[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 43 (Tuesday, March 13, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3024-S3058]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IMPROVING AMERICA'S SECURITY ACT OF 2007--Continued
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues, on the pending
legislation, S. 4, the Senate has now used up all the time postcloture
so that what stands--if I could put it in a more negative light than I
should--before the Senate and the vote on final passage of this
important legislation is disposition of the remaining germane
amendments and any other matters that can be passed by consent.
We are working on a managers' amendment which would contain the
matters about which there is unanimous consent. We are whittling down
the number of germane amendments that will need to be voted on. I say
to my colleagues we hope to be able soon to announce when the last few
votes on amendments and final passage will occur. But they will
definitely occur this afternoon.
I thank the Chair, and pending further developments, I suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have spoken to the manager of the bill,
and I am--with his permission and their permission--going to speak. But
as soon as they are ready to reclaim the floor, to close this down, I
am prepared to stop at that point, or before.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator is recognized.
Amendment No. 383
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I know there is not a lot of time, but the
amendment that is at the desk, No. 383, that I have--I ask it be called
up and be considered.
This is all about rail safety. The Federal Government currently has
no say on where 90-ton rail tankers, filled with chlorine or other
hazardous chemicals, are shipped around the Nation. The Naval Research
Laboratory, at my request, some months ago, issued a report. The
context of my inquiry with them was: What would happen if one of these
90-ton chlorine gas tanker cars exploded--for example, where a
terrorist put C-2 underneath there in a populated area and blew it up?
What made me think of it was, you may remember almost 2 years ago
now, out in North Dakota, one of these tankers leaked, and the end
result was a number of adjoining towns, small towns, had to be
evacuated because it was so deadly.
So I asked the question of the Naval Research Center. As you know,
some of our best scientists in the world are there. I asked: What would
happen? What would happen if a 90-ton tanker containing chlorine were
to be blown up in a major metropolitan area?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the report submitted to
me be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Advanced simulation technology gives us a practical
breakthrough for analyzing and treating urban contaminant
accidents, pollutant incidents, and in combating Chemical,
Biological, and Radiological (CBR) terrorism. Today the
nation is striving to develop plans and corresponding
procedures to prepare for these contingencies. The ability to
construct accurate, easy-to-understand analyses of dangerous
contaminant release incidents is an absolutely crucial
component of civil defense planning and execution. When
decisions have to be made during an actual crisis,
essentially infinite speed is required of the predictions and
yet the analyses must be performed with high accuracy. When
responding to a CBR crisis, waiting even one minute to
perform simplified support computations can be far too long
for timely situation assessment. State-of-the-art,
engineering-quality three-dimensional predictions that one
might be more inclined to believe can take hours or days. The
answer to this dilemma is to do the most accurate
computations possible well ahead of time and then to capture
their salient results in a highly compressed database that
can be recalled, manipulated, and displayed instantly during
a crisis. Dispersion Nomograph TM technology was
invented at NRL to provide this capability.
This presentation is based on a portable software tool
called CT-Analyst TM that uses dispersion
nomographs to combine information from sensors and eyewitness
reports to find contaminant sources in an urban maze of
buildings, to track airborne contaminant plumes accurately
across the city, and to plan evacuation routes. In a crisis,
real time users don't have to wait for any of these results
because personnel defense plans and strategies can be adapted
to current situation assessments with no delay for computing.
This presentation uses CT-Analyst to show the evolution of a
large contaminant plume caused by the rupture of a railroad
tank car adjacent to the Blathersburg Mall.
Detailed, three-dimensional FAST3D-CT simulations (such as
shown at left) are compressed by more than a factor of 10,000
to produce compact data structures called Dispersion
Nomographs TM. These ``nomographs'' allow CT-
Analyst TM to make accurate, instantaneous
predictions including the effects of buildings (as shown at
right). This example shows the situation twenty minutes after
a contaminant release occurred at the location marked by the
blue star with the wind from 295 degrees at 3 m/s. This CT-
Analyst display shows the instantaneous plume at 20 minutes
(light red) superimposed on the footprint of the likely
contamination region (light gray). The footprint can
eventually become contaminated beyond tolerable limits
sometime during the scenario. The plume region displayed
surrounds the instantaneous plume--with a safety buffer zone.
CT-Analyst is in use at a number of locations (see figure),
was extended for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and is being
modified as a CBR Emergency Assessment System for
installation in Navy bases over seas.
Also overlaid on the CT-Analyst display are the results of
the backtrack function (sensor readings and observations
determining a probable source location as shown in blue and
purple). CT-Analyst performs multi-sensor fusion operations
based on the very limited information about the contaminant
density. A number of sensors are active and operating in
automatic (triangles) and manual (circles) modes to register
the presence or absence of the agent plume at their location.
Red indicates a ``hot'' sensor (something considered
dangerous) and blue indicates a ``cold'' reading where the
contaminant agent density is below the threshold for
detection. Please note that the ``Escape'' function has also
been activated in this composite display, projecting optimal
evacuation routes. These recommended evacuation routes
suggest walking paths for rapid egress from the path of the
advancing plume and continue out to the edges of the
contamination footprint. This entire assessment takes about
50 milliseconds on a typical windows laptop computer.
The figure above shows the contaminant concentration just
three minutes after a railroad tank car accident has occurred
along the indicated section of track where the right-of-way
turns toward the east as shown by the yellow arrow. A large
quantity of contaminant has been released in a couple of
minutes. The time is late evening and the brisk breeze, from
the southeast in this scenario, blows the cloud up toward a
quarter of a million people celebrating Fourth of July on the
Mall near the Blatherburg Monument.
The large gray area is the contamination footprint
predicted by CT-Analyst TM; this area can become
highly contaminated in the first half an hour. It is a good
idea to get to outside the footprint and stay outside of it
until an ``all clear'' is given. The bands of color downwind
of the source, originating at the bright blue stars along the
track, indicate the contaminant concentration in the cloud
moving with the wind toward the upper left. The table tells
how to interpret the colors in easily understood terms. The
actual numbers, of course, can only be made specific and
quantitative when the absolute size of the source is known.
Each color marks approximately a factor of two range of
concentration values. People breathing yellow green and
``hotter'' colors are in a very deadly situation. Not all
colors appear on each figure because the contaminant
concentration drops as the plume (cloud) spreads.
The diagonal purple lines in this and the following figures
mark general suggested evacuation routes. The gaps in these
lines show a kind of ``no man's land'' where the plume will
go first and in highest concentration. People should walk
briskly away from the center of the advancing plume along the
general direction of these evacuation paths skirting around
buildings and keeping to reasonable walking routes as
required. Don't run and don't get in or stay in a car.
These two figures show the advancing plume at five minutes
(left) and ten minutes (right) after the release occurred.
Three adjacent blue stars are used to mark the extended
region over which this release has occurred from a moving
railroad tank car. The yellow arrow indicates the direction
of motion along the track and the pink arrow is the
prevailing wind direction in each figure. The brisk breeze
here is a worst case because slower winds allow much easier
evacuation from the affected area and much faster winds
dissipate the cloud so quickly that fewer people at any one
spot receive critical dosages.
Almost everywhere in the plume after five minutes has
elapsed (colored region)
[[Page S3025]]
there is a high probability that the contamination will be
lethal and almost all of the plume is still lethal at ten
minutes. At ten minutes the lethal plume area is spreading at
about its maximum rate. If 100,000 people receive critical
(lethal) doses in the absence of any defensive action, they
are crossing this critical dose threshold at the rate of a
hundred people per second. Thus there is an enormous benefit
to immediate warning delay and speedy defensive response.
Based on a number of other simulations not shown here and a
consistent analytic theory, a warning issued within 3 minutes
is possible with an automated sensor network and near
complete situation assessment and response should be possible
within five minutes. Though many procedural and communication
problems remain to be solved, these times should be adopted
as goals because so many lives will depend on making these
response times as short as possible. Between five minutes and
the current goal of issuing a warning in 15 minutes, 60,000
people or more could be critically dosed.
These two figures show the advancing plume in the previous
scenario at 15 minutes (left) and 30 minutes (right) after
the release has occurred. By 30 minutes the plume has spread
laterally about as much as it will but it is still quite
toxic and still expanding downwind off the edge of the
nomograph. At 30 minutes the plume extends three to four
miles downwind, is about 1.5 miles wide at its widest, and is
still dangerously toxic as indicated by the large yellow-
green region above right. If people are standing or sitting
as much as 15 feet apart in all directions at an event on the
Mall, there would be well over 100,000 people per square
mile. Furthermore, the contaminant plume in this scenario
will be dangerous over several square miles. Therefore, in
the absence of an early warning and concerted action (rapid
evacuation away from the centerline of the plume) over
100,000 people could be seriously harmed or even killed in
the first half an hour.
Although this is a dire scenario, the people several miles
downwind from the source, in this example a couple miles off
the upper left corner of the figures, have plenty of time to
walk out of the way of the plume given a warning in five
minutes or less. They would have to walk only about \3/4\ of
a mile at most to get completely out of the plume and would
have 20 to 25 minutes to do this. Walking is recommended in
urban areas since the roadways should be kept open for
emergency traffic and will gridlock instantly if everyone
tries to leave in their cars at the same time.
The message is clear, walking perpendicular to the wind
away from the centerline of the plume is the only effective
direction to walk, as indicated automatically by CT-Analyst.
There is a wide range of angles, plus or minus 30 degrees,
for which this strategy is effective but the effectiveness
declines the longer the delay in receiving a warning. For
large contaminant sources, simple theory and detailed
computer simulations both suggest that 85 to 95% of the
people who would otherwise be exposed can avoid exposure,
regardless of what the agent is, when the appropriate warning
is issued without delay.
What also becomes apparent is that solid information, as
well as prompt warning and action, reduces exposure. Knowing
the location of the contaminant source, the wind speed, and
its direction can save tens of thousands of lives. Combining
an integrated city sensor net with accurate models
incorporating the unique building/terrain features is the key
to defining the centerline of the plume based on source
location and thus determining effective escape routes. A CBR
Emergency Assessment System must be instantaneous and capable
of incorporating changing wind and sensor data as they become
available. Only centralized analysis and prompt communication
can define the safe routes away from an invisible cloud.
These CBR emergency assessment tools have been used to
evaluate and compare a number of possible CBR defense
strategies. The model on which this graph is based follows
hundreds of thousands of people who begin walking
(evacuating) in a specified direction relative to the wind
once a warning is issued. The computed contaminant density is
integrated to determine each persons dose. This ``warning
delay'' is varied to measure the reduced effectiveness of
evacuation as the warning delay gets too long. Zero (0)
degrees is walking downwind, 90 degrees is across the wind
(perpendicular) to the plume centerline, and 180 degrees is
walking upwind.
We have shown that plausible accidents or terrorist attacks
in an urban environment can put 100,000 people or more at
risk in a 15 to 30-minute time span. During this interval
several square miles of city can become lethally exposed and
people can die at the rate of 100 per second. Clearly there
is a very great premium or fast effective response.
The point is--we already have accurate, fast tools based on
tested scientific models for computing the detailed airflow
and converting these data sets directly to critical civil
defense information. An urban CBR Emergency Assessment System
(CBREAS) based on this new technology can instantly combine
information from eyewitness reports and CBR sensors to locate
hidden sources, can estimate regions about to become
contaminated, and can predict effective evacuation paths.
This new technology faithfully incorporates the 3D structure
of urban building mazes and has reasonable sun, wind, and
information-display options. The challenge is to harness
these tools effectively in the current political climate. If
police, fire department personnel, and emergency first
responders use this technology to obtain a minute-by-minute
situation assessment and implement an action plan, they can
reduce exposures, even of large crowds in the open, by 85 to
95% provided that an early warning is issued.
Sales Pitch: The CT-Analyst contaminant transport system is
ACCURATE. Plume envelopes are 80-90% as accurate as state-of-
the-art 3D computational fluid dynamics. CT-Analyst is VERY
FAST with performance 1000 to 10000 times faster than real
time. This can make the difference in saving tens of
thousands of lives in a real attack. It is also very EASY TO
USE. Two hours of training should be adequate. CT-Analyst can
also be used for war games, virtual reality training, site
defense planning and execution, and sensor network
optimization. The CT-Analyst software has stabilized and is
very rugged. The software also allows the user to displace
plumes by dragging the source across the screen, and can
``backtrack'' to find hidden sources. CT-Analyst will also
project optimal evacuation routes.
Mr. BIDEN. Let me summarize the report.
The answer was ``over 100,000 people could be seriously harmed or
even killed in the first half an hour.'' Let me say that again. One of
these tankers filled with chlorine gas--and there are hundreds, up and
down the road, going through major metropolitan areas, from Los Angeles
to New York and everywhere in between--what would happen if a terrorist
were to explode one of those in a major metropolitan area? The answer
was: ``over 100,000 people could be seriously harmed or even killed in
the first half an hour.''
Said another way: What happens if one of these is blown up in a
freight yard in Philadelphia, PA, right along the Schuylkill River, 10
blocks, 15 blocks from City Hall, the University of Pennsylvania,
Drexel University--a very populated area? Within one-half hour, 100,000
people could be seriously harmed or even killed.
How long would it take to evacuate that area? Imagine evacuating
downtown New York City, Baltimore, Miami, Seattle--you name the city.
So what is the problem? Well, the problem is--and we have seen in
recent reports--insurgents in Iraq are using chlorine in their attacks
on civilians. There is little doubt terrorists who are targeting us
here at home are paying attention. In these roadside bombs, they are--
thank God they have not gotten it down very well yet--but they are
injecting chlorine into that carnage they cause because they know the
consequence of the dissemination of the highly toxic substance in a
populated area.
Nevertheless, we continue to allow these 90-ton--that is a standard:
90-ton--rail tanks containing chlorine and other hazardous chemicals to
roll unprotected through the hearts of our largest cities in high-
threat areas. We know the rail industry has adamantly opposed any
attempt to allow local officials, in conjunction with the Department of
Homeland Security and security people, to reroute these tankers.
Now, again, look where this tanker is sitting, as shown in this
picture. Do these buildings look familiar to you? This is an actual
photograph of a 90-ton chlorine gas tanker car sitting in the direct
view--if you look over the top of it, you can see the Hart Building,
you can see the Dirksen Building, and you can see the U.S. Capitol.
By the way, I know my friend, the Presiding Officer, a former board
member of Amtrak, a guy who has fought very hard to protect Amtrak--we
take the train almost every day together back and forth to and from
Delaware--I say to my colleagues, go on down to the station this
afternoon and follow us down whenever we finish and get on the train.
If it is not an Acela, stand in the back car of an Amfleet train. You
can look out the back window. Watch as we pull out of the station. Tell
me how many cops you see. Tell me how many cameras you see. Tell me how
much protection exists there.
Look at this tanker car, shown in this picture, sitting right out
there--in the middle of nowhere, in the middle of everywhere.
So, folks, the idea we do not even have as an option the ability of
our security people and the mayors and local
[[Page S3026]]
officials to suggest these tankers bypass their cities so, God forbid,
if something happens, they are not as high a prize of a target--by the
way, the less sensational damage able to be done, the less likelihood
it will be picked as a target.
Because someone could legitimately argue: Biden, you are taking this
out of the route--and we have other maps showing the routes of the
various alternative routes that could be used to avoid the major
cities. Now, they could say: You are going to be going through more
rural areas. Yes, serious damage could be done in rural areas, but the
prize for the terrorist is much lower. The likelihood of them
concluding that instead of coming down from, for example, Newark, NJ,
all the way down into Augusta--you can, in fact, reroute these on
Norfolk Southern, which goes through much less populated areas.
People legitimately say: Aren't you putting those folks at risk? No
matter where these cars are, we are at risk. But again, where is the
likely target? Where are terrorists going to risk their lives to be
able to go in and do damage? They will do it where the most people are.
So I know the rail industry, as I said, is adamantly opposed to
amendment No. 306, and is likely opposed to the updated version we will
vote on today. But in the face of such risks, I do not know how we can
let their opposition determine whether we go forward.
This amendment is very limited. It simply states the Secretary of
Homeland Security, not the rail industry--the rail industry is not the
bad guy--should determine the most secure routes for the shipments of
the most dangerous chemicals, and that ownership of the track is not to
be considered in making this risk-based determination; meaning, if you
have something going down on a CSX track that is owned by CSX, they
should be able to use and be diverted to a Norfolk Southern track. I
could give you examples all across the country, as the Presiding
Officer knows.
Again, all I am saying is, let the Department of Homeland Security
determine whether the most dangerous chemicals are able to be diverted
around the most populated areas in our country. And do not--do not--in
fact, use as an impediment the idea the track upon which it is being
carried is not owned by the company whose car is on that track.
That is all we are doing, Mr. President. The amendment would apply to
only .36 percent--less than a third of a percent--of all the shipments
that occur on our rail system. It only applies to through-shipments; it
does not apply to the destination city. Some of this stuff goes into
large populations, where that is the end point. It doesn't say it
cannot go there, but it does say we should reduce the probability of
catastrophic damage by allowing them to be rerouted, if that is the
judgment of the Department of Homeland Security.
A similar amendment was passed by voice vote in the House Homeland
Security Committee today. Not one Republican or Democrat spoke in
opposition to this measure. This amendment will ensure that the Senate
is on the right side of the issue as well.
Mr. President, I was asked by my colleague from Connecticut, one of
the two managers, that he be added as a cosponsor. I ask unanimous
consent his name be added.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I understand that a man with whom I hardly
disagree, Senator Inouye, has reservations. I hope he will reconsider
those reservations. Again, all we are doing is letting the Department
of Homeland Security, in conjunction with local officials, make the
judgment whether the risk is so high that it warrants it being
rerouted. Of all the cargo on all of the tracks in America, we are
talking about .36 of 1 percent, all that is transported on rail. So we
are not asking much. The downside of us being mistaken is significant.
I close by quoting from the rail industry's letter opposing this
amendment. They say:
Rerouting would not eliminate the risk, but instead shift
it from one population to another.
That is true, but this amendment says the Department of Homeland
Security, not the rail industry, should determine how to weigh and
respond to this known potentially catastrophic risk. What did we just
debate last week on the floor? The allocation of resources for Homeland
Security should be going toward the danger lines. There is nothing that
is risk free--nothing. It is a little like my friend from Delaware and
I have heard so much every time we come up with rail security
legislation. We are told we cannot secure every mile of track. That is
true, we can't, but there is a big difference with a terrorist taking a
single train off a track somewhere in rural America and a terrorist
taking a train at 140 miles an hour into the most visited area in
Washington, DC, Union Station, at a high speed.
There is a difference between blowing up a tunnel underneath the
Chesapeake Bay or the Hudson River and blowing up a tunnel in the
middle of some rural area. Terrorists pick targets for the greatest
effect. So the idea that we would not reroute--if the Department of
Homeland Security determined it made sense--a series of chlorine gas
tankers from a major metropolitan area to a more rural area seems to me
to be such a silly argument to make.
The idea is, how do we reduce the risk for the most people of the
United States of America? Again, I will end where I began. When this
was called to my attention some years ago, I went to the Naval Research
Laboratory and I asked them--and I have included this in my statement--
to tell me what would happen--and, again, it doesn't take much for
terrorists to figure out a way to puncture a hole in the bottom or the
side of one of these tanks by use of explosives or other devices. The
answer was that if that were to occur in a highly populated area,
``over 100,000 could be seriously harmed or even killed in the first
half hour.''
Imagine how many people we get to evacuate reasonably so that there
is essentially no one left in a half hour. If the gun goes off right
now, how long does it take downtown Manhattan or downtown Washington,
DC, or Capitol Hill to evacuate people so they are not around? If you
don't evacuate--to say it another way--within a half hour, a whole lot
more than 100,000 people will be seriously injured or will die.
I know the Senator from Connecticut supports this amendment. I don't
know what the view of our colleague from Maine is. I hope they
understand how limited this amendment is, how consequential it is. I
hope my colleagues, when it comes time to vote, will vote in favor of
this amendment.
I thank the Chair and I thank the managers. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the amendment offered by the senior
Senator from Delaware is actually more under the jurisdiction of the
Commerce Committee than the Homeland Security Committee. Nevertheless,
in the absence of a member of the Commerce Committee on the Senate
floor, I want to express my concern about the amendment.
As I understand it, the effect of the amendment would be to require
that hazardous materials on rail cars be routed around high-threat
areas, with some exceptions.
The problem is that the Commerce Committee title on rail security
already has a section that addresses hazardous materials by requiring a
mitigation plan that can include rerouting but only when the homeland
security advisory system is at a high or severe level of threat or when
specific intelligence indicates that there is a specific or imminent
threat.
I think this amendment, while well-intentioned, creates all sorts of
practical problems. The Chamber of Commerce, which is rating this as a
key vote, lists some of those that I want to read from a letter that we
received from the Chamber today. The letter reads:
The Biden amendment, which would require mandatory
rerouting of shipments of hazardous materials around high
threat corridors, would not reduce risk to homeland security.
It would only reallocate risk among population centers. In
fact, the amendment would actually increase risk by either
eliminating routes that provide optimal overall safety and
security, or by adding hundreds of miles and additional
days to the journeys of shipments of hazardous materials
via less direct routes.
In other words, if we are causing this hazardous material to be on
its journey far longer because it is not going by
[[Page S3027]]
the more direct route, that could in fact increase the problems or the
chances of the hazardous material being attacked. The letter goes on to
point out that the railroads have been working with the Federal
Government, with chemical manufacturers, and with consumers to explore
the use of coordinated routing arrangements to reduce mileage and time
in the transit of highly hazardous materials.
This amendment seems to be going in the opposite direction. Another
one of my colleagues has raised the issue of chlorine shipments to
wastewater treatment plants. Those shipments need to be made. It raises
a lot of practical questions about how to move this material. Another
colleague raised the issue to me of whether this would result in more
trucks on our highways carrying hazardous materials.
So I think that while I agree with the overall intent of the
amendment, I am much more comfortable with the approach taken by the
Commerce Committee--a committee which, unfortunately, I don't serve on,
so I don't have the level of expertise that its members have in talking
about this issue. I do expect some members of the Commerce Committee to
come to the floor and debate this issue.
I do want my colleagues to know that the distinguished Senator's
amendment is controversial, that it may have unintended consequences.
Based on my knowledge of the issue, I hope it will be defeated.
Thank you.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator
from Maine. She may have misunderstood two aspects of the amendment.
One, it doesn't mandatorily require rerouting at all. It says the
Department of Homeland Security can reroute, if they determine it
should be rerouted.
No. 2, the freight industry, where they made the judgment on how much
further in distance it would travel if, in fact, you were to reroute,
factored in only that it had to be rerouted on their own tracks. So the
idea being that they would not be able to--this happens all the time,
where other tracks are used; for example, the Chesapeake using Norfolk
Southern track.
No. 3, the Chamber of Commerce is opposed because it costs more
money. A lot of these things cost more money. Will it cost more money
to be able to reroute up to one-third of 1 percent of the freight on
rail? Yes. But I ask the rhetorical question: What will it cost if one
of these tankers goes off in a populated area? What will the cost then
be to the very businesses that are most concerned about it?
Fourth, this doesn't affect destination. If the chlorine gas tanker
car is going to a water treatment facility, it still goes to that
facility. Nothing changes. What we could have changed is what we did in
Delaware, not use chlorine. There are other means by which water can be
purified. We have done it in our home State. That is what you should
do. But that doesn't stop this car, or any other car, from going to
such a facility.
Let me emphasize again that there is no prohibition on end point
distribution. If the car is designed to go to a facility in the center
of a city, it goes to the center of the city. There is nothing you can
do about that. That is very different than--I am making up these
numbers for illustration--you may have one of these tankers going in
once a month versus 50 going through the same city in a month or 100 in
a month. This is all about percentages. You play the percentages.
Again, it is true, rerouting may render cities in North Dakota--well,
they would not be rerouted in North Dakota, but I referenced the small
towns. There was a chlorine gas tanker car going across the top of the
Nation and, thank God, what happened was it went off in a rural part of
the world. You were able to evacuate the three cities and nobody died.
Had that same thing occurred in the middle of Chicago, you would not be
able to evacuate the city. We would not have had time.
So, yes, it is true. Are you going to put a different population at
risk? Yes, about one-tenth, one-twentieth, one one-hundredth or one
one-thousandth of the population, depending on where it is rerouted. So
it is a little bit like saying: Why do we spend so much money worrying
about the Sears Tower? It is there, it is big, and it is a target. Is
it possible that a terrorist would go into a building that is two
stories and blow it up? Yes. Can they fly an aircraft into a rural town
grain elevator? Yes. But that is not what we are worried about. They
are not likely to do that. They are likely to fly a plane, plant a
bomb, do something devastating where the most people are.
So I find it to be a totally disingenuous argument. This is about the
bottom line. I measure the bottom line--as I suspect all of us would if
we thought about it--in human life.
The bottom line, in terms of the dollars, the impact that would occur
in a catastrophic circumstance is if there is a town of 1,000 people
and a town of 6 million people, there is a phenomenal difference
whether that chlorine gas tanker car gets exploded.
Let me summarize. It is indicated by the Department of Homeland
Security again that an explosion of a rail tanker carrying chlorine
would kill 17,500 individuals, require the hospitalization of another
100,000--and only then if we evacuate within a half an hour. We can
evacuate a city of 1,000 people in half an hour. We cannot evacuate a
city of 4 million people in half an hour. So it matters.
If this rail tanker goes off in New York City, my friend from New
York is going to be on the floor again pointing out the catastrophic
impact. If it goes off in rural Delaware, it will be a tragedy for me
and my constituency, but there will be a significant magnitude of
difference.
So everything we do in terms of allocation of resources goes in this
place to deal with protecting the most people who can be protected: The
shipment originates or the point of destination is in the high-threat
corridor; no practical alternative routes exist. If they don't exist,
it doesn't get rerouted. Rerouting would not increase the likelihood of
an attack. It would decrease the likelihood of an attack because people
attack targets that have the maximum impact. This would not increase
the total number of cars on the track. It would allow the potential for
homeland security to reroute them away from the places that would do
the most damage.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I do expect additional Members on my side
of the aisle to come and debate this issue.
I wish to clarify that the language, as I read it, in the Senator's
amendment, is not discretionary, it is mandatory. It does allow for
some certain significant exceptions for the Department to make findings
on, but it clearly says:
The regulations issued under this section shall--
(1) except as provided in--
The subsections part--
provide that any rail shipment containing high hazard
materials be rerouted around any high threat corridor.
So I don't see it as giving the Department great discretion if that
determination is made because of the word ``shall,'' which is not
permissive, it is mandatory. There are some exceptions later which the
Senator has referred to, such as the origination point or point of
destination being within the high-threat corridor. But as I read the
amendment, it pretty clearly calls for rerouting.
I wanted to clarify that issue. Maybe I misunderstood the Senator
from Delaware, but I thought he was saying it did not require
rerouting.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, she is correct,
but it only requires the Secretary to do it if he or she concludes that
there is a safer way to reroute the shipment. If the conclusion made by
the Secretary is that in a high-risk corridor the rerouting would not
result in an increased safety margin for the shipment, then he or she
need not reroute it. But it is correct, the presumption is, in a high-
risk corridor we reroute if it is not a point of destination or origin
but only if the determination by the Secretary is that the shipment, in
fact, would be safer to be rerouted. It is on page 4 of the amendment.
It is section 2, subparagraph E, ``Transportation and Storage of High
Hazard Materials through High Threat Corridor'' areas. It says:
In General.--The standards for the Secretary to grant
exceptions under section
[[Page S3028]]
(d)(4) shall require a finding by the Secretary that--
(A) the shipment originates or the point of destination is
in the high threat corridor;
(B) there is no practical alternative route;
(C) there is an unanticipated, temporary emergency that
threatens the lives of persons or property in the high threat
corridor;
(D) there would be no harm to persons or property beyond
the owners or operator of the railroad in the event of a
successful terrorist attack on shipment; or
(E) rerouting would increase the likelihood of a terrorist
attack on the shipment.
The bottom line is that it should be left to the discretion of the
Secretary to decide not to reroute rather than the privately owned
railroad. I thank the Senator for her clarification.
I yield the floor.
Ms. COLLINS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I will speak briefly because I know the
floor leader for the minority side has people coming to speak to
respond to the amendment. I am not speaking on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator is recognized.
U.S. Attorneys
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise because I heard Attorney General
Gonzales speak about the growing, disheartening, and alarming scandal
with the U.S. attorneys. I wish to say, first, that this is a serious
issue. In every district in America, the U.S. attorney represents the
enforcer of the Federal law without fear or favor. U.S. attorneys over
decades have built up a reputation of being not part of politics but,
rather, enforcing the law, as they say, without fear or favor.
Over every Justice Department office in every corner of the land is
the eagle perched on a branch, with her claw holding a bunch of arrows.
When you see that symbol, it denotes strength, but it denotes fairness
and impartiality. That fairness, that impartiality has received a
serious blow--maybe not a mortal blow because of the resilience of our
country, but a serious blow--over what has happened in the Justice
Department over the last several months.
What we have had in the past is misstatement after misstatement about
what has happened. The story has kept changing, we can't get the truth,
and that is why we had no choice but to undertake our own
investigation.
Let me say that time and time again we have heard falsehoods. We were
told that all seven of the eight U.S. attorneys were fired for
performance reasons. It now turns out this was false, as their glowing
performance evaluations attest.
We were told by the Attorney General he would ``never, ever make a
change for political reasons.'' It now turns out all this was false, as
the evidence makes clear this approach was based purely on politics to
punish prosecutors who were perceived to be too light on Democrats or
too tough on Republicans.
We were told by the Attorney General this was ``an overblown
personnel matter.'' It now turns out, however, that far from being a
low-level personnel matter, this was a longstanding plan to exact
political vendettas or make political payoffs.
We were told the White House was not involved in the plan to fire
these U.S. attorneys. It now turns out this was a complete falsehood.
Harriet Miers was one of the masterminds of this plan, as demonstrated
by numerous e-mails made public today. She communicated extensively
with Kyle Sampson about firing of U.S. attorneys. In fact, she
originally wanted to fire and replace the top prosecutors in all 93
districts in the country.
We were told that Karl Rove had no involvement in getting his protege
appointed U.S. attorney in Arkansas. In fact, there is a letter from
the Department of Justice:
The Department is not aware of Karl Rove playing any role
in the decision to appoint Mr. Griffin.
Mr. Griffin was the attorney whom they appointed. It now turns out
this was a falsehood, as demonstrated by Mr. Sampson's e-mail:
Getting him--
Griffin--
was important to Harriet, Karl, et cetera.
We were told the change to the PATRIOT Act was an innocent attempt to
fix a legal loophole, to help the war on terrorism, not a cynical
strategy to bypass the Senate's role in serving as a check and balance.
It now turns out this, too, was a falsehood--another one--as
demonstrated by an e-mail from Mr. Sampson:
I strongly recommend that as a matter of administration, we
utilize the new statutory provisions that authorize the AG to
make USA appointments.
Mr. Sampson specifically argued that by using these provisions, the
administration ``can give far less deference to home State Senators and
thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it faster and
more efficiently at less political cost to the White House.''
So it has been misstatement after misstatement. To put it delicately,
prevarication after prevarication, changes in stories, coverups in
stories. And the only reason, frankly, we are getting to the truth is
we have the majority, and we have the ability to subpoena and have
hearings and investigate.
A few minutes ago, Attorney General Gonzales spoke. I have to say I
have no animus toward Attorney General Gonzales. In fact, I like the
man. He seems to me to be a genuinely nice man. He doesn't seem to me
to be one of these hard popular warriors who populate the
administration in such large numbers and, frankly, we have seen in
Justice Department appointees throughout the Justice Department in far
too great a number. But simply being a nice person, being a ``nice
guy'' is not enough, particularly when you are not performing your job.
The Attorney General got up and said:
I am ultimately responsible, but simply claiming
responsibility is not enough.
He said:
I was not involved in any memos or discussions of what was
going on.
That is his quote.
He said:
Many decisions are delegated.
Mr. President, did the Attorney General not know that eight U.S.
attorneys were to be fired? If he didn't know, he shouldn't be Attorney
General, plain and simple. That is not a minor personnel decision. That
is a major act that has now shaken the integrity of the U.S. Attorney's
Offices--not only those in question but all of them--to the core.
To simply say decisions were delegated, that is a sorry excuse. And
then, of course, if the Attorney General knew, that one doesn't work
either.
The Attorney General has said:
I will do the best I can to maintain the confidence of the
American people.
Mr. Attorney General, you have already lost that confidence. It has
not simply been on this issue, although this is the straw that has
broken the camel's back, and when you sat in a room with Senator Leahy
and Senator Feinstein and Senator Specter and myself last Thursday and
seemed to give this crisis, most considered crisis, the back of your
hand and say it is not terribly important and don't worry, we will fix
it without caring about it, my total confidence was shaken, and I
believe the others in the room felt the same.
This was, as I said, the straw that broke the camel's back. It was
hardly the only decision. On issue after issue, the Attorney General
has not stood up for the rule of law, which is his foremost duty. On
issue after issue, whether it be wiretaps, whether it be national
security letters, whether it be the unitary theory of the Executive,
allowing the Executive to do everything with no checks and balances,
this Secretary has been a rubberstamp for policies that the courts have
found repeatedly unconstitutional.
The Attorney General, unfortunately, in my judgment, misconceives his
role. The Attorney General misconceives his role because he still sees
himself as counsel to the President, his previous job, where he
rubberstamped everything the President did. But when you are the
President's counsel, your job is to serve the President, period. When
you become Attorney General, you have a higher
[[Page S3029]]
duty. That duty is the rule of law--to preserve it, to protect it, to
defend it. For whatever reason, the Attorney General doesn't see that
as his role. His time in office should be over.
The U.S. attorneys scandal and all the other instances where the
Attorney General did not protect the rule of law are just too great a
weight for the office to bear. To simply say ``I am responsible'' and
not tell people what it is all about makes no sense. We just saw
Scooter Libby be convicted. Many said he was a fall guy. We are not
going to have another Scooter Libby, another fall guy. Kyle Sampson did
many wrong things, and it is very possible he broke the criminal law,
but, as Harry Truman said, the buck stops at the top. The buck stops
with the Attorney General. It defies belief that his chief of staff was
making all these major decisions without his knowledge, particularly
when it is clear that at least on a few instances he admits he had
phone calls from the President and from others about this issue.
I want to say one other thing, because this issue is not going to go
away. This issue is going to stay with us until we find out everything
that has happened, for the sake of punishing those who did wrong but
also, more importantly, to clear the air and restore the good name of
the U.S. attorneys who were fired incorrectly and of the U.S.
attorneys--a more numerous group--who were not involved in this issue
but whose reputations have been called into question. Tomorrow, if
someone is indicted by a U.S. attorney who had no involvement in this
scandal and their defense attorney says politics was involved, the
public may believe it, given what we have seen happen thus far. So it
is our obligation, it is our moral imperative to get to the bottom of
this, to clear the air, and to restore the reputation of U.S.
Attorney's Offices now and into the future, and that is just what we
will do.
Madam President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. McCaskill). The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendments Nos. 441, 357, 448, 337, 389, and 299, En Bloc
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, we are making progress in disposing
of the final amendments pending as we head toward final passage of S.
4. So at this time, I would like to propound a unanimous consent
request that there are a number of pending amendments which I
understand can be considered and agreed to without the necessity of a
rollcall vote, and two of these amendments will have second-degree
amendments.
I now ask unanimous consent that it be in order for the Senate to
proceed en bloc to the consideration of the following amendments, that
they be agreed to en bloc, and that the motions to reconsider be laid
upon the table:
First, the Kyl amendment, No. 357, with a Feingold second-degree
amendment, No. 441.
Second, a Schumer amendment, No. 337, with a modification that is at
the desk, and with an Ensign second-degree amendment, No. 448.
Third, a Bond amendment, No. 389, with a modification at the desk.
Fourth, and finally, a Stevens amendment, No. 299.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, these amendments have been cleared on
this side of the aisle, and I do not object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 441), to amendment No. 357, was agreed to, as
follows:
(Purpose: To require appropriate reports regarding data mining by the
Federal Government)
On page 1, strike ``(1) Data-mining.--'' and all that
follows through ``(c) Reports on Data Mining Activities by
Federal Agencies.--'' on page 2, and insert the following:
(1) Data mining.--The term ``data mining'' means a program
involving pattern-based queries, searches, or other analyses
of 1 or more electronic databases, where--
(A) a department or agency of the Federal Government, or a
non-Federal entity acting on behalf of the Federal
Government, is conducting the queries, searches, or other
analyses to discover or locate a predictive pattern or
anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on the
part of any individual or individuals;
(B) the queries, searches, or other analyses are not
subject-based and do not use personal identifiers of a
specific individual, or inputs associated with a specific
individual or group of individuals, to retrieve information
from the database or databases; and
(C) the purpose of the queries, searches, or other analyses
is not solely--
(i) the detection of fraud, waste, or abuse in a Government
agency or program; or
(ii) the security of a Government computer system.
(2) Database.--The term ``database'' does not include
telephone directories, news reporting, information publicly
available to any member of the public without payment of a
fee, or databases of judicial and administrative opinions or
other legal research sources.
(c) Reports on Data Mining Activities by Federal
Agencies.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (d) of this section shall have
no force or effect.
(2) Reports.--
(A) Requirement for report.--The head of each department or
agency of the Federal Government that is engaged in any
activity to use or develop data mining shall submit a report
to Congress on all such activities of the department or
agency under the jurisdiction of that official. The report
shall be produced in coordination with the privacy officer of
that department or agency, if applicable, and shall be made
available to the public, except for an annex described in
subparagraph (C).
(B) Content of report.--Each report submitted under
subparagraph (A) shall include, for each activity to use or
develop data mining, the following information:
(i) A thorough description of the data mining activity, its
goals, and, where appropriate, the target dates for the
deployment of the data mining activity.
(ii) A thorough description of the data mining technology
that is being used or will be used, including the basis for
determining whether a particular pattern or anomaly is
indicative of terrorist or criminal activity.
(iii) A thorough description of the data sources that are
being or will be used.
(iv) An assessment of the efficacy or likely efficacy of
the data mining activity in providing accurate information
consistent with and valuable to the stated goals and plans
for the use or development of the data mining activity.
(v) An assessment of the impact or likely impact of the
implementation of the data mining activity on the privacy and
civil liberties of individuals, including a thorough
description of the actions that are being taken or will be
taken with regard to the property, privacy, or other rights
or privileges of any individual or individuals as a result of
the implementation of the data mining activity.
(vi) A list and analysis of the laws and regulations that
govern the information being or to be collected, reviewed,
gathered, analyzed, or used in conjunction with the data
mining activity, to the extent applicable in the context of
the data mining activity.
(vii) A thorough discussion of the policies, procedures,
and guidelines that are in place or that are to be developed
and applied in the use of such data mining activity in order
to--
(I) protect the privacy and due process rights of
individuals, such as redress procedures; and
(II) ensure that only accurate and complete information is
collected, reviewed, gathered, analyzed, or used, and guard
against any harmful consequences of potential inaccuracies.
(C) Annex.--
(i) In general.--A report under subparagraph (A) shall
include in an annex any necessary--
(I) classified information;
(II) law enforcement sensitive information;
(III) proprietary business information; or
(IV) trade secrets (as that term is defined in section 1839
of title 18, United States Code).
(ii) Availability.--Any annex described in clause (i)--
(I) shall be available, as appropriate, and consistent with
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), to
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
the Committee on the Judiciary, the Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee
on the Judiciary, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(II) shall not be made available to the public.
(D) Time for report.--Each report required under
subparagraph (A) shall be--
(i) submitted not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act; and
(ii) updated not less frequently than annually thereafter,
to include any activity to use or develop data mining engaged
in after the date of the prior report submitted under
subparagraph (A).
(d) Reports on Data Mining Activities by Federal
Agencies.--
The amendment (No. 357), as modified, as amended, was agreed to.
[[Page S3030]]
The amendment (No. 337), as modified, was agreed to, as follows:
On page 86, after line 20,:
(c) Exception.--The limitations under subparagraph (A)
shall not apply to activities permitted under the full-time
counter-
terrorism staffing pilot, as described in the Fiscal Year
2007 Program Guidance of the Department for the Urban Area
Security Initiative.
The amendment (No. 448), to amendment No. 337, was agreed to, as
follows:
(Purpose: To establish a Law Enforcement Assistance Force in the
Department of Homeland Security to facilitate the contributions of
retired law enforcement officers during major disasters)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. 15 __. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE FORCE.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a Law
Enforcement Assistance Force to facilitate the contributions
of retired law enforcement officers and agents during major
disasters.
(b) Eligible Participants.--An individual may participate
in the Law Enforcement Assistance Force if that individual--
(1) has experience working as an officer or agent for a
public law enforcement agency and left that agency in good
standing;
(2) holds current certifications for firearms, first aid,
and such other skills determined necessary by the Secretary;
(3) submits to the Secretary an application, at such time,
in such manner, and accompanied by such information as the
Secretary may reasonably require, that authorizes the
Secretary to review the law enforcement service record of
that individual; and
(4) meets such other qualifications as the Secretary may
require.
(c) Liability; Supervision.--Each eligible participant
shall, upon acceptance of an assignment under this section--
(A) be detailed to a Federal, State, or local government
law enforcement agency; and
(B) work under the direct supervision of an officer or
agent of that agency.
(d) Mobilization.--
(1) In general.--In the event of a major disaster, the
Secretary, after consultation with appropriate Federal,
State, and local government law enforcement agencies, may
request eligible participants to volunteer to assist the
efforts of those agencies responding to such emergency and
assign each willing participant to a specific law enforcement
agency.
(2) Acceptance.--If the eligible participant accepts an
assignment under this subsection, that eligible participant
shall agree to remain in such assignment for a period equal
to not less than the shorter of--
(A) the period during which the law enforcement agency
needs the services of such participant;
(B) 30 days;
(C) such other period of time agreed to between the
Secretary and the eligible participant.
(3) Refusal.--An eligible participant may refuse an
assignment under this subsection without any adverse
consequences.
(e) Expenses.--
(1) In general.--Each eligible participant shall be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence,
at rates authorized for employees of agencies under
subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code,
while carrying out an assignment under subsection (d).
(2) Source of funds.--Expenses incurred under paragraph (1)
shall be paid from amounts appropriated to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
(f) Termination of Assistance.--The availability of
eligible participants of the Law Enforcement Assistance Force
shall continue for a period equal to the shorter of--
(1) the period of the major disaster; or
(2) 1 year.
(g) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``eligible participant'' means an individual
participating in the Law Enforcement Assistance Force;
(2) the term ``Law Enforcement Assistance Force'' means the
Law Enforcement Assistance Force established under subsection
(a); and
(3) the term ``major disaster'' has the meaning given that
term in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122).
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section.
The amendment (No. 337), as modified, as amended, was agreed to.
The amendment (No. 389), as modified, was agreed to, as follows:
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING A REPORT ON THE 9/11
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND CONGRESSIONAL
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REFORM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (referred to in this section as the ``9/11
Commission'') conducted a lengthy review of the facts and
circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, including those relating to the intelligence
community, law enforcement agencies, and the role of
congressional oversight and resource allocation.
(2) In its final report, the 9/11 Commission found that--
(A) congressional oversight of the intelligence activities
of the United States is dysfunctional;
(B) under the rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in effect at the time the report was
completed, the committees of Congress charged with oversight
of the intelligence activities lacked the power, influence,
and sustained capability to meet the daunting challenges
faced by the intelligence community of the United States;
(C) as long as such oversight is governed by such rules of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, the people of
the United States will not get the security they want and
need;
(D) a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee
structure is needed to give the intelligence community of the
United States appropriate oversight, support, and leadership;
and
(E) the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its
final report will not succeed if congressional oversight of
the intelligence community in the United States is not
changed.
(3) The 9/11 Commission recommended structural changes to
Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities.
(4) Congress has enacted some of the recommendations made
by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing
additional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
(5) The Senate adopted Senate Resolution 445 in the 108th
Congress to address some of the intelligence oversight
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by abolishing term
limits for the members of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, clarifying jurisdiction for intelligence-
related nominations, and streamlining procedures for the
referral of intelligence-related legislation, but other
aspects of the 9/11 Commission recommendations regarding
intelligence oversight have not been implemented.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate each, or jointly, should--
(1) undertake a review of the recommendations made in the
final report of the 9/11 Commission with respect to
intelligence reform and congressional intelligence oversight
reform;
(2) review and consider any other suggestions, options, or
recommendations for improving intelligence oversight; and
(3) not later than December 21, 2007, submit to the Senate
a report that includes the recommendations of the Committee,
if any, for carrying out such reforms.
The amendment (No. 299) was agreed to.
amendment no. 448
Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, I speak today about my amendment to
create the law enforcement assistance force. This amendment is a
common-sense idea and I hope my colleagues would adopt this amendment.
My amendment proposes the creation of a law enforcement assistance
force which is a system for retired law enforcement personnel to apply
to DHS, and complete the necessary paperwork and training, before a
disaster occurs. Then, when disaster happens, DHS would have a pool of
qualified first responders who could be called into action. These
volunteers would be detailed to a Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agency to work side by side with law enforcement located in
affected communities. The amendment also provides that DHS would
reimburse volunteers for their costs.
The need for properly trained first responders was never greater than
it was immediately after Hurricane Katrina. In the wake of this
disaster, I toured the gulf region and saw the devastation firsthand. A
situation caused by natural disaster was made worse by the way Federal,
State and local government responded. I say this not to criticize
anyone but to propose a way to improve how America will respond in the
future.
In the aftermath of any disaster, there is an acute need for trained
rescue and recovery personnel. These needs are often met by volunteers
who, having seen their fellow Americans in need, travel across country
to answer the call for help. In the aftermath of Katrina, there was no
shortage of volunteers who answered this call. Their willingness to
help is a testament to the American spirit. Unfortunately, these
volunteers were not used in a way that was equal to their spirit or the
needs of the people affected by this storm.
As the media reported, FEMA diverted many volunteer first responders
to places outside of the disaster area. Some highly skilled emergency
response volunteers were sent to Arkansas to prepare paperwork. Others
were
[[Page S3031]]
diverted to Atlanta to hand out fliers and still others were forced to
attend ``sensitivity training'' seminars. Meanwhile, in the hardest hit
areas of the gulf region, people suffered. Many needed basic medical
care and supplies. The resources of local first responders and
government officials were strained. The local responders needed
reinforcements, especially when lawlessness broke out. Responding to a
disaster is always a difficult job. But like we advise at-risk
communities to take steps to prepare for potential disasters, the
Federal Government also has an obligation to prepare in advance as
well.
My amendment creates a process to enable FEMA and DHS to put
qualified first responders in place in the immediate aftermath of
disaster. It will ensure a better Federal response by providing State
and local communities with the reinforcements they need. I believe
there is a willingness on the part of retired law enforcement to
volunteer their experience and expertise in times of crisis. In fact,
the idea for this amendment was given to me by a friend of mine, Tom
Page, who is a retired Las Vegas Metro Police officer. I thank him for
this suggestion and I urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.
amendment no. 389
Mr. BOND. Madam President, I would like to commend Senators Lieberman
and Collins for all their hard work on S. 4 and I would especially like
to thank them for their support of my amendment calling for further
congressional review and action with regard to the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission.
The 9/11 Commission identified many shortfalls, some in the
intelligence community and some in congressional oversight.
We can never ease the pain and anguish of the 9/11 families resulting
from the deaths of their loved ones. It is possible, however, to do
everything within our power to ensure more American families are not
subjected to a similar nightmare.
We owe it to the 9/11 families as well as the American people to
adopt reforms that will improve intelligence collection and
dissemination, as well as will improve congressional oversight.
Putting our own house in order may not be popular, but it is the
right thing to do.
I look forward to working with the chairman and ranking member, as
well as the members of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee to continue to improve U.S. intelligence and congressional
oversight of U.S. intelligence.
In closing, I would also like to thank Ms. Holly Idelson of Senator
Lieberman's staff and Mr. Brandon Milhorn of Senator Collins's staff
for their assistance to me and my staff. Both of these young people
went out of their way to assist us, and I am grateful to them for their
courteous demeanor and their professional conduct.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President, I rise today in support of Senate
amendment No. 389 offered by my colleague from Missouri, Senator Bond.
It is appropriate that this amendment be offered to the 9/11 bill as it
is a first step in implementing one of the few outstanding
recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission--to reform congressional
oversight of the intelligence community. I am proud to be a cosponsor
of this important amendment and thank Senator Bond for his leadership
on this issue.
The 9/11 Commission suggested that the rules of the House of
Representatives and the Senate lack the power, influence and sustained
capability to effectuate oversight of the intelligence community. As
such, they recommended that Congress establish one committee in each
House of Congress with both authorizing and appropriation authority for
the intelligence community or create a joint committee based on the
model of the old Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Just this year, the House of Representatives amended their rules to
create a new panel on the Appropriations Committee with members of both
the Intelligence Committee and the Appropriations Committee. While the
House provision does not meet the 9/11 Commission recommendation in
full, the Senate has not acted at all. As every Member of this body
knows, reforming Congress, especially the Senate, can be difficult and
will face much resistance. However, the Senate should not be an
exception to government reform after September 11, 2001. We should lead
by example. We owe the American public and the families of those lost
on September 11, 2001 to continue to improve intelligence collection
and coordination as well as to improve congressional oversight.
I know many have ideas on reform in the Senate, and we should explore
those. We need to find the most effective way to conduct vital, and
often difficult, intelligence oversight. That is why this amendment is
so important--it asks the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to each review
the 9/11 Commission's recommendation. Members of the Senate with
expertise in reform and intelligence will review the oversight process
and develop recommendations on the most valuable reforms.
In conclusion, I hope all my colleagues will support this amendment
and work with the committees in the Senate to improve the congressional
oversight process.
Mr. HATCH. Madam President, we certainly know how complicated and
even vexing the process of reforming the intelligence community is. On
the one hand, we now have in place a new structure, with an overarching
office of the Director of National Intelligence, that is responsible
for addressing many of the institutional and structural impediments
that led to our intelligence community's underperformance in the last
years of the 20th century, leaving us more vulnerable to the attacks of
September 11. The second and recently confirmed Director of the Office
of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, assumes leadership in a
structure that is up and running, if still on its shakedown cruise. In
Mike McConnell we have a leader that will take the DNI to the levels of
authority and accomplishment we in Congress who created the Office of
the DNI intended.
Throughout the IC we have seen many promising developments. Agencies
are infused with resources and focus, and they are addressing our
priority and hard targets like no other time during my 30 years in the
Senate. Mike Hayden at CIA is providing leadership to an organization
that is truly beginning to reach out of its petrified structures and
mindset of the past to bravely and creatively take on the intelligence
challenges of today and tomorrow. As a member of the Intelligence
Committee, I make every effort to commend and encourage all of these
positive developments, and I know I am joined by most of my colleagues.
That is the good news. The bad news is that intelligence reform has
many unfinished aspects. There are still deep cultural problems with
the way certain IC organizations, particularly the CIA, work. We still
have far to go and addressing the challenge of hard targets, like North
Korea and Iran. All of these challenges will take time and leadership
to address.
The 9/11 Commission's report on the intelligence failures leading to
September 11 also focused how Congress needed to change. The report
stated:
Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions the House
and Senate intelligence committees lack the power, influence,
and sustained capability to meet this challenge.
The Commission recommended:
Either Congress should create a joint committee for
intelligence . . . or it should create House and Senate
committees with combined authorizing and appropriations
powers.
We began to improve congressional oversight with S. Res. 445, passed
immediately after the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004. We removed term limits, raised the stature of the committee to
an A Committee, and returned to the use of designated staff. But this
was tinkering in comparison to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation.
I recognize this is a difficult question, for all of the reasons of
congressional resistance and established prerogatives. But I think that
we should not abandon addressing the very substantive question of the
current structure that greatly limits intelligence committee control
over intelligence community appropriations.
Therefore, I am pleased that amendment No. 389 has been accepted to
S. 4, and I commend the author of this amendment, the vice chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Bond. I am pleased
to
[[Page S3032]]
note that this amendment has the cosponsorship of the chairman of the
committee, Senator Rockefeller. This amendment requests a joint review
of this question be conducted by both the Intelligence and the Homeland
Security Committees, and be presented by year's end. This is not a
radical proposal, in and of itself, but keeps the Senate focused on an
unresolved question, a question whose importance to the question of
congressional oversight of our intelligence community cannot be
underestimated.
Intelligence reform is an ongoing process. I happen to believe that,
when our institutional will flags or is diverted, we should remind
ourselves of the costs of intelligence failure, and steel ourselves to
the fact that intelligence will play a larger role in our national
defense for the foreseeable future. And we should never abandon our
oversight of intelligence reform, our dedication to supporting the most
dynamic intelligence community, and our responsibility to conducting
this oversight in the most effective manner possible.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank the Chair and my friend from
Maine, and I notify our colleagues that we are working very hard to
eliminate the remaining objections on components of the managers'
amendment. We anticipate at least one more rollcall vote on one of the
pending amendments and then final passage, and hopefully that will
happen soon.
Pending that, Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, while we are waiting here to line up a
vote on this amendment and this bill, I will speak briefly relative to
my thoughts on how this bill is evolving. Like everyone, I was very
impressed with the work of the 9/11 Commission. I think they did a
superb job of pointing out what were, unfortunately, very significant
problems which we have as a nation relative to our preparedness to
fight terrorism. I had the good fortune to chair the Homeland Security
Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee for the last 2 years and
spent a considerable time before that working on the accounts of the
FBI. We worked hard, honestly, to try to address some of the issues
which were raised by the 9/11 Commission and, as a practical matter,
the great majority of the issues raised by the 9/11 Commission have
been addressed and are moving forward, hopefully, to a constructive
resolution.
This bill, although it has the 9/11 Commission imprimatur on it as
its name, is more of a clutter--a collection of various ideas, some of
which the 9/11 Commission agrees with, some of which I suspect they
never even thought of discussing and, as a practical matter, the bill
as a whole, in my humble opinion, in its present form would actually
end up undermining rather than improving our safety as a nation. There
are a number of reasons for that, but at the moment the most
significant reason is the unionization language in this bill which
essentially says the TSA will become a unionized organization.
When we originally set up the TSA, which was a matter of considerable
debate on this floor, that issue was at the essence, at the center, of
the discussion as to why and how we were going to set up the TSA. The
belief was at the time we set up the TSA and the commitment was at that
time that we would not create a unionized organization.
Why was that? It is not that unions do not do good work. Unions do
extraordinary work. They have been one of the great forces in American
culture for producing and mainstreaming many Americans, from the
standpoint of income and social activity, having a group to participate
with. They have been an extraordinarily positive force. But the belief
was--and it is an accurate belief arrived at after considerable thought
and a great deal of debate--that unionizing TSA would be like
unionizing the military, to give an example.
The TSA is the front line of our defense relative to protecting
airplanes that fly in America today. We know air traffic is the No. 1
source for attack from the al-Qaida interests. We know that they, in
their handbooks and their training manuals, constantly come back to the
use of aircraft as a weapon, and unfortunately we saw them use it on 9/
11.
Having a secure transportation industry, especially in the aircraft
area, is absolutely critical to our protecting our Nation from acts of
terrorism. That is why we put in place the TSA. They are the front line
of securing our air transportation system in this country. They are
like a military force. Their purpose is to be moved around quickly to
areas of weakness. Their purpose is to make sure they execute
efficiently the review of people getting on aircraft to make sure those
people are appropriately screened.
You cannot have incompetence. You can't have inefficiency. You can't
have poorly trained people or people who do not sort of get with the
program. You must have a very disciplined, focused group of individuals
managing the security at our airports. That is the goal we were hoping
to accomplish with the TSA.
It was fully understood, because I was involved in the debate, that
when we set up the TSA it would not be unionized because union rules
inherently create delay and they create stricture and straitjackets and
make it very difficult to manage different issues that have to be
managed aggressively and with fluidity by the leadership of the TSA and
the TSA teams on the ground.
To create a unionized TSA will take away that flexibility, that
efficiency. It will take away the ability to assure the people who are
doing the screening will be the best we can get and they are doing it
in the most effective way that can be done. In my opinion, putting this
language in this bill, if it were to pass, would undermine security
generally.
There are other issues with this bill which I can assure you, in my
reading of the 9/11 Commission report, they did not think of in the
terms this bill is structured: specifically, the formula for the
distribution of funds. I chaired the Appropriations subcommittee which
had responsibility for distributing funds relative to terrorist
activity in this country. We do have this pool of funds which is
distributed to all the States and all the regions in this country under
a formula. My opinion is if you want to effectively use that money, it
should be threat based. That should be the No. 1 priority and the No. 1
criterion. Is the money going where the threat is highest?
We know there are certain targets in this country which are high-
threat areas: New York City, the subway system specifically, but a lot
of parts of New York City; Los Angeles; Washington, DC. These are
clearly high-priority targets when you are talking about terrorists.
Terrorists have goals. One of their goals is to destroy our culture and
kill as many Americans as they can, according to al-Qaida, but another
is to make a statement internationally. That is why they picked the
World Trade Center. That was a recognized international symbol.
I know there are places in New Hampshire that are probably
susceptible to terrorist attack. I am sure they are. But the fact is,
it is unlikely, if you are ordering priorities, that most of them are
going to be very high on a priority list for terror attack--certainly
one structured by an al-Qaida type organization. They may be from
domestic terrorism; that is different--domestic terrorism such as hit
Oklahoma City. But if there were a structured terrorist attack from an
Islamic fundamentalist group, we can prioritize what is the terrorist
threat and what is not the terrorist threat.
The money should go to the threat. Now how does that affect New
Hampshire? It means New Hampshire would get less money. As the chairman
of an Appropriations subcommittee, I had responsibility for this area
up until this year, when I switched over to foreign affairs accounts. I
strongly promoted the program of putting the money where the threat
was, to the disadvantage of New Hampshire, because I felt that was the
way it should be done.
Now this bill comes along and tries to reorder that in a way that
essentially says every State, every community will get, for lack of a
better word,
[[Page S3033]]
``walking around money'' for purposes of buying security, to the
detriment of the high-threat areas. We only have so much money.
Once we have secured the high-threat areas and we are fairly
comfortable, then we can start distributing it maybe more broadly and
without any accountability for threat. But initially the distribution
should be based on threat.
Yes, every State should get some, but it should not be under the
formula that is in this bill. It should be a much lower absolute
commitment of dollars and a much higher commitment of dollars in the
threat area. This is what bothers me about this bill.
In addition, there is the ability of people to get access to
classified intelligence briefings and materials. This is playing with
fire when we start significantly expanding access to this type of
material. Because it is this material falling into the wrong hands by
accident, which it might be, or just oversight, because it is in so
many hands, because it is expanded by this bill and going into so many
hands, that if it falls into the wrong places, people can trace the
source, and protecting these sources of where we get intelligence is
absolutely the most critical thing we have to do. If we have a good
source of intelligence on how people want to attack us, protecting that
source is absolutely essential.
Some of the intelligence material that will be released under this
bill--with good intentions, but, unfortunately, the Congress tends to
be a sieve, and no matter how aggressively people try to protect that
information, it seems to get out--could easily expand the number of
people available who have access to this information to a point where
the security of the administration will come into question.
So these are very serious issues relative to this bill. The most
serious is the unionization of a nonunion, lean, effective organization
which would protect our transportation system, especially air traffic;
the failure to put the money on the target which is threatened; and the
issue of expanding the availability of very sensitive intelligence
information in a way that might undermine the sources of that
information.
Those are the reservations I have about this bill. That is why I will
not be able to support the bill when it comes up for final passage
should it be in its present form.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, we are coming to the moment when we
adopt the managers' amendment and proceed to final passage. I want to
respond to some of the things said by my friend from New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator may proceed.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. In response to my friend from New Hampshire, two
things: One is, S. 4 is a direct response not just to the original 9/11
Commission in 2004, which was the basis of the Intelligence Reform
Terrorism Prevention Act of that year, but it is a response directly to
the appeal the 9/11 Commission issued in December of 2005 that there
was unfinished business.
That appeal was not only seconded but echoed and amplified by the
various organizations representing families who lost loved ones on 9/11
in the terrorist attack of that day.
So this legislation before the Senate now, about to go to final
amendment consideration and adoption, includes improvements in
information sharing--the critical question of connecting the dots
before the terrorists can strike us so we can stop them from doing so.
It creates a new dedicated grant fund to support interoperable
communications equipment--complicated words which simply mean whether
in a crisis, a potential terrorist attack, or a natural disaster such
as Katrina, our firefighters, our police officers, our emergency
responders can talk to each other as they were not able to do on
9/11.
This is a balanced, progressive recommendation to solve once and for
all by legislation the ongoing dispute about how to distribute homeland
security grant funding. We have improved the security requirements of
the so-called visa waiver program. We have strengthened the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Board and done much else. There is a lot constructive
here. One of the parts of this legislation that I believe still should
be the least controversial and, frankly, not the most important but an
act of fairness consistent with our effort to improve homeland
security, was simply to give the transportation security officers at
the Transportation Security Agency, who now can join a union but cannot
collectively bargain, the same right to collectively bargain in very
limited areas without the right to strike, the same rights that most
other employees at the Department of Homeland Security, including law
enforcement personnel, have and continue to have, without impeding
their carrying out of their law enforcement public safety functions.
That includes the Border Patrol, obviously at the Capitol that includes
our Capitol Police, and throughout America it includes firefighters and
police officers.
It is unfortunate that is so much the focus of discussion about this
bill because this bill is a direct response to the appeals of the 9/11
Commissioners and the 9/11 families to take constructive action to
respond to the statements that the Commission itself made in 2004 and
again in 2005: America is safer than it was on 9/11/01 but not yet safe
enough.
This bill, which is not controversial and ought to receive
nonpartisan support, will make the people of America, in an age of
terrorism, safer yet than they have been before. It is why I strongly
urge my colleagues across party lines to support final passage of the
legislation.
I hope soon to be able to propound a series of unanimous consent
agreements. I am waiting for final clearance from my ranking member. As
soon as that happens I will rise to do so.
Amendment No. 448
I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding its adoption, the Ensign
amendment No. 448 be considered a first-degree amendment, agreed to,
and that it be inserted at the appropriate place in the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Requested Resignations of Seven United States Attorneys
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to comment
about the events in the Department of Justice over the course of the
past 10 days, with respect to the request for the resignations of seven
United States attorneys and the disclosures that the FBI was improperly
using national security letters.
With respect to the matter about the request for resignations of the
United States attorneys, I believe it is important for the Judiciary
Committee to proceed with its inquiry to find out exactly what
happened. There is no doubt--I think it is undisputed--that the
Attorney General has the authority to replace United States attorneys.
There is a serious question if they are replaced for improper motives.
We know when President Clinton was elected, one of his first acts in
early 1993, when he took office, was to replace all 93 of the United
States attorneys. I had the occasion recently to discuss this with the
Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Tom Corbett, who was a U.S. attorney
at that time for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In 1993, he had
the position in the United States attorneys organization to make those
telephone calls. That was handled in due course, and nobody challenged
the President's authority to replace United States attorneys.
Now, questions have arisen as to whether United States attorneys were
replaced improperly--for example, the question has been raised as to
U.S. Attorney Lam in the Southern District of California, in San Diego,
and whether she was replaced because of her conviction of former
Congressman Duke Cunningham, now serving an 8-year sentence, and
whether she was about to investigate other people who were politically
powerful.
Ms. Lam was questioned about that. I asked her whether she considered
the
[[Page S3034]]
request for her resignation to be inappropriate. She said she was
surprised by it. I pressed her for her own conclusion. I think we may
need more by way of inquiry to examine what her performance ratings
were to see if there was a basis for her being asked to resign.
We had a situation with Mr. Cummins, who was a U.S. attorney in the
Eastern District of Arkansas. He received a telephone call, which he
then relayed to other dismissed United States attorneys, and he did it
by e-mail very shortly after the telephone call. The question I had for
Mr. Cummins was, what was said? The e-mail did not contain the language
of the caller from the Department of Justice. It had Mr. Cummins'
sense, or feelings, that it was a warning. After little discussion, one
lawyer to another, he said it may have been friendly advice. Well, that
perhaps requires a little more analysis, if not a little more inquiry.
Then we have the situation with the U.S. attorney from New Mexico,
where, according to the news reports--and we have to find this out from
the actual witnesses--there had been concerns expressed by people in
New Mexico as to whether he was doing his job properly. On those
concerns--at least according to the press--we have to find this out
from the witnesses. Those calls, according to members of the press, or
according to what has been reported in the press, were relayed to White
House officials, and they passed them on to the Department of Justice.
We have to look at that and ask ourselves the question of whether
there is impropriety in that. If the Department of Justice is to
evaluate whether a United States attorney ought to be retained, is it
relevant as to what people think about him or her? The comments may
require that we look at whether he was doing the job. Those are matters
we have yet to determine. So when we have declarations made on the
Senate floor that are conclusory, condemning the Department of Justice
for what it has done, I say that is premature.
When the issue came up about the hearing that was a week ago today,
in my capacity as ranking member of the committee, I was asked to waive
the 7-day rule, and I agreed to do so. I agreed to do so because I
thought it was important to move ahead promptly. When Senator Leahy has
raised the issue about other witnesses coming in, I think he is correct
on that. The issue was raised about bringing in former White House
Counsel Harriet Miers, issues were raised about bringing in people from
the Department of Justice and other people in the office of the White
House Counsel. I think that ought to be done. I do not think it is
necessary to subpoena them. We will see.
Before subpoenas ought to be issued, or before there even ought to be
an issue raised about subpoenas, we ought to make a determination as to
whether people are willing to come in voluntarily. When you talk about
subpoenas, the first public reaction is: Why do they have to be
subpoenaed? Why don't they come in voluntarily? Do they have something
to hide? The next inference or question is: Are they guilty of
something that they have to be subpoenaed?
So let us proceed in the regular course of business. I was a district
attorney for some 8 years and an assistant DA before that, and I have
been on the Judiciary Committee for 27 years. The regular way to do
business is to ask people to come in. If they refuse, then you can talk
about subpoenas and you can get tough if it is necessary to do that.
I regret I could not be here when Senator Schumer was on the floor
earlier today. He has made public statements about the Attorney General
politicizing the office. Well, that may be Senator Schumer's opinion,
his judgment. But let's get down to specific facts as to what is
involved in the politicization. We are all working here in a political
field. I, frankly, have a concern to see Senator Pete Domenici on the
Web site of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee. I have a little
concern about some of the statements that have been made by Members of
this body, rushing to judgment, before we have had these witnesses in.
There has been a request for witnesses from the administration, from
the White House. Well, why condemn the parties and condemn the
Department until we have found out what the facts are? My view, as I
expressed last Thursday in the Judiciary Committee's executive session,
has been to tone down the rhetoric. We are now on the heels of the
issue of the request for resignations of the United States attorneys.
We have the disclosures that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had
misused the national security letters. We gave them broader powers in
the PATRIOT Act. We broadened the powers from cases involving foreign
powers to national security matters generally. We put in a provision as
to exigent circumstances, which means an emergency. Until we find, at
least preliminarily, that the FBI used the exigent category more
broadly--in some situations, they were to get statements on probable
cause for the judicial authorization. In giving the FBI these broader
powers under the--Madam President, the Senate is not in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
Mr. SPECTER. We gave the FBI these broader powers under the PATRIOT
Act because of the importance of fighting terrorism, and that is a
major problem of the United States today, an enormous problem
worldwide. We are concerned that where the FBI exercises these greater
powers there has to be an appropriate regard for civil liberties and
for constitutional rights. If it weren't for the fact we inserted in
the reauthorization the authority of the inspector general to make
these audits, we would not have found out what was going on.
So then in evaluating what the Department of Justice has done, I
think it is important to look thoroughly at the issues raised by the
inspector general. It is a thick volume. We are going to need oversight
hearings. Senator Leahy, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, already
announced that. I think we may have to go further and consider changing
the authority of the FBI under the PATRIOT Act. If they do not use the
powers within the confines the Congress has prescribed and the
President authorized, then we may have to limit their power.
There are serious issues that confront the Department of Justice at
this time and the Judiciary Committee, in its oversight capacity and
investigative capacity, has the full authority of power to find out
what the facts are, and we will speak plainly. I will have no
hesitation in making a factually based judgment if they have acted
improperly.
Let us see the background of the firing of these U.S. attorneys, and
let us see what the details are on the national security letters and
what the Department of Justice does to correct the situation.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Amendment No. 291; Amendment No. 293, As Modified; Amendment No. 341;
Amendment No. 323; Amendment No. 290, As Further Modified; Amendment
No. 368; Amendment No. 392; Amendment No. 332, As Modified; Amendment
No. 391; Amendment No. 431; Amendment No. 348; Amendment No. 404;
Amendment No. 388, As Modified; Amendment No. 411, As Modified;
Amendment No. 456; Amendment No. 414, As Modified; Amendment No. 412,
As Modified; Amendment No. 354, As Modified
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I am very happy to indicate to our
colleagues we have reached agreement on a series of unanimous consent
requests that will allow us to move to final passage.
I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and
the Senate proceed to the consideration of a series of amendments,
which have been cleared on our side and by Senator Collins on her side.
The amendments are as follows:
Sununu amendment No. 291; Grassley amendment No. 293, with a
modification; Coleman amendment No. 341; Feinstein amendment No. 323;
Salazar amendment No. 290, with a further modification; Carper
amendment No. 368; Akaka amendment No. 392; Lieberman amendment No.
332, with a modification; Lieberman-Collins amendment No. 391;
Lieberman-Collins amendment No. 431; Wyden-Bond amendment No. 348; Byrd
amendment No. 404; Pryor amendment No. 388, with a modification;
Lieberman-McCain amendment No. 411, with a modification; Landrieu
amendment No. 456;
[[Page S3035]]
Coleman amendment No. 414, with a modification; Inouye-Stevens-
Lieberman amendment No. 412, with a modification; Menendez amendment
No. 354, with a modification.
I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be agreed to en bloc;
that the motions to reconsider be laid on the table, en bloc; that any
statements thereon be printed in the Record as if read; and that
consideration of these items appear separately in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments were agreed to, as follows:
amendment no. 291
(Purpose: To ensure that the emergency communications and
interoperability communications grant program does not exclude Internet
Protocol-based interoperable solutions)
On page 121, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
``(k) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed or interpreted to preclude the use of funds
under this section by a State for interim or long-term
Internet Protocol-based interoperable solutions,
notwithstanding compliance with the Project 25 standard.''.
amendment no. 293, as modified
At the end, add the following:
TITLE_MODERNIZATION OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS
SEC. _01. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``The American National Red
Cross Governance Modernization Act of 2007''.
SEC. _02. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Substantive changes to the Congressional Charter of The
American National Red Cross have not been made since 1947.
(2) In February 2006, the board of governors of The
American National Red Cross (the ``Board of Governors'')
commissioned an independent review and analysis of the Board
of Governors' role, composition, size, relationship with
management, governance relationship with chartered units of
The American National Red Cross, and whistleblower and audit
functions.
(3) In an October 2006 report of the Board of Governors,
entitled ``American Red Cross Governance for the 21st
Century'' (the ``Governance Report''), the Board of Governors
recommended changes to the Congressional Charter, bylaws, and
other governing documents of The American National Red Cross
to modernize and enhance the effectiveness of the Board of
Governors and governance structure of The American National
Red Cross.
(4) It is in the national interest to create a more
efficient governance structure of The American National Red
Cross and to enhance the Board of Governors' ability to
support the critical mission of The American National Red
Cross in the 21st century.
(5) It is in the national interest to clarify the role of
the Board of Governors as a governance and strategic
oversight board and for The American National Red Cross to
amend its bylaws, consistent with the recommendations
described in the Governance Report, to clarify the role of
the Board of Governors and to outline the areas of its
responsibility, including--
(A) reviewing and approving the mission statement for The
American National Red Cross;
(B) approving and overseeing the corporation's strategic
plan and maintaining strategic oversight of operational
matters;
(C) selecting, evaluating, and determining the level of
compensation of the corporation's chief executive officer;
(D) evaluating the performance and establishing the
compensation of the senior leadership team and providing for
management succession;
(E) overseeing the financial reporting and audit process,
internal controls, and legal compliance;
(F) holding management accountable for performance;
(G) providing oversight of the financial stability of the
corporation;
(H) ensuring the inclusiveness and diversity of the
corporation;
(I) providing oversight of the protection of the brand of
the corporation; and
(J) assisting with fundraising on behalf of the
corporation.
(6)(A) The selection of members of the Board of Governors
is a critical component of effective governance for The
American National Red Cross, and, as such, it is in the
national interest that The American National Red Cross amend
its bylaws to provide a method of selection consistent with
that described in the Governance Report.
(B) The new method of selection should replace the current
process by which--
(i) 30 chartered unit-elected members of the Board of
Governors are selected by a non-Board committee which
includes 2 members of the Board of Governors and other
individuals elected by the chartered units themselves;
(ii) 12 at-large members of the Board of Governors are
nominated by a Board committee and elected by the Board of
Governors; and
(iii) 8 members of the Board of Governors are appointed by
the President of the United States.
(C) The new method of selection described in the Governance
Report reflects the single category of members of the Board
of Governors that will result from the implementation of this
title:
(i) All Board members (except for the chairman of the Board
of Governors) would be nominated by a single committee of the
Board of Governors taking into account the criteria outlined
in the Governance Report to assure the expertise, skills, and
experience of a governing board.
(ii) The nominated members would be considered for approval
by the full Board of Governors and then submitted to The
American National Red Cross annual meeting of delegates for
election, in keeping with the standard corporate practice
whereby shareholders of a corporation elect members of a
board of directors at its annual meeting.
(7) The United States Supreme Court held The American
National Red Cross to be an instrumentality of the United
States, and it is in the national interest that the
Congressional Charter confirm that status and that any
changes to the Congressional Charter do not affect the rights
and obligations of The American National Red Cross to carry
out its purposes.
(8) Given the role of The American National Red Cross in
carrying out its services, programs, and activities, and
meeting its various obligations, the effectiveness of The
American National Red Cross will be promoted by the creation
of an organizational ombudsman who--
(A) will be a neutral or impartial dispute resolution
practitioner whose major function will be to provide
confidential and informal assistance to the many internal and
external stakeholders of The American National Red Cross;
(B) will report to the chief executive officer and the
audit committee of the Board of Governors; and
(C) will have access to anyone and any documents in The
American National Red Cross.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) charitable organizations are an indispensable part of
American society, but these organizations can only fulfill
their important roles by maintaining the trust of the
American public;
(2) trust is fostered by effective governance and
transparency, which are the principal goals of the
recommendations of the Board of Governors in the Governance
Report and this title;
(3) Federal and State action play an important role in
ensuring effective governance and transparency by setting
standards, rooting out violations, and informing the public;
and
(4) while The American National Red Cross is and will
remain a Federally chartered instrumentality of the United
States, and it has the rights and obligations consistent with
that status, The American National Red Cross nevertheless
should maintain appropriate communications with State
regulators of charitable organizations and should cooperate
with them as appropriate in specific matters as they arise
from time to time.
SEC. _03. ORGANIZATION.
Section 300101 of title 36, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``a Federally chartered
instrumentality of the United States and'' before ``a body
corporate and politic''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting at the end the
following new sentence: ``The corporation may conduct its
business and affairs, and otherwise hold itself out, as the
`American Red Cross' in any jurisdiction.''.
SEC. _04. PURPOSES.
Section 300102 of title 36, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (4) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following paragraph:
``(5) to conduct other activities consistent with the
foregoing purposes.''.
SEC. _05. MEMBERSHIP AND CHAPTERS.
Section 300103 of title 36, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``, or as otherwise
provided,'' before ``in the bylaws'';
(2) in subsection (b)(1)--
(A) by striking ``board of governors'' and inserting
``corporation''; and
(B) by inserting ``policies and'' before ``regulations
related''; and
(3) in subsection (b)(2)--
(A) by inserting ``policies and'' before ``regulations
shall require''; and
(B) by striking ``national convention'' and inserting
``annual meeting''.
SEC. _06. BOARD OF GOVERNORS.
Section 300104 of title 36, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
``Sec. 300104. Board of governors
``(a) Board of Governors.--
``(1) In general.--The board of governors is the governing
body of the corporation with all powers of governing and
directing, and of overseeing the management of the business
and affairs of, the corporation.
``(2) Number.--The board of governors shall fix by
resolution, from time to time, the number of members
constituting the entire board of governors, provided that--
[[Page S3036]]
``(A) as of March 31, 2009, and thereafter, there shall be
no fewer than 12 and no more than 25 members; and
``(B) as of March 31, 2012, and thereafter, there shall be
no fewer than 12 and no more than 20 members constituting the
entire board.
Procedures to implement the preceding sentence shall be
provided in the bylaws.
``(3) Appointment.--The governors shall be appointed or
elected in the following manner:
``(A) Chairman.--
``(i) In general.--The board of governors, in accordance
with procedures provided in the bylaws, shall recommend to
the President an individual to serve as chairman of the board
of governors. If such recommendation is approved by the
President, the President shall appoint such individual to
serve as chairman of the board of governors.
``(ii) Vacancies.--Vacancies in the office of the chairman,
including vacancies resulting from the resignation, death, or
removal by the President of the chairman, shall be filled in
the same manner described in clause (i).
``(iii) Duties.--The chairman shall be a member of the
board of governors and, when present, shall preside at
meetings of the board of governors and shall have such other
duties and responsibilities as may be provided in the bylaws
or a resolution of the board of governors.
``(B) Other members.--
``(i) In general.--Members of the board of governors other
than the chairman shall be elected at the annual meeting of
the corporation in accordance with such procedures as may be
provided in the bylaws.
``(ii) Vacancies.--Vacancies in any such elected board
position and in any newly created board position may be
filled by a vote of the remaining members of the board of
governors in accordance with such procedures as may be
provided in the bylaws.
``(b) Terms of Office.--
``(1) In general.--The term of office of each member of the
board of governors shall be 3 years, except that--
``(A) the board of governors may provide under the bylaws
that the terms of office of members of the board of governors
elected to the board of governors before March 31, 2012, may
be less than 3 years in order to implement the provisions of
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2); and
``(B) any member of the board of governors elected by the
board to fill a vacancy in a board position arising before
the expiration of its term may, as determined by the board,
serve for the remainder of that term or until the next annual
meeting of the corporation.
``(2) Staggered terms.--The terms of office of members of
the board of governors (other than the chairman) shall be
staggered such that, by March 31, 2012, and thereafter, \1/3\
of the entire board (or as near to \1/3\ as practicable)
shall be elected at each successive annual meeting of the
corporation with the term of office of each member of the
board of governors elected at an annual meeting expiring at
the third annual meeting following the annual meeting at
which such member was elected.
``(3) Term limits.--No person may serve as a member of the
board of governors for more than such number of terms of
office or years as may be provided in the bylaws.
``(c) Committees and Officers.--The board--
``(1) may appoint, from its own members, an executive
committee to exercise such powers of the board when the board
is not in session as may be provided in the bylaws;
``(2) may appoint such other committees or advisory
councils with such powers as may be provided in the bylaws or
a resolution of the board of governors;
``(3) shall appoint such officers of the corporation,
including a chief executive officer, with such duties,
responsibilities, and terms of office as may be provided in
the bylaws or a resolution of the board of governors; and
``(4) may remove members of the board of governors (other
than the chairman), officers, and employees under such
procedures as may be provided in the bylaws or a resolution
of the board of governors.
``(d) Advisory Council.--
``(1) Establishment.--There shall be an advisory council to
the board of governors.
``(2) Membership; appointment by president.--
``(A) In general.--The advisory council shall be composed
of no fewer than 8 and no more than 10 members, each of whom
shall be appointed by the President from principal officers
of the executive departments and senior officers of the Armed
Forces whose positions and interests qualify them to
contribute to carrying out the programs and purposes of the
corporation.
``(B) Members from the armed forces.--At least 1, but not
more than 3, of the members of the advisory council shall be
selected from the Armed Forces.
``(3) Duties.--The advisory council shall advise, report
directly to, and meet, at least 1 time per year with the
board of governors, and shall have such name, functions and
be subject to such procedures as may be provided in the
bylaws.
``(e) Action Without Meeting.--Any action required or
permitted to be taken at any meeting of the board of
governors or of any committee thereof may be taken without a
meeting if all members of the board or committee, as the case
may be, consent thereto in writing, or by electronic
transmission and the writing or writings or electronic
transmission or transmissions are filed with the minutes of
proceedings of the board or committee. Such filing shall be
in paper form if the minutes are maintained in paper form and
shall be in electronic form if the minutes are maintained in
electronic form.
``(f) Voting by Proxy.--
``(1) In general.--Voting by proxy is not allowed at any
meeting of the board, at the annual meeting, or at any
meeting of a chapter.
``(2) Exception.--The board may allow the election of
governors by proxy during any emergency.
``(g) Bylaws.--
``(1) In general.--The board of governors may--
``(A) at any time adopt bylaws; and
``(B) at any time adopt bylaws to be effective only in an
emergency.
``(2) Emergency bylaws.--Any bylaws adopted pursuant to
paragraph (1)(B) may provide special procedures necessary for
managing the corporation during the emergency. All provisions
of the regular bylaws consistent with the emergency bylaws
remain effective during the emergency.
``(h) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `entire board' means the total number of
members of the board of governors that the corporation would
have if there were no vacancies; and
``(2) the term `emergency' shall have such meaning as may
be provided in the bylaws.''.
SEC. _07. POWERS.
Paragraph (a)(1) of section 300105 of title 36, United
States Code, is amended by striking ``bylaws'' and inserting
``policies''.
SEC. _08. ANNUAL MEETING.
Section 300107 of title 36, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
``Sec. 300107. Annual meeting
``(a) In General.--The annual meeting of the corporation is
the annual meeting of delegates of the chapters.
``(b) Time of Meeting.--The annual meeting shall be held as
determined by the board of governors.
``(c) Place of Meeting.--The board of governors is
authorized to determine that the annual meeting shall not be
held at any place, but may instead be held solely by means of
remote communication subject to such procedures as are
provided in the bylaws.
``(d) Voting.--
``(1) In general.--In matters requiring a vote at the
annual meeting, each chapter is entitled to at least 1 vote,
and voting on all matters may be conducted by mail,
telephone, telegram, cablegram, electronic mail, or any other
means of electronic or telephone transmission, provided that
the person voting shall state, or submit information from
which it can be determined, that the method of voting chosen
was authorized by such person.
``(2) Establishment of number of votes.--
``(A) In general.--The board of governors shall determine
on an equitable basis the number of votes that each chapter
is entitled to cast, taking into consideration the size of
the membership of the chapters, the populations served by the
chapters, and such other factors as may be determined by the
board.
``(B) Periodic review.--The board of governors shall review
the allocation of votes at least every 5 years.''.
SEC. _09. ENDOWMENT FUND.
Section 300109 of title 36, United States Code is amended--
(1) by striking ``nine'' from the first sentence thereof;
and
(2) by striking the second sentence and inserting the
following: ``The corporation shall prescribe policies and
regulations on terms and tenure of office, accountability,
and expenses of the board of trustees.''.
SEC. _10. ANNUAL REPORT AND AUDIT.
Subsection (a) of section 300110 of title 36, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Submission of Report.--As soon as practicable after
the end of the corporation's fiscal year, which may be
changed from time to time by the board of governors, the
corporation shall submit a report to the Secretary of Defense
on the activities of the corporation during such fiscal year,
including a complete, itemized report of all receipts and
expenditures.''.
SEC. _11. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
(a) In General.--Chapter 3001 of title 36, United States
Code, is amended by redesignating section 300111 as section
300113 and by inserting after section 300110 the following
new sections:
``Sec. 300111. Authority of the Comptroller General of the
United States
``The Comptroller General of the United States is
authorized to review the corporation's involvement in any
Federal program or activity the Government carries out under
law.
``Sec. 300112. Office of the Ombudsman
``(a) Establishment.--The corporation shall establish an
Office of the Ombudsman with such duties and responsibilities
as may be provided in the bylaws or a resolution of the board
of governors.
``(b) Report.--
``(1) In general.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall submit
annually to the appropriate Congressional committees a report
[[Page S3037]]
concerning any trends and systemic matters that the Office of
the Ombudsman has identified as confronting the corporation.
``(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--For purposes
of paragraph (1), the appropriate Congressional committees
are the following committees of Congress:
``(A) Senate committees.--The appropriate Congressional
committees of the Senate are--
``(i) the Committee on Finance;
``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations;
``(iii) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions;
``(iv) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs; and
``(v) the Committee on the Judiciary.
``(B) House committees.--The appropriate Congressional
committees of the House of Representatives are--
``(i) the Committee on Energy and Commerce;
``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs;
``(iii) the Committee on Homeland Security;
``(iv) the Committee on the Judiciary; and
``(v) the Committee on Ways and Means.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter
3001 of title 36, United States Code, is amended by striking
the item relating to section 300111 and inserting the
following:
``300111. Authority of the Comptroller General of the United States.
``300112. Office of the Ombudsman.
``300113. Reservation of right to amend or repeal.''.
amendment no. 341
(Purpose: To provide for an additional program requirement for the
border interoperability demonstration project)
On page 124, line 16, strike ``and'' after the semicolon.
On page 124, line 18, strike the period and insert ``;
and''.
On page 124, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:
(9) identify solutions to facilitate communications between
emergency response providers in communities of differing
population densities.
amendment no. 290, as modified further
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW.
(a) In General.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than the end of fiscal year
2008, the Secretary shall establish a national homeland
security strategy.
(2) Review.--Four years after the establishment of the
national homeland security strategy, and every 4 years
thereafter, the Secretary shall conduct a comprehensive
examination of the national homeland security strategy.
(3) Scope.--In establishing or reviewing the national
homeland security strategy under this subsection, the
Secretary shall conduct a comprehensive examination of
interagency cooperation, preparedness of Federal response
assets, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of
the homeland security program and policies of the United
States with a view toward determining and expressing the
homeland security strategy of the United States and
establishing a homeland security program for the 20 years
following that examination.
(4) Reference.--The establishment or review of the national
homeland security strategy under this subsection shall be
known as the ``quadrennial homeland security review''.
(5) Consultation.--Each quadrennial homeland security
review under this subsection shall be conducted in
consultation with the Attorney General of the United States,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of
the Treasury.
(b) Contents of Review.--Each quadrennial homeland security
review shall--
(1) delineate a national homeland security strategy
consistent with the most recent National Response Plan
prepared under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 or
any directive meant to replace or augment that directive;
(2) describe the interagency cooperation, preparedness of
Federal response assets, infrastructure, budget plan, and
other elements of the homeland security program and policies
of the United States associated with the national homeland
security strategy required to execute successfully the full
range of missions called for in the national homeland
security strategy delineated under paragraph (1); and
(3) identify--
(A) the budget plan required to provide sufficient
resources to successfully execute the full range of missions
called for in that national homeland security strategy at a
low-to-moderate level of risk; and
(B) any additional resources required to achieve such a
level of risk.
(c) Level of Risk.--The assessment of the level of risk for
purposes of subsection (b)(3) shall be conducted by the
Director of National Intelligence.
(d) Reporting.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall submit a report
regarding each quadrennial homeland security review to
Congress and shall make the report publicly available on the
Internet. Each such report shall be submitted and made
available on the Internet not later than September 30 of the
year in which the review is conducted.
(2) Contents of report.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) the results of the quadrennial homeland security
review;
(B) the threats to the assumed or defined national homeland
security interests of the United States that were examined
for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in
the examination of those threats;
(C) the status of cooperation among Federal agencies in the
effort to promote national homeland security;
(D) the status of cooperation between the Federal
Government and State governments in preparing for emergency
response to threats to national homeland security; and
(E) any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.
(e) Resource Plan.--Not later than 30 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall provide to
Congress and make publicly available on the Internet a
detailed resource plan specifying the estimated budget and
number of staff members that will be required for preparation
of the initial quadrennial homeland security review.
amendment no. 323
(Purpose: To provide for the inclusion of executive level training in
certain curriculum for training)
On page 23, strike lines 11 through 15, and insert the
following:
(a) Curriculum.--The Secretary, acting through the Chief
Intelligence Officer, shall--
(1) develop curriculum for the training of State, local,
and tribal government officials relating to the handling,
review, and development of intelligence material; and
(2) ensure that the curriculum includes executive level
training.
amendment no. 368
(Purpose: To make funds available for the activities of the Public
Interest Declassification Board)
At the end of title XI, add the following:
SEC. 1104. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST
DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
Section 21067 of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution,
2007 (division B of Public Law 109-289; 120 Stat. 1311), as
amended by Public Law 109-369 (120 Stat. 2642), Public Law
109-383 (120 Stat. 2678), and Public Law 110-5, is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c) From the amount provided by this section, the
National Archives and Records Administration may obligate
monies necessary to carry out the activities of the Public
Interest Declassification Board.''.
amendment no. 392
(Purpose: To provide for the Secretary to ensure that chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear detection equipment and
technologies are integrated as appropriate with other border security
systems and detection technologies, and for other purposes)
At the end of title XV, add the following:
SEC. ____. INTEGRATION OF DETECTION EQUIPMENT AND
TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall have responsibility
for ensuring that chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear detection equipment and technologies are integrated
as appropriate with other border security systems and
detection technologies.
(b) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to
Congress that contains a plan to develop a departmental
technology assessment process to determine and certify the
technology readiness levels of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear detection technologies before the
full deployment of such technologies within the United
States.
amendment NO. 332, as modified
On page 54, strike line 5 and all that follows through page
57, line 9, and insert the following:
``(a) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary, through the
Administrator, may award grants to State, local, and tribal
governments for the purposes of this title.
``(b) Programs Not Affected.--This title shall not be
construed to affect any authority to award grants under any
of the following Federal programs:
``(1) The firefighter assistance programs authorized under
section 33 and 34 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control
Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229 and 2229a).
``(2) The Urban Search and Rescue Grant Program authorized
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
``(3) Grants to protect critical infrastructure, including
port security grants authorized under section 70107 of title
46, United States Code, and the grants authorized in title
XIII and XIV of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
``(4) The Metropolitan Medical Response System authorized
under section 635 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 723).
``(5) Grant programs other than those administered by the
Department.
``(c) Relationship to Other Laws.--
``(1) In general.--The grant programs authorized under this
title shall supercede all grant programs authorized under
section 1014 of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 3714).
``(2) Program integrity.--Each grant program under this
title, section 1809 of this
[[Page S3038]]
Act, or section 662 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 763) shall include, consistent
with the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (31 U.S.C.
3321 note), policies and procedures for--
``(A) identifying activities funded under any such grant
program that are susceptible to significant improper
payments; and
``(B) reporting the incidence of improper payments to the
Department.
``(3) Allocation.--Except as provided under paragraph (2)
of this subsection, the allocation of grants authorized under
this title shall be governed by the terms of this title and
not by any other provision of law.
``(d) Minimum Performance Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--The Administrator shall--
``(A) establish minimum performance requirements for
entities that receive homeland security grants;
``(B) conduct, in coordination with State, regional, local,
and tribal governments receiving grants under this title,
section 1809 of this Act, or section 662 of the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 763),
simulations and exercises to test the minimum performance
requirements established under subparagraph (A) for--
On page 66, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:
``(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated for grants under this section--
``(1) for fiscal year 2007, such sums as are necessary;
``(2) for each of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010,
$1,278,639,000; and
``(3) for fiscal year 2011, and each fiscal year
thereafter, such sums as are necessary.
On page 77, strike line 3 and all that follows through page
80, line 7, and insert the following:
``(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated for grants under this section--
``(1) for fiscal year 2007, such sums as are necessary;
``(2) for each of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010,
$913,180,500; and
``(3) for fiscal year 2011, and each fiscal year
thereafter, such sums as are necessary.
``SEC. 2005. TERRORISM PREVENTION.
On page 84, strike line 19 and insert the following:
``SEC. 2006. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF FUNDS.
On page 85, line 25, strike ``611(j)(8)'' and insert
``611(j)(9)''.
On page 86, line 2, strike ``5196(j)(8))'' and insert
``5196(j)(9))''.
On page 87, strike line 22 and insert the following:
``SEC. 2007. ADMINISTRATION AND COORDINATION.
On page 89, line 7, strike ``under this title'' and insert
``under section 2003 or 2004''.
On page 91, strike line 16 and insert the following:
``SEC. 2008. ACCOUNTABILITY.
On page 94, lines 13 and 14, strike ``the Homeland Security
Grant Program'' and insert ``grants made under this title''.
On page 97, strike lines 7 and 8 and insert the following:
``SEC. 2009. AUDITING.
``(a) Audits of Grants.--
On page 104, strike line 7 and all that follows through
page 105, line 9, and insert the following:
``(d) Definition.--In this section, the term `Emergency
Management Performance Grants Program' means the Emergency
Management Performance Grants Program under section 662 of
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6
U.S.C. 763; Public Law 109-295).
``SEC. 2010. SENSE OF THE SENATE.
``It is the sense of the Senate that, in order to ensure
that the Nation is most effectively able to prevent, prepare
for, protect against, respond to, recovery from, and mitigate
against all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, and other man-made disasters--
``(1) the Department should administer a coherent and
coordinated system of both terrorism-focused and all-hazards
grants, the essential building blocks of which include--
``(A) the Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland
Security Grant Program established under this title
(including funds dedicated to law enforcement terrorism
prevention activities);
``(B) the Emergency Communications Operability and
Interoperable Communications Grants established under section
1809; and
``(C) the Emergency Management Performance Grants Program
authorized under section 662 of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 763); and
``(2) to ensure a continuing and appropriate balance
between terrorism-focused and all-hazards preparedness, the
amounts appropriated for grants under the Urban Area Security
Initiative, State Homeland Security Grant Program, and
Emergency Management Performance Grants Program in any fiscal
year should be in direct proportion to the amounts authorized
for those programs for fiscal year 2008 under the amendments
made by titles II and IV, as applicable, of the Improving
America's Security Act of 2007.''.
On page 106, strike lines 1 through 9, and insert the
following:
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 note)
is amended by striking the items relating to title XVIII and
sections 1801 through 1806, as added by the SAFE Port Act
(Public Law 109-347; 120 Stat. 1884), and inserting the
following:
``TITLE XIX--DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE
``Sec. 1901. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
``Sec. 1902. Mission of Office.
``Sec. 1903. Hiring authority.
``Sec. 1904. Testing authority.
``Sec. 1905. Relationship to other Department entities and Federal
agencies.
``Sec. 1906. Contracting and grant making authorities.
``TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS
``Sec. 2001. Definitions.
``Sec. 2002. Homeland Security Grant Program.
``Sec. 2003. Urban Area Security Initiative.
``Sec. 2004. State Homeland Security Grant Program.
``Sec. 2005. Terrorism prevention.
``Sec. 2006. Restrictions on use of funds.
``Sec. 2007. Administration and coordination.
``Sec. 2008. Accountability.
``Sec. 2009. Auditing.
``Sec. 2010. Sense of the Senate.''.
TITLE III--COMMUNICATIONS OPERABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY
On page 126, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:
TITLE IV--EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS PROGRAM
SEC. 401. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS PROGRAM.
Section 622 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 763) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 622. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS PROGRAM.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Population.--The term `population' means population
according to the most recent United States census population
estimates available at the start of the relevant fiscal year.
``(2) State.--The term `State' has the meaning given that
term in section 101 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 101).
``(b) In General.--There is an Emergency Management
Performance Grants Program to make grants to States to assist
State, local, and tribal governments in preparing for,
responding to, recovering from, and mitigating against all
hazards.
``(c) Application.--
``(1) In general.--Each State may apply for a grant under
this section, and shall submit such information in support of
an application as the Administrator may reasonably require.
``(2) Annual applications.--Applicants for grants under
this section shall apply or reapply on an annual basis for
grants distributed under the program.
``(d) Allocation.--Funds available under the Emergency
Management Performance Grants Program shall be allocated as
follows:
``(1) Baseline amount.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
each State shall receive an amount equal to 0.75 percent of
the total funds appropriated for grants under this section.
``(B) Territories.--American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each
shall receive an amount equal to 0.25 percent of the amounts
appropriated for grants under this section.
``(2) Per capita allocation.--The funds remaining for
grants under this section after allocation of the baseline
amounts under paragraph (1) shall be allocated to each State
in proportion to its population.
``(3) Consistency in allocation.--Notwithstanding
paragraphs (1) and (2), in any fiscal year in which the
appropriation for grants under this section is equal to or
greater than the appropriation for Emergency Management
Performance Grants in fiscal year 2007, no State shall
receive an amount under this section for that fiscal year
less than the amount that State received in fiscal year 2007.
``(e) Allowable Uses.--Grants awarded under this section
may be used to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and
mitigate against all hazards through--
``(1) any activity authorized under title VI or section 201
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq. and 5131);
``(2) any activity permitted under the Fiscal Year 2007
Program Guidance of the Department for Emergency Management
Performance Grants; and
``(3) any other activity approved by the Administrator that
will improve the emergency management capacity of State,
local, or tribal governments to coordinate, integrate, and
enhance preparedness for, response to, recovery from, or
mitigation against all-hazards.
``(f) Cost Sharing.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (i),
the Federal share of the costs of an activity carried out
with a grant under this section shall not exceed 50 percent.
``(2) In-kind matching.--Each recipient of a grant under
this section may meet the matching requirement under
paragraph (1) by making in-kind contributions of goods or
services that are directly linked with the purpose for which
the grant is made.
[[Page S3039]]
``(g) Distribution of Funds.--The Administrator shall not
delay distribution of grant funds to States under this
section solely because of delays in or timing of awards of
other grants administered by the Department.
``(h) Local and Tribal Governments.--
``(1) In general.--In allocating grant funds received under
this section, a State shall take into account the needs of
local and tribal governments.
``(2) Indian tribes.--States shall be responsible for
allocating grant funds received under this section to tribal
governments in order to help those tribal communities improve
their capabilities in preparing for, responding to,
recovering from, or mitigating against all hazards. Tribal
governments shall be eligible for funding directly from the
States, and shall not be required to seek funding from any
local government.
``(i) Emergency Operations Centers Improvement Program.--
``(1) In general.--The Administrator may award grants to
States under this section to plan for, equip, upgrade, or
construct all-hazards State, local, or regional emergency
operations centers.
``(2) Requirements.--No grant awards under this section
(including for the activities specified under this
subsection) shall be used for construction unless such
construction occurs under terms and conditions consistent
with the requirements under section 611(j)(9) of the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 5196(j)(9).
``(3) Cost sharing.--
``(A) In general.--The Federal share of the costs of an
activity carried out with a grant under this subsection shall
not exceed 75 percent.
``(B) In kind matching.--Each recipient of a grant for an
activity under this section may meet the matching requirement
under subparagraph (A) by making in-kind contributions of
goods or services that are directly linked with the purpose
for which the grant is made.
``(j) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated for grants under this section--
``(1) for fiscal year 2007, such sums as are necessary;
``(2) for each of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010,
$913,180,500; and
``(3) for fiscal year 2011, and each fiscal year
thereafter, such sums as are necessary.''.
amendment no. 391
(Purpose: To improve the guidelines for fusion centers operated by
State or local governments, to improve the awarding and administration
of homeland security grants, and for other purposes)
On page 37, line 5, strike ``within the scope'' and all
that follows through ``(6 U.S.C. 485)'' on line 8 and insert
``and intelligence''.
On page 37, lines 9 and 10, strike ``local emergency
response providers'' and insert ``local government agencies
(including emergency response providers)''.
On page 37, line 25, strike ``and''.
On page 38, line 3, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
On page 38, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
``(9) incorporate emergency response providers, and, as
appropriate, the private sector, into all relevant phases of
the intelligence and fusion process through full time
representatives or liaison officers.
On page 63, line 13, before the semicolon, insert the
following: ``the inclusion of which will enhance regional
efforts to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to,
and recover from acts of terrorism''.
On page 66, strike lines 3 through 8 and insert the
following:
``(2) State distribution of funds.--
``(A) In general.--Each State shall provide the eligible
metropolitan area not less than 80 percent of the grant
funds. Any funds retained by a State shall be expended on
items or services approved by the Administrator that benefit
the eligible metropolitan area.
``(B) Funds retained.--A State shall provide each relevant
eligible metropolitan area with an accounting of the items or
services on which any funds retained by the State under
subparagraph (A) were expended.
On page 82, line 4, strike ``or other'' and insert ``and
other''.
On page 83, line 15, before the semicolon, insert the
following: ``, including through review of budget requests
for those programs''.
On page 90, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:
``(3) Existing planning committees.--Nothing in this
subsection may be construed to require that any State or
metropolitan area create a planning committee if that State
or metropolitan area has established and uses a
multijurisdictional planning committee or commission that
meets the requirements of this subsection.
amendment no. 431
(Purpose: To clarify the coordination of the accreditation and
certification program for the private sector, and for other purposes)
On page 194, lines 18 and 19, strike ``and each private
sector advisory council created under section 102(f)(4)'' and
insert ``each private sector advisory council created under
section 102(f)(4), and appropriate private sector advisory
groups such as sector coordinating councils and information
sharing and analysis centers''.
On page 195, line 12, strike ``the American National
Standards Institute and'' and insert ``representatives of
organizations that coordinate or facilitate the development
of and use of voluntary consensus standards''.
On page 195, lines 14 through 16, strike ``and each private
sector advisory council created under section 102(f)(4)'' and
insert ``, each private sector advisory council created under
section 102(f)(4), and appropriate private sector advisory
groups such as sector coordinating councils and information
sharing and analysis centers''.
On page 196, line 21, strike ``and'' after the semicolon.
On page 196, strike lines 17-23 and insert the following:
``(C) consider the unique nature of various sectors within
the private sector, including preparedness, business
continuity standards, or best practices, established--
``(i) under any other provision of Federal law; or
``(ii) by any sector-specific agency, as defined under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7; and
``(D) coordinate the program, as appropriate, with--
``(i) other Department private sector related programs; and
``(ii) preparedness and business continuity programs in
other Federal agencies.
On page 201, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following:
``(e) Compliance by Entities Seeking Certification.--Any
entity seeking certification under this section shall comply
with all applicable statutes, regulations, directives,
policies, and industry codes of practice in meeting
certification requirements.
On page 201, line 10, strike ``(e)'' and insert ``(f)''.
On page 201, line 13, strike ``(f)'' and insert ``(g)''.
On page 201, line 18, strike ``(g)'' and insert ``(h)''.
On page 202, strike lines 20 through 24, and insert the
following:
SEC. 706. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this title may be construed to supercede any
preparedness or business continuity standards, requirements,
or best practices established--
(1) under any other provision of Federal law; or
(2) by any sector-specific agency, as defined under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.
amendment no. 348
(Purpose: To require that a redacted version of the Executive Summary
of the Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence
Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Joint
Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 is made available to the
public)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. ___. AVAILABILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY
REGARDING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER
11, 2001.
(a) Public Availability.--Not later than 30 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall prepare and make available
to the public a version of the Executive Summary of the
report entitled the ``Office of Inspector General Report on
Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings
and Conclusions of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks
of September 11, 2001'' issued in June 2005 that is
declassified to the maximum extent possible, consistent with
national security.
(b) Report to Congress.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a classified
annex to the redacted Executive Summary made available under
subsection (a) that explains the reason that any redacted
material in the Executive Summary was withheld from the
public.
amendment no. 404
(Purpose: To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to notify
Congress not later than 30 days before waiving any eligibility
requirement under the visa waiver program established under section 217
of the Immigration and Nationality Act)
On page 133, line 20, strike ``(C)'' and insert the
following:
(C) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:
``The Secretary of Homeland Security may not waive any
eligibility requirement under this section unless the
Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional committees
not later than 30 days before the effective date of such
waiver.'';
(D)
amendment no. 388, as modified
On page 105, after line 9, insert the following:
SEC. 203. EQUIPMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRAINING
(a) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate
that the Department of Homeland Security shall conduct no
fewer than 7,500 trainings annually through the Domestic
Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program.
(b) Report.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
report no later than September 30 annually to the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the
House Homeland Security Committee, Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, and the
[[Page S3040]]
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security--
(1) on the number of trainings conducted that year through
the Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance
Program; and
(2) if the number of trainings conducted that year is less
than 7,500, an explanation of why fewer trainings were
needed.
amendment no. 411, as modified
At the end, add the following new title:
TITLE XVI--ADVANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES
SECTION 1601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Advance Democratic Values,
Address Non-democratic Countries, and Enhance Democracy Act
of 2007'' or the ``ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007''.
SEC. 1602. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that in order to support the expansion of
freedom and democracy in the world, the foreign policy of the
United States should be organized in support of
transformational diplomacy that seeks to work through
partnerships to build and sustain democratic, well-governed
states that will respect human rights and respond to the
needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in
the international system.
SEC. 1603. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It should be the policy of the United States--
(1) to promote freedom and democracy in foreign countries
as a fundamental component of the foreign policy of the
United States;
(2) to affirm internationally recognized human rights
standards and norms and to condemn offenses against those
rights;
(3) to use instruments of United States influence to
support, promote, and strengthen democratic principles,
practices, and values, including the right to free, fair, and
open elections, secret balloting, and universal suffrage;
(4) to protect and promote fundamental freedoms and rights,
including the freedom of association, of expression, of the
press, and of religion, and the right to own private
property;
(5) to protect and promote respect for and adherence to the
rule of law;
(6) to provide appropriate support to nongovernmental
organizations working to promote freedom and democracy;
(7) to provide political, economic, and other support to
countries that are willingly undertaking a transition to
democracy;
(8) to commit to the long-term challenge of promoting
universal democracy; and
(9) to strengthen alliances and relationships with other
democratic countries in order to better promote and defend
shared values and ideals.
SEC. 1604. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Annual report on advancing freedom and democracy.--The
term ``Annual Report on Advancing Freedom and Democracy''
refers to the annual report submitted to Congress by the
Department of State pursuant to section 665(c) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2151n note), in which the Department
reports on actions taken by the United States Government to
encourage respect for human rights and democracy.
(2) Assistant secretary.--The term ``Assistant Secretary''
means the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor.
(3) Community of democracies and community.--The terms
``Community of Democracies'' and ``Community'' mean the
association of democratic countries committed to the global
promotion of democratic principles, practices, and values,
which held its First Ministerial Conference in Warsaw,
Poland, in June 2000.
(4) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the
Department of State.
(5) Under secretary.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means
the Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global
Affairs.
Subtitle A--Liaison Officers and Fellowship Program to Enhance the
Promotion of Democracy
SEC. 1611. DEMOCRACY LIAISON OFFICERS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall establish and
staff Democracy Liaison Officer positions, under the
supervision of the Assistant Secretary, who may be assigned
to the following posts:
(1) United States missions to, or liaison with, regional
and multilateral organizations, including the United States
missions to the European Union, African Union, Organization
of American States and any other appropriate regional
organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the United Nations and its relevant specialized
agencies, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(2) Regional public diplomacy centers of the Department.
(3) United States combatant commands.
(4) Other posts as designated by the Secretary of State.
(b) Responsibilities.--Each Democracy Liaison Officer
should--
(1) provide expertise on effective approaches to promote
and build democracy;
(2) assist in formulating and implementing strategies for
transitions to democracy; and
(3) carry out other responsibilities as the Secretary of
State and the Assistant Secretary may assign.
(c) New Positions.--The Democracy Liaison Officer positions
established under subsection (a) should be new positions that
are in addition to existing officer positions with
responsibility for other human rights and democracy related
issues and programs.
(d) Relationship to Other Authorities.--Nothing in this
section may be construed as removing any authority or
responsibility of a chief of mission or other employee of a
diplomatic mission of the United States provided under any
other provision of law, including any authority or
responsibility for the development or implementation of
strategies to promote democracy.
SEC. 1612. DEMOCRACY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) Requirement for Program.--The Secretary of State shall
establish a Democracy Fellowship Program to enable Department
officers to gain an additional perspective on democracy
promotion abroad by working on democracy issues in
congressional committees with oversight over the subject
matter of this title, including the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and in
nongovernmental organizations involved in democracy
promotion.
(b) Selection and Placement.--The Assistant Secretary shall
play a central role in the selection of Democracy Fellows and
facilitate their placement in appropriate congressional
offices and nongovernmental organizations.
(c) Exception.--A Democracy Fellow may not be assigned to
any congressional office until the Secretary of Defense
certifies to the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives that the request of
the Commander of the United States Central Command for the
Department of State for personnel and foreign service
officers has been fulfilled.
SEC. 1613. TRANSPARENCY OF UNITED STATES BROADCASTING TO
ASSIST IN OVERSIGHT AND ENSURE PROMOTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTS.
(a) Transcripts.--The Broadcasting Board of Governors shall
transcribe into English all original broadcasting content.
(b) Public Transparency.--The Broadcasting Board of
Governors shall post all English transcripts from its
broadcasting content on a publicly available website within
30 days of the original broadcast.
(c) Broadcasting Content Defined.--In this section, the
term ``broadcasting content'' includes programming produced
or broadcast by United State international broadcasters,
including--
(1) Voice of America;
(2) Alhurra;
(3) Radio Sawa;
(4) Radio Farda;
(5) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty;
(6) Radio Free Asia; and
(7) The Office of Cuba Broadcasting.
Subtitle B--Annual Report on Advancing Freedom and Democracy
SEC. 1621. ANNUAL REPORT.
(a) Report Title.--Section 665(c) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22
U.S.C. 2151n note) is amended in the first sentence by
inserting ``entitled the Advancing Freedom and Democracy
Report'' before the period at the end.
(b) Schedule for Submission.--If a report entitled the
Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report pursuant to section
665(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 2003, as amended by subsection (a), is submitted under
such section, such report shall be submitted not later than
90 days after the date of submission of the report required
by section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2151n(d)).
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 665(c) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-228; 2151n note) is amended by striking ``30 days'' and
inserting ``90 days''.
SEC. 1622. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS.
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State
should continue to ensure and expand the timely translation
of Human Rights and International Religious Freedom reports
and the Annual Report on Advancing Freedom and Democracy
prepared by personnel of the Department of State into the
principal languages of as many countries as possible.
Translations are welcomed because information on United
States support for universal enjoyment of freedoms and rights
serves to encourage individuals around the globe seeking to
advance the cause of freedom in their countries.
Subtitle C--Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion and the Internet
Website of the Department of State
SEC. 1631. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
Congress commends the Secretary of State for creating an
Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion, and it is the
sense of Congress that the Committee should play a
significant role in the Department's transformational
diplomacy by advising the Secretary of State regarding United
States efforts to promote democracy and democratic transition
in connection with the formulation and implementation of
United States foreign policy and foreign assistance.
[[Page S3041]]
SEC. 1632. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE INTERNET WEBSITE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should continue and further
expand the Secretary's existing efforts to inform the public
in foreign countries of the efforts of the United States to
promote democracy and defend human rights through the
Internet website of the Department of State;
(2) the Secretary of State should continue to enhance the
democracy promotion materials and resources on that Internet
website, as such enhancement can benefit and encourage those
around the world who seek freedom; and
(3) such enhancement should include where possible and
practical, translated reports on democracy and human rights
prepared by personnel of the Department, narratives and
histories highlighting successful nonviolent democratic
movements, and other relevant material.
Subtitle D--Training in Democracy and Human Rights; Promotions
SEC. 1641. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRAINING IN DEMOCRACY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should continue to enhance and
expand the training provided to foreign service officers and
civil service employees on how to strengthen and promote
democracy and human rights; and
(2) the Secretary of State should continue the effective
and successful use of case studies and practical workshops
addressing potential challenges, and work with non-state
actors, including nongovernmental organizations that support
democratic principles, practices, and values.
SEC. 1642. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ADVANCE DEMOCRACY AWARD.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should further strengthen the
capacity of the Department to carry out result-based
democracy promotion efforts through the establishment of
awards and other employee incentives, including the
establishment of an annual award known as Outstanding
Achievements in Advancing Democracy, or the ADVANCE Democracy
Award, that would be awarded to officers or employees of the
Department; and
(2) the Secretary of State should establish the procedures
for selecting recipients of such award, including any
financial terms, associated with such award.
SEC. 1643. PROMOTIONS.
The precepts for selection boards responsible for
recommending promotions of foreign service officers,
including members of the senior foreign service, should
include consideration of a candidate's experience or service
in promotion of human rights and democracy.
SEC. 1644. PROGRAMS BY UNITED STATES MISSIONS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES AND ACTIVITIES OF CHIEFS OF MISSION.
It is the sense of Congress that each chief of mission
should provide input on the actions described in the
Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report submitted under
section 665(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2151n note),
as amended by section 1621, and should intensify democracy
and human rights promotion activities.
Subtitle E--Alliances With Democratic Countries
SEC. 1651. ALLIANCES WITH DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES.
(a) Establishment of an Office for the Community of
Democracies.--The Secretary of State should, and is
authorized to, establish an Office for the Community of
Democracies with the mission to further develop and
strengthen the institutional structure of the Community of
Democracies, develop interministerial projects, enhance the
United Nations Democracy Caucus, manage policy development of
the United Nations Democracy Fund, and enhance coordination
with other regional and multilateral bodies with jurisdiction
over democracy issues.
(b) Sense of Congress on International Center for
Democratic Transition.--It is the sense of Congress that the
International Center for Democratic Transition, an initiative
of the Government of Hungary, serves to promote practical
projects and the sharing of best practices in the area of
democracy promotion and should be supported by, in
particular, other European countries with experiences in
democratic transitions, the United States, and private
individuals.
Subtitle F--Funding for Promotion of Democracy
SEC. 1661. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY
FUND.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should
work with other countries to enhance the goals and work of
the United Nations Democracy Fund, an essential tool to
promote democracy, and in particular support civil society in
their efforts to help consolidate democracy and bring about
transformational change.
SEC. 1662. THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY FUND.
The purpose of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund should
be to support innovative programming, media, and materials
designed to uphold democratic principles, support and
strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights and
the rule of law, and build civil societies in countries
around the world.
Amendment no. 456
(Purpose: To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to include
levees in the list of critical infrastructure sectors)
At the appropriate place, insert ``The Secretary shall
include levees in the Department's list of critical
infrastructure sectors.
AMENDMENT NO. 414, as modified
Insert at the appropriate place:
(a) Demonstration Project.--Not later than 120 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall--
(1) establish a demonstration project to conduct
demonstrations of security management systems that--
(A) shall use a management system standards approach; and
(B) may be integrated into quality, safety, environmental
and other internationally adopted management systems; and
(2) enter into 1 or more agreements with a private sector
entity to conduct such demonstrations of security management
systems.
amendment no. 412, as modified
(Purpose: To provide for model ports of entry and modify the
international registered traveler program)
On page 2, after the item relating to section 405, insert
the following:
Sec. 406. Model ports-of-entry.
On page 148, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
SEC. 406. MODEL PORTS-OF-ENTRY.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
(1) establish a model ports-of-entry program for the
purpose of providing a more efficient and welcoming
international arrival process in order to facilitate and
promote business and tourist travel to the United States,
while also improving security; and
(2) implement the program initially at the 20 United States
international airports with the greatest average annual
number of arriving foreign visitors.
(b) Program Elements.--The program shall include--
(1) enhanced queue management in the Federal Inspection
Services area leading up to primary inspection;
(2) assistance for foreign travelers once they have been
admitted to the United States, in consultation, as
appropriate, with relevant governmental and nongovernmental
entities; and
(3) instructional videos, in English and such other
languages as the Secretary determines appropriate, in the
Federal Inspection Services area that explain the United
States inspection process and feature national, regional, or
local welcome videos.
(c) Additional Customs and Border Protection Officers for
High Volume Ports.--Subject to the availability of
appropriations, before the end of fiscal year 2008 the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall employ not less than an
additional 200 Customs and Border Protection officers to
address staff shortages at the 20 United States international
airports with the highest average number of foreign visitors
arriving annually.
amendment no. 354, as modified
Beginning with line 1 on page 1, strike through the end of
the amendment and insert the following:
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. PLAN FOR 100 PERCENT SCANNING OF CARGO CONTAINERS.
Section 232(c) of the Security and Accountability For Every
Port Act (6 U.S.c. 982(c)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Not later'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--Not later'';
(2) by resetting the left margin of the text thereof 2 ems
from the left margin; and
(3) by inserting at the end thereof the following:
``(2) Plan for 100 percent scanning of cargo containers.--
``(A) In general.--The first report under paragraph (1)
shall include an initial plan to scan 100 percent of the
cargo containers destined for the United States before such
containers arrive in the United States.
``(B) Plan contents.--The plan under subparagraph (A) shall
include--
``(i) specific annual benchmarks for the percentage of
cargo containers destined for the United States that are
scanned at a foreign port;
``(ii) annual increases in the benchmarks described in
clause (i) until 100 percent of the cargo containers destined
for the United States are scanned before arriving in the
United States, unless the Secretary explains in writing to
the appropriate congressional committees that inadequate
progress has been made in meeting the criteria in section
232(b) for expanded scanning to be practical or feasible;
``(iii) an analysis of how to effectively incorporate
existing programs, including the Container Security
Initiative established by section 205 and the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism established by subtitle B, to
reach the benchmarks described in clause (i); and
``(iv) an analysis of the scanning equipment, personnel,
and technology necessary to reach the goal of 100 percent
scanning of cargo containers.
``(C) Subsequent reports.--Each report under paragraph (1)
after the initial report shall include an assessment of the
progress toward implementing the plan under subparagraph
(A).''.
[[Page S3042]]
Amendments Nos. 423, 424, 340, 307, 358, 359, 394, 415, and 371 En Bloc
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, on behalf of the Commerce Committee,
I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and the
Senate proceed en bloc to the consideration of a series of amendments
which have been cleared by the chair and ranking member of the Commerce
Committee, Senators Inouye and Stevens.
The amendments are as follows: Inouye-Stevens amendment No. 423 with
a modification; Inouye-Stevens amendment No. 424 with a modification;
Rockefeller amendment No. 340; Kerry amendment No. 307; Murray
amendment No. 358 with a modification; Lautenberg amendment No. 359
with a modification; Cardin amendment No. 394.
On behalf of the Banking Committee, Senators Dodd and Shelby, I ask
that the following amendments within their jurisdiction which they have
cleared also be considered: Dodd amendment No. 415, Kohl amendment No.
371 with a modification.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be
agreed to en bloc, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, en
bloc, that any statements thereon be printed in the Record, and that
the consideration of these amendments appear separately in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments (Nos. 340, 307, 394, and 415) were agreed to, as
follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 340 TO AMENDMENT NO. 275
(Purpose: To reinstate the State registration fee system for commercial
motor vehicles until the Unified Carrier Registration System Plan
Agreement is fully implemented)
On page 4, strike the item relating to section 1336 and
insert the following:
Sec. 1336. Unified carrier registration system plan agreement.
Sec. 1337. Authorization of appropriations.
On page 298, strike line 8 and insert the following:
SEC. 1336. UNIFIED CARRIER REGISTRATION SYSTEM PLAN
AGREEMENT.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 4305(a) of the
SAFETEA-LU Act (Public Law 109-59)--
(1) section 14504 of title 49, United States Code, as that
section was in effect on December 31, 2006, is re-enacted,
effective as of January 1, 2007; and
(2) no fee shall be collected pursuant to section 14504a of
title 49, United States Code, until 30 days after the date,
as determined by the Secretary of Transportation, on which--
(A) the unified carrier registration system plan and
agreement required by that section has been fully
implemented; and
(B) the fees have been set by the Secretary under
subsection (d)(7)(B) of that section.
(b) Repeal of Section 14504.--Section 14504 of title 49,
United States Code, as re-enacted by this Act, is repealed
effective on the date on which fees may be collected under
section 14504a of title 49, United States Code, pursuant to
subsection (a)(2) of this section.
SEC. 1337. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
amendmend no. 307 to amendment no. 275
(Purpose: To modify the criteria that the Secretary of Homeland
Security will use to develop a hazardous material tracking pilot
program for motor carriers)
On page 305, strike lines 8 through 15 and insert the
following:
(v) technology that allows the installation by a motor
carrier of concealed electronic devices on commercial motor
vehicles that can be activated by law enforcement authorities
and alert emergency response resources to locate and recover
high hazard materials in the event of loss or theft of such
materials and consider the addition of this type of
technology to the required communications technology
attributes under paragraph (1).
AMENDMENT NO. 394 TO AMENDMENT NO. 275
(Purpose: To require Amtrak contracts and leases involving the State of
Maryland to be governed by the laws of the District of Columbia)
On page 299, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
SEC. 1337. APPLICABILITY OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW TO
CERTAIN AMTRAK CONTRACTS.
Section 24301 of title 49, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
``(o) Applicability of District of Columbia Law.--Any lease
or contract entered into between the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation and the State of Maryland, or any
department or agency of the State of Maryland, after the date
of the enactment of this subsection shall be governed by the
laws of the District of Columbia.''.
AMENDMENT NO. 415 TO AMENDMENT NO. 275
(Purpose: To amend title X, with respect to critical infrastructure
protection efforts by Federal departments and agencies)
On page 233, strike lines 8 through 15.
On page 233, line 16, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(b)''.
On page 233, line 19, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(c)''.
On page 234, strike lines 17 through 21 and insert the
following:
(2) Classified information.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary shall submit with each
report under this subsection a classified annex containing
information required to be submitted under this subsection
that cannot be made public.
(B) Retention of classification.--The classification of
information required to be provided to Congress, the
Department, or any other department or agency under this
section by a sector-specific agency, including the assignment
of a level of classification of such information, shall be
binding on Congress, the Department, and that other Federal
agency.
On page 235, line 21, strike ``private sector'' and all
that follows through page 236, line 4 and insert ``private
sector.''.
On page 236, line 8, insert ``a report'' after ``submit''.
On page 236, beginning on line 11, strike ``a report'' and
insert the following: ``, and to each Committee of the Senate
and the House of Representatives having jurisdiction over the
critical infrastructure or key resource addressed by the
report,''.
On page 236, strike lines 18 and 19 and insert the
following:
``(2) Classified information.--
``(A) In general.--The report under this subsection may
contain a classified annex.
``(B) Retention of classification.--The classification of
information required to be provided to Congress, the
Department, or any other department or agency under this
section by a sector-specific agency, including the assignment
of a level of classification of such information, shall be
binding on Congress, the Department, and that other Federal
agency.''.
On page 236, after line 23, insert the following:
SEC. 1004. PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS.
Not later than 6 months after the last day of fiscal year
2007, and for each year thereafter, the Secretary, in
cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary
of Energy shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Financial Services and the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives a report that details the
actions taken by the Federal Government to ensure, in
accordance with subsections (a) and (c) of section 101 of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2071), the
preparedness of industry--
(1) to reduce interruption of critical infrastructure
operations during a terrorist attack, natural catastrophe, or
other similar national emergency; and
(2) to minimize the impact of such catastrophes, as so
described in section 1001(a)(1).
The amendment (No. 423), as modified, was agreed to, as follows:
amendment no. 423 as modified
On page 203, beginning with line 4, strike through line 5
on page 215 and insert the following:
SEC. 801. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY STRATEGIC PLANNING.
(a) In General.--Section 114(t)(1)(B) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(B) transportation modal and intermodal security plans
addressing risks, threats, and vulnerabilities for aviation,
bridge, tunnel, commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime,
pipeline, rail, mass transit, over-the-road bus, and other
public transportation infrastructure assets.''.
(b) Contents of the National Strategy for Transportation
Security.--Section 114(t)(3) of such title is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, based on risk
assessments conducted by the Secretary of Homeland Security
(including assessments conducted under section 1321 or 1403
of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007 or any
provision of law amended by such title),'' after ``risk based
priorities'';
(2) in subparagraph (D)--
(A) by striking ``and local'' and inserting ``, local, and
tribal''; and
(B) by striking ``private sector cooperation and
participation'' and inserting ``cooperation and participation
by private sector entities'';
(3) in subparagraph (E)--
(A) by striking ``response'' and inserting ``prevention,
response,''; and
(B) by inserting ``and threatened and executed acts of
terrorism outside the United States to the extent such acts
affect United States transportation systems'' before the
period at the end;
(4) in subparagraph (F), by adding at the end the
following: ``Transportation security research and development
projects shall be based, to the extent practicable, on such
prioritization. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be
construed to require the termination of any research or
development project initiated by the Secretary of Homeland
Security before the date of enactment of the Improving
America's Security Act of 2007.''; and
[[Page S3043]]
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``(G) Short- and long-term budget recommendations for
Federal transportation security programs, which reflect the
priorities of the National Strategy for Transportation
Security.
``(H) Methods for linking the individual transportation
modal security plans and the programs contained therein, and
a plan for addressing the security needs of intermodal
transportation hubs.
``(I) Transportation security modal and intermodal plans,
including operational recovery plans to expedite, to the
maximum extent practicable, the return to operation of an
adversely affected transportation system following a major
terrorist attack on that system or another catastrophe. These
plans shall be coordinated with the resumption of trade
protocols required under section 202 of the SAFE Port Act (6
U.S.C. 942).''.
(c) Periodic Progress Reports.--Section 114(t)(4) of such
title is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C)--
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ``, including the
transportation modal security plans'' before the period at
the end; and
(B) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
``(ii) Content.--Each progress report submitted under this
subparagraph shall include the following:
``(I) Recommendations for improving and implementing the
National Strategy for Transportation Security and the
transportation modal and intermodal security plans that the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation, considers appropriate.
``(II) An accounting of all grants for transportation
security, including grants for research and development,
distributed by the Secretary of Homeland Security in the most
recently concluded fiscal year and a description of how such
grants accomplished the goals of the National Strategy for
Transportation Security.
``(III) An accounting of all--
``(aa) funds requested in the President's budget submitted
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31 for the most recently
concluded fiscal year for transportation security, by mode;
and
``(bb) personnel working on transportation security by
mode, including the number of contractors.
``(iii) Written explanation of transportation security
activities not delineated in the national strategy for
transportation security.--At the end of each year, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a written explanation of
any activity inconsistent with, or not clearly delineated in,
the National Strategy for Transportation Security, including
the amount of funds to be expended for the activity and the
number of personnel involved.''; and
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``Select''.
(d) Priority Status.--Section 114(t)(5)(B) of such title is
amended--
(1) in clause (iii), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating clause (iv) as clause (v); and
(3) by inserting after clause (iii) the following:
``(iv) the transportation sector specific plan required
under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7; and''.
(e) Coordination and Plan Distribution.--Section 114(t) of
such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(6) Coordination.--In carrying out the responsibilities
under this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall
consult, as appropriate, with Federal, State, and local
agencies, tribal governments, private sector entities
(including nonprofit employee labor organizations),
institutions of higher learning, and other entities.
``(7) Plan distribution.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall make available an unclassified version of the
National Strategy for Transportation Security, including its
component transportation modal security plans, to Federal,
State, regional, local and tribal authorities, transportation
system owners or operators, private sector stakeholders
(including non-profit employee labor organizations),
institutions of higher learning, and other appropriate
entities.''.
SEC. 802. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) In General.--Section 114 of title 49, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(u) Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan.--
``(1) Establishment of plan.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the program manager of the
information sharing environment established under section
1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), the Secretary of Transportation, and
public and private stakeholders, shall establish a
Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan. In
establishing the plan, the Secretary shall gather input on
the development of the Plan from private and public
stakeholders and the program manager of the information
sharing environment established under section 1016 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6
U.S.C. 485).
``(2) Purpose of plan.--The Plan shall promote sharing of
transportation security information between the Department of
Homeland Security and public and private stakeholders.
``(3) Content of plan.--The Plan shall include--
``(A) a description of how intelligence analysts within the
Department of Homeland Security will coordinate their
activities within the Department and with other Federal,
State, and local agencies, and tribal governments, including
coordination with existing modal information sharing centers
and the center established under section 1406 of the
Improving America's Security Act of 2007;
``(B) the establishment of a point of contact, which may be
a single point of contact, for each mode of transportation
within the Department of Homeland Security for its sharing of
transportation security information with public and private
stakeholders, including an explanation and justification to
the appropriate congressional committees if the point of
contact established pursuant to this subparagraph differs
from the agency within the Department that has the primary
authority, or has been delegated such authority by the
Secretary, to regulate the security of that transportation
mode;
``(C) a reasonable deadline by which the Plan will be
implemented; and
``(D) a description of resource needs for fulfilling the
Plan.
``(4) Coordination with the information sharing
environment.--The Plan shall be--
``(A) implemented in coordination with the program manager
for the information sharing environment established under
section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); and
``(B) consistent with the establishment of that
environment, and any policies, guidelines, procedures,
instructions, or standards established by the President or
the program manager for the implementation and management of
that environment.
``(5) Reports to congress.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report
containing the Plan.
``(B) Annual report.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report
on updates to and the implementation of the Plan.
``(6) Survey.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary shall conduct a biennial
survey of the satisfaction of the recipients of
transportation intelligence reports disseminated under the
Plan, and include the results of the survey as part of the
annual report to be submitted under paragraph (5)(B).
``(B) Information sought.--The survey conducted under
subparagraph (A) shall seek information about the quality,
speed, regularity, and classification of the transportation
security information products disseminated from the
Department of Homeland Security to public and private
stakeholders.
``(7) Security clearances.--The Secretary shall, to the
greatest extent practicable, take steps to expedite the
security clearances needed for public and private
stakeholders to receive and obtain access to classified
information distributed under this section as appropriate.
``(8) Classification of material.--The Secretary, to the
greatest extent practicable, shall provide public and private
stakeholders with specific and actionable information in an
unclassified format.
``(9) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' has the meaning given
that term in subsection (t), but shall also include the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development.
``(B) Plan.--The term `Plan' means the Transportation
Security Information Sharing Plan established under paragraph
(1).
``(C) Public and private stakeholders.--The term `public
and private stakeholders' means Federal, State, and local
agencies, tribal governments, and appropriate private
entities.
``(D) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary
of Homeland Security.
``(E) Transportation security information.--The term
`transportation security information' means information
relating to the risks to transportation modes, including
aviation, bridge and tunnel, mass transit, passenger and
freight rail, ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, and over-
the-road bus transportation.''.
(b) Congressional Oversight of Security Assurance for
Public and Private Stakeholders.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
Secretary shall provide a semiannual report to the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development of the Senate and
the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives that--
(A) identifies the job titles and descriptions of the
persons with whom such information is to be shared under the
transportation security information sharing plan established
under section 114(u) of title 49, United States Code, as
added by this Act,
[[Page S3044]]
and explains the reason for sharing the information with such
persons;
(B) describes the measures the Secretary has taken, under
section 114(u)(7) of that title, or otherwise, to ensure
proper treatment and security for any classified information
to be shared with the public and private stakeholders under
the plan; and
(C) explains the reason for the denial of transportation
security information to any stakeholder who had previously
received such information.
(2) No report required if no changes in stakeholders.--The
Secretary is not required to provide a semiannual report
under paragraph (1) if no stakeholders have been added to or
removed from the group of persons with whom transportation
security information is shared under the plan since the end
of the period covered by the last preceding semiannual
report.
The amendment (No. 424), as modified, was agreed to as follows:
amendment no. 424, as modified
On page 4, strike the item relating to section 1366 and
insert the following:
Sec. 1366. In-line baggage system deployment.
On page 5, after the item relating to section 1376, insert
the following:
Sec. 1377. Law enforcement biometric credential.
Sec. 1378. Employee retention internship program.
On page 5, after the item relating to section 1384, insert
the following:
Sec. 1385. Requiring reports to be submitted to certain committees.
On page 254, line 11, strike ``Administration,'' and insert
``Administration and other agencies within the Department,''.
On page 254, line 12, insert ``Federal'' after
``appropriate''.
On page 267, line 11, strike ``through the'' and insert
``in consultation with''.
On page 267, line 19, strike ``and, through the Secretary
of Transportation, to Amtrak,'' and insert ``and to Amtrak''
On page 269, strike lines 20 through 23 and insert the
following:
(d) Conditions.--Grants awarded by the Secretary to Amtrak
under subsection (a) shall be disbursed to Amtrak through the
Secretary of Transportation. The Secretary of Transportation
may not disburse such funds unless Amtrak meets the
conditions set forth in section 1322(b) of this title.
On page 269, line 19, after the period insert ``Not later
than 240 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall provide a report to the Committees on
Commerce, Science and Transportation and Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs in the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security in the House on the feasibility and
appropriateness of requiring a non-federal match for the
grants authorized in subsection (a).''.
On page 281, beginning in line 24, strike ``terrorists.''
and insert ``terrorists, including observation and
analysis.''.
On page 286, line 7, strike the closing quotation marks and
the second period.
On page 286, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
``(f) Process for Reporting Problems.--
``(1) Establishment of reporting process.--The Secretary
shall establish, and provide information to the public
regarding, a process by which any person may submit a report
to the Secretary regarding railroad security problems,
deficiencies, or vulnerabilities.
``(2) Confidentiality.--The Secretary shall keep
confidential the identity of a person who submits a report
under paragraph (1) and any such report shall be treated as a
record containing protected information to the extent that it
does not consist of publicly available information.
``(3) Acknowledgment of receipt.--If a report submitted
under paragraph (1) identifies the person making the report,
the Secretary shall respond promptly to such person and
acknowledge receipt of the report.
``(4) Steps to address problems.--The Secretary shall
review and consider the information provided in any report
submitted under paragraph (1) and shall take appropriate
steps under this title to address any problems or
deficiencies identified.
``(5) Retaliation prohibited.--No employer may discharge
any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee
with respect to the compensation to, or terms, conditions, or
privileges of the employment of, such employee because the
employee (or a person acting pursuant to a request of the
employee) made a report under paragraph (1).''.
On page 330, beginning in line 7, strike ``paragraph (2);''
and insert ``subsection (g);''.
On page 332, strike lines 21 and 22 and insert the
following:
SEC. 1366. IN-LINE BAGGAGE SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT.
On page 337, line 5, strike ``fully implement'' and insert
``begin full implementation of''.
On page 338, strike lines 1 through 4 and insert the
following:
``(1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an
Office of Appeals and Redress to implement, coordinate, and
execute the process established by the Secretary pursuant to
subsection (a). The Office shall include representatives from
the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, and other agencies or offices as
appropriate.
On page 338, line 19, strike ``and''.
On page 339, line 3, strike ``positives.' ''. and insert
``positives; and''.
On page 339, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
``(C) require air carriers and foreign air carriers take
action to properly and automatically identify passengers
determined, under the process established under subsection
(a), to have been wrongly identified.''.
On page 339, line 21, strike ``utilizing appropriate
records in'' and insert ``as well as''.
On page 342, line 9, strike ``47135(m));'' and insert
``47134(m));''
On page 342, line 21, strike ``47135(m)).'' and insert
``47134(m)).''
On page 343, beginning in line 9, strike ``to the
Transportation Security Administration before entering United
States airspace; and'' and insert ``at the same time as, and
in conjunction with, advance notification requirements for
Customs and Border Protection before entering United States
airspace; and''.
On page 344, beginning with line 14, strike through line 12
on page 345 and insert the following:
SEC. 1376. NATIONAL EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINE TEAM TRAINING
CENTER.
(a) In General.--
(1) Increased training capacity.--Within 180 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall begin to increase the capacity of the
Department of Homeland Security's National Explosives
Detection Canine Team Program at Lackland Air Force Base to
accommodate the training of up to 200 canine teams annually
by the end of calendar year 2008.
(2) Expansion detailed requirements.--The expansion shall
include upgrading existing facilities, procurement of
additional canines, and increasing staffing and oversight
commensurate with the increased training and deployment
capabilities required by paragraph (1).
(3) Ultimate expansion.--The Secretary shall continue to
increase the training capacity and all other necessary
program expansions so that by December 31, 2009, the number
of canine teams sufficient to meet the Secretary's homeland
security mission, as determined by the Secretary on an annual
basis, may be trained at this facility.
(b) Alternative Training Centers.--Based on feasibility and
to meet the ongoing demand for quality explosives detection
canines teams, the Secretary shall explore the options of
creating the following:
(1) A standardized Transportation Security Administration
approved canine program that private sector entities could
use to provide training for additional explosives detection
canine teams. For any such program, the Secretary--
(A) may coordinate with key stakeholders, including
international, Federal, State, local, private sector and
academic entities, to develop best practice guidelines for
such a standardized program;
(B) shall require specific training criteria to which
private sector entities must adhere as a condition of
participating in the program; and
(C) shall review the status of these private sector
programs on at least an annual basis.
(2) Expansion of explosives detection canine team training
to at least 2 additional national training centers, to be
modeled after the Center of Excellence established at
Lackland Air Force Base.
(c) Deployment.--The Secretary--
(1) shall use the additional explosives detection canine
teams as part of the Department's layers of enhanced mobile
security across the Nation's transportation network and to
support other homeland security programs, as deemed
appropriate by the Secretary; and
(2) may make available explosives detection canine teams to
all modes of transportation, for areas of high risk or to
address specific threats, on an as-needed basis and as
otherwise deemed appropriate by the Secretary.
SEC. 1377. LAW ENFORCEMENT BIOMETRIC CREDENTIAL.
(a) In General.--Paragraph (6) of section 44903(h) of title
49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(6) Use of biometric technology for armed law enforcement
travel.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of the Improving America's Security Act of 2007,
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
``(i) consult with the Attorney General concerning
implementation of this paragraph;
``(ii) issue any necessary rulemaking to implement this
paragraph; and
``(iii) establishing a national registered armed law
enforcement program for law enforcement officers needing to
be armed when traveling by air.
``(B) Program requirements.--The program shall--
``(i) establish a credential or a system that incorporates
biometric technology and other applicable technologies;
``(ii) provide a flexible solution for law enforcement
officers who need to be armed when traveling by air on a
regular basis and for those who need to be armed during
temporary travel assignments;
``(iii) be coordinated with other uniform credentialing
initiatives including the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 12;
[[Page S3045]]
``(iv) be applicable for all Federal, State, local, tribal
and territorial government law enforcement agencies; and
``(v) establish a process by which the travel credential or
system may be used to verify the identity, using biometric
technology, of a Federal, State, local, tribal, or
territorial law enforcement officer seeking to carry a weapon
on board an aircraft, without unnecessarily disclosing to the
public that the individual is a law enforcement officer.
``(C) Procedures.--In establishing the program, the
Secretary shall develop procedures--
``(i) to ensure that only Federal, State, local, tribal,
and territorial government law enforcement officers with a
specific need to be armed when traveling by air are issued a
law enforcement travel credential;
``(ii) to preserve the anonymity of the armed law
enforcement officer without calling undue attention to the
individual's identity;
``(iii) to resolve failures to enroll, false matches, and
false non-matches relating to use of the law enforcement
travel credential or system; and
``(iv) to invalidate any law enforcement travel credential
or system that is lost, stolen, or no longer authorized for
use.
(b) Report.--Within 180 days after implementing the
national registered armed law enforcement program required by
section 44903(h)(6) of title 49, United States Code, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit a report to the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. If
the Secretary has not implemented the program within 180 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
issue a report to the Committee within 180 days explaining
the reasons for the failure to implement the program within
the time required by that section, and a further report
within each successive 180-day period until the program is
implemented explaining the reasons for such further delays in
implementation until the program is implemented. The
Secretary shall submit each report required by this
subsection in classified format.
SEC. 1378. EMPLOYEE RETENTION INTERNSHIP PROGRAM.
The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
(Transportation Security Administration), shall establish a
pilot program at a small hub airport, a medium hub airport,
and a large hub airport (as those terms are defined in
paragraphs (42), (31), and (29), respectively, of section
40102 of title 49, United States Code) for training students
to perform screening of passengers and property under section
44901 of title 49, United States Code. The program shall be
an internship for pre-employment training of final-year
students from public and private secondary schools located in
nearby communities. Under the program, participants shall
perform only those security responsibilities determined to be
appropriate for their age and in accordance with applicable
law and shall be compensated for training and services time
while participating in the program.
On page 361, after line 22, insert the following:
SEC. 1385. REQUIRING REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED TO CERTAIN
COMMITTEES.
(a) Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee.--The Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate shall receive the reports
required by the following provisions of law in the same
manner and to the same extent that the reports are to be
received by the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate:
(1) Section 1016(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(j)(1)).
(2) Section 121(c) of this Act.
(3) Section 2002(e)(3) of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as added by section 202 of this Act.
(4) Subsections (a) and (b)(2)(B)(ii) of section 2009 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 202 of
this Act.
(5) Section 302(d) of this Act.
(6) Section 7215(d) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 123(d)).
(7) Section 7209(b)(1)(C) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1185 note).
(8) Section 504(c) of this Act.
(9) Section 705 of this Act.
(10) Section 803(d) of this Act.
(11) Section 510(a)(7) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 320(a)(7)).
(12) Section 510(b)(7) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 320(b)(7)).
(13) Section 1002(b) of this Act.
(b) Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs.--The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate shall receive the reports required by
the following provisions of law in the same manner and to the
same extent that the reports are to be received by the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate:
(1) Section 1321(c) of this Act.
(2) Section 1323(f)(3)(A) of this Act.
(3) Section 1328 of this Act.
(4) Section 1329(d) of this Act.
(5) Section 114(v)(4)(A)(i) of title 49, United States
Code.
(6) Section 1341(a)(7) of this Act.
(7) Section 1341(b)(2) of this Act.
(8) Section 1345 of this Act.
(9) Section 1346(f) of this Act.
(10) Section 1347(f)(1) of this Act.
(11) Section 1348(d)(1) of this Act.
(12) Section 1366(b)(3) of this Act.
(13) Section 1372(b) of this Act.
(14) Section 1375 of this Act.
(15) Section 3006(i) of the Digital Television Transition
and Public Safety Act of 2005 (47 U.S.C. 309 note).
(16) Section 1381(c) of this Act.
(17) Subsections (a) and (b) of section 1383 of this Act.
The amendment (No. 358), as modified, was agreed to as follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 358, as modified
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. PILOT PROJECT TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY OFFICERS AT AIRPORT EXIT LANES.
(a) In General.--The Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration (referred to in this section as the
``Administrator'') shall conduct a pilot program to identify
technological solutions for reducing the number of
Transportation Security Administration employees at airport
exit lanes.
(b) Program Components.--In conducting the pilot program
under this section, the Administrator shall--
(1) utilize different technologies that protect the
integrity of the airport exit lanes from unauthorized entry;
and
(2) work with airport officials to deploy such technologies
in multiple configurations at a selected airport or airports
at which some of the exits are not co-located with a
screening checkpoint.
(c) Reports.--
(1) Initial briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall conduct a
briefing to the congressional committees set forth in
paragraph (3) that describes--
(A) the airports selected to participate in the pilot
program;
(B) the potential savings from implementing the
technologies at selected airport exits;
(C) the types of configurations expected to be deployed at
such airports; and
(D) the expected financial contribution from each airport.
(2) Final report.--Not later than 1 year after the
technologies are deployed at the airports participating in
the pilot program, the Administrator shall submit a final
report to the congressional committees described in paragraph
(3) that describes--
(A) the security measures deployed;
(B) the projected cost savings; and
(C) the efficacy of the program and its applicability to
other airports in the United States.
(3) Congressional committees.--The reports required under
this subsection shall be submitted to--
(A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives; and
(E) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(d) Use of Existing Funds.--Provisions contained within
this section will be executed using existing funds.
The amendment (No. 359), as modified, was agreed to as follows:
amendment no. 359, as modified
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. __. DHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON HIGHWAY WATCH GRANT
PROGRAM.
Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security
shall submit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs on the Trucking Security
Grant Program for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 that--
(1) addresses the grant announcement, application, receipt,
review, award, monitoring, and closeout processes; and
(2) states the amount obligated or expended under the
program for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 for--
(A) infrastructure protection;
(B) training;
(C) equipment;
(D) educational materials;
(E) program administration;
(E) marketing; and
(F) other functions.
The amendment (No. 371), as modified, was agreed to as follows:
amendment no. 371, as modified, to amendment no. 275
On page 370, line 10, after ``workers'', insert ``the
elderly''.
Amendments Nos. 321 and 336, Withdrawn
Amendment No. 367, as Further Modified
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I now ask unanimous consent that
amendments Nos. 321 and 336 be withdrawn and that amendment No. 367 be
further modified with the changes at the desk and that the amendment be
considered and agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the
table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 367), as further modified, was agreed to as
follows:
[[Page S3046]]
On page 303, strike line 12 and all that follows through
page 305, line 18, and insert the following:
of Transportation, shall develop a program to facilitate the
tracking of motor carrier shipments of high hazard materials,
as defined in this title, and to equip vehicles used in such
shipments with technology that provides--
(A) frequent or continuous communications;
(B) vehicle position location and tracking capabilities;
and
(C) a feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to
broadcast an emergency message.
(2) Considerations.--In developing the program required by
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall--
(A) consult with the Secretary of Transportation to
coordinate the program with any ongoing or planned efforts
for motor carrier or high hazardous materials tracking at the
Department of Transportation;
(B) take into consideration the recommendations and
findings of the report on the Hazardous Material Safety and
Security Operation Field Test released by the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration on November 11, 2004; and
(C) evaluate--
(i) any new information related to the costs and benefits
of deploying, equipping, and utilizing tracking technology,
including portable tracking technology, for motor carriers
transporting high hazard materials not included in the
Hazardous Material Safety and Security Operation Field Test
Report released by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration on November 11, 2004;
(ii) the ability of tracking technology to resist tampering
and disabling;
(iii) the capability of tracking technology to collect,
display, and store information regarding the movement of
shipments of high hazard materials by commercial motor
vehicles;
(iv) the appropriate range of contact intervals between the
tracking technology and a commercial motor vehicle
transporting high hazard materials;
(v) technology that allows the installation by a motor
carrier of concealed and portable electronic devices on
commercial motor vehicles that can be activated by law
enforcement authorities to disable the vehicle and alert
emergency response resources to locate and recover high
hazard materials in the event of loss or theft of such
materials; and
(vi) whether installation of the technology described in
clause (v) should be incorporated into the program under
paragraph (1);
(vii) the cost, benefit, and practicality of such
technology described in (v) in the context of the overall
benefit to national security, including commerce in
transportation; and
(viii) other systems the secretary determined appropriate.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, through the
Transportation Security Administration, shall promulgate
regulations to carry out the provisions of subsection (a).
(c) Funding.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary to carry out this section, $7,000,000 for each
of fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, of which--
(1) $3,000,000 per year may be used for equipment; and
(2) $1,000,000 per year may be used for operations.
(d) Report.--Within 1 year after the issuance of
regulations under subsection (b), the Secretary shall issue a
report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Homeland
Security on the program developed and evaluation carried out
under this section.
(e) Limitation.--The Secretary may not mandate the
installation or utilization of the technology described under
(a)(2)(C)(v) without additional congressional action on that
matter.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I now ask unanimous consent that
following adoption of the substitute amendment and the bill has been
read a third time, there then be 20 minutes for debate prior to the
vote on passage of the bill, and that each of the following be afforded
5 minutes: Senators Collins, Lieberman, McConnell, and Reid.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Ms. COLLINS. Reserving the right to object, I may have missed the
complete unanimous-consent request because I did not have that final
page of the agreement. Will the Senator inform me whether there is a
vote ordered on the Biden amendment.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, Madam President. I thank my friend from Maine. I
am sorry she didn't get this page. What I will do after this unanimous-
consent request, hopefully, is agreed to, setting 20 minutes of debate
and final passage, is to ask what the pending business is, which is the
Biden amendment, and then I will urge action on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Ms. COLLINS. I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 383
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, what is the pending amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 383 offered by Senator Biden.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I move to table the Biden amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. First, is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I move to table the Biden amendment,
and I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second on the motion to
table?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the
roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
Johnson) is necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the Senator
from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 73, nays 25, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 72 Leg.]
YEAS--73
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Baucus
Bennett
Bingaman
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burr
Cantwell
Cardin
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Ensign
Enzi
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Isakson
Kyl
Landrieu
Leahy
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McConnell
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Tester
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Webb
Wyden
NAYS--25
Bayh
Biden
Boxer
Brown
Byrd
Carper
Casey
Dodd
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
McCaskill
Menendez
Obama
Reed
Reid
Specter
Whitehouse
NOT VOTING--2
Johnson
McCain
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I
move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the substitute amendment,
as amended, is agreed to.
The substitute amendment (No. 275), as amended, was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read
the third time.
Implemented Recommendation
Mr. BAUCUS. Madam President, I note that the underlying legislation
contains a sense of the Senate resolution that the Senate should
implement the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to ``create a
single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland
security.'' This provision was added during committee markup by the
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. I would ask my
colleague, hasn't the Senate already implemented this recommendation?
Mr. GRASSLEY. Indeed, we have. Near the end of the 108th Congress we
passed S. Res. 445, which created the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs as the principal point of oversight and review
for homeland security in the Senate.
Mr. BAUCUS. I appreciate the Senator's recollection. S. Res. 445
established the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs. It also provided that the newly established committee would
have referral and oversight of all matters relating to the Department
of Homeland Security, with certain exceptions. One of those exceptions
was with respect to functional oversight of customs revenue or
commercial functions performed by any personnel of the Department of
Homeland Security. Does the Senator recall the basis for that
exception?
[[Page S3047]]
Mr. GRASSLEY. Indeed, I do. This is an issue that goes back to the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security and passage of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Finance Committee held a hearing in
July 2002, followed by a letter to the chairman and ranking member of
the Governmental Affairs Committee. We stressed the importance of
preserving the revenue collection and trade facilitation functions of
the U.S. Customs Service, even as that agency moved into the Department
of Homeland Security with an added national security focus.
Mr. BAUCUS. I appreciate the Senator's recollection of our efforts on
this issue. I would add that following that hearing and our letter, we
worked closely with the Committee on Governmental Affairs to develop
text that would keep intact the commercial functions of the Customs
Service. Under the final legislation, authorities vested in the
Secretary of the Treasury relating to customs revenue functions
remained with the Secretary of the Treasury unless delegated to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. By order of the Secretary, dated May
15, 2003, Treasury Order 100-16, the Secretary of the Treasury
delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security general authority over
customs revenue functions, subject to certain exceptions that preserved
Treasury's oversight of the Customs Service with respect to policy
matters and the authority to issue regulations and determinations. That
delegation of authority remains in place to this day.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes. And I believe we can both agree that our efforts
were successful in preserving the revenue functions, commercial
functions, and commercial operations of the Customs Service within the
Department of Homeland Security, including oversight of those functions
and commercial operations within the Committee on Finance.
Mr. BAUCUS. I concur entirely. And those efforts served as the
context for the retention of Finance Committee oversight of customs
revenue functions and commercial operations in S. Res. 445. The Finance
Committee has exercised oversight of those functions for almost 200
years, and we as a nation continue to benefit from that accumulated
expertise.
Mr. GRASSLEY. That is right. In fact, we can point to the enactment
of the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006,
otherwise known as the SAFE Port Act, as an example of that.
Mr. BAUCUS. I agree. The SAFE Port Act demonstrated that the Finance
Committee and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
together with the Commerce Committee, could work together to enact
strong legislation to secure our borders and protect the trade-based
economic security of our country. That legislation is strong precisely
because it was the product of the Finance Committee's focus on customs
functions and commercial operations, coupled with the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee's focus on border security and the
Commerce Committee's expertise relating to our Nation's seaports.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Indeed. The enactment of that legislation demonstrates
that the retention of Finance Committee jurisdiction over customs
revenue functions and commercial operations does not in any way
diminish the effective oversight of other functions within the
Department of Homeland Security by the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, nor does it detract from the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee as the principal point of
oversight and review for homeland security matters in the U.S. Senate.
In fact, by drawing on the focus and expertise of both committees, we
improve overall Senate oversight of the homeland security interests and
economic security interests of the United States.
Mr. BAUCUS. I agree entirely. Consequently, I must note for the
record that I don't see any need to include the sense of the Senate
resolution that has been added to the underlying legislation by the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Mr. GRASSLEY. I agree with my colleague and note the same. However,
since it is merely a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, and is not binding
in any way, I think it is sufficient to note our objections for the
record at this time. The provision is not worth objecting to any more
than that. We have already established a principal point of oversight
and review for homeland security in the U.S. Senate. The current
balance reflected in S. Res. 445 has been proven to work and need not
be disturbed.
Mr. BAUCUS. I agree.
cargo security on passenger planes
Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, I am pleased that in this new Congress,
we are able to take up and pass a bill that implements the 9/11
Commission recommendations. Even though aviation security has improved
greatly in the last 5 years, there are still holes in the system--as we
discovered last summer with the aviation terrorist plot uncovered by
the British authorities. Therefore, implementing these recommendations
is crucial.
Mr. INOUYE. I agree with the Senator from California that
implementing these recommendations is crucial to continuing to increase
aviation security, to prevent our Nation from experiencing a tragedy
like 9/11 again.
Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, one hole in aviation security is the
cargo that is carried on passenger planes. The bill does strengthen
security for cargo on passenger planes. First, the bill requires
screening of all of the cargo going on passenger aircraft. Second, the
bill requires the Transportation Security Administration to implement a
program--either random or risked-based--to place blast-resistant
containers on passenger planes. However, the program does not implement
the 9/11 Commission recommendation to require one blast-resistant cargo
container on every plane.
The 9/11 Commission recommended, ``TSA should require that every
passenger aircraft carrying cargo deploy at least one hardened
container to carry any suspect cargo.'' Therefore, all passenger planes
should have at least one blast-resistant container for cargo.
Mr. INOUYE. I expect that TSA would examine this recommendation when
developing a plan to deploy blast-resistant cargo containers on
airplanes.
Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator for his support. We owe this to the
American people. We cannot allow terrorists to exploit holes in our
aviation security system.
oversight
Mr. INOUYE. Madam Pesident, the expertise exhibited under the
Commerce Committee's jurisdiction is reflected in the substitute
amendment to S. 4, before us today, which incorporates three Commerce
Committee reported bills: S. 184, the Surface Transportation and Rail
Security Act of 2007; S. 509, the Aviation Security Improvement Act;
and S. 385, the Interoperable Emergency Communications Act. Prior to
the reorgnization of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committees, HSGAC, and thereafter, the Commerce Committee's
jurisdiction under the Senate rules over all aspects of transportation
safety and security issues encompassing maritime, Coast Guard,
aviation, rail, pipeline, and trucking, and telecommunications matters,
remain untouched.
Some unfairly claim that problems we are having improving our
national security result from an outdated committee system. I
respectfully disagree. This claim is simply a sound bite that ignores
the truth and short changes the potential for real solutions. The real
problem is the result of creating a new department from scratch by
merging 22 Federal agencies with varying missions, without any true
realignment for non-security related missions, into one mammoth Federal
department and then refusing to fully fund the necessary initiatives.
I am surprised that a few of my colleagues would suggest that through
oversight through several committees of the Department, its Agencies,
and the $34.8 billion in programs weakens DHS. To the contrary, using
the several committees, each with its own significant expertise,
actually improves the quality and scope of congressional oversight, and
therefore, the effectiveness and accountability of the Department
itself. It is the failure to conduct agency oversight that causes the
most harm, as we have seen at DHS over the past few years. Well
coordinated and responsible engagement with DHS by
[[Page S3048]]
committees will only further the Senate's oversight responsibilities
for and the public's understanding of the critical work now being done
by the Department and of the numerous challenges that remain.
S. Res. 445 embraced that approach, and S. 4 which will pass the
Senate today demonstrates the success of that approach. In fact, the
SAFE Ports Act, Public Law 109-347, and S. 4 are a reflection of the
positive progress Congress can make when committees work together in
our respective fields of expertise to conduct oversight and craft
legislation to address identified vulnerabilities.
Mr. STEVENS. I concur with my chairman, Senator Inouye. The Commerce
Committee has worked for over a decade to improve transportation
security and has had to deal with the inertia of the Federal Government
as well as fight entrenched interests to change the way we secure our
transportation system. As far back as 1996 we began discussing the
security advantages of transferring security functions from the airline
industry to the Federal Government. Similarly, we initiated action on
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 prior to 9/11 in order
to address a broad range of criminal activity at our ports. The attacks
of 9/11 created sufficient public pressure for Congress to
fundamentally change the way the Federal Government secures our
aviation system and ports.
In particular, Aviation and Transportation Security Act, ATSA, Public
Law 107-71, established the Transportation Security Administration,
TSA, within the Department of Transportation to be ``responsible for
security in all modes of transportation, including: carrying out
chapter 449, relating to civil aviation security, and related research
and development activities; and security responsibilities over other
modes of transportation that are exercised by the Department of
Transportation.''
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, and the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, HSGAC, did
not alter TSA's authority or the Commerce Committee's subject matter
jurisdiction. The Senate engaged in a healthy debate on the floor and
made clear that the authority being transferred to the HSGAC under S.
Res. 445 did not affect the Commerce Committee's jurisdictional
authority over transportation security programs, the Coast Guard and
communications matters conducted through the Federal Communications
Commission, FCC, and the Department of Commerce. In large part, the
debate focused on the difficulty of separating transportation safety
issues from transportation security issues. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to separate safety and security issues from general
transportation policy. To consider security without understanding the
impacts of the safety and market position of a mode of transportation
could lead to unrealistic, contradictory, and counterproductive
policies. Those tasked with the responsibilities of securing our
transportation system need to understand the complexity of the systems
operations from safety standards to market place realities. The two
cannot be separated and the Senate vote effectively affirmed those
arguments.
Mr. INOUYE. I agree. Without such context, security decisions will be
made in a vacuum that, at best, might produce misguided or extraneous
efforts, and, at worst, could cripple the transportation modes that
ensure the free flow of commerce and travel that our Nation has been
built upon. The Commerce Committee has passed three of the most
significant transportation security bills considered since 9/11 and has
been successful because of its understanding of the industry and past
work on safety and security issues. The distinguished majority leader
and Senator McConnell recognized this when crafting S. Res 445 and the
Senate approved.
Mr. REID. My colleagues from the Senate Commerce Committee are
correct. S. Res. 445, as introduced by me and Senator McConnell and as
passed by the Senate, proposed continued oversight of transportation
security by the Commerce Committee.
Mr. INOUYE. The Department consists of 22 separate agencies. These
agencies are responsible for everything from international trade to
animal health inspection. It would be unwise for the Senate to suggest
that a single committee should manage oversight of those 22 agencies
and each of their multiple missions just because the Secretary does not
like to travel to the Hill and testify. The Senate cannot abdicated its
oversight responsibilities because the Department thinks it takes up
too much time.
And so, I respectfully but deeply disagree with the nonbinding
measure in the underlying bill suggesting that this Senate should
neglect its oversight duty--and put aside much of its long-standing
expertise--because the Department is too busy to come tell us what they
are doing. While I and many of my colleagues discussed striking this
provision from the underlying bill, the majority leader noted that it
was simply the work product of one committee. I would like to ask the
majority leader if it is intention to continue to operate under S. Res.
445 given the recent success of legislation like Public Law 109-347 and
S. 4.
Mr. REID. The Senator is correct. S. Res. 445 determines Senate
oversight and jurisdictional authorities.
TRANSIT SECURITY
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I thank the majority leader for this
colloquy and for his work with the chairmen and ranking members of many
of the committees who have been involved in putting together the
legislation to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
The Banking Committee took this task very seriously. I am pleased to
report that the committee unanimously reported S. 763, the Public
Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, which has been
incorporated into the 9/11 legislation as title XIV. Transit security
has long been a focus of the Banking Committee, where we have held
several hearings and reported similar legislation in each of the last
two Congresses. While the Banking Committee's previous legislation also
passed the Senate, once as a freestanding bill and as title VII of the
SAFE Port Act, it has yet to become law. I will continue to work very
closely with Senator Shelby, who was a leader on this issue as chairman
of the Banking Committee, to work through the conference process with
our counterparts in the House of Representatives to make this provision
law. I appreciate the leader's support and commitment to having the
Banking Committee continue to take responsibility on this title.
Transportation security was also addressed more broadly in title VIII
of this legislation. As title VIII called for national transportation
security and information plans, I worked very closely with my fellow
chairmen and ranking members from the Commerce Committee, Senators
Inouye and Stevens, who have jurisdiction over other modes of
transportation security besides public transportation. Together we
reached an agreement, represented in the Inouye amendment, No. 423,
between the Commerce, Banking, and Homeland Security Committees. I am
very pleased that this amendment was agreed to, and it is my intention
to continue our close working relationship on these issues throughout
the conference process.
The Banking Committee was also very engaged in other areas of the
bill that involved the committee's jurisdiction. Since 9/11, we have
worked with and overseen the Federal financial regulators as they have
implemented sophisticated preparedness requirements for the
institutions under their jurisdiction. Title VII, as proposed,
authorized the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
create another series of requirements. Although these requirements are
voluntary, Federal financial regulators and the financial services
industry have expressed concerns about the impact of these
requirements, and I share their concerns. A letter from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System staff dated March 1, 2007
explains that the ``voluntary standards [of Title VII are] not
appropriate to meet the objective of greater preparedness and
resiliency.'' The letter states that it would ``be desirable that Title
VII reflect the unique relationships that already exist within the
banking and finance sector and not impose any new requirements that
duplicate actions that have already been
[[Page S3049]]
taken by the Federal financial institutions regulators.'' The American
Bankers Association in a letter dated February 28, 2007, stated ``ABA
is concerned that this program would be redundant to and potential
conflict with the existing process by which the banking industry
develops business continuity standards, as well as with existing
business continuity regulatory requirements.'' Also, the Office of
Management and Budget issued a Statement of Administration Policy on
February 28, 2007, that stated, ``These standards may increase the
regulatory burden.''
I have proposed amendments intended to address these concerns,
working with Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins. The final
legislation will include an amendment to clarify that institutions in a
sector, such as financial services, must obey their sector regulators
and to emphasize that this program is voluntary and does not supersede
the institutions' responsibilities to maintain the high standards
required by their regulators.
Another amendment that I authored pertains to title X of the
underlying bill. I commend Senators Lieberman and Collins for their
efforts in addressing an important issue under this title--to ensure
that the Department of Homeland Security thoroughly discerns the risks
to America's critical infrastructure. As originally drafted, however, I
was concerned that the bill would not ensure that DHS adequately
consults with the Federal agencies best equipped to assess and
prioritize risks in specific sectors of the economy. From the
perspective of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, I can
tell you, for example, that no one has greater expertise or technical
resources for assessing the vulnerabilities of our financial
infrastructure than our Federal financial regulators. It is for that
reason that my amendment effectively removed language that would place
limits on the DHS' use of information from sector-specific agencies in
the formulation of their risk assessments and prioritized lists. It is
my belief that we need to encourage greater coordination between these
specialized agencies and the Department of Homeland Security, not
restrict it. This is true in areas outside of the financial services
sector. In matters of public health, DHS should consult the Department
of Health and Human Services. In manners of farming and food
development, the Department of Agriculture should be consulted. In
matters related to drinking water and water treatment systems, the
Environmental Protection Agency should be consulted. That is why my
amendment endeavors to better integrate our efforts to understand
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and hopefully develop
protections in all of these areas. In addition, my amendment ensures
that the agencies most familiar with the sensitive data shared with DHS
and Congress determine the relative classification levels of this
information. Without this provision, I am afraid someone at DHS or
elsewhere, who is unfamiliar with the sensitivities of a specific
sector of the economy, might unintentionally divulge critical
information that could be harmful to U.S. infrastructure.
Finally, although it pertains to the assessment of U.S. critical
infrastructure, title X does not include any reporting requirement on
the government's ability to ensure that U.S. industry reduces
interruption of critical infrastructure operations during a national
emergency and minimizes the impact of such a catastrophe. My amendment
requires reports to the Committees on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs as well as to Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, along
with their House committee counterparts, on compliance with subsections
(a) and (c) of section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to
meet this requirement. As chairman of the Committee with jurisdiction
over this law, it is important to me that we oversee appropriate U.S.
industrial preparedness to meet critical infrastructure needs in times
of national emergency. I appreciate the cooperation of my colleagues in
the development of all of these important provisions.
Once again, I thank the majority leader for his excellent work in
bringing all of these committees together and fashioning an excellent
bill. This demonstrates that the jurisdictional lines established in S.
Res. 445 continue to work.
Mr. REID I thank the Senator from Connecticut. The Senator is correct
that S. Res. 445 determines Senate oversight and jurisdictional
authorities, and I acknowledge the important role that the Banking
Committee has played and will continue to play on this legislation.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Madam President I rise today in opposition to this
final bill because I believe one of the provisions included will
greatly undermine our homeland security efforts. Specifically, the
provision would mandate that the Transportation Security Administration
have the ability to collectively bargain with Government unions
representing airport security screeners. This will create unnecessary
red tape and bureaucracy and tie the hands of our security personnel.
While this provision may be beneficial to the union bosses, it is not
beneficial to Georgians and the American people.
TSA must have the flexibility to respond when our security is
threatened. In this current era of unpredictable threats, TSA must be
able to continually change its systems to meet the changing security
environment. If we mandate that TSA must negotiate with the unions for
every change in circumstance, it will negate the agency's ability to
respond quickly to terrorist threats and other emergencies. I just
don't think that is common sense.
In fact, when TSA was created, the agency was given the authority to
decide whether to engage in collective bargaining with airport baggage
screeners, and TSA concluded that such negotiations would weaken its
ability to protect the American people. This authority was not
recommended in the 9/11 Commission Report.
Now let's be clear--the issue here is not whether TSA employees
should be allowed to join a union but whether TSA must collectively
bargain with Government unions before it changes personnel and
policies. At the present time, airport screeners may voluntarily join a
union and TSA will withhold union dues at an employee's request. The
union, however, has no standing to negotiate with TSA on behalf of
their members.
I would just note that this restriction is not unique to TSA. Other
Federal agencies that collect and respond to intelligence in an effort
to address homeland security, such as the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service,
all have the same restriction. This is done as an acknowledgement that
highly sensitive security information should only be released on a
need-to-know basis. Collective bargaining, conversely, would require
the release of sensitive information to external negotiators and
arbitrators, which would increase the risk of sensitive information
getting in the wrong hands.
TSA must be able to quickly shift employees based on intelligence and
airport traffic demands while modifying procedures at a moment's
notice. For example, this past August, following an attempted United
Kingdom airline bombing, TSA overhauled its procedures in less than 12
hours to prevent terrorists from smuggling liquid explosives onto any
U.S. flights. Not only did this flexibility ensure that no U.S. flights
were cancelled due to the change, most importantly, it ensured the
safety and security of the United States. This past December, during a
major snowstorm in Denver, local TSA employees were unable to get to
the airport. However, due to the current policies, TSA was able to
deploy officers from Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, and Colorado Springs to
the Denver airport. This deployment allowed TSA to open every security
lane in Denver around the clock at the airport until they were back to
normal operations. So in circumstances like these, TSA cannot spend
days, weeks, or months negotiating over officer assignments and new
schedules before implementing them.
We should remember that TSA exists to protect American lives, and its
focus must remain on homeland security and not on labor negotiations. I
am extremely concerned that the provision included in this bill will
lead to a change in culture within the agency, and I just don't think
our hard-working TSA employees gain much from this.
I am proud of our dedicated TSA employees in Georgia, and we already
have a ``pay for performance'' system in place that weeds out
nonperformers.
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The system is based upon technical competence, readiness for duty, and
operational performance. But under the proposed changes, the most
effective security employees will be punished by the change in pay
practices.
Finally, we should be concerned about what this means to passengers
and the American taxpayers. The collective bargaining system would not
reward good screening performance or customer service. Additionally,
implementing the infrastructure for collective bargaining would cost
hundreds of millions of dollars and TSA would be forced to relocate
thousands of personnel. For Georgians, fewer personnel means fewer
screening lanes and longer lines at airports like Hartsfield-Jackson
International Airport in Atlanta.
Our national security is too important to risk. It is no accident
that we have not had a terrorist attack on domestic soil since
September 11, 2001. But that is not to say that it can't happen again.
The terrorists only have to get it right once. But we have to get it
right every time. So let's not hinder our ability to do that. Our
homeland security infrastructure must be able to operate in real time.
We should not tie the very hands we rely upon to protect us here at
home. It is disappointing that this provision is included in this bill,
and I urge my colleagues to oppose final passage.
Mr. KOHL. Madam President, I rise today to discuss three proposed
amendments to S. 4, Improving America's Security by Implementing
Unfinished Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. I thank Senators
Lieberman, Collins, Dodd and Shelby for working with me and my staff on
provisions to protect seniors in the event of an emergency.
Unfortunately, two important provisions were pulled at the behest of
Republicans to limit the number of amendments offered by Democrats.
It has been almost 2 years since our Nation reeled from the tragic
and shameful images of seniors abandoned during the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Sadly, we now know that 71 percent of the people who
died were older than 60. Last year, as the ranking member of the
Special Committee on Aging, we held a hearing to examine how prepared
the Nation is to care for our seniors in the event of a national
emergency. What we learned was disheartening.
We learned that our Nation is woefully unprepared to meet the unique
needs of our seniors in the event of a terrorist attack, natural
disaster, or other emergency. Cookie cutter emergency plans are of
little use to seniors, especially those who depend on others for
assistance in their daily lives. We need specific plans, programs, and
information for all seniors facing emergencies.
That is why Senators Wyden, Coleman and I offered several amendments
to the 9/11 legislation to ensure that the Department of Homeland
Security place seniors on the forefront of its emergency planning
agenda. The first amendment, which is supported by the American Public
Health Association, is an important step towards ensuring that seniors
are protected when the next national emergency occurs.
This amendment would ensure that any recipient of a homeland security
grant, under title II, will include in its State, local, or tribal
homeland security plan the evacuation, transportation, and health care
needs of the elderly.
It would also require that the needs of the elderly are incorporated
into any preparedness exercises or trainings for emergency responders
to ensure they are adequately prepared to safeguard our seniors in the
event of an emergency.
This amendment would have sent a strong signal to States and
communities that are engaged in emergency planning that seniors must be
a priority. Unfortunately, this is one of the amendments pulled from a
manager's package of approved amendments at the last minute.
I am also pleased to be an original cosponsor of Senator Wyden's
amendment to establish a Special Needs Registry Pilot Project, which is
supported by the National Association of Area Agencies on Aging. One of
the most useful recommendations from our Aging Committee hearing last
year was to follow the lead of counties like Miami-Dade in Florida.
They have successfully set up a voluntary registry where seniors can
list where they live, their transportation limitations, their health
needs, and whether they may need help getting food and other supplies
during an emergency.
It's clear that more cities and counties could benefit from these
kinds of special needs registries. That's why this amendment would have
created a pilot project for local emergency management agencies to set
up and test these registries, allowing first responders to locate and
care for seniors before and during emergencies. It was our hope that
this pilot project would have helped spark a nationwide effort to
establish special needs registries; unfortunately this amendment was
also pulled at the last minute.
On a brighter note, I thank Chairman Dodd and Ranking Member Shelby
again for working with me and Senator Coleman to successfully include a
provision, supported by the American Public Health Association, in
title XIV that would ensure that public transportation workers are
trained to meet the evacuation needs of seniors in the event of a
crisis. This is particularly important since so many of our seniors
utilize public transportation for access to their everyday needs.
Furthermore, only public transportation has the capacity to move
millions of people and provide first responders with critical support
in major evacuations of urban areas.
This provision will go a long way to ensure that our seniors are
taken care of if we have another emergency or disaster. Unfortunately,
two crucial provisions intended to safeguard the needs of seniors were
not included in the final bill due to partisan efforts to limit
Democratic amendments. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita taught us many
painful lessons that should never be forgotten. I will not forget and I
intend to pursue legislation aimed at explicitly safeguarding the needs
of America's seniors in the event of an emergency. The time to act to
protect our seniors is now.
Mr. REED. Madam President, today the Senate will vote on a matter of
utmost importance--enacting the remaining 9/11 Commission
recommendations. Since their publication 2\1/2\ years ago, roughly half
of the recommendations have been left unaddressed, while many that have
been adopted into law have not been effectively implemented. S. 4, the
Improving America's Security Act, is a critical step to ensuring our
Nation's safety.
This bill includes an important new interoperability grant program.
Tragedies such as September 11, the Station Fire in my home State of
Rhode Island, and Hurricane Katrina have demonstrated the need for
interoperable communications equipment among first responders. More
communities require access to funding to create interoperable
communications networks, and I have long supported increasing
accessibility for interoperability grants to local and state
governments.
I am also pleased that this bill includes a transit security program
that I helped author as a member of the Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee. The committee has been well aware of the need for
this legislation since the tragic events of 9/11, spending significant
time and effort to improve our Nation's transit security system. The
Senate has passed transit security legislation in the last two
Congresses, only to have them each stall prior to enactment. While our
Nation acted quickly after 9/11 to secure airports and airplanes
against terrorists, major vulnerabilities remain in surface
transportation. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, ``opportunities to do
harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation''
as in commercial aviation. The time to act is now.
Transit is vital to providing mobility for millions of Americans and
offers tremendous economic benefits to our Nation. In the United
States, people use public transportation over 32 million times each
weekday compared to 2 million passengers who fly daily. Paradoxically,
it is the very openness of the system that makes it vulnerable to
terrorism. When one considers this and the fact that roughly $7 per
passenger is invested in aviation security, but less than one cent is
invested in the security of each transit passenger, the need for an
authorized transit security program is clear.
[[Page S3051]]
In addition, the bill provides important protections for
Transportation Security Officers at the Transportation Security
Administration that have been long absent, including whistleblower
protections, the right to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board,
and certain collective bargaining rights.
Lastly, while Providence is now 1 of 39 urban areas eligible for the
Urban Area Security Initiative grants, something that I have long
sought, believing the city faces risks from terrorism, I was
disappointed that Senator Leahy's amendment to restore the minimum
allocation to 0.75 percent for States under the State Homeland Security
Grant Program failed. With this funding, Rhode Island has been able to
make critical improvements, but adequate funding is still needed, and
it is my hope that the highest minimum funding level will prevail in
conference with the House of Representatives.
Implementing the final recommendations of the 9/11 Commission builds
and improves on the work that has been done since the attacks of
September 11, and I am pleased to support this bill.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I want to add my thoughts to the
debate on the Improving America's Security Act of 2007.
First, I preface my remarks by applauding the chairman and ranking
member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee for
their work on this important bill. This bill makes crucial and long
overdue improvements in transportation security, critical
infrastructure protection, and emergency response capabilities. There
is no higher priority than protecting homeland security, and this bill
is a key component in that effort.
Nearly 6 years since the horrific attacks of September 11, we are
still struggling to give our first responders, law enforcement
officers, and the employees of the Department of Homeland Security the
resources they need to keep us safe. I thank these brave men and women
who work daily to protect this Nation. They are on the front lines of
the fight against terrorism. They are the ones who are called on to
stop and respond to any future attack upon our Nation. This bill
includes important resources these brave men and women need to perform
their critical tasks.
I am pleased that the Senate has increased funding for State homeland
security grants, emergency management performance grants, emergency
communications and the Urban Area Security Initiative. I have long
advocated for greater funding of emergency management grants because
they are crucial in assisting State and local officials in preparing
for all-hazards emergencies. These grants provide emergency managers
with the resources they need to increase coordination and planning so
that if an emergency occurs, State and local officials will respond
much more efficiently and effectively.
It is my hope that this bill represents a lasting shift in
priorities, a shift towards an enhanced focus on the most pressing
threats facing our country. We are still spending almost twice as much
on Iraq as is allocated for homeland security, diplomacy, and
international assistance combined. The billions we spend each month in
Iraq could be invested in the protection of critical infrastructure and
our system of national preparedness and response that failed in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina. As we consider the budget resolution and the
defense and homeland security appropriations bills this year, I
encourage my colleagues to take a broader view when it comes to our
national security priorities and make the tradeoffs that must be made.
I am particularly pleased that the Federal Agency Data Mining
Reporting Act is included in this bill as section 504. I have been
working on this legislation for a number of years with Senator Sununu,
Senator Leahy, and Senator Akaka. I am glad that Senator Sununu and
Senator Akaka successfully offered the legislation as an amendment to
S. 4 when it was before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee.
Many law-abiding Americans are understandably concerned about the
specter of secret government programs analyzing vast quantities of
public and private data about their pursuits, in search of patterns of
suspicious activity. Four years after we first learned about the
Defense Department's program called Total Information Awareness, there
is still much Congress does not know about the Federal Government's
work on data mining. This bill is an important step in allowing
Congress to conduct oversight of any such programs or related research
development efforts.
The Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act would require Federal
agencies to report annually on their development and use of data mining
technologies to discover predictive or anomalous patterns indicating
criminal or terrorist activity the types of pattern-based data analysis
that raise the most serious privacy concerns. As amended on the floor,
it would also allow classified information, law enforcement sensitive
information, trade secrets, and proprietary business information to be
provided to the relevant committees separately, in a nonpublic form,
under appropriate security measures.
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies would not be doing their
job if they did not take advantage of new technologies. But when it
comes to pattern-based data mining, Congress needs to understand
whether it can be effective in identifying terrorists, and Congress
needs to consider the privacy and civil liberties implications of
deploying such technology domestically. I hope these reports will help
Congress--and to the extent possible, the public--finally understand
what is going on behind the closed doors of the executive branch, so
that we can start to have the policy discussion about data mining that
is long overdue.
I am concerned about the ongoing development of the Information
Sharing Environment without adequate privacy and civil liberties
guidelines. In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, Congress mandated that the President create an Information
Sharing Environment, ISE, for the sharing of terrorism information
among Federal agencies, State and local governments, and the private
sector. This is a critical goal in our counterterrorism efforts. But
that legislation also required that the President issue privacy
guidelines for the ISE, in recognition of the serious privacy and civil
liberties implications of facilitating more sharing of information
among these entities. Those privacy guidelines were issued in December,
but in my view are wholly inadequate. They touch on the most
significant privacy issues and provide a framework for agencies to
think about the privacy issues that might arise, but they do not
include specific guidelines and rules for protecting privacy. That is
why I filed an amendment to S. 4 that would have provided more
direction to the ISE program manager about what should be included in
these privacy guidelines and the need for more specific government-wide
rules for the ISE. I was disappointed that my amendment was not
included, but will continue to work to ensure that the guidelines for
implementation of the ISE are sufficient to protect the privacy of
Americans.
The bill mandates the declassification of the aggregate amount of the
intelligence budget. This reform has a long history going back to the
Church and Pike Commissions. It is supported by the current Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence. It was also one of the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which stated that ``when even
aggregate categorical numbers remain hidden it is hard to judge
priorities and foster accountability.'' I concur with the Commission,
that aggregate budget figures ``provid[e] little insight into U.S.
intelligence sources and methods.'' Sharing this information with the
American people will, however, provide a greater level of transparency
and accountability and in the end make us more secure.
I was pleased to support Senator McCaskill's amendment to ensure that
workers at the Transportation Security Administration are afforded the
same workplace protections as other DHS employees. The low retention
rate at TSA resulting in part from lack of workers' rights threatens
our security. This amendment will address this concern while giving
administrators the flexibility they need to respond to imminent
threats.
I am pleased that this bill includes provisions to ensure proper
oversight of homeland security grants. I am deeply troubled by reports
of improper
[[Page S3052]]
oversight of expenditures at DHS, including an article in the
Washington Post last November stating that the Department was unable to
locate one-third of the files needed to perform an audit of its
contracts. I therefore supported Senator Coburn's amendment to require
DHS to perform audits on homeland security grants. While I understand
concerns that this requirement could have led to delays in the issuance
of grants in fiscal year 2008, I did not think it was unreasonable to
require DHS to conduct the audits required in a timely manner. I will
continue to work with my colleagues to improve oversight of homeland
security funding.
I supported several amendments that would have added funding for
critical security needs not fully addressed in this bill. I do not take
lightly a decision to vote in favor of spending more money. Fiscal
responsibility is one of my highest priorities, but it is imperative
that we provide the resources needed to combat terrorism.
I voted for this bill because it makes key changes to address
security needs. However, our Nation's vulnerabilities demand more and I
will continue to work to ensure that our vital homeland security needs
are met.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I support the Improving America's
Security Act of 2007 because it takes a giant step in implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Keeping America safe requires
more than expensive weapons and war funding; it also requires a
commitment to homeland security. This legislation shows that
commitment.
We learned on September 11 and during Hurricane Katrina how important
it is for our first responders to be able to communicate with each
other. For years, I have been urging the Department of Homeland
Security to establish a dedicated funding source for interoperable
communications equipment. I am pleased that this legislation creates a
grant program dedicated to improving operability and interoperability
at local, regional, State and Federal levels.
I am also pleased that this legislation moves us closer to the
equitable distribution of homeland security grant funding. For 5 years,
the largest homeland security grant programs have distributed funds
using a formula that arbitrarily sets aside a large portion of funds to
be divided equally among the States, regardless of size or need. The
current ``small State formula'' has severely disadvantaged States such
as Michigan with high populations. In addition, it reduces the amount
of funding that can be allocated to States with highest risks. Although
I am disappointed that the Senate failed to pass two amendments that I
supported that would have lowered the minimum funding level even
further, the .45 percent minimum in the underlying bill is an
improvement from the current .75 percent base funding amount.
The legislation also includes language that I authored that directs
the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish international border
community interoperable communications demonstration projects on the
northern and southern borders to improve collaboration and help
identify common frequencies for cross border communications. These
interoperable communications demonstration projects will address the
interoperable communications needs of police officers, firefighters,
emergency medical technicians, National Guard, and other emergency
response providers at our borders by identifying common international
cross-border frequencies for communications equipment; fostering the
standardization of interoperable communications equipment; identifying
solutions that will expeditiously facilitate communications
interoperability across national borders; ensuring that emergency
response providers can communicate with one another and the public at
disaster sites or in the event of a terrorist attack or other
catastrophic event; and providing training and equipment for relevant
personnel to enable those units to deal with threats and contingencies
in a variety of environments.
Also included in the legislation is language that I authored that
will require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, WHTI,
before publishing the final rule. The WHTI will require individuals
from the United States, Canada, and Mexico to present a passport or
other document proving citizenship before entering the United States.
Although we all share the goals of the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative to make our borders as secure as they can be, we need to
make sure that we are achieving that goal in a way that will not cause
economic harm to our States. I am also pleased that language was
included in the bill that I worked with Senator Coleman on to require
the Department of Homeland Security to sign a memorandum of
understanding with one or more States to conduct a pilot project to see
whether secure driver's licenses could be used as a form of
documentation for travel between the U.S. and Canada under the WHTI.
The amendment also provides that DHS must evaluate the pilot project
and map out next steps, including an expansion if appropriate.
This legislation also takes important steps to shore up rail, transit
and cargo security in the United States. The legislation establishes a
grant fund for system wide Amtrak security improvements and much needed
infrastructure upgrades as well as authorizes an existing grant program
for improving intercity bus and bus terminal security. It establishes a
grant program for freight and passenger rail security upgrades and
requires railroads shipping high-hazard materials to create threat
mitigation plans. It authorizes studies to find ways to improve
passenger and baggage security screening on passenger rail service
between the U.S. and Canada. The bill will hopefully move us closer to
addressing something I have been trying to get implemented at our
northern car and truck border crossings for years: establishing a
preclearance system. The study is required to identify what exactly is
needed to perform prescreening of rail passengers on the northern
border.
I am pleased that the Senate retained language that will require that
TSA screeners finally come under an unambiguous personnel system. A
further amendment that I supported will finally give Transportation
Security Administration screeners the whistleblower protections
afforded to most other Federal workers, including law enforcement
officers. It also gives them the right to appeal suspensions and to
collectively bargain, just like their counterparts in the Border
Control, FEMA and the Capitol Police.
The bill also requires studies on how to improve the safety of
transporting radioactive and hazardous materials and shipments of
explosives and radioactive materials on our highways. I am pleased that
this legislation requires the screening of all cargo carried on
passenger airplanes within 3 years.
The intelligence failures before the Iraq war were, to a significant
degree, the result of the CIA shaping intelligence to support
administration policy. The CIA's errors were all in one direction,
making the Iraqi threat clearer, sharper and more imminent, thereby
promoting the decision to remove Saddam from power. Nuances,
qualifications and caveats were dropped. ``Slam dunk'' was the
assessment.
Among the most important things we can do to keep this from happening
again is to strengthen congressional oversight to ensure that
intelligence community assessments are objective and uninfluenced by
the policy judgments of whatever administration is in power. The 9/11
Commission agreed, stating in its report that ``Of all our
recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the
most difficult and important.'' Section 1102 of S. 4 bill is directed
at that goal.
Too often Congress is stonewalled or slow-walked by the executive
branch in accessing intelligence information necessary to make policy
and conduct oversight of the intelligence community. Section 1102 of
this bill adds a new section 508 to the National Security Act that will
ensure Congress has access to intelligence information critical to do
its job.
Section 508 requires elements of the intelligence community to
provide, upon request from congressional committees of jurisdiction,
timely access to intelligence information. The requirement would apply
unless the President certified that the requested documents were not
being provided because the President was asserting a constitutional
privilege. Requiring the
[[Page S3053]]
intelligence community to respond to requests for information from the
vice chairman and ranking member of the Senate and House intelligence
committees, respectively, will encourage rigorous oversight regardless
of which party controls the Congress.
In addition to providing information in a timely manner, we expect
the intelligence community to provide Congress its assessment of
intelligence matters uninfluenced by the policy goals of the
administration. However, an Office of Management and Budget--OMB--
memorandum directs executive branch agencies to clear, through OMB,
legislative proposals, agency reports, and testimony on pending
legislation. The memo also states that ``If agencies are asked by
Congressional Committees to report or testify on pending legislation or
wish to volunteer a report, similar clearance procedures are
followed.''
Our intelligence agencies should not have to get permission from the
OMB, or any other executive branch official to share their views with
the Congress. Section 1102 of the bill adds a new section 508 (d) to
the National Security Act that says no executive branch official can
require the intelligence community to get permission to testify or to
submit testimony, legislative recommendations or comments to the
Congress. Section 508 (d) is based on authority that exists for
numerous other executive branch agencies, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Housing
Finance Board, and the National Credit Union Administration.
A CRS legal review of direct reporting requirements like the one
created by section 508 (d) states that ``direct reporting provisions
are well within the Congress's constitutional authority to inform
itself in order to perform its legislative function which has been
consistently acknowledged by Supreme Court decisions, and dates back to
the early enactments of the First Congress in 1789.'' The CRS review
calls Department of Justice objections to direct reporting requirements
``without substantial merit.''
Finally, it is important for whistleblowers to know that they can
come directly to Congress if they have evidence that someone has made a
false statement to the Congress. And the Congress has a right to that
information--even if it is classified.
Section 1102 of the bill adds a new section 509 to the National
Security Act making it clear that intelligence community employees and
contractors can report classified information directly to appropriate
Members of Congress and cleared staff if the employee reasonably
believes that the information provides direct and specific evidence of
a false or inaccurate statement to Congress contained in an
intelligence assessment, report or estimate.
Section 509 is substantively the same as section 225 of the Senate-
passed version of the intelligence reform legislation. Section 225 was
stripped from the intelligence reform bill in conference. Section 509
is also similar to a provision that passed the Senate twice previously.
Once as part of the fiscal year 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act and
once as a stand alone measure S. 1668, in the 105th Congress. S. 1668
passed the Senate 93-1.
Section 509 is also consistent with congressional findings passed in
the 105th Congress as part of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1998 and incorporated by reference into the
intelligence reform bill. Those findings state among other things that:
Congress, as a co-equal branch of Government, is empowered
by the Constitution to serve as a check on the executive
branch; in that capacity, it has a ``need to know'' of
allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch,
including allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence
Community; . . .
(N)o basis in law exists for requiring prior authorization
of disclosures to the intelligence committees of Congress by
employees of the executive branch of classified information
about wrongdoing within the Intelligence Community . . .
I am pleased that the Senate will soon pass this legislation, for the
families and friends of those we lost on September 11, 2001, and for
the safety and security of our Nation.
Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I will vote today in favor of final
passage of the Improving America's Security by Implementing Unfinished
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, S. 4, but I do so
with a heavy heart.
I am truly disappointed that the chairman and ranking member of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Senators
Lieberman and Collins, decided to arbitrarily lower the minimum
allocation for States under the State Homeland Security Grant Program
and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program from the 0.75
percent that has existed for the past 5 years to 0.45 percent. Not only
would this change to the formula result in the loss of millions in
homeland security funding for the fire, police, and rescue departments
in small- and medium-sized States, like Vermont, Connecticut, and
Maine, it also would deal a crippling blow to their efforts to launch
federally mandated multiyear plans to build and sustain their terrorism
preparedness.
During the Senate floor debate on S. 4, I offered with Senators
Thomas, Stevens, Roberts, Pryor, Sanders, Enzi, Hatch, Whitehouse, and
Lincoln an amendment to restore the minimum allocation for States under
the State Homeland Security Grant Program from 0.45 percent, which is
proposed by the underlying bill, to 0.75 percent, which is current law.
As with current law, the State minimum under our amendment would have
continued to apply only to 40 percent of the overall funding under this
program. The majority of the funds would continue to be allocated based
on risk assessment criteria, as are the funds under the several
separate discretionary programs that Congress has established for
solely urban and high-risk areas, which also are governed by risk
assessment calculations.
Unfortunately, this amendment lost by a vote of 49 yeas to 50 nays.
This is a marked change from just last year, when the 0.75 percent
minimum allocation was overwhelmingly defended when 64 Senators voted
against an amendment that would have lowered the minimum to 0.25
percent. Fifteen Senators changed their votes from last year, including
HSGAC Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, whose States stand
to lose the most from the decreased minimum.
The bill that passed the Senate today would reduce the all-State
minimum for SHSGP and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
to 0.45 percent. The House bill reduces it even further to 0.25
percent. Due to the formula differences, there is no guarantee that the
minimum will not be even further reduced during conference
negotiations. Small- and medium-sized States face the loss of millions
of dollars for our first responders if the minimum is lowered.
By reducing the all-State minimum to 0.45 percent, the underlying
bill would reduce the guaranteed dollar amount for each State by 40
percent. With appropriations for formula grants having been cut by 60
percent since 2003--from $2.3 billion in 2003, to $900 million in
fiscal year 2007--further reductions in first responder funding would
hamper even more each State's efforts to prevent and deal with
potential terrorist attacks.
In fiscal year 2007, State Homeland Security and Law Enforcement
Terrorism grants were funded at $525 million and $375 million,
respectively, for a total of $900 million. Under the current all-State
minimum of 0.75 percent, the base amount States receive is $6.75
million. Based on fiscal year 2007 levels, each State would face a loss
of an estimated $2.7 million, or 40 percent, under the new 0.45 percent
formula, which would be a real blow to our first responders.
And the cuts will be even deeper should the President's budget
request for next year be approved. The President has requested only
$250 million for these two important first responder grant programs.
My colleagues from our largest States--and apparently some small- and
medium-sized States--seem to forget that the terrorist attacks of 9/11
added to the responsibilities and risks of first responders nationwide.
I wrote the current all-State minimum formula as part of the USA
PATRIOT Act
[[Page S3054]]
of 2001 to guarantee that each State receives at least 0.75 percent of
the national allotment to help meet their national domestic security
needs.
Every State--rural or urban, small or large--has basic domestic
security needs and deserves to receive Federal funds under this
partnership to meet both those needs and the new homeland security
responsibilities the Federal Government demands. Of course, high-
density urban areas and high-risk centers have even greater needs,
which is why this year alone we provided $1.3 billion for homeland
security programs for which only a small number of urban areas are
eligible to apply. All of these needs deserve and need to be met. I
have worked hard over the years to help address the needs of larger
States and high-density areas, and I have opposed the Bush
Administration's efforts to pit our States against each other, as they
have tried to mask their efforts to cut overall funding for first
responders.
Smaller States, especially, would never be able to fulfill those
essential duties on top of their daily responsibilities without Federal
support, especially given that DHS is currently suggesting that States
will pay for REAL ID implementation, an estimated $16 billion, with
first responder grants. My colleagues should be warned that if the
minimum drops further--compounded by substantial drops in overall first
responder funding--then small- and medium-sized States will not be able
to meet those Federal mandates for terrorism prevention, preparedness,
and response.
Some from urban States argue that Federal money to fight terrorism is
being sent to areas that do not need it and is ``wasted'' in small
towns. They claim the formula is highly politicized and insists on the
redirection of funds to urban areas that they believe face heightened
threat of terrorist attacks.
What critics of the all-State minimum seem to forget since the
September 11 terrorist attacks, the Federal Government has asked all
State and local first responders to defend us as never before on the
front lines in the war against terrorism. Emergency responders in one
State have been given the same obligation as those in any other State
to provide enhanced protection, preparedness, and response against
terrorists.
The attacks of 9/11 added to the responsibilities and risks of first
responders across the country. In recent years, due to the 0.75 percent
all-State minimum allocation for formula grants that has existed in
law, first responders have received resources to help them meet their
new responsibilities and have made our neighborhoods safer and our
communities better prepared.
There is much left undone in securing our Nation. I hope that the
Senate's conferees will resist calls for further needless reductions to
the all-State minimum base and risk the preparedness efforts in small
States like their own. I trust they will do all they can during
conference negotiations to ensure continued support and resources for
our police, fire, and EMS services in every State if we expect them to
continue protecting us from terrorist or responding to terrorist
attacks, as well as carrying out their ongoing responsibilities in
helping to keep our communities safe and prepared.
Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, now is the time to implement the
unfinished recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
I commend Senators Lieberman and Collins for their leadership and the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee for its
work on this important legislation. More than 5 years after 9/11
despite tens of billions of dollars spent America's ports, rails,
airports, borders, nuclear powerplants and chemical plants still are
not completely safe. It has been more than 2 years since the 9/11
Commission issued its final recommendations, and here we are, today,
still debating the same issues.
This legislation builds upon previous efforts to enhance homeland
security and includes several critical provisions to allocate homeland
security resources based on risk, ensure that first responders have
interoperable communications equipment, and improve government-wide
information sharing.
I especially am pleased to note three provisions included in this
bill that I have championed for some time. This legislation specifies
that States can use Federal grants to design, conduct, and evaluate
mass evacuation plans and exercises. While most cities and States have
evacuation plans, the lack of training drills and exercises makes it
difficult to address problems and work out solutions before lives are
at risk in a real emergency. As we learned from Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, there is no substitute for being prepared. We may only have one
chance to get it right.
In addition, this legislation makes important structural changes to
strengthen the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Again, I
commend Senators Lieberman and Collins for including a broad statutory
mandate and subpoena power for the Board. This bill also would require
Senate confirmation for the chair and the vice-chair of the Board, as
well as mandatory public reporting by the Board and reports for
Congress. These provisions are key to ensuring the integrity of the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Finally, this bill improves intelligence and information sharing
within the Federal Government and with State and local governments. I
am pleased that the bill we consider today would make the program
manager for the Information Sharing Environment, ISE, permanent and
authorize additional funds and staff to accomplish the ISE mission. The
bill also requires additional reports to Congress on the status of ISE
development. These comprehensive new requirements would improve and
strengthen government information sharing structures, which will mean a
more integrated intelligence network and a more secure Nation.
The 9/11 Commission gave Congress a critically important job by
charging us with making structural changes to close the gaps in
America's homeland security defenses. This legislation responds to that
challenge, and I support its final passage.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will be 20
minutes of debate divided between the managers and the leaders.
The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I first want to thank our colleagues
for their cooperation in moving forward this very important piece of
legislation. When the 9/11 Commission completed its report and made its
findings to Congress, the Homeland Security Committee, which I chaired
at the time, worked very hard to produce a major overhaul of our
intelligence community--in fact, the most sweeping changes in more than
50 years.
That legislation, for example, created the Director of National
Intelligence and also established the National Counterterrorism Center,
which brings together analysts from the 15 agencies involved in
intelligence gathering and analysis. We took a major step forward.
Now we are on the verge of finishing the job. I salute the chairman
of the committee, Senator Lieberman, for making this legislation the
top priority of our committee under his chairmanship. The legislation
is going to help implement the unfinished recommendations of the 9/11
Commission. As I said, most of the recommendations were included in the
2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. But there were
some significant ones that were not completed. Thus, this legislation
improves intelligence and information sharing, and it authorizes the
Homeland Security Grant Program, which has been so important in
improving the capabilities of our communities and States which are,
after all, our partners in improving homeland security.
We worked very hard, the chairman and I and the rest of the committee
members, to devise a formula that would be fair to all States, that
would allocate the majority of the funding based on an analysis of
risk, vulnerability, and consequences but also ensure that each and
every State receive a predictable, steady level of funding so that each
State can be improved and have a basic preparedness level.
I think we struck the right balance in that area. This bill would
authorize a bit over $3 billion for each of the next 3 years for this
new Homeland Security Grant Program. Included in that program is an
emphasis on prevention. We
[[Page S3055]]
all are very focused on recovery and response in the event of a
terrorist attack, but we believe it is very important to also focus on
preventing attacks from happening in the first place. Our legislation
would do that by providing that at least 25 percent of the overall
funding for the urban areas and State Homeland Security Grant Programs
must be used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities.
Another important section of this bill creates a program to deal with
communications equipment interoperability. We know that lives were lost
on 9/11 because the various first responders could not communicate with
one another. As a result, firefighters, police officers, and emergency
medical personnel lost their lives and suffered injuries. Much to our
dismay, we also found as part of our investigation into the failed
response to Hurricane Katrina that exactly those same interoperability
problems were occurring in Louisiana, in particular. We simply must
tackle this problem. It is too big a problem and too expensive a
problem for States and communities to do on their own. That is why we
have a partnership, a grant program that would be administered by FEMA
and dedicated to improving the survivability and the interoperability
of communications equipment used by our courageous first responders and
emergency managers.
Again, that program would authorize $3.3 billion over the next 5
years.
The bill also makes a number of important improvements to prevent
terrorists from traveling to our country; to strengthen the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board; to improve private sector
preparedness, since we know that 85 percent of critical infrastructure
is in the private sector; and to improve transportation security
planning and overall security of our transportation system.
It has been a great pleasure to work with the chairman and the
members of our committee, as well as the Commerce Committee and other
Members who have been interested, to bring this bill to the floor, and
I believe it will help make our Nation safer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, first, let me thank my ranking
member, the Senator from Maine. I was thinking, as she was speaking,
that when the transition occurred at the beginning of this 110th
session of Congress I said to her, all that would change in our working
relationship was our title, the title that each of us had. As I look
back on our work together on this bill, S. 4, I am pleased to say that
we worked with the same spirit of cooperation that we did under her
chairmanship in 2004 when we had our first legislative response to the
9/11 Commission and we adopted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist
Prevention Act of 2004. So I thank Senator Collins.
I thank her staff for their work, and I thank my staff as well.
Madam President, I note the presence on the floor of the majority
leader. I thank him for making adoption of this legislation a priority
for this Congress. Here is why. This bill will strengthen our ability
not just to respond to terrorist attacks but also to prepare our
Federal, State, and local governments to respond to natural disasters.
In that sense, S. 4 is not only a response to finish the mission given
us by the 9/11 Commission that learns from the lessons of the first
months of implementation of that Commission report, but it also applies
to lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. We are trying to create an
all-hazards approach in our Government that increases our homeland
security against the threat of a terrorist attack and also prepares our
Government to respond better to natural disasters. I do not want to
repeat some of the points in this legislation that Senator Collins
focused on. I will just pick a few additionally.
One is that S. 4 recognizes that 85 percent of the critical
infrastructure in our country that is potentially a target for
terrorist attack in our great open society is privately owned. For the
first time, we establish a voluntary program where the private sector
can come in and have their facilities certified as, I would use the
term ``terrorist resistant.''
In another section we declassify the bottom line of the intelligence
budget. That was a specific recommendation of the 9/11 Commission in
the interests of transparency and accountability.
We also greatly improve the provisions that in our law and policy are
aimed at disrupting terrorist infiltration of our borders. This bill
requires the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
State to strengthen the security provisions of the so-called visa
waiver program. It also authorizes an electronic travel system that
would require travelers to apply in advance for authorization to visit
the United States, thus allowing their names to be checked against
terrorist watch lists.
I am very proud of the bill we present after almost 2 weeks of debate
to our colleagues in the Senate for final consideration. I know it will
strengthen the homeland security of the American people. It enjoyed
strong nonpartisan support in our committee, coming out with a vote of
16 to 0 with one abstention.
I gather there will be a significant number of ``no'' votes on the
final passage because of one section, and I regret that. I wish our
colleagues would vote favorably because I know they support almost all
of this bill because it is good for the security of the American people
at home.
The one section, obviously, is the one that deals with the collective
bargaining rights of transportation security officers. I sure hope we
can continue to discuss this section: why we think it is fair, why we
are totally convinced its implementation will have no adverse effect on
public safety--no more than the collective bargaining rights of Capitol
Police officers or local firefighters or police officers or members of
the Border Patrol or other law enforcement agencies in the Department
of Homeland Security in any way adversely affects the carrying out of
the duties to protect the American people.
Madam President, I also want to thank the chairman and ranking member
of the Commerce Committee, Senators Inouye and Stevens, for producing
the rail and aviation security portions of this bill, and the chairman
and ranking member of the Banking Committee, Senators Dodd and Shelby,
who contributed important mass transit security provisions.
I would be remiss if I didn't also thank the majority leader, Senator
Reid, for working with all of the committees involved to bring this
comprehensive measure before tbe Senate. We have had 2 weeks of often
spirited debate, and votes on some important amendments. Now, I believe
we are ready to pass this bill, and I look forward to working with my
colleagues to conference this measure with the House, and moving the
legislation onto the President's desk for signature.
September 11, 2001, was a tragedy of unspeakable proportions, and it
is for the men and women who died in the terrorist attacks that we work
to enact this legislation. The attacks changed the course of history
for our Nation and marked our nascent century as a new and dangerous
era. Overnight, we became aware of our vulnerability to an enemy that
doesn't wear uniforms nor follows any traditional laws of combat.
Rather, they move silently among us, probing for weaknesses while
plotting attacks on innocent civilians.
The families of those we lost on 9/11 have worked with us for years
to get the 9/11 Commission recommendations implemented. I must thank
them as well for their steadfast and courageous advocacy often in the
face of seemingly insurmountable odds. They worked with us to pass the
bill that Senator McCain and I introduced to create the 9/11
Commission. They monitored the work of the 9/11 Commission, and
testified before its members. And then they helped us win the fight to
implement the Commission's recommendations in the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.
In January, Senator Collins and I held a hearing on this legislation
and heard from three family members who urged us to complete the job of
enacting and implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. When
we pass this bill today, they will be watching. And they will know that
they had a hand in its success.
Senator Reid made adoption of this legislation a priority for this
Congress. Here is why: This bill will strengthen our ability not just
to respond to terrorist attacks but also to prepare our
[[Page S3056]]
Federal, State, and local governments to better respond to natural
disasters.
We are trying to create an ``all hazards'' approach that increases
our homeland security against the threat of terrorist attack, but also
prepares our government to respond better to natural disasters since it
failed to prepare or respond adequately to Hurricane Katrina.
How do we do this? Let me briefly describe a few of the provisions in
this bill.
First, we would improve information and intelligence sharing among
Federal, State, and local officials. We know that before 9/11,
different agencies had different pieces of information that, had they
been put together, should have aroused suspicion about the attack that
was to come. One of the most important innovations since 9/11 has been
the establishment of fusion centers to share information within and
between States. This legislation would create standards for the fusion
centers, require the Department of Homeland Security to provide support
and coordination, and authorize the assignment of homeland security
intelligence analysts to the fusion centers to serve as conduits for
sharing information. The legislation also encourages the elimination of
the ``need to know'' standard, which allows the information holder in a
given Federal agency to control dissemination, and instead, encourages
a ``need to share'' standard--obviously with appropriate safeguards.
Second, this legislation provides support and resources to first
responders through a balanced and better funded Homeland Security Grant
Program. We would authorize over $3.1 billion for each of the next 3
years for key grants to reverse a precipitous decline in funding for
homeland security over the past 4 years. We believe we have achieved a
balanced proposal that gives the vast majority of the money out based
on risk but still recognizes that risk is an art, not a science, and
terrorists could strike anywhere. In an all-hazards approach, first
responders everywhere need assistance to protect not just against a
potential terrorist attack but also against natural disasters.
Third, we will help first responders attain the interoperable
communications we know they need to save lives. We have known of this
problem for decades, and on 9/11, when fire fighters and police
officers could not communicate with one another inside the World Trade
Center, hundreds of first responders lost their lives. So, we have
created a grant program--authorized at $3.3 billion over 5 years--that
will require States to spend their grant money consistent with their
statewide communications interoperability plans and the National
Emergency Communications Plan. In other words, their spending must be
part of a statewide plan connected to the national plan.
Fourth, this legislation contains provisions to improve our ability
to disrupt terrorist infiltration of our borders. It requires the
Departments of Homeland Security and State to strengthen the security
of the visa waiver program, by requiring better reporting by foreign
countries in the visa waiver program of lost or stolen passports,
requiring countries to share information about prospective visitors who
may pose a threat to the U.S., and authorizing an electronic travel
system that would require travelers to apply in advance for
authorization to visit the U.S., thus allowing their names to be
checked against terrorist watch lists.
Fifth, this bill moves to ensure that as we fight terrorism, we do
not trample on the rights of Americans we are pledged to defend.
Included here are provisions to strengthen the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board by requiring its members to be confirmed by
the Senate and by giving the Board subpoena power through the Attorney
General.
This legislation also includes a provision similar to one I was
pleased to cosponsor in committee with Senator McCaskill that will
ensure Transportation Security Administration screeners--known as
Transportation Security Officers--have the same employment rights as
others in TSA and throughout the Department of Homeland Security. There
is no good reason to deny TSOs these rights. Other law enforcement
officers at Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border
Protection have these rights, with no negative effect on their
performance of their security mission. In fact, Capitol Police also
enjoy these rights and protections. This is simply a question of
equality.
So this is a comprehensive bill. There are many other worthy aspects
that I have not described. But I am convinced that, as a package, if
this legislation passes and becomes law, the American people will be
safer from the consequences of natural disasters, such as Hurricane
Katrina, than they are today. And we will have done everything possible
to make sure no other Americans suffer the loss that so many
experienced after the brutal terrorist attacks of 9/11.
In the preface to the 9/11 Report, Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman
Hamilton wrote, quoting here, ``We hope our report will encourage our
fellow citizens to study, reflect--and act.''
We have studied. We have reflected. Now is the time to act to build a
safer and more secure America for the generations to come.
Finally, I would like to pay tribute to my dedicated and exceptional
staff, who have sacrificed nights, weekends, family time in the name of
a safer America.
I particularly want to thank my Homeland Security Committee staff
director Mike Alexander for his leadership in expertly guiding this
legislation through drafting, markup, floor amendments, and onto final
passage. I also want to thank the committee's deputy chief counsel
Kevin Landy, whose drive and attention to detail resulted in superior
legislation. Thanks also to Eric Anderson, Christian Beckner, Janet
Burrell, Scott Campbell, Troy Cribb, Aaron Firoved, Elyse Greenwald,
Beth Grossman, Seamus Hughes, Holly Idelson, Kristine Lam, Nate Lesser,
Jim Mcgee, Sheila Menz, Larry Novey, Deborah Parkinson, Leslie
Phillips, Alistair Reader, Patricia Rojas, Laurie Rubenstein, Mary Beth
Schultz, Adam Sedgewick, Todd Stein, Donny Williams, Jason Yanussi, and
Wes Young--all on my committee staff. And thanks to Purva Rawal, Vance
Serchuk, and Cherrie Daniels on my personal office staff.
I must also thank Senator Collins' staff director Brandon Milhorn and
the Senator's entire staff for working with us to move this very
important legislation.
But bottom line, thank you to our colleagues, thanks to the 9/11
Commission, thanks to the 9/11 families who have stuck with this
mission to protect the American people from ever having to suffer the
grievous loss they did at the hands of terrorists on 9/11.
I hope our colleagues will join together across party lines to
support this very nonpartisan homeland security measure.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, let me congratulate Chairman
Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins on their Herculean effort on this
legislation. I particularly commend our ranking member, Senator
Collins, for fighting the good fight when there were some reservations
on our side about a major portion of this bill which will compel me to
vote against the bill. I know Senator Collins made every effort to
strip the provision that I and others find so offensive, but
regretfully the provision was not stripped.
In a few minutes the Senate will vote on final passage of Improving
America's Security Act of 2007. It has, as I indicated, some good
features. At its core, it seeks to improve America's security, but on
balance it would also do much to weaken it. I plan to vote against the
bill, and I urge my Senate colleagues to do the same.
But, before I cast my vote, a little background. Many of our
Democratic friends spent last year campaigning on the claim that
Republicans ignored the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We
didn't. Of the Commission's 39 recommendations, we implemented 37. Nor
are the remaining two recommendations at issue today. Both parties
agree they should not be in the bill, so the two provisions that we did
not adopt of the 9/11 Commission, both sides agreed we should not
adopt. So I will oppose this bill on the basis of my answer to a simple
question: Does it weaken America's security or strengthen it? The
answer that I and many of
[[Page S3057]]
my colleagues have come with is, regretfully, the former.
This bill would weaken America's security because of a single
dangerous provision, and that at the insistence of big labor that
Democrats include collective bargaining rights for airport security
screeners, rights that Congress has refused to give them in the past
because of the impact it would have on our ability to react to
terrorist threats.
Congress would not grant screeners collective bargaining rights back
in 2002. We have had this debate before. We had it at the time of the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security--if it has a familiar
ring to it, to many of my colleagues, we chose not to adopt that
provision then, and we hopefully will not, ultimately, this time.
The difference is the Democrats are letting the fight play out. They
are stretching it out based on a political calculation. They already
know how this showdown is going to end. The President threatened to
veto any bill that makes airport security more like the department of
motor vehicles. So they are delaying passage knowing it won't be
accepted, for an applause line down the road.
Republicans tried to inject meaning into this bill to include
provisions that would improve security. For example, we proposed an
amendment that would make it a crime to recruit terrorists, that would
authorize the deportation of suspected terrorists, that would make it
easier to detain dangerous illegal aliens and would increase penalties
for people who cruelly call families of soldiers overseas and falsely
report their loved one has died. But our colleagues on the other side
of the aisle rejected all of those provisions, opting instead to pump
for big labor. They are turning their backs on their own campaign
promises in the process by ignoring a key recommendation of the 9/11
Commission that the United States do everything in its power to
constrain terrorists' mobility.
TSA workers showed that mobility after the United Kingdom bombing
threat in August when they showed up for work that morning at 4 a.m.
and they were briefed on the situation overseas and they immediately
implemented new protocols. Anyone who traveled to or from an American
airport that day would not even have known anything had happened. The
execution was seamless. It was a different story in Great Britain,
where collective bargaining is the norm. Dozens of flights were
canceled while new procedures were instituted. The Democrats know
Americans will not stand for that approach to terrorism in our country,
but they are counting on the President and the Republicans to stop it
for them. That way, they can call us obstructionists and get another
applause line in the bargain and maybe even a headline or two. It is a
shame because there are some good things in the bill, such as new
performance standards and auditing requirements for DHS grants. But we
will let them have their applause line.
Republicans have never played games with national security, and we
are not going to start now. Therefore, I will vote against the bill,
and for the sake of the American people and their continued security, I
would strongly urge my other colleagues to do the same, while saying
once again how much I commend the Senator from Maine for her efforts to
get this bill in the proper form, and there are provisions in the bill
not as a result of any of the efforts of the ranking member of the
committee. I commend her for her efforts but, regretfully, must oppose
final passage.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. REID. Madam President, this should be a time of celebration, not
a time of finger-pointing. In fact, the fact is, it is true that a
number of recommendations the 9/11 Commission recommended we did do.
But, as you know, the Commissioners themselves graded the
administration on what needed to be done to implement the Commission's
recommendations. That is where we get into the Es, Fs, and incompletes.
So there is no question this legislation absolutely is totally
necessary.
Following the terrible attacks on September 11, our country turned to
a respected group of Democrats and Republicans, the 9/11 Commission, an
independent bipartisan Commission, to review the lessons of that tragic
day and to find a better way to protect the homeland fight on the war
on terrorism. Under difficult circumstances, including a lack of
cooperation, in instances, from the White House, the Commission did an
outstanding job.
In July of 2004, it made a number of recommendations to Congress and
the administration about how best to secure America from al-Qaida and
other terrorist groups. Their recommendations were commonsense
solutions. These commonsense solutions were designed to keep America
safe. But, unfortunately, over the last 2\1/2\ years, many of the
Commission's recommendations have been ignored, and too many of our
communities remain dangerously unprepared to prevent or respond to a
terrorist attack.
Today, in a few minutes, the Senate will correct that mistake. We
will enhance the security of our transportation system at our ports. We
will provide America's first responders with the technology they need
to communicate with each other when a Katrina or another terrorist
attack strikes, and we will put new security requirements in place to
keep terrorists from traveling to the United States.
This is an important piece of legislation we are going to pass. We
are going to pass it, as I said, in a short time. I thank Chairman
Lieberman and his ranking member, Senator Collins, for their efforts on
this bill.
I said before this legislation was taken up on the floor that we have
two people who set the example for how you should legislate. They got
along well in their committee. When she was chairman, Senator Lieberman
worked well with her, and it has worked the same way. I commend and
applaud both of these legislators. They have done a tremendous job
trying to work through this issue. Anything that has been slowed down
in this legislation has not been their fault--in fact, quite to the
contrary. They have worked tirelessly to bring this legislation here
today so we can have this vote. They reported a strong bill out of the
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. It has only been
strengthened by the amendment process before the full Senate over the
past several days.
Now, we do not need to redebate the issue regarding collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining has been in this country for a long
time, and it is here to stay. There is nothing in this piece of
legislation that is in any way going to impair the security of this
Nation.
I wish to thank the entire 9/11 Commission for their service, but
especially I wish to thank 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer and the 9/11
family, but especially Carol Ashley, Beverly Eckert, Mary Fetchet, and
Carie Lemack, members of Families of September 11 and VOICES of
September 11th. Their input in this legislation has been essential.
Former Congressman Roemer spent time here on the Senate floor. No one
could ever accuse Congressman Roemer of being some wild-eyed liberal.
He is a moderate, and he is from the State of Indiana. He has worked
very hard on the Commission and to move this legislation forward. I
underline and underscore my appreciation for his input and also for the
families and the two letters they wrote during the debate. Their
letters served as a reminder of what this legislation is about:
protecting America against terrorism. Our country will be safer,
stronger, and more secure as a result of their efforts.
The first responsibility of Government is to protect our people--the
people of Colorado, the people of Nevada, the people of Maine, the
people of Connecticut, Alabama, Nebraska, and Missouri. The Senators
are here assembled, everyone in their seats. Our No. 1 job is to
protect our people. By passing the legislation today, we will help
ensure the Senate meets its obligation, and we will, once and for all,
write the lesson of that terrible September 11 day into law.
In their report to the Nation, the 9/11 Commission wrote, ``The men
and women of the World War II generation rose to the challenges of the
1940s and the 1950s. They restructured the government so it could
protect the country. That is now the job of the generations that
experienced 9/11.''
[[Page S3058]]
That is what the legislation is all about.
Again, I applaud and commend the two managers of the bill, those who
offered amendments and debated the issue. This is good legislation,
good for the country. It makes America a better place. I urge my
colleagues to vote for this legislation so we can take another step to
fulfilling the directives we were given by the 9/11 Commission.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent that a list of the homeland
security staffers on the Republican side who worked so hard on this
bill be printed in the Record at this point.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Brandon Milhorn, Andy Weis, Rob Strayer, Amy Hall, Allison
Boyd, Kate Alford, John Grant, Amanda Wood, Jennifer Tarr,
Asha Mathew, Brooke Hayes, Priscilla Henley, Jane Alonso, Jay
Meroney, Melvin Albritton, Mark LeDuc, Tom Bishop, Doug
Campbell, Emily Meeks, and Neil Cutter.
Ms. COLLINS. I also wish to add my voice in thanks to the families of
the victims of 9/11. They have truly been the committee's inspiration
as we worked on these issues for the last 4 years.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. REID. For the information of all Members, we are working--Senator
McConnell and I--on a consent agreement to deal with the Iraq debate
tomorrow. Hopefully, we will be able to resolve the Iraq debate.
Thursday, we will be able to deal with the U.S. attorneys bill and some
judicial nominees. We do not have that worked out yet, so everyone stay
tuned.
This will be the last vote today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Salazar). The bill having been read the
third time, the question is, Shall it pass?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
Johnson) is necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senator was necessarily absent: the Senator
from Arizona (Mr. McCain).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 60, nays 38, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 73 Leg.]
YEAS--60
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Brown
Byrd
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Clinton
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Dodd
Dole
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Harkin
Inouye
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
McCaskill
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Obama
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Tester
Voinovich
Webb
Whitehouse
Wyden
NAYS--38
Alexander
Allard
Bennett
Brownback
Bunning
Burr
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Domenici
Ensign
Enzi
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Isakson
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McConnell
Roberts
Sessions
Shelby
Sununu
Thomas
Thune
Vitter
Warner
NOT VOTING--2
Johnson
McCain
The bill (S. 4), as amended, was passed, as follows:
(The bill will be printed in a future edition of the Record.)
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MENENDEZ). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask to speak as in morning business
for such time as I might consume, and if there are other Members who
are wondering how long that might be, it wouldn't be probably for more
than 15 minutes at the most.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.
____________________