP PROGRAM.

       The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
     (Transportation Security Administration), shall establish a 
     pilot program at a small hub airport, a medium hub airport, 
     and a large hub airport (as those terms are defined in 
     paragraphs (42), (31), and (29), respectively, of section 
     40102 of title 49, United States Code) for training students 
     to perform screening of passengers and property under section 
     44901 of title 49, United States Code. The program shall be 
     an internship for pre-employment training of final-year 
     students from public and private secondary schools located in 
     nearby communities. Under the program, participants shall 
     perform only those security responsibilities determined to be 
     appropriate for their age and in accordance with applicable 
     law and shall be compensated for training and services time 
     while participating in the program.
       On page 361, after line 22, insert the following:

     SEC. 1385. REQUIRING REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED TO CERTAIN 
                   COMMITTEES.

       (a) Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
     Committee.--The Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate shall receive the reports 
     required by the following provisions of law in the same 
     manner and to the same extent that the reports are to be 
     received by the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate:
       (1) Section 1016(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(j)(1)).
       (2) Section 121(c) of this Act.
       (3) Section 2002(e)(3) of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002, as added by section 202 of this Act.
       (4) Subsections (a) and (b)(2)(B)(ii) of section 2009 of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 202 of 
     this Act.
       (5) Section 302(d) of this Act.
       (6) Section 7215(d) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 123(d)).
       (7) Section 7209(b)(1)(C) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1185 note).
       (8) Section 504(c) of this Act.
       (9) Section 705 of this Act.
       (10) Section 803(d) of this Act.
       (11) Section 510(a)(7) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C. 320(a)(7)).
       (12) Section 510(b)(7) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
     (6 U.S.C. 320(b)(7)).
       (13) Section 1002(b) of this Act.
       (b) Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs.--The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate shall receive the reports required by 
     the following provisions of law in the same manner and to the 
     same extent that the reports are to be received by the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
     Senate:
       (1) Section 1321(c) of this Act.
       (2) Section 1323(f)(3)(A) of this Act.
       (3) Section 1328 of this Act.
       (4) Section 1329(d) of this Act.
       (5) Section 114(v)(4)(A)(i) of title 49, United States 
     Code.
       (6) Section 1341(a)(7) of this Act.
       (7) Section 1341(b)(2) of this Act.
       (8) Section 1345 of this Act.
       (9) Section 1346(f) of this Act.
       (10) Section 1347(f)(1) of this Act.
       (11) Section 1348(d)(1) of this Act.
       (12) Section 1366(b)(3) of this Act.
       (13) Section 1372(b) of this Act.
       (14) Section 1375 of this Act.
       (15) Section 3006(i) of the Digital Television Transition 
     and Public Safety Act of 2005 (47 U.S.C. 309 note).
       (16) Section 1381(c) of this Act.
       (17) Subsections (a) and (b) of section 1383 of this Act.

  The amendment (No. 358), as modified, was agreed to as follows:


                     AMENDMENT NO. 358, as modified

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. PILOT PROJECT TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TRANSPORTATION 
                   SECURITY OFFICERS AT AIRPORT EXIT LANES.

       (a) In General.--The Administrator of the Transportation 
     Security Administration (referred to in this section as the 
     ``Administrator'') shall conduct a pilot program to identify 
     technological solutions for reducing the number of 
     Transportation Security Administration employees at airport 
     exit lanes.
       (b) Program Components.--In conducting the pilot program 
     under this section, the Administrator shall--
       (1) utilize different technologies that protect the 
     integrity of the airport exit lanes from unauthorized entry; 
     and
       (2) work with airport officials to deploy such technologies 
     in multiple configurations at a selected airport or airports 
     at which some of the exits are not co-located with a 
     screening checkpoint.
       (c) Reports.--
       (1) Initial briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall conduct a 
     briefing to the congressional committees set forth in 
     paragraph (3) that describes--
       (A) the airports selected to participate in the pilot 
     program;
       (B) the potential savings from implementing the 
     technologies at selected airport exits;
       (C) the types of configurations expected to be deployed at 
     such airports; and
       (D) the expected financial contribution from each airport.
       (2) Final report.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     technologies are deployed at the airports participating in 
     the pilot program, the Administrator shall submit a final 
     report to the congressional committees described in paragraph 
     (3) that describes--
       (A) the security measures deployed;
       (B) the projected cost savings; and
       (C) the efficacy of the program and its applicability to 
     other airports in the United States.
       (3) Congressional committees.--The reports required under 
     this subsection shall be submitted to--
       (A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
     of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       (C) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate;
       (D) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (E) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (d) Use of Existing Funds.--Provisions contained within 
     this section will be executed using existing funds.
  The amendment (No. 359), as modified, was agreed to as follows:

                     amendment no. 359, as modified

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. DHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON HIGHWAY WATCH GRANT 
                   PROGRAM.

       Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security 
     shall submit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation and Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs on the Trucking Security 
     Grant Program for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 that--
       (1) addresses the grant announcement, application, receipt, 
     review, award, monitoring, and closeout processes; and
       (2) states the amount obligated or expended under the 
     program for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 for--
       (A) infrastructure protection;
       (B) training;
       (C) equipment;
       (D) educational materials;
       (E) program administration;
       (E) marketing; and
       (F) other functions.

  The amendment (No. 371), as modified, was agreed to as follows:


          amendment no. 371, as modified, to amendment no. 275

       On page 370, line 10, after ``workers'', insert ``the 
     elderly''.


                 Amendments Nos. 321 and 336, Withdrawn

                 Amendment No. 367, as Further Modified

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I now ask unanimous consent that 
amendments Nos. 321 and 336 be withdrawn and that amendment No. 367 be 
further modified with the changes at the desk and that the amendment be 
considered and agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the 
table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 367), as further modified, was agreed to as 
follows:


[[Page S3046]]


       On page 303, strike line 12 and all that follows through 
     page 305, line 18, and insert the following:
     of Transportation, shall develop a program to facilitate the 
     tracking of motor carrier shipments of high hazard materials, 
     as defined in this title, and to equip vehicles used in such 
     shipments with technology that provides--
       (A) frequent or continuous communications;
       (B) vehicle position location and tracking capabilities; 
     and
       (C) a feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to 
     broadcast an emergency message.
       (2) Considerations.--In developing the program required by 
     paragraph (1), the Secretary shall--
       (A) consult with the Secretary of Transportation to 
     coordinate the program with any ongoing or planned efforts 
     for motor carrier or high hazardous materials tracking at the 
     Department of Transportation;
       (B) take into consideration the recommendations and 
     findings of the report on the Hazardous Material Safety and 
     Security Operation Field Test released by the Federal Motor 
     Carrier Safety Administration on November 11, 2004; and
       (C) evaluate--
       (i) any new information related to the costs and benefits 
     of deploying, equipping, and utilizing tracking technology, 
     including portable tracking technology, for motor carriers 
     transporting high hazard materials not included in the 
     Hazardous Material Safety and Security Operation Field Test 
     Report released by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
     Administration on November 11, 2004;
       (ii) the ability of tracking technology to resist tampering 
     and disabling;
       (iii) the capability of tracking technology to collect, 
     display, and store information regarding the movement of 
     shipments of high hazard materials by commercial motor 
     vehicles;
       (iv) the appropriate range of contact intervals between the 
     tracking technology and a commercial motor vehicle 
     transporting high hazard materials;
       (v) technology that allows the installation by a motor 
     carrier of concealed and portable electronic devices on 
     commercial motor vehicles that can be activated by law 
     enforcement authorities to disable the vehicle and alert 
     emergency response resources to locate and recover high 
     hazard materials in the event of loss or theft of such 
     materials; and
       (vi) whether installation of the technology described in 
     clause (v) should be incorporated into the program under 
     paragraph (1);
       (vii) the cost, benefit, and practicality of such 
     technology described in (v) in the context of the overall 
     benefit to national security, including commerce in 
     transportation; and
       (viii) other systems the secretary determined appropriate.
       (b) Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, through the 
     Transportation Security Administration, shall promulgate 
     regulations to carry out the provisions of subsection (a).
       (c) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Secretary to carry out this section, $7,000,000 for each 
     of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, of which--
       (1) $3,000,000 per year may be used for equipment; and
       (2) $1,000,000 per year may be used for operations.
       (d) Report.--Within 1 year after the issuance of 
     regulations under subsection (b), the Secretary shall issue a 
     report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Homeland 
     Security on the program developed and evaluation carried out 
     under this section.
       (e) Limitation.--The Secretary may not mandate the 
     installation or utilization of the technology described under 
     (a)(2)(C)(v) without additional congressional action on that 
     matter.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I now ask unanimous consent that 
following adoption of the substitute amendment and the bill has been 
read a third time, there then be 20 minutes for debate prior to the 
vote on passage of the bill, and that each of the following be afforded 
5 minutes: Senators Collins, Lieberman, McConnell, and Reid.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Ms. COLLINS. Reserving the right to object, I may have missed the 
complete unanimous-consent request because I did not have that final 
page of the agreement. Will the Senator inform me whether there is a 
vote ordered on the Biden amendment.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, Madam President. I thank my friend from Maine. I 
am sorry she didn't get this page. What I will do after this unanimous-
consent request, hopefully, is agreed to, setting 20 minutes of debate 
and final passage, is to ask what the pending business is, which is the 
Biden amendment, and then I will urge action on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Ms. COLLINS. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 383

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, what is the pending amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 383 offered by Senator Biden.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I move to table the Biden amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. First, is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I move to table the Biden amendment, 
and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second on the motion to 
table?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. 
Johnson) is necessarily absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 73, nays 25, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 72 Leg.]

                                YEAS--73

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Tester
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Wyden

                                NAYS--25

     Bayh
     Biden
     Boxer
     Brown
     Byrd
     Carper
     Casey
     Dodd
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Obama
     Reed
     Reid
     Specter
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Johnson
     McCain
       
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I 
move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the substitute amendment, 
as amended, is agreed to.
  The substitute amendment (No. 275), as amended, was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.


                       Implemented Recommendation

  Mr. BAUCUS. Madam President, I note that the underlying legislation 
contains a sense of the Senate resolution that the Senate should 
implement the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to ``create a 
single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland 
security.'' This provision was added during committee markup by the 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. I would ask my 
colleague, hasn't the Senate already implemented this recommendation?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Indeed, we have. Near the end of the 108th Congress we 
passed S. Res. 445, which created the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs as the principal point of oversight and review 
for homeland security in the Senate.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I appreciate the Senator's recollection. S. Res. 445 
established the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs. It also provided that the newly established committee would 
have referral and oversight of all matters relating to the Department 
of Homeland Security, with certain exceptions. One of those exceptions 
was with respect to functional oversight of customs revenue or 
commercial functions performed by any personnel of the Department of 
Homeland Security. Does the Senator recall the basis for that 
exception?

[[Page S3047]]

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Indeed, I do. This is an issue that goes back to the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security and passage of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Finance Committee held a hearing in 
July 2002, followed by a letter to the chairman and ranking member of 
the Governmental Affairs Committee. We stressed the importance of 
preserving the revenue collection and trade facilitation functions of 
the U.S. Customs Service, even as that agency moved into the Department 
of Homeland Security with an added national security focus.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I appreciate the Senator's recollection of our efforts on 
this issue. I would add that following that hearing and our letter, we 
worked closely with the Committee on Governmental Affairs to develop 
text that would keep intact the commercial functions of the Customs 
Service. Under the final legislation, authorities vested in the 
Secretary of the Treasury relating to customs revenue functions 
remained with the Secretary of the Treasury unless delegated to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. By order of the Secretary, dated May 
15, 2003, Treasury Order 100-16, the Secretary of the Treasury 
delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security general authority over 
customs revenue functions, subject to certain exceptions that preserved 
Treasury's oversight of the Customs Service with respect to policy 
matters and the authority to issue regulations and determinations. That 
delegation of authority remains in place to this day.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes. And I believe we can both agree that our efforts 
were successful in preserving the revenue functions, commercial 
functions, and commercial operations of the Customs Service within the 
Department of Homeland Security, including oversight of those functions 
and commercial operations within the Committee on Finance.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I concur entirely. And those efforts served as the 
context for the retention of Finance Committee oversight of customs 
revenue functions and commercial operations in S. Res. 445. The Finance 
Committee has exercised oversight of those functions for almost 200 
years, and we as a nation continue to benefit from that accumulated 
expertise.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. That is right. In fact, we can point to the enactment 
of the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006, 
otherwise known as the SAFE Port Act, as an example of that.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I agree. The SAFE Port Act demonstrated that the Finance 
Committee and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 
together with the Commerce Committee, could work together to enact 
strong legislation to secure our borders and protect the trade-based 
economic security of our country. That legislation is strong precisely 
because it was the product of the Finance Committee's focus on customs 
functions and commercial operations, coupled with the Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee's focus on border security and the 
Commerce Committee's expertise relating to our Nation's seaports.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Indeed. The enactment of that legislation demonstrates 
that the retention of Finance Committee jurisdiction over customs 
revenue functions and commercial operations does not in any way 
diminish the effective oversight of other functions within the 
Department of Homeland Security by the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, nor does it detract from the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee as the principal point of 
oversight and review for homeland security matters in the U.S. Senate. 
In fact, by drawing on the focus and expertise of both committees, we 
improve overall Senate oversight of the homeland security interests and 
economic security interests of the United States.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I agree entirely. Consequently, I must note for the 
record that I don't see any need to include the sense of the Senate 
resolution that has been added to the underlying legislation by the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I agree with my colleague and note the same. However, 
since it is merely a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, and is not binding 
in any way, I think it is sufficient to note our objections for the 
record at this time. The provision is not worth objecting to any more 
than that. We have already established a principal point of oversight 
and review for homeland security in the U.S. Senate. The current 
balance reflected in S. Res. 445 has been proven to work and need not 
be disturbed.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I agree.


                   cargo security on passenger planes

  Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, I am pleased that in this new Congress, 
we are able to take up and pass a bill that implements the 9/11 
Commission recommendations. Even though aviation security has improved 
greatly in the last 5 years, there are still holes in the system--as we 
discovered last summer with the aviation terrorist plot uncovered by 
the British authorities. Therefore, implementing these recommendations 
is crucial.
  Mr. INOUYE. I agree with the Senator from California that 
implementing these recommendations is crucial to continuing to increase 
aviation security, to prevent our Nation from experiencing a tragedy 
like 9/11 again.
  Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, one hole in aviation security is the 
cargo that is carried on passenger planes. The bill does strengthen 
security for cargo on passenger planes. First, the bill requires 
screening of all of the cargo going on passenger aircraft. Second, the 
bill requires the Transportation Security Administration to implement a 
program--either random or risked-based--to place blast-resistant 
containers on passenger planes. However, the program does not implement 
the 9/11 Commission recommendation to require one blast-resistant cargo 
container on every plane.
  The 9/11 Commission recommended, ``TSA should require that every 
passenger aircraft carrying cargo deploy at least one hardened 
container to carry any suspect cargo.'' Therefore, all passenger planes 
should have at least one blast-resistant container for cargo.
  Mr. INOUYE. I expect that TSA would examine this recommendation when 
developing a plan to deploy blast-resistant cargo containers on 
airplanes.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator for his support. We owe this to the 
American people. We cannot allow terrorists to exploit holes in our 
aviation security system.


                               oversight

  Mr. INOUYE. Madam Pesident, the expertise exhibited under the 
Commerce Committee's jurisdiction is reflected in the substitute 
amendment to S. 4, before us today, which incorporates three Commerce 
Committee reported bills: S. 184, the Surface Transportation and Rail 
Security Act of 2007; S. 509, the Aviation Security Improvement Act; 
and S. 385, the Interoperable Emergency Communications Act. Prior to 
the reorgnization of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committees, HSGAC, and thereafter, the Commerce Committee's 
jurisdiction under the Senate rules over all aspects of transportation 
safety and security issues encompassing maritime, Coast Guard, 
aviation, rail, pipeline, and trucking, and telecommunications matters, 
remain untouched.
  Some unfairly claim that problems we are having improving our 
national security result from an outdated committee system. I 
respectfully disagree. This claim is simply a sound bite that ignores 
the truth and short changes the potential for real solutions. The real 
problem is the result of creating a new department from scratch by 
merging 22 Federal agencies with varying missions, without any true 
realignment for non-security related missions, into one mammoth Federal 
department and then refusing to fully fund the necessary initiatives.
  I am surprised that a few of my colleagues would suggest that through 
oversight through several committees of the Department, its Agencies, 
and the $34.8 billion in programs weakens DHS. To the contrary, using 
the several committees, each with its own significant expertise, 
actually improves the quality and scope of congressional oversight, and 
therefore, the effectiveness and accountability of the Department 
itself. It is the failure to conduct agency oversight that causes the 
most harm, as we have seen at DHS over the past few years. Well 
coordinated and responsible engagement with DHS by

[[Page S3048]]

committees will only further the Senate's oversight responsibilities 
for and the public's understanding of the critical work now being done 
by the Department and of the numerous challenges that remain.
  S. Res. 445 embraced that approach, and S. 4 which will pass the 
Senate today demonstrates the success of that approach. In fact, the 
SAFE Ports Act, Public Law 109-347, and S. 4 are a reflection of the 
positive progress Congress can make when committees work together in 
our respective fields of expertise to conduct oversight and craft 
legislation to address identified vulnerabilities.
  Mr. STEVENS. I concur with my chairman, Senator Inouye. The Commerce 
Committee has worked for over a decade to improve transportation 
security and has had to deal with the inertia of the Federal Government 
as well as fight entrenched interests to change the way we secure our 
transportation system. As far back as 1996 we began discussing the 
security advantages of transferring security functions from the airline 
industry to the Federal Government. Similarly, we initiated action on 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 prior to 9/11 in order 
to address a broad range of criminal activity at our ports. The attacks 
of 9/11 created sufficient public pressure for Congress to 
fundamentally change the way the Federal Government secures our 
aviation system and ports.

  In particular, Aviation and Transportation Security Act, ATSA, Public 
Law 107-71, established the Transportation Security Administration, 
TSA, within the Department of Transportation to be ``responsible for 
security in all modes of transportation, including: carrying out 
chapter 449, relating to civil aviation security, and related research 
and development activities; and security responsibilities over other 
modes of transportation that are exercised by the Department of 
Transportation.''
  The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, and the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, HSGAC, did 
not alter TSA's authority or the Commerce Committee's subject matter 
jurisdiction. The Senate engaged in a healthy debate on the floor and 
made clear that the authority being transferred to the HSGAC under S. 
Res. 445 did not affect the Commerce Committee's jurisdictional 
authority over transportation security programs, the Coast Guard and 
communications matters conducted through the Federal Communications 
Commission, FCC, and the Department of Commerce. In large part, the 
debate focused on the difficulty of separating transportation safety 
issues from transportation security issues. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate safety and security issues from general 
transportation policy. To consider security without understanding the 
impacts of the safety and market position of a mode of transportation 
could lead to unrealistic, contradictory, and counterproductive 
policies. Those tasked with the responsibilities of securing our 
transportation system need to understand the complexity of the systems 
operations from safety standards to market place realities. The two 
cannot be separated and the Senate vote effectively affirmed those 
arguments.
  Mr. INOUYE. I agree. Without such context, security decisions will be 
made in a vacuum that, at best, might produce misguided or extraneous 
efforts, and, at worst, could cripple the transportation modes that 
ensure the free flow of commerce and travel that our Nation has been 
built upon. The Commerce Committee has passed three of the most 
significant transportation security bills considered since 9/11 and has 
been successful because of its understanding of the industry and past 
work on safety and security issues. The distinguished majority leader 
and Senator McConnell recognized this when crafting S. Res 445 and the 
Senate approved.
  Mr. REID. My colleagues from the Senate Commerce Committee are 
correct. S. Res. 445, as introduced by me and Senator McConnell and as 
passed by the Senate, proposed continued oversight of transportation 
security by the Commerce Committee.
  Mr. INOUYE. The Department consists of 22 separate agencies. These 
agencies are responsible for everything from international trade to 
animal health inspection. It would be unwise for the Senate to suggest 
that a single committee should manage oversight of those 22 agencies 
and each of their multiple missions just because the Secretary does not 
like to travel to the Hill and testify. The Senate cannot abdicated its 
oversight responsibilities because the Department thinks it takes up 
too much time.
  And so, I respectfully but deeply disagree with the nonbinding 
measure in the underlying bill suggesting that this Senate should 
neglect its oversight duty--and put aside much of its long-standing 
expertise--because the Department is too busy to come tell us what they 
are doing. While I and many of my colleagues discussed striking this 
provision from the underlying bill, the majority leader noted that it 
was simply the work product of one committee. I would like to ask the 
majority leader if it is intention to continue to operate under S. Res. 
445 given the recent success of legislation like Public Law 109-347 and 
S. 4.
  Mr. REID. The Senator is correct. S. Res. 445 determines Senate 
oversight and jurisdictional authorities.


                            TRANSIT SECURITY

  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I thank the majority leader for this 
colloquy and for his work with the chairmen and ranking members of many 
of the committees who have been involved in putting together the 
legislation to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 
The Banking Committee took this task very seriously. I am pleased to 
report that the committee unanimously reported S. 763, the Public 
Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, which has been 
incorporated into the 9/11 legislation as title XIV. Transit security 
has long been a focus of the Banking Committee, where we have held 
several hearings and reported similar legislation in each of the last 
two Congresses. While the Banking Committee's previous legislation also 
passed the Senate, once as a freestanding bill and as title VII of the 
SAFE Port Act, it has yet to become law. I will continue to work very 
closely with Senator Shelby, who was a leader on this issue as chairman 
of the Banking Committee, to work through the conference process with 
our counterparts in the House of Representatives to make this provision 
law. I appreciate the leader's support and commitment to having the 
Banking Committee continue to take responsibility on this title.
  Transportation security was also addressed more broadly in title VIII 
of this legislation. As title VIII called for national transportation 
security and information plans, I worked very closely with my fellow 
chairmen and ranking members from the Commerce Committee, Senators 
Inouye and Stevens, who have jurisdiction over other modes of 
transportation security besides public transportation. Together we 
reached an agreement, represented in the Inouye amendment, No. 423, 
between the Commerce, Banking, and Homeland Security Committees. I am 
very pleased that this amendment was agreed to, and it is my intention 
to continue our close working relationship on these issues throughout 
the conference process.
  The Banking Committee was also very engaged in other areas of the 
bill that involved the committee's jurisdiction. Since 9/11, we have 
worked with and overseen the Federal financial regulators as they have 
implemented sophisticated preparedness requirements for the 
institutions under their jurisdiction. Title VII, as proposed, 
authorized the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to 
create another series of requirements. Although these requirements are 
voluntary, Federal financial regulators and the financial services 
industry have expressed concerns about the impact of these 
requirements, and I share their concerns. A letter from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System staff dated March 1, 2007 
explains that the ``voluntary standards [of Title VII are] not 
appropriate to meet the objective of greater preparedness and 
resiliency.'' The letter states that it would ``be desirable that Title 
VII reflect the unique relationships that already exist within the 
banking and finance sector and not impose any new requirements that 
duplicate actions that have already been

[[Page S3049]]

taken by the Federal financial institutions regulators.'' The American 
Bankers Association in a letter dated February 28, 2007, stated ``ABA 
is concerned that this program would be redundant to and potential 
conflict with the existing process by which the banking industry 
develops business continuity standards, as well as with existing 
business continuity regulatory requirements.'' Also, the Office of 
Management and Budget issued a Statement of Administration Policy on 
February 28, 2007, that stated, ``These standards may increase the 
regulatory burden.''

  I have proposed amendments intended to address these concerns, 
working with Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins. The final 
legislation will include an amendment to clarify that institutions in a 
sector, such as financial services, must obey their sector regulators 
and to emphasize that this program is voluntary and does not supersede 
the institutions' responsibilities to maintain the high standards 
required by their regulators.
  Another amendment that I authored pertains to title X of the 
underlying bill. I commend Senators Lieberman and Collins for their 
efforts in addressing an important issue under this title--to ensure 
that the Department of Homeland Security thoroughly discerns the risks 
to America's critical infrastructure. As originally drafted, however, I 
was concerned that the bill would not ensure that DHS adequately 
consults with the Federal agencies best equipped to assess and 
prioritize risks in specific sectors of the economy. From the 
perspective of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, I can 
tell you, for example, that no one has greater expertise or technical 
resources for assessing the vulnerabilities of our financial 
infrastructure than our Federal financial regulators. It is for that 
reason that my amendment effectively removed language that would place 
limits on the DHS' use of information from sector-specific agencies in 
the formulation of their risk assessments and prioritized lists. It is 
my belief that we need to encourage greater coordination between these 
specialized agencies and the Department of Homeland Security, not 
restrict it. This is true in areas outside of the financial services 
sector. In matters of public health, DHS should consult the Department 
of Health and Human Services. In manners of farming and food 
development, the Department of Agriculture should be consulted. In 
matters related to drinking water and water treatment systems, the 
Environmental Protection Agency should be consulted. That is why my 
amendment endeavors to better integrate our efforts to understand 
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and hopefully develop 
protections in all of these areas. In addition, my amendment ensures 
that the agencies most familiar with the sensitive data shared with DHS 
and Congress determine the relative classification levels of this 
information. Without this provision, I am afraid someone at DHS or 
elsewhere, who is unfamiliar with the sensitivities of a specific 
sector of the economy, might unintentionally divulge critical 
information that could be harmful to U.S. infrastructure.
  Finally, although it pertains to the assessment of U.S. critical 
infrastructure, title X does not include any reporting requirement on 
the government's ability to ensure that U.S. industry reduces 
interruption of critical infrastructure operations during a national 
emergency and minimizes the impact of such a catastrophe. My amendment 
requires reports to the Committees on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs as well as to Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, along 
with their House committee counterparts, on compliance with subsections 
(a) and (c) of section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to 
meet this requirement. As chairman of the Committee with jurisdiction 
over this law, it is important to me that we oversee appropriate U.S. 
industrial preparedness to meet critical infrastructure needs in times 
of national emergency. I appreciate the cooperation of my colleagues in 
the development of all of these important provisions.
  Once again, I thank the majority leader for his excellent work in 
bringing all of these committees together and fashioning an excellent 
bill. This demonstrates that the jurisdictional lines established in S. 
Res. 445 continue to work.
  Mr. REID I thank the Senator from Connecticut. The Senator is correct 
that S. Res. 445 determines Senate oversight and jurisdictional 
authorities, and I acknowledge the important role that the Banking 
Committee has played and will continue to play on this legislation.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President I rise today in opposition to this 
final bill because I believe one of the provisions included will 
greatly undermine our homeland security efforts. Specifically, the 
provision would mandate that the Transportation Security Administration 
have the ability to collectively bargain with Government unions 
representing airport security screeners. This will create unnecessary 
red tape and bureaucracy and tie the hands of our security personnel. 
While this provision may be beneficial to the union bosses, it is not 
beneficial to Georgians and the American people.
  TSA must have the flexibility to respond when our security is 
threatened. In this current era of unpredictable threats, TSA must be 
able to continually change its systems to meet the changing security 
environment. If we mandate that TSA must negotiate with the unions for 
every change in circumstance, it will negate the agency's ability to 
respond quickly to terrorist threats and other emergencies. I just 
don't think that is common sense.
  In fact, when TSA was created, the agency was given the authority to 
decide whether to engage in collective bargaining with airport baggage 
screeners, and TSA concluded that such negotiations would weaken its 
ability to protect the American people. This authority was not 
recommended in the 9/11 Commission Report.
  Now let's be clear--the issue here is not whether TSA employees 
should be allowed to join a union but whether TSA must collectively 
bargain with Government unions before it changes personnel and 
policies. At the present time, airport screeners may voluntarily join a 
union and TSA will withhold union dues at an employee's request. The 
union, however, has no standing to negotiate with TSA on behalf of 
their members.
  I would just note that this restriction is not unique to TSA. Other 
Federal agencies that collect and respond to intelligence in an effort 
to address homeland security, such as the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service, 
all have the same restriction. This is done as an acknowledgement that 
highly sensitive security information should only be released on a 
need-to-know basis. Collective bargaining, conversely, would require 
the release of sensitive information to external negotiators and 
arbitrators, which would increase the risk of sensitive information 
getting in the wrong hands.
  TSA must be able to quickly shift employees based on intelligence and 
airport traffic demands while modifying procedures at a moment's 
notice. For example, this past August, following an attempted United 
Kingdom airline bombing, TSA overhauled its procedures in less than 12 
hours to prevent terrorists from smuggling liquid explosives onto any 
U.S. flights. Not only did this flexibility ensure that no U.S. flights 
were cancelled due to the change, most importantly, it ensured the 
safety and security of the United States. This past December, during a 
major snowstorm in Denver, local TSA employees were unable to get to 
the airport. However, due to the current policies, TSA was able to 
deploy officers from Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, and Colorado Springs to 
the Denver airport. This deployment allowed TSA to open every security 
lane in Denver around the clock at the airport until they were back to 
normal operations. So in circumstances like these, TSA cannot spend 
days, weeks, or months negotiating over officer assignments and new 
schedules before implementing them.
  We should remember that TSA exists to protect American lives, and its 
focus must remain on homeland security and not on labor negotiations. I 
am extremely concerned that the provision included in this bill will 
lead to a change in culture within the agency, and I just don't think 
our hard-working TSA employees gain much from this.
  I am proud of our dedicated TSA employees in Georgia, and we already 
have a ``pay for performance'' system in place that weeds out 
nonperformers.

[[Page S3050]]

The system is based upon technical competence, readiness for duty, and 
operational performance. But under the proposed changes, the most 
effective security employees will be punished by the change in pay 
practices.
  Finally, we should be concerned about what this means to passengers 
and the American taxpayers. The collective bargaining system would not 
reward good screening performance or customer service. Additionally, 
implementing the infrastructure for collective bargaining would cost 
hundreds of millions of dollars and TSA would be forced to relocate 
thousands of personnel. For Georgians, fewer personnel means fewer 
screening lanes and longer lines at airports like Hartsfield-Jackson 
International Airport in Atlanta.
  Our national security is too important to risk. It is no accident 
that we have not had a terrorist attack on domestic soil since 
September 11, 2001. But that is not to say that it can't happen again. 
The terrorists only have to get it right once. But we have to get it 
right every time. So let's not hinder our ability to do that. Our 
homeland security infrastructure must be able to operate in real time. 
We should not tie the very hands we rely upon to protect us here at 
home. It is disappointing that this provision is included in this bill, 
and I urge my colleagues to oppose final passage.
  Mr. KOHL. Madam President, I rise today to discuss three proposed 
amendments to S. 4, Improving America's Security by Implementing 
Unfinished Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. I thank Senators 
Lieberman, Collins, Dodd and Shelby for working with me and my staff on 
provisions to protect seniors in the event of an emergency. 
Unfortunately, two important provisions were pulled at the behest of 
Republicans to limit the number of amendments offered by Democrats.
  It has been almost 2 years since our Nation reeled from the tragic 
and shameful images of seniors abandoned during the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina. Sadly, we now know that 71 percent of the people who 
died were older than 60. Last year, as the ranking member of the 
Special Committee on Aging, we held a hearing to examine how prepared 
the Nation is to care for our seniors in the event of a national 
emergency. What we learned was disheartening.
  We learned that our Nation is woefully unprepared to meet the unique 
needs of our seniors in the event of a terrorist attack, natural 
disaster, or other emergency. Cookie cutter emergency plans are of 
little use to seniors, especially those who depend on others for 
assistance in their daily lives. We need specific plans, programs, and 
information for all seniors facing emergencies.
  That is why Senators Wyden, Coleman and I offered several amendments 
to the 9/11 legislation to ensure that the Department of Homeland 
Security place seniors on the forefront of its emergency planning 
agenda. The first amendment, which is supported by the American Public 
Health Association, is an important step towards ensuring that seniors 
are protected when the next national emergency occurs.
  This amendment would ensure that any recipient of a homeland security 
grant, under title II, will include in its State, local, or tribal 
homeland security plan the evacuation, transportation, and health care 
needs of the elderly.
  It would also require that the needs of the elderly are incorporated 
into any preparedness exercises or trainings for emergency responders 
to ensure they are adequately prepared to safeguard our seniors in the 
event of an emergency.
  This amendment would have sent a strong signal to States and 
communities that are engaged in emergency planning that seniors must be 
a priority. Unfortunately, this is one of the amendments pulled from a 
manager's package of approved amendments at the last minute.
  I am also pleased to be an original cosponsor of Senator Wyden's 
amendment to establish a Special Needs Registry Pilot Project, which is 
supported by the National Association of Area Agencies on Aging. One of 
the most useful recommendations from our Aging Committee hearing last 
year was to follow the lead of counties like Miami-Dade in Florida. 
They have successfully set up a voluntary registry where seniors can 
list where they live, their transportation limitations, their health 
needs, and whether they may need help getting food and other supplies 
during an emergency.
  It's clear that more cities and counties could benefit from these 
kinds of special needs registries. That's why this amendment would have 
created a pilot project for local emergency management agencies to set 
up and test these registries, allowing first responders to locate and 
care for seniors before and during emergencies. It was our hope that 
this pilot project would have helped spark a nationwide effort to 
establish special needs registries; unfortunately this amendment was 
also pulled at the last minute.
  On a brighter note, I thank Chairman Dodd and Ranking Member Shelby 
again for working with me and Senator Coleman to successfully include a 
provision, supported by the American Public Health Association, in 
title XIV that would ensure that public transportation workers are 
trained to meet the evacuation needs of seniors in the event of a 
crisis. This is particularly important since so many of our seniors 
utilize public transportation for access to their everyday needs. 
Furthermore, only public transportation has the capacity to move 
millions of people and provide first responders with critical support 
in major evacuations of urban areas.
  This provision will go a long way to ensure that our seniors are 
taken care of if we have another emergency or disaster. Unfortunately, 
two crucial provisions intended to safeguard the needs of seniors were 
not included in the final bill due to partisan efforts to limit 
Democratic amendments. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita taught us many 
painful lessons that should never be forgotten. I will not forget and I 
intend to pursue legislation aimed at explicitly safeguarding the needs 
of America's seniors in the event of an emergency. The time to act to 
protect our seniors is now.
  Mr. REED. Madam President, today the Senate will vote on a matter of 
utmost importance--enacting the remaining 9/11 Commission 
recommendations. Since their publication 2\1/2\ years ago, roughly half 
of the recommendations have been left unaddressed, while many that have 
been adopted into law have not been effectively implemented. S. 4, the 
Improving America's Security Act, is a critical step to ensuring our 
Nation's safety.
  This bill includes an important new interoperability grant program. 
Tragedies such as September 11, the Station Fire in my home State of 
Rhode Island, and Hurricane Katrina have demonstrated the need for 
interoperable communications equipment among first responders. More 
communities require access to funding to create interoperable 
communications networks, and I have long supported increasing 
accessibility for interoperability grants to local and state 
governments.
  I am also pleased that this bill includes a transit security program 
that I helped author as a member of the Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs Committee. The committee has been well aware of the need for 
this legislation since the tragic events of 9/11, spending significant 
time and effort to improve our Nation's transit security system. The 
Senate has passed transit security legislation in the last two 
Congresses, only to have them each stall prior to enactment. While our 
Nation acted quickly after 9/11 to secure airports and airplanes 
against terrorists, major vulnerabilities remain in surface 
transportation. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, ``opportunities to do 
harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation'' 
as in commercial aviation. The time to act is now.
  Transit is vital to providing mobility for millions of Americans and 
offers tremendous economic benefits to our Nation. In the United 
States, people use public transportation over 32 million times each 
weekday compared to 2 million passengers who fly daily. Paradoxically, 
it is the very openness of the system that makes it vulnerable to 
terrorism. When one considers this and the fact that roughly $7 per 
passenger is invested in aviation security, but less than one cent is 
invested in the security of each transit passenger, the need for an 
authorized transit security program is clear.

[[Page S3051]]

  In addition, the bill provides important protections for 
Transportation Security Officers at the Transportation Security 
Administration that have been long absent, including whistleblower 
protections, the right to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, 
and certain collective bargaining rights.
  Lastly, while Providence is now 1 of 39 urban areas eligible for the 
Urban Area Security Initiative grants, something that I have long 
sought, believing the city faces risks from terrorism, I was 
disappointed that Senator Leahy's amendment to restore the minimum 
allocation to 0.75 percent for States under the State Homeland Security 
Grant Program failed. With this funding, Rhode Island has been able to 
make critical improvements, but adequate funding is still needed, and 
it is my hope that the highest minimum funding level will prevail in 
conference with the House of Representatives.
  Implementing the final recommendations of the 9/11 Commission builds 
and improves on the work that has been done since the attacks of 
September 11, and I am pleased to support this bill.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I want to add my thoughts to the 
debate on the Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
  First, I preface my remarks by applauding the chairman and ranking 
member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee for 
their work on this important bill. This bill makes crucial and long 
overdue improvements in transportation security, critical 
infrastructure protection, and emergency response capabilities. There 
is no higher priority than protecting homeland security, and this bill 
is a key component in that effort.
  Nearly 6 years since the horrific attacks of September 11, we are 
still struggling to give our first responders, law enforcement 
officers, and the employees of the Department of Homeland Security the 
resources they need to keep us safe. I thank these brave men and women 
who work daily to protect this Nation. They are on the front lines of 
the fight against terrorism. They are the ones who are called on to 
stop and respond to any future attack upon our Nation. This bill 
includes important resources these brave men and women need to perform 
their critical tasks.
  I am pleased that the Senate has increased funding for State homeland 
security grants, emergency management performance grants, emergency 
communications and the Urban Area Security Initiative. I have long 
advocated for greater funding of emergency management grants because 
they are crucial in assisting State and local officials in preparing 
for all-hazards emergencies. These grants provide emergency managers 
with the resources they need to increase coordination and planning so 
that if an emergency occurs, State and local officials will respond 
much more efficiently and effectively.
  It is my hope that this bill represents a lasting shift in 
priorities, a shift towards an enhanced focus on the most pressing 
threats facing our country. We are still spending almost twice as much 
on Iraq as is allocated for homeland security, diplomacy, and 
international assistance combined. The billions we spend each month in 
Iraq could be invested in the protection of critical infrastructure and 
our system of national preparedness and response that failed in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina. As we consider the budget resolution and the 
defense and homeland security appropriations bills this year, I 
encourage my colleagues to take a broader view when it comes to our 
national security priorities and make the tradeoffs that must be made.
  I am particularly pleased that the Federal Agency Data Mining 
Reporting Act is included in this bill as section 504. I have been 
working on this legislation for a number of years with Senator Sununu, 
Senator Leahy, and Senator Akaka. I am glad that Senator Sununu and 
Senator Akaka successfully offered the legislation as an amendment to 
S. 4 when it was before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee.
  Many law-abiding Americans are understandably concerned about the 
specter of secret government programs analyzing vast quantities of 
public and private data about their pursuits, in search of patterns of 
suspicious activity. Four years after we first learned about the 
Defense Department's program called Total Information Awareness, there 
is still much Congress does not know about the Federal Government's 
work on data mining. This bill is an important step in allowing 
Congress to conduct oversight of any such programs or related research 
development efforts.
  The Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act would require Federal 
agencies to report annually on their development and use of data mining 
technologies to discover predictive or anomalous patterns indicating 
criminal or terrorist activity the types of pattern-based data analysis 
that raise the most serious privacy concerns. As amended on the floor, 
it would also allow classified information, law enforcement sensitive 
information, trade secrets, and proprietary business information to be 
provided to the relevant committees separately, in a nonpublic form, 
under appropriate security measures.
  Intelligence and law enforcement agencies would not be doing their 
job if they did not take advantage of new technologies. But when it 
comes to pattern-based data mining, Congress needs to understand 
whether it can be effective in identifying terrorists, and Congress 
needs to consider the privacy and civil liberties implications of 
deploying such technology domestically. I hope these reports will help 
Congress--and to the extent possible, the public--finally understand 
what is going on behind the closed doors of the executive branch, so 
that we can start to have the policy discussion about data mining that 
is long overdue.
  I am concerned about the ongoing development of the Information 
Sharing Environment without adequate privacy and civil liberties 
guidelines. In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, Congress mandated that the President create an Information 
Sharing Environment, ISE, for the sharing of terrorism information 
among Federal agencies, State and local governments, and the private 
sector. This is a critical goal in our counterterrorism efforts. But 
that legislation also required that the President issue privacy 
guidelines for the ISE, in recognition of the serious privacy and civil 
liberties implications of facilitating more sharing of information 
among these entities. Those privacy guidelines were issued in December, 
but in my view are wholly inadequate. They touch on the most 
significant privacy issues and provide a framework for agencies to 
think about the privacy issues that might arise, but they do not 
include specific guidelines and rules for protecting privacy. That is 
why I filed an amendment to S. 4 that would have provided more 
direction to the ISE program manager about what should be included in 
these privacy guidelines and the need for more specific government-wide 
rules for the ISE. I was disappointed that my amendment was not 
included, but will continue to work to ensure that the guidelines for 
implementation of the ISE are sufficient to protect the privacy of 
Americans.
  The bill mandates the declassification of the aggregate amount of the 
intelligence budget. This reform has a long history going back to the 
Church and Pike Commissions. It is supported by the current Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence. It was also one of the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which stated that ``when even 
aggregate categorical numbers remain hidden it is hard to judge 
priorities and foster accountability.'' I concur with the Commission, 
that aggregate budget figures ``provid[e] little insight into U.S. 
intelligence sources and methods.'' Sharing this information with the 
American people will, however, provide a greater level of transparency 
and accountability and in the end make us more secure.
  I was pleased to support Senator McCaskill's amendment to ensure that 
workers at the Transportation Security Administration are afforded the 
same workplace protections as other DHS employees. The low retention 
rate at TSA resulting in part from lack of workers' rights threatens 
our security. This amendment will address this concern while giving 
administrators the flexibility they need to respond to imminent 
threats.
  I am pleased that this bill includes provisions to ensure proper 
oversight of homeland security grants. I am deeply troubled by reports 
of improper

[[Page S3052]]

oversight of expenditures at DHS, including an article in the 
Washington Post last November stating that the Department was unable to 
locate one-third of the files needed to perform an audit of its 
contracts. I therefore supported Senator Coburn's amendment to require 
DHS to perform audits on homeland security grants. While I understand 
concerns that this requirement could have led to delays in the issuance 
of grants in fiscal year 2008, I did not think it was unreasonable to 
require DHS to conduct the audits required in a timely manner. I will 
continue to work with my colleagues to improve oversight of homeland 
security funding.
  I supported several amendments that would have added funding for 
critical security needs not fully addressed in this bill. I do not take 
lightly a decision to vote in favor of spending more money. Fiscal 
responsibility is one of my highest priorities, but it is imperative 
that we provide the resources needed to combat terrorism.
  I voted for this bill because it makes key changes to address 
security needs. However, our Nation's vulnerabilities demand more and I 
will continue to work to ensure that our vital homeland security needs 
are met.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I support the Improving America's 
Security Act of 2007 because it takes a giant step in implementing the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Keeping America safe requires 
more than expensive weapons and war funding; it also requires a 
commitment to homeland security. This legislation shows that 
commitment.
  We learned on September 11 and during Hurricane Katrina how important 
it is for our first responders to be able to communicate with each 
other. For years, I have been urging the Department of Homeland 
Security to establish a dedicated funding source for interoperable 
communications equipment. I am pleased that this legislation creates a 
grant program dedicated to improving operability and interoperability 
at local, regional, State and Federal levels.
  I am also pleased that this legislation moves us closer to the 
equitable distribution of homeland security grant funding. For 5 years, 
the largest homeland security grant programs have distributed funds 
using a formula that arbitrarily sets aside a large portion of funds to 
be divided equally among the States, regardless of size or need. The 
current ``small State formula'' has severely disadvantaged States such 
as Michigan with high populations. In addition, it reduces the amount 
of funding that can be allocated to States with highest risks. Although 
I am disappointed that the Senate failed to pass two amendments that I 
supported that would have lowered the minimum funding level even 
further, the .45 percent minimum in the underlying bill is an 
improvement from the current .75 percent base funding amount.
  The legislation also includes language that I authored that directs 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish international border 
community interoperable communications demonstration projects on the 
northern and southern borders to improve collaboration and help 
identify common frequencies for cross border communications. These 
interoperable communications demonstration projects will address the 
interoperable communications needs of police officers, firefighters, 
emergency medical technicians, National Guard, and other emergency 
response providers at our borders by identifying common international 
cross-border frequencies for communications equipment; fostering the 
standardization of interoperable communications equipment; identifying 
solutions that will expeditiously facilitate communications 
interoperability across national borders; ensuring that emergency 
response providers can communicate with one another and the public at 
disaster sites or in the event of a terrorist attack or other 
catastrophic event; and providing training and equipment for relevant 
personnel to enable those units to deal with threats and contingencies 
in a variety of environments.
  Also included in the legislation is language that I authored that 
will require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, WHTI, 
before publishing the final rule. The WHTI will require individuals 
from the United States, Canada, and Mexico to present a passport or 
other document proving citizenship before entering the United States. 
Although we all share the goals of the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative to make our borders as secure as they can be, we need to 
make sure that we are achieving that goal in a way that will not cause 
economic harm to our States. I am also pleased that language was 
included in the bill that I worked with Senator Coleman on to require 
the Department of Homeland Security to sign a memorandum of 
understanding with one or more States to conduct a pilot project to see 
whether secure driver's licenses could be used as a form of 
documentation for travel between the U.S. and Canada under the WHTI. 
The amendment also provides that DHS must evaluate the pilot project 
and map out next steps, including an expansion if appropriate.
  This legislation also takes important steps to shore up rail, transit 
and cargo security in the United States. The legislation establishes a 
grant fund for system wide Amtrak security improvements and much needed 
infrastructure upgrades as well as authorizes an existing grant program 
for improving intercity bus and bus terminal security. It establishes a 
grant program for freight and passenger rail security upgrades and 
requires railroads shipping high-hazard materials to create threat 
mitigation plans. It authorizes studies to find ways to improve 
passenger and baggage security screening on passenger rail service 
between the U.S. and Canada. The bill will hopefully move us closer to 
addressing something I have been trying to get implemented at our 
northern car and truck border crossings for years: establishing a 
preclearance system. The study is required to identify what exactly is 
needed to perform prescreening of rail passengers on the northern 
border.
  I am pleased that the Senate retained language that will require that 
TSA screeners finally come under an unambiguous personnel system. A 
further amendment that I supported will finally give Transportation 
Security Administration screeners the whistleblower protections 
afforded to most other Federal workers, including law enforcement 
officers. It also gives them the right to appeal suspensions and to 
collectively bargain, just like their counterparts in the Border 
Control, FEMA and the Capitol Police.
  The bill also requires studies on how to improve the safety of 
transporting radioactive and hazardous materials and shipments of 
explosives and radioactive materials on our highways. I am pleased that 
this legislation requires the screening of all cargo carried on 
passenger airplanes within 3 years.
  The intelligence failures before the Iraq war were, to a significant 
degree, the result of the CIA shaping intelligence to support 
administration policy. The CIA's errors were all in one direction, 
making the Iraqi threat clearer, sharper and more imminent, thereby 
promoting the decision to remove Saddam from power. Nuances, 
qualifications and caveats were dropped. ``Slam dunk'' was the 
assessment.
  Among the most important things we can do to keep this from happening 
again is to strengthen congressional oversight to ensure that 
intelligence community assessments are objective and uninfluenced by 
the policy judgments of whatever administration is in power. The 9/11 
Commission agreed, stating in its report that ``Of all our 
recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the 
most difficult and important.'' Section 1102 of S. 4 bill is directed 
at that goal.

  Too often Congress is stonewalled or slow-walked by the executive 
branch in accessing intelligence information necessary to make policy 
and conduct oversight of the intelligence community. Section 1102 of 
this bill adds a new section 508 to the National Security Act that will 
ensure Congress has access to intelligence information critical to do 
its job.
  Section 508 requires elements of the intelligence community to 
provide, upon request from congressional committees of jurisdiction, 
timely access to intelligence information. The requirement would apply 
unless the President certified that the requested documents were not 
being provided because the President was asserting a constitutional 
privilege. Requiring the

[[Page S3053]]

intelligence community to respond to requests for information from the 
vice chairman and ranking member of the Senate and House intelligence 
committees, respectively, will encourage rigorous oversight regardless 
of which party controls the Congress.
  In addition to providing information in a timely manner, we expect 
the intelligence community to provide Congress its assessment of 
intelligence matters uninfluenced by the policy goals of the 
administration. However, an Office of Management and Budget--OMB--
memorandum directs executive branch agencies to clear, through OMB, 
legislative proposals, agency reports, and testimony on pending 
legislation. The memo also states that ``If agencies are asked by 
Congressional Committees to report or testify on pending legislation or 
wish to volunteer a report, similar clearance procedures are 
followed.''
  Our intelligence agencies should not have to get permission from the 
OMB, or any other executive branch official to share their views with 
the Congress. Section 1102 of the bill adds a new section 508 (d) to 
the National Security Act that says no executive branch official can 
require the intelligence community to get permission to testify or to 
submit testimony, legislative recommendations or comments to the 
Congress. Section 508 (d) is based on authority that exists for 
numerous other executive branch agencies, including the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Housing 
Finance Board, and the National Credit Union Administration.
  A CRS legal review of direct reporting requirements like the one 
created by section 508 (d) states that ``direct reporting provisions 
are well within the Congress's constitutional authority to inform 
itself in order to perform its legislative function which has been 
consistently acknowledged by Supreme Court decisions, and dates back to 
the early enactments of the First Congress in 1789.'' The CRS review 
calls Department of Justice objections to direct reporting requirements 
``without substantial merit.''
  Finally, it is important for whistleblowers to know that they can 
come directly to Congress if they have evidence that someone has made a 
false statement to the Congress. And the Congress has a right to that 
information--even if it is classified.
  Section 1102 of the bill adds a new section 509 to the National 
Security Act making it clear that intelligence community employees and 
contractors can report classified information directly to appropriate 
Members of Congress and cleared staff if the employee reasonably 
believes that the information provides direct and specific evidence of 
a false or inaccurate statement to Congress contained in an 
intelligence assessment, report or estimate.
  Section 509 is substantively the same as section 225 of the Senate-
passed version of the intelligence reform legislation. Section 225 was 
stripped from the intelligence reform bill in conference. Section 509 
is also similar to a provision that passed the Senate twice previously. 
Once as part of the fiscal year 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act and 
once as a stand alone measure S. 1668, in the 105th Congress. S. 1668 
passed the Senate 93-1.
  Section 509 is also consistent with congressional findings passed in 
the 105th Congress as part of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1998 and incorporated by reference into the 
intelligence reform bill. Those findings state among other things that:

       Congress, as a co-equal branch of Government, is empowered 
     by the Constitution to serve as a check on the executive 
     branch; in that capacity, it has a ``need to know'' of 
     allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch, 
     including allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence 
     Community; . . .
       (N)o basis in law exists for requiring prior authorization 
     of disclosures to the intelligence committees of Congress by 
     employees of the executive branch of classified information 
     about wrongdoing within the Intelligence Community . . .

  I am pleased that the Senate will soon pass this legislation, for the 
families and friends of those we lost on September 11, 2001, and for 
the safety and security of our Nation.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I will vote today in favor of final 
passage of the Improving America's Security by Implementing Unfinished 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, S. 4, but I do so 
with a heavy heart.
  I am truly disappointed that the chairman and ranking member of the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Senators 
Lieberman and Collins, decided to arbitrarily lower the minimum 
allocation for States under the State Homeland Security Grant Program 
and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program from the 0.75 
percent that has existed for the past 5 years to 0.45 percent. Not only 
would this change to the formula result in the loss of millions in 
homeland security funding for the fire, police, and rescue departments 
in small- and medium-sized States, like Vermont, Connecticut, and 
Maine, it also would deal a crippling blow to their efforts to launch 
federally mandated multiyear plans to build and sustain their terrorism 
preparedness.
  During the Senate floor debate on S. 4, I offered with Senators 
Thomas, Stevens, Roberts, Pryor, Sanders, Enzi, Hatch, Whitehouse, and 
Lincoln an amendment to restore the minimum allocation for States under 
the State Homeland Security Grant Program from 0.45 percent, which is 
proposed by the underlying bill, to 0.75 percent, which is current law. 
As with current law, the State minimum under our amendment would have 
continued to apply only to 40 percent of the overall funding under this 
program. The majority of the funds would continue to be allocated based 
on risk assessment criteria, as are the funds under the several 
separate discretionary programs that Congress has established for 
solely urban and high-risk areas, which also are governed by risk 
assessment calculations.
  Unfortunately, this amendment lost by a vote of 49 yeas to 50 nays. 
This is a marked change from just last year, when the 0.75 percent 
minimum allocation was overwhelmingly defended when 64 Senators voted 
against an amendment that would have lowered the minimum to 0.25 
percent. Fifteen Senators changed their votes from last year, including 
HSGAC Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, whose States stand 
to lose the most from the decreased minimum.
  The bill that passed the Senate today would reduce the all-State 
minimum for SHSGP and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program 
to 0.45 percent. The House bill reduces it even further to 0.25 
percent. Due to the formula differences, there is no guarantee that the 
minimum will not be even further reduced during conference 
negotiations. Small- and medium-sized States face the loss of millions 
of dollars for our first responders if the minimum is lowered.
  By reducing the all-State minimum to 0.45 percent, the underlying 
bill would reduce the guaranteed dollar amount for each State by 40 
percent. With appropriations for formula grants having been cut by 60 
percent since 2003--from $2.3 billion in 2003, to $900 million in 
fiscal year 2007--further reductions in first responder funding would 
hamper even more each State's efforts to prevent and deal with 
potential terrorist attacks.
  In fiscal year 2007, State Homeland Security and Law Enforcement 
Terrorism grants were funded at $525 million and $375 million, 
respectively, for a total of $900 million. Under the current all-State 
minimum of 0.75 percent, the base amount States receive is $6.75 
million. Based on fiscal year 2007 levels, each State would face a loss 
of an estimated $2.7 million, or 40 percent, under the new 0.45 percent 
formula, which would be a real blow to our first responders.
  And the cuts will be even deeper should the President's budget 
request for next year be approved. The President has requested only 
$250 million for these two important first responder grant programs.
  My colleagues from our largest States--and apparently some small- and 
medium-sized States--seem to forget that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
added to the responsibilities and risks of first responders nationwide. 
I wrote the current all-State minimum formula as part of the USA 
PATRIOT Act

[[Page S3054]]

of 2001 to guarantee that each State receives at least 0.75 percent of 
the national allotment to help meet their national domestic security 
needs.
  Every State--rural or urban, small or large--has basic domestic 
security needs and deserves to receive Federal funds under this 
partnership to meet both those needs and the new homeland security 
responsibilities the Federal Government demands. Of course, high-
density urban areas and high-risk centers have even greater needs, 
which is why this year alone we provided $1.3 billion for homeland 
security programs for which only a small number of urban areas are 
eligible to apply. All of these needs deserve and need to be met. I 
have worked hard over the years to help address the needs of larger 
States and high-density areas, and I have opposed the Bush 
Administration's efforts to pit our States against each other, as they 
have tried to mask their efforts to cut overall funding for first 
responders.
  Smaller States, especially, would never be able to fulfill those 
essential duties on top of their daily responsibilities without Federal 
support, especially given that DHS is currently suggesting that States 
will pay for REAL ID implementation, an estimated $16 billion, with 
first responder grants. My colleagues should be warned that if the 
minimum drops further--compounded by substantial drops in overall first 
responder funding--then small- and medium-sized States will not be able 
to meet those Federal mandates for terrorism prevention, preparedness, 
and response.
  Some from urban States argue that Federal money to fight terrorism is 
being sent to areas that do not need it and is ``wasted'' in small 
towns. They claim the formula is highly politicized and insists on the 
redirection of funds to urban areas that they believe face heightened 
threat of terrorist attacks.
  What critics of the all-State minimum seem to forget since the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, the Federal Government has asked all 
State and local first responders to defend us as never before on the 
front lines in the war against terrorism. Emergency responders in one 
State have been given the same obligation as those in any other State 
to provide enhanced protection, preparedness, and response against 
terrorists.
  The attacks of 9/11 added to the responsibilities and risks of first 
responders across the country. In recent years, due to the 0.75 percent 
all-State minimum allocation for formula grants that has existed in 
law, first responders have received resources to help them meet their 
new responsibilities and have made our neighborhoods safer and our 
communities better prepared.
  There is much left undone in securing our Nation. I hope that the 
Senate's conferees will resist calls for further needless reductions to 
the all-State minimum base and risk the preparedness efforts in small 
States like their own. I trust they will do all they can during 
conference negotiations to ensure continued support and resources for 
our police, fire, and EMS services in every State if we expect them to 
continue protecting us from terrorist or responding to terrorist 
attacks, as well as carrying out their ongoing responsibilities in 
helping to keep our communities safe and prepared.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, now is the time to implement the 
unfinished recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
  I commend Senators Lieberman and Collins for their leadership and the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee for its 
work on this important legislation. More than 5 years after 9/11 
despite tens of billions of dollars spent America's ports, rails, 
airports, borders, nuclear powerplants and chemical plants still are 
not completely safe. It has been more than 2 years since the 9/11 
Commission issued its final recommendations, and here we are, today, 
still debating the same issues.
  This legislation builds upon previous efforts to enhance homeland 
security and includes several critical provisions to allocate homeland 
security resources based on risk, ensure that first responders have 
interoperable communications equipment, and improve government-wide 
information sharing.
  I especially am pleased to note three provisions included in this 
bill that I have championed for some time. This legislation specifies 
that States can use Federal grants to design, conduct, and evaluate 
mass evacuation plans and exercises. While most cities and States have 
evacuation plans, the lack of training drills and exercises makes it 
difficult to address problems and work out solutions before lives are 
at risk in a real emergency. As we learned from Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, there is no substitute for being prepared. We may only have one 
chance to get it right.
  In addition, this legislation makes important structural changes to 
strengthen the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Again, I 
commend Senators Lieberman and Collins for including a broad statutory 
mandate and subpoena power for the Board. This bill also would require 
Senate confirmation for the chair and the vice-chair of the Board, as 
well as mandatory public reporting by the Board and reports for 
Congress. These provisions are key to ensuring the integrity of the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
  Finally, this bill improves intelligence and information sharing 
within the Federal Government and with State and local governments. I 
am pleased that the bill we consider today would make the program 
manager for the Information Sharing Environment, ISE, permanent and 
authorize additional funds and staff to accomplish the ISE mission. The 
bill also requires additional reports to Congress on the status of ISE 
development. These comprehensive new requirements would improve and 
strengthen government information sharing structures, which will mean a 
more integrated intelligence network and a more secure Nation.
  The 9/11 Commission gave Congress a critically important job by 
charging us with making structural changes to close the gaps in 
America's homeland security defenses. This legislation responds to that 
challenge, and I support its final passage.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will be 20 
minutes of debate divided between the managers and the leaders.
  The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I first want to thank our colleagues 
for their cooperation in moving forward this very important piece of 
legislation. When the 9/11 Commission completed its report and made its 
findings to Congress, the Homeland Security Committee, which I chaired 
at the time, worked very hard to produce a major overhaul of our 
intelligence community--in fact, the most sweeping changes in more than 
50 years.
  That legislation, for example, created the Director of National 
Intelligence and also established the National Counterterrorism Center, 
which brings together analysts from the 15 agencies involved in 
intelligence gathering and analysis. We took a major step forward.
  Now we are on the verge of finishing the job. I salute the chairman 
of the committee, Senator Lieberman, for making this legislation the 
top priority of our committee under his chairmanship. The legislation 
is going to help implement the unfinished recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. As I said, most of the recommendations were included in the 
2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. But there were 
some significant ones that were not completed. Thus, this legislation 
improves intelligence and information sharing, and it authorizes the 
Homeland Security Grant Program, which has been so important in 
improving the capabilities of our communities and States which are, 
after all, our partners in improving homeland security.
  We worked very hard, the chairman and I and the rest of the committee 
members, to devise a formula that would be fair to all States, that 
would allocate the majority of the funding based on an analysis of 
risk, vulnerability, and consequences but also ensure that each and 
every State receive a predictable, steady level of funding so that each 
State can be improved and have a basic preparedness level.
  I think we struck the right balance in that area. This bill would 
authorize a bit over $3 billion for each of the next 3 years for this 
new Homeland Security Grant Program. Included in that program is an 
emphasis on prevention. We

[[Page S3055]]

all are very focused on recovery and response in the event of a 
terrorist attack, but we believe it is very important to also focus on 
preventing attacks from happening in the first place. Our legislation 
would do that by providing that at least 25 percent of the overall 
funding for the urban areas and State Homeland Security Grant Programs 
must be used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities.
  Another important section of this bill creates a program to deal with 
communications equipment interoperability. We know that lives were lost 
on 9/11 because the various first responders could not communicate with 
one another. As a result, firefighters, police officers, and emergency 
medical personnel lost their lives and suffered injuries. Much to our 
dismay, we also found as part of our investigation into the failed 
response to Hurricane Katrina that exactly those same interoperability 
problems were occurring in Louisiana, in particular. We simply must 
tackle this problem. It is too big a problem and too expensive a 
problem for States and communities to do on their own. That is why we 
have a partnership, a grant program that would be administered by FEMA 
and dedicated to improving the survivability and the interoperability 
of communications equipment used by our courageous first responders and 
emergency managers.
  Again, that program would authorize $3.3 billion over the next 5 
years.
  The bill also makes a number of important improvements to prevent 
terrorists from traveling to our country; to strengthen the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board; to improve private sector 
preparedness, since we know that 85 percent of critical infrastructure 
is in the private sector; and to improve transportation security 
planning and overall security of our transportation system.
  It has been a great pleasure to work with the chairman and the 
members of our committee, as well as the Commerce Committee and other 
Members who have been interested, to bring this bill to the floor, and 
I believe it will help make our Nation safer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, first, let me thank my ranking 
member, the Senator from Maine. I was thinking, as she was speaking, 
that when the transition occurred at the beginning of this 110th 
session of Congress I said to her, all that would change in our working 
relationship was our title, the title that each of us had. As I look 
back on our work together on this bill, S. 4, I am pleased to say that 
we worked with the same spirit of cooperation that we did under her 
chairmanship in 2004 when we had our first legislative response to the 
9/11 Commission and we adopted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist 
Prevention Act of 2004. So I thank Senator Collins.
  I thank her staff for their work, and I thank my staff as well.
  Madam President, I note the presence on the floor of the majority 
leader. I thank him for making adoption of this legislation a priority 
for this Congress. Here is why. This bill will strengthen our ability 
not just to respond to terrorist attacks but also to prepare our 
Federal, State, and local governments to respond to natural disasters. 
In that sense, S. 4 is not only a response to finish the mission given 
us by the 9/11 Commission that learns from the lessons of the first 
months of implementation of that Commission report, but it also applies 
to lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. We are trying to create an 
all-hazards approach in our Government that increases our homeland 
security against the threat of a terrorist attack and also prepares our 
Government to respond better to natural disasters. I do not want to 
repeat some of the points in this legislation that Senator Collins 
focused on. I will just pick a few additionally.
  One is that S. 4 recognizes that 85 percent of the critical 
infrastructure in our country that is potentially a target for 
terrorist attack in our great open society is privately owned. For the 
first time, we establish a voluntary program where the private sector 
can come in and have their facilities certified as, I would use the 
term ``terrorist resistant.''
  In another section we declassify the bottom line of the intelligence 
budget. That was a specific recommendation of the 9/11 Commission in 
the interests of transparency and accountability.
  We also greatly improve the provisions that in our law and policy are 
aimed at disrupting terrorist infiltration of our borders. This bill 
requires the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of 
State to strengthen the security provisions of the so-called visa 
waiver program. It also authorizes an electronic travel system that 
would require travelers to apply in advance for authorization to visit 
the United States, thus allowing their names to be checked against 
terrorist watch lists.
  I am very proud of the bill we present after almost 2 weeks of debate 
to our colleagues in the Senate for final consideration. I know it will 
strengthen the homeland security of the American people. It enjoyed 
strong nonpartisan support in our committee, coming out with a vote of 
16 to 0 with one abstention.
  I gather there will be a significant number of ``no'' votes on the 
final passage because of one section, and I regret that. I wish our 
colleagues would vote favorably because I know they support almost all 
of this bill because it is good for the security of the American people 
at home.
  The one section, obviously, is the one that deals with the collective 
bargaining rights of transportation security officers. I sure hope we 
can continue to discuss this section: why we think it is fair, why we 
are totally convinced its implementation will have no adverse effect on 
public safety--no more than the collective bargaining rights of Capitol 
Police officers or local firefighters or police officers or members of 
the Border Patrol or other law enforcement agencies in the Department 
of Homeland Security in any way adversely affects the carrying out of 
the duties to protect the American people.
  Madam President, I also want to thank the chairman and ranking member 
of the Commerce Committee, Senators Inouye and Stevens, for producing 
the rail and aviation security portions of this bill, and the chairman 
and ranking member of the Banking Committee, Senators Dodd and Shelby, 
who contributed important mass transit security provisions.
  I would be remiss if I didn't also thank the majority leader, Senator 
Reid, for working with all of the committees involved to bring this 
comprehensive measure before tbe Senate. We have had 2 weeks of often 
spirited debate, and votes on some important amendments. Now, I believe 
we are ready to pass this bill, and I look forward to working with my 
colleagues to conference this measure with the House, and moving the 
legislation onto the President's desk for signature.
  September 11, 2001, was a tragedy of unspeakable proportions, and it 
is for the men and women who died in the terrorist attacks that we work 
to enact this legislation. The attacks changed the course of history 
for our Nation and marked our nascent century as a new and dangerous 
era. Overnight, we became aware of our vulnerability to an enemy that 
doesn't wear uniforms nor follows any traditional laws of combat. 
Rather, they move silently among us, probing for weaknesses while 
plotting attacks on innocent civilians.
  The families of those we lost on 9/11 have worked with us for years 
to get the 9/11 Commission recommendations implemented. I must thank 
them as well for their steadfast and courageous advocacy often in the 
face of seemingly insurmountable odds. They worked with us to pass the 
bill that Senator McCain and I introduced to create the 9/11 
Commission. They monitored the work of the 9/11 Commission, and 
testified before its members. And then they helped us win the fight to 
implement the Commission's recommendations in the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.
  In January, Senator Collins and I held a hearing on this legislation 
and heard from three family members who urged us to complete the job of 
enacting and implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. When 
we pass this bill today, they will be watching. And they will know that 
they had a hand in its success.
  Senator Reid made adoption of this legislation a priority for this 
Congress. Here is why: This bill will strengthen our ability not just 
to respond to terrorist attacks but also to prepare our

[[Page S3056]]

Federal, State, and local governments to better respond to natural 
disasters.
  We are trying to create an ``all hazards'' approach that increases 
our homeland security against the threat of terrorist attack, but also 
prepares our government to respond better to natural disasters since it 
failed to prepare or respond adequately to Hurricane Katrina.
  How do we do this? Let me briefly describe a few of the provisions in 
this bill.
  First, we would improve information and intelligence sharing among 
Federal, State, and local officials. We know that before 9/11, 
different agencies had different pieces of information that, had they 
been put together, should have aroused suspicion about the attack that 
was to come. One of the most important innovations since 9/11 has been 
the establishment of fusion centers to share information within and 
between States. This legislation would create standards for the fusion 
centers, require the Department of Homeland Security to provide support 
and coordination, and authorize the assignment of homeland security 
intelligence analysts to the fusion centers to serve as conduits for 
sharing information. The legislation also encourages the elimination of 
the ``need to know'' standard, which allows the information holder in a 
given Federal agency to control dissemination, and instead, encourages 
a ``need to share'' standard--obviously with appropriate safeguards.
  Second, this legislation provides support and resources to first 
responders through a balanced and better funded Homeland Security Grant 
Program. We would authorize over $3.1 billion for each of the next 3 
years for key grants to reverse a precipitous decline in funding for 
homeland security over the past 4 years. We believe we have achieved a 
balanced proposal that gives the vast majority of the money out based 
on risk but still recognizes that risk is an art, not a science, and 
terrorists could strike anywhere. In an all-hazards approach, first 
responders everywhere need assistance to protect not just against a 
potential terrorist attack but also against natural disasters.

  Third, we will help first responders attain the interoperable 
communications we know they need to save lives. We have known of this 
problem for decades, and on 9/11, when fire fighters and police 
officers could not communicate with one another inside the World Trade 
Center, hundreds of first responders lost their lives. So, we have 
created a grant program--authorized at $3.3 billion over 5 years--that 
will require States to spend their grant money consistent with their 
statewide communications interoperability plans and the National 
Emergency Communications Plan. In other words, their spending must be 
part of a statewide plan connected to the national plan.
  Fourth, this legislation contains provisions to improve our ability 
to disrupt terrorist infiltration of our borders. It requires the 
Departments of Homeland Security and State to strengthen the security 
of the visa waiver program, by requiring better reporting by foreign 
countries in the visa waiver program of lost or stolen passports, 
requiring countries to share information about prospective visitors who 
may pose a threat to the U.S., and authorizing an electronic travel 
system that would require travelers to apply in advance for 
authorization to visit the U.S., thus allowing their names to be 
checked against terrorist watch lists.
  Fifth, this bill moves to ensure that as we fight terrorism, we do 
not trample on the rights of Americans we are pledged to defend. 
Included here are provisions to strengthen the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board by requiring its members to be confirmed by 
the Senate and by giving the Board subpoena power through the Attorney 
General.
  This legislation also includes a provision similar to one I was 
pleased to cosponsor in committee with Senator McCaskill that will 
ensure Transportation Security Administration screeners--known as 
Transportation Security Officers--have the same employment rights as 
others in TSA and throughout the Department of Homeland Security. There 
is no good reason to deny TSOs these rights. Other law enforcement 
officers at Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border 
Protection have these rights, with no negative effect on their 
performance of their security mission. In fact, Capitol Police also 
enjoy these rights and protections. This is simply a question of 
equality.
  So this is a comprehensive bill. There are many other worthy aspects 
that I have not described. But I am convinced that, as a package, if 
this legislation passes and becomes law, the American people will be 
safer from the consequences of natural disasters, such as Hurricane 
Katrina, than they are today. And we will have done everything possible 
to make sure no other Americans suffer the loss that so many 
experienced after the brutal terrorist attacks of 9/11.
  In the preface to the 9/11 Report, Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman 
Hamilton wrote, quoting here, ``We hope our report will encourage our 
fellow citizens to study, reflect--and act.''
  We have studied. We have reflected. Now is the time to act to build a 
safer and more secure America for the generations to come.
  Finally, I would like to pay tribute to my dedicated and exceptional 
staff, who have sacrificed nights, weekends, family time in the name of 
a safer America.
  I particularly want to thank my Homeland Security Committee staff 
director Mike Alexander for his leadership in expertly guiding this 
legislation through drafting, markup, floor amendments, and onto final 
passage. I also want to thank the committee's deputy chief counsel 
Kevin Landy, whose drive and attention to detail resulted in superior 
legislation. Thanks also to Eric Anderson, Christian Beckner, Janet 
Burrell, Scott Campbell, Troy Cribb, Aaron Firoved, Elyse Greenwald, 
Beth Grossman, Seamus Hughes, Holly Idelson, Kristine Lam, Nate Lesser, 
Jim Mcgee, Sheila Menz, Larry Novey, Deborah Parkinson, Leslie 
Phillips, Alistair Reader, Patricia Rojas, Laurie Rubenstein, Mary Beth 
Schultz, Adam Sedgewick, Todd Stein, Donny Williams, Jason Yanussi, and 
Wes Young--all on my committee staff. And thanks to Purva Rawal, Vance 
Serchuk, and Cherrie Daniels on my personal office staff.
  I must also thank Senator Collins' staff director Brandon Milhorn and 
the Senator's entire staff for working with us to move this very 
important legislation.
  But bottom line, thank you to our colleagues, thanks to the 9/11 
Commission, thanks to the 9/11 families who have stuck with this 
mission to protect the American people from ever having to suffer the 
grievous loss they did at the hands of terrorists on 9/11.
  I hope our colleagues will join together across party lines to 
support this very nonpartisan homeland security measure.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, let me congratulate Chairman 
Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins on their Herculean effort on this 
legislation. I particularly commend our ranking member, Senator 
Collins, for fighting the good fight when there were some reservations 
on our side about a major portion of this bill which will compel me to 
vote against the bill. I know Senator Collins made every effort to 
strip the provision that I and others find so offensive, but 
regretfully the provision was not stripped.
  In a few minutes the Senate will vote on final passage of Improving 
America's Security Act of 2007. It has, as I indicated, some good 
features. At its core, it seeks to improve America's security, but on 
balance it would also do much to weaken it. I plan to vote against the 
bill, and I urge my Senate colleagues to do the same.
  But, before I cast my vote, a little background. Many of our 
Democratic friends spent last year campaigning on the claim that 
Republicans ignored the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We 
didn't. Of the Commission's 39 recommendations, we implemented 37. Nor 
are the remaining two recommendations at issue today. Both parties 
agree they should not be in the bill, so the two provisions that we did 
not adopt of the 9/11 Commission, both sides agreed we should not 
adopt. So I will oppose this bill on the basis of my answer to a simple 
question: Does it weaken America's security or strengthen it? The 
answer that I and many of

[[Page S3057]]

my colleagues have come with is, regretfully, the former.
  This bill would weaken America's security because of a single 
dangerous provision, and that at the insistence of big labor that 
Democrats include collective bargaining rights for airport security 
screeners, rights that Congress has refused to give them in the past 
because of the impact it would have on our ability to react to 
terrorist threats.
  Congress would not grant screeners collective bargaining rights back 
in 2002. We have had this debate before. We had it at the time of the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security--if it has a familiar 
ring to it, to many of my colleagues, we chose not to adopt that 
provision then, and we hopefully will not, ultimately, this time.

  The difference is the Democrats are letting the fight play out. They 
are stretching it out based on a political calculation. They already 
know how this showdown is going to end. The President threatened to 
veto any bill that makes airport security more like the department of 
motor vehicles. So they are delaying passage knowing it won't be 
accepted, for an applause line down the road.
  Republicans tried to inject meaning into this bill to include 
provisions that would improve security. For example, we proposed an 
amendment that would make it a crime to recruit terrorists, that would 
authorize the deportation of suspected terrorists, that would make it 
easier to detain dangerous illegal aliens and would increase penalties 
for people who cruelly call families of soldiers overseas and falsely 
report their loved one has died. But our colleagues on the other side 
of the aisle rejected all of those provisions, opting instead to pump 
for big labor. They are turning their backs on their own campaign 
promises in the process by ignoring a key recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission that the United States do everything in its power to 
constrain terrorists' mobility.
  TSA workers showed that mobility after the United Kingdom bombing 
threat in August when they showed up for work that morning at 4 a.m. 
and they were briefed on the situation overseas and they immediately 
implemented new protocols. Anyone who traveled to or from an American 
airport that day would not even have known anything had happened. The 
execution was seamless. It was a different story in Great Britain, 
where collective bargaining is the norm. Dozens of flights were 
canceled while new procedures were instituted. The Democrats know 
Americans will not stand for that approach to terrorism in our country, 
but they are counting on the President and the Republicans to stop it 
for them. That way, they can call us obstructionists and get another 
applause line in the bargain and maybe even a headline or two. It is a 
shame because there are some good things in the bill, such as new 
performance standards and auditing requirements for DHS grants. But we 
will let them have their applause line.
  Republicans have never played games with national security, and we 
are not going to start now. Therefore, I will vote against the bill, 
and for the sake of the American people and their continued security, I 
would strongly urge my other colleagues to do the same, while saying 
once again how much I commend the Senator from Maine for her efforts to 
get this bill in the proper form, and there are provisions in the bill 
not as a result of any of the efforts of the ranking member of the 
committee. I commend her for her efforts but, regretfully, must oppose 
final passage.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, this should be a time of celebration, not 
a time of finger-pointing. In fact, the fact is, it is true that a 
number of recommendations the 9/11 Commission recommended we did do. 
But, as you know, the Commissioners themselves graded the 
administration on what needed to be done to implement the Commission's 
recommendations. That is where we get into the Es, Fs, and incompletes. 
So there is no question this legislation absolutely is totally 
necessary.
  Following the terrible attacks on September 11, our country turned to 
a respected group of Democrats and Republicans, the 9/11 Commission, an 
independent bipartisan Commission, to review the lessons of that tragic 
day and to find a better way to protect the homeland fight on the war 
on terrorism. Under difficult circumstances, including a lack of 
cooperation, in instances, from the White House, the Commission did an 
outstanding job.
  In July of 2004, it made a number of recommendations to Congress and 
the administration about how best to secure America from al-Qaida and 
other terrorist groups. Their recommendations were commonsense 
solutions. These commonsense solutions were designed to keep America 
safe. But, unfortunately, over the last 2\1/2\ years, many of the 
Commission's recommendations have been ignored, and too many of our 
communities remain dangerously unprepared to prevent or respond to a 
terrorist attack.
  Today, in a few minutes, the Senate will correct that mistake. We 
will enhance the security of our transportation system at our ports. We 
will provide America's first responders with the technology they need 
to communicate with each other when a Katrina or another terrorist 
attack strikes, and we will put new security requirements in place to 
keep terrorists from traveling to the United States.
  This is an important piece of legislation we are going to pass. We 
are going to pass it, as I said, in a short time. I thank Chairman 
Lieberman and his ranking member, Senator Collins, for their efforts on 
this bill.
  I said before this legislation was taken up on the floor that we have 
two people who set the example for how you should legislate. They got 
along well in their committee. When she was chairman, Senator Lieberman 
worked well with her, and it has worked the same way. I commend and 
applaud both of these legislators. They have done a tremendous job 
trying to work through this issue. Anything that has been slowed down 
in this legislation has not been their fault--in fact, quite to the 
contrary. They have worked tirelessly to bring this legislation here 
today so we can have this vote. They reported a strong bill out of the 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. It has only been 
strengthened by the amendment process before the full Senate over the 
past several days.
  Now, we do not need to redebate the issue regarding collective 
bargaining. Collective bargaining has been in this country for a long 
time, and it is here to stay. There is nothing in this piece of 
legislation that is in any way going to impair the security of this 
Nation.
  I wish to thank the entire 9/11 Commission for their service, but 
especially I wish to thank 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer and the 9/11 
family, but especially Carol Ashley, Beverly Eckert, Mary Fetchet, and 
Carie Lemack, members of Families of September 11 and VOICES of 
September 11th. Their input in this legislation has been essential. 
Former Congressman Roemer spent time here on the Senate floor. No one 
could ever accuse Congressman Roemer of being some wild-eyed liberal. 
He is a moderate, and he is from the State of Indiana. He has worked 
very hard on the Commission and to move this legislation forward. I 
underline and underscore my appreciation for his input and also for the 
families and the two letters they wrote during the debate. Their 
letters served as a reminder of what this legislation is about: 
protecting America against terrorism. Our country will be safer, 
stronger, and more secure as a result of their efforts.

  The first responsibility of Government is to protect our people--the 
people of Colorado, the people of Nevada, the people of Maine, the 
people of Connecticut, Alabama, Nebraska, and Missouri. The Senators 
are here assembled, everyone in their seats. Our No. 1 job is to 
protect our people. By passing the legislation today, we will help 
ensure the Senate meets its obligation, and we will, once and for all, 
write the lesson of that terrible September 11 day into law.
  In their report to the Nation, the 9/11 Commission wrote, ``The men 
and women of the World War II generation rose to the challenges of the 
1940s and the 1950s. They restructured the government so it could 
protect the country. That is now the job of the generations that 
experienced 9/11.''

[[Page S3058]]

  That is what the legislation is all about.
  Again, I applaud and commend the two managers of the bill, those who 
offered amendments and debated the issue. This is good legislation, 
good for the country. It makes America a better place. I urge my 
colleagues to vote for this legislation so we can take another step to 
fulfilling the directives we were given by the 9/11 Commission.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent that a list of the homeland 
security staffers on the Republican side who worked so hard on this 
bill be printed in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Brandon Milhorn, Andy Weis, Rob Strayer, Amy Hall, Allison 
     Boyd, Kate Alford, John Grant, Amanda Wood, Jennifer Tarr, 
     Asha Mathew, Brooke Hayes, Priscilla Henley, Jane Alonso, Jay 
     Meroney, Melvin Albritton, Mark LeDuc, Tom Bishop, Doug 
     Campbell, Emily Meeks, and Neil Cutter.

  Ms. COLLINS. I also wish to add my voice in thanks to the families of 
the victims of 9/11. They have truly been the committee's inspiration 
as we worked on these issues for the last 4 years.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. For the information of all Members, we are working--Senator 
McConnell and I--on a consent agreement to deal with the Iraq debate 
tomorrow. Hopefully, we will be able to resolve the Iraq debate. 
Thursday, we will be able to deal with the U.S. attorneys bill and some 
judicial nominees. We do not have that worked out yet, so everyone stay 
tuned.
  This will be the last vote today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Salazar). The bill having been read the 
third time, the question is, Shall it pass?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. 
Johnson) is necessarily absent.
  Mr. LOTT. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 60, nays 38, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 73 Leg.]

                                YEAS--60

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brown
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Clinton
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Dodd
     Dole
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Obama
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Salazar
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Tester
     Voinovich
     Webb
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--38

     Alexander
     Allard
     Bennett
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Martinez
     McConnell
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Sununu
     Thomas
     Thune
     Vitter
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Johnson
     McCain
       
  The bill (S. 4), as amended, was passed, as follows:
  (The bill will be printed in a future edition of the Record.)
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MENENDEZ). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask to speak as in morning business 
for such time as I might consume, and if there are other Members who 
are wondering how long that might be, it wouldn't be probably for more 
than 15 minutes at the most.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.

                          ____________________