Congressional Record, Volume 153 Issue 42 (Monday, March 12, 2007)

[Congressional Record Volume 153, Number 42 (Monday, March 12, 2007)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2992-S2996]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

PROGRESS IN IRAQ

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, for weeks, I have been coming to the floor to
discuss the signs of progress we are beginning to see as the military
implements our new strategy in Iraq. Recent developments are
encouraging. They include the following:
First of all, the Iraqi Cabinet approved a national oil compact,
which is the beginning of a resolution of what to do with the revenues
that are produced from the oil that is produced in Iraq. It is a vital
step in ensuring a united Iraq, and Prime Minister Maliki called it a
``gift to all of the Iraqi people.'' This is expected to be approved by
the Iraqi legislature this spring.
Next is the capture recently of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of
al-Qaida in Iraq, the successor to al-Zarqawi, in the western outskirts
of Baghdad. This represents a continuing increase in the number of
terrorist chiefs who have been killed or captured.
Just last week, the Iraqi neighbors meeting was held. It generated a
lot of press because both U.S. and Iranian representatives were
present. It involved all 16 nations involved in the conflict. It was
the neighbors of Iraq, as well as countries such as Great Britain and
the United States. It was the largest meeting of foreign countries in
Iraq since the summit meeting of the Arab League members in March of
1990. There were working groups established to work on various problems
all the countries had--for example, refugees from Iraq who have gone
into Syria or Jordan. A special working group was created to try to
deal with that issue.
This represents a step forward, all of which illustrates the fact
that not only is the new strategy being implemented a military one but
it involves diplomatic and economic and political factors as well.

[[Page S2993]]

It was interesting that the Prime Minister toured Baghdad to
illustrate the security part of the new strategy that is beginning to
work. He had been largely confined to the relatively safe Green Zone,
as it is called, but on Sunday, he was able to go outside the wire to
tour a power station, visit with police, and shake hands with ordinary
Baghdad citizens. He attributed his newfound freedom of movement to the
success of the Baghdad security plan, and he committed to redouble his
efforts, saying: This operation will be accelerated at all levels in
numbers and weaponry; we will not back down.
You have also seen successes in places such as Sadr City, where it is
pretty clear that the Shiite militias have decided to stand down and
not contest the Iraqi and American forces.
In fact, at the conclusion of my remarks, I will have printed in the
Record two newspaper articles. One was written for the Washington Post
on March 11, called ``The `Surge' is Succeeding,'' by Robert Kagan.
While the leaders in Iraq are not yet willing to publicly say the surge
is succeeding, clearly evidence of that is on the ground, and at least
the media--journalists--are entitled to conclude from what is happening
that it is succeeding.
I was in Iraq a couple of weeks ago and was briefed by General
Odierno and General Petraeus, as well as others. They all were
cautiously optimistic that things were looking better on the ground.
They just wanted to caution that there would be good days and bad; that
the enemy has a say in this and they will strike back, certainly, all
they can. And if the administration were to claim too much in the way
of success too early and there was some kind of event that resulted in
a lot of violence, there might be a suggestion that the administration
was trying to put too nice a gloss on it. So the administration is
trying to downplay the successes. But the reality is that there is news
of success.
I think that makes all the more distressing and puzzling the effort
by a lot of our colleagues not only to downplay the potential for
success there but to develop strategies to undercut that success with
resolutions that would micromanage the war from the Senate and, indeed,
bind the hands of our commanders and our military as they begin to
implement this program.
It is hard for me to fathom the amount of time and energy that has
been put into the development of these various resolutions--at last
count, some 17 different resolutions--that would, in one way or
another, criticize the President's plan or try to find some way to stop
it from occurring.
What is further puzzling and distressing is the degree to which this
appears to be resulting from political considerations. Another one of
the pieces I am going to ask to print in the Record is an article from
March 12--that is today's Roll Call magazine--in which leaders on the
Democratic side are quoted as referring to the political aspects of
this strategy to try to get resolutions adopted.
The article talks about the Democratic leader's ``abandoning efforts
at crafting a bipartisan deal'' and ``instead look to directly tie
Republicans to the unpopular conflict. . . .''
The articles goes on to talk about ``the decision to ratchet up their
partisan rhetoric''--``their'' meaning Democratic partisan rhetoric--by
a resolution that sets ``specific dates for a mass redeployment of
troops in Iraq and creating new restrictions on the war effort,'' and,
indeed, that is what the latest resolution of the majority leader would
do.
But the article goes on to talk about this ``more aggressive push to
tar vulnerable Republicans up for re-election in 2008.'' That is not
what we should be all about in debating the war in Iraq and designing
solutions to ensure that war can be resolved successfully. It should
not be about trying to tar vulnerable Members of the opposition party
to diminish their reelection prospects in the year 2008.
The chairman of the Democratic Campaign Committee, the distinguished
senior Senator from New York, has, according to this Roll Call article,
``warned that Democrats would use the issue as a bludgeon on
Republicans up for reelection next year,'' and they quote him as
saying:

The heat on these Republican Senators that are up in '08 is
tremendous.

Adding:

. . . this is a campaign . . . we are going to keep at [it].

To me, that is an illustration of something very wrong with the
Democratic Party's approach to this war. Reasonable people can differ
about whether we should be there and how we should conduct the
operations once there. But we ought to be able to agree that our
responsibility is to provide the funding or to cut it off. The
President's responsibility as Commander in Chief is to do his best to
see that the mission is achieved. That is what we are sending the
troops over there to do. That is what General Petraeus was sent there
to do. He was confirmed unanimously by this body a month or so ago.
When I was in Iraq, General Petraeus told us: Please see to it that
we have what we need to fulfill our mission. Pass the supplemental
appropriations bill to fund our effort and don't tie our hands with
micromanagement from the Senate.
This is the message from the person we sent over to do the job. It
seems to me this would be the wrong time to pull the rug out from under
him and pull the rug out from under the troops just as there are signs
of success, as I discussed earlier.
It is interesting, too, that there seem to be so many different
approaches to this effort to criticize the President and his plan. I
mentioned that at last count there are some 17 different resolutions.
Somebody called it the ``Goldilocks'' strategy, with the Democratic
leader searching for a solution that is neither too hot nor too cold.
The real question is: In the House of Representatives, are they going
to lose people on the left or the right or did they get it just right,
with sufficient numbers of projects in the supplemental appropriations
bill to appeal to those who may not like the end result with respect to
the Iraq part of the resolution?
Some have labeled it a ``slow bleed'' because it appears to be a
solution that doesn't cut off all the funding for the troops at this
moment but, rather, over time makes it impossible for us to succeed.
The resolution, as I understand it, says we have to begin withdrawing
our troops by a specific date and complete the withdrawal by another
specific date. In the past, there has been a fairly good bipartisan
consensus for the proposition that is the worst of all worlds, that you
don't want to set a timetable for withdrawal because it gives the enemy
precisely what they need to calibrate how long they have to hang in
there until you are gone and then they can move in and take over and
fill the vacuum. So it is a bad proposition, even apart from the
political motivation behind it.
It is worth, taking a look at some of the iterations.
We started with S. 2, a nonbinding resolution, that it wasn't in the
national interest of the United States to proceed. That was criticized
as being nonbinding.
Then we move on to S. Con. Res. 7 that expressed disagreement with
the plan. That didn't have sufficient support, so that was replaced by
S. 470, the Levin bill. It expressed disagreement with the strategy but
in a form the President would be forced to veto.
Then we moved on to the Reid-Pelosi proposal, S. 574. Not
surprisingly, this approach had no more support than the others, and so
we then moved on to the Biden-Levin proposal. That bill never even saw
the light of day. It wasn't even debated.
Now we are down to S. J. Res. 9, a nonbinding resolution encouraging
the President to redeploy all, or almost all, of the troops by the end
of 2008. This has been described as a goal, and yet the resolution
itself provides that it is much more than that; that the troops would,
in fact, have to begin being redeployed and be fully redeployed by the
end of March of 2008. I don't think this resolution will pass either
because, as I said, most people agree setting a timetable for
withdrawal is absolutely the worst thing you want to do, even if you
don't agree with the troops being there in the first place.
As I said earlier, the amount of time and effort consumed in trying
to craft the perfect Iraq resolution is difficult to square with all
the other important business we have to do. The majority

[[Page S2994]]

leader, the chairmen of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations
Committees, and other important Members of this body have devoted hours
and hours to making grammatical edits to this legislation, even though
none of it is going to pass.

Frankly, it is a good illustration of why wars should not be
micromanaged by Congress. We are not good at conducting wars. That is
why we have a Commander in Chief, that is why we have a Joint Chiefs of
Staff, that is why we have our military commanders, such as General
Petraeus, in whom we have placed a great deal of confidence, who have
the experience to conduct these kinds of operations.
I daresay, there are not many of us who have the experience of the
distinguished Presiding Officer, and it is important for us not to be
armchair quarterbacks when lives are on the line.
Iraq is perhaps the most critical issue facing our country at the
moment, and my comments are not meant to suggest that Iraq deserves
anything less than a full and fair debate on the floor. It is one
thing, however, to have a debate and let each side make its position
known and then vote on competing proposals. It is quite another to
devote this kind of energy to attempts which appear to be purely
political attempts to undercut the President and undercut the mission
in Iraq.
I believe the President has chosen a course that has the potential
for success. That is why I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks
some of the events which have been reported in the media that
demonstrate early success. I, frankly, urge my colleagues to turn their
energies to find ways to amplify these successes rather than to
undercut them.
It is interesting that Lee Hamilton, the chairman of the Baker-
Hamilton commission, who has been cited many times by Members on both
sides of the aisle, in testimony before the Congress has been insistent
that now that the President has laid out a plan, that strategy should
have a chance to succeed, that we should give it a chance to succeed.
By the way, even though the President at the time did not indicate
what he would be doing specifically, since that report has come out,
several of the recommendations have, in fact, been a part of what the
administration strategy is following. For example, the strategy of
meeting with people in the neighborhood is a followup on one of the
Baker-Hamilton recommendations.
I agree with cochairman Lee Hamilton that we should give the strategy
in Iraq a chance to succeed and not undercut it at the very moment it
appears there are early signs of success with a resolution which, as I
said, there had been a bipartisan consensus for that we shouldn't be
setting a timetable for withdrawal since that simply plays into enemy
hands.
The final document I will ask unanimous consent to be printed in the
Record when I conclude is a piece from the L.A. Times, dated today,
March 12. Headline: ``Do we really need a Gen. Pelosi?'' It refers, of
course, to the distinguished Speaker of the House of Representatives,
who is supporting the plan that has been put forth in the House of
Representatives by the Democratic leadership there. To quote from this
L.A. Times.com piece:

This comes from the Los Angeles Times, no particular friend of this
administration. The Times goes on to say that this kind of
micromanagement ``is the worst kind of congressional meddling in
military strategy.''
They go on to say:

By interfering with the discretion of the commander in
chief and military leaders in order to fulfill domestic
political needs, Congress undermines whatever prospects
remain of a successful outcome.

Then they go on to criticize the Speaker and others for trying ``to
micromanage the conflict . . . with arbitrary timetables and
benchmarks.''
Concluding:

Congress should not hinder Bush's ability to seek the best
possible endgame to this very bad war.

So a paper that does not like the war or support the administration
generally, nevertheless, recognizes it should not be micromanaged from
the Congress; that if there are any possibilities for it to succeed, we
should be following those possibilities.
To sum it up, I simply say this: There is a chance for this strategy
to succeed. We should give it a chance to succeed. Early signs are
positive. We should not try to micromanage the war from the Congress.
Therefore, when these resolutions come before us, we should reject them
and allow our military commanders the opportunity that we have asked
them to engage in to bring a successful conclusion to this war.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the articles to which I
referred be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 11, 2007]

The `Surge' Is Succeeding

(By Robert Kagan)

A front-page story in The Post last week suggested that the
Bush administration has no backup plan in case the surge in
Iraq doesn't work. I wonder if The Post and other newspapers
have a backup plan in case it does.
Leading journalists have been reporting for some time that
the war was hopeless, a fiasco that could not be salvaged by
more troops and a new counterinsurgency strategy. The
conventional wisdom in December held that sending more troops
was politically impossible after the antiwar tenor of the
midterm elections. It was practically impossible because the
extra troops didn't exist. Even if the troops did exist, they
could not make a difference.
Four months later, the once insurmountable political
opposition has been surmounted. The nonexistent troops are
flowing into Iraq. And though it is still early and horrible
acts of violence continue, there is substantial evidence that
the new counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the infusion of
new forces, is having a significant effect.
Some observers are reporting the shift. Iraqi bloggers
Mohammed and Omar Fadhil, widely respected for their straight
talk, say that ``early signs are encouraging.'' The first
impact of the ``surge,'' they write, was psychological. Both
friends and foes in Iraq had been convinced, in no small part
by the American media, that the United States was preparing
to pull out. When the opposite occurred, this alone shifted
the dynamic.
As the Fadhils report, ``Commanders and lieutenants of
various militant groups abandoned their positions in Baghdad
and in some cases fled the country.'' The most prominent
leader to go into hiding has been Moqtada al-Sadr. His Mahdi
Army has been instructed to avoid clashes with American and
Iraqi forces, even as coalition forces begin to establish
themselves in the once off-limits Sadr City.
Before the arrival of Gen. David Petraeus, the Army's
leading counterinsurgency strategist, U.S. forces tended to
raid insurgent and terrorist strongholds and then pull back
and hand over the areas to Iraqi forces, who failed to hold
them. The Fadhils report, ``One difference between this and
earlier--failed--attempts to secure Baghdad is the
willingness of the Iraqi and U.S. governments to commit
enough resources for enough time to make it work.'' In the
past, bursts of American activity were followed by withdrawal
and a return of the insurgents. Now, the plan to secure
Baghdad ``is becoming stricter and gaining momentum by the
day as more troops pour into the city, allowing for a better
implementation of the `clear and hold' strategy.'' Baghdadis
``always want the `hold' part to materialize, and feel safe
when they go out and find the Army and police maintaining
their posts--the bad guys can't intimidate as long as the
troops are staying.''
A greater sense of confidence produces many benefits. The
number of security tips about insurgents that Iraqi civilians
provide has jumped sharply. Stores and marketplaces are
reopening in Baghdad, increasing the sense of community.
People dislocated by sectarian violence are returning to
their homes. As a result, ``many Baghdadis feel hopeful again
about the future, and the fear of civil war is slowly being
replaced by optimism that peace might one day return to this
city,'' the Fadhils report. ``This change in mood is
something huge by itself.''
Apparently some American journalists see the difference.
NBC's Brian Williams recently reported a dramatic change in
Ramadi since his previous visit. The city was safer; the
airport more secure. The new American strategy of'' getting
out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods, grabbing a
toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the
locals--that is having an obvious and palpable effect.'' U.S.
soldiers forged agreements with local religious leaders and
pushed al-Qaeda back--a trend other observers have noted in
some Sunni-dominated areas. The result, Williams said, is
that ``the war has changed.''
It is no coincidence that as the mood and the reality have
shifted, political currents have shifted as well. A national
agreement on sharing oil revenue appears on its way to
approval. The Interior Ministry has been purged of corrupt
officials and of many suspected of torture and brutality. And
cracks

[[Page S2995]]

are appearing in the Shiite governing coalition--a good sign,
given that the rock-solid unity was both the product and
cause of growing sectarian violence.
There is still violence, as Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda
seek to prove that the surge is not working. However, they
are striking at more vulnerable targets in the provinces.
Violence is down in Baghdad. As for Sadr and the Mahdi Army,
it is possible they may reemerge as a problem later. But
trying to wait out the American and Iraqi effort may be
hazardous if the public becomes less tolerant of their
violence. It could not be comforting to Sadr or al-Qaeda to
read in the New York Times that the United States plans to
keep higher force levels in Iraq through at least the
beginning of 2008. The only good news for them would be if
the Bush administration in its infinite wisdom starts to talk
again about drawing down forces.
No one is asking American journalists to start emphasizing
the ``good'' news. All they have to do is report what is
occurring, though it may conflict with their previous
judgments. Some are still selling books based on the premise
that the war is lost, end of story. But what if there is a
new chapter in the story?
____

[From Roll Call, Mar. 12, 2007]

Reid To Attack on Iraq

(By John Stanton and Susan Davis)

With the GOP maintaining a unified front against Democratic
efforts to end the Iraq War, Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid (D-Nev.) and other party leaders are abandoning efforts
at crafting a bipartisan deal on the issue and will instead
look to directly tie Republicans to the unpopular conflict,
senior leadership aides said Friday.
The decision to ratchet up their partisan rhetoric followed
Thursday's announcement of a joint resolution by House and
Senate Democrats setting specific dates for a mass
redeployment of troops in Iraq and creating new restrictions
on the war effort. Reid is expected to bring the resolution
to the floor this week following completion of the 9/11 bill,
aides said.
According to Democratic leadership aides, Reid, Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee Chairman Charles Schumer (N.Y.)
and other party leaders hope that a more aggressive push to
tar vulnerable Republicans up for re-election in 2008 with
the prospect of an open-ended commitment to the war will
force enough defections to pass legislation forcing Bush to
begin bringing the war to an end.
``If they want to follow Bush over the cliff, that's fine
with us,'' one Democratic leadership aide said, adding that
Democrats will continue to push the issue between now and the
2008 elections in the hopes of eventually forcing a change in
the administration or Congressional Republicans.
Saying Democratic Members ``are close to unanimity in both
Houses,'' Schumer accused Republicans of being torn between
``their president who says 'stay the course,' and the
American people who demand change'' and warned that Democrats
would use the issue as a bludgeon on Republicans up for
reelection next year.
``The heat on these Republican Senators that are up in '08
is tremendous,'' Schumer maintained, adding that ``this is a
campaign . . . we are going to keep at'' until Reid has
enough GOP defections to pass a bill.
According to leadership aides, Democrats have thus far
tried to walk a careful line of criticizing GOP opposition to
efforts to end the war while not being so harsh as to
alienate potential GOP allies. But over the past several
weeks ``it's become evident that Republicans have decided to
march in lockstep with the president'' and that, at least at
this point, a bipartisan solution is unlikely.
As a result, Reid, Schumer and other leaders have decided
to pivot to a more confrontational--and partisan--approach
starting this week and will attempt to portray opposition to
the joint resolution as de facto support for Bush's war
plans.
``They have made a politically perilous decision to stand
with the president,'' a Democratic aide said, and Reid will
attempt to use Bush's low poll numbers and public concern
with the war to pressure Republican Members to break ranks.
Senate Republicans, meanwhile, will continue to make the
case that Democrats are in disarray on the war and that any
efforts to bring about an end to the war amount to a
dangerous micromanaging of the war by Congress.
One GOP leadership aide noted that despite early jitters
within the Conference, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-
Ky.) has done an excellent job of keeping his Members
together and in reasserting Republicans' vaunted discipline.
``Part of our strength in this debate has been staying on
message'' and not being dragged in to fights over specific
Democratic proposals or process questions, the aide said.
But despite their successes in recent weeks, McConnell and
other Republicans acknowledge Iraq is a politically perilous
issue for them because of its unpopularity with voters.
In an interview with Roll Call reporters and editors
Friday, McConnell said Democrats appear intent on keeping the
focus on the war, arguing that Democrats' success with the
issue in 2006 has convinced many in the new majority that it
is ``the gift that keeps on giving.''
He also said that Senate Democrats appear intent on making
it a cornerstone of their 2008 campaign strategy. Pointing to
the fact that Democrats have proposed some 17 different Iraq
resolutions or bills since November, McConnell maintained
``the best evidence of that is that they keep moving the goal
post'' on how they want to deal with Iraq.
``Would I like the election to be about something else? You
bet,'' McConnell said, arguing that Republicans would have
much better terrain in a fight over the economy.
``We are the economic engine of the world in many ways''
but that fact has become lost in public concern over Iraq,
McConnell argued. Iraq has ``just put people in a kind of
funky mood,'' he lamented.
But even McConnell--one of the White House's staunchest
supporters on the war--acknowledged that conditions on the
ground must change and that Iraq will need to demonstrate
improvements.
``This is the Iraqis' last chance to get it right. . . .
They need to show they can govern right now. Not next year.
Not this fall. Now. Right now,'' a clearly upset McConnell
said.
Meanwhile, unburdened by having to craft their own policy
on funding the Iraq War, House Republicans appear to be
unified against the supplemental in its current form.
``There is nearly unanimous opposition in the Republican
Conference to any proposal that undermines the troops'
ability to fight and win the war on terror,'' said Brian
Kennedy, a spokesman for Minority Leader John Boehner (R-
Ohio). ``Our Members are committed to sustaining a united
front against anything short of full and unqualified funding
for the troops.''
The House Republican Conference held a special meeting
Friday morning to discuss the spending bill. Multiple Members
and aides in attendance said almost all of the chamber's 201
Republican lawmakers are prepared to take the potentially
risky vote against a war-funding bill.
House Republican leaders are united in opposition, and
Appropriations ranking member Jerry Lewis (R-Calif.) also
told the Conference he would vote against the measure.
Much of the rank and file are looking to veteran Rep. Bill
Young (R-Fla.) for guidance on how to vote. Young is Rep.
John Murtha's (D-Pa.) counterpart on the Appropriations
subcommittee on Defense and the most senior Republican in the
House.
Young told his colleagues Friday that he was--at that
point--prepared to vote against the measure. He said he was
reluctant to vote against any funding bill for the military,
but that the Democratic bill was unacceptable.
However, Young left open the possibility that he could
ultimately support the bill if Democrats remove date specific
provisions on troop withdrawal. That appears unlikely, as
doing so would result in anti-war Democrats voting against
the bill.
Rep. Sam Johnson (R-Texas), a Vietnam War veteran and
former prisoner of war, gave the most stirring speech at
Conference, attendees said. ``He said, `We need to call this
what it is--a piece of crap,' '' recalled a GOP leadership
aide.
House Minority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) was unusually candid
in his whip count last week, stating that he expected all
Republicans who voted against the mid-February Iraq
resolution to oppose the supplemental, ``give or take one or
two.''
There were 17 Republicans who voted with Democrats on that
resolution, and two Democrats who voted with Republicans. Of
those 17 Republicans, several already have indicated they are
likely to oppose the supplemental, including GOP Reps. Tom
Davis (Va.), Mark Kirk (Ill.) and Howard Coble (N.C.), and
GOP leaders are confident they can whittle that number into
the single digits if the underlying bill is not substantially
changed before it hits the House floor.
____

[From the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 12, 2007]

Do we really need a Gen. Pelosi?

After weeks of internal strife, House Democrats have
brought forth their proposal for forcing President Bush to
withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq by 2008. The plan is an unruly
mess: bad public policy, bad precedent and bad politics. If
the legislation passes, Bush says he'll veto it, as well he
should.
It was one thing for the House to pass a nonbinding vote of
disapproval. It's quite another for it to set out a detailed
timetable with specific benchmarks and conditions for the
continuation of the conflict. Imagine if Dwight Eisenhower
had been forced to adhere to a congressional war plan in
scheduling the Normandy landings or if, in 1863, President
Lincoln had been forced by Congress to conclude the Civil War
the following year. This is the worst kind of congressional
meddling in military strategy.
This is not to say that Congress has no constitutional
leverage--only that it should exercise it responsibly. In a
sense, both Bush and the more ardent opponents of the war are
right. If a majority in Congress truly believes that the war
is not in the national interest, then lawmakers should have
the courage of their convictions and vote to stop funding
U.S. involvement. They could cut the final checks in six
months or so to give Bush time to manage the withdrawal. Or
lawmakers could, as some Senate Democrats are proposing,
revoke the authority that Congress gave Bush in 2002 to use
force against Iraq.
But if Congress accepts Bush's argument that there is still
hope, however faint, that

[[Page S2996]]

the U.S. military can be effective in quelling the sectarian
violence, that U.S. economic aid can yet bring about an
improvement in Iraqi lives that won't be bombed away and that
American diplomatic power can be harnessed to pressure
Shiites and Sunnis to make peace--if Congress accepts this,
then lawmakers have a duty to let the president try this
``surge and leverage'' strategy.
By interfering with the discretion of the commander in
chief and military leaders in order to fulfill domestic
political needs, Congress undermines whatever prospects
remain of a successful outcome. It's absurd for House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) to try to micromanage the
conflict, and the evolution of Iraqi society, with arbitrary
timetables and benchmarks.
Congress should not hinder Bush's ability to seek the best
possible endgame to this very bad war. The president needs
the leeway to threaten, or negotiate with, Sunnis and Shiites
and Kurds, Syrians and Iranians and Turks. Congress can find
many ways to express its view that U.S. involvement,
certainly at this level, must not go on indefinitely, but it
must not limit the president's ability to maneuver at this
critical juncture.
Bush's wartime leadership does not inspire much confidence.
But he has made adjustments to his team, and there's little
doubt that a few hundred legislators do not a capable
commander in chief make. These aren't partisan judgments--we
also condemned Republican efforts to micromanage President
Clinton's conduct of military operations in the Balkans.
Members of Congress need to act responsibly, debating the
essence of the choice the United States now faces--to stay or
go--and putting their money where their mouths are. But too
many lives are at stake to allow members of Congress to play
the role of Eisenhower or Lincoln.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

____________________